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J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQ.,

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
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INTRODUCTION.

THE papers contained in this volume relate almost exclusively to the campaigns of 1799 between the forces of the European Powers forming the Third or, as it is sometimes called, the Second Coalition, and those of Republican France. They are a frank revelation of the policy of the British Cabinet, its hopes, fears, projects, efforts and failures, in connexion with the important events crowded into seven months, from the end of March to the end of October, of that year. But as the volume closes while the war was still in progress, and its issue still doubtful, it has seemed better to restrict the Preface to a brief indication of its contents. Another volume bringing the course of affairs down to the peace of Luneville, the Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland, and the fall of Pitt's first ministry, will afford a fitting opportunity of reviewing in their entirety the momentous changes that marked the two last years of the 18th century, and of Lord Grenville's official connexion with Mr. Pitt.

As has been already told in the Introduction to Volume IV., Lord Grenville, early in the year of 1799, sent his brother Thomas as Envoy Extraordinary to Berlin to act as "his other self" in forming an offensive league between Great Britain and the leading monarchies of the Continent, to crush the subverting power of revolution which had its seat at Paris, and restore the systems and landmarks its victories had swept away. Negotiations with these objects in view had already begun. The British Government had made repeated overtures to the Tzar; Austria sought aid against French aggression at St. Petersburg and London. Paul I., Tzar of Russia, had no material interests to serve by waging war against France. But coveting the glory of being everywhere acclaimed as the champion of conservative principles and the saviour of Europe, he yielded to appeals

from the Emperor Francis II. and George III.; and spared no effort not only to bring the King of Prussia into the Coalition, but to strengthen it by reconciling the estranged Governments of Austria and Great Britain. Frederick William III., however, clung tenaciously to the neutral policy adopted by his father in 1795. And Lord Grenville, with Pitt's support, refused to subsidize or enter into concert with Austria, until a financial convention signed in London in 1797 had been ratified at Vienna. The matter in dispute was apparently of little real importance. Austria acknowledged her debt; Great Britain did not ask for immediate repayment. But angry reproaches, wounded pride, mutual resentment and suspicion aroused by diplomatic methods, had magnified what seems to have been little more than a formality into a point of national honour on which neither party would give way. The consequence was that, at the breaking out of war, France found herself confronted by a coalition so loosely constructed as to afford little promise of long life. It was a triple league, of which the Tzar was centre, and connecting link: his allies, the Governments of Austria and Great Britain, forming plans in concert with him but without communication with each other; each intent on pursuing a line of action against the common enemy according most with its particular views and interests.

Lord Grenville, partly in deference to his brother's complaints from Berlin, sent Lord Minto to replace Sir Morton Eden at Vienna, with some expectation of being able to influence Austrian counsels through a stronger minister. But he seems to have much under-rated the danger to the Coalition likely to result from his own antagonism to the Imperial Chancellor Baron Thugut, on whose position and character foreign letters included in the correspondence throw considerable light. Thugut having acquired complete ascendancy over the mind of the Emperor Francis II., exercised absolute control over the armies, as well as the policy of the Austrian Monarchy. Even Archduke Charles the Emperor's brother, and already reputed the ablest Austrian commander since Prince Eugene, seems to have been during this campaign, however unwillingly, a mere

puppet in his hands. And he pursued his plans with a silent and stubborn tenacity which all remonstrance of an unfriendly or interested character only served to harden.

From the very beginning of the war, and even before Russian succours reached the scene of hostilities, the Austrian generals and armies showed decisive superiority over those of France. Archduke Charles defeated General Jourdan at Stockach and drove his army in headlong confusion across the Rhine. Then passing into Switzerland he dislodged Massena from fortified positions which seemed to defy attack. In Italy the Austrian General Kray opened the campaign by a brilliant victory over General Scherer at Magnano. Immediately afterwards Marshal Souvarow entered the field with a body of Russians and assumed supreme command of the allied troops. Marching from triumph to triumph he routed in succession the three French armies of Moreau, McDonald and Joubert, captured the fortresses of Alessandria and Turin, and expelled the French from the entire peninsula with the exception of the city of Genoa and a few positions on the Maritime Alps. These splendid successes changed the face of the political situation, and stimulated the hopes and efforts of all the enemies of France. Even the King of Prussia allowed Count Haugwitz to resume the discussion of a project, proposed earlier in the year by Mr. Granville, of joint intervention in Holland for the restoration of the House of Orange. But the British Government distrusting the king's timidity—and justly, for soon after he suffered the French Directory to entangle him in an elusive negotiation—now framed bolder plans, embracing the same object, but based mainly on the co-operation of the Emperor Paul. These, as unfolded and discussed in Lord Grenville's correspondence with his brother, resolved themselves into three distinct series of military operations: (I.) A joint expedition of British troops and Russians in British pay, to recover Holland and Belgium from France, and restore the Prince of Orange as ruler of the whole Netherlands, or of the Dutch Republic only, as riper knowledge and experience might determine, but on terms exceedingly advantageous to Great Britain. (II.) The assembling in Switzerland of a larger army composed of

Russians, Swiss, Wirtembergers, and Condé's corps of *émigrés*, also in the pay of Great Britain, but under the command of Marshal Souvarow, who had nearly finished his work in Italy. It was proposed that this force, operating in concert with the Austrians under Archduke Charles, should expel Massena from Swiss territory, penetrate into France, and take up winter quarters at Lyons, to serve as a rallying point and support for royalist disaffection, in the eastern and southern Departments. (III.) Later in the year when the Netherlands had been conquered, the landing of a strong body of British and Russian troops in Brittany, to capture and destroy Brest, and aid a Chouan revolt which Georges Cadondal was organizing with funds supplied from the British Treasury.

The first of these enterprises, requiring the co-operation of the Russian Emperor only, moved smoothly forward through all its preparatory stages. Paul granted a contingent of 18,000 troops, and procured from the King of Sweden an offer of 6,000 more, which the British Government declined. The Hereditary Prince of Orange, who had been living at Berlin in constant communication with the adherents of his House in the Dutch Republic, repaired to Lingon. With full powers from his father at Hampton Court, and money furnished by Mr. Grenville, he despatched trustworthy agents to all parts of the Netherlands to rally and organize the Orange party, collect information, and arrange for simultaneous risings when the time for action should have come. Their reports left no doubt of a general desire among people of every shade of opinion to rid themselves of the oppressive yoke of France; of disaffection in the Dutch army and navy; of the reduction of the French garrison to a mere handful of troops; of the hopeful activity of the Orange party, and the discord and deep discouragement of the party in power. To muster the troops, and provide means of transport for them would require many weeks. But neither Lord Grenville nor his brother seems to have entertained a doubt that, should existing conditions hold good for that period, the occupation of the entire Netherlands by a powerful Anglo-Russian force, boldly led, would be rather a triumphal march than an arduous military operation.

The Tzar also readily adopted the British plan of campaign in Switerland, pressed its acceptance at Vienna, and sent a body of Russian troops numbering, at least on paper, 45,000, to Zurich, under the command of General Korsakow. In this plan Austrian co-operation was an essential ingredient. Baron Thugut at first raised no difficulty. Souvarow's victories in Italy had excited to a very high pitch the jealous anger of the Austrian generals under his command. The Marshal, finding his orders disobeyed, his plans thwarted, and his Russian troops, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, reduced to a mere remnant, complained to his sovereign of the slights put on him, and asked to be recalled. His letter and a disposition already shown by the Austrian Government to aggrandize itself in Italy at the expense of the Pope and the King of Sardinia, whom the Russian autocrat had taken under his protection, incensed Paul. Sharp remonstrances from the Russian Chancellor Rostopchin to Count Cobentzl greatly perturbed the Court of Vienna. And in his anxiety, as it would appear, to remove Souvarow from Italy, without any rupture of friendly relations with an imperious ally, Thugut acquiesced in the British plan of campaign. Assured, as he thought, on this point, Lord Grenville sent back Mr. Wickham as British Minister in Switzerland to re-open communications with the Royalists of eastern France, and hasten the enrolment, already begun, of 20,000 Swiss. Later on, he despatched Lord Mulgrave as military commissioner to the Russian head-quarters at Zurich, to bring Suvarow or Korsakow, as the case might be, into concert with the Archduke, and to take command of the Swiss levies; and he held Count d'Artois in readiness to join Souvarow at the opportune moment. Hardly, however, had the Russian Field-marshal been ordered to march into Switzerland, when Baron Thugut began to show his hand. Having been refused a subsidy, and even concert, by the British Cabinet, he seems to have resolved to reserve Austrian armies as much as possible for the accomplishing of Austrian aims, and, where these were not involved, to allow armies subsidized by Great Britain to bear the brunt of the war with France. With this view he had checked

the Archduke's advance in Switzerland, and kept him inactive for two months. On several important points Austrian policy clashed with that of Great Britain. The Court of Vienna had lost all sympathy for the Royalist cause in France. It disliked the French princes, and would not risk a man or a florin to make the Count of Provence Louis XVIII. Neither was it willing to abandon Belgium, which had been for so long a period a possession of the Emperor, and where he still had powerful partizans, to be disposed of as the British Cabinet might determine. Under the pretext that Souvarow's army alone would be strong enough to expel the French from Switzerland, Baron Thugut suddenly announced the intention of withdrawing the Archduke's army to protect Germany against a French attack, recover the fortress of Mayence, and, as Lord Grenville surmised, open the way for an Austrian occupation of the Netherlands. It was in this manner, he declared, that the Emperor could give most effectual support to the movements of his allies. Even if all the other conditions of the British plan had been fully satisfied, this decision must have proved fatal to it, Massena's army having been largely reinforced. But the Swiss recruiting had failed. Owing in a great measure, as Wickham reported, to the faults of British officers employed as commissaries, 2,000 men only out of 20,000 had been enrolled. The Wirtembergers had not arrived. The effective strength of Korsakow's Russian army did not exceed 40,000 men. Lord Mulgrave on reaching Zurich found that military rivalries had already spread from Italy to Switzerland, Austrian and Russian generals being on terms that almost forbade any hope of cordial co-operation. While he laboured to improve their relations, the Archduke, in obedience to orders from the Austrian War Office, moved off to Mayence, leaving General Hotze with an Austrian division in the Grisons, as a link of connexion between Souvarow and Korsakow. Massena, seizing his opportunity, fell with superior force on the armies of Korsakow and Hotze, routed them completely, and sent them flying in wild confusion into Germany. The Archduke hastened back to repair these disasters only to find them irreparable. Souvarow crossed the St. Gothard by

forced marches only to find the Austrian positions and magazines, on which he counted for support, in the hands of the French. He extricated himself from the trap into which he had fallen unawares, by a wonderful retreat over frightful passes, amidst almost incredible hardships and privations, to Coire; and skirting Lake Constance, joined the wreck of Korsakow's army. A letter from Mr. Wickham, dated September 30, describes the earlier incidents of the battle of Zurich, of which he was an eye-witness. Other letters from him of later date, most of which, having been published by his literary executors, are not included in this volume, give accounts of Marshal Souvarow. The eccentricities and occasional roughness of the famous old warrior seem to have shocked Mr. Wickham's sense of propriety, and clouded his judgment.

While reverses thus tarnished the arms of the Coalition in Switzerland the Anglo-Russian expedition made little way in Holland. Sir Ralph Abercromby, with the leading British divisions, after tossing about for a fortnight on the North Sea, beaten off by contrary winds from more eligible points of the Dutch coast, had effected a landing at the Helder towards the end of August. A fleet of Dutch warships in the Texel, on being summoned by Admirall Mitchell, hoisted the Orange flag and surrendered. Dutch soldiers deserted in bands growing larger every day after the arrival of the Hereditary Prince at the Helder. General Brune, the Republican Commander-in-Chief, had as yet under his orders only a small body of French soldiers, the only troops on whom he could count with any confidence. But contrary to the intention of the English ministry Abercromby, although reinforced by 10,000 Russians, remained strictly on the defensive for another fortnight, until the arrival of the Duke of York with other divisions brought up the strength of the invading army to a total of 48,000 men. It had been decided in England that four or five thousand of these should be detached from the main body to aid insurrections in Groningen and Friesland. But this design was not carried out. Nor were six thousand Dutch deserters, who joined the Hereditary Prince, turned to any use, no vessels being available to transport them

across the Zuyder Zee. After the Duke of York's arrival there was another considerable pause for preparation, during which Brune's army continued to grow in strength and in power of vigorous resistance. Then followed nearly three weeks of alternate advance and retreat along a narrow neck of land, resulting in a convention which allowed the Duke to return with the allied troops to England, on conditions which gave it, in Lord Grenville's view at least, too much the character of a capitulation.

Thomas Grenville had left Berlin in the beginning of September to aid the Hereditary Prince of Orange in organizing revolt in the provinces of Groningen and Friesland; and thence proceed to Holland as British Ambassador Extraordinary to take charge of the political objects of the Anglo-Russian expedition. The sudden departure of the Hereditary Prince from Lingen to the Helder partly upset his plans. Want of certain intelligence from England or Holland, owing partly to adverse gales, kept him for many weeks in painful suspense at Hamburg. And contrary winds delayed his passage for some weeks more from Emden to Holland. His letters during this trying period betray the feelings of astonishment and dismay which the dilatory tactics of the British generals seem to have excited in all well-wishers of the expedition. The staunchest friends of the House of Orange in the two provinces most faithful to it, Friesland and Groningen, refused to run any risk so long as the armed aid they had been taught to look for was withheld. Other letters contain passing references to General Brune's activity and decision in turning to account every available means of defence. His resolute energy saved a situation which, in the beginning, had seemed to men of all parties desperate. Mr. Grenville only reached the Helder to learn that the Anglo-Russian army was about to evacuate Holland, and he returned at once to England. In a letter to Mr. Dundas dated October 28, Lord Grenville protested against the ratification of an article of the convention signed in Holland by which the Duke of York conceded the release of some thousands of French prisoners whom he had not taken, as exceeding the powers of a general-in-chief. Dundas, however, as Minister for War,

assumed the responsibility for giving more palatable advice to the King.

When active hostilities ceased at the end of October, 1799, France had lost Italy, but remained mistress of all the Netherlands, and of Switzerland. Internal discord had already brought the Coalition to the verge of disruption. On the other hand, it was very doubtful whether the French Directory, incapable, divided against itself, bankrupt, and representing only a small minority of the French nation, could continue to wage a most unpopular war. The determining fact of the situation, Bonaparte's return to France, was still unknown in England; and for a long time after it became known there, was very imperfectly appreciated.

The Appendix to this volume contains two confidential reports from Mr. Liston, British Minister at Stockholm, of considerable historical interest. They relate to the assassination of Gustavus III., King of Sweden, and the regency of his brother the Duke of Sudermania; and came to light after the publication of the volume to which they belong chronologically.

The present volume, like its predecessors, has been prepared, and the introduction written, by Mr. Walter Fitzpatrick. The Index has been compiled by Mr. A. E. Bland, B.A., of the Public Record Office.

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE,
PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

VOL. V.

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, April 5. Cleveland Row.—“I am vexed to see how long you have remained without hearing from us. You will, however, since have had your table and boxes full of my letters, and I will not add to them to-day except only to say how happy I feel that our ideas have so much agreed, notwithstanding the interruption of plan and time.

“I have perhaps gone one step further than you would have done in the communication made to Vienna of the march of the Russians, but I could not in conscience delay the step; and when taken, I knew Thugut would learn it through Woronzow and Panin, so I thought we might as well take the merit of the communication.”

Copy.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, April 8. Berlin.—“I had originally intended to have deferred the expedition of this messenger a day or two longer, but the important account of the progressive success of the Austrians, and the very judicious proclamation of the Archduke upon his entering the Swiss territory, together with the authentic account, which I am told is taken from the *Vienna Gazette*, of the defeat of the French at Legnano, have determined me to send to you without delay, and to persuade myself that you will easily spare my political reasonings when I sacrifice them to the more speedy communication of such substantial intelligence. You will easily see in all my latter despatches how partial I still continue to be to the plan of the Russian subsidiary army being employed on the *Bas-Rhin*; and I must honestly confess that I still continue to be so, even after reading, in your despatch of the 15th

ultimo to Petersburg, what were the sort of precautions to be recommended, in the case of the Russians acting in Switzerland, to preserve the necessary co-operation, secure the independence of that force, and guard against the chance of its telling in lieu of other force for the benefit of Austria. I own I think that, for objects of military co-operation, such precautions are more likely to create jealousy and embarrassment than to secure the reasonable objects which you wish to obtain by them. In truth I have so much apprehension of this limited co-operation, and of the bad effects it would produce that, though I am, as little as anybody can be, inclined to suffer Austria to profit by her treachery to us, yet if we are to pursue the great object of the war in joint military operations of any description, I should recommend the expediency, nay the absolute necessity, of pursuing that co-operation in the most frank and cordial manner, because no other can be adopted with success; and if their past behaviour makes that cordial and liberal concert impracticable, it is a reason for having nothing to do with them; but I should think limitations and restrictions could never cure that difficulty or do other than defeat the wishes and the efforts of both parties.

"I see by the despatches which were brought to me from you by the last two messengers that you had almost considered my journey to Vienna as being fixed; you know that I will do whatever is thought likely to be useful, but I have considerable doubts, in the first place, whether we had better enter into any detailed concert with Austria; and in the second place, whether more advantage might not be had by my continuing here, at least until all idea of military arrangements respecting Holland should be put aside. Count Panin teaches me to fancy that I might be of more use by keeping up the communications with Petersburg and Austria from hence than I could be in going to either of those places; and he is pleased to suppose that the confidential terms upon which I am put by our Government might enable me to act with more general advantage from hence than from any other spot. I do not, however, see how this could be done without my putting myself more forward than it becomes me to do, and I suspect his opinion upon this subject is founded rather upon his partiality to me and his desire to retain me as long as he can, than from any practicable benefit which any such measure would be likely to produce. For myself, I have no fancy to gratify; I am here because it was thought that I could do good here, and I have no suggestion to make that has any other reference.

"I hope soon to be able to obtain some intelligence from Flanders, and have applied for that purpose to the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange and to Baron Lynden who have sent a trusty and intelligent person into the country. I have likewise accepted the offer of General Stamford to pursue the same object by means of a M. de la Palue, son-in-law to M. Riviere, *ancien envoyé de Saxe*, by whose means, I am told, much may be done with no considerable expense. I have not as yet received from General Stamford any decided recommendation of an officer to command in Portugal, but he is disposed to think that M. de Schwerin might

answer this purpose, and his enquiries are directed towards this object, upon which I shall soon be able to write to you. I do not know that any can be found of talents as good as those which he possesses ; he desires you will make what use you please of his pen, and I send you a very good translation of his of a pamphlet on Prussian neutrality, which has had great effect in this part of Germany."

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, April 9. Berlin.—" Je ne crois pas que le séjour de M. de Lynden ici se prolongera, puisqu'il y est superflu dans les circonstances actuelles.

" Mr. Grenville cependant ne paroissoit pas être sans espérances de réussir en dernière analyse à déterminer cette Cour à prendre part à la coalition, mais ne lui ayant pas parlé de quelque temps, je ne puis dire ce qui en est dans ce moment, mais m'en instruirai un de ces jours. Au reste on travaille maintenant à un plan pour opérer la révolution chez nous sans la Prusse, s'il n'y a pas moyen de faire décider celle-ci à la guerre ; et je fais rassembler des matériaux pour cet objet, afin de pouvoir donner toutes les informations possibles quand le moment sera venu. L'objet de la Belgique ne tient pas moins à cœur à Mr. Grenville que celui de la Hollande, et il m' a prié de lui procurer, à cet égard, tous les renseignemens possibles. C'est aussi pour cela que Ragay s'est rendu de ces cotés pour tâcher de procurer des notions justes. Je crois pouvoir présumer que le propos de Haugwitz, savoir, qu'il ne falloit parler que de la délivrance de la Hollande sans nommer la maison d'Orange, a rapport aux déclarations à faire sur cette matière vis-à-vis des François ; savoir, dans le temps où, devant de leur déclarer la guerre, on leur dicteroit les conditions de la paix ; jusqu'à présent je ne crois pas que les Bataves aient fait des démarches directes pour être reconnus, et les liaisons avec la France étant rompues, ce ne peut non plus être par cette mission.

" Mais l'on parle de l'arrivée de Députés qui viennent pour être reconnus, ou pour demander le consentement à la réunion avec la France ; je parlerai au premier jour sur cette matière avec Haugwitz, qui, au reste, n'a plus à beaucoup près le crédit qu'il a eu, et il paroît que Köckeritz, Beyme, et Mencke sont de plus en plus tout puissants : tous les trois sont pour le système pacifique, mais on assure cependant qu'il y auroit moyen de gagner quelqu'influence sur eux, du moins sur celui qui a le plus d'influence, savoir Beyme. Les dispositions de Mylord Grenville pour notre maison me font un très-grand plaisir, et assurent que le cabinet Britannique travaille toujours en notre faveur."

April 16. Berlin.—" Lynden est réparti, sa présence ici étant superflue. Avant de partir il a parlé avec Haugwitz, qui lui a donné les assurances générales de bonnes dispositions pour la République, mais soumettant la conduite de sa Cour à cet égard aux combinaisons générales ; dans la conversation Lynden lui

demanda si l'on pouvoit se flatter qu'au cas que les événemens permissent de rétablir les choses en Hollande, ou qu'un désespoir général provoquat une révolution, il seroit possible de compter sur l'assistance du Roi, pour empêcher que les François ne s'emparent de nouveau du pays. La réponse fut affirmative dans le cas où une révolution seroit faite, mais Haugwitz recommanda, en même temps, la plus grande prudence pour ne pas exposer tant de fortunes et de vies. Je crois, au reste, que si les succès de l'Archiduc continuent, il sera probable que nous nous aidions nous-mêmes, et d'ailleurs l'on s'occupe d'un projet pour parvenir à délivrer la République quand même le roi resteroit neutre en dernière analyse ; et je doute qu'on détermine la Prusse à agir, puisque les puissances exigent une coopération directement offensive, tandis qu'on ne veut s'y décider que d'après les circonstances ; et, en attendant, on veut être en état de pouvoir agir à tout moment. On en étoit du moins encore là il y a peu de jours, mais j'ignore si depuis l'arrivée des derniers couriers il s'est passé quelque chose de nouveau. Yvoy doit être maintenant à Emerick, d'où il tachera d'avoir des nouvelles de la Belgique. L'affaire de la Hollande et de la Belgique est d'un intérêt majeur à Mr. Grenville, et il ne les sépare presque plus. A moins de grands revers du côté des Impériaux, je ne doute pas que dans le cours de cet été on ne tente quelque chose de ce côté là, et je m'occupe en conséquence à coucher mes idées sur le papier par rapport à ce que nous pourrions faire. Dès que j'aurai formé mon projet, je le communiquerai chez vous et ici à Mr. Grenville. Les dispositions de la Cour de Berlin ne m'affligent pas moins que Mylord Grenville, et, en particulier, que l'on soit parvenu à éloigner si fort le roi de toute idée de guerre.

“Cependant il y a des moyens d'influencer plusieurs des personnes qui ont du crédit. Peut-être qu'en employant les véritables, on réussiroit à changer le système.” *Extract.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, April 10. Berlin.—“In my hurry to send Shaw with his budget of news, I overlooked one or two points to which your private letters have adverted, and I take this opportunity of adding a word or two to supply that deficiency ; and first with regard to Holland and to Count Haugwitz's doubts about naming the Stadtholder in the first efforts to be made in that country. I do not apprehend there is any *finesse* on his part in declaring that opinion, but I presume that his information leads him really to believe that more management is necessary on that point, than is in truth either requisite or advisable ; I should feel much disposed to think with you that this is a mistaken view in point of policy, but it is of a description to be easily corrected in the moment of acting, and as I apprehend no underhand design in this view, I have not, in my private conversations with him, pursued any further that topic of discussion. They certainly feel upon the whole gratified by the liberal arrangements proposed from

England for re-establishing the independence of Holland, and I have found the description of our disposition on this subject very useful to correct the impression which the French industriously labour to establish here, of an overbearing and tyrannical design in Great Britain to engross and monopolize by force the trade and commerce of Europe. This French artifice is most easily traced here upon a variety of topics, and I am assured that they have succeeded in creating a very general belief that the present high price of coffee (which is in as general use in Germany as tea is in England) is entirely owing to that trade being got entirely into the hands of the English. I never hear this quoted without remarking how much it is our wish to see re-established in Europe the only commercial country which in wealth and industry could ever be compared to us; and I observe that wherever our desire of seeing Holland re-established is believed, we have ample credit for a conduct which seems more liberal and disinterested than in general they know how to think sincere on our part. The last news which I have from thence announces rather an ostentatious imprudence on the part of the French in sending all their force towards the *Haut Rhin*; but this is so publicly announced that it is impossible not to suspect some artifice in it, more especially as it is so much their practice to work by the operation of these reports; and it is remarkable enough that, in the same moment, the old project of the union of the *Batavian* provinces to the French Republic is again very much circulated and discussed in Holland.

“My last letters from Sir James Crawford upon our Hamburg project state all the difficulties which he finds, and do not state many resources or assistances; but I regard this the less because it seems to me that in temper and disposition he is naturally more sensible of difficulties than fertile of expedients to remove them; he says the magistrates are frightened at having been questioned by Prussia whether they had desired the assistance of the Emperor of Russia, and that they have expressly disclaimed a wish for any such assistance, but that their fears of offending Russia by this declaration still give him some hold of this subject and the only hold which now remains. I do not feel less anxious than I did as to the ultimate success of an arrangement with Denmark for a combined force on that side either by land or sea; but as that expedition could not succeed for Holland until the main Russian force should have approached to Dusseldorff, all that I now wish is to have that cooperation established; and an arrangement of that nature might be settled by Anstruther so as to be ready when it is wanted without previously challenging the Prussian neutrality, or awakening on that side the defence of the enemy. Meantime a Prussian engineer has been sent to consider of the defence of Cuxhaven, and I understand they mean to send some troops to that neighbourhood; if however I am to give credit to Mr. Harward the agent at Cuxhaven, you have it in contemplation to make Norden your port of passage in future instead of Cuxhaven; at least he tells me that he is ordered to report on this to the Post Office, and I conceive by his

letter that he means to report favourably of such an arrangement. There is little doubt but that in point of facility of communication in winter, and nearer and more direct route to the middle of Germany, Norden would have the advantage; but how far the consideration of its being Prussian instead of Hamburgois is an advantage does not appear to me to be quite so clear; and I have likewise some doubts whether the *money packets* will not be exposed to considerable danger from the small Dutch privateer row-boats which can so easily skulk about those little islands, and shelter themselves on the Dutch side of the *embouchure* of the Ems. Mr. Harward advises me to avail myself at Berlin of a measure so agreeable to the interests of the Prussian monarchy; but before I do so I shall be glad to be better informed, and assured that such a measure will be agreeable to the interests also of the little island that I belong to; pray let me know what are your wishes and opinions in England upon this subject.

"Fauche and his friend have received passports from Petersburg, and are going thither to make the Emperor their plenipotentiary with Louis XVIII, instead of treating with him through the Duc de Fleury; you will already have seen by my letters how much I agree with you, both in the speculations of the whole affair and in the entire disinclination which I have to have anything to do with it. I never can believe Barras to be such a blockhead as to put his life and fortune so entirely in their hands, and I am persuaded that the Paris negotiation is only a bargain of some under intriguer who buys and sells with the name of Barras whatever he can get by it at any market; we shall see what it will be worth at Petersburg. Before however I entirely quit these northern sovereigns let me again return to suggest to you, in one word, the consideration of the combined project between Great Britain, Russia, and Denmark, as offering no inconsiderable guard against the danger which you seem to apprehend of Prussia engaging the last of these powers in questions of naval jealousy and altercation with Great Britain. Surely any project of concert, naval and military, for any expedition in which Prussia had no part, would very much tend to diminish that danger; and on the other hand it should not be forgot that the transferring to Norden the commerce of English passage, is to put into the hands of the Prussian Cabinet additional means of peevish litigation and dispute, if upon such subjects any unpleasant disposition is in the least likely to shew itself at Berlin.

"Since my last declaration to the Prussian Ministers I have sought for no other discussion with them, and wish only to hear from England what your decisions may be as to the employment of the Russian force, and what assistance you think I can give to that, or to any resolution that you may come to upon these subjects. They will certainly feel much embarrassed here at the solitary figure which they will display in the politics of Europe whenever Russia and England shall publicly have taken their ground with Austria, and I have no doubt but that a good deal

of that distrust and dissatisfaction will be shewn here which is the constant result of weak measures, and no bad punishment of the wretched system which has produced them. Of the insufficiency of Count Haugwiz to resist that system and those measures, however he may disapprove of them, I learnt a new and strong proof to-day. In Saxe-Weimar a celebrated professor has published a system of atheism which, when published, was immediately forbidden there, and was denounced at Berlin and Hanover as being a wicked and dangerous publication; in Hanover it is forbidden, in Berlin Haugwiz proposed and urged vehemently the suppressing it; the forms here require however that this question should be submitted to a consistory, who decided in opposition to Haugwiz; and one of the members gave for his reason, that he should be ashamed to believe in a God if he was afraid of any book that could be written to prove that there was no God. This difference of opinion between Haugwiz and the consistory was referred to the King, who decided for the consistory upon *these liberal principles*, and the book is sold publicly in all the streets of Berlin. I mention this matter to you not only as a proof of the incapacity of those who influence the King, but as a strong instance of the insufficiency of Haugwiz, who, vehemently urging another and a wiser opinion, has not firmness enough to give effect to his own sentiments, but submits to worse and weaker counsels on points which he himself believes to be of the greatest danger and importance.

"It has been whispered here these last two days that the disgrace and infamy of the Austrian negotiation with France is not confined to the shameful convention of Rastadt which you see in all the papers, but that there are secret articles of a still more scandalous description; if I procure them I will send them to you, and I have desired Count Panin to endeavour likewise to get them and send them to Woronzow and to you. My Russian friend is under very great apprehension for the turn which things may take at Petersburg if Woronzow should refuse, and I fancy he writes to him by this messenger to tell him his mind upon that subject. I have a letter from Eden of April 3 with a confirmation of the Legnano victory as I sent it to you in my last; but he speaks of Laudohn's having had a check in the Tyrol, before he could join Bellegarde, which however he has done. The freshest news here is a letter from Schaffhausen of 30th, which speaks of the French at that moment evacuating the town on the approach of the Austrians. By Staray's approach, Jourdan is obliged to cross the Rhine. I have no public despatch, but I send to Cuxhaven as there is no messenger to bring me what despatches you may send there; for Shaw's merits in our escape were so great that I could not refuse him permission to go on to England, and therefore I have on this occasion no back-carriage to bring your letters."

Postscript. "I cannot get these secret articles yet, but as they are sent from Radstadt to disgrace the Austrians here, they will soon enough be known; in my mind it is not easy to add to their shame in the book of Radstadt negotiations.

"The Prussian Ministers are ordered to withdraw from Radstadt. We have it whispered here that Zastrow has had a dispute with the King upon military arrangements which has lessened his favour; and Schmettau, who is considered as being *dans les bons principes*, is talked of as advancing in the king's favour; but all these are wretched and little pursuits too minute and of too confined a scale to tell with any advantage upon the great objects which ought to engross the attention and influence the conduct of one of the greatest powers of Europe.

"The Prince of Orange has this moment left me, and has promised great activity among his friends for information from the Low Countries. He has given me an extract from the letter of a man very well informed at Paris, which shews that they seriously have the project of attack upon Hamburgh. Haugwitz does not encourage Baron Lynden with an expectation of early support, but distinctly promised that, if the Republic of Holland could re-establish itself, the King would prevent the French from re-entering Holland. The Prince of Orange's correspondents tell him there [are] not above one thousand French left in the country; if so they might almost do the business themselves. I am impatient to hear from you."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 12. Harley Street.—"Je vous envoie ce que j'ai reçu du Comte de Panin de Berlin, en vous prient de me renvoyer ces incluses dès que vous les aurez lue.

"Je vous demande la faveure de me communiquer ce qu'on vous écrit de Petersbourg, tant sur les mesures qui se prennent pour sauver l'Europe, car je n'ai pas reçu des lettres de Russie par cette poste, et de me communiquer ce que le Chevalier Whitworth vous écrit par à port [rapport] à ce qui me regarde. Il doit en savoir quelque chose, puisque par la poste précédente, Katchoubey m'a écrit du $\frac{5}{16}$ Mars, que la nouvelle de l'invitation que l'Empereur m'a fait s'est répandue par la ville, quoiqu'en expédient le courier, le $\frac{2}{13}$ de Mars, l'Empereur ne l'avoit dit à perssone.

"Comme cette affaire comence à s'ébruiter ici, je dis (et cela est vrai d'après ce que j'ai répondu à l'Empereur) que je vais par congé, et que j'espère de revenir l'été prochain. Je me réjouis avec vous sur la confirmation des victoires de l'Archiduc, et je suis tout à vous pour la vie."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, April 12. Cleveland Row.—"Your despatches and letters of the 8th instant were received this morning. I have not time to answer them officially by this night's mail, nor indeed is there anything in them that much presses, but I would not let the post go without a few lines to you. I am vexed beyond all description to find that so late as the 3rd you had received nothing from me. You will since have seen that I have not

been so negligent as you must have thought me ; but I am still at a loss to conceive how it is possible that my letters (the first I mean) can have been so long in reaching you.

“ The accounts of the Archduke’s successes on the 23rd and 25th, added to those of the 21st which you have sent, have put us all into high spirits, but I have so total a want of confidence in everything Austrian that I look upon all this only as a prelude to some patched up peace that will give to Austria a score of leagues more in Italy or in Germany, and may possibly (but not probably) restore the King of Naples ; but will leave everything else exactly where the war found it. Still even this is one degree better than the immediate subversion of all Germany, which would have followed Jourdan’s success. How Prussia can be so blind to both those dangers is perfectly incomprehensible on any principle of reasoning, and would be astonishing to anyone who had not been doomed to watch the conduct of these great politicians for six years. Oh that I could speak to them as Gustavus Adolphus did when he occupied Berlin, and told them that as they must pay either for being saved or for being ruined, he might as well force them to do the first, as leave them to be forced by Austria to do the second.

“ I am very sorry that you thought it necessary to respect Sir M. Eden’s seal. Pray do not do so any more, whatever reason he may have or not have for putting it. You had no loss. Your bile would have been still more moved to read how he ‘*deplores as hopeless*’ the only thing that he is ordered to do, and how he transcribes into that despatch his transcript of Thugut’s nonsense. I am almost tempted to re-transcribe it, only changing *Prussia* into *Austria* all through, and then send it him back. It is a sore evil, but God knows how it can be remedied, for one would have not only to remove him, but to supply his place, and there are not two *yous* in the world, nor would the one *you* stay there long, after you had seen the impossibility of giving these people one sentiment of honour, honesty, or common sense.

“ You will have seen how, while our letters have been frozen up, or buried in the portmanteau of some lagging messenger more tardy than your friend Fabius Maximus himself, we have been writing the same thing to one another from the two sides of the water. We differ but in one point, and your judgment makes me distrust my own ; but still the more I think of it, the more adverse I am to bring the Russians to the Middle Rhine, where they will fall into the whole chaos of Prussian and Austrian politics, and will infallibly lose their way in that labyrinth, instead of going, as I trust they will, through Switzerland straight on into France, while Lord Hawkesbury’s regiment meets them at the gates of Paris. My heart sunk within me when I read Whitworth’s despatch, which adds to the difficulties, great as I think them, of that plan others absolutely insuperable. There is no part of that frontier on which it would, I conceive, be possible to stir a step without a regular battering train. How are the Russians to bring that with them, or who is to supply it ?

The operation on Holland, either as the Duke of Brunswick proposed it, or by sea, turned that whole defence and took it in the rear. The operation on Switzerland turns it on the other side, and equally brings us behind the fortified line. But the Middle Rhine is the very centre of that defence, where France possesses now all her own iron frontier, and all that was opposed as a barrier against it. Surely then it requires not much more military talents than belongs to a major of yeomanry to see that this is the very worst of all points of attack. Add to this the political labyrinth which I have already mentioned. Add the inconveniency of renewing the system of multiplied and distant attacks, instead of bringing all to bear on one and that the weakest point. Add the impossibility of making any of these Electors and Landgraves stir a step without Prussia, the incurable jealousies which such a project would excite both at Vienna and Berlin, the ten thousand means of intrigues that France would set in motion against it, and fifty other reasons that you would be tired to read of, and surely you will not differ from me in the preference I so decidedly give to the proposition which we have made to Petersburg. All I fear is that they will be *entêtés* with their own project.

"My eyes will let me write no more. Do not forget maps, if there are any at Berlin worth sending." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, Apr. 12. Dublin.—"The Speaker opened last night his long expected attack upon Mr. Pitt and the Union. The first hour was passed in a very laboured and tiresome detail of proofs that the arrangement of 1782 was final and conclusive to all objects and purposes; and for this he read a great collection of addresses, resolutions, speeches. He then went at length into the examination of the commercial question between the two kingdoms, with the most violent, unconnected, and unbounded abuse of Pitt to the utmost extent; and with the most unqualified expressions of 'weak, flimsy, paltry, contemptible, wicked, perfidious, designing, dangerous, ruinous' Minister; and the most inflammatory address to all religions and descriptions to unite against this design, to which he expressly stated Parliament incompetent. He controverted every part of the linen question, and dared Great Britain to commence a war of bounties or of regulations that would leave Ireland at liberty to profit by the natural advantages which she had over England. Extolled the vigour, independence, character, and conduct of the Irish Parliament in *detecting* and *putting* down the rebellion; stated the incompetence of a Legislature or Government sitting in London to meet the difficulties of this moment; warned Ireland against the oppression and neglect that Great Britain had always shewn to Scotland, and even to Wales, since their union; illustrated this by the neglect of the harbour and dock at Milford from local and national jealousy, considerations which he addressed to Cork; and finished with an exhortation to

Ireland to run every risk, and to prefer *any possible evil* to that greatest evil, the Union. He spoke four hours but very ill, and without *Parliamentary effect*; but his friends say that his speech is to be printed, and that the *effect* is to be elsewhere; and I am told that it will be a very *seditionous*, perhaps even a *treasonable* publication. All this proves him to be completely desperate, but I am satisfied that the temper of the country is changed, and that he mixes this acid with the mass in hopes of creating a fermentation where it appears wholly to have subsided. You will be told that it is not wise to press it till next year. I, on the contrary, shall persist in my advice to *do what alone will carry the question*, and then to propose it as soon as may be.

“Adieu; most happy am I in the hopes that this is my last letter to you from this detested scene. I embark on the 17th, and hope to see you as soon as I can get to Stowe.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 16. Harley Street.—“Vous vous souviendrez que quand vous m’avez lue le passage de la dépêche du Chevalier White-worth sur le changement fait à la marche du corp Russe qui, au lieu de s’embarquer dans l’Adriatique pour passer directement à Naples ou en Sicile, devait aller joindre le Maréchal Souwarow, que je vous ai fait observer les grands inconvénients qui doivent en resulter de ce changement de plan. Plus j’ai réfléchi après sur cette affaire et plus ces inconvénients m’on paru graves. J’en ai parlé avec le Marquis de Circello qui en a été aussi très alarmé. J’ai cru de mon devoir de faire quelque observations à l’Empereur sur ce sujet; je vous envoie la copie de ma dépêche en vous prient de me la renvoyer, et en vous suppliant de donner vos ordres au Chevalier Whiteworth d’appuyer, en comun avec le Duc de Seracapirola, les arguments de cette dépêche, pour éviter le mal qui s’en suivra si on ne revient pas chez nous au plan primitif, et à la manière de secourir le Roi de Naples par un débarquement directe dans un de ses deux royaumes.”

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, April 16. Cleveland Row.—“I wrote to you so fully by the last mail that I have little to add to-day to my public despatch. You will readily understand that the only intention of that despatch is to keep you for some time longer where you are, without its being possible to specify any good that you can do precisely in the present moment. But so many different events may alter the present state, or rather it seems so certain that it must be altered in some manner by any course of events, that I should be in despair at seeing you quit *la partie* just now. I cannot help entertaining sanguine hopes that these Austrian successes, if they continue a little longer, will begin to rouse the Prussians, in order that they may come in for their share of the fruits of victory; but although this would not be a very

magnanimous motive of action, I should be well content to take the war, and leave the motive to shift for itself.

"I have however learnt a very curious circumstance which, to a certain extent, I know with certainty to be true. Vander-Goes, the minister of foreign affairs at the Hague, certainly told the Danish Minister there, in confidence, a little more than a fortnight ago, that the French had purchased the neutrality of Prussia at the rate of two millions per month, the first payment of which the Dutch were then taking measures to provide for. Whether Talleyrand has bamboozled the Dutchman, and means to put this money into his own pocket, or whether the Directory makes this a pretence to squeeze more money from their Batavian allies, or whether the Dutch Talleyrand was laughing at the Dane, who is certainly no conjurer, or whether De Luc's magnanimous and virtuous friend really meant that both parties should pay him for doing nothing, I do not pretend to decide. Perhaps you may have some grounds for forming a conjecture on the subject, but you must not mention the intelligence even to Panin.

"Woronzow goes most reluctantly to Petersburg. It is, I really believe, the most sincere *nolo episcopari* that ever was pronounced, but go he must. He has however stipulated that in the first instance he shall go only *par congé*, and that no one shall be named to succeed him. This is not without its inconveniences. Lisakewitz, whom he leaves, is, I believe, a well disposed man, but his opinions can have but little weight at Petersburg." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 17. Harley Street.—"Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour les excellentes nouvelles que vous venez de me donner. Le commencement de cette guerre est si beau, si encourageant pour l'Autriche, et si propre pour décourager et avilir les troupes Françaises, qu'il y a espérer que la continuation et la fin répondront aux brillants succès de cette belle ouverture de campagne; l'ardeur de l'Archiduc ne peut être assés loué. L'entrée des Autrichiens en Suisse est ce qu'il y a de plus heureux; ce sera une brave nation délivrée, et qui, armée contre ses opresseurs, aidera les alliés en s'armant et en se joignent à eux. Le Comte Panin ne m'a rien écrit par cette poste; mais un de nos Ministres qui est auprès de l'Empereur, M. Rostopchin, m'écrit de Petersburg qu'on est très mécontent du Roi de Prusse, et qu'on vient de lui demander une réponse cathégorique. Je voudrois qu'on ne heurta pas trop ce Roi; mais avec de la douceur et de la patience, jointe aux grand succès des Autrichiens, on pourroit peut-etre le déterminer à profiter des désastres des Français, pour netoyer la Holande et les Pays-Bas. Mais, si on le choque, il refusera net, se rapprochera davantage des Français, et une foi jété dans leurs bras, il sera difficile de l'en retirer."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 18. Harley Street.—"Je vous envoie ce que j'ai reçu par votre courier de Berlin. Après avoir lue les incluses,

je vous supplie de me les renvoyer, afin que je puisse répondre demain au Comte Panin. Sur la différence d'opinion par apport au théâtre de la guerre, je demande mille pardons au Général Stamford; mais je trouve que le Secrétaire d'Etat, Lord Grenville, a mieux jugé que le militaire, et que quarante-cinq milles hommes, isolés et entourés de forteresses, ne seront que sacrifiés, et que le même nombre employé en Suisse feront un bien infini, renforceront l'Archiduc, et pénétreront en Franche Comté. L'harmonie parfaite qui régné entre Monsieur votre frère et le Comte Panin me fait un plaisir extrême. Je vous supplie de m'envoyer une copie de la note de Diedrichstein dont le Comte Panin me parle et ne me l'envoi pas, espèrent que je l'aurai de vous."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, April 18. Cleveland Row.—"I am answering to-day two very welcome letters of yours of the 8th and 10th instant, the first of which I received yesterday, the other to-day. The opening of the campaign is really brilliant, and, whatever else may happen, it must be productive of solid and permanent good to shew that these tigers may be resisted by firmness and courage, at land as well as at sea. We are told that the first column of the Russians cannot arrive in Italy till about this time, so that the Austrians will have had to support their position alone for near a month later than our accounts. Craufurd however writes of a further success obtained by Kray on the 30th. I cannot quite discharge from my mind the apprehension that in the middle of all this we shall hear of some Austrian negotiation with France, and yet, if they do lose the present opportunity of saving themselves, they will deserve their fate.

"Since you wrote your private letter, No. 15, you will have seen at full length all my arguments, stated to Sir C. Whitworth, against the project of employing the Russians on the *Bas-Rhin*, and in favour of sending them into Switzerland. I perfectly agree with you that, if they go there, their cooperation with the Austrians must be complete and unlimited; and you will have seen that, since this idea has been decidedly adopted, I have dropt all mention of limitations and restrictions. I never indeed had much more in view than to make Russia require that the Cabinet of Vienna should not, on the arrival of the Russians, weaken the Archduke's present force. But even this is so easily evaded that it seems hardly worth insisting upon it. The Emperor of Russia's notion of letting the same army at the same moment act against France and awe Prussia, is with me a strong confirmation of my former opinion that, in trying both, it will do neither.

"I suspect that the Danes and we are on the very point of quarrelling about illicit trade, and seizures of neutrals, and blockade of Dutch ports. They are fitting out ten sail of the line, which can mean nothing but to alarm us, for half

that number of frigates would, as things now stand, protect their commerce against France, which is the ostensible pretext they use to us, though they do not mean that we should believe it, but the contrary. All further plans about Hamburgh must therefore be pressed upon them from Russia, who may do at Copenhagen whatever she really pleases to do. You will see how much I agree with Panin in thinking that your continuance at Berlin is in the present moment a point of the utmost importance, particularly with this very view of urging Russian cooperations in every quarter. When you do come away it is settled (and announced) that you are to be succeeded by Paget, with whom the Elector of Bavaria has picked a quarrel, evidently in order to pay his court to France. He will stay at Ratisbon or in the environs, but will not go to Berlin till you have left it, which I trust will not be for some time yet.

"I had heard nothing of the project about Norden, but agree much in your speculations concerning it, and will take some steps to check Mr. Harward's zeal.

"Lord William Bentinck goes to the army in Italy. I had kept this nomination back as long as I saw any hopes of operations in Holland, because I thought his name and connexions particularly fitted him for that; but this dream is over, and he goes to learn a little Russian *tactique*. He will set out on Tuesday for Vienna, but I suppose, as things now are, will not pass through Berlin. I will do as you suggest about Lord Talbot. It is curious that while Craufurd writes of nothing but the Hamburgh jealousy of Russia, and desire to abide by Prussian protection exclusively, the Danes, who ought to know better, think that the exact reverse of this picture is the true one. I conclude from it that *Messieurs les Hambourgeois* are not a little afraid of all these great protectors, and I cannot much blame them for it. The Senate have written to me to beg leave to send Napper Tandy and his colleague about their business, but I am adamant.

"Your anecdote about Haugwitz and his master is horrible. If these madmen could but ruin themselves without involving others, who would pity them.

"Woronzow does not refuse, but is quite persuaded that he will not maintain his ground three months, and keeps this mission open that he may return to it.

"God bless you my dearest brother. It would be a vain attempt to describe the satisfaction I have felt from our correspondence, and I beg you to believe that this is not the language only of my affection, for the same opinion is entertained by all who see it. Our master is particularly (and I believe very sincerely) gracious on the subject." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, April 18. Berlin.—"In the last half hour which I had destined to my private letter the Prince of Orange breaks in, and makes it impossible for me to write more than a few lines to you,

The negotiation here is, as you see, with respect to its original object completely at a stop, and I agree with you in thinking that there seems little chance of my being more useful at Vienna than I have been at Berlin. I should therefore naturally have proposed to you to consider of my return, if I did not see that you still attached some idea of advantage to my prolonging my stay here. You will have seen by my former letters that I do not entirely differ with you as to the theory of extending into the Continent, by the confidence which you place in me, something of a more immediate communication with the leading Courts than their distance from London will seem to admit of; but, tempting as this sounds in the advantage which it seems to offer, I fear it must be found entirely impracticable when it is applied to use, for with all that you know and see of the jealousy of resident Ministers as to the interference of those whom they consider as interlopers, I do not see or know how it will be possible for me to keep up that intercourse with any essential effect. My desire however is, as you know, to be useful, and my peculiar desire would certainly be to be useful to you. I have therefore only to say that any arrangement which seems to promise any public service more peculiarly through me, will certainly be cheerfully acquiesced in by me, if it can be made to seem to promise any real benefit.

"Baron Arnfeldt has communicated to me from his correspondent the intelligence which I send in my despatch respecting Flanders; his correspondent is a man of no abilities or talents, but he says is of most perfect veracity. The intelligence from thence seems so important that I have desired General Stamford to send by *estafette* to endeavour to establish means of correspondence through M. de la Palue; and I have told him that fair expenses and gratifications shall be allowed according to a plan delivered for that purpose. Haugwitz's information concerning Brest is through Sandos, from the Spanish Minister at Paris."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 19. Wimbledon.—"The enclosed letter addressed to the Prince of Orange was yesterday put into my hands by the Duke of York. It is too general to make any practical system out of it, but if you think any more defined could be obtained, you may think it right to suggest to the Prince of Orange the propriety of the writer of the letter coming over here that we may [learn] precisely his plan, and the means of accomplishing it to any beneficial extent."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 19. Avington.—"I have this instant seen a letter from a gentleman of property in this county mentioning, as a certain fact, that Lord Bolton is to be appointed Lord Lieutenant, and that *I am not*. I trust there is no authority for this assertion, but as Mr. Pitt has not thought proper to send me one word of answer to my letter to him, I thought it best to apprise

you of this circumstance, and to beg of you to exert yourself as much as you can in my behalf; as I cannot help thinking my pretensions to the full as good as Lord Bolton's, and I must confess I feel not a little hurt at the very cavalier manner in which Mr. Pitt has chosen to treat my application."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, April 20. Dropmore.—"I return the letter you sent me yesterday. Mr. Grenville has already taken, at my desire, some steps in concert with the Hereditary Prince of Orange for sending into Brabant some two or three persons of the description there mentioned. But this is very circuitous and uncertain in its result. The object appears to me so pressing that I think it would be a great pity that so much time should be lost as would be necessary to bring M. de Thuyl from Munster into the Low Countries.

"If the Prince of Orange knows him and has a confidence in his principles, I should think it much better to desire His Serene Highness to write at once to approve of his engaging without delay in this enterprise. It might be necessary for that purpose to remit to him some small sum of money, which either Huskisson or Hammond would easily settle with M. Fagel; and some assurance should be given of further aid, if necessary, to a limited amount."

Postscript. "If he succeeds in getting into the country he should be ordered to use his utmost efforts to open a communication either with England or with Mr. Grenville at Berlin." *Copy.*

"ALEXANDRE" to [H. FAGEL].

1799, April 23. Berlin.—"Je me souviens que vous m'avez demandé un jour de ne point mettre de cérémonie dans mes lettres, et je vous obéis.

"J'ai à la fin pris le parti de sortir de mon affreux exil de Lick, et de me rendre ici, où j'ai le plaisir de voir souvent Robert, qui jouit maintenant d'une très bonne santé. Au moment de mon départ le L[and] Gr[ave] de Hombourg me pria de passer à Francfort où il me remit les *papiers* que je vous envoie. Je m'acquittais ici de ce dont il m'avait chargé; le Pr[ince] Héréditaire d'Orange me conseilla d'en parler à Garlike, qui me transmit de Mr. Grenville la communication qu'il ne pouvait entrer dans aucune de ces idées. Garlike y ajouta comme de lui-même que rien n'empêcherait qu'on ne les communiquât directement au ministère Britannique. Le Landgrave me marqua son désir que cette démarche se fit: comme je ne sais comment y mieux parvenir que par vous, pardonnez-moi la peine que je vous donne de vous en incommoder, et quoique la chose paraisse ne présenter que des impossibilités, je voudrais, vu l'amitié et l'estime que j'ai pour celui qui en est l'auteur, qu'il ne s'imaginât pas qu'il ait des reproches à me faire sur le manque de réussite d'un projet auquel il tient extrêmement par zèle et dévouement pour la bonne cause et nullement par ambition: de quoi la moindre connaissance de son caractère doit persuader

un chacun. Daignez donc me donner une réponse que je puisse lui communiquer, et si c'est par la voie de la poste, veuillez ne le point nommer : ayant des relations et de grands rapprochements de parenté ici, cela pourrait le compromettre désagréablement.

“Je saisis cette occasion avec empressement pour vous assurer que ni des lieux ni le temps n'apportent jamais d'altération à l'attachement inviolable que j'ai voué à tous les intéressants individus qui composent votre famille.”

Enclosure.

Mémoire [by the LANDGRAVE OF HESSE HOMBURG].

“Dans la position actuelle de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe, où les succès des Français menacent le système actuel d'une destruction totale, il paraît qu'il y a encore *un moyen* pour prévenir ce malheur.

1. “Il faudrait au nom de l'Empereur lever et mettre sur pied une armée de 50,000 hommes sur quelque point éloigné, la Bohème par exemple, de manière toute fois que cet enrôlement se fit sans éclat, et simplement sur le pied de mettre les régiments au complet.

2. “Cette armée qui devrait être formée des troupes des Princes ecclésiastiques, des contingents de celles de l'Empire, de recrues de la Suisse et de l'ancienne armée d'Hollande, qu'on pourrait avoir à foison, pourrait être sur pied dans *2 ou 3* mois.

3. “L'Angleterre devrait se charger du paiement. Il serait plus de l'intérêt de cet état, qui déjà a été tant trompé par tous les recrutements partiels qu'il a payé, d'en entreprendre un en grand qui peut-être mettrait fin à la guerre ; il faudrait *3 ou 4* millions de livres sterling.

4. “La destination de l'armée pourrait être à ——— ou comme reserve, de couvrir la grande armée, servir à ses communications, faire des sièges sur ses derrières, remplir les intervalles ; utilité déjà très grande.

6. “Mais elle pourrait en avoir infiniment davantage en étant employée de la manière suivante.

“D'abord on divulgueroit qu'elle est destinée pour l'Italie ; après quoi on la ferait passer pour être prise à la solde des états du nord de l'Empire pour renforcer la ligne de démarcation ; à la suite de quoi, par des marches forcées et sur des chariots autant qu'on le pourrait, elle s'avancerait vers le bas Rhin où elle se dirait payée par l'Angleterre, ferait prendre les armes aux habitantes de la rive gauche du Rhin, tomberait sur les Français qu'elle trouverait, passerait le Meuse, se réunirait aux insurgés des Pays-bas, chasserait tous les Français du Brabant, sur quoi

la révolution en Hollande éclaterait d'elle-même. Dans le même moment 30,000 Anglais débarqueraient en Flandres ; on assiégerait avec la plus grande énergie les places si rapprochées de Condé, Valenciennes, Quenoy, Landrecies et Maubeuge, occasion à laquelle le numéraire devrait ne point être épargné pour tirer parti de toutes les intelligences, complots, et espions ; au cas que cela prit trop de temps on ferait bloquer ces villes par des Anglais et des insurgés. Dans cette même époque *Louis 18* devrait arriver à l'armée. On marcherait droit en avant, et entrerait en France par St. Quentin aussi vite que possible, accompagné d'un *manifeste* par lequel le roi promettrait une *amnistie* plénière (avec la seule clause que ceux qui ont voté la mort du dernier roi devraient quitter la France) et la promesse que les acquéreurs de biens d'émigrés resteroient en possession, avec la réserve que ceux-ci conserveraient le droit de les révéndiquer pour le prix de l'acquisition.

“Pendant ces opérations, les puissances continentales n'auraient autre chose à faire qu'à prendre une attitude menaçante pour tenir les armées ennemies éloignées de l'intérieur de la France.

“Comme il serait impossible de donner dans les détails des magasins, il serait indubitablement nécessaire qu'on ne manquât jamais d'argent pour pouvoir payer tout comptant, même en pays ennemi, et donner l'exemple d'une discipline parfaite.

“Il est de là plus grande probabilité que les peuples de France, voyant paraître leur roi sous de *pareils auspices*, accouriront en foule à lui, et sécoueront le joug de leurs tyrans ; après quoi il ne sera pas difficile de faire la paix générale avec le nouveau roi, s'entendant sur le pied du *statu quo* qui avait lieu en Europe avant la guerre, avec l'exception que la maison d'Autriche garde Vénise, et que celle d'Orange obtienne les Pays-bas.

“Une réflexion importante est que dans toute cette affaire personne ne serait compromise, que si elle devait ne point réussir elle ne nuirait point aux affaires en général, et que, quelque chimérique que peut-être ce plan paraisse au premier abord, il ne faut, à un examen plus mûr, pour son exécution qu'un chef déterminé, de la promptitude, de l'argent, et surtout un *secret impénétrable*.

“Il y a quelqu'un qui offre de se charger de cette entreprise, et de se sacrifier pour son exécution.”

“Il est à remarquer, qu'il s'agit de deux moyens d'employer l'armée, comme réserve, ou comme agissante. Je serai très fâché qu'on adopta le premier, parceque l'utilité en serait nulle ; je serais sans cesse tirailé de tout côté pour des secours, et les choses au fond resteraient au même point.

“*L'essentiel* est qu'on adopte l'autre projet. C'est l'*unique* moyen qui reste de sauver l'Europe, qui tôt ou tard sera engloutie si la République subsiste. Il faut méditer le projet plusieurs fois, avant de le rejeter. Tout risqué qu'il paraît d'abord (quoique personne n'y risque que ceux qui y vont) on trouvera que si tous les points demandés sont remplis dans le moment marqué ; si

l'argent ne manque jamais ; si l'armée marche sous les prétextes allégués ; si on pouvait, outre cela, faire quelque diversion en Hollande ; si les Autrichiens empêchent surtout la rentrée des armées Françaises ; si les Anglais débarquent à point nommé ; si Louis XVIII arrive à l'instant proposé ; s'il publie le manifeste dans les termes projetés ; la vraisemblance de la réussite approche de la certitude.

“Il faudra même dès le commencement que je sois fourni d'une bonne somme d'argent nécessaire, pour quantité de fraix de voyages, d'envoi de courrier ; j'offre de rendre mes comptes à la fin de l'expédition, ou même tous les mois, et j'espère être à l'abri de tout soupçon de motif d'intérêt dans cette affaire.

“Il faudra qu'on me laisse le choix des généraux et de l'état-major, qu'on ne me gêne en rien dans les opérations, qu'on garde le secret le plus impénétrable, et que pour cet effet le moins de personnes possibles soient informées.

“Je désire que le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange fut le premier qui sût la chose, qui donna ses conseils, et voulût bien diriger la négociation.

“Comme je ne voudrais pas que les Cabinets en fussent informés, mais qu'il est absolument nécessaire que ce soit l'Angleterre qui en fasse la proposition, il faut s'ouvrir au Mr. Grenville, ou après son départ à l'ambassadeur Anglais.

“Peut-être que l'envoyé Russe doit aussi le savoir ; ce sera selon que le Prince d'Orange et Lord Grenville décideront.

“Au cas que l'Angleterre ne voulut pas y entrer, peut-être faudrait-il se rabattre sur la Russie. Si, d'après la proposition de l'Angleterre, L'Empereur ne voulait pas qu'on enrôlat en Bohême, il faudrait voir si cela pourrait se faire en Bologne, ou autre part. S'il était possible que mon nom restât caché dans le public pendant quelque temps, cela serait fort à souhaiter pour mon pays et ma famille. Cependant je serais en désespoir si on voulait confier à un autre l'exécution de l'entreprise. Quoique rien ne serait plus aisé que de trouver quelqu'un qui s'en acquitterait mieux comme général, cependant comme le projet vient de moi, personne n'est plus attaché à sa réussite ; tout autre que moi aurait des vues politiques, des jalousies, qui seraient très nuisibles dans cette occasion ; personne n'y serait certainement plus désintéressé que moi, d'autant plus que je compte de périr ou de réussir dans cette entreprise.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 24. Harley Street.—“Ce seroit un grand plaisir pour moi que de pourvoir avoir la satisfaction de passer avec vous, avec my lady, et avec Monsieur Pitt, un jour ou deux à Dropmore, et d'y mener mon fils qui sent avec reconnaissance les bontés que vous avez pour lui et pour son père ; mais il y a un obstacle qui m'empêche de sortir de la ville avant lundi prochain. Vous savez que nous autres de la religion Grèque suivons un autre stil que le votre, et que, pour

la célébration des Paques, nous suivons la décision du Concile de Nicée. Or les pères qui y étoient assemblés étoient plus remplis de sainteté que de la sience d'Hiparque, aussi ont-ils cru que l'équinoxe du printems devoit être éternellement le 10 de Mars; delà, ils ont tellement embrouillés leurs calculs que nos Paques se rencontrent rarement avec les vôtres. C'est dimanche prochain que sera notre Paque, et nous soûmes à présent dans notre semaine sainte, où il y a, matin et soir, des services à notre église, desquels, et par ma place, et come père de famille, il m'est impossible de m'absenter. Vous n'avez donc qu'à fixer tel autre jour qu'il vous plaira, pourvue que ce soit après dimanche prochain. Plus je vois la nécessité indispensable d'aller en Russie, plus je vois celle de causer à fond avec vous et avec Monsieur Pitt sur les affaires. Il y a huit ans que nous n'étions pas d'accord, Monsieur Pitt et moi, et cela a du metre du froid entre nous; mais depuis que nous travaillons dans le même sens, que nos principes en politique sont conformes, je suis un de ses plus zélé admirateurs; et je me flatte qu'il me rend aussi la justice d'être perssuadé que, n'ayant jamais changé d'opinion sur la nécessité d'une union intime entre nos deux pays, que j'ai mis à l'exécution de ce principe le zèle le plus ardent, et qu'aiment ce pays à l'égal de ma propre patrie, je me trouve bien heureux de voir mon désir acompli, grace aux soins que vous et lui vous vous êtes donnés pour l'accomplissement de cette union, qui sera la vraie cause du salut de l'Europe."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, April 24. Berlin.—"It is not the value of the communication which induces me to reserve for my private letter the further discussion of the Paris romance, and the mutual confidences of Louis XVIII. and the *Directeur Barras*, but I send them to you in secret because I have even greater reluctance than you have to agitate these precious questions of French restoration, and to follow the many monks of the day who see in their daily dreams of the French monarchy the millions of *livres* they are to roll in at the end, and will not overlook the English guineas which I presume will be wanting to set them a rolling in the beginning. Stamford's good sense would go far, however, to assist in overcoming these prejudices, if they are such; and I do, as you see, condescend to read something of the discussions which he mixes in (however he dislikes them) because he dislikes the revolution still more, for, as he himself says, '*contre cette maudite révolution il faut pourtant malheureusement se servir de tout.*' I have forgot to ask you what his own situation is, but sure I am that his merits and services are such as entitle him to a better situation than he seems to have to boast of; he is really an invaluable man, whom it is not easy to praise as much as he deserves, but

who appears to me to be better esteemed than he is rewarded. The negotiators are already on their road to Petersburg, and before Fauche went, he communicated a short notice, which I likewise enclose to you, of French *louis d'ors* passing into Ireland in the shape of French claret, and a *signalement* of two suspicious men whose steps I fear are not enough traced, though their features and general description may be.

"You will see that I have latterly been chiefly employed about Holland and Hamburg, and you will perhaps have been more amused with my project of proving to the Emperor that his embargo is an act of kindness, than you will have been satisfied of my success in the suggestion which I have made to Sir Charles Whitworth about it, '*mais dans cette maudite révolution il faut pourtant malheureusement se servir de tout.*' Am I not however fairly entitled, in the barrenness of all my present communications, to question without any super-abundant modesty whether His Majesty's expectation of my important services by a few weeks longer residence is really very likely to be effectually gratified, according to the present political appearance of things upon the Continent? Having offered this impartial question to your consideration, I shall like to hear what can be reasonably replied in answer, or how it can be urged that I can do any good by staying when, as you see, I have really nothing to write to you while I do stay. I believe however that I have got you two or three good maps, and I do assure you whenever I hear of one I do not omit to ask if there are two. I do not believe that I shall have anything to add to the two despatches which I have written to you, unless a conversation which I am endeavouring to have with Haugwiz should be managed before my messenger sets out to catch the packet of Sunday. With him and with the other Ministers I have had very little communication since I found him so entirely set upon the necessity of English subsidy that I could not bring him to discuss any of the great considerations of the establishment of Europe, or to look at any other motive for the possible activity of this great monarchy except the old hackneyed motive of putting 'five pounds into a certain place.'

"The littleness of such a disposition surprised me as much as it disturbed me, for surely, made up as they are here of fears and prejudices upon the north and upon the south of them, a guaranty against any such dangers, and an invitation to make in partnership that general arrangement which may otherwise turn out to be prejudicial to them, was an offer more tempting to the mind of a great statesman than could be found in the very limited measure of pecuniary subsidy; yet to that alone are all their ideas so inseparably attached, that I have not advanced with Haugwiz even in the smallest discussion of any of these great objects of negotiation. It is barely possible that the violent and ungovernable temper of the Emperor of Russia may enough increase their apprehensions here to produce some momentary advance on their part, and for that I am looking."

Postscript. 1799, April 25, Berlin, 12 at noon.

"I have delayed my messenger till the last moment in order to say a few words to you of my conference this morning with Count Haugwiz, which I had been prepared for with great appearance of mystery and importance. The news which they have received of the hostile intentions of Russia towards them has produced the greatest uneasiness here, and though I put the best face that I can upon it, it is impossible for me not to share very much in that uneasiness. No formal notification of the embargo has been as yet made here, but, whenever it is, Count Haugwiz means to apply to England and Denmark for their interference; and I made no scruple of telling him that I had already written to Petersbourg, in the persuasion that the embargo in question was meant only to prevent the return of those ships to Hamburgh till proper measures of defence for that city had been adopted; he fears however, and I wish it may not be with reason, that the French will make this hasty measure a pretence for seizing all the Hamburgh ships in their ports, which amount to a very considerable value. With regard to the orders for a Russian rendezvous at Dantzic, he observes that besides the expression of *division* which he thinks may mean *rupture between the two Courts* instead of *dispersion of the squadron*, he says they cannot receive the Russian fleet at Dantzic or in the *rade* without some previous amicable communication. The first of these doubts as to the word *division* I think I have satisfied him can have no real object; the second I try to make him think will be satisfied by the usual practise in all similar cases. He says that a very large force is assembled near Memel, and that all the Russian officers plainly declare that they are going to war with Prussia, and that Poland already begins to stir in this expectation; that therefore he has been obliged to give orders to resist the Russians if they offer to pass the Memel, and that they mean to remonstrate both about Hamburg and the rendezvous at Dantzick. He is persuaded that the French are at the bottom of this *brouillerie*, and he complains with reason that Chevalier, an actor and the intimate friend of Collot d'Herbois, is protected by the Emperor and received there in a Russian uniform, because his wife is the mistress of Kotizuff the Emperor's favourite; and he thinks he has good reason to believe from the language of Syéyès here, and of Madame de Stahl [Staël] at Geneva, that the French are both active and successful with the influence which they use at Petersburg. He made these communications to me, as he said, at the King's particular desire, who ordered him to speak in the most confidential manner to me upon it, and to express his reliance upon my agreeing with him in endeavouring to divert this great evil. I told him, with proper civilities, that it was scarcely necessary to observe to him how strongly it was the interest of Great Britain to prevent such an unfortunate breach as that which he feared, and I assured him that I should think myself bound to use every endeavour in my power to prevent it. I persuaded him to put their representation about Hamburgh into the hands of Panin rather than their own

minister, and induced him as much as I could to regard this business as a French stratagem to defeat the confederacy which they fear. I again suggested to him that complete concert between the great Courts was the only solid security against these doubts and jealousies so artfully circulated by the enemy, and when I reproached him with not having pursued the last idea which I had suggested of concert for eventual offence, combined with previous arrangements between the great powers, he said he had only put it by in the hopes of still leading the King to immediate and decisive measures, but that he was ready to pursue that object with me whenever I pleased. They are upon the whole alarmed to a great degree, and Haugwiz fears that the rupture will not be prevented; but he puts his best hopes in us upon this subject, and properly enough, for I do think no such entire ruin could in any other way be produced as would result now from war between Prussia and Russia. The messenger will be too late if I proceed, and my remarks are scarce worth an extra packet."

Two enclosures.

Enclosure 1.

Rapport sur une négociation relative au rétablissement de la monarchie en France.

"Sa Majesté Louis XVIII. a nommé pour son agent auprès des personnes qui voudroient concourir au rétablissement de la monarchie, un homme qu'aucun obstacle n'a rebuté, et dont le zèle ardent mais circonspect s'est attiré les plus grands éloges. Une dernière lettre de la main de S[a] M[ajesté] ne laisse aucun doute sur l'étendu de la confiance que mérite cet agent.

"D'ailleurs il est de fait que c'est à lui qu'est due l'ouverture et la négociation du plus grand plan qui ait été conçu dans cet objet, celui dont l'effet fut interrompu au 18 fructidor par le Directoire.

"A cette époque même cet agent étoit à Paris. Les placards qui dénonçoient la confédération l'en désignèrent nomément comme premier instigateur.

"Cet agent actif, embarrassé d'abord de pourvoir à la sûreté de sa personne, ensuite réfugié, reçu avec amitié chez un franc et loyal monarchiste, s'occupe de préparer un nouveau mouvement.

"Il étoit porteur d'un billet du Roi conçu en ces termes, *confiance au porteur du présent billet*; suivent la date et la signature.

"Il s'autorisa de cette lettre de créance, dont il s'étoit autorisé vingt fois, et il parvint à déterminer celui auquel il devoit son azile et sa vie à tenter des ouvertures auprès de Joseph, l'un du Directoire.

"Alexandre, c'est le nom de celui qui a sauvé l'agent du Roi, Alexandre avoit des rapports avec le secrétaire intime du Directeur. C'est par ce secrétaire qu'il est parvenu à avoir des explications précises avec le Directeur lui-même.

“Ce dernier se chargera de faire un mouvement et de rétablir la monarchie à condition qu'on lui donnera sûreté et indemnité. 'Il n'impose aucune limitation à l'autorité monarchique.' ”

“Ces premières données ont été transmises par lettre à l'agent du Roi après sa sortie de France. Alexandre demanda en même tems qu'on lui fit passer un pouvoir, à l'aide duquel il peut justifier la mission qu'il avoit commencé de remplir. Il observa que la demande lui en étoit faite à lui-même, et qu'il ne pouvoit s'y refuser sans danger pour l'affaire.

“L'agent du Roi récrivit à Alexandre pour lui confirmer les intentions de S[a] M[ajesté] en l'invitant à faire un voyage à Hambourg où il combinerait et recevrait le pouvoir demandé.

“Le voyage entreprit et fait devint inutile, parceque l'agent du Roi avoit été appelé à Londres par une affaire pressante et majeure.

“Mais au lieu même du rendezvous se rencontra Dubois, l'ami, l'associé, le chargé des affaires de cet agent. Il avoit ordre d'accueillir tout étranger qui auroit quelque rapport au Roi. Au nom d'Alexandre il reconnoit celui qui est chargé au nom d'un Directeur de provoquer un mouvement monarchiste. Il se charge lui-même d'annoncer au Roi d'une part, et à son agent de l'autre, cette arrivée venue à contretems. Il est arrêté que le voyage se fera de nouveau, et qu'on préparera dans l'intervalle les pouvoirs demandés.

“Dubois n'obtint point de communication plus intime de l'affaire, parcequ'on la supposoit entendue par le Roi et par son agent. Il écrivit donc dans le sens qu'il pouvoit l'entendre.

“Le Roi, par une lettre écrite de sa main, témoigna la plus grande bienveillance à son agent et à Dubois, et leur annonça le pouvoir demandé.

“Alexandre avoit déjà fait présenter deux choses, la première que la communication du projet à quelques puissances devenoit indispensable ; la seconde que la nature et les termes des pouvoirs ne pouvoient guères se concerter que dans le Cabinet du Roi ; il avoit ajouté à cela une troisième observation, c'est que l'agent du Roi dont il avoit reçu les ordres, et l'ami de cet agent qui l'avoit un moment remplacé, l'accompagneroient auprès du Roi pour faciliter les ouvertures, et réciter eux-mêmes ce qui leur étoit personnel dans la négociation.

“L'agent de S[a] M[ajesté] et son ami Dubois, ayant participé ces dernières ouvertures par leurs correspondances à la Cour de Mittau, reçurent une lettre de M. de St. Priest qui les blamoit de toute communication faite avant que d'y être autorisés, rendoit leur voyage avec Alexandre incertain, déclaroit qu'une affaire de cette importance devoit sortir de leur main, et qu'on devoit à Mittau seulement juger de l'à propos et du moment.

“A l'arrivée d'Alexandre cette lettre lui fut prudemment cachée par Dubois et par l'agent de S[a] M[ajesté]. Elle eut entraîné des explications, et peut-être des ruptures.

“A cette arrivée Alexandre vit M. le Duc de Fleury, qu'on lui dit chargé des pouvoirs du Roi.

“ Ces pouvoirs communiqués se trouverent destinés, non pas à être remis dans les mains d’Alexandre pour justifier sa qualité d’envoyé du Roi auprès du Directeur, mais à rester dans les mains de M. le Duc de Fleury, et l’autoriser de prendre le titre d’envoyé du Roi.

“ Ce mal-entendu se seroit expliqué s’il n’avoit tenu à un préjugé qui repoussoit toute confiance. M. de Fleury n’a cessé de voir dans Alexandre un démocrate qui venoit au nom d’un Directeur imposer des conditions à la restitution du trône, et couvrir les excès d’une conduite blamable. Quelques douceurs que M. de Fleury ait pu mettre dans ses insinuations, elles ont eu un mauvais effet. Elles ont donné de l’amertume à Alexandre, qui se dit à bon droit l’un des plus constants et des plus fidèles sujets de S[a] M[ajesté]. Elles l’ont décidé à ne prendre point le titre de fondé des pouvoirs du Directeur.

“ Alexandre s’est résolu d’aller lui-même présenter ses hommages respectueux et ses explications à Mittau.

“ Il en a été empêché par M. de Fleury, qui a déclaré qu’il mettroit obstacle à toute délivrance de passeport.

“ On doit dire que M. de Fleury y a consenti cependant, mais qu’il y a mis une condition qui a détruit l’effet de son consentement.

“ La condition étoit qu’Alexandre déclareroit et donneroit parole qu’il emportoit avec lui un blanc seing du Directeur, qui lui tenoit lieu de pouvoir. Alexandre avoit fait insinuer qu’il seroit muni du blanc seing, mais qu’il avoit ordre de pourvoir à la sûreté de ce titre indéfini par tous les moyens possibles ; qu’on devoit lui laisser une grande latitude pour la disposition de ce titre en cas d’accidents ; que les conditions qu’on lui présentait étoient senties ; mais qu’on ne devoit point y insister, qu’il falloit laisser à son jugement la disposition libre de ce titre ; sauf à le réclamer lors de la conclusion à Mittau.

“ M. le Duc de Fleury n’ayant point voulu entendre à ces insinuations, Alexandre se disposa à faire son rapport, et déclara qu’il l’enverroit à Mittau par l’agent du Roi avec lequel il avoit traité.

“ M. de Fleury rompit les conférences avec une telle impétuosité, qu’il refusa de se charger du témoignage de respect et de dévouement d’Alexandre auprès de S[a] M[ajesté].

“ C’est après cette rupture qu’Alexandre a été informé de la lettre de M. de St. Priest, par laquelle il blâme toute déclaration à des Ministres de Cours étrangères, interdit le voyage à Mittau, et réserve au Roi seul de décider l’à propos des communications et des mouvemens.

“ Sans doute qu’Alexandre a rendu justice à M. de St. Priest en se persuadant qu’il y avoit dans sa lettre quelque erreur, quelque omission involontaire. Car il est sensible qu’on ne peut dans une affaire de ce genre, dont l’exécution n’a que six mois de délai ultérieur, attendre que l’à propos soit décidé à six cents lieues du théâtre où doit se passer l’action.

Il n'est pas possible non plus que celui qui est chargé du mouvement éprouve des entraves pour les voyages et les déclarations qu'il croira nécessaires.

“La seule mesure qu'Alexandre croit utile, c'est de déclarer aux Ministres, et par eux au monarque magnanime dont ce projet fixera l'attention, qu'il n'entre point dans les vues de celui qui a fait les ouvertures auprès du Directeur, ni dans celle du Directeur lui-même, de pénétrer le secret des autres opérations de même genre, ni de toutes autres négociations diplomatiques. Ils livrent avec confiance leur secret, et ne demandent point à connoître celui des Cabinets.

“Pour abrégér toute explication, Alexandre a rédigé, d'après ses instructions, la formule des actes qui vont déterminer l'exécution du plan.

“Il demande à S[a] M[ajesté] Louis XVIII des lettres patentes, qui, en menageant la dignité du monarque, assure à Joseph sa sûreté, ses propriétés, et la bienveillance de S[a] M[ajesté].

“Sans doute que Louis XVIII ne peut sans secours de quelque puissance fournir aux fraix d'une telle opération.

“On ne peut aussi avoir le projet de ramener Louis XVIII vers son trône sans en faire la déclaration à l'Empereur des Russies, dont il a été accueilli avec magnanimité. C'est à ce généreux ami d'un roi dans l'infortune qu'Alexandre voudroit faire parvenir ses vœux, le tableau de ses efforts, et l'aperçu de ses moyens. On y verra peut-être la très grande possibilité du succès.

Quelques vues sur l'exécution.

“Je n'examinerai point quelles causes ont fait avorter les tentatives qu'on a fait jusqu'à ce jour pour le rétablissement de la monarchie en France, mais j'indiquerai les caractères indispensables que doivent avoir les projets de même genre, pour que l'on puisse s'en promettre quelques succès.

“L'espoir de rétablir la monarchie est fondée sur l'attachement général des François à leur ancienne constitution. Il trouve un puissant appui dans le mécontentement général qu'occasionne l'oppression du gouvernement actuel.

“On a pu croire d'abord que les vrais zélateurs de la monarchie, excités par tous les moyens possibles, et réunis à la foule des mécontents, détermineroient par la force de l'opinion un retour à l'ancien état. On s'est convaincu depuis que les zélateurs les plus ardents n'ont pas une action suffisante, qu'ils sont difficiles à diriger, et que le concours des mécontents ne coïncide pas au même but, ce qui forme une diversion aussi dangereuse dans le succès que dans les revers.

“Tout ce que l'expérience dans ces essais a produit d'avantageux pour la cause de la monarchie, c'est qu'on apprit que l'esprit général en France est porté vers l'état monarchique. Il est impuissant pour rétablir cet état, mais si l'on y parvient, il est prêt à éclater pour y donner son assentiment. On doit observer d'autre part que le développement de cet esprit, s'il précède

l'état monarchique, ne peut qu'augmenter les difficultés de rétablir le trône ; puisque c'est un puissant avertissement aux usurpateurs de l'autorité. Je vois dans cette prématuration la cause qui a renversé jusqu'à ce jour tous les projets monarchistes.

“ La première condition pour le rétablissement du trône est dans le silence de l'opinion. Il suivra de ce principe que le peuple restera étranger au mouvement, et que le remplacement du trône sera fixe et d'un coup de main. Sans doute pour le succès d'un tel mouvement, il faut le concours de quelque chef puissant. Sans doute encore il faut des agens qui forment avec ce chef une confédération. A cette confédération enfin sont nécessaires tous les moyens possibles de sûreté et d'action.

“ Tout ce qu'on pourra dire sur un plan de cette espèce se réduit à ce mot. Il faut un chef qui *puisse* et qui *sache* former sa confédération ; carte blanche—voilà son pouvoir.

“ Quel obstacle peut éprouver le rétablissement du trône en France ?

“ L'opinion publique est prête en tous tems à le réclamer, encore mieux à le recevoir. Le Corps Législatif est d'une nullité absolu, reste le Directoire et les armées. Des cinq Directeurs, si l'un devient le chef du projet, il ne reste à écarter que ses quatre collègues. Paralyser l'action de quatre individus, les éloigner, les séparer, rendre physiquement impossible leurs délibérations, n'est pas une tentative hors de la portée de l'un des Directeurs. C'est la seule chose nécessaire pour proclamer sans contradiction le rétablissement de la Monarchie.

“ Les armées, quand elles ne recevront point d'ordres, seront immobiles. Une armée, gagnée et influencée, donnera son assentiment, les autres suivront l'exemple.

“ Pour déterminer l'attitude des armées on les désorganisera en destituant les chefs et officiers. On nommera soudain, mais par un autre acte, quelques chefs convenus desquels on sera sûr, avec pouvoir de replacer tous les autres dans leur grade, à la change du serment de fidélité.

“ L'administration de l'intérieur ne souffrira pas de suspension si l'on employe à changer ses rapports les moyens indiqués pour l'armée.

“ Je ne prétends point que les mouvemens indiqués s'opèrent avec la facilité la plus grande, j'y suppose au contraire beaucoup d'obstacles. Tout projet a les siens, mais plus la confédération sera resserrée, plus son action deviendra rapide ; les accidens seront moindre et les secours plus puissans.”

Lettres patentes du Roi, portant nomination de Commissaire pour le rétablissement de la monarchie, données à M. . . .

“ Louis par la Grace de Dieu Roi de France et de Navarre, à tous ceux qui ces présentes verront, salut.

“ Appelé par notre naissance et par l'ancienne constitution de l'état à nous imposer le fardeau du gouvernement François ; persuadé que le premier et le plus essentiel devoir qui nous est commandé à ce titre est celui de rétablir le bonheur de nos peuples

en mettant un terme à la succession de calamités qui leurs est ouverte depuis les principes de la Révolution ; prévenus que nos bons et fidèles sujets, qui forment la presque totalité des habitans de notre royaume, n'attendent que la déclaration de notre ferme et stable volonté pour concourir avec nous à cet important objet ; Nous, de l'avis de notre conseil, et de notre certaine science, légitime puissance, et autorité royale, voulons, et nous plait, disons, déclarons, et ordonnons ce qui suit.

Art. 1°. “ Dans le délai de six mois à compter de ce jour, le rétablissement de la monarchie sera proclamée en notre nom dans toute l'étendue du territoire François compris entre ses limites reconnues avant l'ouverture de la guerre actuelle.

Art. 2°. “ La même proclamation sera étendue au territoire qui se trouvera lors occupé par les armées ou par les autorités Françaises, sans tenir à conséquence, et sans préjudicier aux anciens traités du royaume.

Art. 3°. “ Nommons pour notre commissaire spécial à l'effet de préparer, exécuter, et maintenir la susdite proclamation par tous moyens convenables, et qui seront à sa disposition, Notre très cher et féal

. auquel nous donnons par ces présentes tout pouvoir à l'effet ci-dessus, même de nommer et s'adjoindre tel nombre d'autres commissaires qu'il jugera convenable, et de ne suivre dans le mouvement ordonné que ce qu'il croira conforme à la raison de l'état. Les dits commissaires adjoints seront tenus de faire enregistrer leur brevet de nomination dans le délai de trois jours à peine de nullité.

Art. 4. “ Nous mettons à la disposition de notre commissaire spécial la somme de 1,500,000 livres, à prendre sur les caisses qui lui seront indiquées lors de la remise des présentes en ses mains ; et ce pour les frais du mouvement.

Art. 5. “ Après la proclamation faite de nostre autorité dans toute l'étendue de notre royaume ou dans partie d' défendons à tous juges, cours de justice, et autres autorités quelconques de prendre, sous aucun prétexte et dans aucun cas, connoissance des faits qui ont précédé depuis l'origine de la révolution, qui précéderont ou accompagneront le rétablissement ci-dessus ordonné de notre monarchie, en tant que les dits faits seroient directement ou indirectement relatifs à notre dit commissaire spécial, ou aux autres commissaires qu'il se sera adjoint ; déclarons celui ou ceux qui voudroient en prendre connoissance, ennemis de notre personne sacrée ; ordonnons, le cas y échéant, qu'ils soyent poursuivis comme coupables de haute trahison et de lèse-majesté.

Art. 6. “ Engageons notre autorité et parole royale à maintenir pour toujours et en tout lieu de notre obéissance la sûreté, la liberté, et la tranquillité de notre dit commissaire spécial et de ses commissaires adjoints ; même d'employer efficacement notre puissance et médiation s'il y a lieu pour leur sûreté et liberté en pays étranger.

Art. 7. “ De même manière garantissons à notre commissaire spécial et à ses commissaires adjoints l'entière liberté et immunité

des droits et des biens par eux acquis ou possédés dans l'étendue de notre royaume et pais actuellement occupés par les Francois, encore qu'il en fut autrement ordonné par les loix anciennes, ou par les loix à venir auxquelles il est expressément dérogé par ces présentes, renonçant expressément à ceux des dits biens et droits qui serroient dépendans de nos domaines, et nous portant fort pour la cession de tous autres si le cas requiert.

Aug. 8. "Voulant donner en outre à notre dit commissaire spécial et à ses commissaires adjoints un témoignage particulier de notre satisfaction et bienveillance, ordonnons que dans un mois au plus tard du rétablissement de la monarchie proclamée dans notre ville de Paris par le sus-dit commissaire spécial, il lui sera payé à la présentation des présentes, sur sa simple quittance, et sans autre ordonnance, controle, ni visa, à titre d'indemnité personnelle la somme de - - - - 10,000,000 livres,

et pour répartir à ses co-opérateurs, ce que nous confions entièrement à son jugement et honneur, une autre somme de - - - - 2,000,000 livres,

ce qui fait en total la somme de - - - - 12,000,000 livres.

Art. 9. "La somme totale ci-dessus sera payée en espèces sonnantes et au titre actuel, par notre trésorier principal sur les fonds destinés à notre personnel; la perception ou le recouvrement en seront exercés concurremment sur toutes les caisses de l'ordinaire et de l'extraordinaire de nos finances, et par privilège à tout autre paiement.

Art. 10. "Les présentes ne seront sujettes à aucune sorte d'enrégistrement, et non obstant, vaudront comme déclaration et ordonnance relatifs aux besoins de notre personne."

"Le commissaire spéciale répondra qu'il reçoit les lettres patentes de S[a] M[ajesté] en date du . . ., qu'il accepte la commission spéciale qui lui est donnée. Il témoignera sa reconnaissance pour tous les autres de bienveillance dont il est l'objet."

Copie de la lettre de David, adressée le 7 Mars au Roi à Mittau, et remise à M. le Comte de Panin.

"Votre agent confidentiel Louis Fauche Borel, porteur d'un billet écrit et signé de la main de V[otre] M[ajesté], qui lui servoit de lettre de créance, m'a engagé à me charger d'ouverture pour le rétablissement de la monarchie en France; la négociation a été ardemment suivie, elle a développé un plan bien conçu, une exécution facile; elle étoit conduite par des agens de toute confiance, il ne restoit plus qu'à engager par écrit deux hommes dont la foi pouvoit être équivoque, lorsqu'un mal-entendu a changé la forme de vos ordres nécessaires à cet objet.

"J'avois demandé à V[otre] M[ajesté], Sire, la confirmation des pouvoirs qui m'avoient été transmis; au lieu de cela, ces mêmes pouvoirs demandés ont été accordés à M. le Duc de Fleury; alors mon rôle étoit interverti. Je devenois l'agent de l'homme auprès duquel je m'étois présenté au nom de V[otre]

M[ajesté.] M. le Duc et moi n'avons pu nous entendre. J'aurais eu l'honneur, Sire, de porter mes expressions devant V[otre] M[ajesté,] j'y aurois accompagné les deux amis qui m'ont engagé et secondé dans cette difficile entreprise, si l'on n'avoit arrêté tout passeport qui auroit pu nous être délivrés. Mais l'on s'est trompé, Sire, si l'on a cru que rien puisse me dispenser d'accellerer la négociation que j'ai commencée, ni détendre incessamment à son exécution.

“Le bonheur de votre empire, la tranquillité de l'Europe, le sort entier de l'humanité paroissent attachés, Sire, au rétablissement de votre trône. V[otre] M[ajesté] retrouvera, je retrouverai moi-même des co-opérateurs partout où il y a des hommes capables de penser. J'ai crû arriver à un terme prochain et heureux en donnant pleine connoissance de l'affaire au Général Pichégru, livrant ensuite d'après son avis la négociation à des hommes d'état, et à un Prince magnanime (l'Empereur de Russie) qui seuls dans ce moment peuvent vous transmettre nos vœux et nos pensées. Le tems presse, il m'est difficile de ménager de nouvelles temporisations, laissez approcher auprès de V[otre] M[ajesté] Sire, le sujet très fidèle (M. le Marquis de la Maisonforte) qui a obtenu une fois votre bienveillance et qui a partagé mes travaux. Il vous expliquera les détails que je ne puis expliquer moi-même. Il est autant que moi l'homme nécessaire à l'opération, sa discrétion extrême, sa modestie l'ont empêché de vous demander des pouvoirs, l'intérêt de V[otre] M[ajesté] m'oblige de vous supplier de la lui accorder. Non, Sire, ne chargez point auprès de moi de vos volontés des hommes qui ne m'entendent pas, si du moins V[otre] M[ajesté] consent que je tente à l'acheminer vers le trône. Consentez, Sire, que vos sages volontés me parviennent par cet ami, c'est mon co-opérateur. Cet ami n'a comme moi d'autre désir que de mériter sa place dans sa propre estime et de fuir le champ de l'intrigue.” *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

NOTE BY GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

Quelques considérations relatives à un certain projet présenté à Louis XVIII.

1799, April 12. Berlin.—“On a raison, sans doute, d'être continuellement en garde contre les ruses et les artifices du Gouvernement François. Trop d'exemples nous fait voir combien il peut être dangereux de ne pas user d'une extrême circonspection à cet égard.

“Cependant, comme la proposition faite à Louis XVIII. par l'agent de Paris, ne renferme rien qui autorise à soupçonner la sincérité de son commettant, il semble que ce seroit pousser trop loin la défiance que d'imaginer que ce dernier, en feignant de vouloir rétablir le trône en France, voit dans cette ruse un nouveau moyen de consolider son usurpation.

“ Mais, en admettant même que telles puissent être ses vues, on ne voit pas qu'en donnant suite aux négociations entamées en son nom, il puisse en résulter quelque chose de fâcheux pour Louis XVIII. puisqu'elles ne sauroient compromettre ni son honneur, ni sa dignité. Sans doute que la rentrée de ce prince en France seroit accompagnée de plusieurs difficultés, et de très grands risques, mais on trouvera assez de moyens de les écarter et de pourvoir à la sûreté de sa personne, si jamais les choses peuvent être amenées jusqu'au point de rendre ces moyens nécessaires.

“ Voici quelques précautions et mesures que provisionnellement on oseroit proposer comme pouvant devenir utiles à cet effet.

1°. “ On peut attendre de la justice et de l'âme généreuse de Louis XVIII. que ce prince ne quittera pas l'asile dont il jouit dans les états de l'Empereur des Russies, sans s'être engagé envers ce monarque magnanime, par un acte formel, de rendre à la France les limites qu'elle occupoit avant la Révolution, et de rétablir dans leurs propriétés, privilèges, et droits légitimes les princes qui, avant cette époque, avoient des possessions situées dans les états du royaume de France.

2°. “ Comme les Païs-Bas, depuis la démolition de leurs places frontières, sont de tous côtés ouverts et sans défense du côté de la France, on croit que l'on ne sauroit trouver injuste la demande qu'il soit stipulé dans l'acte ou traité susdit, que telles et telles places de la frontière Française, comme Condé, Valenciennes, Lille, Dunkerke, seront livrées au souverain des Païs-Bas, à condition qu'elles recevront des garnisons composées de troupes de celles des Puissances qui seront garantes du traité, bien entendu, qu'elles n'y resteront que le tems nécessaire au relèvement des fortifications des places qui autrefois formoient la frontière militaire des Païs-Bas, au nombre desquelles seront probablement Tournai, Courtrai, Menin, Ypres, Charleroi, Mons. On pourra fixer par le traité le tems qui sera jugé indispensable au rétablissement des dites forteresses, après l'échéance duquel les places appartenantes à la France, qui n'auront possédées que comme un gage de bonne foi et de sûreté, lui seront fidèlement restituées dans le même état où on les aura reçues ; à moins qu'à l'égard de Dunkerke on ne soit convenu d'avance de quelque autre arrangement que l'Angleterre, en vertu d'anciens traités avec la France, auroit été en droit d'exiger.

3°. “ Ce qu'on vient de proposer à l'égard de ces places dans l'article précédent semble être une précaution indispensable pour la sûreté même de Louis XVIII. puisqu'elle met les Puissances ses amies à portée de lui porter des secours, dans le cas où des troubles imprévus, qui compromettroient sa sûreté à l'époque de sa rentrée en France, lui feroient un besoin de leur assistance. Mais une autre précaution, non moins indispensable que la précédente, et qui devra nécessairement précéder le mouvement dans Paris, c'est que celui qui imprimera et dirigera ce mouvement, devra avoir trouvé moyen, sous quelque prétexte que les circonstances lui fourniront aisément, de faire passer dans le

Brabant une armée composée de troupes et de chefs qu'il saura portés pour le rétablissement de la monarchie et de l'ordre en France.

" Cette armée confiée au commandement du Général Pichégu, dont les dispositions, le courage, et les talents militaires sont connus, conduira le roi à Paris, pendant qu'une autre armée, des Puissances amies de ce monarque, s'avancera pour prendre possession des places dont il a été parlé à l'article second.

4° " Tout cela se liant parfaitement aux idées que l'auteur de ces considérations a eu l'honneur de communiquer à M. de Grenville dans sa lettre du 9 de Mars, il est évident de quelle importance il seroit pour la réussite du projet dont il s'agit ici, qu'on effectuât une descente dans les provinces de Frise et de Groningue, qui s'opéreroit avec facilité à une époque convenue, qui seroit celle où les troupes Françaises auroient entièrement évacué la Hollande pour se joindre à l'armée royaliste dans la Belgique. *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 25. Harley Street.—" Par les lettres que j'ai reçu de Berlin, je vois que notre concert avec la Prusse recule au lieu d'avancer, et qu'à Petersbourg on prend trop d'humeur, et un ton qui ne servira qu'à resserrer les liens de la Prusse avec la France. Cette conduite de la Cour de Russie est très impolitique, et je crois que c'est encor les intrigues de Cobentzel qui nous poussent à ces imprudences. De Hambourg on me marque qu'on mit un embargo sur tous les vaisseaux Hambourgeois dans tous les ports de Russie. Que veut dire cette incartade? Je ne le comprend pas.

" Si vous avez quelque nouvelle de Vienne et de Petersbourg faite moi la grace de me les communiquer. Je désire sur tout de savoir l'état de la santé du Prince Bezborotko."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 26. Harley Street.—" Je viens de voir notre ami Starhemberg, qui m'a dit avoir aprit d'Almeida que le Comte de la Marque est entré au service du Portugal. Quoique beau-frère de Starhemberg, celui-ci avoue qu'il en est aussi étonné qu'affligé pour la bonne cause, car son beau-frere n'est qu'un intrigant, perdu de mœurs, et qui n'a ni foi ni loi. Je puis vous assurer aussi que le Comte de la Marque est un sujet exécrable, qui a été l'ami et le compagnon des débauchés du Duc d'Orléans le guillotiné, et l'ami intime de Mirabeau, et de l'évêque d'Autun. Comment peut-on confier quelque commandement à un tel homme? Il ne cessera d'intriguer dans tous les sens, et ce sera un homme très dangereux à Lisbonne. Après ce que je connois de cet homme, et ce que m'a confirmé Starhemberg, je crois devoir de vous en avertir."

Postscript. “Je vous envoie le brouillon de ma dépêche d'aujourd'hui. Si vous l'approuve, elle partira ce soir ; si non, elle ira avec les corrections que vous jugerai à propos de faire.”

PAUL I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to M. MOURAVIEFF,
Russian Minister at Hamburg.

1799, April 26. St. Petersburg.—“En conséquence de votre rapport que Nous venons de recevoir aujourd'hui sur l'effet qu'a produit sur le sénat et les habitants de la ville de Hambourg, la nouvelle du séquestre qui a été mis sur leurs batiments marchands qui se trouvent dans les ports de notre empire, Nous vous prescrivons de déclarer au Sénat de Hambourg, que les mesures prises par Nous contre la ville de Hambourg, résultaient de, et devaient mettre fin à celles qui ont été prises, et ont journellement eu lieu dans cette ville contre la tranquillité des autres états ; et que la ville de Hambourg, de ville commerçante, est devenue un nid des mal-intentionnés, et un refuge de toute espèce de vagabonds, qui veulent se soustraire à la justice, et qui, pour avoir seulement du pain, sont prêts de tout entreprendre. D'après ces raisons notre bienveillance et notre protection ne peuvent être restorées à la ville de Hambourg avant qu'elle ne détruise le club nommé la Société Philantropique, et qu'elle n'ait livré au Ministre Britannique, ou encore mieux à son gouvernement, les rebelles Irlandais qui y ont été arrêtés, et parmi lesquels se trouve aussi Napper Tandy. D'une autre part, Nous avons vu avec plaisir par votre rapport, que l'envoyé Français Marragon a quitté Hambourg.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to His Royal Highness the DUKE OF YORK.

1799, April 26. Cleveland Row.—“The King having been graciously pleased to approve of Lord William Bentinck, whom I had humbly recommended to His Majesty to proceed with a mission in His Majesty's name to the Austrian and Russian army in Italy, it has occurred to me that some advantage might possibly arise if your Royal Highness saw no impropriety in his having the local rank and letter of service of a Major-General on the Continent. This idea has not been suggested to me by Lord William Bentinck, but occurred to me in fixing the rate of his allowances. But as its decision must in the first instance rest entirely with your Royal Highness, with whom it would also lie to receive His Majesty's pleasure upon it, I have not thought myself at liberty to mention the subject to His Majesty till I knew whether the proposal met your Royal Highness's approbation.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, April 30. Berlin.—“The unremitted work of three days has so completely exhausted my mind and pen that I cannot add to

my despatch as much as I should naturally wish to do upon so important a subject. What I have sent you is the result of the attack which I told you in my last private letter I should once again make upon the hopes and fears of Count Haugwiz; and though I cannot boast of sending you all that I wished, yet I confess I think that there is ground enough for very serious consideration of this project at London, unless it be that my constant desire of working out the salvation of Holland inclines me to look with too much partiality to every possible project which seems to offer any chance of success there. I do not however disguise to myself the difficulties that hang upon it. In the first place Haugwiz himself may have over-calculated his influence, and may not be able to obtain the king's consent to this project; he may seek only to divert the storm which he fears from Russia by engaging us in a negotiation which would ensure our efforts in mediation with Russia; he may feel the necessity of arming against the menaces of Russia, and wish to engage us in furnishing that first expense, leaving afterwards to events to determine what shall be the direction given to that force. He evidently thinks, however, that he can obtain a positive engagement on the part of the King to name by a secret article the day on which he will begin military operations; and, if this point be distinctly obtained, I own that I attach so much importance to it as to think that much should be sacrificed to obtain it; and if the King of Prussia is once engaged in hostilities with France for the recovery of Holland, I think one may trust that the most advantageous military steps will be taken by Prussia as far as is consistent with her own safety. The construction to which this is liable leaves certainly a door open to fraud, and they may refuse the enterprise of Holland under a description of difficulties the truth of which we may not admit; but, if on the 15th of July they bind themselves to begin military operations to rescue Holland, I do not think we run an unreasonable risk in not specifying beforehand the precise line of operations which is to be followed; but it certainly is of the highest importance that the engagement to begin military operations be clear beyond the possibility of doubt, dispute, or cavil, and so it is understood between Count Haugwiz and myself. I have however most earnestly to entreat you to send back such a secret article as would meet your ideas upon this subject, because I distrust my own *pen* on a point where the choice of diplomatic words may decide upon the advantage or disadvantage of the whole subject. In the case too of the idea being pursued, I must beg some assistance as to the military terms of the treaty of subsidy, of which I know nothing.

"You will see what my object was in shortening the term or extending the number of men, in as much as it gives us for our 1,200,000*l.* 60,000 men instead of 35,000; and I cannot teach myself to doubt that, before December, Holland may be itself again, and may be enabled to assist in the charge of such Prussian garrisons as may be wanted there during the winter. Haugwiz has suggested to me the idea of our employing also the Dutch

money in our English funds, for raising Dutch troops, in like manner as he says we employ Swiss money for raising regiments in Switzerland; but, as I know nothing of that transaction, I could only say that I doubted whether any such existed. Upon the project of Holland, Haugwiz has likewise had a great deal of conversation with the P[rince] of Orange, who seems much inclined to believe them here in earnest upon the subject; and it is most certain that all accounts concur in proving beyond a doubt that even a demonstration from hence would be sufficient now to do the business in that country.

“With respect to the King of Prussia’s beginning by demanding the evacuation of Holland, instead of declaring war, so far from objecting to it, I think it in every respect the best and wisest course which could be followed, because it takes the strong ground of a pre-existing engagement to which this King of Prussia succeeded with his crown, and there can be but little doubt that such a summons to the Directory will be as effectual a declaration of war as any which could be adopted. I have sometimes been apprehensive, it is true, that the uncertainty which they are studious to build round their march to Holland might likewise be extended to the publication of this summons, and that if any military motives be alleged in July against marching to Amsterdam they may be alleged for delaying likewise the manifesto of summons; but, on the other hand, if they are engaged to military operations on that day, why should we fear that the Duke of Brunswick will see military difficulties with as feeble an eye as he has shewn in his political speculations; and what motive can induce him at that time to propose any other military operation than that which has always in these last months seemed to engross both his thoughts and his wishes. The better however to ensure this point I shall lose no time in employing General Stamford, who has latterly been occupied in establishing the correspondence which we want with Flanders through M. de la Palue, nephew to M. de la Rivière the minister from Saxony. I believe I have forgot to say that I have authorised General Stamford to offer to him as far as 200*l.* for six months’ correspondence, which you will then judge whether you ought to renew. I hope that, if you approve of our projected convention, you will follow it up by trying to unite the force of Denmark with us, and to combine the internal measures in Holland and Flanders which must be ready to co-operate for the July manifesto; and, above all, I trust that you will assist the wording of the convention if it takes place, as I do really distrust my pen both in the diplomatic and the military terms to be discussed.

“I have every reason to think that Haugwiz will pursue the last project of negotiation as proposed by you if this subsidy convention should fail. I have seen in him upon this a great desire to extend the mutual guaranty to the Elector of Hanover and of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse and other German princes. I presume this is meant to include the Elector Palatine for the sake of Bavaria, and I told him that I saw his object,

but that I did not see any difficulty in our adopting that principle of the integrity of the German empire which Austria had itself adopted in disclaiming all indemnities on that side; and I reminded him that this principle must likewise put an end to all those projects of secularisation which Prussia had, as I thought, given too much countenance to at a time when establishments had great value as being such, without any other reference to the question; and I further said that, although it would be idle to ask a mutual guaranty from the lesser German princes, I did not know but that it might be worth considering whether the great Powers might not extend to these lesser princes the benefit of that guaranty, which might prove a useful security to the established governments of Europe. I have seen likewise in Count Haugwiz an inclination to doubt the advantage of Prussia (without navy) giving guaranty to our insular possessions; whether he is embarrassed in this view about the Cape and Ceylon I know not, but more than once he has said our navy is our best guaranty to our insular possessions, and he had questioned the propriety of Prussia proffering to defend what she could not reach. I have hitherto contented myself by treating that objection lightly, and I have asked whether he thought our guaranty to Poland would not be worth something in spite of the distance which separated us. I must not quit this subject without reminding you that if this proposal of guaranty, as stated in your despatch No. 15, is to be pursued, some communication should be made by you upon it to Petersburg, in order that Count Panin may be instructed to co-operate in it; they leave him at present entirely without any communication whatever, and he is so disgusted that he has written for leave to go to Carlsbadt for his health."

Enclosure.

DUTCH AFFAIRS.

"Une personne distinguée arrivant de la Hollande, où elle a passé dix mois avec tous les gouvernans et généraux Français, dit que tous ces derniers n'avaient qu'une manière uniforme de penser, laquelle était qu'aucune coalition ne les effrayerait tant qu'ils conserveraient pour allié la Prusse, et que Siéyès leur répondait de ce Cabinet. Mais qu'armées et gouvernans se croiraient perdus, si elle se mettait contre'eux. Ces informations ajoutent que parmi tous les généraux qui agissent dans ce moment-ci, Joubert serait le plus redoutable par ses moyens, ses talens, et son caractère; mais qu'heureusement le Directoire en a eu peur, et l'a dégouté par des passe-droits.

"La même personne a vu l'état des revues des troupes qui se trouvait en Hollande au mois de février, lequel n'allait pas au delà de 12,166 hommes; et les Français en ont depuis retiré pour les envoyer sur le Rhin. Tous les habitans sans distinction rappellent et désirent aujourd'hui leurs anciens maîtres."

His Royal Highness the DUKE OF YORK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 1. Horse Guards.—“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship’s letter of the 26th instant, proposing that Colonel Lord William Bentinck should, in consequence of his proceeding with a mission in His Majesty’s name to the Austrian and Russian armies in Italy, have the local rank and letter of service of a Major-General. I should have infinite pleasure in attending to your Lordship’s wishes upon this, as well as upon all other occasions, and I should not hesitate in taking his Majesty’s pleasure upon the subject in question, was I not decidedly of opinion that the advantages which would result to Lord William Bentinck from holding the local rank of Major-General during the continuance of His Majesty’s mission are not such as would counterbalance the inconvenience which the service might eventually suffer from the establishment of a similar precedent.”

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, May 1. London.—“Une lettre de Whitworth m’annonce l’embargo sur les navires Hambourgeoises, sans que l’on connut à Petersbourg les motifs de cette résolution subite et violente. De Vienne j’ai la douleur d’apprendre la maladie de l’Archiduc Charles, que l’on cachoit au public. Un de nos courriers l’a vu à Stockach, où l’on disoit qu’il se portoit mieux. La première colonne Russe est arrivée à Padoue le 10. Le parti de Schimmelman, Connich, triomphe à un tel point que si l’on ne parvient pas à y porter remède, bientôt nous en serons à des extrémités. La flotte de Breste est sortie forte de 18 à 19 vaisseaux. Lord Bridport est à leur poursuite. Apparemment qu’ils sont destinés ou pour l’Irlande, ou pour le Portugal. Ce n’est que cet alternatif qui nous est embarrassant.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 1. Harley Street.—“Je vous envoie la lettre de Krudener de Copenhague qu’on vient de déchiffrer dans ce moment.

“Le Vice-Amiral Macaroff, qui est venu ici hier et repart demain pour Sherness, a reçu aujourd’hui un ordre de l’Empereur dont il m’a donné la copie. Je l’ai fait traduire pour vous en Français. Cet ordre, qui est assez curieux, vous fait voir au moins le motif de ce qu’on fait chez nous contre la ville de Hambourg. J’ai besoin de vous voir pour ce sujet, et je vous prie de me fixer un quart d’heure dans la matinée de demain, avant ou après le cercle de la Reine.”

Enclosure.

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to VICE-ADMIRAL MAKAROFF.

1799, Mars 21. St. Petersburg.—“Ayant depuis quelque tems remarqué le penchant de Hambourg vers les principes

d'anarchie et le gouvernement des usurpateurs Français, Nous vous ordonnons de saisir comme bonne prise tous les vaisseaux marchands et autres qui leur appartiennent, et de les envoyer sous convoi dans nos ports." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, May 3. Cleveland Row.—“My faith in Fauche and his negotiations is not, nor ever will be, great. I have seen and known them too long to trust for one moment to their visions. My despatch of to-night will show you that I am not insensible of Stamford's merits, though in truth I know not how to set about rewarding them. The suggestion of his going to Petersburg is, however, Woronzow's, and I think it is a very good one; for Whitworth would be staggered by the first of the many solid objections which may be urged against this plan. But were there no objections to be made when Cæsar marched into Italy, or the Duke of Marlborough into Bavaria? The first great point must be to persuade Stamford himself that the scheme is practicable, and then I doubt not that he will easily succeed in persuading a set of people who will probably not know much of the matter.

“Of all the difficulties, that of transports is the greatest; but we have as you see undertaken to surmount it, and I am confident we shall do so, and that in the course of a fortnight or three weeks, we shall have enough, in readiness to sail, to carry a first division of 15,000 men, and in my conscience I believe that these 15,000 men would do the business.

“There is little probability that the sailing of the Brest fleet will disturb these plans. If they have common sense they are gone to Ireland, and if they are gone there they are, I trust, inevitably destroyed. Lord Bridport is gone off Cape Clear, and no body of troops that they can land will do lasting mischief in Ireland, though it may lead Lord C[ornwallis] as long a march as the last. If accounts received today are to be believed, they have but 3,000 troops on board. This is utterly inconsistent with the idea either of Ireland or Portugal, and can mean nothing but a project to unblock Cadiz, or to relieve Bonaparte. Both of them pretty hazardous undertakings!

“They are said to be eighteen of the line. Lord Bridport had sixteen and five more have sailed successively to join him. Lord Keith is supposed to have seventeen off Cadiz, and Lord St. Vincent has in the whole under his command thirty (including Lord Keith's) besides Turks and Russians, who, though I suppose not worth much, are probably as good as many of the French ships.

“It has occurred to me that Prussia, if she wants an excuse to change her mind (not otherwise) might be tempted to increase her forces, according to her own proposal, on receiving not money but a mortgage on Holland; that is a promise that in the event of Prussia's acting, and of Holland being restored, the

expenses of the previous preparation should be defrayed by the United Provinces. Would it not be worth while for you to try whether anything can be made of this idea?

"With respect to your Hamburg project I do not know whether you ever adverted to the circumstance that Holstein is not within the line of the Prussian neutrality, as marked on Chanchard's map by themselves, and transmitted here by Lord Elgin.

"As to the question you ask about yourself, my despatch of to-night is the answer to it. I am confident you will not feel a wish to come away from the place where you are, little agreeable as it is, while you can contribute (as you can in this instance most essentially) to the execution of a plan which promises so much in its results. The effect of your residence at Berlin really is to bring England just ten days nearer both to Petersburg and Vienna.

"With respect to the latter place I am turning in my mind a plan for a change there, and I am confident it can hardly be for the worse, so much has Eden put himself into the hands of Thugut, and thereby rendered himself worse than useless." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 5. [Stowe.]—"I am indeed most anxious to see you, but I cannot yet prevail upon myself to break in upon that relaxation from constant anxiety that has pressed so much upon me, and that endears my own fireside so dearly to me; but I fear that, in the course of fourteen days, I must set my face towards London. Your account of the Arch-Duke Charles has damped my hopes of seeing the blow followed up most vigorously in Switzerland; conceiving as I do that it is more than possible that, in the course of this summer, not one Frenchman will be left in lower Italy, supposing always that the Swiss game is fortunately and warmly pushed; but I am equally pleased and surprised with your hopes that Alexandria is or will be in our hands, as I will acknowledge that I had formed no such hope, and feared very much that the Brest fleet would—at least in part—have found its way into the Mediterranean, where it would certainly break in upon many of your plans. But it is a very sincere gratification to know that such is the state of our internal defence that we can spare our Channel fleet to follow them wherever they go; and that a competent number of vessels of all sorts will still remain for any unexpected attempt. I cannot persuade myself that they are meant for Ireland, and yet the number (3,000) of troops appear unequal to any serious attempt in the Mediterranean, and unfit for any object of unblocking Cadiz. As to Ireland, you know as well as I do that the appearance of such a fleet would be enough, even without troops, to bring on a serious explosion in the south; but I cannot think that the French will venture it. I will beg you to send me your report from your Secret Committee as soon as you can, as I am very anxious to see it; but as I know that these people just seized in

Dublin had great correspondences in England, I wish you to keep it open, till you know from Cooke whether any discoveries have been made that are worth your insertion. Wright the surgeon was the real efficient Director in Dublin; and O'Hanlon, who had been in the Spanish service, is a very intelligent and dangerous man.

"I am delighted with the statute of Henry VIII., and I trust that you will keep Lord Thanet's right hand and that of his friend Ferguson in hot water for some time, before the King in his mercy remits that part of his sentence. I have prepared for Sir William Young, who goes to town on Tuesday, an amendment which I think material to Mr. Pitt's Bill; namely a power to the Attorney-General to file an information *out of term* before any one Justice of the King's Bench, *as of the first day of the ensuing term*, against any printer or publisher; and that upon such procedure, of which proper notice shall be given, an injunction shall issue of course to stop all sale of the work till the information shall have been tried. This appears necessary from the constant sale, *pendente lite*, of prosecuted libels; and the principle is recognised in private prosecutions for pirated books or counterfeit editions, where the injunction issues from Chancery of course."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 6. Harley Street.--"Je vous soumet, d'après votre volonté, ma faible opinion sur la proposition de Thugut. 'Si elle est conforme à la votre, je suis persuadé que vous ne vous contenterez pas d'envoyer vos ordres à ce pauvre Eden, mais que vous dépêcherez, tout de suite, un courrier à Petersbourg pour que le Chevalier Whiteworth explique vos raisons pour le maintien de votre premier plan, et qu'il insiste sur son exécution; car je suis sûr qu'avant de parler à Eden, Thugut en a déjà parlé à Razoumowskoi, et en a écrit à Cobentzel; et je ne puis vous cacher qu'on n'est pas chez nous dans l'habitude de réfléchir sur les affaires, et que tout va avec chaleur, précipitation, et enthousiasme.

"Il est très important pour vous que ce soit les Russes qui soient en Suisse, parcequ'étant joint par vingt milles Suisses que vous voulez lever dans ce pays, vous aurez soixante-cinq milles tout-à-fait dépendants de vous; ce qui ne serat pas si ces vingt milles Suisse se joignent aux Autrichiens, et mes pauvres compatriotes seront inutilement sacrifiés sans pouvoir rien faire sur la rive gauche du Rhin.

"J'ai reçu hier-au-soir trois demandes, coup sur coup, avec un empressement étonant, pour donner un passeport au capitaine Popham pour Revel. Je l'ai envoyé, mais je vous conjure de faire retenir ce capitaine jusqu'à ce que je vous voye, ce qui sera aujourd'hui à deux heures après midi."

Enclosure.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST FRANCE.

“La proposition du Baron de Thugut est très singulière ; ce qu’il propose n’est pas exécutable, même pour les Autrichiens, encore moins pour les Russes, et le motif principal est tellement faux, que lui-même croyant l’appuyer, le renverse par des contradictions manifestes.

“Il veut que les Russes passent le Rhin à Philipsbourg, et se promènent sur la gauche de ce fleuve, ayant de tous cotés des forteresses Françaises que l’Autriche elle-même a livrées au Directoire : il prétend que de là ils pourront faire diversion, et appuyer les Belges bien-intentionnés, oubliant qu’il y a, entre le Bas-Rhin et la Flandre, les places que la France possède sur la Moselle et la Meuse. Comment notre corps de troupes pourra-t-il subsister ? qu’est ce qu’il pourra faire ? il est étranger et aux Allemands de la rive gauche du Rhin, et aux Flammands, anciens sujets de l’Autriche ; au lieu qu’une armée Autrichienne parlera aux Allemands au nom du chef de l’empire, et aux Belges au nom de leur ancien souverain, promettant aux uns et aux autres de les délivrer de leur joug, et le promettant au nom de celui qui est le plus intéressé à leur délivrance.

“Les généraux Autrichiens connoissent tout ce pays, et y ont des relations particulières avec les habitans : tous ces motifs et ces moyens manquent à mes compatriotes, et s’il est possible d’aventurer et de faire subsister une armée dans ces contrées, il n’y a qu’une armée Autrichienne qui peut y être utilement employée, mais pas une armée Russe ; par les raisons ci-dessus expliquées.

“Après l’incohérence de la proposition, venons aux contradictions manifestes qu’elle contient en elle-même. Le Baron Thugut dit : ‘que depuis la première fois qu’il exprima son désir que ces troupes fussent employées en Suisse, les circonstances de la guerre étoient considérablement changées ; le gros de l’armée étoit maintenant sur la frontière de ce pays ; les magasins de toute sorte y sont conséquemment transportés : si les Russes y marchent il y aura plus de troupes qu’on ne pourroit y employer dans ce quartier ; on seroit obligé de déplacer l’armée Autrichienne et ses magasins.’ Après avoir établi ces raisons comme victorieuses, il nous jette sur le Bas-Rhin parceque nous arriverons là, je ne sçais d’après quel calcul, trois semaines plus tôt que les Autrichiens ; il oublie, tout d’un coup, que les Russes entrant en Suisse, composeroient un corps de troupes plus qu’il n’en faut, et feroient déplacer les Autrichiens et leurs magasins, et il dit qu’au lieu de ces 45 milles Russes, *l’Empereur d’Allemagne s’engageroit d’envoyer une force égale, ou plus s’il étoit nécessaire, pour agir effectivement et de concert avec le Général Hotz pour la délivrance de la Suisse.*

“Votre cher Chevalier Eden n’a pas compris ces contradictions palpables ; il n’a objecté que la difficulté de changer une destination déjà fixée ; sur quoi le fin Thugut lui repliqua que c’est

pour la convenance mutuelle et pour l'utilité commune qu'il le proposoit ; qu'il croyoit que l'Empereur d'Allemagne, en envoyant un nombre égal de ses troupes pour agir dans la Suisse, étoit [otait] l'objection principale.

“Vous voyez l'incohérence du plan et ses contradictions absurdes, qui n'ont pû échapper au Chevalier Eden que par quelque malheureuse distraction qu'il a eue quand Thugut lui parlait, et quand après il vous rapportoit dans sa dépêche.”
Copy.

EARL SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 7. Bath.—“I send you copies of some letters which I have had from Sir Sidney Smith, lest your dispatches from his brother should not contain all the information they convey. I confess I do not much like the accounts of the French penetrating into Syria, and of the disposition of the inhabitants in that country to receive, and of the armies to run away from them.

“I have never seen a copy of the treaty which has actually been signed by the Smiths with the Porte, but I do not know what to make of what appears about it in these, and some former letters. They seem to have entered into stipulations that were not in my contemplation, both with respect to the British force to be employed on the coast of Egypt, and to inviting the French to leave Egypt and return to Europe. Sir Sidney appears to be of opinion that the disadvantages of this latter measure will be done away by their being considered as prisoners of war, but I cannot see it in that light, because the instant they set their foot either in France or Italy, they will make very little scruple of serving either against us or some of our allies ; and, if it was only for the sake of example, I should be extremely sorry that any considerable proportion of that army were ever to return on any conditions.”

Enclosure 1.

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH TO EARL SPENCER.

1799, March 6. *Tigre*, off Alexandria.—“I profit of the departure of the *Culloden* to acquaint your Lordship of my having relieved Captain Troubridge upon this station in pursuance of Lord Nelson's orders. I shall pursue the plan of operations his experience points out to me with this difference, that, according to the measures adopted as the result of the conferences at the Porte, we shall no longer keep the enemy damned up in Egypt, but allow him to evacuate the territory by all means except that of permission to retire with arms in their hands, at liberty to use them elsewhere.

“Buonaparte, in his secret instructions to an agent of his, says ‘*si jamais on vous faisait la question, les Français consentiront-ils*

à quitter l'Egypte ? pourquoi pas ? pourvu que les deux empereurs fussent finir la revolte de Passivan Oglou et abandonnent leur projet de se partager la Turquie Européenne ; que, quant à nous, nous ferons tout ce qui pourroit être favorable à l'empire Ottoman, et le mettre à l'abri de ses ennemis. Mais que le préliminaire de toute négociation, comme à tout accomodement, c'est un firman qui fasse relâcher les Français partout où on les a arrêtés, surtout en Syrie.' To this I mean to answer him by his courier now on board (not Beauchamp) that the sense of this article of his instructions *being clear*, I have only to assure him of my readiness to listen to any reasonable proposition ; at the same time reminding him that his passage back to France depends *entirely* on the British squadron cruising off Alexandria, and that, according to agreement with the Porte, my passports alone are *valables* with them, and the Barbary powers, for *British prisoners of war*. I mention this, thus early, to enable your Lordship to judge of probabilities in this quarter where everything is as yet in embryo, dependent on Turkish armies which may never be what they are promised to be. *On n'attrape pas des mouches avec du vinaigre—ainsi je leur offre du miel* ; and it is not to Buonaparte alone that I offer this *pont d'or*, but by other channels indirectly to all individuals of his army. I hope to come at those, by this means, that are out of the reach of our shells ; as for the latter I consider them a surer prey from what I hear." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to EARL SPENCER.

Private.

1799, March 7. *Tigre*, off Alexandria.—“ Having received an offer from an Albanian chief to furnish me as many men as I chose on the footing of our marines, I have found myself very fortunate in such a resource at a time when I feel the want of men to land and secure the ports that the enemy would surrender to us, though they would defend them to the last extremity against the Turks for fear of the ill usage their prisoners meet with. I have thus found myself under the necessity of accepting this offer, and have accordingly sent a transport down to bring up some. I shall write officially about this when I have seen the thing realised sufficiently to enable me to speak more positively as to the efficiency of these men, who, it is understood, can row as well as use fire-arms. I shall put them on the *Tigre's* supernumerary list, rated according to their qualifications. I see no other way of satisfying their officers by a proportionate addition of pay than by bearing as many numbers, after the manner of widow's men, as will make up the proportion ; but for this deviation from the established rule on a supernumerary list, I must have an order from the Admiralty ; further these people require to be paid monthly on the spot, which is a *sine qua non* it seems. The French troops write on

their quarters *point d'argent point de soldats*, and complain much of being seven months in arrear; thus they will not be able to recruit their army in this way by the Albanians, who, like the Swiss, quit their mountains and the coast of the Morea to serve the neighbouring Pashas for present pay. They are the only people for this sort of service, and if we had a few of them just now, I could profit by the weakness of Aboukir Castle, as announced in Du Muy's letter to Beauchamp, a copy of which is enclosed, and cut off the only channel by which Alexandria receives supplies at present. I have my doubts of the Turkish troops promised arriving in time, or being efficient and active when they do; besides I can only expect to influence them by example, and our own marines are too essential to a cruising ship to be detached for anything but a *coup de main*; we cannot retain posts with them without having a port to secure the ships in the interim, and there is none on this coast. What we do we must do before the May and June breezes set in, and be already in a fair way to profit by the rise of the Nile to send the flotilla up it. Without that we may correspond, to the right and left, with Gezzar Pasha, Murad Bey, Ibrahim Bey, but we shall never come to blows with enemy I see."

Midnight, secret. "As I am writing to Mr. Forgli, a Turkish ship is come down from the eastward with the letter, of which a copy is enclosed, from our factotum at Acre, which I am enabled to send through Mr. Forgli to your Lordship by the vessel which I am about to dispatch to Zante to bring up some Albanian recruits, now, as your Lordship sees, become more necessary than ever. I have already answered my Acre correspondent, and written again to Gezzar Pacha pointing out what he can yet do to save his capital by constantly harrassing the French rather than risking a pitched battle, and also what I can do on the coast to support him. I have detached the *Theseus* to the eastward as desired. Captain Troubridge not having any frigates to give me in compliance with my official request to him, has left me the *Lion*, which I leave off the Western port of Alexandria while I look out on the eastern one, and Rosetta, from whence recent movements indicate an intention in the enemy to send something eastward. You see how insufficient the force at present under my orders, without numbers of small vessels, is for the work in hand. The appearance of our two decks keeps the eight frigates they have in the old port in check; the three French built ones and two Venetians lately coppered there are evidently ready for a start, which corroborates recent intelligence; they would rather go home than go on." *Copy.*

Enclosure 3.

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to EARL SPENCER.

1799, March 8. *Tigre*, off Alexandria.—"On second thoughts I have, to save time, made my official proposition to the Admiralty to extend the number of Albanians already engaged

to three thousand. If they do not like to take our two last as marines, will you get Mr. Windham to state to me the terms which he can allow me to offer these chiefs who offer their services. The Albanians are the Swiss of this part of Europe, and he may have two regiments of a thousand men each to serve in this country if he likes it, on writing me a single line." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, May 8.—“It is now one o'clock in the morning, and I have been the whole day unremittingly employed in enabling myself to forward these despatches to you to-night. You will not therefore expect much of private letter with them, and my great anxiety not to lose another day must explain any inaccuracy or indistinctness that there may be in them. It was a happy day when you first consented to undertake this troublesome and unpromising task, and you will be the happier for it all the days of your life.

“French papers talk of 25 sail of the line and 14,000 troops—*sed ego non credulus illis*. Every day makes it more and more probable that their destination is to relieve Buonaparte. The curious papers you sent seem to confirm this; we have heard no more of our fleet.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 9. Berlin.—“Loose and incorrect as the French memorandum was which I enclosed to you in my last despatch, I preferred the sending it in its original terms as written by Haugwiz, because the embarrassment of his views and conduct is better described in the bad French and confused language in which it is written, than by any detailed description of mine. I believe the truth to be that he personally wishes this measure to succeed, and that he has good hopes of accomplishing it, but his natural timidity and anxiety makes him afraid to support by open and unqualified language the opinions which he entertains and the system which he recommends, until he shall have persuaded himself that the small confidential circle of aid-de-camps and secretaries at Potsdam shall be in unison with him. He is therefore eternally struggling through his speculations about his own situation and influence, and as you will have observed, has seldom or ever the courage to pursue a plain and direct line, but seeks to express himself in involved and ambiguous terms in order to avoid being positively pledged and committed upon any precise and determinate object. This disposition is certainly unfavourable to the success of our measure of convention, and increases extremely the difficulties in treating of it, and the doubts which will attach upon the execution of it in case it should be completed; yet, with a very full sense of all these discouragements, and a very sincere wish that it had not fallen to my share to discuss them, I am still so much impressed with

the incalculable importance of pursuing through Prussia the successes of this one campaign which may decide the fate of Europe, that I acknowledge I am more ready than in prudence perhaps I ought to be to risk greatly for this great object; and I should not deal fairly with you, if I did not so far put you upon your guard in all that you hear from me upon this subject. Our separate article, such as I have enclosed it in the despatch, was drawn up by Count Panin and myself for Count Haugwiz to carry to the King in order to describe the proposition in question in the manner the most likely to engage the inclination of the King's mind; if it be adopted our course would naturally be to make the whole convention secret in order not prematurely to announce the attack upon Holland, and some immediate guaranty of present possessions and of future security to the United Provinces would naturally make a part of such a convention. I took Count Haugwiz's account of the sum proposed as applying to 60,000 men for six months, but I see upon a closer examination, that at the rate of 80,000*l.* per month for 35,000 men, one million will pay the 60,000 men for six months and will also very nearly defray the *fraix de mobilité*. The question is whether you will trust the Duke of Brunswick and them with the discretionary power they ask for, of making their march into Holland depend upon their view of the then existing circumstances of the campaign, and whether any Russian force can supply that protection on their left without which they will think 60,000 men too small a force to challenge the hostility of France. You will see that they have sent me a very coarse and stupid note which has given me the trouble of writing them an answer, which you may perhaps think too captious, but which, I think, is scarcely enough so. Their note was written by Struensee and Alvenslaben who are completely adverse to English connection, and Haugwiz, in this as in many other instances, has not courage enough to resist what he has sense enough to disapprove.

"The French faction triumph in the murder of Roberjest and Bonnier by the Austrians; I enclose to you the account as sent here by the Prussian legation, but I would not do the French deputies the honour of naming them in my public despatch. It is undoubtedly a dirty piece of business, and I therefore indulge myself in talking of it as being probably the act of the Directory to get rid of two men who have both been named to succeed in the ensuing vacancy; there is very little truth in this suggestion, but it is better than abusing the Austrians, and the Directory are very little entitled to the benefits of truth and candour."

Enclosures.

(1.) *Récit de la mort des Députés François à Rastadt.*

1799, Avril 27. Rastadt.—"Les Ministres F[rançois] ont donné avant-hièr une protestation contre les démarches des A[utrichiens] concernant la sûreté du congrès, en déclarant qu'ils ne pouvoient plus continuer de traiter à R[astadt,] qu'ils

recevroient les propositions de ceux qui voudroient traiter. Un nouvel incident vint les embarrasser. Le courrier ordinaire F[rançois] fut arrêté hiér par une patrouille sur la route de Seltz. On le conduit à Gernsbach, après lui avoir enlevé les dépêches. Les François l'adresserent à la mission Prussienne pour intervenir à obtenir son élargissement, la restitution des dépêches, et la sûreté du passage de la mission sur l'autre rive du Rhin.

“ On l'y prêta avec empressement, en envoyant à cette fin le Comte de Bernstorff au Colonel Barbaczay, afin de réunir ses représentations à celles que les Barons Albini et Edelsheim alloient lui faire. Il répondit qu'il ne pouvoit s'expliquer avant de recevoir les ordres du général, auquel il avoit expédié un courrier. Le départ commun fut ainsi sursis.

R[astadt] le 29 Avril. “ Nous venons de passer une nuit terrible. Le Colonel B[arbaczay] ayant fait sommer hiér les ministres F[rançois] par un officier suivi de Hussards, de quitter R[astadt] dans les vingt-quatre heures, ils résolurent de partir incessamment. C'était à huit heures du soir. Arrêtés pendant une heure à la porte, on leur permit enfin de sortir, mais sans leur accorder l'escorte qu'ils demandoient. A peine parvenus à 500 pas de la ville, une troupe de cavaliers arrête les voitures. On arrache les trois ministres l'un après l'autre, et les massacre à coups de sabre. Bonnier et Roberjeot restent sur la place hachés en pieces. J[ean] de Bry, assailli le premier, quoique criblé de coups, n'ayant pas reçu de blessures mortelles, eut le bonheur d'échapper à la faveur de l'obscurité des mains des meurtriers. Rosenstiehl doit sa vie à son domestique qui eut la présence d'esprit de le jeter malgré lui hors de sa voiture, et le força à prendre la fuite à travers un marais aboutissant au jardin du chateau, où les Hussards ne pouvoient le suivre. Après s'être rendus maitres de tout ce qui se trouvoit d'argent et de précieux dans les voitures, ils les forcerent à retourner en ville.

“ Comment entreprendre de décrire l'état des femmes qui furent témoins du sort affreux de leurs maris, ou de peindre les sentiments qu'éprouvoient les personnes accourus de toutes parts, en les voyant rentrer. La plupart du corps diplomatique, déchirés d'un spectacle si terrible, l'empressoient de donner à ces malheureux tous les soins dont leur situation les rendoit susceptibles. Epuisé de fatigue Jean de Bry, caché dans le bois au creux d'un fossé, attendoit la pointe du jour. Assez heureux pour se soustraire aux yeux de ses persécuteurs, il parvint à sept heures du matin à gagner l'hôtel de M. le Comte de Goertz. Je l'ai vu ensanglanté, couvert de blessures, défiguré, ses habits tombant en haillons, courir se jeter aux pie[d]s du Comte, implorer sa protection. V[otre] E[xcellence] devine la manière où il fut accueilli. Tout le monde s'empressa autour de lui. On fit pauser ses blessures et approcher sa femme et ses deux filles qui avoient passé la nuit dans les transes sur l'incertitude de ce qu'il étoit devenu. À deux heures après midi, lui, sa femme, l'infortunée veuve de Roberjeot, avec les autres personnes attachés à la mission passerent heureusement le Rhin,

protégés par une escorte qu'enfin l'on avoit obtenu du Colonel B[arbaczay] lequel, désavouant le fait, témoigna ses regrets dans une lettre.

“On prétend avoir des données non équivoques pour croire que cet attentat n'a pu se commettre sans une autorité supérieure quelconque. On va jusqu'à assurer que le butin fait dans cette occasion, évalué à 60 mille florins, a été partagé parmi les soldats et officiers à la lanterne auberge, située hors de la ville sur la route de Carlsruhe. La majeure partie du Congrès n'eut rien de plus pressé que de partir ensemble, formant un cortège de trente voitures escortés par des Hussards de Bade et de Darmstadt. Nous apprenons que les dépouilles de Roberjeot et Bonnier ont été enterrés hier avec cérémonie à R[astadt].

(2.) Carlsruhe le 2 de Mai.

“M. de Dohm a rédigé un exposé historique des événements qui ont précédé notre départ de Rastadt. On en a fait part, au nom des divers députés assemblés ici, au Margrave de Bade et à l'archiduc Charles. L'étendue de cette piece, aussi détaillée qu'intéressante, et mes occupations m'empêchent d'envoyer la copie à V[otre] E[xcellence]. Les A[utrichiens] se sont saisis de tous les papiers de la mission Française, et l'officier commandant à R[astadt] s'est obstinément refusé à les restituer.”

1. Pièce. “Une lettre des membres du Congrès au Colonel B[arbaczay] pour lui communiquer l'attentat, et demander sûreté pour leur personnes.

Signée

Goertz	Jacobi Dohm
Reede	Hanovre
Danois	Rosenkrantz
Bavière	Rechberg
Darmstad	Gazert
Wetteren	Solms
Nassau	Knye
	Schweitzer
Cassel	Taube

2. Réponse du Barbaczay; c'est une très belle lettre exprimant son horreur de l'attentat, et ajoutant que ce malheur affreux ne seroit pas arrivée si la mission F[rançaise] auroit voulu partir du jour.

3. Lettres des députés du Congrès pour obtenir l'escorte du Capitaine Burkhard commandant à R[astadt] pour la protection du passage de la mission F[rançaise].

4. Première intervention des députés pour obtenir les escortes de protection à la mission F[rançaise] au Colonel B[arbaczay].

5. Réponse et rapport du M. de Bernstorff. Le colonel ne peut accorder les escortes sans ordre supérieur. Dépôts des postillons.” *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 10. Harley Street.—“Vous verez par ma lettre officielle, et par l'anexe qui y est jointe, qu'il y a quelque mésentendu chez nous par rapport à Kuxhaven, qu'on suppose que vous

voulez occuper ; et comme cet endroit appartient à Hambourg, je crois en vérité que nos démarches hostiles contre cette ville ne proviennent du refus que les Hambourgeois ont fait de vous rendre les conjurés Irlandois, et que, soit par les lettres de votre ministre à Hambourg au Chevalier Whiteworth, soit les rapports de celui que nous y avons, on s'est imaginé chez nous que les Hambourgeois étoient des Jacobins fières qu'il falloit punire.

“ Faite moi l'amitié de me répondre officiellement, afin que je puisse envoyer encor ce soir la copie de ma lettre et votre réponse. Si je n'étois pas malade, je serois venu vous demander ce que vous avez répondu à la proposition du Baron du Thugut, qui veut absolument exclure les Russes de la Suisse, et les faire promener sans aucune utilité sur la rive gauche du Rhin, entourée de toutes ces fortresses que possèdent les Français. Quelque soit la réponse que vous ferez, je vous prie de la communiquer au Chevalier Whiteworth pour qu'il la fasse connaitre chez nous, et déjouer les intrigues de Cobentzel.”

The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 12. Fort St. George.—“ Concluding that you know the whole history of the war in which I have been compelled to engage with Tippoo Sultan, I say nothing of the causes, or first operations of it, but I lose not a moment in transmitting to you the inclosed *Gazette*, which I know you will read with pride and satisfaction equal to any which I can feel. The event is indeed brilliant, glorious, and substantially advantageous beyond my most sanguine expectation. Dundas or Cabell will furnish you with all such details as I yet have obtained ; they all tend to throw additional lustre on this (in India) unequalled event ; and with all your Duncan's and Nelson's thunder sounding about you, may I not venture to say to you,

*‘ Et nos tela, Pater, ferrumque haud debile dextrâ
‘ Spargimus, et nostro sequitur de vulnere sanguis.’*

“ To you I shall use no disguise, but inform you plainly that the manner in which I have conducted this war has been received with exultation, and even the most unqualified admiration in India ; and (to talk like Lord Abercorn) you will gain much credit by conferring some high and brilliant honour upon me immediately. The Garter would be much more acceptable to me than any additional title, nor would any title be an object which should not raise me to the same rank which was given to Lord Cornwallis. Tippoo Sultan fought better and had a much more efficient army than in the last war ; yet the British army entered Mysore on the 5th of March, and took Seringapatam on the 4th May. In my conscience I believe the army fitted out under my eye, and commanded by General Harris, to be as fine as any in the world. I trust to you not to suffer me to be neglected. If my success at Hyderabad and at Seringapatam, accomplished within less than twelve months, be not merit, I know not what the public service is, and I cannot return to my happy indolence at home too soon.

"I am on the point of departure for Kykottah, and probably from thence I shall proceed to Seringapatam to settle the affairs of Mysore; a task in which I expect more unpleasant pangs from the view of fallen dignity, than real difficulties in practice."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 13. Berlin.—"In reading my former despatches you will have seen that I had succeeded in convincing the Minister, but in reading this despatch you will see how little I am for that advanced in the more arduous task of convincing H[is] P[russian] M[ajesty]. While I have worked myself to a lath in working upon the foreign secretary, a round and stupid aid-de-camp who scarcely knows one step beyond the daily parade of the King's guards at Potsdam, works daily upon the easy and undistinguishing ear of the King, and in the voice of this mentor is lost all the hope of the uncommon exertions which were sincerely made by Haugwitz. It is difficult to describe the degree of mortification which Haugwitz seems to have felt in this disappointment, and although he endeavours to conceal it in conversation with me, I see that he is sorely hurt at his being checked and counter-acted upon so important a matter. At other times we have been inclined to think that as much was to be apprehended from Zastrow's influence as from that of Koekeritz, but upon this occasion the opinion of the former is considered as being rather favourable than otherwise to the measure of hostility; and in truth it is not easy to conceive upon what reasoning or with what speculation any reasonable man in Prussia could refuse himself to the conviction of the advantages which belong to the present moment for hostility to France; in the King there is naturally a great indolence, and it is partly by working upon that indolence, and partly by an appeal to the King's conscience as to exposing Prussia to the expense and calamity of war, partly too by profiting of his suspicions towards Austria, and out of that making the new terror of Prussia being alone engaged in war with France, these are said to be the motives which Koekeritz employs; whether on his own part weakly, or corruptly, or both, is a matter much disputed, but successfully as you see by what has so recently passed. With respect to the disappointment of the project, I rest less upon that; because, in truth, there were so many difficulties attending both the drawing up of the treaty and the execution of it, so much opposition to be feared from the Duke of Brunswick having so small a force, so much doubt about succeeding in the obtaining the Russian force, and so much embarrassment in specifying all these conditions of an indistinct and complicated contract, that I have never been enough in love with it to suffer in the loss of it. My thoughts now all centre in the immediate march of [the] Russian force towards the Lower Rhine, and as I am persuaded that they would thus succeed in arriving at Dusseldorf, I cannot but believe

their appearance there would tell with sufficient effect in Holland to give complete success to the rising in that country, even if any French troops should remain in it, which is I think by no means certain. I make to myself some scruple of always recurring in my despatches to this project, the repetition of which may be embarrassing to you; but I hear so much of the means which prevail there, I feel so much the importance of the object and the facility of obtaining it, and I dread so much the letting go by a moment so made for acting upon the confidence of our friends and the fears of our enemies, that I cannot in conscience as an honest man restrain my pen from tracing my eager and sanguine hopes on this inviting prospect of success. I do not now see what I can do that is likely to be useful at Berlin, and I am tempted to think that I might do more good by coming and tormenting you all daily with the daily visitations of my fancy upon this subject. Meantime I have concluded a bargain with La Palue through General Stamford; he is a good officer, a very intelligent man, has about 700*l.* per annum of his own, and takes 200*l.* for six months to pay his spies and his communications; he will live at Emerick and Wesel, and if you find he does not answer you may get rid of him. I have drawn upon you for one hundred pounds for him, for which I will send you receipt when I have more time."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Secret.

1799, May 13. Dropmore.—"I have examined very attentively the different papers which you have sent, and which I now return, respecting Batavia. They contain two perfectly distinct and even opposite proposals. The one, for a conquest of Java conducted on the same wise and liberal principles on which we have acted at Ceylon and elsewhere, securing to the public the real advantages of the conquest, and protecting (but under British laws and sovereignty) the inhabitants of Batavia (as we protect those of the Cape) in the enjoyment of their property; effectually restraining them at the same time from remitting that property to Holland where it would be at the mercy of our enemies, and would infallibly be put in requisition to be employed against us. The other is, as I conceive, nothing but a proposal from some of the parties concerned in the most scandalous system of fraud and perjury that was ever exposed, that we should by a solemn engagement, and even by an Act of Parliament, cover their transactions in future; and renouncing all advantage from the possession of Java, allowing all its produce to be remitted either in kind, or at least in value, to Holland, undertake the whole expense and loss of its defence.

"Seeing them in this light, I need hardly tell you to which of them my opinion inclines. I have always thought the conquest of Java an object of great importance, and much regretted that the state of our affairs in India did not seem to allow us the

means of collecting a force there for that purpose. Captain Popham's papers certainly suggest more reasons in favour of this project than I was before acquainted with, and I by no means think that our views of continental operations for the delivery of Holland ought to prevent or delay the adoption of his plan. If the Stadtholder is restored, one of the greatest difficulties we should have to encounter will be the demand for the restoration of Ceylon and the Cape, which, from what I have already seen, will, I am certain, be pressed upon us by Prussia as well as by the Dutch. It would be a great means of putting this by if we had Batavia and Surinam to restore to them. There is also another consideration that will deserve attention. It is this, that if a counter-revolution takes place in Holland without our having taken steps to secure these points, there is danger of the French or Spaniards being before hand with us there.

Postscript. "You know best what could be done with sepoys, but I have always understood that for the conquest of Java we might procure Malays, and other troops of that description, from Ceylon and the Eastern Islands, which would not feel the same objection as sepoys to naval expeditions, and distant service."
Copy.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 16. Berlin.—"Wagstaff's despatches of yesterday from you have so completely occupied me in writing to Whitworth and to the Office, and in arranging all that in conversation could be arranged with Stamford, that I shall with difficulty be able to save the packet if I delay Dietry in writing a long private letter. Stamford is fully impressed with the grandeur of your Russian naval project, and goes with good heart and zeal to Petersburg on Saturday the 18th, where I really think he will do invaluable service in the assistance which his talents and energy will give to support Whitworth in his negotiation. For myself I walk in air, and can hardly reduce my imagination to wait for the progress of the great events which I am confident will arise out of this spirited enterprise. In the midst of this burning fever arrives your second despatch to Whitworth, your laborious and prompt assistance to my convention, and your praise of my successful exertions at Berlin. Your letter to Whitworth I desire him not to regard, but to get by heart the despatch which preceded it. Your *projet d'articles* and your ready assistance I know not how enough to thank you for; but your praises and congratulations you will already have seen that I have in no degree the smallest pretensions to, and that all I can boast of is that I have managed so as not to make the expectation of my Berlin project retard the better energy of Paul and Petersburg.

"Meantime I must take notice that you have sent me no directions how to forward your last despatch to Sir M. Eden, but as it is important, and moreover not in cipher, I shall send it on this evening by messenger.

"I enclose to you a communication made by Mr. Diemar respecting the person who has the contract at Cuxhaven for victualling our ships. I know nothing of the facts, if they are true he ought to be removed. I send you likewise the last news which I have received from the Prince of Orange, which continues to be very promising. I cannot send you the receipt for La Palue's 108*l.* till the next messenger. Be so good as not to forget the letter from the Stadtholder, to regret his son, and to recommend his interests to the Emperor. Stamford would not take any money here, but wishes to be enabled to draw upon Whitworth for what he may want for his expenses there, and I told him I would desire you to write accordingly.

"I fear there has been strange intriguing against the Archduke, but while he retains the command I still think all will go on well ; and as for the disposition of your 45,000 Russians, I have no doubt but that the Germans may be brought at Vienna to take that position which they wish to be taken on the Rhine, and leave the Russians to advance towards France.

"I am interrupted by receiving a message confidentially from Haugwitz to tell me that he has got Count Finckenstein to unite with him in making a declaration to the King that they will resign if their opinion is not followed in favour of the convention, and he desires to see me on this to-morrow, and to repeat to me the good hopes which he has that he shall succeed. I have sent him word that I will come, but my determination is to tell him that we can no longer suspend for a single day the measures of the campaign in waiting the reluctant and tardy decisions of Berlin, and therefore that nothing short of the immediate acceptance of the proposition can now make it practicable. My messenger shall go to Petersburg to-day ; if they are in earnest here that will be a spur to them, but I cannot and will not recommend to you one moment's delay. The spirit and activity of your last project delights me, and I will not let the cold air of Berlin blow upon it ; if they accept the proposition, I will then act on your last despatch, provided they accept it immediately."

Enclosure.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS.

Extraits de différentes lettres du 7 et 8 Mai.

"Les lettres de la Hollande deviennent tous les jours plus pressantes, et il est sérieusement à craindre de deux choses l'une, qu'il y aura du désordre partiel, mal-dirigé, et sans succès ; ou que les Directeurs actuels, voyant qu'ils ne peuvent plus mener la barque, tenteront une coalition avec le bon parti, parmi lequel il y en aura qui s'y prêteront, voyant qu'il n'y a plus d'autres ressources. Surtout à Amsterdam on paroît assez disposé à cela, et c'est aussi par là que la bombe éclatera s'il y a du désordre sérieux, car depuis que les Anglois bloquent sérieusement les ports et n'y font plus rien entrer, il y a beaucoup d'effervescence.

"Le retard des postes Angloises donne matière à plusieurs conjectures, car malgré que le vent a été favorable, il nous manque

dans ce moment trois malles, d'où l'on conclût qu'il doit y en avoir de pris, ou bien que le gouvernement, projetant une expédition, a contremandé toute communication, comme lors de l'entreprise sur les écluses du canal. On prétend qu'ils se sont déjà montrés en force sur les côtes de la Zélande avec beaucoup de vaisseaux de transports.

“ Dans ce moment les Bataves n'ont plus d'autres ressources que de faire venir tout de Bremen par les Wadden ; si les Anglois empêchent cette communication, il pourroit y avoir une famine.

“ Brune, à ce qu'on assure, a déclaré que si le république Batave fut attaquée dans les circonstances présentes, il n'y auroit pas moyen de l'aider, et que par conséquent, on devoit penser à sa propre défense. Ceci doit avoir occasionné le message du Directoire concernant l'augmentation de l'armée. On doute toujours que la réquisition passera, et on la dit même déjà rejetée par la seconde chambre.

“ Pendant mon séjour à la Haye, et en général en Hollande, d'où je suis ressorti il y a quelques jours, j'ai fureté partout, consulté grands et petits, et même un des cinq Directeurs que je puis vous assurer avoir trouvé bien disposé, ainsi que le sont ses confrères. Ils seroient dans leur joie s'ils pouvoient contribuer à nous faire avoir l'orangerie de retour. Je ne crois pas que dans ce moment il y ait un être dans toute la République qui en doute, et sûrement l'unanimité désire un changement ; il n'y a guères de François, et le militaire y est bien disposé ; ce seroit le vrai moment d'entreprendre quelque chose, et, en outre, les villes fortes étant dégarnies de canons et de soldats. Je serois très tenté de croire que, si cela traîne encore, on s'entendra en Hollande pour y prendre des arrangemens entre soi, ainsi gare la maison d'Orange ! C'est à elle d'y penser bien murement ; il n'y aura pas de notre faute, car nous l'avons assez avertie ; si l'heure du berger est passé, il est difficile de la rattrapper ; alors c'est sauvé qui peut.

“ Les Belges sont de très bonne volonté, surtout le Pays de Waes ; les villes de même, mais n'osent encore se montrer puisqu'ils craignent leurs cités, et qu'il n'y a point de tête qui les commande ; ils ont envoyé à différentes reprises des émissaires en Angleterre pour être soutenus et secourus. Si l'on veut commencer une révolution en Hollande, nous serons sûrs de notre fait ; mais si elle se fait d'elle-même, il est à craindre deux contre un pour la maison d'Orange, car alors l'intérêt s'en mêle, et on n'en peut prévoir ses suites.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 17. Harley Street.—“ Voilà deux poste arrivée depuis quatre jours et je n'ai pas de lettre de mon pays. Je crois qu'on s'est imaginé là, qu'aussitôt que j'ai reçu l'ordre de venire à Petersbourg, j'ai pris d'abord la poste, que je suis déjà en route

courent com̄e un enragé pour saisir une place dans le ministère. Le Prince Bezborotko est mort le $\frac{6}{17}$ d'Avril, à ce que marquent des lettres particulières reçu dans la cité. Je perds un ami de 31 ans, et ma patrie perd le plus habil ministre qu'elle a jamais eu. C'est une perte irréparable.

“ Si vous avez quelque nouvelle de Petersbourg, faites moi l'amitié de me le communiquer.

“ Je crois qu'il n'y a rien à attendre de Berlin avant qu'on aient reçu là la réponse de Petersbourg sur les ouvertures qui ont été faites, à monsieur votre frère et au Comte Panin. Nous devons être bien contents de la rapidité des progrès des alliés en Italie. J'espère que ce serat de même en Suisse quand l'Archiduc Charles sera en état de reprendre le comandement de son armée. Il est facheux seulement de voir que le General Belegarde [Bellegarde] au lieu d'avancer avec tout ce qu'il a de forces et netoyer les Grisons et l'Engadine, ne fait la guerre qu'à la façon du Maréchal Lassi [Lascy], se tient enfermé dans le Tirol, et n'envoit que des petits détachements qu'il laisse battre par les Français.”

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 17. Cleveland Row.—“ Many thanks for your trouble about the maps. I will immediately replace the money to your account at Coutts's, and I should be obliged to you to send the maps by degrees as messengers come. I indulge the hope that their arrival will be frequent. I do not at all grudge the expense of the two other maps you have ordered.

“ I have to reproach myself with having omitted to write to you about your own concerns. There cannot be the least difficulty about replacing to you the full amount of your loss, and the only point is to ascertain it. For this the Office must of course refer itself to you, and the mode I meant to follow was to write to you an official letter saying that H[is] M[ajesty] having been pleased to express his disposition to replace to you the amount of your loss sustained, I am to desire that you will transmit to me a statement of the amount thereof as nearly as you can ascertain it. This statement, of course, need only be of a general sum, without the necessity of your specifying so much for the blue and silver and so much for the green and gold. Before I take this step I will wait for your answer to this.

“ These Austrians are really going on at a great rate in Italy, but as much as their armies delight me, so much am I disgusted with their cursed politics. I sometimes start when I think what great generals we are grown with our 40,000 Russians, which Austria wants at Philipsburgh, and Prussia wants at Dusseldorff, and which we are obstinately bent on sending to Basle. But after all one cannot surrender one's common sense to fifty Duke's of Brunswic, or five hundred Thuguts. I think one may venture to pronounce on past experience that if 60,000 Prussians, aided by the debarkation of 20,000 Russians, are insufficient to conquer

Holland, 230,000 are infinitely more so. The former may succeed, but I would forfeit my head if the latter do, for the first operation would stand some chance of being conducted on military principles; the latter would inevitably be nothing more than a political demonstration.

"You will have seen that your Secret Article is in some respects stronger and more explicit than what we had made up our minds to be satisfied with, but I hope you will be able to save us the *frais de mobilité*. I do not know whether I made myself intelligible in the parallel between the two Subsidy Treaties, but if you will yourself go through the process of the comparison, you will see that nothing is clearer than that [this] is a worse bargain, even so, than the other.

"As for Russian force to cover their left, and the D[uke] of B[runswick]'s fears lest France should do in 1799 what she did not do in 1787, it is all *fudge*, and deserves no more courtly phrase.

"I am delighted with your note in answer to my old friend Alvensleben, whose style I easily recognise. In truth you must not think it flattering when I assure you soberly and sincerely that I have never received one despatch from Berlin since you got there without seeing fresh cause to admire your judgment and talents, and to lament that you have not given them more frequent occasion to show themselves as they have now done.

"You see, of course, that your coming away while this convention is in question (may I not say while its execution is so?) is not to be thought of. Nor do I think you wish to leave such a work imperfect. The occupation is not always amusing, but the success must, I am sure, already amply repay you.

"God bless you, my dearest brother; you will easily judge the interest that I must feel in continuing to receive such assistance, especially when I am every hour hearing (from everybody who has success (? access) to know anything about it) the strongest expressions of its ability and advantage to the public service."
Copy.

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 18. Fort St. George.—"I refer you to the packet of *Gazettes* for the fate of Tippoo Sultan, and I rely on your friendship to see that justice is done to the author of that important event. I am very well; whether you praise or blame, *me me adsum qui feci!* We have found Tippoo's correspondence with the French in his palace. I am now proceeding to Seringapatam, where I have little doubt that I shall soon be able to settle a good arrangement. The kingdom of Mysore is absolutely at our disposal. I wish you to read my dispatches to the Court of Directors and to Dundas.

"You shall hear from me again soon, if the hot weather does not kill me. We have every reason to believe that the French are established in Egypt."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 19. Berlin.—“As neither of my messengers are returned from Cuxhaven I shall not be able to write to-morrow for Thursday’s packet; in truth, however, as Mr. Cockburn’s immediate departure gives me an opportunity of telling you that nothing new has arisen since my despatch of the 16th, I do not regret the want of a more regular communication. The interview which I expected took place on the 17th; it announced to me some better hopes, but of too uncertain a description to offer any ground of conduct, and I remained after the conversation perfectly satisfied with myself that I had not suffered the expectation of it to delay either of the messengers for one moment. I heard the new hopes with more patience than confidence, and I professed that I now thought no decision here could overtake the arrangements made, or bring back the same shape of things of which there had been question; but that there doubtless would be found in the great objects which still remained for discussion sufficient inducements of another description to enable us to act together as soon as a ready disposition to it should be manifested here. In this shape it now rests. My fellow labourer begins his pilgrimage in a few hours; when I write my next despatch, I will say more to you of his general ideas than I care to do at present, more especially as I can say nothing which is to affect anything you can do in the business before we hear of him; he is more moderate in his view of numbers necessary than you seem to have been in England, but he thinks the short line of communication beyond all measure preferable to the other, and I do most heartily hope that it will, upon examination, be found practicable in every sense of the word. We have no fresh military news; we hear that Rewbell is out of the Direction, but we know not who has succeeded to him in it.”

Enclosure 1.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, May 19. Berlin.—“Although my letter of the 16th instant will, I am sure, have sufficiently interested you in the arrival of General Stamford at Petersburg to ensure to him all the assistance which you are so well enabled to give to him, I cannot nevertheless allow him to begin this journey without taking the liberty of adding to the claim of his eminent talents, whatever you will be so good as to allow to the testimony which I can so well bear to his good qualities and his very amiable manners.

“Attached by opinion only to the cause in which he is engaged, he gives to his exertions in it, at the expense of a feeble state of health, all the powerful faculties of a mind uncommonly ardent and vigorous. It is impossible to know him two days without feeling his value, and though my praise cannot add to it, it will not lessen, I am sure, your good offices and good inclinations towards him.

"It will not be difficult for him through your assistance to have an audience of the Emperor on account of the verbal compliment which he will deliver from the Stadtholder, previous to the letter in question, and it is possible that his audience of the Emperor may have its advantage.

"I would likewise take the liberty of requesting you to introduce him to Captain Popham, if he shall be arrived, or to any other officer with whom it may be useful to him to have communication. And you will likewise forgive me for suggesting that upon a business so pressing both in time and in importance it may be useful to have more frequent recourse to messengers than is done in the ordinary habits of official correspondence.

"The course of the military operations being once concluded upon, General Stamford will be impatient to return to a post where his local information will be peculiarly valuable to the further success of the enterprise for the deliverance of Holland." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to CAPTAIN POPHAM.

1799, May 19. Berlin.—"It is with very great pleasure that I have heard of the share which you are likely to have in the important business which is in negotiation at Petersburg, being well persuaded that the issue of this great enterprise depends altogether upon the zeal, the resources, and the activity which will be necessary to superintend it.

"To assist in relieving those difficulties which the novelty of the proposition may produce at Petersburg, General Stamford has undertaken to go thither to discuss the military objections which will, perhaps, be put forward by the Russian officers, and may require some knowledge and some address to surmount.

"It is to request from you your assistance to him, and your co-operation with him that I have taken the liberty of addressing this letter to you. You will find in him, in addition to his acknowledged military talents and experience, a mind ardent, intelligent, and fertile of resources. I know how much these qualities will be congenial to you, and I have therefore the most extreme satisfaction in reflecting upon the assistance which this great object will derive from your mutual discussions and communications." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, May 20. London.—"We have an account to-day that the French fleet has been seen on the 2nd and 3rd of May off the Portuguese coast, steering S.W., evidently for Cadiz. If no accident happens to Lord St. Vincent by the junction of the two fleets, which naval men do not seem much to apprehend, all will be well, and we can easily reinforce him time enough to prevent the combined fleet from doing us any serious mischief in the Mediterranean. The Cadiz accounts do not speak of more than

sixteen ships fit for sea; the Ferrol squadron has, as you will have seen, missed them in the Bay, and is got into Aix. The being relieved from all watch of Brest will wonderfully ease our operations here, both naval and military. I thought of sending you a despatch to-day about *general concert*, but on the whole I have judged best to delay it till I hear from you again, and by the paper you enclosed in your last letter it does not appear that Haugwitz's ideas on that subject are as yet very far advanced.

"It requires more philosophy than I possess to see with any degree of patience these two German Courts struggling so hard against being saved. Still I trust the current will drive them to shore in spite of themselves. All this violence about the three most worthy representatives of the French Government at Rastadt is very fortunate for us, because it puts at a greater distance the possibility of Thugut's sacrificing, by some deep stroke of policy, all the present advantages of the situation in which Austria stands, in order to obtain a French guaranty of some square miles more or less in Germany and Italy. God bless you.

"It is *true* that we want the Elbe ships elsewhere, and do not withdraw them in order to save the question. It may be necessary that you should make this felt at Berlin, in order to keep them in order. If Denmark does not mend its manners we shall very shortly have a fresh naval war. Provided we dispose well of this combined fleet we need not much fear the hostility of Denmark.

"I send you the enclosed for criticism. It has been much approved here. It is the joint production of Pitt and your humble servant. You will perhaps say that we might both find better employment for our time than in writing Latin inscriptions." *Copy.*

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 20. Duke Street, Westminster.—"I send you the two papers which I mentioned yesterday, and which you told me you had not yet received from Mr. Grenville, to whom they have been communicated by the Hereditary Prince of Orange. The one is a note which was conceived between the Hereditary Prince and Count Haugwitz, and which the latter, if I recollect well, took with him to Minden, and promised to lay before the King of Prussia. It contains a request that those inhabitants of the United Provinces, who may be obliged to leave that country in consequence of the newly decreed requisition, may find an asylum in the neighbouring Prussian provinces. The other is a sketch of some of the most material improvements which the ancient constitution of the Republic seems to stand in need of, and of some preliminary measures which might be taken in the event of a happy change of circumstances. I doubt not but your Lordship will find that the paper contains some useful hints, tho' not very accurately expressed. It is to this latter circumstance that I chiefly attribute the Prince of Orange's

remark, which you will find in the enclosed letter. I thought it right, however, to send this letter to you, together with the paper to which it alludes. I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you soon."

Enclosure.

PRINCE OF ORANGE to H. FAGEL.

1799, May 19.—"Je vous envoie le projet de constitution, et la copie de l'adresse de mon fils au Roi de Prusse, avec prière de communiquer ces pièces à Mylord Grenville; mais, en meme temps, il est nécessaire d'observer que je n'ai pas eu le loisir d'examiner à tête reposée ce projet de constitution, et que je n'ai pas pu y faire les remarques et peut-être les corrections nécessaires; en gros je me conforme avec les idées contenues dans ce projet, mais je crois qu'il y a quelques points qui devraient être retouchés et élucidés, tels que l'article de la Présidence tant dans les-états-généraux que dans les différents collèges que l'on voudroit y donner au Stadhouder, et que je doute qu'il puisse prendre sur lui; les occupations attachées aux devoirs de son poste ne lui laissant pas de loisir d'assister journellement à les différentes assemblées; et peut-être y a t'il encore d'autres points qui demanderoient des changements."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 21. Berlin.—"General Stamford began his journey yesterday to Petersburg; taking with him Colonel Dumas, who is an old friend of his, and who accompanies him, though without being informed of the particular business which is in question. General Stamford's intention was to endeavour to direct the course of the proposed expedition from Revel to the neighbourhood of Delftzyll, and to land there 15,000 men, having previously established a *corps de reserve* of 5,000 men in the Russian principality of Yevern. He prefers this line of attack to any other for many important reasons; in the first place in pursuing Captain Popham's idea of passing along the Eyder, the Russian troops may go from the mouth of the Eyder to the coast of Delftzyll in so short a time as to keep the troops fresh for service, to require no intermediate place of *rendezvous*, and create none of those apprehensions which might be entertained about them in a longer passage. In the next place, the troops being so landed, will be easily masters of Schantz Buyrtang and Coverden, and thus have complete possession of the provinces of Groningen and Friesland, where they could long maintain themselves against any force which a change of circumstances in the campaign could enable the French to send there; a consideration which may become very important if at Petersburg they are inclined to represent this enterprise as being unreasonably hazardous, in case of unexpected reverses on the Rhine. The landing in North Holland he describes as being much more precarious in practice, and much more doubtful in success from the means of attack which the enemy might find in the ships of Amsterdam and the

fleet of the Texel. He considers, however, an attack to be made at the same time upon Zealand as an essential part of this plan, and regards that expedition as naturally taking place from the British Coast, in co-operation with the landing in Friesland; and he is persuaded that by means of these two attacks in Zealand and Friesland, with the circumstance of the English fleet to check the enemy at the Texel, and the favourable disposition of the people of the country, the command and possession of the United Provinces would immediately fall into our hands. He regards the principality of Yevern as a very great object in affording an useful point for the collecting of magazines and for the establishing a *corps de reserve*; and he considers 20,000 men as being a force so amply sufficient to the whole object that, in his last conversation with me, he frankly declared that he thought a larger number would be more embarrassing to the country than useful to the expedition, and repeated that he desired not a man more than 15,000 to land in Friesland, and 5,000 to remain as a *corps de reserve* in Yevern.

“If his military experience seems to authorise this more limited number, many considerations appear to me to concur forcibly in recommending it. Although there may be no actual ground of jealousy for us in seeing a large Russian army in Holland, yet common prudence would seem to suggest many motives for not putting that country more than is necessary into the hands of any foreign power; and if this consideration applies in some degree to English views, the prejudices of the Dutch too upon this subject should perhaps not be neglected; and I have frequently observed among some of our friends of that country considerable traces of uneasiness at the idea of a large Russian army taking possession of Holland.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 21. Berlin.—“You will have seen that Sir Charles Whitworth’s last letters from Petersburg are not very flattering to our hopes of General Stamford’s success, but I do not nevertheless abandon the enterprise, and I have persuaded myself, though probably I may not have persuaded you, that either by part of the *old* subsidiary army, or by a *new* subsidiary army, we must and will make good your project of 20,000 Russians assuring the deliverance of Holland by disembarking from the Baltick on the coast of Friseland. I have so long and so often tormented you by recurring to your 45,000 men for the means of attacking Holland, that I expect you all to be a good deal out of humour with me for venturing to suggest the employing one third of this force, in case no other troops should be supplied by Russia; and yet in honour and conscience I cannot avoid making this suggestion to you, and earnestly requesting you to consider whether you should not send, without a moment’s delay, to direct Sir Charles Whitworth to take this course, if they should adhere to their last answer at Petersburg, and refuse to furnish to

England any new subsidiary corps; nor can I help entreating you to remark how infinitely pre-eminent in importance it is that, at all hazards and in all events, this one blow of Holland should be struck now, when it is utterly impossible that any resistance can be offered on the part of the French. Upon this point, however, it is to you only that I can write, and I feel that I must not venture to say anything more to Whitworth which can affect the actual march of your subsidiary army after the formal decision which you have taken upon it, and the measures which you may perhaps have taken in consequence of it. If the knowledge of your deliberate determination had not precluded me, I would, on my own responsibility, have written instantly to Whitworth to entreat him to delay the march of the last 15,000 of the 45; but it would be unjustifiable in me to do so, and therefore I can only again conjure you not to let this disposition of force towards Switzerland lose to you the invaluable and perhaps irretrievable opportunity of the recovery of Holland. If both objects can go on together, there can be no doubt of that being the preferable course, but if an option is to be made and a sacrifice is requisite, surely there can be no hesitation in deciding between the possession of Holland and the increased effort of the combined army in Switzerland.

"You will observe that I have not noticed your despatch about the proposed convention, except to thank you for it, and I suppose you will understand my silence upon it to arise only from its not appearing now necessary to discuss it; I will only remark that their treaty of *demarcation* includes all the countries behind the line of it and therefore includes Holstein; the absurdity of their treaty is that by its literal interpretation Russia likewise would, as you see, be included; I trust, however, that you will respect no such neutrality, but that you will persuade Paul to insist upon his troops passing along the Eyder, and that you will likewise make of his principality of Yevern the commodious magazine and point of reserve which Stamford wants to make of it. I am impatient for news of the fleet. God bless you, dearest brother.

"You will easily comprehend that in the obscurity in which Schwerin has passed the last three years it is not easy for Stamford to hunt him out, now that he is on the high road to Petersburg. Mahony, who was proposed as second in command, is by this time in London, and as second is highly recommended by Stamford.

"You write to Garlike to complain of the Prussian posts retarding your messengers; I believe your messengers should be complained of for retarding the post. I never knew how bad they were till it was so much my business to observe them; it is shameful to see how negligent they are. Panin's couriers arrive at Berlin usually in nine, sometimes in ten days, ours are upon the average from twelve to thirteen days from Petersburg; from Cuxhaven your messengers are usually three days to Berlin. Dietry, who goes from here, almost always arrives at Cuxhaven in between fifty and sixty hours; in short, depend upon it, you will have no good messengers till some account is regularly taken of

the dates of their arrivals in their land journeys; the sea passage will always leave some room for abuse, but by land you may correct it. Panin is going to Carlsbadt for his wife's health ; he will be a great loss."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 21. Admiralty.—“Should you see any objection to our ordering away from the Elbe the frigates which were stationed there some time ago under the apprehension of an attack on Hamburg? That attack seems at present not to be very probable, and we are in very great want of our small squadron to scour the North Sea, which swarms with privateers, who run in and out on the Norway coast in a very intolerable manner, and will, I fear, do much mischief to our trade.

“I wish much to speak to you on one or two other points, and should be extremely obliged to you to let me know whether I could see you to-day between two o'clock and four, or at any other time after two, being engaged till then.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 22. Harley Street.—“Votre courier m'a apporté des dépêches qui étent en Russe ne pourront être traduite que demain au soir. Pourriez-vous me donner, dans la soirée de demain entre les 8 et les 10 heures, une demi-heure d'entrevue, car vendredi, il y a un courier Portugais qui vat à Petersbourg, et par lequel j'ai beaucoup à écrire, et mille lettres particulières au quelles je dois répondre. Votre courier m'a rendu le plus heureux des hommes. J'ai la certitude de recevoir par un autre de vos couriers, qui doit incessamment partire de Petersbourg, la détermination de l'Empereur qui me permet de rester ici. Soyez persuadé que je serai plus util pour le bien des affaires de loin que de près, où un tal[taille] d'enemis s'élaxeroient contre moi pour me traversser, et me donner tous les dégouts possible, ce qui m'auroit obligé de quitter tout-à-fait le service.

“Ainssi, et en ami et en politique, rejouissez-vous avec moi, et pardonez moi la joie inexprimable que j'ai de rester dans ce pays que j'aime, où j'ai des amis parmi lesquels vous êtes le premier.”

The HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, May 24. Berlin.—“Le départ du général de Stamford pour Petersbourg a fait grande sensation ici ; comme de raison. Je tiens à cet égard le langage dont je suis convenu avec lui, et en ai même parlé de cette manière à Haugwitz, qui m'a dit trouver tres-naturel que mon père envoie quelqu'un en Russie pour y veiller à ses intérêts dans des momens comme les présens, et où l'Empereur de Russie employe des moyens et avance des intentions pour le succès de la bonne cause. Du reste je suppose que Stamford vous aura fait savoir lui-même les véritables motifs de ce voyage, et dans le public ici personne ne semble douter que le but ne soit d'employer les 45,000 Russes

qui doivent passer en Allemagne pour la délivrance de la République. Je lui ai fourni des cartes marines du Zuider Zee et des Waddens qu'il a prises avec lui pour pouvoir consulter sur cette matière vaillant, et concerter les moyens d'une descente dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, si la chose entroit dans les plans des cours respectives. Je ne puis que me louer, par continuation, de la conduite de Mr. Grenville à mon égard, et je lui communique tous les renseignemens et informations que je recois, tant par rapport à la Belgique qu'aux Provinces-Unies. La confiance que Lord Grenville veut bien mettre en moi, d'après ce que vous me marquez, ainsi que l'assentiment qu'il donne aux mesures prises et proposées me flatte beaucoup, et puisque mon père y donne également son approbation, je continuerai à agir dans les mêmes vues et les mêmes principes. Je dois remarquer que si on travaille à établir la communication avec l'Angleterre depuis la Belgique, il seroit intéressant de savoir 1^o, de quelle manière les Anglois pourroient favoriser semblable entreprise ; 2^o de combien de forces disponibles pourroit ensuite être fait usage pour se maintenir, et aider à faire prendre de la consistance au soulèvement général." *Extract.*

INTELLIGENCE RESPECTING HOLLAND—from M. d'Yroy.

1799, May 25. Emmerick.—“ En Hollande l'armement de l'escadre de chaloupes canonnières Russes y cause les plus vives allarmes. La crainte qu'il est destiné pour les côtes du paÿs de Yevern, et la possibilité que la Russie y a envoyé des troupes, a porté le Directoire à en envoyer beaucoup dans les provinces de Frise et de Groningue : plusieurs régimens, avec presque toute l'artillerie à cheval, sont partis pour la dernière ; quelques autres, avec ce qu'ils ont de hussards, occupent les frontières de la Frise. La réquisition décrétée n'étoit point encore publiée hiér. On l'attribue principalement à ce que le plan d'organisation souffre beaucoup de contradictions. On presume qu'on mitigera la première idée en commençant par former un corps de volontaires, qui sera payé sur le pied des troupes de ligne, et devra être toujours en activité et servir avec l'armée : que du reste, on formera des corps de bourgeoisie armée seulement pour servir dans les districts, et qui ne seront payés que quand des troubles intérieurs exigeroient leur service. Tous seront obligés de faire la promesse de fidélité à la constitution et de la reconnoître ; ceux qui s'y refuseront, ne seront point armés, mais payeront le triple de la contribution de ceux qui l'age exclut de la conscription. On me mande que M. de Leeuw remplacera Van Hooff comme Directeur, et que le premier sera remplacé dans la seconde chambre par un nommé Jonckheer, fameux Jacobin.

“ Ce qui suit est en chiffre :—

“ D'abord à la reception de la lettre de Votre Altesse, je me suis rendu à Munster pour m'aboucher avec M. de Tuyll, que je trouvai prévenu par la lettre de M. F[agel]. Il sentoît parfaitement la nécessité de ne rien faire sans l'aveu et la connoissance du Prince Héritaire, et je suis assuré qu'il ne fera rien de son chef,

et qu'il n'agira que conformément aux intentions du Prince. Comme il n'avoit pas encore reçu la lettre de Monseigneur le Prince, et qu'on a des notions très-imparfaites sur la situation en Flandre, il partira incessamment pour là, afin de s'assurer par lui-même de tout ce qui concerne la position militaire, l'esprit public, et d'établir une voye sûre de correspondance, ce qui prendra tout au plus deux à trois semaines, et ne dérangera en rien le plan qu'on pourroit trouver bon de suivre. J'attendrai ici le résultat des arrangemens pris, afin de pouvoir, en conséquence, me concerter sur l'endroit le plus propre à favoriser et faciliter la correspondance, me trouvant ici dans un vrai foyer de tripotage, et d'un espionnage puéril qui ne finit pas. Je m'occupe, en attendant, à préparer les voyes pour être bien informé, et ne négligerai surtout point l'article d'une communication directe." *Extract.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 25. Cleveland Row.—“You will easily suppose by the feelings of your own mind those with which I received your letters to-day. My despatch will remove all difficulty which had been created by the variations of our wishes in the different prospects of Prussian politics. I trust very much to the Austrian successes for renewing the energy of this sleeping Cabinet (or interior Cabinet) at Berlin, and I feel a happiness that I cannot express to you, in being *myself*, as I am now, here in London to plan, and there at Berlin to execute.

“It seemed very important to procure Woronzow's support of our plan, and I therefore urged him to write by this messenger to that effect. He begged me to put in writing what it was that we particularly urged in this moment, and I sent him the enclosed minute, which I will beg you (in order to save me the trouble of another letter to-night) to forward *in a private letter* to Whitworth, that he may know what it is that Woronzow writes, for I am confident his despatch will be conformable to my suggestion. I will not forget the letter from the P[rince] of Orange, but I could not have got it to-day, and I was not willing to delay this messenger. A Portuguese messenger goes on Tuesday, and I will send it by him.

“Naval news we have as yet none of any importance. Captain Peard of the *Success* was chased by the French off Oporto on the 1st. They were then, as he counted them, no more than nineteen sail of the line, and their list of twenty-five is said to be certainly false. Peard bore away immediately for Cadiz. Lord Keith was returned to his station, but we do not accurately know his numbers. If Lord St. V[incent] is apprised in time he may have seventeen or eighteen, much more than enough to give an account of nineteen French.

"Then there is a story that the French were seen again from Lisbon on the 9th, but I think that is entitled to little credit. If it were true, Whitshed with five s[ail] of [the] l[ine] might join Lord St. V[incent] before the French got there. He might very well be at Cadiz the 12th.

"Lord Bridport has, we fear, been kept by the south-west winds on the west coast of Ireland, and consequently will not have been able to detach. But I see little or no room for uneasiness on this subject, and all the rest seems to go from good to better.

"I have received a project which is said to have been shewn you, from the L[andgra]ve of Hesse Homberg. I think nothing can be made of it. Pray tell me what hope you think there is of Saxons, and what course one could in your opinion best pursue on that subject." *Copy.*

Enclosure.

NOTE DELIVERED BY LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

"L'objet de l'expédition du courier de ce soir porte sur la proposition que l'on avoit déjà chargé le Ch[evalier] Whitworth de faire, d'un corps de troupes Russes pour être employé à une descente sur les côtes maritimes des Provinces-Unies, et pour y rétablir l'ancien gouvernement.

"Quand on l'a cru impossible d'obtenir la coopération de la Prusse, on a chargé le Ch[evalier] Whitworth de porter sa demande au nombre de 40 ou 45,000 hommes.

"Depuis est venue la proposition de Haugwitz pour fournir un corps de 60,000 Prussiens pour le même objet.

"J'ai alors écrit à Whitworth de se borner à demander 20,000 hommes pour l'opération maritime, ce nombre étant évidemment suffisant pour, avec coopération Prussienne aidée aussi par celle que nous pourrions fournir, chasser les François entièrement des Provinces-Unies, et des Païs-Bas.

"Aujourd'hui nous avons encore quelques espérances vagues d'obtenir cette coopération, mais, comme toutes ces décisions Prussiennes sont si incertaines, j'écris à mon frère et à Whitworth; au premier, de poursuivre toujours sa négociation, s'il y a lieu de le faire, mais à Whitworth de traiter à Petersburg pour le même nombre de 40 à 45 mille troupes, dont nous nous chargerons de tous les frais de transport, et qui nous donneront la certitude de délivrer la Hollande sans que cela dépende d'une politique aussi vacillante qu'est celle de Berlin.

"En tout cas il vaut mieux avoir trop que trop peu de forces.

"Je vous prierai donc d'appuyer auprès de l'Empereur cette demande, à laquelle nous mettons tout l'intérêt que nous inspire naturellement la délivrance de la Hollande.

"Vous excuserez la peu de précision de cette note, faite à la hâte comme vous l'avez demandé." *Copy.*

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 26. Wotton.—“With respect to your question as to the importance of the Lieutenancy to me in my future prospects, I need not say that certainly my *ultimate* object must be Buckinghamshire; but as, thank God, that object is not only I hope and trust, but is in point of fact in all human probability, very very distant (and it cannot be more than I pray it may) it ceases being the objection to my holding the Hampshire Lieutenancy which it otherwise would. With respect to my residence, I have not the least difficulty in saying that my residence will be fully sufficient to enable me to fulfil the duties of the office, should his Majesty confer it on me. I am fully aware of the trouble and the importance which attend it, but if it is given me I shall take it with my eyes open, and with a full determination to resign it the moment I should find my situation such as, from non-residence or any other cause, might make a proper attention to the duties of it difficult. Under these circumstances I trust I shall not be thought too pressing in urging the accomplishment of an object which a great many circumstances, private feelings, and (*entre nous*) a little family pride make important to me.

“When I see you I shall wish to talk with you respecting the possibility (supposing the Lieutenancy given me) and the propriety of my retaining my Buckinghamshire commission. For every possible reason I should feel the greatest and most insurmountable objections to the idea of leaving the regiment in which I now am; and as both the Hampshire regiments are full, I should suppose there would be no difficulty on that point.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 27. Berlin.—“My opinion still is that we shall at last succeed in bringing the King to a declaration against France by a manifesto of summons to evacuate Holland; and Haugwitz is grown so sanguine about his journey that he takes with him all that shall be necessary for this measure, in hopes of firing his manifesto from Wesel on the day of the King's arrival there; you may easily imagine with how much impatience Count Panin and I shall be looking out of our windows on the Brunswick road towards the 4th of June, about the time that you will be dancing the first country dances at the ball of St. James's; my imagination does not carry me beyond the expectation of seeing Haugwitz return on that day to conclude the convention with us, to accept the offer from Russia, and to take immediate measures for collecting the army which is to act for the deliverance of Holland. I questioned our Prussian Minister very closely about his information respecting the French troops opposed to the present army of observation, and he assures me that there are not above 4,500 men in Holland, about the same number in Mayence, and not more than 5,000 scattered about in bodies of 600 at Coblenz,

Ehrenbreitstein, Dusseldorf, Maestricht; so that in truth the Duke of Brunswick's army is unquestionably strong enough to march forward in the present moment, if the Landgrave of Hesse will only undertake, with the 18,000 now under arms at Cassel, to watch Mayence while the Prussian troops are collecting. The only check which I now fear is from the deplorable weakness or indecision of the Duke of Brunswick's character; if he has the energy of a mouse in the present moment the thing is done, and I have not failed to put in his way the remark that if he does not now take his part and do the business, we shall do it by a Russian General, and leave him with his doubts and his difficulties and his army of observation, to observe how easily eight or ten Russian battalions will take possession of Holland while he is looking at it, and menace the Flemish frontier of France while he is trembling at the feeble garrison of Mayence. Yet the last letter which I saw of his writing described with satisfaction the new eagerness which he found in his army, and which he justly attributed to the spirit of emulation which the Austrian successes have inspired. I have sometimes been apprehensive that he would be reluctant to commit his military reputation to an army of numbers comparatively small; but on the other hand it must be remembered that he will have the sole command of that small army, whereas upon the large scale which had been proposed the King would have commanded, and would have brought with him the influence of General Reukel, Köcheritz, Zastrow, who would hold the Duke of Brunswick, and govern him through the authority of the King. I had once the idea of suggesting to Haugwiz the additional advantage of our immediately co-operating by a descent in Zeeland; but as he has never required it, as the immediate difficulty might be increased by the uncertainty respecting the Brest fleet, and as I was sure that he would generally be prompt enough in asking this, and all of you enough prepared to furnish it, I would not add to the details of the first discussion, and have left it without any new remark. In truth I still retain too much doubt of our success with the King to build with any certain and secure hope on the journey in question, and you will have observed that I cannot bring myself to recommend the slackening of any of our new efforts, on account of the better appearance of the state of things here. Let us pursue our hopes here with all possible activity and energy, but let us not put confidence enough in them to sacrifice to our speculations here a single man whom we can employ with the certainty of success upon so important an object. Meantime it would almost amuse you to see how much Haugwiz and I have changed places in our conversations, how he triumphs over those doubts and hesitations with which he has inoculated me, and belabours me with all the zeal, ardour, and confidence which my friend Panin and I have hitherto unprofitably wasted upon him. I cannot better describe this to you than by repeating that he yesterday assured me that if the King would publish his manifesto next week at Wesel he, Haugwiz, would undertake to settle the arrangement of Holland

by going with 500 Hussars to the Hague, and peaceably making the new settlement of the country. Let us dream of this while we may, but let us nevertheless get our 20,000 Russians to march with while we can.

"I presume that you will already have taken notice that it is in consequence of a direct order to Panin that he has offered to the King of Prussia *the army* which has of late appeared to menace the Prussian frontiers; according to the terms of this offer *the army* in question would therefore be a voluntary addition of means furnished by the magnanimity of the Emperor, and so I have considered it, and so I have always spoken of it to Haugwitz and to Panin; but when I recollect that the Emperor made a similar offer to Prussia six months ago, and yet that the corps thus offered was really the subsidiary corps paid by England, I am sometimes afraid that they will endeavour to recur to the same course in this instance at Petersburg, and that after the orders given to Whitworth from England to propose another engagement for 45,000 men, the Russian Cabinet may mean to conclude with Whitworth for them in case the King of Prussia should accept this offer, and then two great inconveniences would happen; in the first place the Emperor would have the grace of an offer which we should have the pleasure of paying for; in the next place we should be engaged in our convention here for 60,000 men, and at the same time at Petersburg for 45,000 men more, which would unreasonably extend our expenses and engagements. Perhaps you will think that I am over-cautious and suspicious as to our friends and allies, but I confess I think any misunderstanding at Petersburg so great an evil that I cannot help recommending you to direct Whitworth at all events to conclude only for the 20,000 men which Stamford is gone to negotiate for; in that case, supposing our convention here to fail, you will have a surplus of your original sum, which will be applicable to the unavoidable expenses of Holland and of Flanders with which the Russian expedition there must be supported; but if no previous explanation be had upon this matter, it may happen either that you may be loaded with a very heavy expense, or engaged in a misunderstanding by refusing yourself to it after that they shall have reckoned upon it.

"We have lost our French Minister, and I very much regret his departure, for both in conduct and in character here he was all that we could desire the Minister of the great nation to be; another ground for regretting his loss is one of which you are likely to feel the inconvenience; he is considered as entertaining the opinion that France should stand upon the defence of its limits and offer peace to Europe, and his desire at all times for peace is said to be built upon the persuasion that peace would consolidate the power of the French Republic, an opinion on which he has so fundamentally differed with the ex-Director Rewbell; it seems, however, doubtful whether he will prevail in recommending this conduct, and if he does I still conceive that his description of limits would still point to the Rhine, and I

cannot but hope that before any such negotiation can arise, the Rhine may again have found some of its old acquaintances upon its banks.

"We have to-day uncertain rumours of movement in the Austrian army of the Archduke, and our politicians speculate upon the probable evacuation of Swisserland by the French troops now that Luciensteig is taken and General Raim is in the Valois; the last news from Vienna of the 18th instant describes Moreau to be encamped near Alexandria with 17,000 men; of the Neapolitan army I know nothing, but presume that the King is returned to his capital."

LORD GRENVILLE TO THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, May 27. Cleveland Row.—"There is I believe no messenger's place now vacant, or if it is, my turn is not come round. Dietry has I fear no chance, there being hardly an acquaintance I have in the world, or a peer who votes with Government in the House of Lords, that has not a *valet de chambre* who *'has travelled and would make the best possible messenger.'*

"Either Pelham or Lord Minto will go to Vienna; you know them both so much better than I do that I regret never having asked your opinion as between them. But I had another project which has failed.

"Who is Mr. Diemar? His information seems worth attending to.

"I received a few days ago a letter from you through Craufurd and respecting Craufurd's nephew. I had immediately on your going answered the father (I believe) of the young man (Craufurd of the Pay Office) by stating, what is the real truth, that my engagements leave me very little prospect of being able to bring him into the Office in any reasonable time, and that I would by no means advise him to sacrifice other prospects or views of any kind for one so remote and uncertain; almost all the clerks in the Office now being quite young men, and I myself being already under some engagements for vacancies.

"We shall be, as always happens, later with our transports than we had talked of; the plan of gallies would certainly be much the best, if no fresh difficulties are found in it.

"Did you mention to Stamford before he went what I said to you in my despatch about cavalry? I see it was omitted to be mentioned by me to Whitworth, but I hope you supplied the deficiency; if not, Stamford probably will, and, at all events, this despatch may be in time to do it.

"No news of the fleets.

"I believe I have not mentioned to you that Woronzow stays, and that Kotschouby is to direct the whole machine at present.

I fear he has not weight enough with the Emperor to prevent many extravagancies from being committed which will, in the course of time, much embarrass us." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, May 28. Downing Street.—“In answer to your private letter of the 30th April, I can at present only say that I should hope his Majesty would not be disinclined graciously to comply with your request in appointing you one of his Privy Council; but that appointment is no otherwise made than by calling the person appointed into the council, and there administering to him the usual oaths. This mark of his Majesty’s favour towards you must, inevitably, be deferred until your return to England.”
Copy

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 28. Berlin.—“As it is doubtful whether I shall have any communication this day or two which is worth the journey of a messenger, I write a few lines by this night’s post to acknowledge the receipt this morning of your despatches 22 and 23, with your private letter, as also your private letter by Mr. Casamajor of the 10th instant. By intelligence from Paris of the best source I am told that the object of the French fleet is to unite with that of Cadiz, to proceed to Toulon in order to embark troops there, and then to act successively upon Minorca, Naples and Sicily. My letter from Sir M. Eden of the 22nd instant encloses official accounts which I transmit to you of the success of the Austrians at Luciensteig, Coire, Sargans, ; he also mentions a messenger having passed through Vienna with despatches to Lord Nelson acquainting him with the sailing of the Brest fleet; he further informs me that Ruff the messenger had arrived with the despatches of which he was the bearer, and that the Austrian Minister had very cheerfully acquiesced in that employment of the troops which was proposed in these despatches from you.

“I presume that you will have had official despatches with these accounts more detailed, and it is only *ex abundanti* that I indulge my cautious temper in sending them likewise by Berlin post.

“I shall write by Mr. Casamajor to Petersburg in the same sense with that of my last despatch to you, Number 32. The numbers which I mention in that despatch become the more necessary to be repeated in consequence of the letter from Sir Charles Whitworth of [the] 14th instant under flying seal, which is forwarded by this post.”

Postscript. “We have accounts arrived here of the occupation of Genoa by the Russian and Austrian troops, and of a defeat of

the advanced guard of Macdonald's army; these accounts come from Nuremberg and appear probable, though they are hitherto imperfectly related. I doubt a little of the good policy of the measure which you announce in your No. 22, though I suppose that you may have reasons for it which I do not understand. I will write about it by my next messenger."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 30. Harley Street.—"Circello vient de me montrer un billet qu'il a reçu de mylord Spencer, qui lui annonce que les Français ont évacué Naples. Il ne se possède pas de joie et je partage celle qu'il rescut. Voilà donc un souverain légitime que vous avez eu la gloire de réintégrer dans ses états. Il faut espérer que nous aurons ensemble la satisfaction d'apprendre que la même chose arivera au Roi de Sardaigne, et que l'États de l'Eglise, quoique sans Pape, retournera sous la domination du Sacré colége, et qu'aucune parcelle de ces états, ainssi que du Piémont, ne seroit pas démembrés pour satisfaire l'appétit dévorent et insatiable de l'Autriche."

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 30. Ipswich.—"I left London on Friday on a visit to some of Lady Elgin's family, and intended returning early this week, but she has, most unfortunately, been seized with a violent indisposition which, though somewhat abated, is not yet sufficiently so for me to think of leaving her without an absolute necessity. This delay induces me to use the present mode of requesting your Lordship to be so obliging as to determine and notify the allowances attached to my mission, and the date at which they commence. The arrangement rests entirely with you; I never did propose, nor do I wish to propose, anything on the subject. But I hope that the nature of my embassy; the assistance it is to hold out at my expense for researches of various kinds; the number of English officers, naval as well as military, who will naturally make my house their home; and the aid and support (always leading to much expense) which some Foreign Ministers in London assure me their Governments expect from the English mission at Constantinople; these considerations, while they have guided me in the extent of my preparations, induce me to hope your Lordship will put the embassy in point of appointments, as well as in dignity, on the footing of an extraordinary one. I know that the appointments are in a regular course of payment from which there is no deviation. But you may probably be able to direct the allowances made on fitting out to be paid immediately; and it really is a matter of very great consequence to me, since my outlay on objects quite indispensable for me has been enormous, and ought to be paid before I sail. Some steps

having been announced to me as being taken at the Chamberlain's office for my plate, I applied while in London for the allowance in money, as I was obliged to collect the quantity required on such an occasion from different quarters, there not being time for my having a full set made at present. But it seems I cannot have this allowance for a twelvemonth, and having positively purchased the plate, this delay would be a material inconvenience.

"I am extremely sorry to have to trouble your Lordship so very much, but in fact I am anxious to be ready to sail as soon as the navigation is secure; and I foresee no delay whatever on my part but from these arrangements, on which I consequently feel very desirous of knowing your decision and having your assistance."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, May 31. Duke Street.—"The enclosed paper seems to me to contain all the material points upon which it is necessary that I should be instructed.

"I do not think that there can be any objection to preparing the King's letter even in the present state of Switzerland, the Government of which may fairly be considered by his Majesty as *suspended only*; particularly if the letters were to begin in this manner, 'Not doubting but that it shall have pleased God to have *restored* you to the *full* exercise of your sovereignty and the enjoyment of your liberties before our Minister shall reach you.'

"If your Lordship approves of this idea, I will procure a copy of the usual letter and submit it to you with such alterations as the occasion may seem to require. At all events the letter to the Grisons may now be prepared immediately; and, supposing I should find Switzerland still occupied by the enemy, I should strongly recommend, myself, an immediate assembly of the magistrates either in the Grisons, or, what would be still better, on the territory of Schaffhausen, the whole of which canton, about five square miles excepted, is occupied by the Austrians; and surely the Austrian bayonet is as capable of rendering an Assembly legal at Schaffhausen as the French cannon at Lucerne.

"At all events I feel it most important that I should set out as soon as possible, and I know of nothing that can detain me beyond the Birthday. I presume that it will not be necessary or even advisable for me to kiss hands, even though it is your Lordship's opinion and intention that I should have a regular commission.

"Your Lordship will, I trust, direct a letter to be written to the Admiralty to desire that I may be taken over in a ship of war.

"I have a private letter this morning from Lord Castlereagh, who tells me that the country has more the appearance of being settled now than it has had for these last two years.

"I will call in the course of the morning to receive your Lordship's command. The Irish Debentures are at 81, an increase in the revenue in the year ending 25th March of 500,000*l.*, a full fourth of the entire amount; and this notwithstanding the rebellion."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, May 31. Berlin.—"You will see that I have sent you the scold which I menaced you with for moving your gun-boats to the coast of Norway instead of leaving them to control the many supplies which had been used to pass both to the French-Dutch through the Waddens and to the French-Irish by the activity of Napper Tandy's Privy Council at Hamburgh; the trading from that place to Holland has been so extensive and so undisguised that I do assure you Haugwiz had been entirely persuaded that we were all parties to it in England, and when our little flotilla arrived and gave some check to it, he desired me to explain to him why we had altered our system in disturbing an intercourse which he presumed we had thought profitable to ourselves, from our having so long tolerated it without interruption; if Lord Hawkesbury and you are really such determined traders as Haugwiz appears to think you, my remonstrances will not be well received by you and him; but as I feel pretty confident that this cannot be the case, I have thought no time should be lost in writing to you formally upon it, and I have said something to Lord Spencer upon the same subject. When I sent you an account of the Emperor of Russia's *gracious* and conditional forgiveness of the city of Hamburgh, I felt a little too English to be perfectly satisfied with the prospect of our owing Napper Tandy and the satisfaction which we required about him to the interference of our friends at Petersburg; and, with every acknowledgment to the kindness of their motives, it appears to me that this point is one peculiarly of national dignity, and therefore one which should not invite on our side any, even friendly powers, as parties to it; I am making this observation only as a ground on which to express my hope that you will not direct Crawford or Whitworth to pursue this object in Russian partnership. I do not apprehend that it will soon come to issue, as it has been referred to H[is] P[russian] M[ajesty] and to the Duke of Brunswick as co-directors; and besides the usual laudable delays of such discussions, I flatter myself that on this day those great personages are employed in discussions of a more important and interesting nature. Yet as long as Cuxhaven continues to be our only point of contact with the Continent, it is in all its relations both of commerce and of ordinary communication a subject that requires very close attention from us; I wish I was satisfied with the attention and intelligence of all that you employ in that quarter, or that I could put you into

a better course than that which exists ; you will have seen, by the different detached observations which in many letters I have made to you on these subjects, that I have a restless desire to see all the business of *our* port of Cuxhaven pursued with activity and intelligence ; I do not by this mean any particular reproach to Mr. Harward, of whom I know nothing, but I cannot help expressing some desire that our general superintendence of this great English bridge was watched from home with all the attention which it deserves, and was not so much abandoned to the ordinary course of common packet-boat agency. If all goes well I trust we may soon expect a better road through Flushing, Helvoet, and Amsterdam ; but while Cuxhaven is our only stepping-stone, it is in importance worthy of very active and efficient control, and you would find the advantage of making Harward, or somebody at least, supply that to you.

“I delight in your confederate inscription, which I think, without flattery to either of you, is uncommonly good ; my only criticism upon it is that it is a little too much prolonged, and therefore, in defiance of your parental feelings, I send you back your child with some of his fingers and toes cut off, and I own ‘I like him the better therefore.’ *Voluntarii milites* with *ultra offerentes* is a pleonasm. The *Laus* and *Fama* is, I think, of too ordinary a style for so distinguished a composition, and *obmutescat* is not to my fancy. I cannot help thinking that after telling the story of the Dead the comment of praise should be made by the reader. I suppose you will both of you think my erasures very impertinent, and that you will probably add a line or two to the original in order to convince me how mistaken I was in thinking that there was a word too much ; yet you will observe that I have the modesty to add nothing but one little word, which I do not entirely protect, though I think the sense of it is wanted, for without it nobody knows where they died ; *ibi* should therefore be somehow found, though close to *idem* there is what Johnson would have called a cacophony of *iii*. I think I should upon the whole prefer *ibi etiam excepturi*. *Ipsa in morte invicti* seems to stand better after *occubuerunt*. I should not criticise much if I did not greatly admire. I thought I had concluded, but I must come back from Latin to English.

“I have heard here at various times, since your intention has been known concerning Mr. Paget, objections and difficulties stated which, though coming from leading persons here, I did not think it necessary to trouble you about, more especially as I have not the smallest personal knowledge of him ; but I have grown more uneasy about this subject since I have seen the strong impression which Panin has received upon it, and the serious anxiety which he expresses to me about it. I do not know how far this impression is in fact justified, but it is a matter of serious consideration that at so important a time any man should be sent here as English Minister against whom there is an unfavourable prepossession, which will stand very much both in his way and in the way of his Court. I have therefore, though with reluctance,

determined to mention the matter privately to you in order that you may give to it such consideration as you think fit. The objections which are made to him are stated to be a supposed want of knowledge of business and a want of attention to it, together with a violent and headstrong temper, and an affectation of *brusquerie* in his manners and conduct. The persons who are quoted to me for dwelling much upon these objections are Haugwiz and Gotz and Panin; to me Haugwiz has said nothing except now and then a remark upon Paget's youth and indiscretion; but Gotz, who is well considered here and was Minister at Petersburg, has strongly urged Panin for his own sake to endeavour, if possible, to procure any other appointment here; and I cannot fairly conceal from you that Panin's prepossessions are so strong upon this matter as to leave me very little hope that it will be possible for them to have that communication and friendly intercourse which, in these times, appears to be so desirable between the Russian and English Minister at Berlin. I do assure you that I have long hesitated to say anything to you which might step across the fortunes of a young man who is entirely unknown to me; but with all that I hear and fear upon it, I should not treat you with proper confidence if I did not advise you to pause upon it, and if [I] did not acquaint you with what I have heard of the impression made by his supposed appointment here. Would it not be worth while to consider whether you might not take this opportunity of endeavouring to bring into the line of foreign mission some higher rank both of talents and of general situation than the present course of succession in the line will afford to you; and would it not be a very considerable advantage to the whole of your foreign establishment if, by mixing in it a few persons of rather higher calibre, you could add both to the general estimation of the foreign line, and by increasing the desire to belong to it, you could add to the number of candidates from amongst whom you would have to choose. I cannot help thinking that, if you read the Peers and Commoners in the Red Book, you will easily find some of those names which we have more than once talked over; and the natural vacancy which I am now daily expecting to make for you at Berlin, in the conclusion of my business here, will give a fair opportunity for your introducing at once here some new man of talents, character, and rank enough to help you in his mission, instead of being helped by his promotion here at some cost both of anxiety to you and of insufficiency for the public business.—*Diri*.—You will not be sorry that I have arrived at the last period of my diplomatic sermon."

Private.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 3. Berlin.—"You will see by my public letter that, in the uncertainty whether the Emperor will not still delay your new engagement till he hears from Berlin, and doubting

whether his new offer to Berlin will admit of such extensive supply to you likewise, I have done what I could to lead them at Petersburg to adopt at least the measure of the 20,000 troops for Friesland and Groningen. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than I shall feel in the knowledge of this embarkation having entered the Eyder, though you do not tell me what hopes you have of that important passage being secured for us. Stamford's journey, and the obvious speculations arising besides from the general state of things, have created a good deal of discourse in the public upon measures of this description, and you will see by the Dutch correspondence that the enemy begins to move a little in that quarter. I have not, however, any apprehensions on that account, though certainly it furnishes a new reason for the greatest diligence and activity on our part. There is still a little confusion in the correspondence from Petersburg, though none that I think very essential; the force which Panin was directed to offer was no specified number, but was described to be the army on the confines of Prussia; yet Whitworth's letters speak of the same offer as being a specific offer of 45,000 men. Whitworth's letter expressly renounces on the part of the Emperor all further English subsidy while there is any hope of Prussia receiving it, and therefore I think myself justified in presuming that the Russian offer to Berlin is at the Emperor's cost, and has no reference to future English subsidy. Panin has no distinct orders upon this, and was at first inclined to think that the new offer from Russia to Berlin was grounded upon hopes of English subsidy and would depend upon it; but I think I have quite converted him by Whitworth's last letter, as I shewed to him that the Emperor expressly took credit for the generosity of his declining English subsidy in the moment when he was offering his new proposal of military aid to Prussia. I do not fear the result of any embarrassment on these questions, because I see that you are prepared in England to subsidise, if necessary, both the 60,000 Prussians and the second corps of 45,000 Russians; but I have not told Panin of this determination, because it would be desirable, if possible, to save you that expense. My speculation therefore is as follows. I think it not improbable that Haugwitz will return in a day or two, and offer to conclude for Prussian hostility as soon as the troops can be collected, provided we sign our convention for 60,000 men, and that Russia makes good the Emperor's last offer of 45,000 men to act upon the left of the Prussian army. Upon these terms, if the King consents, we shall be probably able to conclude; if we do, the 20,000 Russian troops will, I hope, still pursue the same plan of expedition, because by doing so they will both enable the Prussians to act more vigorously towards Flanders, and besides that, there will, I think, be an advantage in our having in the United Provinces Russian force enough to make us independent of Prussian co-operation, although I would not have that Russian force large enough there to put any bad thoughts into the head of Paul. Supposing, however, our treaty with Haugwitz to take

this turn, Panin is inclined to propose his concluding a separate treaty with Prussia for the 45,000 men, and my concluding separately with Prussia for the 60,000 men, and then an act of mutual accession to these treaties; perhaps this would be the clearest course to pursue, but I am not quite sure that the same impression of general concert would be produced in this shape, and I shall expect that Haugwiz will not be inclined to part with the security of Great Britain being connected immediately in the Prussian treaty with Russia, but for this we must be governed by what shall appear to be the most quickly practicable; the fault of the times is that every where but in England the whole world is fast asleep. Perhaps we shall fail at last in rousing the Prussian eagle at Minden, but even then we shall still be marching with our 20,000 Russians; and I delight in my spirited old general's insisting that more than 20,000 would embarrass the cause and the country more than they would assist it.

“With respect to Saxony I do not see what can be done there until this Prussian question is determined; if it ends favourably, Saxony will naturally drop into that system; if we continue to slumber here, that cannot be longer than until our Russians are in Holland, for if that event does not wake them their sleep is eternal. I know no separate way of influencing Saxony but by the old project which I used to plague you with of Russian march. What are you doing with Fagel and your old Stadtholder? my young one seems to do well.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 3. [Holwood.]—“I hope you will persist in the idea of discouraging absolutely all detachment from the 45,000 Russians destined to Switzerland; and of concluding a treaty for 20,000 to be employed on the side of Holland. If more can be had, and General Stamford is right in supposing more not wanted in that quarter, we can find other purposes to apply them to, and I am most inclined to think Prussia will have adopted very soon such a line, as will leave no objection at Petersburg to parting with a larger part of their force. The great points certainly are, to keep unimpaired the force for Switzerland, and to ensure what is necessary for Holland; but it seems very desirable to keep up the idea of our subsidising as many more as Russia can spare, to be employed wherever it can be done to most advantage.”

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, June 3. Cleveland Row.—“If we cannot have forty, and if Stamford undertakes that twenty shall do, to be sure we must

take them if we can get them. But I cannot think we should do well to retard the march of any part of the first forty-five, with a view to this object. If I have learnt anything by the disagreeable lessons of this war it is that success in military operations wholly depends on acting *en masse* on one or two chosen points, and in avoiding to distract your force by multiplying your objects of attack.

"If my whole forty-five were at this hour in Switzerland I am confident there would not be a man too many there; and if either by any waverings in our decision, or by any effect of the cursed crooked policy of my friends at Vienna, the force in that quarter is diminished before the object is completely obtained, the whole game will be thrown back again, and then our twenty in Holland will only be food for frogs. I never felt so confident in my life on any one point as I do that the success of the whole and every part of this war depends on pushing the campaign with vigour in Switzerland, and this can only be done by the arrival of a new army there, for you see how a first army wastes itself away even by its own successes.

"Another and no inconsiderable advantage is that these Russians will now, by the course which events have taken, be more or less under Suwarow's orders, which they could not be if any other destination was assigned to them.

"Let Stamford therefore limit the new force to twenty thousand men if he will, but I cannot spare him a man of the others, and had rather undertake the reconquest of Holland from hence, with militia regiments, unpromising and difficult as that project would be.

"I have taken your hint about the messengers, and you will receive an official despatch on the subject.

"You will think we have on the whole no reason to be dissatisfied with the naval news, though, to be sure, one had rather have beat them. I suppose you will hear the details from Lord Spencer, but as I know it is not very kind to one's friends at a distance to act on that sort of supposition, I will just mention that Lord Keith with fourteen or fifteen was a day and a half between the two fleets; the French fleet had the wind of him though they have published that they were manœuvring to get it. The Spaniards (nineteen sail of line) were in movement in their port, but did not come out of it. The junction was evidently the object the French had in view. The storm or gale of wind dispersed them, and probably drove them into the Mediterranean. They passed the Straights the 4th or 5th and Lord Keith four or five days after them. Lord St. Vincent's intention was to collect the whole at Minorca. He would have there nineteen or twenty sail, and Whitshed with five more was off Lisbon the 16th, and would therefore join him a few days after. This is much more than enough to block Toulon, and I hope therefore he will not have interrupted the services of Sicily, Malta, and Alexandria. But he did not know at first of Whitshed being sent, and it is therefore to be feared that he may in his first anxiety have despatched orders to collect his whole force.

“ Lord Bridport has received, and probably has by this time executed orders to detach Gardner with seventeen sail of line to reinforce Lord St. Vincent]. These I presume will continue the blockade of Cadiz. In the meantime it is reported that the Spaniards have sent out seven sail of line from Cadiz, probably to the Havanna. If so they have gained some, though a very inconsiderable advantage from this move, by which France has, at a great expense of men and money, contrived to place us in a much better and more secure position than we were before, both with respect to the facility of naval operations, and also with a view to the most important point of all to us, which of course is that of Ireland.

“ There is not the least ground to fear that any mischief can arise from their being five days before us in the Mediterranean. They had got into Toulon and were repairing and refitting there—operations which in any state of that port, but much more now, would take them some time.

“ Smith writes me word not to believe the Constantinople news of success against Bonaparte. If Hamilton and Lord Nelson’s opinions are to be relied on, the King of Naples must long before this be returned there ; but they are both sanguine, or rather the latter is so, and the other takes any impression that is given him.

“ Pelham has refused Vienna, and Lord Minto will be sent, but I have not yet spoken to him. Wickham returns for a few months to Switzerland, where his assistance will indeed be invaluable to me. He can ill be spared here, but our Jacobins are brought so low that we can leave them for a few months with less attentive watching.

“ The Emperor of Russia will oblige us to have our Irishmen, whom I could have been content to leave in prison where they are. If they are sent to us they must be hanged, and God knows they will deserve it.

“ I leave this open till to-morrow, though I suppose the pleasures of Court dinner and ball will leave me little time to add to it. I have seen Mahony and have recommended him to Almeida. You forgot to recommend him to me, or I have forgot that you did so ; but Lord Spencer did, and that answered the same purpose.” *Copy.*

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to BRIGADIER-
GENERAL KOEHLER.

1799, June 4. Acre.—“ I have to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters of the 3rd, 9th, 12th, 23rd, 24th and 26th April, which I find accumulated here on my return from a successful cruise between Jaffa and Damietta to pick up the wreck of Bonaparte’s retreating army, and cut off his supplies meeting him.

"It is needless to say I entirely approve of your obvious plan of campaign, as you see I have successfully executed a principal part of it, and the execution of the rest is easy, as I have successfully sown discontent and insubordination in the French army by the distribution of the proclamation of the Porte among them from high to low, so that a more disorderly army never was seen under arms. Our success will now depend entirely on the early assembly of the forces destined to act against them in Egypt. I have sent positive orders to those committed to my direction to come forward without waiting for each other, that we may profit by the distress of the enemy before they recover after the passage of the desert. I have sent a copy of these orders to my brother, who will no doubt communicate them to you; and shall transmit this letter by another conveyance, in order to multiply the chance of your being early informed of my present movements. I need not tell you how much I long for your presence on the scene of action, where your peculiar talent would much shorten the business. I have hitherto endeavoured to profit by the lessons in the art of land operations which your instructive conversation has frequently given me, and with such success as to make me thankful to you. The Nile will be of course the high road by which the army must be supplied as it advances in Egypt, and from which it never can separate far. I am taking measures to have a respectable flotilla on the coast ready to enter the river when its banks are sufficiently protected by the advancing army; thus each will mutually support each other as at Acre, and Bonaparte has seen that such a combination is an over match for him.

"Major Faed's arrival enables us to begin putting Acre in such a state of defence as will allow of its garrison moving on. The Pasha is too overjoyed at the arrival of an additional Englishman for it to be possible for me to announce, in the same breath when I present him, that you require his immediate return.

"As to the *Charon*, I can only say that I have been most anxiously waiting for the supplies of ammunition she contains, which, I need not say, were much more wanted in the presence of the enemy than anywhere else. I considered myself as authorised to order her to join me, not knowing she contained anything besides what I had pointed out at Woolwich for the equipment of the flotilla; in which idea I was confirmed by General Rosse's letter of the 17th November, of which I enclose you a copy, to prove to you that I did not act unadvisedly in the business. I have now only to tell you that I am obliged to beg and borrow powder of the Turks, after having spared them mine in action, to ensure your not detaining the *Charon* from joining me at Aboukir." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 5. Stowe.—"The newspaper of Tuesday, which I received this morning, explains to me what I had not understood

before, namely, your expectation of seeing me in town on Monday, of which I never had the smallest idea ; but having seen the account of what passed in the House of Lords with respect to Lord Berkeley's marriage, it was natural for you to expect to see me there. Perhaps you will be surprised when I tell you that I never had heard of his intention to bring that matter forward ; and that the information which I got this morning at ten o'clock was the first I received that it either had, or was to be discussed ; and I have been very seriously distressed as to my line of conduct. A very confidential communication respecting his connexion with Miss Tudor, or rather with respect to her children then born, had been made by Lord Berkeley to me some years since ; and that communication was, at his desire, made by me to his brother and Mrs. Berkeley. His brother considers that communication as very material on the question ; for, the last time I saw him, namely in May, 1798, he recalled it to my recollection and discussed it with me, repeating the inference which we both drew from it at the time. I can, between the two brothers, have no choice or object but that of justice. I do not even guess whether George Berkeley means to take any part, either now or hereafter, upon this question ; but I should rather imagine that he does. I cannot write to Lord Berkeley upon this subject without committing his brother's name, which I have no authority to do, and which perhaps might make ill blood between them ; and I am very doubtful how far I ought to *volunteer* on this occasion the disclosure of communications which were strictly confidential, and which I have never mentioned save to his sister Lady Berkeley, with whom Lord Berkeley has, at very many times, conversed very confidentially upon this matter. At the same time I feel that George Berkeley has a right to my evidence, and to that of my wife ; and so has Lord Berkeley. The latter has not called for it, but I should think it highly probable that his brother would. Under these circumstances I should myself move in the House of Lords to postpone any resolution till after the return of Admiral Berkeley, if (as I said before) such a step did not seem likely to give his brother umbrage as with respect to him, from a jealousy that it was done in concert with him ; and for the same reasons I do not choose to write to Lord Bathurst or the Duke of Richmond. But, having the highest confidence in Lord Loughborough's private honour, as well as his great discretion upon these most unpleasant family discussions, I wish you to communicate this letter to him in strict confidence, for no one save Lady Buckingham will know that I have written it, with my earnest request that he would find means of putting off (upon points of order) any final or conclusive resolution till George Berkeley has the means of personally judging for himself what it befits him to do, as with respect to the question itself, or with respect to my evidence and that of Lady Buckingham upon it. And I will beg you very particularly to keep this letter entirely private from everyone save Lord Chancellor. I have long seen this very unpleasant storm gathering, and am *very very* sorry for it."

The HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1779, June 7. Berlin.—“Au lieu de revenir ici avant-hièr, comme Haugwitz l'avoit annoncé, il accompagna le Roi à Cassel et ne sera que le 14 de retour à Berlin. D'après ce qu'il a dit à son départ, on devoit juger que c'est un bon signe ; du moins étoit-il d'avis qu'on devoit le regarder comme tel. Il n'a pas écrit ni à Mr. Grenville ni au Comte Panin, mais il a donné de ses nouvelles au Comte de Ginck, et celui-ci a dit hièr au Panin, avec sa circonspection ordinaire, que Haugwitz paroissoit content de son voyage et du Duc de Brunswic ; ainsi c'est un motif de plus d'espérer. On peut d'ailleurs compter que si le Landgravé de Hesse est consulté, ce qui semble être l'intention, il travaillera et conseillera tout à fait dans le bon sens ; et pour lors les lettres de l'Empereur de Russie, qui en a écrit à ces deux Princes, comme j'en rendis compte dernièrement par rapport au dernier, pourront faire encore leur effet. Il n'y a, en attendant, rien à faire de notre côté que d'avoir patience encore une dizaine de jours, et même, d'après l'avis de Mr. Grenville, je fais rester Tuyll ici, qui est venu prendre des instructions avant de partir pour la Flandre, et qui étoit porteur de très-longues lettres d'Ivoy, qui a établi une communication avec Ruys et Michiels, et par lequel canal nous avons appris que le Duc de Brunswic cherche à avoir des renseignemens sur les Paÿs-bas.” *Extract.*

INTELLIGENCE RESPECTING HOLLAND, *from M. d'Yroy.*

1799, June 8. Emerick.—“En Hollande les défaites des Français influent sur les meneurs : tout annonce confusion, et abattement. On travaille sans plan à remettre l'Yssel en état de défense, tandis que d'autres ouvrages annoncent l'incertitude contre qui ils devront servir. On s'attend à voir arriver le 21 du courant la colonne Russe destinée pour la Bavière. Un corps nombreux des mêmes troupes se trouve rassemblé sur les frontières du côté de la Prusse-méridionale, et le bruit se soutient toujours que quelques milliers d'hommes de la même nation seront sous peu débarqués dans le Holstein. On voit clairement que les meneurs en Hollande prévoient le terme de leur domination s'avancer à grands pas, qu'ils se doutent de quelque dessein des puissances, mais ne savent de quel côté cela viendra. Delà la confusion de tous leurs plans et la nullité de tous leurs travaux. La réquisition, loin d'être poussé avec vigueur, trouve les plus grandes entraves, suggérées par les Directeurs même. Le nombre de François, diminué à vue d'œil, et l'exportation libre de tous effets mobiliers, défendue depuis 9 ans, décrétée aujourd'hui, n'est que pour faciliter la retraite de ceux qui sentent ne pouvoir attendre le dénouement.”

Ce qui suit étoit en chiffre.

“Depuis que je me trouve dans ces quartiers j'ai eu occasion de

m'entretenir avec plusieurs Belges émigrés, qui ci-devant étoient membres du Gouvernement : chez la majeure partie j'ai trouvé l'inclination marquée de voir s'effectuer une réunion de leur pays avec les Provinces-Unies sous un même chef, et c'est avec le plus grand plaisir que j'ai vu qu'il n'existoit aucune dissension sur le choix de ce chef, au cas que les Puissances, dont dépendra le sort de ces deux pays, n'aient point de raisons de s'y opposer. J'ai toujours craint que la différence de religion feroit du côté des Belges une difficulté insurmontable; ou bien que lors même qu'ils glisseroient sur ce point dans le premier moment, cette différence pourroit dans la suite amener des troubles nuisibles pour l'autorité souveraine dans des momens de mécontentement. Mais j'ai été tranquilisé sur ce point, et j'ai trouvé à cet égard un esprit de tolérance et de modération chez ceux même qui par état sont le plus attachés à la religion Catholique Romaine, et que toute difficulté de ce côté-là est levée. Les Belges, et surtout ceux du Brabant, ne désirent aucun changement dans leur constitution, et toute autre forme de gouvernement qu'on voudrait leur donner que celle d'un souverain sur le pied de la *joyeuse entrée*, ne les contenteroit pas. Il y en a même qui m'ont demandé pourquoi si les Provinces-Unies faisoient des difficultés, et qu'on ne jugeât point prudent de faire adopter à ces Provinces la même forme, on ne pourroit pas être à la fois Stadhouder des 7 et souverain des 10; que, quant à eux, ils envisageoient la réunion, non des 17 provinces entre elles, mais sous un même chef, comme le plus grand bonheur pour les deux pays; que le souverain, prenant l'engagement de ne point aliéner ni séparer les dites provinces, devoit être le seul lien qui les associât; qu'on devrait bien se garder d'établir entre elles un pacte d'union, ou d'en former un seul corps, représenté par une assemblée d'Etats-Généraux : qu'en prenant pour base du gouvernement dans chaque province en particulier la *joyeuse entrée* du Brabant, le souverain obtiendrait toute l'autorité nécessaire pour gouverner cet ensemble, et que chaque province conservant sa constitution primitive, aucune d'elles n'auroit à se plaindre, puisqu'un chacun conserveroit ses loix et ses privilèges, sa religion, et sa liberté. Les obligations du souverain consistent (1) à ne point lever de taxes que du consentement des états; (2) à faire rendre justice à chacun par son juge compétent, et d'après les lois établies; (3) à n'introduire aucun étranger dans les charges de l'état. Pour le reste l'autorité souveraine réside dans le chef. C'est sur ce pied que je m'assure que les Belges verroient avec plaisir, désirent même, que cette union se fasse; mais on n'en est encore qu'au sentiment particulier de quelques individus, qui, une fois assurés et instruits des intentions des Puissances à cet égard, n'adopteront pas seulement pour eux-mêmes cette forme, mais contribueront par leur influence à la faire confirmer par le voeu unanime du peuple. Ceci n'est point une nouveauté pour les Belges. En 1715 le même plan a existé; en 1791 ils l'auroient exécuté avec plaisir; mais à ces deux époques ils furent rendus à la maison

d'Autriche, ce que les rend scrupuleux aujourd'hui à faire plus que d'exprimer leur désir, et s'expliquer par manière de conversation particulière sur la forme à adopter, et les moyens d'y parvenir. Si les Puissances, dont le sort de la Belgique dépendra, pouvoient dans ce moment s'expliquer sur leurs intentions à cet égard, si elles pouvoient donner aux Belges ne fut ce que l'assurance de leur disposition à établir cette réunion, et à y consentir pour le bonheur des deux pays, au cas que les circonstances rendent la dite réunion possible, on verroit les Belges marcher avec confiance vers ce but, et ne rien négliger pour en assurer le succès; mais tant qu'on ne peut s'expliquer à ce sujet, la possibilité de se voir ramener sous la domination Autrichienne, et l'incertitude des vues que les Puissances ont sur eux, les rend circonspects et sur leurs gardes afin de ne pas se compromettre. Il y a quelques semaines que j'en ai écrit à Berlin, mais j'ai eu pour réponse qu'on croyait trop prématuré encore que l'Angleterre put s'expliquer sur un point de cette importance." *Extract.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1799, June 8. Dropmore.—“In consequence of what passed in conversation between us a short time since, I lose no time in mentioning to you that Sir M. Eden's quitting his present situation being now finally determined on, I should have the greatest pleasure in being permitted by your Lordship to submit your name to the King for the important duties of that situation, on the active and able discharge of which the interests of this country so much depend in the present moment.

“As it is wished that the termination of Sir M. Eden's mission should be arranged in the manner the most satisfactory to his feelings, it will be desirable that the circumstance of your being destined to it should not be publicly declared till the return of the messenger now sent to Vienna; but I am very anxious that you should, in the meantime, make such preparations as may enable you to set out with the least possible delay after Sir M. Eden's resignation is received.” *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 9. Roehampton.—“I am this moment honoured by your Lordship's letter of yesterday, and am much flattered by your opinion that the important affairs of the mission to Vienna may be confided to me, and I beg you to accept my best thanks for this mark of your Lordship's confidence. The strong sense I entertain of the importance attached to the affairs of that quarter in the present moment would make me more diffident of myself, if I were not encouraged by reflecting that I shall act only under your direction; and I need only add that I

shall hold myself ready to obey your commands whenever you are pleased to call upon me.

"It will be matter of real satisfaction, and indeed relief to my mind, that my appointment should stand clear of everything uncomfortable respecting Sir M. E[den], and I shall be careful to observe the caution you prescribe on that subject.

"One of the preparations I should be most anxious to make for my departure would be to peruse the correspondence from Vienna, and I shall take the liberty of applying to your Office for leave to do so, if your Lordship does not disapprove of it."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 9. Stowe.—"Your resolution to suppress my letter in consequence of the determination to keep the question upon Lord Berkeley's marriage open till George Berkeley returns, is exactly what I could wish. Nothing can pain me more than to be obliged to appear as an evidence on such a subject, and I should not have written even to you upon it if I had not feared that the chapter might have been closed without an opportunity having been given to the brother to act and speak for himself. It is impossible that Lord B[erkeley] in his character of husband, father, and brother, can come out of this fiery trial to advantage. His line of conduct, upon his own statement, is most incorrect, as well as most silly; but those who do not believe the statement he makes of his first marriage will, of course, think that no conduct can be more dishonest. I was aware of all the circumstances you have stated, except the averment that the first marriage was by banns; and I perfectly agree with you that no parson could have publicly proclaimed those banns in Berkeley church, or registered the marriage afterwards in the public register, without an immediate discovery of both those steps. The character of Hipsman (son to an old governess of Lord Berkeley's sister) always was most *villainous*, and his share in this transaction adds to the doubts upon it. I am most happy that I was not in London when Lord Berkeley called upon you to make his communications, which you cannot have been more anxious to avoid than I should.

"I am now to request from you two favours, neither of them, as I hope, very troublesome; the one a common letter to Sir M. Eden recommending in the usual manner to his protection Mr. Blaquiere, who is arrived at Vienna from Munich on his travels, and whom my *particular friend* Sir J. Blaquiere, his father, requested through John Beresford, that I would recommend to you for a letter of this description.

"My second favour is that you would recommend for the honour of knighthood my friend Dr. Pegge, who wants to be Sir Christopher Pegge, who is to be presented to the King as major of the Oxford volunteers on Wednesday the 18th. He is an

Oxford Professor of Anatomy; his brother Professor at Cambridge has been knighted. *Hinc lacrymæ!* till you wipe them from his cheek, by notifying to him the King's consent through me to this high honour. Setting aside this folly, in which I suspect his wife has the greatest share, he is a most excellent good man, and very high in his profession, and the real father of all the Oxford armed associations."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [LOUGHBOROUGH].

1799, June 10. Dropmore.—"I send you a letter which appears to me to be well deserving of attention.

"There could, I think, be no objection to, 1. Expunging the present power of licence or approbation given to the Grand Master, a person totally unknown to the law or to Parliament.

"2. Requiring all Lodges now existing to register themselves and the names of their members with the Clerk of the Peace for the place where they meet.

"3. Prohibiting any new Lodge from being formed; and

"4. Empowering the Quarter Sessions, at their discretion, to dissolve any existing Lodge.

"5. Obliging all new members of any old Lodge to register themselves within six months after their admission. And in case these conditions are not complied with, subjecting the meetings to the general provisions of the Act.

Postscript. "I am sorry to trouble you again about Lord Dunstanville, but, you will see by the inclosed, I cannot avoid it." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 10. Wimbledon.—"I received your letter last night. If the possession of the island you mention would have the effect of enabling Lord St. Vincent more effectually to blockade Toulon, it is certainly most desirable, and is an additional ground of regret in the deficiency of our offensive force. By the despatches which went some time ago, Lord St. Vincent, for the safety of Minorca, is entitled to make a call upon the Portugal force, and likewise to call for one regiment from Gibraltar. I can extend that liberty to the other object by tomorrow's despatches, but I do not perceive that I have the means to do more at the present moment without disturbing the arrangement I have made to be ready to execute our engagements at the isle of Walcheren, if called upon for that purpose. The enclosed paper will show you the arrangement I have made. They are a body of excellent troops, and I trust adequate to the purpose, but it would not be wise to take anything from it; and I am only enabled to do it by borrowing from Ireland and Jersey and Guernsey, having in view to replace the force so borrowed by the fencible regiments now raising for European service."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 10. Berlin.—“I take advantage of the suspension of business produced by Haugwiz’s journey, and sit down to answer a few detached questions in your last letters which I have not yet had occasion to notice. When you ask me my opinion of the comparative merits of Lord Minto and of Pelham, I think I cannot answer you according to my own ideas more satisfactorily, than by referring you to what you yourself officially know of them, and by reminding you how much more secure from humour, irritation, and eccentricity you would find your correspondence with Pelham than you can hope to find it with Lord Minto. I know Pelham well enough to feel confident in his good sense and good judgment, in his close observation of the tempers of other men, and in the perfect command which he has of his own; added to which he has a natural cheerfulness and gentleness of disposition which very much assists him in communications of business, and makes all transactions with him more easy as well as more agreeable. Lord Minto’s talents are superior to Pelham’s as applied to any single object of composition, and I have no doubt that he would write a better argument and make a better speech than Pelham could do; but for the average of business, including conduct, discretion, and temper, I should have no doubt in preferring infinitely the commoner to the peer, and I believe you will trace this opinion very strongly if you converse with the Duke of Portland, who has corresponded so much both privately and officially with both of them. They are however both of them in the class which I adverted to in my last letter, and you will already have seen in that letter how important it appeared to me to be that you should give yourself the best materials which can be found, in order to give to the business of your department all the advantages to which it is so well entitled in your hands. Did I ever name to you upon these subjects the name of Lord Amherst? He is a young man with whom I am personally not much acquainted, but the little that I have seen of him has given me a very good opinion of him; and I have heard from many who know him well so high a character of him, that I cannot help thinking that he would be an acquisition to you in the foreign line; his rank in life would make his appointment creditable, his talents would, I believe, make it useful to you, and his very limited income would probably make it convenient to himself, and enable you from his youth to place him at some of the second courts, the missions to which would be infinitely more sought after if two or three such appointments could take place. In the same view, among the peers, Lord Boringdon might perhaps also occupy the subordinate situation of a second or third rate court, till occasions of promotion should occur; the names of Lord Hobart and Lord Bathurst I do not mention, both because they are obvious enough, and because they apply only to the highest class of business; whereas, in my view, I want to see your succession-house well stored, besides all that is wanted

of the best for immediate use and consumption. You once thought of proposing some such matter to Lord Carysfort ; I do not know whether he would be inclined to it, but I should think that he might like it for a year or two, and that it might not be disagreeable to him ; if so, and if Elisabeth could take to it, I believe they would both like it and be amused with it, and I am persuaded that he would do well in it ; but perhaps these are all dreams and visions.

“ You ask me concerning Diemar ; he is, I believe, a Swiss, has been in our service in some of the foreign levies of this war, and was, I believe, in the commissariat in Flanders ; he has long been well known to general Stamford, and it is upon Stamford’s authority that I stated Diemar’s Cuxhaven intelligence as being to be depended upon ; our general thinks he will be likely to be of use in the necessary arrangements in the principality of Yevern, as he perfectly knows every inch of that country, and is well versed in the knowledge of the commissariat part of his profession ; meantime he is at present only in quality of post-chaise friend and companion to Petersburg. The mention of these last names reminds me of the business upon which they are employed, and of the desire which you shew in your last letter to keep clear of any large embarkation of cavalry ; I believe I have neglected to tell you that I had already spoken in the same sense to Stamford, and that I found his opinions entirely agreed with those which I see you entertain ; the idea therefore upon which we had agreed was to embark at Revel only a small body of dismounted cavalry with all the necessary accoutrements, and trust to Frieseland and Groningen for mounting them when they arrive. If the French should be able to collect any considerable force in Flanders, it will then be necessary to have the assistance of English cavalry in a country where they can act with so much advantage ; but for the first landing in the neighbourhood of Delfzyll, the dismounted Russian cavalry would easily find a sufficient number of horses ; or if it be thought more advisable, those horses might be provided in Yevern which is accessible, as I am told, by a tolerably good seaport, and which is always considered in our military conversations here as the most advantageous spot for a depot of every description. The more I consider this project of attack the more partial do I grow to it, nor can I figure to myself any formidable difficulty to encounter in the execution of it, if either by fair means or by foul you can pass them along the Eyder ; for the difference between this course and that of the Northern Ocean may decide upon the success of the enterprise, and perhaps may decide the Court of Petersburg as to the engaging in it. The feverish state of English politics at Copenhagen seems to offer very little resource upon this point, but I endeavour to persuade myself that if the Emperor’s vanity be well engaged in the prospect of recovering Holland by Russian regiments, he will not be pushed out of his project by the Danish punt-poles in the river Eyder.

“ If I had a mind to hunt after new sources of uneasiness I should dwell more than I do upon Panin’s last letters from

Petersburg, which hint at some uneasiness arising there with respect to Stockholm about their Finland frontier; it had gone far enough for Paul to recall from his German corps one or two of his officers who have served in Sweden, and to begin to make some military arrangements for the possibility of Swedish war; but I trust that this irritation will have subsided in the last anti-Gallican declaration of the King of Sweden, and that they will shake hands, and threaten the French Directory at Paris instead of blustering at one another upon the banks of the Kiemen. In truth, however, one cannot but be uneasy in observing all the dangerous violence, precipitation, and change which mark the character of the Emperor, and the total want of ability and influence to keep it within any degree of bounds or discretion; if, however, these evils weaken the solid grounds of our alliance there, they ought to be a spur to us to make the best advantage of the moment there, and to employ every possible effort in this instant, for fear the next should breed some new caprice and inconsistency as little to be accounted for as those which we have seen. It is not unimportant in the present moment to keep up at Petersburg the dislike and distrust which the Emperor has shewn of the continuance or extension of the Prussian system of neutrality; and you will see in my despatch 36 that I cannot help expressing some suspicion that the princely conferences which belong to the Royal Prussian progress may look much more towards a continuance of this same blessed system, than to any prudent or manly change of it.

“Whitworth’s despatch to you under flying seal is just arrived; I do not much relish the languid and diffident tone in which he chants forth the difficulties of the measure, instead of looking them manfully in the face, and hurrying the troops on board as he ought to do, and as I trust Stamford will make him do when he arrives there. I am likewise a little disturbed at the indiscretion of writing *en clair*, for the benefit of the Prussian government, of the jealousy prevailing at Vienna against Suwaroff, and of the Wirtemberg application for English money supported by the interference of the Russian minister; surely if there is any Court in Europe in which it would have been wise to have kept these points of discussion secret, Berlin is *par préférence* the very Court which one should have most wished to have kept in ignorance; but these are subordinate considerations when compared to the object of the grand expedition; do try and make Whitworth put his shoulders to it with good heart. Panin begins to be afraid of its failing at Petersburg, and I see that he is driving at me to go there and help it, but there are many reasons against this, three of which are I think sufficient to mention: in the first place what can be done in that way will be done by Stamford; in the next place there is not time for new hands in that business; in the third place, faint as our hopes are here, it is not fit to abandon them till the answer is given, though I hope little from it.”

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, June 11. London.—“I received this morning your despatches Nos. 33 and 34, and very much concur in your reasoning respecting the subjects of both; but as one day more would probably enable you to throw new light on both, I have determined not to write any answer by to-night’s post, especially as the wind is still East.

“The subject of your private letter gives me much uneasiness, but the thing is done and unremediable. It is only a new reason for *things as they are*.” *Copy*.

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 11. Northampton.—“I am much obliged to you for a sight of the enclosed, which I return herewith. The reason for recalling the squadron from the Elbe was rather (as you may recollect) for the purpose of facilitating some naval arrangement we wanted to make with the ships that composed it, than on any political ground. If your brother should state any apprehension of the necessity of a defence for that river, we can easily resume the station when it is wanted, and we shall, of course, send some more small vessels to that coast, when our operations now preparing in Russia come into execution.

“I am here in the midst of yeomanry and dust, and cannot help mentioning on the occasion the extremely good spirit which appears to pervade every part of this country; the improvement which has taken place in it within these last two or three years is as surprising as it is comfortable.

“I am afraid your brother’s news about Genoa is not founded; it would be a most material point to have possession of. I had already that of the isles of Hières, and I am persuaded from what Lord St. Vincent once said to me on that subject that it will not be absent from his mind; but some officers to whom I mentioned it some time since in conversation seemed to think that they were very strongly fortified.”

Postscript. “I shall be in town on Thursday; I could not avoid attending my corps here, and I hope I shall not miss any vote on the Slave Trade question.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1799, June 13. Cleveland Row.—“With respect to architectural pursuits, I really believe all has been done by travellers, and by the magnificent publications of their discoveries, that could reasonably be expected now; and I do not think that we could (at least certainly not from any funds at the disposal of the Foreign Department) defray, with any propriety, the expense of that encouragement which a person qualified, as you mention, would be entitled to expect for such an undertaking. It is very difficult for me to form any accurate calculation of the expenses

of the embassy, but the line I adopted was not fixed without a good deal of consideration. I really am inclined to think you will not find it below the mark. You must consider that, although in some respects the representation may equal (or even in a few points exceed) that of a mission to a Christian Court, there are other points in which, the society being so much more limited, your expense must be much less. And you are, no doubt, aware how much this allowance exceeds that of any former case.

"I perfectly know that you have no wish upon the subject but that of discharging the duties of the embassy in a manner creditable to yourself and to your country, and I cannot help hoping that this may be done on the footing proposed." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 14. Berlin.—"You will easily see that the chief object of my sending to-day to Cuxhaven is to give you immediate information of the ready disposition which Van Braam has shewn to manage the junction of the Dutch fleet of the Texel with that of Lord Duncan, whenever he shall be assured of foreign troops being ready to assist the restoration of the Stadtholder. I flatter myself that moment is now so near that instant measures ought to be taken for assuring the means of this co-operation; the only conditions which I understand him to insist upon are that he shall receive an order from the Stadtholder to take this step, and that he shall be fully satisfied upon the point of the Dutch ships being treated by us as allies, and being not required to strike their flag or do any act of submission; he undertakes to control Storey, he assures the consent of the generality of the fleet, and he answers for every officer on board of his own ship except one; he further requires that some officers of the old establishment shall be ready to join the ships under his command, which do not at present exceed the number of five of the line and eight or ten frigates, the others not being yet manned. The reason of his waiting for some order or opportunity to go out is that some new batteries have been erected upon the Texel and the Helder, and he believes those batteries, which have been erected to control the fleet, would completely destroy it if it declared itself in port.

"I have thought the secrecy of this communication so necessary to its success, that I have abstained from mentioning the particulars in my despatch, but have thought it best to refer you entirely to the letter written upon this subject by Robert Fagel to his brother, because that enclosure will give you all the information which I have, and it may be as little communicated as you please. I learn besides from Fagel that General Daendels is now very actively employing himself in fortifying the line of the Greb, upon which five or six hundred men are incessantly employed; but by his account the French force in the country appears to be still less than our other informations have described, and he is persuaded that all the new levies which they are endeavouring to make there, will join the Stadtholder's army

whenever it shall appear. Fagel however does not believe in Daendels being accessible to any offers from the Orange party, but he considers him as a most determined and active enemy, and one who is much esteemed by the common soldiers in Holland; what strikes me most in his report upon the general state of things is the reluctance and terror which he finds still to prevail so as to make every man, however anxious for a change, tremble at the idea of committing himself by any decided act; and it is evidently his opinion that some leading men must be immediately sought and found to give the proper tone in this business. I have done what I can to occupy the Prince here with these details, and he very readily engages in them, but nevertheless I trust that the Greffier and you are likewise working and making the Princess work upon this very interesting scene. I do not find any other person to be very much consulted or very confidentially employed by the Prince except M. d'Yvoy and M. de Thuil, but I presume that it is known to the Greffier and to the Stadtholder who are the persons to be brought forward in the different parts of the United Provinces; as however I never think anything is clearly understood till it can be clearly stated, I have recommended to the Prince to endeavour to state upon paper the exact position and duty of some leading individuals in every part of the United Provinces, and perhaps you will agree in thinking that the Greffier would very usefully assist such a general plan of arrangements. There certainly appears to be a want of a few men with talents leading enough in the country to become the points round which the loose and unsettled disposition of the people may collect and form itself; I have no doubt that this is to be found, and hitherto my fear has been that it would shew itself too soon; but approaching as near as we now do, I cannot help thinking that every possible arrangement should now become complete, in order that, in the moment of action, there may be nothing left to do but to execute what had been preconceived. My wish therefore certainly would be to have drawn out upon paper such a plan of arrangements throughout the whole country as might immediately be executed whenever the military measures can begin; and as I do not see sufficient means for that arrangement in any body here, I cannot help earnestly recommending the consideration of it to those who have a competent knowledge both of the country and of the influencing persons in it.

"I begin to be surprised that I hear nothing of general Stamford, and shall be very anxious for the arrival of the messenger whom Whitworth talks, in his last despatch, of sending speedily; we have not heard of our general since his leaving Dantzick, yet if he was ill, he would surely have made colonel Diemar write to us; I trust therefore that all is going on as it ought, and I do not, for my part, see how it is possible that our enterprise should fail. It is not as easy to engage my friend Panin in naval as in military arrangements, but I have at last completely succeeded with him, and he has written to his Court a long and pressing letter earnestly recommending the immediate adoption of your plan.

"I know not what to think of the result of the Cassell conferences, not having heard one word of Haugwiz. Fagel met general Pichégru two days ago on his road to Münster, where he was going to meet two or three officers of the Dusseldorff army; Pichégru said that the Duke of Brunswick had told him he believed that Prussia would act, but Pichégru added that everybody else told him they would not, and that he rather himself believed in this latter opinion. For my own part, I still suspect that some half-measure is in agitation. You will see that I cannot refrain from putting Whitworth upon his guard against the Emperor's suffering his new *protégés* of Bavaria and Wirtemberg to be put within the possible scope of Prussian neutrality. It is not that I have any information upon this head, but I cannot get rid of an indistinct suspicion that our friends here will perhaps endeavour to find some mode of ostensibly preparing a confederacy against France, but that their measures, both in their shape and their real object, will be directed to an extension of their neutral system in Germany, by which at Berlin they will fancy that they provide a security against France and against Austria, without committing themselves to the danger and expense of actual hostility; some such proposition therefore I expect as may belong to such motives, and am guarding against it as well as I can by telling their secret before they have ripened it into a regular project. The idea of summoning France to respect Prussian territory, and to restore the United Provinces, all seems to me to belong to some such notion as I have described; and you will observe that, whenever there has latterly been question of Prussia declaring itself, they have always been seeking for the means of reconciling their declaration of war with a continuance of their system of neutrality; and if they did this two months ago, they will surely be not less disposed to do so now that, by their jealousy of Austria, their German interests are so much more awakened. But why should I weary you with speculations, when a few days will enable me to give you the better grounds of facts?

"I send you a statement of losses by wreck which is considerably within the mark, but if you think either the sum or any of the articles improperly stated, pray do not scruple to draw your pen across them. Mr. Coutts's book offering a perfect blank, it is an object that what is to be paid, should, if possible, be paid immediately."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 15. Berlin.—"I do not wonder that in the multiplicity of all that you have to remember, the name of Count O'Mahony and the recommendation which I gave you of him by General Stamford's desire, should have escaped your recollection; yet you will find that in two letters, one public and the other private, I have mentioned him as an officer highly recommended by General Stamford as a fit person to be second in the command

of which there was question. The other officer whom I named has not yet been found by such enquiries as could be made, and therefore it is that I have not repeated the discussion of that subject.

"We had yesterday the satisfaction of hearing from General Stamford; he had been delayed by a fever upon the road, but he was entirely recovered, and thought himself sure of arriving at Petersburg on the 11th or 12th inst. The Vienna post is come in this morning, but it brings no news of the armies, though it contains an invitation from the Emperor to the Diet of Ratisbon to send deputies to Villingen to assist at the examination of all that relates to the death of the French Ministers at Radstadt.

"I find that letters are just arrived to Count Panin from Marshal Suwarow at Turin dated 29th ultimo. They contain an account of the taking of Turin and of the beginning of the siege of the citadel; they also mention the occupation of the city of Alexandria and the blockade of that citadel, where there is a garrison of 1,500 men; they further state the retreat of Moreau to Coni with the remainder of his army, consisting of 10,000 men only, though he is said to have received reinforcements from France since his arrival at Coni. A copy of Suwaroff's letter is sent to Count Woronzow.

"M. de Haugwiz is expected to arrive this evening, though I do not find that he has written to say so; it seems that the King of Prussia prolonged his stay at Cassel, and that circumstance is said to have delayed the return of M. de Haugwiz to Berlin."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 16. Berlin.—"You will easily see how infinite is the satisfaction which I feel in forwarding to you the despatches from Petersburg which announce the formal acceptance of the project for the deliverance of Holland. I ought not however to conceal from you that M. de Kotchoubey has written to Count Panin to say that all the Russian troops being now upon the frontiers of Prussia, he believes it will be difficult to furnish the necessary body of men ready for embarkation before the month of August; I hope however that our coadjutors at Petersburg will not give way to this difficulty of time, and I am at a loss to conceive how it is possible that the distance from the Prussian frontier to Revel should require anything like the interval of time which is mentioned by the Russian Minister. The Emperor appears to be so dissatisfied with the account which he had received from Count Panin of the fate of our *projet d'article secret* at Berlin, that he has directed Count Panin to avail himself of this opportunity to go to Carlsbadt, and he accordingly proposes to set out on the 20th instant for the baths of that place and take leave of the King, leaving M. de Sievers here as *chargé d'affaires*; he has availed himself of this new order by making Count Finckenstein sensible how much danger there is of exasperating the Emperor by these repeated delays, and as the Emperor's order contains in it an

expression that orders will be sent to Count Panin at Carlsbadt relative to his future destination, Count Panin has given it to be understood that it is very doubtful whether he shall ever return to Berlin; he has moreover proposed to Count Finckenstein to send a courier to Count Haugwiz to apprise him of these circumstances, and he has offered to meet Count Haugwiz upon the road, in case there should be really anything substantial to do. All this is likely to be useful in urging them here. Count Panin thinks that there is some danger at Petersburg of the Emperor being diverted from the immediate Baltic project by the expectations which he will have of the Minden and Cassel conferences, which had not been announced to him at the time of Fabiani's departure. I trust however to Stamford for goading them well at Petersburg, and hope you will help as much as possible the same spirit from Whitworth. I will not detain the tardy Fabiani. Adieu. The enclosed notice comes through Schulembourg, who is *Ministre de Police*."

Enclosure.

"Otto, chargé d'affaires du gouvernement François à la cour de Berlin, vient de recevoir une lettre d'un émigré François résidant à Londres par laquelle il lui donne avis que plusieurs agents de l'Angleterre sont chargés d'enrôler les émigrés Hollandoises et les militaires au service de l'ancienne république des Provinces—Unies, pour en former un corps de troupes régulières pour le service du Stadhouder. On désigne le duché d'Oldenbourg et les environs de Brême comme les points de rassemblement, et on indique avec beaucoup de détail les personnes chargées de l'opération.

"Cet avis a été envoyé au Directoire par Otto, et sa lettre aiant été ouverte à la poste, M. le Comte de S[chulembourg] a découvert la trahison, dont il a donné connoissance au Comte de Panin pour en prévenir [le Cabinet] de Londres. On ne sait pas le nom de l'émigré François."

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, June 18. St. Petersburg.—"Sans m'arrêter à vous faire le récit de tous les accidens qui ont retardé mon arrivée en cette ville, pour le moins de 5 à 6 jours, je vais aborder tout de suite la question principale, celle qui concerne l'objet de ma mission.

"M. le Chevalier Whitworth vous apprendra que tout est en règle pour ce qui régarde le nombre de troupes que sa Majesté l'Empereur des Russies croit pouvoir fournir pour l'expédition sur la Hollande. Elle a fixé ce nombre à 18 milles hommes, ce qui me paroît suffisant, vu les 8 milles hommes qu'on espère que fournira la Suède. Quant à cet article je me suis parfaitement rencontré avec M. Popham; mais quant au point d'attaque sur les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, nos opinions étoient d'abord un peu différentes. Je me suis trouvé vouloir attaquer le taureau par le flanc, lui par les cornes.

“ Le projet de M. Popham consiste, pour ce qui régarde ces deux provinces, à porter une force de 9 milles hommes dans l’isle d’Ameland ; à fournir de là des armes, des munitions, et des troupes, s’il le faut, aux habitans de la Frise et de la Groningue, qu’il dit savoir disposés à se débarrasser eux-mêmes de leurs oppresseurs ; et à faire avec le reste des forces, et celles qu’y joindra l’Angleterre, une descente en Zéelande, dont, à mon avis, il a parfaitement bien combiné les opérations.

“ J’ai eu l’honneur de vous expliquer dans plusieurs entretiens que nous avons eûs ensemble à Berlin sur le chapitre de ces descentes, les raisons qui me faisoient préférer, à tout autre projet, celui de pénétrer dans la Groningue du côté de Delfzyl, et je vais prendre la liberté de vous retracer ici sommairement ces mêmes raisons.

“ 1° En opérant une descente avec 15 milles hommes près de Delfzyl, je me rendois probablement maître de cette place en y jettant quelques bombes, et je me procurois par là une première place d’armes très importante.

“ 2° En même tems que je me présentois devant Delfzyl, je pouvois porter des troupes sur le fort de Buyrtang et sur Coeverden ; et il y a bien peu d’apparence que, vû le dénûment où se trouvent ces deux places, ainsi que Swartsluys et Zwol, elles se fussent disposées à faire quelque résistance.

“ 3° Maître de ces points, je l’étois des provinces de Frise et de Groningue, et je pouvois, en me trouvant au milieu de leurs habitans, avec bien plus de fondement compter sur leurs bonnes dispositions. qu’on ne pourra le faire lorsqu’on ne sera qu’en possession de quelques-unes des îles sur les côtes de la Frise.

“ 4° L’ennemi vouloit-il porter des secours de troupes dans ces deux provinces, j’étois en état de l’en empêcher, en prenant avec les miennes une position sur le Vecht, d’où je pouvois moi-même faire des incursions dans les provinces de Gueldre et d’Overysse, qui probablement n’auroient pas tardées à se soulever en faveur de la bonne cause.

“ 5° Enfin, une fois établis dans la Frise et la Groningue, j’attirois indubitablement dans mon parti la majeure partie de l’armée Hollandoise, que je pouvois employer dans les places, tandis qu’avec les troupes étrangères, je pénétrois plus avant dans la république.

“ M. Popham a objecté à ces argumens. 1° Qu’ une descente du côté de Delfzyl seroit regardé par la Prusse comme une infraction faite à sa ligne de neutralité, puisqu’elle prétendoit avoir la souveraineté sur les deux branches de l’embouchure de l’Ems, appelées l’Ooster et la Wester Ems. 2° Que s[a] M[ajesté] l’Emp[ereur] des Russies ayant déjà donné son entière approbation au projet d’attaque de M. Popham, ce seroit peut-être l’en dégoûter tout-à-fait, que de lui montrer des difficultés, ou de lui proposer des changemens.

“ Vous pensez bien, que j’aurais eu bien des choses à opposer à la première de ces objections, mais que je n’avois rien à répondre à la seconde. Cette dernière me parut en effet si grave, que je ne hésitai pas un instant à entrer dans les vuës de

M. Popham, et me proposai tout de suite de les appuyer auprès de l'Empereur, s'il arrivoit que sa Majesté daignât m'en parler. Tout bien considéré, il faut se demander ici de quoi s'agit-il? De dégager la Hollande. Or, que cela se fasse, en dirigeant l'attaque principale contre la Zéelande, d'après le plan de M. Popham, ou contre les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, d'après le projet de M. Stamford, peu importe, pourvu que les chances soient à peu près égales, comme elles le sont en effet.

“Vous voyez, d'après ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous dire, que c'est la réussite de la chose qui me tient à cœur et non la gloriole de la faire marcher conformément à mes vues, pour qu'il m'en revienne un peu plus d'honneur. C'est vous dire en peu de mots que j'ai tellement adopté le plan de M. Popham que je l'envisage dès à présent comme s'il m'appartenait; mais soyez sûr en même tems que je n'en agis ainsi que par ce que je le trouve bon,—parfaitement bon. S'il en étoit autrement je vous le dirais avec cette franchise que vous me connoissez. Je suis trop pressé aujourd'hui pour m'entretenir plus longtems avec vous, quelque envie que j'en aye, et je suis affligé de n'avoir pas le tems d'écrire un mot de lettre à notre excellent Comte de Panin. Veuillez me rappeler à son souvenir. Je lui suis attaché ainsi qu'à vous par tous les sentiments qu'une vénération sans bornes peut inspirer.”

Copy.

INTELLIGENCE RESPECTING HOLLAND.

M. d'YVOY to H. FAGEL.

1799, June 19. Emerick.—“J'eus hiër quelqu'un du pay's chez moi, qui m'a assuré que Daendels a perdu toute confiance, et qu'on travaille à le culbutter. On se plaint beaucoup de la peur et du peu de support qu'on a à attendre des anciens Régens. Personne presque n'ose ni ne désire se mêler des affaires. La majeure partie des bien-intentionnés est dans le même cas. M. d'Enghuysen vient me voir de temps à autre; il est très-bien disposé, et ne ménage rien pour la bonne cause. Je me flatte d'avoir trouvé moyen d'établir des correspondances dans les différens ports de la Hollande, et dans les villes de Dort et Delft pour les magasins. Mais comme jusqu'ici je n'ai encore aucune certitude de ce que je puis employer à cela, je dois aller avec trop de retenue pour m'en promettre une expédition aussi prompte que cela mériterait. Quant à la correspondance directe, la défense de la pêche sur la côte y porte grand obstacle, les gouvernails et agrès de tous les batimens pêcheurs ayant été enlevés. J'attends réponse s'il sera possible de l'établir avec l'escadre Anglaise devant le Texel même, et je ne désespère point que cela pourra s'exécuter, puisqu'on m'assure qu'il n'est pas difficile d'entretenir commerce avec eux devant le Texel. Je serois charmé en attendant qu'on m'instruisit (1) comment et à qui je pourrai adresser mes lettres; (2) si dans un cas pressant je puis envoyer mes lettres par estafette jusqu'à Cuxhaven à l'agent des paquet-boats; tant que la correspondance directe ne sera pas

établie, elles pourront arriver de cette façon à temps, et ne seront pas huit jours entre Cuxhaven et ici, comme c'est le cas en écrivant par la poste ordinaire; 3^o à qui en ce cas je devrai les adresser en Angleterre, et que l'agent à Cuxhaven soit autorisé à les expédier à leur destination par le premier paquet qui mit en mer, sans qu'il soit nécessaire qu'elles entrent dans la malle.

"La reflexion amène en Hollande la peur dans les esprits. Je ne doute pas qu'on ne commence à faire des propositions, et qu'un chacun ne veuille avoir l'honneur d'avoir contribué à un changement; mais j'espère qu'on tiendra bon, et qu'on n'entrera dans aucun arrangement qui ne pourroit que lier les mains pour la suite. Pour l'armée, on n'a besoin de gagner aucun officier, car je réponds que du moment qu'une force étrangère se montrera sur la frontière, ou qu'une révolution commence (ce qu'on empêchera autant que possible, avant qu'il en soit temps) l'esprit du soldat sera bon, et qu'ils chasseront leurs officiers. Il en est à peu près de même des bourgeois. Il y a peu d'endroits où le peuple redemandera ses anciens Régens, et c'est sur cela, je pense, que j'ai les notions les plus sûres. Je ne puis rien dire par la présente de la Belgique. Le Prince Héréditaire a gardé Tuijl, et je ne l'attends de retour que dans 10 ou 12 jours avec les intentions de s'Altesse.—Le rapport ci-joint est de quelqu'un qui est allé seulement pour fixer la correspondance dans les deux provinces, et ne sert, par conséquent, qu'à donner une idée générale de la situation actuelle." *Extract.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 20. Berlin.—"I have thought myself obliged to write so much at length in my public despatch that I have very little to add for your private eye. The letter upon which I have had to write so tedious a comment has in no respect surprised me, because I did not very much expect anything so good as a plain, clear, and reasonable proposal; but it requires nevertheless a good deal of attention, and is upon the whole worth the trouble which you see I challenge from you in the consideration of it. We had heard of this letter from Brunswick, before we saw it, by the means of M. de Gallatin, who is there, and who, being a confidential friend of the Duke's, had seen a copy of it in his hands before it had reached Finckenstein, to whom it was addressed. The Duke's remarks upon it to M. Gallatin were, that we ought to accept the proposition at once, and that we should observe that the condition did not require the capture of the strong places, but only required positions upon the Rhine; the truth however is that there are two sentences in the letter, in one of which the word "positions" stands alone, in the other there is added to it the phrase of strong places upon the Rhine; we were, too, obliged to reason upon Finckenstein's interpretation of it, and he seemed to think (though evidently not informed upon the point) that the capture of the two fortresses was intended to be expressed; if it was, you will certainly agree that

we did right in rejecting it; if any other sense is to be given to it, there is an easy way for Haugwiz to do so, upon Finckenstein's report of our conference. It was the secretary of the conference who questioned me as to money from England, if the proposition should end only in requiring the Russians to take a position which would block the garrison of Mentz, and as he is a shrewd man and well informed of what is intended, I am inclined to believe that this may be the proposition intended. It is not entirely impossible that as the military here have all the notion that the scarcity of forage ought to delay their operations till harvest, it is not impossible that they seek only to drag on the negotiation till that period of acting should arrive; but much is gained in drawing from the King even so feeble an expression of decision for war; and now that he is once advanced so far, I cannot help believing that they would soon quicken their march if they thought we were sailing into Holland as fast as I trust and hope we are.

"I perceive it is imagined that Haugwiz will not return much before the King, so that another fortnight may pass before we can fully discuss this matter. Though I have not noticed it in my despatch, it is right that you should be informed that from more than one quarter I am told of General Daendels in Holland having said that, in order to resist this damned coalition, they should be obliged to call in Prussia; is this a proof of Daendels paving the way for a revolution in which he will introduce the forces of Prussia? Yet Fagel thinks him a thorough Jacobin; if so, can it be possible that he can have reason to hope for Prussian assistance to support the Batavian republic? I think that cannot be; but it is possible that Prussia may try a Dutch negotiation of its own for the deliverance of Holland, and that possibility is another strong motive with me for wishing to see the question quickly determined by your Russian expedition. Panin's journey to Carlsbadt is necessary for his wife's health; it will do some harm in giving a notion of our negotiation failing; it may do some good if it alarms and quickens the government here. I will try to obtain as much of the good, and prevent as much of the evil as I can. I am impatient to hear what you do with our Dutch fleet, and what measures the old Stadt and Greffier and you are taking; it will all do well."

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE TO H. FAGEL.

1799, June 22. London.—"Je vous envoie mon projet d'ordre pour le Capitaine Van Braam, que je vous prie de communiquer ce matin à my Lord Grenville. Je désirerois obtenir une déclaration par écrit de la manière dont les vaisseaux seront traités et, s'il se peut, une copie des ordres que my Lord Duncan recevra à cet égard, avant de faire expédier et envoyer cet ordre; afin que je puisse être sûr que les vaisseaux qui voudront, resteront des vaisseaux appartenants à la République des Provinces-Unies, et que lui seront rendus à la paix, et dès qu'elle sera délivrée du joug des Français et de ses oppressions

actuels; et que ces vaisseaux resteront sous mes ordres comme Amiral-Général des Provinces-Unies; et que sa Majesté Britannique daignera pourvoir à l'entretien de ces vaisseaux, et de leurs équipages, jusqu'à ce qu'ils puissent retourner dans leur patrie. Il me serait fort agréable de pouvoir obtenir à cette occasion la délivrance des prisonniers Hollandais qui se trouvent dans ce pays, et qui voudraient se laisser employer à bord de ces vaisseaux pour en compléter les équipages; et particulièrement celle des malheureux pêcheurs, tant de Schieveningen que d'autres villages d'Hollande, qui ont été pris durant cette guerre; et, s'il était possible, d'avoir une liste de tous les prisonniers Hollandois qui se trouvent, tant dans les différentes prisons que sur les vaisseaux qui servent de prison, avec les noms des bâtiments, et le lieu, et le temps où ils ont été pris. Je la recevrai avec la plus vive reconnaissance, puisqu'alors on serait à même de voir quelles personnes on pourrait délivrer sans risque, et quelles personnes il serait peut-être utile de ne pas délivrer avant la paix, et le rétablissement des choses dans notre patrie. J'ai dressé la précés en Hollandais, et vous prie de vouloir bien la traduire en Français, afin que Messieurs les Ministres puissent la mieux comprendre, et suis prêt à y faire les changements que sa Majesté trouvera bon, et jugera pouvoir mieux servir au but de délivrer notre patrie, et d'ôter les moyens de défense à ceux qui, sans aucun titre légal, y exercent l'autorité suprême. La seule chose sur laquelle je dois insister est que ces vaisseaux restent vaisseaux de la République des Provinces-Unies, et que je soye sûr qu'ils retourneront dans les ports de la République quand elle sera délivrée. Je vous prie aussi de faire remarquer que je promets de récompenser, mais non de garder au service, ceux qui passeront, et que les récompenses peuvent être en gratifications ou pensions. Si cela était sujet à trop de difficultés, de les employer après le rétablissement des choses avec les officiers qui sont restés fidèles à l'ancienne constitution, et n'ont pas voulu reconnaître ou servir les oppresseurs de leur patrie."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Most secret.

1799, June 25. Downing Street.—“A confidential communication having been made to his Majesty's government that several of the officers commanding the Dutch ships of war in the Texel are desirous of throwing off the yoke of the present government of the United Provinces, and of joining his Majesty's fleet, provided that the ships and their crews shall, in that case, be considered as belonging to an allied power, and as being under the orders and direction of the Prince of Orange, I have received the King's commands to signify his Majesty's consent to these conditions. The enclosed copies of a note which I have addressed to the Prince of Orange on this subject, and of the orders which his serene Highness has transmitted to Captain Van Braam, will explain to your Lordships the conduct which is to be observed by the commander of his Majesty's fleet

after a junction has been formed with the ships of war from the Texel; and I have therefore to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you communicate both these papers to Admiral Lord Duncan, or the officer commanding his Majesty's fleet in the North seas. It is probable that by means of a fishing boat, or through some other channel, Captain Van Braam will open a secret communication with Lord Duncan, and will settle with him the signals to be made, and the measures to be taken for the execution of this plan; and it is his Majesty's pleasure that his Lordship should be instructed to enter into such communication, and to concert such arrangements as may appear to him best calculated to facilitate and ensure a junction between his Majesty's fleet and the ships from the Texel; provided that the commanders of the latter appear disposed to act with good faith, and in conformity to the orders transmitted by the Prince of Orange. It is farther his Majesty's pleasure that, in the execution of this plan, his Majesty's officers should not only abstain from any hostile proceeding against the Dutch ships of war which shall, according to such concert, come out in order to join his Majesty's fleet, but should treat the officers and crews with the kindness and attention due to the officers and crews of ships of war belonging to a power in alliance with his Majesty.

"It is likewise his Majesty's pleasure that, after the junction has been formed, his Majesty's fleet, or such portion thereof as may be judged sufficient, should, together with the Dutch ships, immediately proceed to Yarmouth, or some other port of this kingdom."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June 25. Harley Street.—"Par les dépêches que votre courier vous a apporté ce matin du Chevalier Whitworth vous devez être bien content de mon Empereur. Je vous envoie quelques-unes des lettres que j'ai reçu de Sa Majesté Impériale. Il y a d'autres que je dois vous lire, et que je vous apporterai demain avant ou après le levé du Roi, suivent que vous me fixerez l'heure.

"Après avoir lue les pièces que je vous envoie, faite-moi l'amitié de me les renvoyer, car j'en ai besoin, et si vous voulez en avoir de copies, je vous les ferai copier chez moi, et je vous les enverrai demain.

"Craignant que n'avez perdu la clef de mes cassettes, je vous envoie cacheté la clef qui me reste, et si vous n'avez pas perdu la votre, dans ce cas renvoyez moi la mienne cachetée.

"Je suis enchanté de plus en plus du zél de mon souverain pour la bonne cause, et de la noblesse avec la quelle il le fait.

"C'est nos deux souverains et nos deux patries qui auront la gloire de rendre le bonheur à l'Europe."

Postscript. "Mr. Hammond vient de m'écrire dans ce moment pour m'avertir que vous allez envoyer un courier ce soir pour Petersbourg. Je vous supplie de le remettre, au moins à demain au soir, car il faut que je vous entretienne avant; la

différence de 24 heures n'est pas grande, et je ne suis pas prêt pour répondre ce soir à tout ce qu'on m'a écrit, et ce me sera impossible d'écrire la dixième partie de ce que j'ai a grifoné."

2nd Postscript. "Les Comtes Kotchoubey et Rastopchin m'écrivent que l'Empereur consent à l'envoi des vingt-six milles homme pour la libération de la Hollande, et qu'on n'attend que l'arivée du General Stamford pour régler cette affaire. Je vous envoi aussi ce que j'ai reçu du Comte Panin, et je vous prie de me renvoyer le tout."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, June 25. Cleveland Row.—"You will naturally suppose the pleasure with which I received the despatches by Fabiani, who has however been so tardy that I think he must be put on the superannuated list. I shall send a messenger either to-morrow or the next day through Berlin to Petersburg, but as this depends on other people in some degree I cannot be sure. Lord Minto goes on Friday or Saturday. He will pass through Berlin. I am occupied with what you so earnestly press." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 25. Berlin.—"As I find by Sir Charles Whitworth's despatch under flying seal of the 11th instant, that a messenger from thence will pass through Berlin to-morrow or next day, I merely write a line by the post of to-night to tell you that no new event of any description has happened since my letters of the 20th by Wiffin. The King passed one day with the Elector Palatine at Anspach on the 20th, and Count Haugwitz continues with him, so that our business does not advance in discussion. Count Schulemburg is ordered by the King to meet him at Dessau, and it is possible that Count Haugwitz may then return to Berlin, unless he remains to complete the royal progress; but nothing certain is known of his intentions.

"We have letters from Turin of the 5th instant which describe the government established there by order of Suwarow, and seem to speak with confidence of their expectation of being soon masters of the citadel, as their provisions are scanty, their garrison only one third of its number, and that third divided in its wishes and interests.

"The last letters from Swisserland are from Bern and Geneva on the 12th, on which day both those cities were still occupied by French troops; but at Berne they had already decreed the release of the hostages, and everything bore the appearance of immediate retreat, the main army then marching upon the line of Soleure to Basle; at Geneva French engineers had arrived to put the city in a state of defence, but nothing had been begun, nor was it clear that they had the money, the time, or the men necessary for the construction of new works of defence.

“From Paris all the accounts agree in describing the immediate expectation of a great explosion. I have reason also to believe that Azara is upon the point of being recalled, the Directory being well satisfied with Urquijo, and not desiring to support Azara in contradiction to him. At Paris they report their fleet to have left Toulon on the 31st, but they do not seem to speak positively of this; they do however agree that the damage done to the Spanish fleet by the tempest will require some weeks before it can be repaired.

“The last mails from Italy and Germany brought no authentic accounts from Naples, nor any good intelligence of the real situation of Macdonald and his army.

“Count Panin went on Saturday to Carlsbadt. I write by the post and therefore could add nothing very interesting, but I have in truth nothing to add since my last despatches by Wiffin.”

Postscript. “Lord Folkestone is just arrived here from Mittau. I open my letter to say that the Vienna post of the 19th June is just come in. I enclose from Sir M. Eden a gazette by which it appears, I think, that Moreau has joined Macdonald’s army at Savona. Sir M. Eden adds that the Toulon fleet (consisting of 24 sail) had landed 3,000 men at Vado, and that a regular report of this had been made by General Sechendorff on the 8th to head quarters at Turin, but without any date, or any mention of the English fleet; and on the 10th Suwarow was marching by Asti towards the enemy, having left the citadel of Turin blockaded.”

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 26. Cleveland Row.—“This is an answer to a great many hitherto unanswered letters of yours. No. 27 is about the gun boats moved from the mouths of the German rivers to the coast of Norway. I believe you attach rather more importance to the thing than belongs to it, but in truth some measure of protection to our trade against that swarm of privateers which have their resort to the bays of Norway was become absolutely necessary, and Lord Spencer thought he had no resource for the purpose but in these vessels. If we succeed in my proposal of bullying the Danes into common sense we may then be at liberty to resume our blockade of the Wadden’s.

“I can by no means answer for it that Haugwitz’s suspicions, as applied to Lord Liverpool, are wholly unfounded. He loves a little contraband trade as dearly as if he shared in it, and I believe really thinks that the commercial interests of this country are very much promoted by manœuvres of this sort, to which I am *ex officio* naturally hostile.

“You will have seen by my having said nothing to Whitworth about Napper Tandy and the others that I saw that subject in the same light that you did.

“Now as to our great project. My joy in Whitworth’s despatch is greatly damped by what he says about the flotilla, and still

more by two letters from Kotchoubey and Rostopchin which my friend Woronzow gave me to read to-day, and which express a great deal more doubt on the subject than Whitworth seems to have been aware of. There is however no use in reasoning about this, for before you can receive this letter the *aye* or *no* will have been finally pronounced, and you will know the decision. But then comes this unfortunate business of transports. If we do not in some manner or other get assistance on this head either from Russian flotilla, or from English ships in the Baltic, the whole project is, I fear, irrecoverably defeated, though my sanguine colleagues do not *yet* allow it. But the fact is not the less apparent because they shut their eyes. The end of June is now come, transports are now *to be* provided for 10,000 men, and when that is done, then we are to see if we cannot begin to provide for 10,000 more. And I thought all the while that transports for 20,000 were preparing! and they were urging me to make the 20,000, 40! All my hope is therefore in Popham's zeal and resource, and dashing spirit. But if he also should have relied on the thing being done for him here, then all is over for this year. Still however, even with this opinion, I urge on the measures for these 10,000. They have been preparing transports for 10,000 British troops for the Zealand expedition; a part of them is now employed in bringing troops from Ireland; a part consisted in revenue cruisers which could not be spared out of the N[orth] Sea. But when the moment comes I should hope about half of this quantity of transport might be added to the 10,000 above mentioned, so as to leave the Zealand expedition to shift a little for itself, and to send at once transports for 15,000 Russians. But do all you can to urge and stimulate Popham to find or to supply resources from thence, for here it is but too evident that we shall be miserably deficient. The difficulty that is stated on this head of transports exceeds all imagination. One would think that in carrying on all the trade of the world we do so without any ships.

"You talk of other people being asleep and ask what the Stadtholder is doing. Why, he is fast asleep, snoring, and not even dreaming of doing anything. Nor has he (in my conscience, I believe it) the least desire to return to Holland.

"You will have seen that Lord Minto is named, and within a few days after receiving this letter you will see him at Berlin in his way to replace his Irish Lordship of Henley. I anticipated your judgment of preference, and made the offer to Pelham, but he would not hear of it. Lord Minto seems right enough in his ideas just now, and I hope will continue so, but he takes with him his Corsican *Lord President*, who I wish was anywhere else. Of your other names I see little that is promising, except Lord Amherst, of whom I will enquire more.

"Pitt told me that he thought Watson had spoken to him unfavourably of Diemar, but I have had no opportunity of learning any further particulars, and Watson's judgment of men cannot be implicitly relied on, though I believe his integrity may. Perhaps one of the reasons against their complying at

Petersburgh with our project of the flotilla may be found in the desire to keep always in their reach this powerful instrument of hostility against Sweden. Perhaps the objection may be no more than an unwillingness to own how much all this part of their force has been suffered to go to ruin. I entirely agree in your ideas as to the plan of your going to Petersburgh to supply that energy which is wanting in Whitworth. I rely much on Stamford and Popham; the latter I know, and the former I hope, to be peculiarly well qualified to inspire activity and exertion, and we cannot spare you at Berlin in the present moment, especially under the circumstances which you have mentioned to me about Paget.

"Instructions are sent to Lord Duncan to endeavour to settle with V[an] B[raam] the execution of his plan. You will receive by this messenger a copy which the P[rin]ce of O[range] sends to his son of his orders on this subject, and also a copy in English for yourself of the orders. A duplicate of them will be sent into Holland directly by a channel which seems a safe one. May one not however doubt whether there is any real disposition to come out, and whether the whole is not rather a plan for managing a loop-hole in case of a new revolution?

"I have had several conversations with F[agel] on the prospects that are opening to us. He yesterday sent the P[rin]cess an account of our plan and a note stating the extreme importance of forming our plan of insurrection, and of establishing in each province comm[itt]ees of persons capable of putting the thing in motion with a reasonable hope of controlling its direction. He is to see her to-morrow, and in the meantime is working on the subject. When this is tolerably digested, one of his brothers will go to you at Berlin with it, and will return from thence to Münster, where he will establish himself in order to keep up the correspondence.

"I am vexed at the success these cursed French intriguers have met with at Petersburgh. I am incredulous, and am quite persuaded that even if our reports (of Paris insurrections and of Barras being at the head of everything) were true, still we should never get any assistance from him till his assistance would not be worth having." *Copy.*

LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1799,] June 26. Dublin Castle.—"I have been honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 19th, and shall not fail to avail myself of its suggestions as soon as Lord Mountmorris returns to Ireland. I hope his Lordship is not the only convert which a deeper investigation of the subject has produced.

"Knowing how deeply your Lordship is interested in the success of the measure of Union, I should trouble you with some particulars of our progress, were not your Lordship in possession of the official correspondence. I look forward with much anxiety to an opportunity of communicating with your Lordship

in person on the many important points that yet remain to be considered of this interesting work ; and trust I shall receive the Lord Lieutenant's permission to visit England in the course of the summer, when I shall beg leave to solicit a renewal of that confidence with which your Lordship honoured me when last in London, and from which I derived so much valuable information on the subject of my mission."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 26. Vienna.—"I avail myself of the messenger Slater's return to England to convey to your Lordship my sincere acknowledgments for the immediate and very flattering attention which your Lordship has been pleased to give to my wishes communicated to your Lordship by Lord Auckland, who, in all that he has done on the subject, acted in perfect conformity to the desires and sentiments which I had more than once expressed to him, and the result of whose endeavours cannot but give me entire satisfaction.

"I have, at the same time, to express to your Lordship my most grateful sense of the very flattering terms in which your Lordship has been pleased to speak of my services, and of my retreat from the foreign line; and to return your Lordship my unfeigned thanks for the representations which your Lordship purposed to make to the King, in order to induce His Majesty to mark my retreat by some gracious testimony of His Royal approbation and favour.

"Next to the satisfaction which I must necessarily feel from a conscientious discharge of my duty, my greatest pleasure must be to know that I have acquitted myself, in the honourable but very arduous situation in which I have been placed by your Lordship's protection, in such a manner as to have met with your Lordship's approbation. Your Lordship's very handsome letter has left me nothing to desire on that head, and I shall retire into private life with the most lively sense of the many and very great marks of kindness which I have uniformly experienced from your Lordship, and the remembrance of which I will cherish to the last hour of my life.

"The choice of my successor must give satisfaction here. I will cheerfully remain with him as long as he may think that my services can be useful to him."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1779, June. London.—"Le porteur de ce billet est le négociant Flamand, dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler hiér. Je crois qu'il vaut mieux qu'il vous voie seul. Il est prévenu sur l'*unbounded* confiance qu'il doit avoir dans la probité et *secrecy* de mon ami Lord Grenville. Puisse-t-il réussir avec vous à tirer ses braves compatriotes du joug des monstres qui les assassinent."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, June. London.—“Je suis complètement de votre avis au sujet de la proposition, et je transmettrai les papiers que vous m'avez communiqué à ma Cour par le courier prochain. J'aime à croire, et je me flatte, qu'on y verra la chose comme on le doit.

“Le ciel continue à bénir nos armes. Nous allons en Italie de succès en succès ; et il paraît que l'Archiduc pourra continuer à commander.”

LORD W. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, June 30. Alexandria.—“I take the liberty of sending your Lordship the copy of a letter which Field Marshal Souvarof has this day written to Lord Nelson.”

MILORD NELSON, BARON DU NILE.

“Tachez de devenir Duc de la rivière levante, ponente, et de Gènes, avec Malta. Je vous embrasse tendrement. Excellence, grand Nelson.

Votre frere, ami, et adorateur.

(signed) Comte Alexandre Suworow Rimnikski.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 1. Harley Street.—“Je vous envoie les lettres de notifications de l'Empereur et de son fils aîné à Sa Majesté le Roi au sujet de la naissance d'une princesse, que je vous supplie de remettre à Sa Majesté.

“Je vous envoie, en meme tems, la lettre que le courier du Chevalier Whitworth m'a apporté du Comte de Rastopchin ; come son écriture est peu lissible, mon fils l'a copié, et il n'y a qu'un mot peu important que j'ai souligné qui ne présente aucun sens. La lettre de Hawkwitz à Finkenstein est vraiment impudente. Ils veulent rester neutres, nous défendent de passer par leur territoire, et quand nous aurons repris les deux fortresses, dont l'une a été livrée par l'Autriche, et l'autre a été prise parceque la Prusse ne l'a pas empêché, c'est alors seulement que cette dernière se déterminera à entrer en Holande, où il n'y a pas de troupes pour défendre le pays. Le Comte Panin fait bien de s'en aller d'une Cour qui se joue si indécemment des autres.

“J'espère que vous êtes content de la célérité avec la quelle on a dépêché l'affaire pour la quelle le très dilligent Capitane Popham est venu chez nous. Son voyage est miraculeux ; en six jours de Shernes à Cronstat, c'est inoui !

“Les huit milles Suedois, avec les dix-sept milles Russes, feront un bon corp pour délivrer la Holande. Je ne m'imagine pas que vous ayez besoin des huit vaisseaux de ligne que la Suède vous offre. Quand à ce qui se fait à Berlin, vous avez sans doutte reçu de Monsieur votre frere tous les détails possibles. Ils sont bien désagréables.

“En vérité si l’Autriche et la Prusse n’étoient pas en Europe, elles mériteroient bien qu’on les abandonne à leurs mauvais sort, et qu’on les laisse révolutionner par les Jacobins.”

Enclosure 1.

COUNT RASTOPCHIN to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, June 13. Petersburg.—“Je vous écris cette lettre que j’envoie par le courier de terre, et une copie sera expédiée par mer, afin que vous soyez instruit de l’objet de cet envoi.

“Le Capitaine Popham est arrivé ici de la manière du monde la plus singulière, car il n’a mis que six jours de Londres jusqu’à Cronstadt; il a été présenté aujourd’hui à l’Empereur, a eu une conférence de trois quarts d’heure, a diné, et reviendra après demain. Vous connoissez l’objet de sa mission, voici ce qui en résulte :

“L’Empereur donne 17,000 des troupes de la division de la Livonie.

“Ces troupes seront embarqués à *Libau* et *Riga*. Les transports seront Anglais et aux fraix de l’Angleterre. L’Angleterre fournira à l’entretien de ces troupes dans le trajet, et pendant tout le tems que ce corps restera aux ordres et à la solde de l’Angleterre. En cas que l’expédition ne puisse pas avoir lieu en Hollande, alors les troupes seront transférées en Angleterre pour y hyverner, et être ramenés en Russie au printemps, ou employé de nouveau d’après les circonstances. Le Lieutenant-Général Herman commandera ce corps; c’est un élève de Bauer, homme de mérite. On fixe le départ au 1 d’Aoust.

“Le Roi de Suède a offert de son propre mouvement 8,000 hommes pour servir contre les Français, et une flotte de 8 vaisseaux et 4 frégates. Il prioit l’Empereur de lui négocier des subsides de l’Angleterre. On lui a dépêché un courier avec la proposition de donner ce huit mille hommes pour la Hollande. S’il y consent on les embarquera à Gottenburg, et cela fera avec les notres 25,000. Sinon, les 17,000 Russes seront embarqués seuls. Les probabilités sont pour, au pis aller, cela occupera les forces des Français, et attirera leur attention. Cela peut décider le Roi de Prusse à entreprendre quelque chose de son côté. Car, alors, il y aura tout à gagner et rien à risquer. Une fois le Roi de Suède dans la coalition, le Dannemarc entrera aussi. Selon moi, cette expédition, qui ne dérange en aucune manière les mesures de l’Empereur, peut avoir les suites les plus importantes. Dieu veuille que la prospérité accompagne nos braves et respectables soldats.—La cour de Vienne est inconcevable, *la masquée* a fait encore une farce. Elle souffre M. Hompesch comme un phantome de Grand-Maitre à Trieste, il y a Cour et envoi des députés. Je vous dirai que l’Electeur de Bavière fait ses soumissions; on a expédié un courier à Vienne pour arranger cette affaire.

“Je ne sais si M. Thugut sera content de cette reconciliation, car il aimeroit assez qu’on le laisse faire de la Bavière ce qu’ils ont fait de Venise. Le Comte Cobenzl est bien malade; il est dans un état affreux, faible, couvert de plaies, et frappé de son

état. Les médecins craignent qu'ils ne l'en tirent pas. Le jour de baptême il y a eu des grâces. Malgré mes prières l'Empereur m'a fait Directeur-General des Postes. C'est une place qui embrasse tout l'empire. Ce n'est ni les revenus immenses de ce département, ni les gens à y employer qui m'embarrassent. C'est l'ordre à y établir. Adieu M. le Comte ; plaignez-moi et souhaitez-moi plus de santé."

Enclosure 2.

Portrait du Maréchal Souvarow.

"Le Maréchal, Comte de Souvarow, est un homme d'une taille moyenne, âgé de 65 à 66 ans, et quoique très maigre, il est encore jusqu'aujourd'hui plein de force, de feu, et d'activité. Son corps est d'une trempe si extraordinaire, qu'il est aussi inaccessible au froid et aux intempéries de l'air, qu'il est insensible aux fatigues. Sa manière de vivre et ses mœurs sont d'une simplicité sans égale. Une botte de paille forme son lit ordinaire, et lorsqu'il est en campagne, la première chaumière qu'il rencontre au bout de sa marche lui sert de palais. Personne n'est plus sobre, ni plus frugal que lui. D'une famille distinguée, né au milieu de l'aisance, il a conservé cette austérité de mœurs qui tient du stoïcisme, mais dont la source est infiniment plus pure. Ennemi de la mollesse, du luxe, et de la volupté, il s'est durci de bonne heure dans le choix qu'il a fait du métier le plus rude, qui est celui de la guerre ; et ce n'est que dans ce métier, au bruit des armes, et au milieu des combats, qu'il trouvait ses plaisirs, et qu'il passait sa vie. Avec une âme ardente et taillée en grand, un esprit juste et entreprenant, un cœur généreux et désintéressé au point de dédaigner même les richesses, et avec une force de caractère qui le rend aussi inflexible et ferme dans le bien qu'insensible à la crainte, cet homme, en embrassant la carrière des armes, a cultivé les talens militaires par de profondes études ; et l'on peut dire, hardiment, que nul homme n'a médité davantage sur les campagnes des grands capitaines ; nul n'a étudié mieux l'art de faire la guerre, tant des anciens que des modernes ; et nul n'a conservé, peut-être aussi bien, la mémoire des grandes actions qui se sont données sur les différens théâtres de la guerre. Plus philosophe que la plupart des guerriers, il a senti que l'homme n'est pas purement et simplement machine ; que si le corps, qui en fait une de ses parties, est sujet aux loix de la mécanique, sa partie la plus noble, celle qui dirige le mouvement et commande au sentiment, n'obéit qu'à des loix qui, suivant sa nature, lui sont particulières ; et que si l'on ne cultivait que la partie la plus grossière, sans songer à mettre de l'accord avec l'autre, l'homme se réduirait à l'état d'automate ; et pire que cela, car sa propre volonté, n'étant ni entièrement détruite, ni dirigée, pourrait souvent se refuser à suivre la direction qu'une impulsion étrangère voudrait lui donner. D'un autre côté, connaissant le désavantage incalculable qu'ont toutes les troupes automates, et par conséquent, sans passion, vis-à-vis de celles qui sont

électrisées par les sentimens qu'on a soin de leur inspirer, dont l'imagination est exaltée par la magie des différens tableaux qu'on trace devant eux, et qui sont enivrées de zèle et d'ardeur par tous les prestiges qu'on met en usage : ce Général ne se bornait pas aux seuls exercices qui donnent de la souplesse et de la dextérité aux troupes, mais il s'occupait en même tems de l'esprit de l'armée, qu'il a toujours cherché de cultiver ; en se servant pour cela de tous les moyens que son génie pouvait tirer de la connaissance exacte du caractère des individus qu'il commande, de leur génie, leurs opinions, mœurs, coutumes. Un seul exemple suffira pour donner une idée de la manière dont il s'y prenait. Lorsque la Grande Cathérine, peu de tems avant sa mort, se détermina d'envoyer au secours de l'Empereur 60 mille hommes contre les Français, elle nomma le Maréchal Souvaroff pour commander cette armée, et lui communiqua là-dessus, quelques mois d'avance, ses volontés. Le Général rassembla les troupes destinées pour cette expédition autour de son quartier-général, et faisant venir, tous les jours et tour à tour, chaque regiment à la parade, il lui lisait, lorsque la parade était finie, quelques petites instructions qu'il avait soin de composer lui-même. Ces instructions, écrites de la manière la plus simple et la plus analogue à l'esprit d'un soldat Russe, roulaient sur ses devoirs, et sur les parties qu'il lui était indispensable de connaître, comme guerrier ; mais il y délayait en même tems quelques ingrédiens, bien choisis et bien calculés pour produire en lui une horreur pour les principes atroces des Français républicains, une haine pour cette nation dégénérée, et une ardeur pour la combattre. Non content de cela, il ne laissait échapper aucune occasion qu'il croyait être propre pour entretenir en eux ce sentiment. Lorsqu'il les exerçait, par exemple, soit par regiment, soit par corps, c'était toujours les républicains qu'on avait devant soi ; c'est eux qui étaient l'objets de toutes les attaques et de tous les manœuvres qu'on faisait, et les bayonnettes au bout des fusils étaient toujours dirigées contre eux lorsqu'on marchait en colonne serrée. Toutes ces choses ne pouvaient manquer de produire l'effet qu'il désirait, et qui était celui de faire sur eux une impression si forte, que le nom seul de Français républicain puisse leur servir de signal pour le combat. Ajoutez à cela que personne ne s'est plus appliqué à étudier l'art de se faire aimer des troupes, et n'a mieux réussi, parceque personne n'a été plus convaincu que *Principes pro Victoria pugnans, comites pro principe*. Si d'un côté la vérité de cette maxime est attestée par les expériences journalières, qui nous font voir que les armées les moins propres à triompher sur leurs ennemis sont toujours celles qui sont composées d'individus dont les ames froides portent aussi peu d'affection pour le chef qui le commande, que d'intérêt pour la cause qu'ils défendent ; d'un autre côté, les succès brillants et non interrompus du Comte Souvoroff ne la confirme pas moins. Il serait difficile, dans un écrit de cette nature, d'entrer dans les détails de ses exploits qui viennent à l'appui de cette vérité ; c'est pourquoi l'on se bornera de dire simplement que ce général, ayant fait toutes les guerres

que la Russie a eues dans les derniers 45 ans, s'est trouvé à un nombre de batailles que pas un guerrier de nos jours n'a eu occasion de voir ; qu'ayant eu pour la plupart le commandement en chef, il s'est constamment tenu au-dessus des revers de la fortune ; et que dans toutes ces occasions, la gloire n'a jamais hésité, un seul instant, de se déclarer pour lui. L'on pourrait également ajouter qu'il n'est, peut-être, pas aisé de trouver, dans les fastes de la guerre, un second exemple d'un général qui eut livré autant d'assauts que lui, et qui eut emporté des villes aussi bien défendues que celles qui, à la suite de combats sanglans, ont été forcées de céder à la valeur de ce chef, et à l'intrépidité des troupes Russes qu'il commandait.

“ Mais avant de finir, que l'on me permette d'ajouter quelques mots sur un préjugé qui a généralement prévalu parmi tous ceux dont le jugement superficiel se brise sur la surface des objets, sans pouvoir jamais pénétrer l'écorce qui les couvrent ; ce préjugé est celui de croire qu'une certaine originalité dans le caractère, quelques singularités dans les manières, beaucoup de simplicité dans les formes du discours, et un grand respect pour les opinions, les coutumes, et les usages de nos pères, sont incompatibles avec le génie et les talents militaires : un préjugé qui les conduit à une conclusion non moins fausse, qui est celle de supposer que tous les succès constans du Général Souvaroff ne doivent être attribués qu'aux effets du hasard. Sans m'occuper à combattre cette opinion, et à démontrer combien l'idée d'un *hasard fixé* répugne à la raison et à la saine logique, je tâcherai de diriger l'attention de tous ceux dont le raisonnement a plus de suite et de méthode, sur les qualités particulières auxquelles tous les succès de ce général doivent être, principalement, attribués, en leur citant quelques traits de ses exploits qui les mettront en évidence. Lors de la dernière guerre avec les Polonais (celle qui décida de Varsovie), L'Impératrice de Russie, fatiguée à la fin d'en attendre les derniers résultats qui tardaient d'arriver, voulait accélérer les opérations en donnant ordre au Général Souvaroff d'entrer en Pologne avec un corps de 15 mille hommes, qui se trouvant alors disposé sur les bords du Dniester, non loin de *Balta*, était par là le plus à portée de ce pays. Ce Général, au moment même de suivre les ordres de sa souveraine et de se mettre en marche, reçoit la nouvelle que le Roi de Prusse a été obligé de quitter le territoire Polonais avec toute son armée qu'il commandait en personne, pour aller se porter dans ses propres états, où quelques insurrections naissantes demandaient sa présence et celle de ses troupes. Voyant alors que les forces qui avaient agi en Pologne étaient diminuées de 40 mille hommes (ce qui composait l'armée du Roi), il a senti qu'il ne lui restait d'autre ressource que celle de porter à ce pays un coup inattendu, en précipitant, autant que possible, la marche des troupes qu'il commandait, afin d'étonner l'ennemi ; et de le combattre avant qu'il eut le tems de connaître le nombre des assaillants, et avant que ses propres troupes fussent informées des obstacles qu'elles auront à surmonter. Pour exécuter ce plan, il presse la marche des troupes Russes au point que la vitesse avec la quelle elles se

sont portées ne peut paraître qu'un fait peu croyable pour toute autre nation. La distance qui les séparait de Varsovie, le centre des forces réunies de la Pologne contre lequel ce général dirigeait ses efforts, était de plus de 700 verstes, ou près de 485 milles Anglais. Dix jours de marche ont suffi pour ce trajet. Au bout de ce tems, à peine arrivé au point où il brûlait déjà d'impatience d'y être, qu'il fait une reconnaissance assez générale et assez complète pour connaître la position de l'ennemi sur tous les points possibles; et lorsqu'il n'eut plus rien à désirer de ce côté, il se décide sur-le-champ d'entamer cette ville du côté de Prague, et distribue les ordres nécessaires pour le mettre en exécution le jour suivant. Ce jour arrive, et quelques minutes décident du sort de la Pologne et terminent cette guerre. Ce trait-ci, avec tous ceux qui sont connus de lui, comme celui d'avoir battu avec une poignée d'hommes et mis en déroute totale l'armée nombreuse des Polonais commandés par le Prince Oginsky, lors de la première confédération; celui d'avoir complètement défait avec un corps de 10 mille hommes toute l'armée du Grand Vizir, une victoire qui lui a valu cette grande considération dont il jouit dans l'armée Autrichienne; tous ces traits, dis-je, avec une infinité d'autres, sont certainement les meilleures preuves que l'on puisse donner pour faire voir combien le jugement que quelques-uns ont porté sur lui, et dont nous avons parlé plus haut, est mal-fondé."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 1. Wimbledon.—"Lady Jane, at the request of a corps of volunteers in our neighbourhood, is obliged to perform a ceremony this forenoon in presenting their colours, and having nothing to do in town which I could not do here to better purpose, I have not gone to-day. It was at any rate my intention to be with you to-morrow forenoon at eleven o'clock, having appointed Sir Ralph Abercrombie to be at your house at that hour. You'll recollect I mentioned to you my intention in the view that Mr. Fagel, or anybody you please, might likewise be present, in order that the subject might be considered in different lights. I shall come to you at half an hour before eleven.

"Don't be uneasy about the transports; I shall bring it all right. *Entre nous*, I think Lord Spencer sometimes listens when he ought not to official difficulties stated by his naval colleagues at the Board, without exercising his own understanding and authority on a general view of the subject as a member of Government. I have desired Huskisson to send for your perusal the letters I have wrote to the Admiralty, and it is my intention to write a *private* letter to Lord Spencer this morning to state the total impossibility of a great and urgent public service being obstructed from the want of a thousand or fifteen hundred seamen which can, without the smallest inconvenience, be taken from guard-ships or others for a short time.

"I must send Lord Spencer the despatches from Popham the moment they come from the King; but I will accompany them with a memorandum to send them to you as soon as he has read them."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, July 1. Cleveland Row.—"This letter will not go till to-morrow night, but as I may probably be hurried then, I begin it now.

"Your despatch by Wiffin brought me in yesterday from a very fine walk at Dropmore, and I am afraid I hardly thought myself repaid by the perusal of Haugwitz's display of the King of Prussia's most valorous resolution to make war the very moment it shall be clear that he can do so without either expense or danger. I most perfectly agree in the opinion you have stated of the impossibility of our acceding to the condition of taking Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein, operations which, you well know, I have from the beginning had no fancy for; but I am inclined to go a little further in my negative resolutions, and to decline all engagement that shall be founded on any condition of Prussian co-operation, because where it is so evident that Prussia does not mean to give herself roundly and fairly to the cause, but to preserve in her hands every species of back game, I am not willing to afford her so easy a means of doing this as must arise out of any such engagement, the non-performance of which may always be pretended, and frequently with some show of reason. We must therefore do our business ourselves. If Prussia will help us in it, even for the eleventh hour, it is well, *lucro appone*; but if not, let us be quite sure that we can do without her.

"But then these cursed transports! pray tell me your opinion (we shall have full time to receive it) whether in the present state of affairs we might not with our 10,000 men from here strike the blow against Walcheren without waiting for the other attack which is, I am grieved to see it, still at two, should I not say three months distance. Transports to go from here to Riga one month, even if they were ready to-day. To embark the troops and to bring them to Yevern or rather to Gothenburg, one month more. Then the time, be it more or less, of preparing the attack and making it, and the result must bring the actual operation late in September; not an unfavourable season by any means for acting in Groninguen and Overysse, but full late to commence operations by sea against Zealand or Holland.

"If we attack Walcheren in one month from this time, and we could do it in less if this cursed transport service does not stand in our way, we could in all probability make ourselves masters of it without much difficulty, and there seems every reason to hope that we could hold it for two months longer against the whole force that the Batavian Government could bring against it, supposing their French allies as well occupied as they are now, and as they are likely to be. The course of this operation would naturally point to that quarter every effort that

the Dutch Government could make, and would leave the n[orth] e[ast] frontier totally open to our projected attack supposing it executed any time in September; and the success of this latter being thus facilitated and almost ensured, the whole country could ultimately be reduced.

“The inconvenience (and almost the only one) to be apprehended from this change in our projects is that the appearance of our forces on the coast, and still more their success, would probably occasion insurrections in almost every other part of the United Provinces, and these (as we should have no means of supporting them) would probably be crushed at once, the mischief of which would be infinite in a public light, besides the ruin which it would bring on so many individuals.

“On the other hand, if we are to delay our attack for three months longer we give great time for strengthening the vulnerable points, and we defer acting till the season is very unfavourable for our share of the attack. I really hardly know to which side my mind leans in this balance.

“The offer of Sweden, if it had been made six weeks ago, would have relieved all our difficulties, for there we might unquestionably procure transports sufficient. But now we shall hardly save time by this resource, though we may avoid other difficulties by it.

“If even now we could make the King of Prussia take one manly resolution, we might save much time and expense by landing our troops at Lubeck, and marching them either to Hamburgh, or at once to Bremen, or even to Deventer. But this is not very likely at the same moment that he prescribes to the Russian army, whose assistance he asks for, that they shall not march through his territory, or any other *enclavé*.

“Did I mention to you in my last letter that I have set Fagel to work, and that his brother, who is here, will be sent to you with the result of all we can do here; which all however I fear will not be much?”

July 2.—“I guessed rightly enough that I should have little time to write to you to-night, but the despatches to Whitworth will tell you much of what I wished you should know. You see our friend Paul has blabbed our secret, and this is the worse considering how much time must elapse before we execute our schemes. In other respects things look well.” *Copy.*

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE to the HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, July 1. Hampton Court.—“Je vous envoie une lettre pour M. de Rhoon avec sa copie: je vous prie de la lui faire parvenir si vous n’y avez point de remarques; et si vous avez quelques raisons de croire que cette démarche pourroit être nuisible, et contrecarrer des mesures que vous pourriez prendre pour obtenir le but que nous nous proposons, sçavoir, la délivrance de notre patrie, je vous prie de me les marquer, et de me renvoyer la lettre afin que je puisse juger si vos raisons sont bonnes pour ne pas l’envoyer. On désire en général ici que

M. de Rhoon soye employé à travailler au rétablissement des choses, à cause de son zèle pour la bonne cause, et que lui aime à être employé. Je rends justice à son attachement à la constitution, mais je ne voudrais pas que, pour satisfaire à ses désirs, on empêchat l'effet de ce que vous pourrez faire pour la délivrance de notre patrie, et ce seroit lui rendre un mauvais service à lui-même que de le mettre en avant, et de rendre par là, sa rentrée dans notre patrie et son rétablissement dans ses emplois plus difficile ; l'expérience m'a prouvé que son trop grand désir de tout faire a nui souvent aux affaires, et qu'il a désiré d'obtenir, et a obtenu, des commissions qu'il auroit été à souhaiter pour lui et pour moi qu'il n'eut point eues, telle que celle de changer les magistratures des villes d'Hollande en 1787 et 1788. Vous êtes mieux en état de juger que moi si ma lettre peut lui être remise sans difficultés, et je vous laisse le maître d'agir selon les circonstances, vous priant de me faire scavoir, le plus tôt le mieux, ce que vous aurez fait de ma lettre, afin que je puisse en informer ceux qui voudraient que M. de Rhoon fut mis en activité." *Copy.*

Enclosure.

The PRINCE OF ORANGE to COUNT DE BENTINCK RHOON.

1799, July 1. Hampton Court.—“ Mon fils m'ayant informé de la continuation de votre zèle pour la bonne cause, et de votre désir de voir une contre-révolution s'effectuer dans la République des Provinces-Unies pour la délivrer du joug des François, et de ceux qui sous leur autorité y exercent le pouvoir suprême sans aucun droit : je vous prie de me communiquer vos idées à ce sujet, et spécialement sur les moyens que vous croyez qu'on pourroit employer pour organiser une contre-révolution dans la province d'Hollande, dans le cas où l'on pourroit avoir l'assurance d'être promptement assisté par une armée étrangère.

“ Je vous prie de communiquer ce que vous m'écrivez à mon fils qui, étant sur le Continent, est plus à même que moi de juger si les circonstances permettent d'agir ou non, et de ne point faire de démarches qui pussent avoir pour suite quelque explosion, ou qui pussent vous compromettre, ou exposer quelques-uns des bien-intentionnés qui se trouvent dans le pays, sans vous être concerté là-dessus avec mon fils, et sans que vous soyez d'accord avec lui que ces démarches sont utiles à la bonne cause.” *Copy.*

1799, [July]. *Memorandum of MONSIEUR VAN DE SPIEGEL, on the project of a Union of the Dutch and Austrian Netherlands under the House of Orange.*

“ Serait-il avantageux pour notre république, qu' au moyen d'un arrangement à faire à la paix générale, les dix provinces ci-devant autrichiennes fussent réunies aux nôtres, et ne formassent qu'une république ?

“ A considérer la question superficiellement on dirait qu'oui ; car il semble qu'un pareil arrangement donnerait un grand

accroissement de forces à l'état ; et si l'on fait dépendre uniquement de là le bonheur d'un pays, l'on a raison ; mais il est encore d'autres considérations qu'on ne doit pas négliger.

“ En premier lieu la république changerait par là entièrement de forme, et il faudrait conclure une ligue tout-à-fait nouvelle avec des contrées qui diffèrent de nous par la religion, par les mœurs, les intérêts, quelques-unes même par le langage ; or il est à peu près politiquement impossible d'espérer une réunion solide et sincère entre des éléments aussi discordants. L'Empereur Charles Quint a déjà énergiquement voulu cette réunion, mais il a été obligé d'abandonner son projet à cause des difficultés qu'il y voyait. On le reprit pendant la guerre avec l'Espagne, et la *pacification de Gand* de 1756 semblait y paver les voies ; mais on ne tarda pas à s'apercevoir combien il en résultait peu d'avantages, et, trois ans après, les Sept Provinces se séparèrent des autres et conclurent entre elles l'Union d'Utrecht.

2. “ Notre république est bâtie sur des bases toutes différentes de celles qu'il faudrait alors ; nous avons été une puissance maritime et nous deviendrions une puissance continentale ; la chaîne de fortifications qui avait été construite contre des attaques qui pouvaient nous être faites du côté des provinces Autrichiennes, devra être placée ailleurs, et comme ces provinces n'ont point de forteresses, on sera obligé d'en construire des nouvelles. Notre politique a toujours été d'empêcher que le commerce ne se transportât de chez nous dans la Flandre et le Brabant, ce qui serait certainement arrivé au moyen de l'Escaut jusqu'à Anvers, d'Ostende, et d'un canal qu'il aurait été facile de creuser depuis Bruges, si notre république ne s'y était constamment opposée par la force et par les stipulations des traités. Maintenant ces maximes devraient être changées ; et n'en résulterait-il pas bien vite que le Brabant et la Flandre redeviendraient ce que ces provinces étaient il y a 300 ans, savoir, le théâtre d'une prospérité sans bornes, tandis que la Hollande et Zeelande rentreraient dans leur ancien état, et serviraient de nouveau de demeure à quelques pauvres pêcheurs.

3. “ Le voisinage de la France ne nous entrainerait-il pas dans des guerres continuelles ? La politique de nos ancêtres a toujours consisté à éviter ce voisinage, et à avoir plutôt une puissance intermédiaire entre la France et nous : c'est pour cette raison que le Prince Frédéric Henri d'Orange n'a jamais pu réussir à faire la conquête des Pays-bas, conformément au traité de partage avec la France, quoiqu'il les ait attaqués à plusieurs reprises à la tête des armées Françaises et de celles de notre république ; mais chez nous on voyait ces projets avec déplaisir, et on les a toujours traversés. C'est encore pour la même raison qu'en 1701, lors de la Grande Alliance entre l'Empereur, la Grande Bretagne, et notre République, le roi Guillaume stipula que les Pays-bas Espagnols serviraient de barrière pour l'état, mais ne chercha jamais à lui en procurer la propriété, ni en tout ni en partie. Le but de cette barrière, qui explique toute notre politique à l'égard des Pays-bas Espagnols, était d'en assurer la souveraineté à une puissance dont il ne fut pas probable qu'elle

devint l'alliée de la France, et qui, en même temps, fut assez considérable pour défendre ses états ; le tout cependant de telle manière que notre république conservât toujours une influence suffisante dans les Pays-bas, pour pouvoir empêcher soit que le souverain de ces provinces en fit une place d'armes contre nous, ou qu'il y protégéât le commerce au préjudice du nôtre. Dans ce but nous entretenions des troupes aux Pays-bas, et étions maîtres de la navigation de toutes les rivières dont la France aurait dû se servir pour entrer dans notre pays (excepté du côté de l'Empire) pendant que nous étions, en même temps, en possession du commerce intérieur le long de ces rivières.

“Et c'est là encore à présent l'unique intérêt que nous avons aux Pays-bas ; nous n'en avons pas à les posséder en propre, ou à les incorporer dans notre république. S'il est possible d'effectuer quelque espèce de réunion avec ce pays-là, j'aimerais mieux que les dix provinces des Pays-bas devinssent une république à part, sous le Stadhoudérat de la Maison d' Orange, et unies avec nous par ce lien-là ; ou qu'elles fussent cédées en souveraineté à la Maison d'Orange à titre de dédommagement, pour les posséder *sur le pied de barrière* ; ou bien encore, qu'afin de prévenir la collision que des intérêts commerciaux pourraient faire naître entre nous et le souverain des Pays-bas, *Anvers, Ostende, et Bruges* fussent cédées à notre république, et tout le reste à la Maison d'Orange ; mais il est peu probable pour plus d'une raison que cela arrive jamais ; il est toujours utile néanmoins de ne pas perdre de vue ces principes de nos véritables intérêts.”

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE to J. FAGEL.

1799, July 3. Hampton Court.—“Le Prince d'Orange croyant utile pour les intérêts tant de sa patrie, que de sa maison, d'avoir une personne de confiance au Continent qui puisse y être employé par son fils le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange à correspondre, tant de la part du Prince d'Orange que de celle du Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, avec des anciens membres de la Régence, et avec d'autres personnes bien-intentionnées qui se trouvent, soit dans l'intérieur de la République des Provinces Unies, soit dans ses environs, a fait choix pour cet effet de M. Jacques Fagel, et l'a chargé de se rendre dans le courant de ce mois en Allemagne, d'aller, directement après son arrivée à Cuxhaven, à Berlin auprès du Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, et de prendre ses ordres, et les renseignements qu'il pourra lui donner sur les moyens de correspondre d'une manière sûre avec les bien-intentionnés qui se trouvent dans le territoire de la République des Provinces-Unies, ainsi que sur le choix des personnes avec lesquelles il pourroit et devrait correspondre. Il se rendra en suite à Bremen, ou à tel autre endroit peu éloigné tant de la frontière de la République des Provinces-Unies que du port de Cuxhaven, et qui puisse être un endroit intermédiaire entre Londres, Berlin, et la République des Provinces-Unies, que le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange pourra lui indiquer, et s'y établira. Il pourra porter en compte ses

débours, tant pour le port de lettres que pour les voyages qu'il pourra faire avec l'aveu du Prince Héritaire d'Orange, soit en Allemagne, soit dans l'intérieur de la République, soit même en Angleterre dans le cas où le Prince Héritaire d'Orange pourroit trouver nécessaire qu'il s'y rendit pour faire rapport de bouche au Prince d'Orange de la situation des choses, ou prendre ses ordres sur des articles qui ne pourroient être confiés au papier. Il pourra assurer les anciens Régens, et autres personnes bien-intentionnées, sur la discretion desquelles il pourra compter, et avec lesquels il correspondra, de l'intérêt que sa Majesté Brittanique daigne prendre au sort de la République des Provinces-Unies et de la Maison d'Orange, et de son intention de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faire agir avec efficace la garantie du Stadhoudérat qu'elle a donné par le traité de — du ——— 1778.

“ Il tachera par le moyen de ses correspondances d'entretenir les bons sentimens des bien-intentionnés, de prévenir un découragement qui empêcheroit de tirer parti de leurs bonnes dispositions lorsque l'occasion pourroit devenir favorable d'effectuer le rétablissement de la constitution légitime de la République des Provinces-Unies et du Stadhoudérat ; mais en même tems il évitera tout ce qui pourroit les engager à des démarches inconsidérées, ou à une explosion prématurée, avant que les troupes des Puissances alliées pussent le soutenir et seconder leurs efforts, pour tacher de se délivrer du joug des Francois. Il informera le Prince Héritaire d'Orange de toutes les choses importantes qui parviendront à sa connoissance, et agira d'après ses directions. Il écrira aussi au Prince d'Orange ce qu'il apprendra d'intéressant, et si cela presse et ne peut être confié à la poste, il est autorisé d'envoyer des exprès avec ses lettres. Quant à d'autres choses secrètes qui ne sont pas assez importantes pour les envoyer par exprès, il les écrira en chiffre, et se servira du chiffre que le Prince d'Orange lui fournira.

“ Enfin il fera ce qui est en son pouvoir pour être utile à sa patrie et à la Maison d'Orange, d'après les directions qu'il recevra du Prince Héritaire d'Orange, ou du Prince d'Orange.”
Copy ; enclosed in the following letter.

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 3.—“ I have endeavoured, agreeably to your wish, to express in the enclosed paper your own and Mr. Grenville's ideas, which agree perfectly with my own, and to combine them both with the information and advice which, I have reason to believe, the Prince and Princess will have given to the Hereditary Prince, in consequence of what I suggested to them in your name, and with the establishment of that correspondence which is the principal object of my brother's journey. A detailed and regular plan of the nature alluded to can, I think, be definitely settled only by persons of the description mentioned, and being actually in the country, communicating their ideas on the subject to the Hereditary Prince, by means of the correspondence which is to

be set on foot. I know that the Hereditary Prince is already in correspondence with some persons of that description, as, for instance, with a Mr. van de Poll[†] at Amsterdam, a man of considerable abilities and influence in that city; with Mr. d'Enghuysen in the province of Gelderland, and others. The Princess further points out to him some persons who might be usefully employed in the same way. He will of course instruct my brother to correspond with them, particularly for attaining the object in question, and I have not the least doubt myself but that, by this means, it will be attained.

"I take the liberty also to submit to you whether you would not think proper to authorize my brother to inform, in general terms, Mr. Charles Bentinck in your name that the general circumstances of Europe are such as to afford a nearer prospect of a favourable change of circumstances in Holland, and to desire him to correspond with the Hereditary Prince on the measures to be taken in the provinces of Friesland and Groningen on the approach of an armed force from without, which will enable the well-disposed inhabitants of those provinces to come forward.

"I don't know whether the enclosed paper will exactly answer your intention, either in point of substance or in form. I must submit that to you. I am still more in need of your indulgence with respect to the language. Writing in English in Lord Grenville's name would, under any other shape, and any other circumstances than the present, make me appear ridiculous in my own eye.

Postscript. "If I should not hear from you to the contrary I mean to call with my brother to-morrow morning before 11 o'clock. If he is to set off by next Saturday's packet, he must leave town Friday, very early in the morning."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 6. Berlin.—"I do most heartily give you joy in forwarding to you without delay the important intelligence of the conclusion of all your Petersburg arrangements, and I know not how to do justice to all that seems due to the extraordinary exertions and success of Captain Popham which have been well supported by Sir Charles Whitworth. Unfortunately he entirely forgot to send two letters to me from General Stamford, so that I know not a word of the General's opinions,* but I think I can answer for his approving all that marks so strongly the zeal, intelligence, and activity of those who have been so successfully at work. Perhaps I might have wished that the fleet of galleys and the navigation of the Eyder had not been put by from political speculations about Hamburgh, or military apprehensions of summer camps and Danish boors; but where there is so much to commend, one must not allow oneself to be too critical, and the merits of Popham are too great to bear any remark other than of great praise in this important transaction; for the same reason I do not object to the objectionable part of

* See letter of General de Stamford to Mr. Grenville, dated June 18, 1799, on page 96.

Whitworth's treaty in leaving to the Emperor the absolute recall of all his ships at any moment, and yet consenting to give him two months extra pay even in the case of sudden recall; but the ships are there, the troops will be there, the expedition will take place, and must succeed, and therefore I am, as you will doubtless be, *au comble de la joye*. I really am only doing bare justice when I praise in my despatches the conduct of the Hereditary Prince of Orange; he is reserved, prudent, and laborious to the greatest degree, and I have found him in every respect disposed to do all that his talents and situation can afford, and that without any appearance hitherto of wishing to press forward his own ideas and opinions; he approves highly of what I have told him respecting the object in question, and I have recommended to him to make all his arrangements respecting the officers who are to be collected, and the other facilities which can be offered from the interior, without giving to any one individual person the knowledge of the proposed expedition. This is difficult, but it is necessary, and he has promised to conduct himself scrupulously upon this principle. It will however be necessary that some place should be fixed for the embarkation of those officers who will be wanted in the interior, and who dare not pass the frontier by land. I must take this opportunity to state to you that Robert Fagel is very apprehensive of the bad effects which may arise, if you should have taken an exact copy of his letter to his brother, and if that copy should reach the Stadtholder or the H[ereditary] P[rince], because there are six words in Dutch which speak slightly of the Prince of Orange's *mémoire*. I have therefore promised that, if you have taken a copy, you will erase those six Dutch words for fear of accidents, and I am confident you will not forget to do so as the letter was a private one, and not intended for the public eye.

"With respect to our Berlin negotiation, I can add but little to my public letter. I understand from Haugwiz that these military difficulties have all arisen from the Duke of Brunswick himself, who has taught the King to believe that he must not run the risk of a French army collecting on the Moselle, a risk which Haugwiz holds as cheap as I can do. He is sanguine in his belief that his *projet de convention*, which I am to see to-morrow night, will furnish the grounds of a real agreement, and he has promised distinctly to specify the point at which the Russians are to arrive; he is certainly sincere in his belief that the King will really act sooner than he will be bound to do, and I am ready enough to believe this, because I have always thought they must act as soon as they are aware of our project, and that cannot now be long a secret. I have some reluctance therefore to consent to pay them sooner for acting only in the case in which they can act without danger to themselves; but, upon the whole, the early declaration of Prussia is still so important, that I am inclined to think every practicable inducement should be resorted to for it, however disgusting it may be to act in measure with such feeble and wretched politicians. I am not quite without apprehensions that the Emperor of Russia may at last find

his army so drained as not to furnish the corps which he had offered to Prussia; but when I recollect that a Prussian war with France will set the Emperor free from all disquietude on the Prussian frontier, I trust that he will not hesitate to fulfil his promise if the Prussians will claim it. It may however possibly happen that the Emperor will refuse, and I have reason to believe that, in such a case, the Prussian Ministers will be still more disposed to concert only with England, for I have remarked that Haugwiz has always caught with great avidity at the loose hints by which I have endeavoured to learn his wishes in such a case. It is in reference to this possible case that I am inclined to recommend separate conventions on the part of Russia and of England with Prussia, because then our contract may stand good by our accepting a positive epoch of time, instead of the general description of time implied in the arrival of the Russian troops. You will probably agree with me that the demand of Russian troops for Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein was intended to stop the march of the 45,000 men, and divert them from Austrian to Prussian co-operation, but I have stoutly defended your subsidiary corps, and have told Haugwiz we could not discuss with him the march of our troops till he made himself a party to the measures of which he now made question.

"I presume that you will have instructed Lord Minto respecting the Austrian cession of Austrian Flanders; till some measure is taken upon this point it will be found full of difficulties; the desirable thing seems to me to be to obtain from Austria some declaration respecting their abandonment of the Low Countries, such as they have already on former occasions made at Berlin; but it will be very necessary to keep them at Vienna to their original measure of compensation in the Venetian territory, as you are doubtless informed that they are openly looking to a great part of Piemont as necessary to complete their compensation, and I find their greediness increases with their success. I have sent the Dutch intelligence to Stamford. On the 1st instant Popham is to meet General Thule from Stockholm at Petersburg.

"To the Dutch intelligence which I had enclosed, I now add a letter this moment received from the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange. I perfectly agree with him in thinking that the Texel fleet could usefully assist the insurrection of the coasts of the Zuyder Zee, but I have observed to him in answer that the new batteries which are constructed on the shore were considered by Van Braame as commanding entirely the fleet while in the Texel, and of course rendering all co-operation impossible till it shall be out of reach of that control. The other demand of arms is one which it is natural for him to make, and desirable that you should assist as you can, but my yeomanry recollections upon that subject do not give me great confidence in your assistance upon that point, as I do not ever recollect that there have in latter times been any surplus of arms in England. I have omitted to offer you my special congratulations upon the transport difficulties under which you laboured being now completely overcome; for you will observe the first division is provided with Russian ships,

for the second there are, by your own account, English ships sufficient, and for the third I have no doubt but that Sweden will hire her ships to Popham, or at the worst the Russian ships can come back to fetch them."

Enclosure.

REPORT FROM M. D'IVOY.

1799, July 3. Emerick.—“On dit que Sa Majesté Prussienne a fait savoir au gouvernement Batave qu'elle désiroit que tout fut remis sur le même pied qu'avant 1795; que dans ce cas elle offroit sa protection et emploieroit ses forces afin que le tout se fit sans confusion; mais que, dans le cas d'un refus, elle se verroit obligé d'employer la force, et que là-dessus il falloit une réponse en trois jours.—Les autorités à la Haye ont été assemblées, extraordinairement, le 25 à 7 heures dans la matinée, à l'occasion de dépêches arrivées la veille de Paris par courrier. Rien n'en avoit transpiré, mais on les croyoit relatives au changement qui y avoit eu lieu, et dont Lombard et Brune n'ont été instruits que par le Directoire Batave, dont les membres appréhendent beaucoup de la continuation de Barras. Après l'assemblée on s'est aperçu de beaucoup de trouble, et depuis, on a remarqué beaucoup d'irrésolution, surtout par rapport aux travaux et arrangemens militaires. On vouloit même que l'ouvrage au Greb fut provisoirement suspendu, mais mes nouvelles d'avant hièr ne confirment point cette circonstance; elles m'annoncent, au contraire, qu'on augmente les garnisons sur l'Yssel.

“Les Francois ont fait entrer, il y a quelques jours, 80 pièces du plus gros calibre dans Venlo, venant de Maestricht, dont 40 au moins sont Hollandoises. Cela fait présumer qu'ils se retireront dernière la Meuse, d'autant plus que mille paÿsans sont occupés à transporter les magasins de Dusseldorff et Cologne sur Maestricht et Breda.

“Ce qui suit est en chiffre :—

“Il y auroit moyen d'avoir, soit au *Texel*, au *Helder*, ou à *Helvoet*, un bâtiment qui se chargeroit de passer les dépêches en droiture; ainsi par ce moyen on pourroit établir une correspondance directe. Cela reviendrait à 4 florins par jour à titre de *leggeld*, parceque le bâtiment devoit être toujours disponible, et le trajet serait payé en conséquence. Je n'ai pris aucun engagement encore, désirant de savoir préalablement lequel de ces trois endroits on préféreroit; et d'être instruit où et comment l'on voudroit que ces batimens abordassent. Quand je serai informé des intentions à cet égard, il sera temps de mettre cette affaire en train. *Extract.*

BRITISH EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.

NOTE OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, K.C.B.

1799, July 6.—“The object of the present armament is the conquest of that part of Holland to the northward of the Waal.

“The advanced season of the year demands the greatest promptitude and vigour in the execution of it. No operation which does not immediately tend to the accomplishment of this object ought to be undertaken. It would waste your strength and your time to conquer islands; except in so far as they are necessary to secure to you a firm footing on the continent of Holland, and to keep up your communication with Great Britain. The United Provinces must be attacked on the Meuse, or by a landing in the province of Groningen. The first mode of attack seems in the abstract most advisable. It gives you at once a footing in the province of Holland. It enables you to avail yourself of the Waal, as a line of defence on the side of France. It opens an immediate communication with Great Britain. It affords you a prospect of getting possession of the province of Holland during the good weather. It takes the lines of the Greb and the Yssel in the rear; and it gives you the probability that, on the conquest of the province of Holland, the other provinces will submit. All these advantages are of little moment if your force is inadequate, or if the means of landing the troops are precarious. Should your force be sufficient to attack the island of Voorn, and to effect a landing on the mainland at the same time, the object would probably be attained. But if you cannot effect a landing without previously getting possession of Voorn, the difficulty would be increased, because, whilst you were reducing the Brill and Helvoetsluys, the enemy would collect his force, and would throw many difficulties in your way. The question then is, “can a fleet pass up the Meuse if the enemy is master of the island of Voorn?” Should this be practicable, which is the point where a landing ought to be made that will enable the troops to hold their ground until reinforced, and keep up their communication with the shipping? It has been said that a landing may be effected at Schevelinge. This is obviously a precarious undertaking. But should the weather admit of it, the troops thus landed ought to march immediately and co-operate with their friends on the Meuse. Unless on the most favourable concurrence of circumstances no attempt on Holland ought to be made until the first division of foreign troops is within reach and ready to co-operate. At the moment of execution, demonstrations ought to be made from the mouth of the Somme to the Ems.

“A number of regiments of cavalry being ordered for foreign service, and transports prepared for their reception, will add to the uncertainty and increase the alarm. As in the execution of this plan everything depends upon accurate information, the following queries are stated:—

Queries.

1st. What is the probable force in the Province of Holland?

Answers.

1st. By Lord Grenville.—The French force cannot exceed 10,000 men. Little account is to be made of the *Bataves*.

* *Margin.* Answered in the negative by Col. S.

2nd. Is the navigation of the Meuse clear and practicable for heavy transports and 50 gun ships, from its mouth to Schiedam or Rotterdam?

3rd. Can the fortifications at the Brille, or on the opposite side of the Meuse prevent ships from passing up?

4th. Should neither the fortifications of the Brille nor the difficulties of the navigation of the river prevent ships from passing up to Schiedam or its vicinity, at what point can the troops be disembarked to the greatest advantage?

5th. Should it be necessary to take possession of the island of Voorn, where ought the landing to be made?

6th. What is the state of the fortifications of the Brille and of Helvoetsluys?

7th. What garrisons are at present in these places?

8th. Would not the possession of the island of Voorn and of Williamstadt give several and advantageous points of attack upon Holland?

2nd. By Colonel S.—that he believes the passage for heavy ships to Rotterdam is by Helvoetsluys, which is the branch of the river leading to Rotterdam by Dort. The passage by the Brille would not answer for large transports.

3rd. By Colonel S.—Yes.

5th. By Colonel S.—On the west side of the island.

6th. By Colonel S.—The fortifications are good, the Brille has a covered way, and a wet ditch.

8th. By Colonel S.—*Yes, certainly.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 8. Berlin.—“I think that I now begin to trace the exact operation upon the wretched politics at Berlin, which I had ventured to predict would be the sure consequence of the vigorous measures which you are pursuing from Petersburg; and through all their doubts, their difficulties, their apprehensions and irresolutions, I think I now see strongly their new fear that we shall at length somehow or other do the business without them, and leave them to the solitary enjoyment of the solitary system which they have so curiously carved for themselves among the great powers of Europe. Count Haugwiz is now so convinced of our being determined to complete the business without them, that I am persuaded he is sincere in the desire which he professes to engage the King of Prussia with us, and I am inclined to

believe that he speaks truly when he represents his difficulties to consist partly in the personal reluctance of the King to commit himself to the measure of war, and partly in the military doubts suggested by the extravagant caution of the Duke of Brunswick. I do not see any reason to think that Count Haugwiz is as yet informed of the Baltic expedition, but it is hopeless to imagine that 15,000 men can be embarked there by the assistance of an English officer, without pointing out pretty distinctly the object of its destination. I made so many criticisms upon the paper which he shewed me that I have not been able yet to obtain from him a copy of it, though I am making another effort to get it for you before I close this letter. If he acts up to his conversation of yesterday in the alterations which he promises to make, I think it highly probable that we shall speedily come to an understanding with respect to the English share in this convention, as he agreed to endeavour to adopt the idea of employing the million, which they asked, in monthly payments for the remainder of this year, according to the proportions of the last Prussian and Russian subsidies. I do not see any great difficulty likely to arise on our own part so as to defeat the conclusion of the arrangement. The greatest difficulty which I apprehend is on the part of the Emperor of Russia who may hesitate to incur this new drain both of men and money, though it is certainly a direct offer made from him to Prussia, and one which Count Panin considered himself as authorised to conclude upon, if Prussia should accept it. We must not however forget that the present Baltic armament was not in question when he made the offer which is now claimed by Prussia, and that their home force is therefore diminished at Petersburg by the number of the 18,000 men who are now to embark on the Baltic. I shall not put these difficulties in the way of Panin or of Paul, but I do not on that account feel perfectly satisfied that I shall not hear of them; these difficulties may likewise be increased by the confidence which the Emperor may entertain of the success of this Baltic expedition, and by the reluctance which he may have to admit Prussia into the share of a conquest which his *chevaleresque* character may make him glorious to reserve to himself. There is likewise to be added to this the reflection that his finances are scarcely sufficient to furnish at his own cost another German army of 40,000 men, and Haugwiz is so persuaded of his present poverty in men and money, that he assures me we shall not have more than 30,000 of the 45,000 Russians whom we are to pay for; an information which, to Haugwiz, I appeared to discredit, but which is important enough to require your attention and that of your commissary. There would be no difficulty whatever upon the subject of this new Russian force demanded by Prussia, if we could make the troops of the Baltic expedition count in the Prussian estimation for the new army which they require; in fair reasoning the troops who land in Holland will offer a more effectual assistance to Prussia than any who could approach the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and there is no question but that the spirit of the condition is more advantageously fulfilled by the

Russians acting on the Dutch and Flemish side of the Rhine than by their acting towards the German and right bank of it; and I think I could easily shew them, in defiance of all the doubts of their irresolute Ducal commander, that 25,000 or 30,000 of the allied troops in Holland, in giving to Prussia the disposition of the whole of its own force for its German frontier, give to it more effectual support than could arise from 40,000 men approaching to the fortresses of Mayence and Ehrenbrietstein; but unfortunately we cannot have the benefit of this discussion without making them parties to our military projects, before they are absolutely engaged to co-operate with us; and we must observe too that, however strong our general reasoning on this point might be, we should have to contend with all the prejudices which they would feel against an expedition calculated to put Holland into the hands of Russia instead of Prussia; and therefore that, by making a communication to them of our plan, we invite their certain opposition to it; and yet, without making that communication, we cannot reasonably demand to have the benefit of it in our convention with them. Perhaps I over-rate the jealousy which I apprehend from them on this subject, but I own I should not be surprised to find that they will soon discover the object of our expedition, and that they will at all hazards pre-occupy the country by a Prussian force. If they did this early enough to save us the risk and expense of the Baltic expedition, I know no great harm in our having quickened them by that threat into doing what we have wished them to do; I only object to their having such a knowledge of our plan as would lead them to throw difficulties in our way without taking the task into their own hands. The fair and liberal course of proceeding would be to give them the knowledge of our new means for Holland, and take credit with them for that force as applying to the force which their convention demands from Russia; but to justify this frank and open communication we ought to be more assured than I am that none but a fair and liberal use will be made of this communication; it may however happen that the Prussian Cabinet may obtain the knowledge of our enterprise before we have completed our convention, and in that case, as there would be no secret to keep respecting it, there might seem to be some advantage in openly claiming this force as being to make part of the assistance which they claim from Russia.

"Another idea which has occurred to me is that I might, without risk, state to Haugwiz an intention on the part of Great Britain to attack Holland by sea, and I might claim that the number of troops landed in Holland shall be considered as equivalent to the troops which he asks for the neighbourhood of Ehrenbreitstein; the only objection which I see to this is that, though it does not actually tell our secret, it very much suggests the knowledge of it. Perhaps I am all this time fighting with a shadow, perhaps the Emperor will give his troops according to his offer, and I should like that best because that would produce for us the largest mass of force; and I own I am strongly inclined to the opinion that every possible exertion should be made to the greatest

extent, in order to push with effect the advantages of this campaign, and give to our enemy no breathing time to recover himself. In my conversation of yesterday I again felt the ground as to the possibility of our concluding with Prussia singly, in case the arrangement could not be made acceptable at Petersburg; and I think I see it would not only be practicable to do so, but that in fact they wish rather for a separate connection with us, although they require at the same time the assistance and support of the arms of Russia. I have however taken care to tread this ground with great caution, professing always that our present intimate connection with Russia is an object the most forward in the views of the British Cabinet. Upon these various difficulties and doubts I shall be glad to receive any suggestions which you will furnish to me; but if any occasion presents itself for a tolerable conclusion, I shall conclude as fast as possible for the best, and I will take my chance of being hanged, drawn and quartered afterwards; the only *sine quâ non* upon which I shall immoveably rest is, that no payment shall take place until the King of Prussia shall explicitly declare himself at war with France for the deliverance of Holland and the *pays limitrophes*, with a sure and strong frontier to them. By the *pays limitrophes* Cologne is, I understand, included, as well as Berg and Juliers which are, as you know, reversible to Prussia. The English debate has made the King think it necessary distinctly to express that he will enter into no engagement for the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. nor will he undertake for a step more than the rescue of Holland and *les pays limitrophes*, with a sure frontier; and having gained that he will return to the defence of it, and will pursue no other object in France military or political; if he does that task well, I shall be better satisfied with him than I have hitherto been.

“The Prince of Orange has just left me; by his last accounts the French appear to take alarm about Maestricht, and they occupy themselves likewise upon the Greb; but this is nothing; we must not hope that if we give them time and means of preparation they will not turn them to some advantage. I understand that the Batavian Directory has been sounded without effect; that they admit their own situation to be desperate, but do not lend themselves to the suggestions which are held out to them. The Prince has consulted me upon the position which he himself should personally take, and I have recommended to him to make no decision as yet, but to look to the probability of either marching in from Ameland at the head of that division, or of meeting it at the head of the well affected in Groningen and Friesland; I am rather inclined to the first of these two measures because I think the Russians will be less unpopular if they are headed by the Prince, and because the situation of the Prince will be less exposed at the head of a regular force than in the first explosion of the interior of the country; but we shall have some time, and I hope not much time, to make this decision.

"I ought to have mentioned that in Haugwiz's last conversation he spoke of the impossibility of preserving the ecclesiastical possessions, in any final settlement of the Empire. I have not yet been able to trace the exact object of this opinion which he has now for the first time expressed, and I contented myself with observing how desirable it was to keep the principle of *l'intégrité de l'Empire* as much untouched as possible.

"My letters from Flanders speak of great and redoubled vigilance in the Brussels Directory, and apprehensions of a renewed system of terror there as well as at Paris. My correspondent urges the necessity of a direct negotiation immediately from England in that country, and says they are afraid to negotiate with Prussia and the House of Orange. I have not time to send you the Dutch and Flemish correspondence."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1779, July 9. Cuxhaven.—"I sailed from Yarmouth on the 5th instant, a fog having prevented the *Latona* from sailing the day before. I landed to-day, and shall immediately proceed on my journey. On my passage I had occasion to learn that the officers on this station think the blockade of the Dutch ports would be much more effectual to distress the enemy if the Scheld were also included in the blockade, the trade for Holland being now in general directed to that river. I am persuaded your Lordship will think this point worthy of consideration.

"I have also learnt that the peculiar situation of Embden affords a channel, which is not neglected, for a very extensive and fraudulent trade between England and Holland. I have seen in the possession of Captain Sotheron, who commands the *Latona*, positive evidence of a direct connection between several houses in London and merchants in Holland.

"The vessels employed in this trade are bound to Embden, but the Dutch port being on the other side of the same river, they do not even use the ceremony of unloading at Embden, but carry their cargoes directly to the Dutch side and send them by canals to the interior of Holland. As the supply of Holland may seem advantageous to England in a commercial point of view, although it undoubtedly counteracts the exertions which are making to distress that country as an enemy, it is for the wisdom of government to consider whether means should be employed to restrain this intercourse with Holland. I understand that it is much favoured by the government at Embden, and the officers do not understand that there is a British consul at that place. An agent of our government would no doubt be useful at Embden in detecting and checking these irregular practices.

"As these matters are altogether foreign to my mission I should not take the liberty of troubling your Lordship with them otherwise than in the form of a private letter."

EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.

Minute of Lord Grenville.

1799, July 10.—“The first plan which was given in for the deliverance of Holland (and which can be considered as at all applicable to the present circumstances), was contained in the *mémoire* of the Duke of Brunswick, dated October 22, and received here November 7, 1798.¹

“It rests entirely on the possibility of seizing by surprize or secret correspondence one of the strong places in Groningue or Overysse, and of forming there a Dutch army of 10 or 12,000 men, which should be transported in flat-bottom boats from Staveren to Enchuysen, while one Prussian army should pass the Yssel and advance on the Greb, and another occupy the French between the Rhine and the Meuse. This operation to be favoured by a diversion made from this country either against the Texel or against Zealand.

“A proposal had a few months before been in consideration here for seizing the islands of Ammeland and Schiermonick Ooge, in concert with some of the inhabitants of the provinces of Groningue and Overysse, who were thereupon to have risen and disarmed the *Batares*, there being at that time no French troops beyond the Yssel. The person who gave in this plan, and who is unquestionably a man of much ability and knowledge, is now on the frontiers of the republick, and is in correspondence with the King’s government.

“Various proposals have at different times been made respecting Walcheren, but these it is conceived to be unnecessary to detail here. This paper (No. 3) also contains some considerations respecting the line of operations to be followed by the armies in Holland and the Netherlands.

“About the beginning of May in the present year the state of the Court of Petersburg was judged such as to afford a probability of obtaining a body of troops from thence, which, being brought by sea, might operate on one part of the United Provinces, while the British Army could co-operate with them by an attack in a different quarter. Communication was had with Captain Popham as to some of the details of these ideas, and particularly about the means of transporting and disembarking such a force if furnished by the Emperor of Russia.

“And the paper (No. 4) having been received from him, he was instructed to proceed to Petersburg with directions for his conduct, as in (No. 5.)

“A letter (No. 6) was written to Mr. Grenville at Berlin communicating to him what had passed on this subject, and desiring him to prevail upon General Stamford to proceed to Petersburg in order to explain and concert the military details of such an expedition, in so far as related to the part to be allotted to the Russian troops.

“Mr. Grenville’s despatch (No. 7) of the 21 May, describes the plan which General Stamford formed for this purpose, and which he proceeded to Petersburg to recommend.²

[¹ See page 350, Vol. iv.]

[² See extract from, printed on page 60.]

"It consists in landing 15,000 men in the neighbourhood of Delfzyl, having 5,000 more in reserve in the principality of Yevern, where the depot of provisions was to be formed.

"This army was to make itself master of Groningen and Overysse, while the British force should take possession of Zealand, and Lord Duncan's fleet block the Texel, or even make some demonstration of attack there.

"The progress of these attacks was supposed sufficient to ensure a counter-revolution by internal risings in all the Provinces, particularly as by the latest accounts it appeared that the whole French force on that side amounted only to 15,000 men from Mayence inclusive, about 5,000 being in and about Mayence, 5,000 men in the other fortresses, and 5,000 only in the interior of the Republic. (*See Mr. Grenville's despatch, where he states these numbers from the authority of Count Haugwitz.*)¹

"Captain Popham arrived at Petersburg near three weeks earlier than General Stamford, and it being found necessary in order to obtain the Emperor of Russia's consent to the King's proposal, to suggest to him some distinct and precise plan of operations, an attack on the three points of Walcheren, Goree, and Ammeland was proposed by Captain Popham, and after some discussion adopted by the Emperor with that eagerness which belongs to his character. When General Stamford arrived the whole business was nearly settled, as appears by Sir Charles Whitworth's despatches, Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37, and by Captain Popham's letters. The latter describes his project as including the occupation of Groningen and Overysse in the same manner as General Stamford's, but as differing from it as to the point of disembarkation, which the one proposes to be on the Island of Ammeland, the other on the continent, and near Delfzyl. It is to be observed as to the latter that some little doubt may arise respecting the line of neutrality at the mouth of the Ems, but this might probably be arranged or disregarded if the point were decided in a military view.²

"By Sir Charles Whitworth's last letter, No. 37, it appears that the treaty was to be signed at Petersburg on the 22nd, and it would probably be conformable to the copy (No. 10) which Count Woronzow has in confidence communicated to Lord Grenville.

"According to that project the Russian troops would amount to 17,600 men, viz :—

17 battallions Infantry
2 companies Artillery
1 do. Pioneers
1 squadron Hussars

to be embarked with their artillery, but without any horses of any kind.

"For these, transports were to be provided in part by Russia and in part by this country, but the whole at our expense. The Russian ships of war which the Emperor lends for the purpose are calculated to hold 8,000 men, and to be ready by the middle

[¹ See also Mr. Grenville's private letter, dated May 27, on page 67.]

[² See De Stamford's letter of June 18, on page 96.]

or end of this month (July). The whole of the troops were to be ready to embark at the same time. But the transports for the 10,000 men could not be depended upon as being to be procured even in part in the Baltic, and measures are therefore in course to send the whole from hence. They are however not yet sailed, and when they sail their voyage can hardly be calculated at less than 1 month—it may be more.

“In consequence however of Lord Grenville’s letter to Sir Charles Whithworth, extract of which is annexed [No. 11], it is probable that the first division of 8,000 men would sail as soon as they were ready, and *rendezvous* at Gothenberg. And it seems proper that the orders to this effect should be repeated. (See also what Captain Popham says on the subject in his note 15–20 June.)

“It may be hoped therefore that this first division may arrive at Gothenberg about the third week in August, and the second division in a fortnight or three weeks afterwards, according to the date of the arrival of the transports at Revel. The Swedish troops that have been offered are 8,000 men. It is conceived that the most expeditious mode will be to collect these at Gothenberg, and that transports may readily be procured there for their use, so as the whole may be ready by the time that the first division of Russians arrives there—say the middle of August. On this point, however, further details are expected, and the troops themselves cannot yet be relied on with certainty, though there appears great probability of our having them. To this force either of 18,000 or of 26,000 men, according as we get the Swedes or not, is to be added that which is now collecting in this kingdom, and which may be put at 10,000* infantry, and 6,000 cavalry. It is to be observed that the Russians having no cavalry with them except a single squadron of Hussars, it would be necessary that, as soon as they are to act in any country where cavalry would be wanted, a due proportion should be joined to them from this country; and that this is indeed stipulated in the treaty.

“The points therefore to be decided are, supposing the two operations of Groningen and the islands of the Meuse determined on;

“1. What proportion of this whole force of about 45,000 men should be allotted to these two operations, and which troops to each?

“2. Whether the operations may not commence on the arrival of the first Russian division at Gothenberg, supposing the British and Swedes then ready?

“3. With respect to the operation against Groningen, whether the landing should be made at Ammeland, or on the continent?

“This, it is conceived, must depend on points of detail, respecting which particular information must be procured and easily may, but the final decision of which must in some measure depend on the opinion of the officer commanding that operation.

* Increased to 12,000, July 13, 1799.

“The papers annexed (No. 12) contain some information respecting Groningen during the last year, and by the means of the communications established, the most minute details may be obtained as soon as it is judged safe to let our agents see that our enquiries point to that quarter.

“With respect to the operation against the Province of Holland, Sir R[alph] A[bercrombie]’s note contains the queries which are in the first place necessary to be answered. Steps are taking to procure information upon them; and the note (No. 13) may be of some use in that respect. It is to be remarked that if, on a fresh consideration of the force to be employed, it should be judged necessary to bring it all to bear exclusively on one point, that of the islands of Holland, such a determination must without delay be stated to the Emperor of Russia, in whose mind it may raise some, but probably not insuperable difficulties.

“As the obtaining the port of Gothenberg for a depot, though it is probable, yet cannot be entirely depended upon, some consideration ought to be had whether, in the contrary event, the first division of Russians must be brought to any *rendezvous* in Great Britain, or whether they could be carried straight to their point of attack. And in either case what steps are to be taken for supplying them with the horses which they may want in the first instance.

“A plan should also be formed and digested beforehand for arranging as extensive a system of diversion as possible, and it might perhaps not be wholly impossible to circulate and accredit the report that the expedition is destined against Havre, or St. Malo. A shew if not a reality of attack on the Texel fort would, as it is conceived, be of the utmost importance in the same view. It should also be considered what steps must be taken with regard to the Dutch *rassemblement*, as it is called, which must form the foundation of the army to be raised by the Prince of Orange on his restoration.”

Minute by Mr. Pitt.

July 13th.—“The force to act in two divisions. The first, on the Isle of Voorn, to consist in the first instance of 12,000 British, to sail as soon after 1st August as possible if 29th and 50th are arrived, or 1,000 men obtained from Militia; to be joined by 8,000 Russians who are to embark on the 20th July, and may arrive about 20th August. Afterwards by 10 or 15,000 British Infantry and 3,000 Cavalry who may also be ready by about 20th August. And then to penetrate into Holland. The second to land in Groningen, and consist of 10,000 Russians and 8,000 Swedes, who may arrive about 15th September, and to be joined by 3,000 Cavalry, and a battering train with 500 Artillery from England, which will be ready by the same time.

“Latitude to substitute 8,000 Swedes for the 8,000 Russians.—Engineers for second division.

Effective under Arms.

5,000 now

1,700 from Ireland.

1,600 3 regiments.

8,300 say 9,000

Add Guards 1,000

10,000

Numbers to be carried 12,000.

Transports.

Troop ships for - - 4,000 men.

Ordinary Transports for 5,000 „

Ships of War—Cutters for 2,000 „

In a fortnight - - 11,000 „

Wanting - - 1,000 „

[Arrangement for conveying Recruits expeditiously to their Regiments.]

Tons.

For cavalry 24,000 wanted by 15th August.

For ordnance :—

2,700 tons—by 1st August.

2,600 „ Battering Train by September.

Bat. and Artillery Horses,

and other freight - - 6,400 by —

INTELLIGENCE FROM HOLLAND.

1799, July 11. Beckestein (North Holland).—“Il m’a été impossible de débrouiller votre citron, ce que j’attribue à l’humidité que la lettre aura contractée entre les mains du porteur. J’ai cependant compris que vous désirez que je remette la lettre moi-même. J’ai écrit le même soir, mardi passé, à l’homme en question (van Braame) en le priant de me fixer un rendezvous; mais sa réponse a été négative, parcequ’en l’absence du chef, il remplit sa place, ce qui l’oblige à rester à son poste. Je lui ai écrit en conséquence pour lui demander si ma venue chez lui ne seroit pas sujette à caution; car je sais que déjà il a eu une entrevue pareille. Sa réponse me déterminera. Je l’attends demain, et si je vais chez lui je vous ferai part de ce que j’y aurai fait. Comme je suis dans le cas de rencontrer beaucoup de connoissances, vous ne trouverez pas la précaution que j’ai prise superflue. Vous me connoissez assez pour être persuadé que je ne négligerai rien pour bien m’acquitter de cette commission. Pour ce qui est de l’homme je crois que si l’on désire de lui qu’il se rende chez vous, il ne le fera qu’à bonnes enseignes, et en étant sûr d’y être bien reçu et bien traité. Il teint beaucoup à l’honneur de la Castille; il est un peu enthousiaste, un peu

beaucoup même; rempli en outre de cette idée d'orgueil et d'indépendance nationale que les émigrés, en imitation du Roi Jaques, ont si fort mise à la mode; d'ailleurs brave homme, et homme brave en même temps. Robert vous aura sans doute dit qu'un de mes camarades a eu une conversation avec ce même homme, dont il a fait part à M.M. de Kinsk et de Bylands. Comme vous ne m'en dites rien, je suppose que l'intention n'est pas d'en informer ces Messieurs." *Written with lemon juice. Extract.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1779, July 12. Berlin.—“I must not detain Johnson any longer than to say I have received yours of the 1st. You will already have found by the former despatches from Petersburg, and you will see by these that the first division will be ready, and will be embarked at Revel, and on their way to the Sound by the end of this month. If this division should by your orders attack Groningen and Friesland from Ameland, as soon as you can attack Walcheren, and if I succeed in obtaining Prussian co-operation to give support to your enterprise by declaring and marching, all will do well, and the second division from the Baltick of Swedes and Russians will come in as a *corps de reserve* in later days. I am almost tempted to engage absolutely for you upon almost any terms if I can engage Prussia to this step, and I can work upon it independent of Russia. Stamford, as you see, has given way to Popham, and he really thinks the plan of Ameland very practicable. It is then to these two objects of Ameland and Zeeland that I imagine you will direct your combined attack of the first division of Russians, and the embarkation of British. They will be more than enough with Prussian co-operation if I get it; they will be enough, I believe, if I fail of obtaining it; but I think I shall have it. Do not groan therefore over the tardy transports which do not come, but trust to the 10,000 first division from Revel, and add to that your 10,000 from England for Zeeland, and all will move prosperously. I do not like to promise for Prussia, but I am more sanguine here than I have ever yet been, and I think I have reason. You will see that I have no great hopes of Lubeck being admitted here, but if the King of Prussia shall have declared upon the expedition of 10,000 men to Ameland and 10,000 to Zeeland, he will then I presume not refuse his consent, for then he will be at war. God bless you, I am tired to death. I do not write of good Berlin hopes to Petersburg for fear the Emperor should slacken and trust to Prussia entirely for Holland.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 12. Berlin.—“If my predictions respecting the conduct of the Berlin politicians had not been obvious enough to be the predictions of everybody who considered the subject, I

should have been vain of the accomplishment of my prophecy ; for it is evident to me both from the second edition of the project, and from the course of a very long conversation with Count Haugwiz that we are at last upon the eve of obtaining our concert with them, and in good truth I attribute it only to their seeing plainly that we were determined to do the thing without them. My former private letter will have prepared you for the advantage which I am endeavouring to take of the publicity which attaches to our preparations for some expedition from England. I am sure that you will all approve of my endeavours, if I succeed in obtaining a declaration from Prussia to welcome our Baltick expedition ; and if I do not succeed in this point, I trust at least that you will think I have proceeded with sufficient caution to prevent any bad consequences from my speculations upon this important subject. I have however still one more apprehension respecting Russia, or rather I should have, if the calculation of time did not afford some security against that apprehension. I should be afraid that if our success at Berlin was known at Petersburg before the whole Baltick expedition was afloat, the Emperor might prefer to leave it to the arms of Prussia to make the easy conquest of Holland ; nay I will own fairly that it has sometimes also passed across my mind that I was not doing wisely in giving hopes in England which might lead also there to relax in the active pursuit of our Russian expedition. I will trust however that this latter danger is imaginary altogether, and I will trust to Captain Popham's activity for hurrying the Russian army on board, before there can be any question of convention or co-operation from the Court of Berlin. I have not yet been able to despatch Johnson, and I am vexed to have already detained him six and thirty hours, but as I am to see Count Haugwiz at eleven this morning, I cannot but believe that you will prefer my keeping him two or three hours longer in order to speak of Haugwiz's conversation since he has seen the King, for yesterday evening I was disappointed of the conference which I had expected with him, and to this moment I cannot answer with any certainty for the result of yesterday's consultations at Charlottenburg.

“By the second sketch in article third, you will see that they propose to begin their preparations as soon as the Russians begin their march ; if they adopt my proposal of considering an English expedition in Holland as an epoch of their declaration, I should see no difficulty in requiring them to prepare immediately, and I presume that as soon as the convention is *signed*, they would become entitled to a fair communication of those plans which they are bound to co-operate in ; according to this idea, therefore, I think in naming the subject I have done enough to justify the making it a ground of condition, but I shall tell them that no confidential communication of details can be made to them till by their treaty they have engaged themselves to co-operate with us ; the only previous specification which they are entitled to is to fix the number of troops whose landing in Holland ought to engage them in hostility ; I mean to state that as low as they will take it,

and not higher than 20,000 men, of which number we are pretty sure ; on their side I imagine they will require four weeks for preparation, and if they will engage for that time I shall be content. You see I go on reasoning upon this as if I was sure of success ; I own I feel sanguine, though not certain. I conceive it is probable that even if they do adopt my new epoch, they will still make the offer from the Emperor of 45,000 men a condition, but I have no great fear of refusal from the Emperor after so direct an offer, although I think he would probably be very slow and tardy in supplying those troops, from the difficulty which he made of furnishing more than 18,000 for Holland. I think, however, it is plain that the Ministers here do not so much want the actual assistance of the force of Russia, but that their object is to engage that country as deeply as possible in the expense and dangers of the contest. I therefore expect that when the Emperor has signed and sealed and begun his march, they will be ready enough here to act without him, if no new danger should assail any flank of any of their Minister-Generals or General-Ministers. On the third article of the *seconde esquisse*, I remarked that the Declaration to be made ought rather to be to the General Commanding the French troops than to the Directory, in order to avoid all delay between that measure and the immediate advance of the Prussian troops, and this idea was not objected to by Haugwiz, who agrees with me in regarding this Declaration only as a form ; but I shall endeavour to give to it as short an interval of time as is possible, for I think it is to the last degree absurd to give your enemy notice of your approach and desire him by his answer to fix the period of your attack ; upon the last sentence of this article I told Haugwiz that I thought the direction of the Prussian troops on the day of hostility should rather depend upon military concert according to the circumstances of the day, than be specified in a treaty, but he said that the King thought he acted more fairly in plainly saying he would not be positively bound to march into Holland, unless his left was sufficiently protected ; upon the whole I give less importance to this object just now, because I hope I can trust that from our Baltick expedition we are much less solicitous to fix the Prussians down to entering the United Provinces ; what we want is their hostility to France, and the new impression of dismay which will be produced at Paris by their seeing a new and powerful enemy pressing upon them with all the other defeats and misfortunes of the campaign.

"Upon the convention I have said in my despatch all that I can say till I come to closer quarters ; I hope I shall limit the sum somehow or other to one million from 1st August to 31st December, by periodical payments to be made on the 1st of every month ; and I presume there would be no objection to making the first payment on the 1st August, if they will positively engage for acting the first moment that we land, or that the Russians arrive in the *cercle du Haut Rhin*.

"By the fifth article you see Haugwiz retains the hope of being again upon the defensive after success, but as far as our

treaty is concerned in this, it gives me no pain, as our monthly payments will secure us against any improper application of our money; as far as it regards the general politics of Europe, though I had rather keep Prussia as an active ally against France, if however Prussia will fairly defend the Dutch provinces with their new limits, and maintain them against France without a new peace, I shall be content; against the separate peace of Prussia we have likewise the security of the sixth article, for I apprehend we shall not let Prussia make their own peace first, and ours afterwards.

"I send you some interesting Dutch papers respecting the state of their military defences. I think it is evident that the French expect us in the provinces of Groningen and Zeeland, and their attention to the Greb betrays their apprehensions of Prussia; they are applying with increasing activity, and I trust that their doing so will produce, as it ought, redoubled activity at London and Petersburg; I was going to add too, at Berlin, but I must now see Haugwiz and will tell you if I can add that word at my return."

1 p.m.—"I am just returned from Count Haugwiz; all goes on well, he has seen the King who approves the second sketch, and we send to invite Panin to come in haste from Carlsbadt and do his business here. Haugwiz gave to me also the royal approbation of my project to make a new epoch of our claim to his declaration as soon as we had landed a force in Holland, and Haugwiz desires himself to draw up his notion of our separate convention of subsidy, with this new condition stated in it. I shall be very proud of myself if I succeed in this to my wish. The Baltick expedition begins however to be much talked of, and Haugwiz told me to-day that they were alarmed at Copenhagen by our project of landing at Lubeck. I told him I was very glad of it, and that I desired no better than that the whole northern coast should be alarmed from Lubeck to Ostend, because the more general was the alarm, the more easy it would be to cover any real enterprise which it might be wise to undertake; he again spoke of the necessity of our understanding each other for military co-operation in Holland, and I again told him that as soon as he had made himself an active ally by signing a treaty for active hostilities, we would then concert and communicate with him upon our military operations.

"I enclose to you two letters from Stamford for your private eye; they have added to the esteem and admiration which I have for him. Popham's present despatches to Dundas I have respected as they are not under flying seal. I think he has infinite merit and deserves infinite praise; I will not quarrel with him for his desiring to make that praise exclusive.

"I expect Stamford the end of this month; I hope he will come to take possession of Holland, and then I shall fairly have worked my passage home through Helvoetsluys. I am going to give the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange another sum of one thousand pounds; if he has as much discretion and economy in public finances as in his own there will be no ground of complaint,

for I do assure you that among the princes of the day he is one of the very best that I have seen. I shall wait impatiently for Panin; he has sent me a report from Carlsbadt dated 8th instant of Sir Sydney taking Buonaparte and his army, and of Suwaroff having announced at Vienna the taking of Alexandria, and of Klenau having again beaten the French at Modena, taking 3,000 prisoners and two generals; but these are unsupported reports; that which I mention in my despatch is sent from Munich both to Haugwiz and to the Bavarian Minister. If I judge of your fatigue by mine, you must be heartily tired of me both *public* and *private*. Pray send a messenger instantly to tell me how far you approve or disapprove, for I shall go on as fast as I can."

Enclosure 1.

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, June 29. St. Petersburg.—"Le départ du courier chargé de vous porter ma lettre du 26, se trouvant retardé de quelques jours, je profite d'un instant de liberté que me laisse la vie très dissipée à laquelle je suis obligé, pour vous écrire encore quelques mots.

"Les difficultés pour les subsistances de l'armée Russe de 45,000 hommes, dont je vous parlai dans ma lettre d'avant-hier,¹ seront levées. M. de Cobenzl vient de donner à ce sujet les plus fortes assurances à l'Empereur, et comme il a des pouvoirs fort étendus de sa Cour, il a expédié, dit-on, des ordres très-précises en conséquence. Les préparatifs qui se font à Cronstadt intriguent furieusement ce Ministre, et pour le moins autant que sa face hideuse, toute convertie d'ulcères, intrigue son médecin, qui ignore probablement s'il pourra le tirer d'affaire sans que le patient y laisse le nez ou les oreilles. Il m'a taté et tourné de toutes les manières pour tirer de moi quelques éclaircissemens sur ces préparatifs; mais se persuadant enfin que je n'en savois pas plus que lui, il m'a dit tout bonnement qu'ils ne pouvoient avoir pour but qu'un de ces trois objets: d'embarquer un corps de troupes soit pour le Portugal, soit pour les côtes d'Angleterre, où elles seroient à portée d'être transportées en Irlande, soit enfin pour faire une descente en Hollande.

"On m'assure qu'il n'a tenu qu'à Cobenzl, à son arrivée ici, d'avoir 40,000 Russes de plus; mais qu'il n'en a pas voulu, parcequ'il a craint de donner à l'Empereur de Russie une trop grande influence sur les dispositions ultérieures de la Cour de Vienne. On voit, à travers tout ce que cet homme dit, le faiseur de paix qui ne demanderait pas mieux que de renouveler le traité de Campo-formio avec quelques avantages de plus pour l'Autriche, sans s'embarrasser le moins du monde de ce que deviendrait tout le reste. J'avoue que j'eus une belle peur en voyant, ces jours passés, débarquer ici son ancien collègue le Marquis de Gallo; mais je suis rassuré depuis que je sais que leurs chiens ne chassent plus ensemble. Ce dernier dit à qui veut l'entendre que l'Autriche se soucie si peu de voir le Roi de

[¹ This letter has not been found.]

Naples rétabli sur son trône, que si elle trouvoit à faire pour elle-même une paix comme elle la désire, la condition que le royaume de Naples restât république ne l'effaroucheroit pas un seul instant ; et que c'est pour cette raison, et pour recommander les intérêts de son maître à l'Empereur, qu'il est venu ici. Voilà donc un Câmpe-formien bien converti. Dieu veuille les convertir tous.

“ Je ne vous parle pas, de notre affaire *κατ'ἑξόκην* par ce que je sais que M. le Chevalier Whitworth vous tient au courant de tout ce qui se fait ici à ce sujet. Graces à l'activité de M. Popham, la chose se presse avec toute l'ardeur possible. Cependant, je crois devoir ajouter encore quelques mots à mon apologie sur ce que je n'ai pas, comme vous l'auriez peut-être désiré, insisté sur un nombre plus considerable de troupes. Tout étoit déjà convenu et concerté entre sa Majesté l'Empereur et Messieurs Whitworth et Popham, lorsque je vins ici ; et quelque diligence que j'eusse pu faire, je n'aurois jamais pu y arriver en même tems que le dernier. Or, l'Empereur ayant d'abord aquiescé à la demande qui lui fut faite, mais en declarant qu'il ne pouvoit pas accorder au delà de 17,000 hommes, auxquels il a trouvé bon depuis d'ajouter encore mille, j'aurois certainement indisposé ce monarque si je m'étois avisé de revenir à la charge pour lui demander un nombre plus considerable. Ma position entre ce Prince et M. Popham, dont il avoit déjà adopté les plans, étoit delicate. L'Empereur est un prince tel qu'il le faut pour la salut de l'Europe ; c'est une ame de feu, pleine de noblesse, sensible à l'honneur et à la gloire, et n'ayant en vuë que de faire triompher la cause dont il a embrassé la défense ; mais ces sentimens veulent être ménagés ; un mot, une expression inconsiderée, la moindre contrariété dans sa volonté, cette volonté prévenue ou trop pressée, peuvent tout-à-coup arrêter chez lui les résolutions les plus importantes. Il souffre l'observation quand elle est juste et il se rend ; mais il faut une grande délicatesse pour oser la lui présenter, et pour qu'il n'en soit pas blessé au début.

“ J'ai rencontré dans M. Popham un homme plein de zèle, de talents et de connoissances. Il me paroît né avec ce courage qui ne doute de rien, et à qui les choses les plus difficiles paroissent aisées ; mais j'ai tout de suite pu m'appercevoir qu'il joignoit à ces qualités ce degré d'ambition qui porte l'homme qui en est doué, et qui se voit chargé de quelque entreprise, à vouloir seul en recueillir toute la gloire. Je devois par conséquent le ménager, et surtout ne lui donner aucun ombrage. Au lieu donc de chercher à lui faire adopter mes idées, je me mis à examiner attentivement les siennes, et trouvant que d'après son plan les principaux efforts seront tournés contre la Zéelande, ce qu'il vaut peut-être mieux que s'ils l'étoient contre la Frise et la Groningue, j'y aquiesçai sans la moindre contradiction, en lui observant simplement, ainsi qu'à M. Whitworth, qu'il est d'une importance extrême d'user de toute la prévoyance possible, pour éviter les cas où l'on seroit obligé de sacrifier un grand nombre de troupes. Ce qui m'a paru avoir fait sur M. Popham l'effet de lui

faire examiner de nouveau son projet d'attaque, et d'y faire de très excellens changemens, qu'il a eu la bonté de me communiquer hiér.

"Mon départ va être retardé de quelques jours encore, M. le Vice-Chancelier m'ayant fait dire que l'Empereur se proposoit de me charger d'une lettre pour le Prince d'Orange. Si je la reçois aujourd'hui, comme je l'espère, je partirai sans faute demain." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

ESQUISSE SECONDE D'UN PROJET D'ARTICLES, DE
M. DE HAUGWITZ.

1799, July 10. Berlin.—Article 1. "Le Roi s'engage à co-opérer avec la Russie et l'Angleterre à la délivrance de la Hollande et des pays limitrophes.

Article 2. "S[a] M[ajesté] accepte pour cet effet l'offre amicale que lui a faite s[a] M[ajesté] l'Empereur de Russie de concourir à cette expédition, en y employant un corps de 45,000 hommes.

Article 3. "À mesure que les troupes Russes avanceront vers les frontières de l'empire Germanique, le Roi de Prusse préparera, et rassemblera de son côté, les moyens nécessaires dont il aura besoin pour l'entreprise qui fait l'objet de sa co-opération.

Nota Bene. "Ici l'on exprimera la force de l'armée Prussienne qui doit agir, proportionnellement aux arrangements pécuniaires dont on sera convenu.

"Du moment que les troupes Russes auront dépassé les frontières de la Franconie, et seront arrivées dans la partie de l'empire qui est située entre le Mayne et le Rhin, le Roi s'engage d'adresser à la République Française une déclaration péremptoire pour la sommer d'évacuer, dans un délai donné, le territoire des Provinces-Unies et des pays limitrophes. Si cette sommation n'est pas suivie d'une réponse complètement satisfaisante, et du prompt effet qui doit en résulter, le Roi combinera dès lors ses opérations militaires avec celles des troupes de s[a] M[ajesté] l'Empereur de Russie, et poursuivra, dans un concert ultérieur, l'expédition projetée contre la Hollande et les pays limitrophes qui fait le but de la présente convention. Mais avant d'en venir à l'exécution même de cette entreprise, le Roi présuppose que les troupes Russes seront déjà parvenues à former le blocus des forteresses de Mayence et d'Ehrenbreitstein, pour couvrir le flanc gauche de l'armée Prussienne.

Article 4. "L'Angleterre s'engage à fournir à la Prusse les secours pécuniaires dont elle aura besoin pour sa co-opération, et à les continuer jusqu'au terme où elle finira, sur le taux et d'après les répartitions qui seront réglées dans une convention particulière à conclure entre les deux Cours.

Article 5. "Dès qu'on sera parvenu à délivrer la Hollande et les pays limitrophes de la dépendance dans laquelle le Gouvernement Français les retient présentement, et qu'on aura procuré à ces pays une frontière solide qui les mette à l'abri des entreprises

futures de la République Française, la Prusse se bornera dès lors à des mesures purement défensives, et telles que l'état des choses les exigera, sans être censée liée par la présente convention à s'immiscer ultérieurement dans les affaires intérieures de la France.

Article 6. "Dans le cours de la guerre, et surtout vers l'époque de la paix générale, les trois Cours se concerteront entre elles sur les affaires qui regardent l'Italie et la Suisse, mais particulièrement sur l'ordre des choses à rétablir dans la république des Provinces Unies, et sur les affaires qui se rapportent à l'empire Germanique. Et à l'égard de ce dernier, elles se chargeront d'une garantie mutuelle, tendante à maintenir intactes les principautés ou possessions héréditaires en Allemagne." *Copie.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 12. Harley Street.—"Je vous prie de me faire l'amitié de m'envoyer un billet avec lequel Rogerson et moi nous puissions entrer dans votre chambre des Pairs pour voir la prorogation du Parlement.

"Je supplie de vous souvenir de la notte que vous m'avez promis de m'envoyer, pour que je puisse écrire par le courier de ce soir, en conformité de ce que vous ecrirez vous-meme."

INTELLIGENCE RESPECTING HOLLAND.

July 12. Bremen.—"On assure, à n'en presque pas douter, que le corps Russe qui descend en trois colonnes de la Bohême et d'Hongrie vers le bas Rhin est destiné en partie à appuyer les mesures d'insurrection dans les Provinces-Unies. Il n'est presque pas douteux que, du coté de la Prusse, on n'entre de cette manière incidemment en lice, soit pour ou contre. Il semble qu'on médite à Berlin de jouer le rôle de Médiateur, et l'on voudra, peut-être, se faire valoir dans cette qualité au moment où on le jugera convenable.

"Lorsqu'on en sera venu au moment de délivrer la Hollande la bombe éclatera, l'on se déclarera, et l'on voudra prévenir que la Russie et l'Angleterre seules ne rétablissent le Stadhoudérat en Hollande." *Extract.*

SECRET REPORT FROM FRANCE.

[1799] July 13.—"Le nouveau Directeur Goyer [Gohier] a quelqu'esprit, quelques-uns des talens qui caractérisent l'avocat, aucun de celles qui sont nécessaires à l'homme d'état, aucune de connoissances que sa place exigerait. Il est Jacobin; il était avant la Révolution avocat à Rennes; il fut connu particulièrement par un mémoire qu'il fit pour un M. Desgrées du Coup, contre M. le Duc de Duras. Le vérité est que Goyer n'avait fait qu'y donner son nom, et que ce mémoire avait été fait par un autre avocat. Roger Duclos lui ressemble à tous les égards, il est plus éloquent,

mais il a moins d'esprit. Le général Dumoulin est jacobin sans talent, sans aucun esprit. Tout dépend des armées, si elles continuent à être battues tout achevera de désorganiser. Le découragement et l'indiscipline se portent à leur comble ; le Gouvernement n'effraye plus. On cesse de payer, le crédit achève de se détruire, et les armées restent sans approvisionemens ; mais si la victoire revient aux Français, les conscripts marcheront aux armées, les fournisseurs feront des avances, et la résistance peut se prolonger. Mon ami chargea l'homme dont on a parlé d'aller chez Brune, et de lui faire des questions sur la situation présente, et voici leur conversation. 'Hé bien, général, où en sommes nous ? tout va fort mal.—est-ce qu'il n'y a pas quelque espérance de ramener la victoire?' 'On n'en remporte pas—avec les soldats découragés qui ne veulent plus se battre.—Il est vrai qu'on va former un camp sur le Bas Rhin ?—et avec quoi voulez-vous qu'on le forme, quand on n'a pas même de troupes pour renforcer les armées qui agissent?'—'On dit qu'on veut vous donner le commandement d'une des armées en activité ; je le désirerais beaucoup ; vos talens' 'Et moi, j'en serais fâché ; qu'est-ce que je ferais de soldats qui, comme je vous l'ai dit, ne veulent plus ni obéir ni se battre ?'—L'officier de garde entra, la conversation changea, mais comme bientôt on reparla des armées, cet officier ne craignit point de dire devant le général qu'il y avait assez longtems qu'on se battait, et qu'il fallait la paix, et le général ne répondit rien.—On a copié littéralement cette conversation, parce qu'elle met à portée de connoître l'opinion que les gens les plus instruits de l'état des armées ont aujourd'hui des forces de la France.

"Il est évident que Syès, en faisant ou consentant à la révolution qui a déplacé les trois Directeurs, a été d'accord avec les deux partis qui divisent les conseils, mais il est très difficile de croire qu'il consente à laisser dominer les jacobins, qui ne veulent point de Directoire. Il ne reste qu'à savoir si c'est lui qui joue les Jacobins, ou qui a été leur dupe : plusieurs décrets tendant à diminuer la puissance Directoriate, l'établissement de la commission des onze, semblant annoncer que c'est Syès qui a été trompé. L'on aura bientôt le mot de l'énigme ; si cette commission se maintient, elle culbutera le gouvernement. Les papiers publics le disent dissident, et les nouvelles du 2 Juillet de Paris parlent de la création d'une nouvelle commission de six membres, pour faire un rapport prochain sur l'état actuel, et sur les moyens d'y obvier, et de rendre à la France la supériorité. Pour peindre tout ce qui tient au gouvernement il suffit de dire—qu'il n'y en a pas un seul qui ne soit à vendre, et qui ne se donnât au premier qui lui assureroit, sous un autre gouvernement, de l'argent, ou un équivalent de la place qu'il perdrait ; et qu'à l'instant où l'approche du danger commencerait à leur inspirer des craintes, tous, sans excepter les Directeurs, se laisseraient aisément gagner, si on leur donnait une garantie de leur vie, de leur fortune, et un azile dans quelque partie de l'Europe ; on est de même persuadé que si les craintes que les Jacobins leur inspirent devenaient plus vives, il

ne serait point impossible de traiter avec eux. Voilà les détails que la personne qu'on a proposée pour être instruit de tout ce qui se passe en France, a donné à mon ami, il y a huit jours.

“Voici les nouvelles qui m'arrivent de Hollande par ce courrier. Le parti Jacobin paraît prévaloir, et s'est étayé de Daendels, qui jusques hiér avait été leur antagoniste. Il passe pour certain que c'est Brune qui a fait cet arrangement : on le juge par les liaisons extérieurs des deux généraux. Ce nouvel ordre de choses déplace les Directeurs Zaarsollen et Emmerens qui demandent leurs démissions. *Van der Goos*, ministre des affaires extérieures, a donné la sienne. On croit que Daendels pourrait être nommé Directeur ; le général est vain et présomptueux, et pourrait bien donné dans un piège qu'on lui tendrait en l'éloignant du généralat, où il n'est pas aisé de faire de lui ce qu'on voudrait, parceque les troupes Bataves lui sont attachées, c'est à dire, les officiers qui lui doivent en plus grande partie leurs places, et leur avancement. Le ministre Français Lombard a été rappelé subitement sans avoir eu le tems d'emmener avec lui sa famille. On l'accuse de liaisons avec les Anglais, d'accord avec le ministre de la marine Batave, pour livrer le pays aux Anglais, et leur en faciliter l'entrée.

“Le gouvernement Batave vient de donner l'ordre aux commandants et municipalités des villes de Breda, Bois le Duc, Steenberg, et Bergopzoom d'approvisionner leurs places dans l'espace de deux mois.

“L'homme de la Haye écrit un seul petit billet, où il dit que l'on est inquiet à Paris pour les provinces de Bretagne et de Poitou, où on craint qu'il n'éclate des troubles, lorsqu'on voudra mettre à exécution la loi qui rassemble ou fait marcher les classes, et prélever le contingent de l'emprunt forcé de 100 millions. J'ai eu quelques détails hiér sur le Brabant : grand découragement parmi les habitans, et tout préparé pour un soulèvement, s'il paraît de troupes. Les conscrits désertent tant qu'ils peuvent ; il y a huit jours, trois postes qui gardaient les portes de Malines ont déserté en entier. Les conscrits du pays n'ont pas meilleure volonté : les gendarmes n'osent pénétrer dans les villages, ni dans les bois, retraite des fugitifs, parcequ'on les fusille.”

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

Note de l'objet dont nous avons parlé ce matin.

1799, July 13. Dropmore.—“La Cour de Vienne ayant témoigné au Lord Henley son désir qu'il fut envoyé au quartier-général de l'Archiduc un officer-général de la part du Roi, ainsi que de celle de l'Empereur de Russie, pour concerter les opérations futures des deux armées, Sa Majesté a accédé à cette demande, et Sa Majesté désireroit que le Général Korsakoff fut autorisé d'entrer dans cette discussion, et d'appuyer les plans qui seront proposés de la part du Roi en conformité aux idées qui ont déjà été communiquées et approuvées à Petersbourg. Elles consistent en faisant joindre aux 45,000 Russes sous le Général Korsakow,

les troupes Russes servant actuellement en Italie—mettant le tout sous les ordres du Maréchal Souvarow, et les faisant marcher en France, et particulièrement sur Lyons. A cette armée on joindroit les Suisses que l'on pourroit lever, et les 6,000 hommes de Wurtemberg.

“Mais pour le succès de cette opération on le croit absolument nécessaire qu'elle soit soutenue à droite et à gauche par les armées Autrichiennes, et cela d'assez près pour que les armées puissent, en cas de besoin, se soutenir réciproquement, ou même se réunir.

“On regarde donc le projet (annoncé à Lord Henley par M. Thugut) du siège de Mayence comme étant aussi incompatible avec ce plan qu'avec toute autre vue d'attaque vigoureuse contre la République. Et on désire vivement d'être appuyé par la Russie en protestant contre cette mesure.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 14. Berlin.—“The enclosed packet arrived here this morning from Vienna by *estafette*. I profit of the departure of M. De Luc, who quits Berlin this evening, to forward it to you; he means to travel night and day, and therefore you will soon be in possession of the agreeable news concerning Buonaparte; I shall have an additional pleasure if his defeat and discomfiture shall have been brought about by Sir Sidney; I do not care how much he vapours about it, provided he does the thing, and I do not agree in any respect with those who are fastidious enough not to admire his spirit of activity and enterprise because he dresses like Charles the Twelfth, and talks more of himself than is consistent with perfect modesty and discretion. The last of my letters by Johnson was written in so much hurry and after so much fatigue that I am not sure it will have been quite intelligible to you. I have however sent to you by a short official despatch my letter to Captain Popham, by which you will see that I not only entirely agreed with you in the project of an immediate attack by the two divisions, but, knowing the importance of time, I have already suggested the same project to Captain Popham, as one which may very probably be approved by the Government and acted upon; he will certainly feel bound to wait for your orders, and it is absolutely necessary that he should receive your directions as to the time and means of co-operation in the attack from England; but, at all events, if you ultimately pursue this plan, it will be useful that Popham should have been thus early apprised enough of it to turn it in his thoughts, and to consider of such arrangements as may be necessary to the execution of it. I shall expect to-morrow or next day to advance with M. de Haugwiz in the discussion of the pecuniary convention.

“The more I consider the whole subject, the more I am persuaded that, if possible, I must pursue my project of engaging the Prussian declaration by the march of our enterprise, and making them agree to act openly so soon as our two

divisions shall have set foot in any part of the United Provinces. The advantage of this agreement will be that it can be concluded at once, whereas the condition of the Russian march may meet with great doubt, delay, and difficulty at Petersburg. I see no reason why we should not pursue in one treaty the epoch of the Russian march if it can be obtained, but I shall care little about the success of that if I can accomplish the other treaty, and bind them by that to act as soon as we shall act in Holland. It is not the part of a good politician to feed you with these good hopes upon grounds which I see perhaps with too sanguine an eye: but provided these hopes do their duty in England, they will tend rather to redouble the activity of your measures than to suspend or relax them.

“We begin to hear much of magazines forming by Prussian commissaries near Wesel; the Duke of Brunswick has sent to the Prince of Orange for two or three confidential officers, and the expectation of the public begins to grow alive upon the appearances of Prussian co-operation. You will perhaps wonder that I have spoken so slightly at Petersburg of my hopes here, but I am afraid of diverting the Emperor from the great project which he is now engaged in, to the little calculation of Prussian hopes, and I wish him still to think, as I do, that our only sure hope is in our own exertions.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, July 16. Dropmore.—“The despatches which this messenger carries to Sir Charles Whitworth will put you *au fait* of our present projects which are much more forward than I ventured to flatter myself they would be by this time. Knowing as you do how much I am attached to operations *en masse* preferably to diversions, you will naturally imagine that I fell in very readily with the opinion expressed by our military advisers here in favour of bringing so large a proportion of our force to the westward, and making the other operation serve rather as a *point d'appui* for insurrection than as a serious and principal attack. I only hope the change will not discourage Stamford, nor diminish the zeal of our Emperor who conducts himself as an Emperor should. A letter from Lord R. Fitzgerald informs me, on the authority of his Russian colleague, that we have got our Swedes, so that there can now be no doubt of our force being amply sufficient for the progress of the enterprise, provided it is so for its beginning, and on this point I do not find that the person who is to execute it entertains the smallest doubt. We have taken all the means we can think of to alarm the Dutch Government for Walcheren; but it is unlucky that we cannot spare ships or men enough to make a show of landing, though without really doing so.

“The business of transports is also advanced much beyond any hopes that I had allowed myself to entertain, and within these few days we have obtained an additional aid in East India

ships which seems to put the thing out of all doubt. If we ourselves are not too late, the lateness of the season will operate in some respects in our favour, for once in possession, it will be less easy to undertake any operation to dislodge us.

"We are waiting with much impatience for your next despatch which is to bring us the explanation of Haugwitz's enigmas. I have, however, little expectation that this explanation will be such as, in the increased state of our own preparations, and with the additional expense which they must of course bring upon us, we shall think it prudent to accept. In truth they have not only let our opportunity pass by, but their own also. We shall now do, by great exertion and expense, what they might have done for us at much less than the million we offered. But in standing by as lookers on of this operation, they will lose a great part of their own consideration and weight, both present and future.

"The thing that perplexes me most in this and in every other part of my business is the conduct of Thugut. If he were paid to thwart all our measures, and to favour those of France, he could not do it more effectually. I have desired a copy to be sent you with this of Lord Henley's despatch No. 75, because I doubt whether he will have done so. My answer to it, as far as it can yet be answered, passes also through Berlin, in order that you may see it and write to Lord Minto upon it.

"I construe the whole thus. Thugut now thinking the Italian acquisitions secure, and the Milanese reconquered, and the Novarese in his hands, looks back to the Low Countries as the next object of scramble. For the success of our forward move into France, and for the effects which that is to produce on the internal government of that country, the real root and origin of all its wickedness, he is not in the least degree anxious; and considers it only as a diversion which will put Mayence, the Netherlands, and the left bank of the Rhine into the hands of Austria to cut and carve as she thinks proper.

"With regard to the Netherlands we may perhaps be beforehand with him, as far as relates to driving the French out of the open country, and organizing a government of the Brabançons and Flemings themselves; because, even if he executes his plan, the siege of Mayence will occupy him till winter; and if we execute ours, there is little reason to believe that any of the towns of the Dutch frontier will hold out as long as that; unless perhaps Maestricht.

"But the real difficulty of the whole is this, that unless we can get the Archduke's army to co-operate *directly* (not by diversion) with the Russians, the force of the latter cannot be sufficient to to produce real impression on France. Korsakow's is called 45,000, say 40,000. Suwarrow's Russians, taking both bodies, cannot at the end of the campaign be put at more than 15,000 the one and 10,000 the other. It would be safer to calculate the whole at 60,000 Russians; add 6,000 Wurtemburghers, and 14,000 Swiss (if we get them) and the whole is 80,000 men. A formidable body for any one line of attack, or for a narrow country like Lombardy and Piemont, bounded by Alps on one

side, and sea on the other. But it is nothing for advancing into France, where your base is of no greater [less?] extent than from Basle to Geneva, and where every step you go lengthens both your flanks. The siege of Mayence would, in fact, be no diversion at all with a view to this operation, for the French would neglect it, leave the place to occupy the Austrians as long as it could, and would bring all their force to bear on the advancing army.

"We must therefore, if we are persuaded as I am that nothing will terminate this war but such success in France as enables us to restore the monarchy, take some measures to dissuade the Court of Vienna from this ruinous or insidious project. How to do this is the difficulty. When they have once set their hearts upon the recovery of the Netherlands, and have the means pretty much within their own power, will anything make them abandon this object except the assurance that we will take care of it for them? Can we give them this assurance? Could we do the thing, and, if we could, what will Russia say to it? The only thing that seems at all distinctly stated in Haugwitz's riddles is the idea of giving a better frontier to the U[nited] P[rovin]ces, which means, in other words, giving them a part or the whole of the Netherlands.

"I had formed a project within these few days of proposing both to Berlin and Vienna some compromise on this subject, by which Austria should enjoy, perhaps a nominal sovereignty, but certainly an annual payment equal to the greatest surplus revenue that the Vienna treasury ever drew from Brussels; while, as to real government, those Provinces should be placed under the direction of Holland, and should unite in some federal compact with that country. Complicated as this seems, it is not much more so than the present state of the sovereignty of Neuchatel as with respect to Prussia and Swisserland, nor would it be difficult to find a mode of executing it, partly on the principle of the barrier treaty, and partly by applying that of mortgage for the Imperial loans here, and acting on that principle according to the practice recognised in the Empire. But the solid objection is found not to the mode of executing it, so much as, *in limine*, to the thing itself. It does not, I fear, hold out inducement enough to the Austrians to acquiesce in it for the present, and it would undeniably be a state of things that could not last, and that must be the seed of future wars, in which this country, both from her engagements, and her interest in the subject, would be compelled to bear her part.

"We have therefore resolved to suspend our decision till your next letter arrives, because that will give us a little more insight into the views of Prussia. If the result is (as I rather expect) unfavourable, or at least not sufficiently decisive to induce us to close with it, the present tendency of my opinion would be to take Austria at her word, and to offer to her that, if she will abandon this project of Mayence and the Netherlands, and suffer the Archduke to act towards Basle, Belfort and Besançon, we will send our Russians to Lyons, and having re-established royalty in those provinces during the winter, proceed in the spring as

far as our success will carry us, giving to the Court of Vienna the guaranty of Great Britain and of Russia that no peace shall be made which does not restore the Netherlands to them.

"This you see is a large project, and requires being deliberately and maturely considered. And the quarter in which it presents most difficulty is on the side of Prussia. It can hardly be hoped that Berlin could be a tranquil spectator of such a result, and if they were, without acting, merely to draw together an army in Silesia, the whole plan might be deranged.

"In like manner if we refuse, or if Russia refuses, to accede to Thugut's plan it is impracticable, for unless Swisserland and the Upper Rhine be protected by Korsakow, there can be no question of the Archduke's going to Mayence.

"Any one of the four Powers might, if it pleased, destroy even the brilliant prospects that we have now before us, but how to make them draw together for one common object, and with one combined plan, is still, as it always has been, our great difficulty. The unbounded influence which we have just now at Petersburg offers us for this purpose better means than we have yet had, and you see I do not neglect to avail myself of them.

"We leave you, as you see, but little time for what is to be done in the Dutch Provinces by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, but the thing presses; and you will, I know, as far as depends on you, rather push it on than let it be retarded by any cause which you can either remove or diminish." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 16. Downing Street.—"I think the mail of to-day, as far as relates to Berlin, a little less encouraging than your brother's preceding dispatch of the 6th. Neither seem to throw any clear light on the question what Prussia aims at respecting the Netherlands; but I suppose the expression of 'Holland and the neighbouring Provinces' must be supposed to include the Netherlands. If so his operations, if they take place at all, will make him nearly master of the Netherlands for the time, however he may mean to dispose of them afterwards. I believe, on the whole, this is the best thing that could happen, provided he acts in time to prevent Russia diverting its force to the same quarter. In this view the great objection to the proposed or rather expected convention is the clause about Mayence and Ehrenbreitstein, as I suppose this fourth army of the Emperor Paul is so far from those quarters that, if Prussia still waits for its arrival, Austria may hope to reach the Netherlands before him, our great object being to prevent Austria from acting on that side this year. We seem still to be in as great a difficulty as ever to decide what is the best line for that purpose. What instructions do you incline to send either to Berlin or Vienna under these circumstances? The prospect of concluding with Prussia seems near enough to leave us no subsidy to transfer to Austria. The chance of Prussia's occupying the Netherlands seems to make any offer on our part to co-operate with Austria

for recovering them another year nugatory. There are, at the same time, pressing, and I rather think, decisive reasons for concluding with Prussia, if they will close on the terms your brother expects. But then I see no inducement left to bring Austria to concur heartily in our plan for the remainder of this campaign, except good argument, and the chance of the influence of Russia ; and I much doubt whether these alone are sufficient to make them act rationally."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 16. Park Street, Westminster.—“The change of things which has brought us back to the same hopes as at the beginning of the war, seems to have brought us likewise to the same errors. We are proceeding equally without regard to those allies who, if not in the first instance, must in the last be the most necessary of all ; and are letting loose upon the Royalists in the interior all those whom the successes of the allies have set aside from combating upon the frontiers. The garrisons of Milan and other places are now about to do the same thing that the garrisons of Mayence and Valenciennes did at the beginning of the contest. They are to be employed in garrisoning Brest, and keeping in order the Royalists of those provinces. Surely it is necessary that something should be done with a view to this evil. My idea is that, in the case of any future prisoners taken upon capitulation, one of the conditions should be that they should not serve (either against the allies or) *against any party in France acting in the name of Louis XVIII.* It is perfectly possible, and most likely, that such a condition will produce no effect in the use that will be made of any prisoners so surrendered ; and that not a man the less will be employed against the Royalists. But the same may be said probably in the case of any condition made in favour of the allies. The chief advantage will be in the impression made upon the Royalists, and in its furnishing the most safe, and possibly the most efficacious, of all modes of manifesting to the well affected in France the sentiments with which the allies are actuated. If this opinion should be adopted, you will probably think that no time should be lost in communicating an instruction to this effect to Wickham and Lord Minto and others who may be in the way to dispose the Austrians ; for the Russians, I hope, will need no persuasion to adopt this measure. The want of it will produce no small degree of distrust and discouragement.

“It appears by accounts from all quarters that a considerable tendency to insurrection is showing itself throughout the whole extent of the Royalist provinces. It is certain, indeed, that it must be so. The disposition has never ceased to exist, and having only been kept down by the strong hand of military force, is sure to rise the moment that pressure is removed. Do we mean to leave this spirit wholly unassisted ; and, while we are seeking and relying upon insurrection everywhere else, to reject it in the quarter where we are sure to find it in its highest degree of intensity, and where it can alone prove directly and

completely effectual? If we do not, it is high time that means should be taken to co-operate with these dispositions; and that we should not be to seek at the moment when some successful operation on the part of the Royalists may call upon us for immediate assistance. The first thing to be done is by countenance, and communication, and reasonable assistance to show that at a proper time we mean to co-operate with them; and thus to endeavour to gain their confidence, and acquire in some measure the direction of them. It is by these means that we may hope to hold them back; which may be more important and probably more difficult than to bring them forward. I am the last person in the world for wishing that at this moment the spirit of royalism in these provinces should break out into any acts of open violence. But this is the moment when a secret organization should be going forward, and means be taken for preparing them for what may be desirable, or what may be necessary for them to do at a period of which we cannot tell the exact distance.

"Sir S. Warren is, I understand, likely to be employed soon. If he is allowed to take on board with him a proper supply of arms and ammunition, his zeal and intelligence in this service will find the means of conveying them into the country without exciting any dangerous attention. An application has lately been handed over from me to Frere, with a note from me recommending a compliance with it. It is a matter of small amount; but in the spirit of economy which I have always acted upon in these concerns, I should, upon second thoughts, recommend a more limited compliance even with that request. I would willingly save a hundred pounds in the quality of the arms, to have a hundred more to lay out on the pressing exigencies of individuals here, or on the other side of the water, who may want it for shoes and stockings. Means should likewise be taken for increasing the supply of arms from Jersey and St. Marcouf. Though each cargo is small, the quantity thus introduced into the country may be made to become not inconsiderable; and if the insurrection shall break out, every firelock gives a soldier. When matters are more advanced, and the allies shall be certain of entering France, I should clearly be of opinion for taking possession of Haedick and Houat, and protecting them against sudden attacks, during accidental absences of the naval force, by a blockhouse. The force which Sir S. Warren should have with him should not be less, and I don't know that it need be more than two or three ships of the line in addition to his frigates. I have the best reason for saying that, with the most trifling preparation, the ships may be made perfectly independent of this country in respect of water. One of the reasons for taking possession of these two islands is that they may become safe depositaries for stores to be left there, which now are always liable to be discovered and seized by the enemy. I shall be much surprized if, with a force stationed in Quiberon Bay, we shall hear any more of convoys continually passing into Brest; of which, in the course of the present summer, I doubt whether there have been less than four hundred sail."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 17. Harley Street.—“La quantité de troupes que vous donnez pour l'expédition fera grand plaisir à l'Empereur. parceque mes amis Kotchoubei et Rastopchin me marquent qu'il a désiré que vous en donniez, car il a une grande opinion, et come de raison, de la valeur des Anglois, et il s'est servi de ces mots, *j'ai autant de confiance dans leurs troupes qu'ils en ont dans les miennes*; et comme vous en donnez plus qu'il n'espérait, il en sera enchanté. Par une lettre que je reçois dans ce moment de Sievers, notre chargé d'affaire à Berlin, je vois la confirmation de espérance que vous m'avez donné par votre billet d'hier. Ainsi je me flatte que vous viendrez ici, et que j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 18. Downing Street.—“On considering the doubts you state, and all the circumstances suggested in your brother's letter, I incline to think still that it is very desirable that the Prussian convention should, at any rate, be completed on the conditions he mentions without delay; and I should be much afraid of the effects of now desiring any fresh reference hither. Indeed it is more than possible that any instruction to that effect will be too late, as your brother will, I think, have signed the convention in the meantime. But there is certainly great awkwardness, at least, in withholding, in that case, the knowledge of the measures we are ourselves taking; and there might, I think, even be great advantage, and at all events could be no harm, in communicating them. We shall be so near the very moment of acting, that we shall at most be only telling our secret a few days before it will tell itself, and too late for Prussia to oppose us, even if so inclined. We shall have the chance by a frank communication of bringing them to accept our operations as a substitute, either in the whole or in part, for the aid of Russian troops on their left; and may induce them, if they are really in earnest, to act immediately, destining, if necessary, a part of their force (which our support on the other side will enable them to spare) to watching Ehrenbreitstein and even Mayence. By their acting immediately we shall secure the point which I mentioned in my note last night (and which still seems to me very important) of their occupying the Netherlands (if that is part of their plan) so soon as to put the march of the Austrians to that quarter out of the question. By the other plan of waiting for a reference hither and to Petersburg, we should, I fear, give such notice to Austria of the Prussian schemes as would induce them to quicken their march towards Mayence, both for the purpose of occupying the Netherlands as soon as possible themselves, and of making it necessary for the Emperor of Russia to march all the further force he can spare to supply their place on the side of Switzerland; and by this means making it impossible for him to fulfil his condition with Prussia,

and so retarding, if not finally preventing the advance of the Prussian troops. Under all these circumstances I rather think the right instruction to your brother would be that, if the treaty is not already signed, he should, as soon as the Prussian Ministers declare themselves ready to sign it (but not till then) state to them confidentially our plan, and endeavour to insert an article substituting this co-operation for the proposed blockades. And if it should have been signed, that he should, immediately on receiving the instructions now sent, make a similar communication, and endeavour to sign a similar article as an additional and separate article to be made part of the convention. This is the result of the best consideration I have given the subject. But I should like so much better to talk with you upon it that I would come down to you to-morrow if I did not feel that, on the whole, so much seems to turn on the present decision, as to make it almost indispensable to have a Cabinet upon it. If you agree with me in thinking so (which I believe you will) it will probably suit you best to have it as early as between eleven and twelve to-morrow. You will probably find no difficulty in being in town by that time, and may easily return by dinner. To save time I send this without waiting for your answer to my note of last night. I have always forgot to say anything about Sir Charles Whitworth's Irish peerage, which I think he has very fully earned."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 18. Berlin.—“On the night that M. De Luc quitted Berlin I received from him a short note respecting a conversation which he had just had with Count Haugwiz, by which I was led to imagine that new and great difficulties had arisen in the Minister's last conference at Charlottenburg. I cannot however say that I perceive any other new difficulty except in relation to the number of men whom the King wishes us to subsidise, and they are now waiting at Berlin for the military opinion of the Duke of Brunswick upon this question. I am sick of his name, because I never hear it but that I know it is to be the prologue of some new imaginary danger, and the Duke seems to have conceived the extraordinary project of requiring for the military operations which he is to direct, a security which human arrangements cannot furnish; which, if furnished, might be acted upon by an infant as well as a general, and which in the present moment is more completely produced by the events of the campaign than the most sanguine hopes could have led any man to expect. With this difficulty on the one hand, on the other we to have cope with the natural indolence of the King's character, the reluctance which he has to active measures, partly from a diffidence of his own capacity to engage in them, and partly from his mind having been already prepossessed with the imaginary advantages of that negative system which has so long prevailed here. Great as this difficulty is it might have been overcome if there had been a real efficient minister here,

with talents, influence, and energy of mind ; but none such is to be found here, and I am placed in the extraordinary situation of having obtained a complete concurrence in the opinions and wishes of the leading minister and the public, without being able to secure any of the advantages which ought to result from such a state of things. Count Haugwiz talks to me without reserve of the difficulties which he finds in combatting the King's prepossessions, but his difficulties offer at least to him an object of contention, whereas with me I have the mortification to find that, in having gained everything, I am not much more advanced than if I had gained nothing. The truth is that the frame of this Government was constructed for the strong hands of Frederick the Great, and was accordingly so arranged as to bring personally to him the effective control of all real business ; the march of this machine continues, but without system, alacrity, or decision, for the King is afraid of business which he does not understand, he is diffident of himself, and there is no minister who has enough of his confidence to work roundly and fairly for the advantage of his Government. At the end of this description you will expect to be told that there is no longer question of our treaty ; yet you must make no such conclusion ; the treaty will go on, and, if the idea which I suggest in my despatch be adopted here of taking the Russian 18,000 in part of the 45,000 offered to Berlin, I think it will probably succeed ; nor am I without some hope of our naval enterprise accelerating the co-operation of the King of Prussia ; but to obtain a positive engagement from him I know not how I can speak with any confidence, when I see that such an engagement could probably only be obtained by the decision of a military opinion, and by the energy of an active minister, and when I recollect that I am to look for these treasures at Brunswick and at Berlin. Yet I am content to look on as long as I can rely upon our pursuing those measures in England which make us in some degree independent of all that we have to complain of here.

"You will see that I have almost stated it as a matter of doubt whether we ought to give to Prussia the advantage of stepping in with a claim to a subsidy when we have actually done the business which was the chief object of it ; and if I could once satisfy myself that, after landing our Russians, Swedes, and English, we could secure Holland upon terms anything like as cheap as Prussian subsidy, I should be the first to deprecate the idea of gratifying them with one farthing ; but upon these questions one must not suffer even a just indignation to prevail over a solid interest, nor will political arrangements admit always of strict poetical justice being done by them. If the Duke of Brunswick, however, condescends to consider 60,000 men as able to take the field against 6,000 I shall have to proceed in my bargain with Count Haugwiz ; he dropped a word or two yesterday by which I should conceive that he meant to propose the subsidy to be extended beyond December, if the monthly payments were adopted ; I do not yet quite see his object, but I shall not think myself authorised to exceed the sum of one

million for subsidy, and two hundred thousand pounds for *mobilité*, and I shall fight hard before he shall obtain the latter, though I see you have properly directed that it shall not absolutely go off upon that point. I should like, if it were possible, to average the *frais de mobilité* at so much per month; but it is evidently impossible to do so, because to a small average they will not consent, lest they should be left in the lurch in two or three months; and a large average would too much increase our expense if the treaty should be of any duration. In Lord Malmesbury's treaty the 62,400 men at
 1*l.* 12*s.* 0*d.* per man, bread, and forage, cost - 99,840*l.*
 monthly subsidy was - 50,000*l.*

62,400 men. Total monthly - - 149,840*l.*

If from these 62,400 you deduct the 27,000 contingent, you find
 $\frac{37.900}{35.400}$ men at 1*l.* 12*s.* 0*d.*, bread, and forage, cost 56,640*l.*
 and at 1*l.* 8*s.* 2½*d.* by monthly subsidy cost 50,000*l.*

35,400 men then at 3*l.* 0*s.* 2½*d.* total monthly - 106,640*l.*

If the same proportion be adopted now and applied to the same number, the 62,400 men would cost above 187,200*l.* per month, besides the *frais de mobilité*. This large scale is probably the reason of Count Haugwitz's preference to it upon the only occasion on which I could draw him into any detail upon the subject; as soon as I can discover his ideas I will explain them to you, but in the meantime, the principle by which I shall be governed will be not to incur a larger expense than that of a million subsidy by monthly payments between the first of August (if they then begin to march) and the 31st December, and I shall only avail myself in case of absolute necessity of the latitude given of 200,000*l.* *frais de mobilité*.

"I have made an advance to the Prince of Orange of 1,000*l.* for lesser expenses which he requires in the directions given by him, but he is very impatient to know what system can be adopted for raising a military force in Holland, and what arrangements Great Britain intends to furnish towards that object. I presume that the importance of some speedy arrangement upon this point will already have occurred to you, and it should seem to me that no time should be lost in preparing the means for enabling the Hereditary Prince to head a certain number of his own countrymen, and make the *noyau* of a Dutch army; this subject presses the more because, till your decisions are known upon it, no directions can be given to the many Dutch officers who now expect to receive them. I am impatient to hear what has been done in this insurrection on board the Dutch fleet, but I have as yet no particulars. I expect Lord Minto in a day or two from Brunswick, and General Stamford about the 23rd instant. I write to Mr. Hammond to desire him to tell me from what day I must draw on the extraordinaries for Mr. Fisher's allowance; you recollect that it was promised to be paid in that shape, as the fees of office would otherwise tell heavily on it.

“Our last accounts are that the Archduke was waiting the success of a march of General Haddick with 15,000 men to turn the position of Massena; a report prevailed on the 5th at Zurich that Moreau had been beat, but I suppose you have more authentic intelligence from Moreau.”

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 19.—“The enclosed is my brother’s last letter to me with an accurate translation of his report to the Hereditary Prince, which was originally written in Dutch. The *memoire* mentioned in both these papers, was a sort of instruction given by the Hereditary Prince to my brother before his departure; he was directed by it to endeavour to engage some old friends of two officers of the ancient navy who had taken service under the present government [Van Braam and Capellen] to remonstrate with them on their conduct, and to give to them assurances of suitable rewards if they would contribute towards bringing the fleet back to its duty. I cannot say that I think this report so satisfactory as I could have wished, nor Van Braam’s assurances so positive as I was led to believe from my brother’s first letter, which was sent by Mr. Grenville, and which your Lordship delivered to me the day I saw you, Mr. Pitt, and Lord Spencer in Cleveland Row. What I do not understand is the time when Van Braam’s project is to be executed. He will not effect a change on board the fleet as long as it remains within harbour, on account of the batteries at the Helder. But then he objects equally to sailing, and will use his utmost endeavours with the present Government to prevent the fleet from sailing. This seems to be contradictory. I shall be happy to know your opinion on this subject.”

Enclosure 1.

R. FAGEL to H. FAGEL.

1799, July 6. Schoenhausen.—“J’ai fort bien reçu votre lettre du 24 du mois passé, et pour y répondre tout de suite par le courier qui part aujourd’hui, et puis rectifier tout ce qui doit y avoir eu de louche dans un rapport fait à la hâte, au moment où je m’y attendois le moins, et échauffé d’un voyage de sept jours et sept nuits; quand à la chose même, je vous envoie la copie exacte du rapport que je mis par écrit le jour même de l’entrevue avec M.M. d’Enghuysen et Verheul, l’homme en question. La parole que je *lui* avois donnée de ne le point nommer, et le danger réel qu’il y a pour *lui* d’être connu, m’ont seuls engagé à cacher son nom. François, qui m’avoit accompagné d’Amsterdam chez Job May, auquel j’étois adressé, a été témoin du refus qu’a fait celui-ci de se charger de la commission dont il étoit question dans le mémoire que j’avois pour lui, fondé sur ce que cela le compromettroit auprès de ses anciens camarades, en ce que, disoit-il, ils me jetteront la pierre d’avoir terminé à leur désavantage et au profit de leurs ennemis une

affaire qui, en elle-même, peut avoir des désagréments pour le Prince même. Vous avez donc bien jugé que François étoit instruit de ma commission ; ne nous ayant pas accompagné à Aanholt, ce n'est pas [de] moi qu'il sçait les détails ultérieurs.

“J'apprends par une lettre de lui que May les lui a donnés. Il y a donc sûr à parier qu'il remettra à Verheul l'ordre que vous lui avez envoyé : soit que cela ait tenu à la manière dont je me serai expliqué, il paroît qu'on n'a pas compris comme il faut le projet de Van Braam, quand au pilote et à l'officier à envoyer à l'amiral Anglois. Vous sentés fort bien qu'il lui est impossible de se mettre sans le plus imminent danger en communication directe avec lui, et que même on ne doit point l'essayer de votre coté. Van Braam m'a semblé désirer tout simplement que le commandant Anglois sçût à quoi s'en tenir quand il verra venir à lui les deux personnes désignées. Il n'a d'autre raison de vouloir d'empêcher la sortie de la flotte que la crainte et la presque certitude, où il est, que son plan ayant réussi, comme nous le désirons, n'occasionne de la part du parti révolutionnaire un mouvement qui culbuteroit le Gouvernement modéré d'aujourd'hui, et exposerait nombre de personnes au plus grand danger, et, surtout, extorquant le peu d'argent qu'il y a encore.”

Enclosure 2.

R. FAGEL to the HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE.

June 6. Coesfield.—“Conformément à mes instructions je devois communiquer à M.M. d'A. et d'Enghuisen le mémoire relatif à la flotte : d'après cela ce dernier m'en demanda une copie pour la faire voir à un ancien officier de la marine, des sentimens duquel il répondoit. Sachant que ce dernier étoit M. Verheul, ami de M. J. May, je crus ne pas devoir refuser cette demande. Cependant n'ayant point reçu de réponse satisfaisante de M. J. May, j'étois sorti du pays assez mécontent, lorsqu'à mon arrivée sur la frontière, M. d'Yvoy y reçut une lettre de M. d'Enghuisen qui me fit différer mon départ jusqu'au jeudi, 6 Juin. Ce jour-là M.M. d'E[nghuisen], Verheul, et d'Yvoy se rendirent à A [Anholt] et M. V[erheul] fit, pour autant que je m'en rappelle, le rapport suivant.

“Dès la première communication du mémoire du Prince Héréditaire, M. V[erheul] y avoit trouvé les mêmes difficultés que M. J. May avoit remarquées, relativement à la proposition à faire par un des officiers de l'ancienne marine. Il préféroit effectuer une révolution à bord des vaisseaux, sans qu'on fut dans le cas de la devoir aux officiers actuels, et afin de prévenir toute espèce d'engagement du Prince Héréditaire, ou de sa part, avec les dits officiers. Plein de zèle pour la bonne cause, M. Verheul étoit parti pour la Hollande peu de jours après la communication que M. d'E[nghuisen] lui avait faite, afin de s'aboucher avec Van Braam. Ce qui lui réussit complètement.

“Après que ces deux Messieurs se furent entretenus quelque temps sur la situation actuelle des affaires dans la République, et

que Van Braam eut clairement donné à connoître combien sa position étoit facheuse, et combien il seroit charmé de contribuer à un changement dans l'état des choses, M. V[erheul] lui dit enfin, qu'il n'y avoit pour lui qu'un seul moyen de rétablir son honneur, et d'effacer la tache qu'il avoit contractée en se laissant employer par la république Batave. M. V[erheul] ayant assuré Van B[raam] des bonnes intentions qu'on avoit à son égard et à celui de M. de Cappellen, et lui ayant représenté, en même temps, qu'il pourroit rendre le service le plus important à sa malheureuse patrie, proposa la mesure suivante comme la seule chose qui restât à faire à ces Messieurs. Il faut, dit-il, effectuer une révolution à bord des vaisseaux, et cela de la manière suivante. Van B[raam] inviterât certain jour ses officiers à bord de son vaisseau, et après un repas cordial et gai, il se levera de table et rentrera tout d'un coup, une paire de pistolets à la main. Alors il leur donnera ordre du ton le plus sérieux de l'écouter sans donner aucun signe de mécontentement. Il déclarera ensuite que le moment est venu de se soumettre de nouveau, ainsi que le pays entier, au souverain légitime, et d'obéir aux ordres qu'il leur donneroit en son nom.

“Le premier qui ne voudroit par contracter cet engagement devoit être, tout de suite, arrêté, ou même tué. Pendant que ceci se passera dans la cabine, la même chose se fera dans le même temps parmi l'équipage, déjà préparé au moyen des bas-officiers (qui sont presque tous bons). On aura soin de poster d'abord un nombre convenable d'hommes auprès des pièces, on coupera la figure de la liberté hors du pavillon, et l'on criera *Orange boven*. Le Sieur Van Braam n'hésita pas un moment à donner sa *parole d'honneur* qu'il l'entendrait ce qu'on vient de dire, d'autant plus qu'il ne doutoit nullement que la chose ne réussit très-bien : il ajouta que la plus part de ses officiers (à l'exception de son premier officier) verroient avec plaisir un changement de choses dans la République.

“L'Amiral Story, dont le Capitaine de Capellen est l'officier de pavillon, n'occasioneroit guères d'obstacle dans ce projet, vu qu'il est regardé par les équipages comme un homme de peu de caractère. Van Braam a déclaré de plus qu'il seroit fort mauvais d'effectuer une révolution à bord de la flotte, tant qu'elle restoit en rade, vu que les trois batteries à boulets rouges qui ont été construites au Helder, pouvoient en tout temps empêcher les vaisseaux de sortir ! Aussi longtemps que cela dépendra de lui, il tâchera d'empêcher auprès du Gouvernement que la flotte ne sorte, mais si elle recevoit ordre de sortir et de mettre en mer, il promet *sur sa parole d'honneur* d'exécuter le plan et de se joindre aux Anglois. Il enverra alors un *pilote* avec un *officier* au commandant de la flotte Anglaise ; le tout à condition que les vaisseaux Hollandois soyent reçus en amis et alliés, et ne soyent pas obligés de baisser pavillon, ni d'éprouver aucun mauvais traitement ni menaces, vu qu'il aimeroit mieux se laisser couler à fond que de s'y soumettre.

“Il a voulu aussi que M. V[erheul] informât de tout ceci l'Amiral Kiusbergen, afin qu'il y ait d'abord quelqu'un qui puisse, dans la

suite, donner des ordres, nommer des officiers, et prévenir tous les désordres qui pourroient aisément avoir lieu parmi des matelots, gens difficiles à tenir en respect, amateurs de nouveautés, et qu'il ne seroit pas aisé en pareil cas de calmer, à moins qu'il ne se trouvât sur le champ un chef qui eût leur confiance, et auquel ils fussent dans l'habitude d'obéir.

"Ceci a été fait et promis à mon insu, et j'en ai témoigné mon mécontentement n'ayant point d'ordres à ce sujet. M. Verheul dit qu'il n'avoit consulté que son zèle, et qu'il se flattoit, en conséquence, que le Prince Héréditaire ne trouveroit pas mauvais qu'il en eût agi ainsi, et qu'il eût fait la proposition ci-dessus à Van Br[aam]. Il pensoit n'avoir engagé par là le Prince Héréditaire avec personne d'autre que M.M. Van Br[aam] et Capellen, pour lesquels il savoit par moi et par le contenu du mémoire de Br[aam], que le Prince étoit favorablement disposé."

Translation.

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, July 19. Cleveland Row.—"I congratulate you most sincerely on the successful issue of your long and laborious negotiation, and I certainly agree with you in thinking that the hostility of Prussia must, whatever shape it assumes, be productive of great impression on the minds of people in France.

"But you will easily have collected from my intermediate despatches that the arrangement as it now stands is not without its difficulties, and I own myself at a great loss what solution to suggest for them.

"We are so ready with our expedition that there is hardly time to apprise Prussia of it before it sails, much less to concert with them any part of its political or military details. If we execute the thing and it succeeds, it will do so long before the possible march of a Russian army (a fourth army from that country) can bring it to the Rhine. The King of Prussia may find it less easy to summon the French to evacuate Holland at the very moment we are attacking it; and, at all events, there can be hardly any question of his marching his army into Holland. Certainly you would not recommend that for these considerations, or for any other, we should delay our attack for a single hour.

"Then comes the question, if Holland is rapidly recovered (say in the first or second month), what is it we are paying the Prussians to do for the remainder of the year? The article about not acting with us in any measures respecting the interior of France must, as I conceive, admit of some change in the form, because, as it now stands, it seems to imply some censure on our views, which yet I believe every rational being even in Prussia must allow to be those which afford the only prospect of peace for Europe. But whatever the form be, we understand by it that Prussia means to remain on the defensive and not co-operate in our attack on the territory of France itself, which yet affords the only means of trying the experiment of the Royal Standard. Can we then be paying Prussia for doing nothing, but possibly

hanging on the operations of the Austrians ; and can we at the same moment solicit the *gratuitous* support of the latter in *our* plans, though calculated for their benefit.

“But a further question arises. Prussia is to act for the deliverance not only of Holland but also of the *pais limitrophes*. Now must we not before we begin to pay her army understand precisely what these *pais limitrophes* are ? Whether the Netherlands or the German provinces ? And above all what the Russian views are respecting the situation of those countries from which she drives the French, whether by force or by threats ? A consideration the more interesting from the very remarkable phrase in the sixth article, of security for the *hereditary* Princes of the Empire to the exclusion of all the ecclesiastical states. The whole of that sixth article is liable to another and a very serious objection. To agree by a public treaty that the *three* Courts will concert about a peace in Swisserland, Italy, and Germany, is to say, in other words, that England and Russia will join with the Court of Berlin to dictate a peace to Austria, and that at a moment when Austria, with all her faults, is however gaining victory upon victory over our enemies without our paying her for it, and when Prussia asks a million for sitting down armed to see Russia and England reconquer Holland and block Mentz.

“The greatest difficulty of all is that which relates to the Netherlands. After many variations in my opinion I have nearly brought myself to think that the best thing we could do would be to guaranty to Austria the repossession of the Netherlands on some such footing and arrangement as is detailed in the enclosed sketch, which I drew yesterday for Mulgrave’s perusal, and which will, I believe, form the basis of his instructions. Now is it not to be feared that this is the very result which the interposition of Prussia is intended to prevent ; and that while she pretends to be arming for the deliverance of Holland, which we shall deliver without her, and into which she professes not to intend to enter, the real object is, to be in sufficient force and sufficiently near to overrun those provinces at the first appearance of an Austrian cockade there.

“You see that in my despatch I have reserved all these points (for it is these to which I refer) for further discussion in Cabinet before I write officially upon them. But as yet the only solution that I see is in a fresh proposal to Berlin that as we are, as we trust, on the point of accomplishing by our own exertions (to which their indecision has driven us) the principal, and indeed the only distinct object which is proposed in the articles as drawn by Haugwitz, we remain equally desirous of establishing a system of concert and co-operation with Prussia, and are willing to contract with that Court the same pecuniary engagements as are there specified, provided we can see the means of making their force applicable to any other object of common interest.

“You will observe that the idea stated in the enclosed memorandum of allotting to Prussia the blockade of Mentz would perfectly coincide with their defensive plan, without

the necessity of admitting into any treaty an article of such obnoxious import as their 5th article appears to us to be.

"I am grieved that at the very moment you had with so much labour and persevering ability brought these people to the point, the total change of our circumstances and situation should necessarily plunge you into a fresh sea of discussion, and *that*, in many parts of it, by no means of a pleasant kind. But you will, I am sure, even before this letter reaches you, have felt that it was unavoidable.

"I send you all these ideas as the best mode of putting you in possession of what occurs to me, but I have before mentioned that they are all subject to further Cabinet discussion, though I believe they are in general conformable to the opinions expressed to-day, and on which I was on the point of writing to you officially when Johnson arrived.

"I send you the account of the sailing of the combined fleets. I had rather it was otherwise, but so it is.

"Our militia enlisting goes on well, and will, I trust, give us from 15 to 20,000 men. If the enemy land in Ireland we shall want them.

"Might there not be some means, in order to save time, of agreeing that the monthly payments shall run for the first two months, subject to be then discontinued if Holland is then recovered, and if some other operation be not agreed upon by common consent." *Copy.*

INVASION OF THE DUTCH PROVINCES.

Official Minute by Lord Grenville.

1799, July.—"Mr. Gartshore to proceed first to Gothenbourg in the cutter—then either by land or sea to Stockholm—and finally to send the cutter to Riga. He will be the bearer of a despatch to Mr. Hailes apprizing him of the business, and of the King's intention to accept the 8,000 troops on the same terms as the Russians, to act with us or Russia; but not the ships of the line except fitted as transports. That in all events the ships for the transport of these 8,000 must be furnished in Sweden though at the King's expense. The treaty will probably be to be concluded at Petersburg, but Mr. Hailes is to give the fullest assurances to the effect above mentioned.

"Mr. G[artshore] will communicate to him more particularly the sentiments of the King's Government on the whole subject, and will assist in expediting all the details that may be connected with it. He will proceed with the result to Captain Popham, and will lend himself to such steps as circumstances may require in order to accelerate the whole.

"Mr. Hailes' instructions to be conformable to the above.

"Sir Charles Whitworth to be apprised of this—to be also told what steps are taken or taking about transports here—and about the Baltic ships, there.

"That on Stamford's arrival he will have learnt that the plans in agitation may lead to employ the troops in Groninguen. This will not be done without a co-operation here of at least — men on the coasts of the U[nited] P[rovinces].

"That steps will also be taken to send to Gothenbourg, or elsewhere, artillery, stores, and cavalry.

"He is to do his utmost to induce the Emperor to accede to these arrangements, without which the measure may fail of securing the deliverance of Holland.

"Transports for 3,600 actually under sailing; 6,000 will go in a week or ten days. And the remainder as fast as possible."

COUNT RAZOUMOUSKI, Russian Minister at Vienna, to the
EMPEROR PAUL I.

1799, [July 20.] Vienna.—"L'événement de l'occupation de Naples, précédé déjà par la soumission de toutes les provinces à l'autorité royale, a fait penser au Baron de Thugut que le corps destiné par votre Majesté Impériale pour ce même objet sous les ordres du Général Rhebinder, pourrait être employé plus utilement à l'avantage de la cause commune, et aux intentions magnanimes de votre majesté. En me développant sur cet objet ses idées, Monsieur de Thugut a commencé par me dire qu'il ne prétendrait absolument autre chose que de soumettre ses pensées pour le bien commun à la sagesse de votre Majesté Impériale, me sollicitant de lui représenter en même temps que le dit corps restera dans sa position actuelle, prêt à se porter où votre Majesté Impériale jugera à propos de le prescrire, jusqu'à ce que nous recevions ses ordres définitifs à cet égard. Ce ministre présume que l'expédition par la Suisse vers les frontières de France au moyen des corps conjoints des généraux Korsakoff et Derfelden, ne serait point suffisante pour son important objet, et que l'addition de celui du Général Rhebinder en consoliderait puissamment l'effet. Si votre Majesté Impériale n'agréait point cette proposition, il lui semblerait qu'un autre emploi pourrait occuper utilement le général Rhebinder, et ce serait, comme je l'ai déjà indiqué précédemment, de le transporter à Malte. Après que cette île aurait été délivrée des Français, on y laisserait la garnison, qui fait partie de ce corps, et le surplus formant, à vue de pays, sept mille hommes, pourrait entreprendre un débarquement en Provence; on pourrait y joindre 10 à 12 mille Napolitains, ce qui formerait une armée très suffisante pour cette partie de la France, la plus disposée à se soulever contre le Gouvernement actuel.

"Le Comte de Cobenzl recevra aujourd'hui ordre de déclarer l'adhésion de l'Empereur son maître au vœu de votre Majesté Impériale de joindre le corps auxiliaire à celui du Lieutenant-Général Korsakoff, et les dispositions en seront communiquées au Maréchal Souvoroff d'abord après la prise de Mantoue. Il ne reste à cet égard qu'à régler l'approvisionnement de ce corps dans sa nouvelle destination. Il sera enjoint au Comte de Cobenzl de s'en entendre avec le Chevalier Whitworth. On

espère ici que ce ministre ne fera point de difficulté d'engager, sa Cour à se charger de cet objet. Si cependant elle s'y refusait, Monsieur de Thugut propose dans ce cas de porter le dit corps à la droite du Général Korsakoff, ou pour mieux dire du Maréchal Souvoroff, et de le joindre à l'armée intermédiaire que agira sur le haut Rhin, et qui sera pourvue des restes des magasins Autrichiens qui ont été formés sur le Danube, et dans la Suabe, pour l'Archiduc Charles. Enfin, si aucune de ces deux mesures ne pouvait s'effectuer, je pense que cette Cour-ci ne se refuserait point à tenir compte aux Anglais de leurs fraix à raison de l'entretien qui a eu lieu de sa part jusqu'ici en faveur du dit corps auxiliaire.

“ J'ai parlé ci-dessus d'une armée intermédiaire. Pour rendre cette expression intelligible, je dois indiquer que, sous peu de jours, il sera décidé à l'égard de la nouvelle répartition des forces qu'on emploiera. Ce travail depuis longtemps en instance, et qu'on dit avoir été différé par la marche du Général Korsakoff, sera fixé de la manière suivante. L'Archiduc Charles évacuera la Suisse à mesure que les troupes de votre Majesté Impériale y entreront. Ce prince filera le long du Rhin pour occuper la partie inférieure de ce fleuve. Il couvrira par sa gauche Mayence, point essentiel par où l'ennemi peut se porter aisément sur l'Allemagne, et forcer les armées Autrichiennes à abandonner leurs opérations, pour défendre les pays héréditaires. Sa droite s'étendra jusques vers les Pays-bas, pour seconder de ce côté la nouvelle expédition que les efforts généreux de votre Majesté Impériale dirigent vers la Hollande. Sur le haut Rhin sera une armée intermédiaire, commandée par le Prince Ferdinand de Wurtemberg, qui pourra entreprendre les sièges de Huningue et de Brisac, pour aider celle de Suisse. Toutes ces dispositions feront l'objet d'un courier que le Baron de Thugut se propose d'expédier sous peu de jours au Comte de Cobenzl, afin qu'il soit à même d'en transmettre les détails au ministère de votre Majesté Impériale.

“ Votre majesté Impériale en faisant mention dans un des derniers rescrits dont elle m'a honoré, de la déclaration à publier par les alliés en commun, m'a ordonné de lui transmettre mes observations sur la manière dont le ministère Autrichien envisageait cet objet. Le Baron de Thugut s'en est expliqué d'autant plus librement que son opinion se trouvait parfaitement d'accord avec le langage qui m'était prescrit, ayant pour principe de différer cette mesure jusqu'à ce qu'une plus grande maturité de circonstances en indique le moment favorable. Ce moment serait celui où les armées, se trouvant sur toute l'étendue des frontières ennemies, manifesteraient aux habitants de la France les intentions bienveillantes de leurs souverains. On chercherait alors à se procurer des intelligences qui mettent à même de juger de la disposition des peuples. Ces dispositions diffèrent indubitablement d'une province à l'autre, et n'ont de conformité que dans le mécontentement contre le gouvernement actuel; celui-ci paraît évidemment adopter le système du terrorisme depuis le dernier changement opéré par le conseil

législatif. Les Jacobins les plus outrés, investés aujourd'hui de l'autorité publique, saisiraient avec empressement l'occasion d'alarmer le peuple sur l'approche des troupes étrangères en leur imputant le dessein de démembrer la France et de la forcer à reconnaître un roi. Il paraîtrait donc utile, sous ce point de vue, de fixer la déclaration aux deux bases suivantes, promettre l'intégrité de la France dans ses anciennes limites ; et le rétablissement d'un gouvernement conforme à sa tranquillité intérieure, et, par conséquent, à un état de paix durable avec ses voisins. Cet engagement rassurerait les esprits, et on serait à même d'en modifier l'objet relatif à la forme du gouvernement d'après les notions qu'on acquerrait sur la majorité des vœux des habitants. On est ici d'opinion qu'il faut bien se garder d'être induit en erreur par les prétendues notions des émigrés à l'égard de l'intérieur ; on en a été grandement abusé pendant la dernière guerre, et on le serait de même aujourd'hui. Un officier, revenu il y a trois semaines seulement par l'échange, et qui a séjourné en Franche Comté et en Bourgogne, rapporte que l'esprit n'y est point aussi prononcé qu'on aurait en lieu de la croire en faveur de la royauté, et surtout pour la personne de Louis XVIII. Quant à l'époque où l'on pourrait espérer de mettre pied en France, si les armes des coalisés continuent comme jusqu'ici à être couronnées de succès, on ne pense point que cette entrée puisse s'effectuer avant le printemps. On juge que la saison sera déjà trop avancée lorsque les diverses armées seront rendues à leurs stations respectives, et on présume qu'il serait avantageux que cette entrée se fit à la fois sur l'étendue entière qu'occuperont les armées. Celle d'Italie le plus aisément par la vallée de Barcelonnette. Les Français ne se méprennent point sur la facilité qu'offre ce point ; déjà ils l'ont garni de six à sept mille hommes, et probablement ils y élèveront quelques ouvrages de défense. L'armée Russe réunie pourra, avant l'expiration de l'hiver, occuper la totalité de la Suisse pour se porter par le Franche Comté. L'armée intermédiaire mettra le siège devant les deux places ci-dessus mentionnées sur le haut Rhin, et s'ouvrira sa route de ce côté ; tandis que sur le bas Rhin l'Archiduc Charles se tiendra en mesure d'avancer en même temps. Telle est l'idée générale qu'on se forme ici de l'exécution de ce plan formidable, qui mettra fin glorieusement à la guerre la plus mémorable qui ait jamais été entreprise, et dont les succès, déterminés par la généreuse intervention de votre Majesté Impériale, seront éternisés d'âge en âge par les bénédictions et la reconnaissance de la postérité la plus reculée.

“Le Baron de Thugut allègue pour motif du délai jusqu'au printemps l'indispensable nécessité de procurer du repos à l'armée autrichienne, dont on évalue les pertes pendant cette campagne à près de 80 mille hommes, et le temps d'y rétablir l'ordre et la tenue que la guerre ne manque jamais d'altérer. Au surplus ce ministre a ajouté que, dans la supposition où votre Majesté Impériale voulut faire entreprendre quelque expédition partielle à ses troupes en Suisse, celles de l'Empereur des

Romains concourraient par des démonstrations sur les points qu'elles occuperaient, à forcer l'ennemi de diviser ses forces, ce qui faciliterait les succès du Marechal Souvoroff." *Copy.*

Endorsed by Lord Grenville, "Communicated by Count Woronzow, September, 1799."

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 21. Jermyn Street.—"I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, by Mr. Pitt's desire, the enclosed paper ; perhaps it is too long ; your Lordship may make what use you please of it, either in whole or in part."

Enclosure.

Note on the subject of an invasion of the Dutch Provinces.

1799, July 20.—"Various plans have been offered for an attack on the United Provinces, with the view to recover them from the oppression of France. It has been proposed to seize the island of Walcheren with a British force. This would have been a most important point, should any of the great armies now on foot have crossed the Rhine and the Meuse, and have penetrated into Brabant. The advantages are so obvious that they require no elucidation. Considered as unconnected with any co-operation, it could be of no use to Great Britain. It would have required a strong garrison, and a considerable naval force, to have protected it. And in autumn it is extremely unhealthy.

"Another plan offered has been to occupy the islands of Walcheren, Goree and Ameland, with a view to encourage and support an insurrection in Holland. It is apprehended that the support which the possession of these islands would have given would not have produced the intended effect ; being too superficial. The intention of landing fifteen thousand men in the province of Groningen probably would have produced very considerable consequences if put in execution. We may fairly suppose that such a force might have rescued from the hands of the French, not only Groningen, but Friesland, and part of Overysse. It is doubtful if Coevorden could have been taken during the short remains of the good season. It is probable that the operations of this body of troops must have been confined to the northern part of the United Provinces. The last proposition which has been made has been to concenter the whole force now assembling, and to attack Holland by the Meuse. The advantages resulting from this mode of attack, if fairly estimated, are very considerable.

"The possession of the island of Voorn will afford a safe port, and a free communication with Great Britain. An immediate passage into the province of Holland will be opened. And if the whole force should happily arrive before the middle of September it is hoped that a very considerable progress will be made in the reduction of the provinces of Holland and Utrecht before the

month of November. At any rate, we shall be in such force as to form a corps of observation to act on the Waal and the Rhine, and to secure us from any attempt on the part of France. We should likewise be enabled to open a passage to any power on the Continent, who should decide to enter Holland, either on the side of Groningen or of Guelderland and of Overysse, by depriving Holland of her defence on that side of the lines of the Greb—which we should take in reverse—whilst at the same time we should be enabled to facilitate in a great degree the passage of the Yssel. The free navigation of the Rhine to Arnheim would afford a certain supply of provisions to the army, and would save the expense of a heavy transport by land.

“On a fair comparison of the respective advantages attending each plan it is apprehended that the attack by the Meuse is preferable under every point of view, whether the attempt is made by an army from this country, which is not expected to be supported by any of the Continental powers on the eastern frontiers of the Republic, or whether it is made with the expectation of such co-operation. Under this last idea, indeed, it is still more to be preferred to any of the others. For the assistance we should give to such an ally would be immediate, and even operate previously to their attack. We should open the way for them by acting in the rear of the enemy which opposed them.

“In the farther prosecution of the war, should it be found expedient to carry our operations into Brabant, Great Britain, from the augmentation of her force and her naval power, would be able in the beginning of the next campaign to seize Walcheren in the first instance, and to open the communication by the Scheld, and to reduce the remainder of the province of Zealand.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 21. Berlin.—“Courvoisier is arrived here early this morning from Petersburg. Sir Charles Whitworth’s letter to me contains no addition to his despatch except a stronger intimation of his hopes to bring the king of Sweden to more reasonable terms, and his intention to conclude if he can obtain them. I trust that the delay and demur upon the timber contract will vanish with the better assurances given concerning Malta, but I cannot help recommending a little more caution in the unbounded assurances which we give respecting that island (lest their demands should increase with our concessions) and a great deal more caution too in the manner in which we press our demand of timber, and the degree of necessity which we describe ourselves to be under of obtaining that article from Russia. I know that this necessity is very great, but I cannot think that it is either prudent or decorous that an English Minister should represent at Petersburg that it depends upon them ‘that the English fleet should not be stopped in all its enterprises, paralysed in the middle of all its great efforts, and

rendered incapable of pursuing and annoying its naval enemies.' I hope Lord Spencer and you will not subscribe to this declaration at Petersburg; I think myself a pretty good Russian in politics, but I cannot consent to make the Emperor consider himself as the Man-Mountain who walks up and down the beach with the English fleet in the same string that held the fleet of Blefuscu. With respect to the Emperor's preference of the Prince de Condé, it evidently originates only in a desire of his keeping in his own pocket the active and efficient person who is to take the lead in France, but I conceive by Whitworth's letter that he will in the end give way.

"Lord Minto arrived here the night before last, and goes on to-morrow with the intention of only stopping two days at Dresden. He had no important conversation with the Duke of Brunswick, who was as usual full of words and civilities to him, but disclaimed having any knowledge of the King of Prussia's intentions political or military; yet at this very moment he had just sent a courier secretly to Haugwiz and to Yastrow, so secretly that I know it only by the chance of the man being seen to arrive and to go from hence the night before last; this courier was probably charged with the Duke's opinion as to the number of men to be subsidized, and as Panin arrived here yesterday, we shall probably see Haugwiz to-night, when I hope to hear something more positively from him. The same reluctance continues on the part of the King, but I believe it could be surmounted without difficulty, if there was not likewise in the minister and in the Duke of Brunswick a little paltry intriguing desire of not committing themselves ultimately till they have learnt more distinctly what is the course of our projected expedition; but I shall leave to Captain Popham and to General Herman to tell them that secret in Holland, and certainly shall give them no more precise knowledge of it at Berlin. They are meanwhile pressing through the Duke of Brunswick upon the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange for a more complete information of all that is intended with respect to the interior of the country, the proposed declaration, the intended alteration in the constitution there; but I have strongly recommended to him to be very sparing and cautious in all his communications both at Brunswick and at Charlottenburg, and to keep in his remembrance that at neither of those places is it fit that they should be confidentially trusted, until the King of Prussia will openly and manfully take the part which belongs to him. I am very glad to have to add that I think I can rely upon the discretion of the Prince in this respect. I know that he has been considered as entertaining originally some jealousy of English politics in Holland, and some attachment of preference to Prussia; but if this is not extremely changed, he is a much greater hypocrite than I take him to be, for his constant and uniform language to me is as strong and vehement a reprobation of Prussia as I could myself express, and as cordial professions of acknowledgment to England as I could desire or expect to hear from him. What is, besides this, perhaps a more decisive proof is the new marks which he has

given of confidence in the Grand Pensionary, to whom as well as to the Greffier, he is much better inclined than I believe in England he is thought to be. I had yesterday a long conversation with him and with Mr. James Fagel upon the course which it would be the most proper for the Prince to take. I thought there would be too great a danger of sudden explosion in Holland if the Prince shewed himself on the frontiers before we can shew ourselves upon the coast; and yet it seemed very desirable to collect a few influencing persons nearer than Berlin to the frontiers, in order to be more immediately present, and to furnish more promptly to the arrangements which will be wanted; the Grand Pensioner, I thought, might join them to keep them a little in order, and the Prince might go and converse with them there without remaining long enough to produce too early and active irritation in the country. This measure has been adopted. M. Vanderspiegel is desired to come to Varel in the Duchy of Oldenburg, where he may probably be in about a fortnight; and the Prince may there confer with him and a few other leading persons, and may then hold himself in readiness to go wherever the ultimate course of the expedition shall make his presence the most useful.

"I am impatient for the arrival of General Stamford, who is expected in three or four days, because, although the plan was concluded without his ideas having been much previously discussed, I take for granted that he will have acquired or that he will himself furnish more detail as to the exact and precise plan which is to be carried into execution; and in truth without a pretty exact knowledge of the time, the place, the force, and the objects to which that force is to be applied, we shall find it difficult to be as useful to you from the land as you will reasonably think we might be. Meanwhile I hope you will not overlook the necessary object of furnishing some *noyau* of Dutch army, and of giving the means of putting the H[ereditary] Prince at the head of a regular force of his own countrymen; and when you recollect that all the well-disposed officers are now expecting his orders, you will agree that, if this measure be to any extent adopted, it ought to be brought forward without a moment's loss of time. I have desired him to prepare a short list of those officers whose local knowledge might make it desirable to employ them at any of the appointed attacks either of Ameland, Goree, or Walcheren; but though I mention Goree, I still hope that you will persevere in beginning with the first Russian division at Ameland, supported by the English attack upon Walcheren; and leave to the second Russian division whatever may, at the time of its arrival, be the most useful and advantageous destination of it. How far you will be able to secure the co-operation of the first Russian division for Ameland, and the English division for Walcheren, without losing time in bringing the Russian across to Yarmouth, I do not know; if their going directly from the Baltick to Ameland leaves too much uncertainty for ascertaining the co-operation of the Walcheren attack from England, to be sure the first division must then pass to Yarmouth; but if the direct passage

could be safely made to Ameland, I think much time would be gained, and much more advantage had of surprise upon the enemy. I send you some interesting intelligence, the last which has been received."

Enclosure 1.

MÉMOIRE SUR L'ÉTAT ACTUEL DE LA HOLLANDE.

[1799.]—"Quelques soient les plans et les vûes que les alliés ont sur la manière de détruire la domination Française dans la Hollande, on croit essentiel de tracer et réunir sous un seul point de vûe tous les renseignemens qu'on a pu se procurer sur cette république : il est possible que la sagesse et l'habileté de ceux qui dirigent les plans y trouvent encore quelque chose à glaner.

"Nil doute que tous les partis et tous les esprits se réunissent à détester l'empire que les Français se sont arrogés en Hollande. Leur conduite y a été hautaine et cupide ; ils n'ont ménagé ni les personnes, ni les usages, ni les préjugés. Tous sont persuadés que la France a voulu usurper, dominer, et piller. Le gouvernement n'a point dissimulé l'opinion qu'il avait des employés Français, puisqu'il leur a retiré, depuis près de deux ans, toute espèce de disposition de fonds, et qu'il a établi une Directoire de commissaires et d'employés pour surveiller et contrôler les commissaires et employés Français qui ne sont chargés que de présenter les états ; et ce sont les commissaires Hollandais qui, après avoir fait la vérification, donnent l'ordre de paiement. Un changement est donc universellement désiré, mais aucun des partis n'est d'accord sur la manière. Il y a dans la république Batave trois partis très distincts, les Aristocrates, les Stadhoudériens, et les Patriotes. Tous ont des intérêts différens, et plus ou moins d'influence dans le pays, et même dans les troupes. La religion influe aussi notablement sur les vues politiques des habitans, surtout parmi les Catholiques, qui dans le commencement se sont déclarés les plus zélés partisans de la révolution, et qui en eussent été les défenseurs obstinés, si la France n'eût point cherché à détruire cette antique religion de leurs pères. Les Catholiques jouissent paisiblement de l'exercice de leur culte, la révolution a même amélioré leur sort en avouant ce qui n'était que toléré, et en donnant aux membres de cette communion l'entrée aux places et aux charges que la constitution Hollandaise ne leur permettait point. Les Catholiques sont nombreux surtout parmi le peuple ; si la Hollande reprend son ancienne attitude, ils sont persuadés qu'ils perdront leurs droits. Si quelque proclamation ne les rassure point sur leur état à venir, et ne leur donne pas des espérances, on n'éprouvera d'eux aucun secours, et ils attendront impassiblement l'issue de cette lutte. Les patriotes et les aristocrates, quoique divisée d'opinion, se rapprochent cependant par la peur qu'ils ont de se voir écartés des charges et des emplois, qu'ils ne doutent pas qu'ils ne soient donnés de préférence aux Stadhoudériens. Il est, sans doute, difficile d'obvier à ces vûes personnelles, et de

détruire les conséquences individuelles qu'elles peuvent avoir. Il est cependant nécessaire d'en être instruit pour tarifier avec exactitude le fonds que l'on peut faire sur l'intérieur du pays, et la manière d'y négotier. si l'on en a le projet. On dit, et répète sans cesse, que les troupes sont bien disposées ; cela est vrai jusqu'à un certain point, mais les officiers, les généraux veulent conserver leurs places, et les émigrés Hollandois, semblables aux émigrés Français, aliennent les esprits par leurs propos inconsiderés, par les prétentions qu'ils affichent, par le mépris qu'ils affectent pour ceux qui sont en place. On ne peut disconvenir que cette conduite ne soit au moins nuisible.

“ Il n'y a en Hollande que deux généraux qui ayent de l'influence et de la consideration parmi les troupes :—Daendels et Du Monceau. On ne croit aucun des deux accessibles du côté de l'argent. Tous deux tiennent à leur état, et ne pourraient être gagnés que par l'espérance de conserver leurs grades militaires. Il parait que, jusqu'à présent, l'opinion publique ne leur a point laissé cet espoir ; leurs caractères différent extremement ainsi que leurs talens. Daendels a de l'activité, de l'espèce d'intrigue nécessaire pour le soutenir dans la place qu'il occupe. Il ne faudrait pas juger de son intrépidité par la révolution qu'il a opérée le 22 Juin dernier ; il a été conduit par des circonstances impérieuses, qui ne lui ont point laissé de choix ; la maladresse, l'irrésolution, et l'impéritie des Directeurs lui ont rendu cette besoyne facile ; avec tout cela Daendels n'aurait rien effectué s'il n'avait point eu Joubert, dont le caractère hardi, entreprenant, on peut ajouter étourdi, ne l'avait poussé et encouragé.

“ Dumonceau a des talens militaires ; il a une franchise, une simplicité qui lui concilie l'amour et la confiance du soldat ; il est zélé républicain par conviction, et fidèle au parti qu'il a embrassé ; il n'est point jaloux de Daendels et a même pour lui de l'attachement et du dévouement. C'est lui qui commande dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise et le pays de Drenthe, et il s'y est fait estimer. On doit ajouter qu'il est actif et laborieux, capable de n'omettre aucune des précautions nécessaires pour la sûreté du pays qui lui est confié. Les habitans de Groningue lui sont attachés, sont en plus grande partie révolutionnaires, et seconderaient les troupes en cas d'attaque ; il n'en est pas de même de la Frise, où, on assure, que l'esprit est excellent. Ce sont les deux seuls généraux Hollandois qui valent la peine qu'on s'occupe d'eux. La reste suivra le flot, ou la direction que les circonstances ameneront.

“ Il existe encore en Hollande un motif de division et d'incertitude qu'il est de l'intérêt même de la maison d'Orange de faire cesser. Il y est répandu que le Prince d'Orange père, las des troubles de sa patrie, renonçait à reprendre en main le maniement des affaires, et céderait au Prince héréditaire sa place et ses droits pour vivre comme particulier en Angleterre. Ces bruits, sans doute dénués de fondement, nuisent à la chose, et on croit essentiel de les faire cesser, pour unir et les opinions et les efforts. On en est encore loin en Hollande, où, dans cette calamité publique, aucun parti,

aucun individu n'a perdu ni ses préjugés ni ses prétentions. Un mélange de fédéralisme et de patriotisme se mêle dans tous les plans, dans toutes les idées, et rien n'est fixé ni arrêté dans les têtes. Un ouvrage sage et fait par un homme qui connoitrait bien les intérêts généraux de la Hollande, et les intérêts et usages particuliers des provinces, qui saurait les conseiller et proposer un plan qui ferait fléchir les abus, serait de la plus grande utilité, et fixerait des idées qui sont encore bien confuses.

“Pour se résumer, on dira que la Hollande désire une révolution, que tous les élémens sont préparés, mais c'est encore un cahos. Il faut savoir, trainer, diviser, rassurer, et si on n'a pas en main des forces suffisantes pour tout abaisser devant soi, si le concours de l'intérieur est nécessaire pour la succès du but qu'on se propose, il est tems de s'en occuper, et d'embrasser d'un seul coup d'œil les difficultés qu'on a à surmonter et à vaincre ; surtout qu'on se méfie des personnes qui n'envisagent qu'un seul aspect, et jugent de l'ensemble par l'objet qu'ils ont sous les yeux. Leurs intentions sont bonnes et pures, mais on s'égarrera si l'on y met une confiance entière, et on n'aura pas la véritable situation de ce qu'il est si important de connoître.”

Enclosure 2.

Voici les détails donnés par l'homme dont on a parlé dans la dernière :—

“L'armée Batave est forte de plus de vingt mille hommes effectifs ; l'armée Française en Hollande est du même nombre, mais dans celle-cy, il n'y a pas plus d'un sixième d'anciens soldats, le reste sont des conscrits, parmi lesquels il y a une prodigieuse quantité de malades, particulièrement en Zelande, à Nimegue, et à Groningue.

“Le Général-en-chef Brune, cy-devant prote d'imprimerie de Marat, qui a volé beaucoup d'argent en Italie, qui a de la Hollande plus de 40 mille florins de revenu, tant pour son traitement que pour sa table, sans compter les petites exactions qu'il peut faire, et qui est trop diffamé pour ne point craindre le retour de l'ordre, fera les derniers efforts pour soutenir la révolution ; il est aimé du soldat, parce qu'il est libéral envers lui : il a la réputation d'être brave, mais on doute qu'il ait de grands talents. Le général Reubel, qui commande en second, est un imbécile, incapable, et méprisé du soldat.

“Le général de l'artillerie est un ancien officier du corps royal, qui a fait la guerre de sept ans. Il a des connoissances de son métier, mais il est loin d'aimer la révolution, dont il n'a embrassé le parti qu'après une detention de 18 mois, et pour sauver sa tête, et celle de sa famille ; on le croyait aisé à gagner si on lui assurait son grade, et qu'il put se déclarer sans se perdre ; il a un frère émigré. Tous les officiers inférieurs, chefs de brigade, capitaines, n'ayant que leur état qu'ils tiennent de la révolution, méprisent le gouvernement, mais combatteront pour le défendre, ou plutôt pour défendre leur existence qui s'évanouirait s'il était détruit. Le Ministre de la Marine Batave

déteste les Français, il ne peut dissimuler sa haine, et ferait tout pour les chasser de son pays. Ceux des affaires étrangères, de la justice, et des finances, aiment trop leurs places, leur pouvoir, leur traitement pour vouloir un Stadhouder, et il seroit impossible de les gagner. Celui de la guerre leur ressemble; la seule différence c'est qu'on pourroit le corrompre; le Ministre de la police est un Jacobin, et en même tems un des hommes les plus vils et les plus bornés qu'on ait jamais mis dans une administration. Les Directeurs sont des hommes assez honnêtes, ils ont été patriotes, reconnoissent aujourd'hui leur erreur, détestent les Français, sont incapables de faire le mal, mais trop foibles pour ne pas s'y prêter engémissant, dépourvus de toute espèce de talens et de caractère. Van Zoof est celui qui en auroit le plus, c'est en même tems le plus attaché au gouvernement actuel. Si les membres de ce gouvernement voyaient le parti jacobin prêt de l'emporter, ils préféreraient sans doute de voir arriver les étrangers, mais ils n'auroient ni assez de courage, ni assez de moyens pour les servir utilement.

"Il y a dans ce moment au Texel 8 vaisseaux de 74, 3 frégates et 2 bricks prêts à mettre à la voile; les commandants et les capitaines sont patriotes, mais la désertion règne parmi les matelots; beaucoup sont malades et tous sont découragés. L'apparition de quelques vaisseaux Anglois ont été cause de quelques simptoms de mutinerie parmi les matelots, que les officiers ont réprimés à l'instant, mais qui démontrent l'esprit et les dispositions des équipages. Les fortifications des places de guerre sont en très mauvais état, les garnisons très foibles; on vient cependant d'en renforcer quelques-unes. Les finances ne se soutiennent que par l'emprunt forcé; il n'y a point d'esprit public, les seuls mobiles sont le désir de conserver sa fortune, sa place, et la crainte du danger.

"Le gouvernement Français n'a pas retiré de ce pays la dixième partie des ressources pécuniaires qu'il auroit pu lui fournir, s'il avait été aussi habile qu'avidé. Les Hollandais ont eu l'adresse de se montrer toujours dans l'impuissance, de ne rien épargner pour gagner les agens, et les empêcher d'y regarder de trop près. La grande ressource du Directoire français est digne de ceux qui gouvernent, et donne la mesure de leur génie: ils n'ont su que changer perpétuellement les corps qu'ils envoient ici et de faire habiller par les Hollandais 60 à 80 mille homme au lieu de 20 mille. Les rescriptions Bataves perdent 79; les anciennes obligations à $2\frac{1}{2}$ sont toujours à 40, les nouvelles à 39, 36. Le Ministre de France, Lombard, vient d'être rappelé, mais a eu ordre d'attendre à la Haye l'arrivée de son successeur."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 21. Hollwood.—"It seems desirable, as soon as you have any respite from your foreign labours, that we should name a day for renewing and bringing to a point the discussion respecting the intended Order in Council for restraining the importation of slaves into our new acquisition.

"After Wednesday many of the Cabinet (and probably myself among the number) will be absent from London. I shall not be out of reach, nor absent in the whole more than a fortnight, but my brother will probably be absent on his command, and very likely the Chancellor gone for the summer. If therefore it will suit you to fix a Cabinet before the *levée* on Wednesday, it will save a great deal of delay; and we may take the same opportunity of settling the point (which in one view is closely connected with this) of what we are to restore to Holland.

"The Duke of Portland and my brother and I have already fixed to meet on some other Council business at twelve; but we can leave it at any time when the Cabinet is ready. If you have any leisure in the meantime pray turn in your mind the form as well as substance of the measure, and let me know your ideas upon it. I still hope, on reflection, you will not have been anxious to keep your brother as much in the dark as you intended yesterday."

*Memorandum of LORD GRENVILLE in regard to the intelligence conveyed in H. FAGEL'S letter of July 19, 1799.**

1799, July 21.—"As we expect that by the beginning of the second week in August at latest our attack may be made, it seems very important that no time should be lost in apprising either Admiral Kingsbergen or Captain V[an] B[raam] of it, in order that measures may be concerted for a revolution on board the fleet as soon as the first account is received there of the English having landed in any part of the Republic. This may be done by a direct communication through Hamburg and Varel to the person who was entrusted with the last letter; and, as it would not be necessary to name the intended point of attack, there would be no danger even in case of treachery on the part of those officers, or of any accidental discovery, as the Government in Holland must be well aware that the period of attack cannot be very distant."

Memorandum of EARL SPENCER on the same subject.

1799, July 22. Admiralty.—"On the subject of Lord Grenville's *mémoire*, it strikes me that, even in the event of our effecting a landing, V[an] B[raam] would not attempt a revolution on board the fleet while in port, on account of the batteries; therefore unless he will consent to come out at that time, it would not be adviseable to make an *éclat*, which would only expose all the well-disposed people on board to discovery, and probably to destruction."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, July 22. Dropmore.—"In the papers lately received from the interior of Holland the subject of arms is particularly mentioned, and, if our Ameland expedition takes place, it will be indispensably necessary that we should be able and ready to furnish a supply.

* See page 156.

"It seems also probable that we shall soon be called upon to send some supply of arms to the Vendée.

"Will you be so good as to take measures as to the first point, so that the expedition that goes to Ameland may have a supply with it, and may not have to send back to England for this very essential article."

Postscript. "I directed Taylor to send you yesterday the draft of a proclamation for Sir Ralph Abercrombie. It will, I think, be also necessary that something should be published in the name of the Prince of Orange, and if you think so, I will write to him about it.

"Will it not be necessary, in order to guard against accidents, to send orders to the Sound to bring the Russians from thence to Yarmouth?" *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 22. Berlin.—"The picture of shame and disgrace which I am obliged to send you in my public despatch, tells its own story too well to require much additional comment in a private letter. I had certainly rather have died on a dunghill than have undergone the humiliating scene which Haugwiz had yesterday to pass through in his evening conference; and, to do him justice, he did not appear in any degree insensible to the figure which he had to make upon this occasion. He was not, as I believe, altogether prepared for the very decisive tone in which he was answered, and I saw a considerable impression made upon him by the manner in which Count Panin gave him to understand that he was asking for what would assuredly be an audience of leave. With respect to myself, you will observe that I have not been behind-hand in expressing myself with equal decision as to the measure; but I have not thought it expedient upon many accounts to seem to threaten as immediate a departure. In the present moment more than ever it seemed to me that you would all of you wish me to remain here, and in doing so it is not for the first time that I put entirely aside every regard to my own personal feelings and wishes; but while your present expedition goes on, and it is now more necessary than ever, I know that you would be at a loss if I turned my back upon these shuffling politicians and indulged myself in shewing to them all the contempt which I feel for them.

"My first care has been to inform the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange of this new state of things, and to put him upon his guard against any overture of this nature which may be made to him. I have found in him the same good sense and good conduct which I have already so much esteemed in him; he said that he should naturally refer any such proposition entirely to the decision of the Stadtholder, and that perhaps he should take that occasion to desire to absent himself in order to go to England, so that by such permission he may put himself at liberty to act without being shackled by his Prussian uniform,

He is entirely agreed with me in believing that it is the Duke of Brunswick who is really the active person in this business, and that being afraid to commit his military reputation to a war with France, he has conceived this mode of settling Holland by Prussian influence without engaging in French hostility. What tends much to confirm this opinion is that every day brings new accounts of the French troops retiring from the country, and brings new instances of the Duke of Brunswick's political intrigues with several persons in the United Provinces whom the Prince thinks very little attached to the interests of the House of Orange; and I was glad to see the Prince express himself determined not to furnish to the Duke of Brunswick any means of information, or the assistance of any persons who can be useful to the enterprise of the allied Courts. With this prudent precaution and reasonable jealousy, I am likewise very glad to see that the Prince proposes to avoid all appearance of breaking in any degree with the King of Prussia, although he will give himself as entirely as it can be wished to the military operations of which I have given him the knowledge: it is chiefly against the Duke of Brunswick that I find him strongly indisposed, and in the present moment, I do not wish him to look more favourably towards that quarter. I have recommended to him great vigilance and attention in tracing all that the Duke of Brunswick is doing in Holland, and I am confident that it is with him that this rare project has taken root; if this be true the course will be that, whenever they have settled their shameful traffic at Paris, the Duke of Brunswick will obtain by his Dutch agents an application to the King of Prussia for assistance to march in and to settle the country, and this march will by them at Berlin be pressed on according to their intelligence respecting our expedition, which I conceive they wish to be beforehand with. Upon this speculation, however, I do not see any change which is to be made in the course that you are pursuing, although I see every motive for all possible diligence in the conduct of the expedition, and I almost grudge the loss of the time which is necessary for Popham to receive his orders to sail from the Sound. Meanwhile I have the pleasure to tell you that General Stamford is just returned, and I delight much in the assistance which he will be able to give at a moment so critical and so important.

"We now approach however so near to the moment where there may be a real want of all the Orangists that can be found, that I cannot help again suggesting to you the advantage there would be in the Greffier's arrival either at Varel, or Berlin, or where he pleases, provided he be more within reach. Upon the whole although I think the conduct of Prussia more dirty and reproachful than it is easy to find words to express, I do not know that the deliverance of Holland will be retarded or prevented by it. It is not our business to break openly with Prussia because they are disgracing themselves in the eyes of their own country and of all Europe; it is not our business to go to war with them because they will not go to war with France,

nor yet because they try to bargain with Syéyès instead of beating him from the Rhine and the United Provinces; nor yet is it our business, if we meet the Prussians in Holland, to consider ourselves as fighting with them for the possession of it; but it is our business, our first and most important business, to endeavour to be beforehand with Prussia in the obtaining firm footing in Holland, and in availing ourselves for the House of Orange of all the pains, expense, and risk which belongs to the expedition that we have undertaken for the deliverance of the United Provinces.

“Panin is afraid of the Emperor’s growing quite furious at this low and pitiful Brunswick intrigue, but we must do what we can to keep him quiet, for a Russian war with Prussia would not mend our situation; for myself I cannot promise entirely to keep down all traces of the disgust which they have inspired me with, but I will not let that disgust stand in the way of any real service which can be done here. I am not here for my pleasure, and a little more or less dissatisfaction shall not prevent me from doing any good that may arise, though in the present moment nothing good or bad can be done; we rest upon the diligence of the expedition to run this race with Prussia.”

DUTCH AFFAIRS. *Minute of Lord Grenville.*

1799, July 23rd.—“Mr. F[agel] will write that V[an] B[raam] should be apprized that the P[rince] of O[range] is decidedly of opinion that he should lose no time in endeavouring to come out, and to join L[ord] D[uncan] in the manner already agreed upon.

“To write to Mr. J[ames] F[agel] that it is extremely desirable to prevent any premature explosion in the Eastern provinces till the force appears off the island of Ameland, which may be by the end of August at the latest. But that everything should be in readiness to break out then. And that Helvoet is the best point for the correspondence to be established.”

J. H[OOKHAM] FRERE to LORD MINTO.

1799, July 23. London.—“I have just received Lord Grenville’s directions for preparing a dispatch upon the subject of the capitulations which have hitherto been granted to the French, and which, upon the same view of the subject, you will, I am sure, join with us in considering as utterly nugatory and insufficient; that most pressing remonstrances have been made on the part of the French Royalists, who are apprehensive of being exposed to the same hard fate as in the first years of the war, when the garrisons of Mayence and Valenciennes were let loose upon the inhabitants of Brittany and La Vendée. It is now understood that the prisoners returning from Italy under capitulation are to be stationed in Brest, and other parts of the interior, for the purpose of keeping down those movements which are hourly expected to break out. It becomes therefore highly important that some system should be adopted which, however ineffectual it may prove in point of restraint upon an enemy so

regardless of conventional obligation, may at least have the effect of giving confidence to the well-disposed party in France, by putting them upon the same footing with ourselves, and relieving them from those apprehensions which a severe experience has so strongly impressed upon their minds. Add to this the advantage to be derived from an oblique recognition of the King of France, strong enough to be understood by the well-affected party in France, without giving any hold to Opposition at home. Upon this view of the subject Mr. Wyndham has suggested (in a letter which is now before me) that the conditions of every future capitulation should be not to serve against the allies, nor against any party acting in the name of Louis XVIII. I have ventured therefore to anticipate the regular dispatch which you will probably receive by the next post, considering the extreme importance which at a moment like the present may attach to the events of two or three days; and in the confidence that any step which you may think it right to take in consequence of the unauthorised suggestions which I have taken the liberty to communicate, would be fully and entirely approved of at home.”
Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, July 23. Dropmore.—“I have just received your despatch and letter of the 14th instant. I have not time to add anything to the voluminous despatch that I send you, and I trust you will find it sufficiently clear and precise to act upon. We much wish to get the Prussian declaration, and its effect on the present circumstances may be decisive, but we are afraid of being involved blindfold in the Prussian politics as to Cologne, and still more as to the Netherlands. I trust, however, that now that they have once made up their minds to act, you will not find much difficulty in putting the thing on some such footing as we propose.” *Copy.*

M. FAUCHE BOREL to MONSEIGNEUR [le COMPTE D'ARTOIS].

1799, July 24. Hamburgh.—“Si ma présence sur le Continent n'étoit pas nécessaire dans ce moment pour suivre à la négociation qui doit être connue de votre Seigneurie, je me serois rendu avec empressement auprès d'elle, pour avoir l'honneur de lui donner des détails infiniment intéressants à ce sujet. Mais devant me rendre en dilligence auprès du général Pichégrou et de Monsieur Wickham en Suisse, je me borne à vous faire parvenir le mémoire qui a été mis sous les yeux de s[a] M[ajesté] Impériale des Russes, et comme je ne puis le mettre en chiffre, je ne crois pas être imprudent que de le remettre à Monsieur le chevalier de Crauffurth, qui a bien voulu m'assurer qu'il seroit remis sûrement dans les mains de votre Seigneurie. J'ai dans le temps eu soins de toujours faire parvenir à Monsieur Wickham tout ce qui pouvoit l'intéresser dans cette affaire, que l'on aura, je pense, jugé de quelqu' importance pour que je me persuade qu'il aura été chargé

d'y donner ses soins. C'est dans cette persuasion que je me rends en Suissé pour faire arriver le général Pichégru à un nouveau rendez-vous sur le Rhin. On doit se faire l'échange des lettres pattentes du Roi, contre la lettre de Paul, conformément à la copie que précédemment j'ai fais passer à Monsieur Wickham, et qui sera connue de votre Seigneurie, ainsi que le mémoire qui y étoit annexé. Les événemens du 16 ont empêché David de se rendre où le général et moi nous étions rendus, mais aujourd'hui D[avi]d nous mande de nous y rendre en toute hâte, que tout a repris confiance, et que le mouvement n'a rien changé aux dispositions de Paul, mais que nous devons être en mesure pour les fonds, comme il le sera pour tout ce qui a été promis par Paul. En conséquence, pour que tout soit bien entendu, je me suis déterminé à lui envoyer un de mes parents, homme de confiance, afin de pouvoir lui faire connoître plus sûrement notre marche, et convenir du jour où la rencontre se fera. J' ai crû, Monseigneur, qu' il étoit de mon devoir de vous faire parvenir dans cette circonstance intéressante l'état où en est cette négociation, qui je l'espère ne pourra avoir qu'une heureuse issue. J'ose espérer que votre Seigneurie daignera pour ma tranquillité me faire accuser reception de la présente, en me la faisant parvenir par le canal de Monsieur le chevalier de Crauffurth.

"Je ne dois point taire à votre Seigneurie que, pour suivre aux dépenses et aux fraix de voyages nombreux qui ont été nécessaires, j'y ai employé toutes mes ressources personnelles; et que je dois à Monsieur le Chevalier de Crauffurth une somme de 10,500f. dont j'ose prendre la liberté de solliciter le prompt remboursement. Au surplus, je justifierois dans le temps l'emploi de ce dont j'ai disposé, tant mes propres deniers que de la somme ci-dessus.

"Je reçois un petit aperçu sur les derniers événemens qui me parroit être bien fait; j'ose prendre la liberté de le joindre à la présente. Il peut intéresser dans ce moment. Il est d'un homme qui connoit bien la marche des affaires, qui le traitent à Paris, mais qui est entièrement étranger à l'objet de Paul."

2 *Enclosures.*

Enclosure 1.

[1799, July.]—COPIE DU MÉMOIRE mis sous les yeux de SA MAJESTÉ IMPÉRIALE, et au quel elle a fait répondre officiellement par ses Ministres.

"La négociation entamée depuis plusieurs mois entre Barras et Sa Majesté le Roi de France, ayant été mise dans le plus grand détail sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale et de ses ministres, ainsi que sous ceux du ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique, les démarches faites jusqu'à ce jour ayant été approuvées, le plan adopté, l'im-

Consent est le terme qu'il veut employer, puisqu'il déclare y avoir été provoqué par David Monnier, qui est l'agent de la monarchie auprès de lui et non celui de la république auprès du Roi.

Tout ceci est répondu dans les lettres patentes.

Répondu dans les lettres patentes.

portance reconnue, il ne s'agit plus que de réunir tous les moyens qui doivent seconder les desseins du Directeur, et surtout en accélérer l'exécution.

"Ce Directeur tout-puissant, le plus actif, le plus entreprenant des Cinq, *consent* à rétablir la monarchie. Il demande, pour y réussir, sûreté et indemnité, ce sont ses propres termes. Sûreté, c'est à dire, l'entier oubli de sa conduite révolutionnaire, l'engagement sacré du Roi d'annuler par son pouvoir souverain toutes recherches à cet égard. Indemnité, c'est à dire, une somme au moins équivalente à celle que pourrait lui valoir deux années qu'il doit probablement passer encore au Directoire, somme qu'il évalue à douze millions livres Tournaises, y compris les deux millions de livres qu'il doit distribuer entre les co-opérateurs. A ces demandes, qui regardent personnellement Barras, il faut joindre :

"1. Une somme nécessaire à subvenir aux fraix du mouvement à faire dans Paris.

"2. Un billet conditionnel pour servir d'appas et de frein tout à la fois à Bottot, le secrétaire de Barras.

"3. Une somme moins importante pour indemniser de ses fraix, et récompenser de ses premiers soins David Monnier, engagé dans ce moment avec Bottot et quelques sous-ordres qu'il a été important de gagner.

"Sa Majesté le Roi de France, en vertu de lettres patentes demandées par Barras lui-même, et accordées par elle, se charge de satisfaire aux deux premières conditions, indemnité et sûreté. Les douze millions y sont promis au Directeur, et

Les lettres patentes ont été remises à Fauche Borel, qui les a données au Général Pichégru, chargé de faire l'échange au moment où David se rendra à un poste convenu.

Sa Majesté a envoyé, le 3 Juin, un courier à M. le Comte de Woronzow. Le ministre d'Angleterre en a fait autant, en répondant d'avance de l'assentiment du Gouvernement Britannique.

Il est urgent que l'on satisfasse à cette demande le plutôt possible. Cet article est le seul qui reste à faire.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur a fort approuvé cette disposition.

la parole royale et sacrée de Sa Majesté y est engagée de s'interposer entre lui et tout tribunal quelconque qui voudrait connaître de sa vie passée. Ce qui dépend donc de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne sera exécuté. Les lettres patentes vont être dressées et scellées à Mittau; elles seront remises à M. de la Maison-Fort; il les portera sur les bords du Rhin à David Monnier; et ce dernier livrera en échange l'acceptation motivée, écrite toute entière de la main du Directeur.

“Voulant donc bien accorder sa puissante protection et sa haute entremise à cette négociation, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toute la Russie est suppliée de vouloir bien s'entendre avec son généreux allié le Roi d'Angleterre, pour les sommes dont le paiement doit précéder la restauration de la monarchie et en devenir la principale cause.

“Le Directeur demande 1,500,000 Tournais à sa disposition au moment de l'échange de sa lettre contre les lettres patentes. Il est donc nécessaire que, le plutôt possible, un crédit de cette valeur se trouve soit à Hambourg, soit dans toute autre place de commerce, et soit placé de façon que les agents de Leurs Majestés qui se rendent à Essen le puissent transporter (en recevant la lettre de Barras) sur une maison de banque de Paris, et le mette à sa disposition. Tout ce qui à cet égard pourra abréger le temps est non seulement essentiel mais indispensable. Sa Majesté l'Empereur, ayant trouvé à propos qu'un billet conditionnel de cent mille écus soit remis à Bottot, secrétaire à Barras, afin de se l'assurer sans retour, il faudra joindre cette somme au crédit

que l'on formera dans Paris, avec cette différence, cependant ; c'est que l'on ne pourra en disposer que le mouvement fait, et 24 heures après que l'étendard de la royauté sera levé dans Paris.

- Il existe des moyens pour cela qui ont déjà été indiqués par David Monnier ; moyens très communs, et que l'on pratique journellement dans un pays où tout se marchande, se vend, et ne s'obtient qu'aux moyens de pareils billets au porteur. L'agent qui remettra ce billet se charge de prendre toutes les précautions possibles à cet égard.

Sa Majesté a approuvé que cette somme soit remise à David.

David a un état dont il a suspendu les fonctions depuis qu'il s'occupe de cette négociation ; il y a huit mois qu'il s'en occupe sans relâche.

“La somme que réclame David Monnier, par ses lettres arrivées le 13 et 15 de ce mois de Mai à St. Pétersbourg, est d'environ onze cents louis. Elle est indispensable pour bien disposer les entours du Directeur ; il en a contracté l'obligation sous peine de n'être plus crû ni écouté. Si l'on veut bien y ajouter la juste indemnité à accorder à l'homme le plus habile, le plus intelligent, le plus dévoué, à celui qui a couru seule les plus grands dangers pour entamer la négociation avec Barras, qui a fait, au milieu de deux hivers, deux voyages très pénibles, et qui sort des portes du tombeau, venant d'avoir une maladie qu'il doit à tant de courses, et surtout à tant d'inquiétudes, on ne trouvera plus que juste de la porter à 1,500 ou 2,000 louis ; et on chargera de les lui payer celui qui fera l'échange des lettres patentes avec la lettre de Barras.

“Telles sont les sommes contre lesquelles deux grandes puissances peuvent jouer la paix de l'Europe, le bonheur du monde, et le sang et les subsides que peuvent coûter deux campagnes heureuses. Moins de deux millions pour ce qui regarde l'intérieur, et peut-être une somme pareille destinée non-seulement au voyage du Roi de France à l'armée, mais à payer, pendant les premiers jours seulement, l'armée royaliste destinée au général Pichégrou.

Accordé.

Il est essentiel que cette somme soit effectivement remise à David.

Tout ceci a été exécuté et remis à Fauche Borel.

Le Général Pichégro ainsi que Fauche Borel, qui sera de retour de Londres, se trouveront, s'il est possible, au rendez-vous d'Essen, où il est essentiel que le premier fasse passer à Barras le plan dont il s'occupe pour la suspension de tous les généraux suspects, et la réorganisation de l'armée.

Ceci a été exécuté par M. le Comte de Rostopschin, ministre de Sa Majesté Impériale.

“D'après les ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale, les ministres chargés de traiter avec M. de la Maison-fort voudront bien, le dispensant de toute autre formalité, lui expédier le plutôt possible un passeport pour non seulement partir de St. Pétersbourg, mais pour sortir de Russie soit par mer, soit par terre.

“Les précautions une fois prises pour la somme principale de 1,500,000f. destinée à Barras, pour celle de 300,000f. à payer conditionnellement à Bottot, le surplus sera délivré, soit en crédit, soit en argent comptant, à David Monnier.

“Aussitôt ces dispositions prises, M. de la Maison-fort partira pour Mittau. Il aura l'honneur de porter au Roi la lettre que Sa Majesté l'Empereur lui écrit, il confèrera avec Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne et ses ministres, il recevra les lettres patentes telles que Sa Majesté Impériale les approuve, ainsi que le ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique.

“Sa Majesté l'Empereur ayant daigné accorder quelque confiance à M. de la Maison-fort en lui déclarant qu'il attachait autant d'intérêt que d'importance à cette négociation, il aura l'honneur d'être mis en rapport directe avec Son Excellence M. le Comte de Woronzow, à Londres, et son Excellence M. le Général Korsacow. Les ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale voudront bien prendre les précautions nécessaires à cet égard.

“M. de la Maison-fort ne pouvant probablement (l'échange une fois fait) s'éloigner du théâtre des événements, il est à désirer que l'on veuille bien lui

Cela a été exécuté au nombre de trois.

Si M. Fauche Borel peut faire le voyage, ce sera lui qui probablement se chargera d'une commission qu'il mérite à tant de titres. Si sa santé ou d'autres cas qu'on ne peut prévoir lui empêchaient, M. de la Maisonfort prévient qu'il emploiera avec autant de confiance que de tranquillité M. Hermann, qui a été attaché au Roi, et que l'on a déjà chargé de missions délicates. Après lui M. de Coiffier, son ami. Il répond de l'un et de l'autre de ces deux messieurs comme de lui.

L'Empereur a déclaré à M. de la Maison-fort que s'il priait le Gouvernement Anglais de se charger des trois sommes pour Barras, Bottot, et David, il le chargeait de déclarer à Sa Majesté le Roi de France, qu'il se réservait de fournir à tout ce que serait nécessaire pour son voyage, et son entretien à l'armée, et aux premières sommes nécessaires au Général Pichégrou en rejoignant l'armée Française. Il a ajouté que, pour ce dernier objet, le Général Korsacow avait déjà ses ordres, et prendrait les sommes qu'il faudrait sur sa propre caisse.

remettre sur sa responsabilité un ou plusieurs passeports, s'il est possible, à la charge de n'en disposer que pour des renseignements importants, et des avertissements indispensables.

“Les ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale étant bien prévenus des difficultés qui naissent aux frontières, et du danger qui peut être attaché à un retard, sont priés d'y avoir égard.

“Sa Majesté l'Empereur ayant bien voulu dire à M. de la Maisonfort qu'elle regarderait l'échange des lettres patentes contre celle de Barras comme un gage suffisant, et un signe certain de l'existence du plan de restauration de la monarchie, on expédiera, du lieu même où cette lettre sera remise, un courrier qui apportera ce titre important.

“Le général Korsacow en sera en même temps instruit, ainsi que le Gouvernement Britannique. Aussitôt la communication faite à Sa Majesté Impériale, le Roi de France partira de Mittau sous le plus sévère incognito, et se rendra à l'armée du général Korsacow où il sera reconnu.

“Le général Pichégrou, ainsi qu'il en sera convenu plus particulièrement à Essen, se rendra soit à l'armée même du Général Korsacow, si elle est en présence de l'ennemi, soit, le plus près possible, de l'armée Française que Barras lui destinera; il y sera probablement avec quelques officiers sûrs, dont il aura fait choix, et une caisse militaire suffisante pour porter tout à coup l'abondance là où l'on aura eu le soin d'entretenir la disette.

“Les moyens de Barras étant à lui seule, on se contentera pour entretenir la confiance, et parler à la fois à Londres, à Pétersbourg,

à l'armée, de signes publics et officiels, tels que celui qui a été lieu pour *Badouville*. David Monnier, le général Pichégru, Fauche Borel, et M. de la Maisonfort conviendront à cet égard d'une suite des signes dont le vrai sens sera d'avance communiqué. Tels sont les principaux événements à prévoir, les principales précautions à prendre. On y ajoutera à Essen la rédaction des premières proclamations du Directeur, proclamations qui contiendront, le plus possible, les intentions du Roi, et tout ce qu'il peut avouer, sans cependant élaguer encore tout ce qu'il sera sage de conserver, afin de ne pas effaroucher d'abord toute une nation qui, par une secousse inattendue, retournera avec autant d'étonnement que de joie à la seule constitution qui puisse lui assurer et son repos et son bonheur."

Enclosure 2.

"Les derniers événements, quoique très inopinés, ont dus paroître naturels à ceux qui suivent avec attention le cours de la Révolution; ils ont pu être prévus par ceux surtout qui connoissent le personnel des hommes qui étoient à la tête du Gouvernement.

"Les Conseils étoient opprimés depuis 15 mois, toujours menacés par Merlin et Rewbel d'être renvoyés, et plus directement menacés depuis quelques tems; c'est alors qu'ils ont du chercher au Directoire un appui dans les hommes qui étoient en opposition avec la majorité; leur résolution étoit unanime, le danger étoit commun.

"Barras conservoit trop d'anciens ressentiments contre cette majorité pour ne pas saisir la première occasion de la détruire. Qu'on se rapelle l'ostracisme des nobles contre lequel il fut en opposition avec Merlin; les mécontentemens de Bonaparte qu'il partagea contre Rewbel; l'affaire de la Caisse du compte courant, dans laquelle il se trouva impliqué pour la soustraction d'une somme de 1,800,000f.; son éloignement alors du Directoire, et les menaces qui lui firent ses collègues de le dénoncer, on aura du motifs suffisants pour expliquer pourquoi Barras s'est déterminé à seconder les intentions des Conseils.

"Siéyès, pour qui l'ambassade de Berlin fut presque une disgrâce, comme celle de Stockholm pour La Marque, ne devoit pas

conserver beaucoup de bienveillance pour ceux qui l'avoient éloigné du Conseil où on le redoutoit, pour l'envoyer sur un point où il ne pouvait qu'être utile sans devenir trop dangereux.

“Voilà les causes réelles de cette dernière révolution ; les revers des armées, les dilapidations n'en ont été que les prétextes adroitement tirés des circonstances pour la colorer, et la populariser.

“Chaque parti co-opérant avoit son but particulier ; très-certainement Barras vouloit rester Directeur, et Directeur toujours puissant. Siéyès ne pouroit pas avoir d'autres idées. Se défaire d'hommes qui formoient contr'eux une majorité unie, voilà leur but unique.

“Dans les Conseils on étoit divisé sur le but. Les têtes ardentes, les Jacobins éfrénés, vouloient arriver à la révocation de la loi du 22 Floreal. Le renfort que ce parti en auroit reçu, lui auroit bientôt facilité les moyens de poursuivre d'autres projets, telles que la suspension de la constitution, du Directoire, le rétablissement de la terreur et de ses accessoires. Ce parti s'est à peine fait remarquer, comme pour vouloir sonder le terrain, mais ne jugeant pas le moment favorable pour mettre à découvert ses projets, il les a ajournés sans y renoncer.

“C'est dans ce parti qu'il y a le plus de tactique, d'obstination, et d'audace ; il dévorera les autres si on lui en donne le temps ; il finira par se dévorer lui-même.

“Au contraire la majorité vouloit seulement reserrer l'autorité du Directoire, et s'en approprier assez pour régner avec lui et à côté de lui. La commission du onze étoit dépositaire de ses projets, elle les a trop tôt annoncés ; c'est un tort qu'elle a eu, et cette indiscretion a perdu la majorité.

“Dès ce moment les Jacobins de première force, voyant leurs espérances déçues, ont reculés ; et le Directoire, voyant où l'on vouloit arriver, a sappé et miné de toutes manières le travail de la commission ; de-là les pamphlets, les journaux, les inquiétudes semées à Paris, aux Conseils, exprimées à la tribune et forçant la commission à demander elle-même sa démission.

“Ce premier succès du Jacobins et du Directoire sur la commission du onze, et sur la majorité des Conseils dont elle étoit l'organe, rend en ce moment problématique les résultats de cette révolution. Le Directoire, les Jacobins, et les Conseils en sont encore aux prises, ils s'observent, et se préparent dans le silence à se porter de nouveaux coups.

“Les Jacobins réussiront à renverser le Directoire, ou le Directoire opprimerà pour quelques temps les Jacobins par quelques grands coups d'autorité. L'alternative est inévitable ; mais dans cette lutte la majorité du Conseil ne sera que la troupe auxiliaire s'attachant au parti du vainqueur ; elle a perdu tous ses avantages, et elle ne peut se montrer en premier ligne.

“L'autorité du Directoire, déjà ébranlée, doit infailliblement succomber ; il est difficile qu'il n'y ait pas parmi ses membres quelque traître au profit du Jacobins, et en leur accordant l'unité d'intention, il est impossible qu'ils aient l'unité d'action contre

un parti dont ils ne sont pas également ennemis. Ces cinq hommes sont tous étrangers, les-uns aux autres ; tout oppose à ce qu'il s'établisse entr'eux une harmonie parfaite, dans ce moment surtout où tant de passions agissent autour d'eux.

“ *Moulin* étoit de tous les généraux le plus obscur. On a crû satisfaire les prétentions des militaires en l'appellant au Directoire, on n'a fait que les révolter par l'indignité du personnage. On a principalement mécontenté les généraux qui par leurs talens et leurs succès pouvoient avoir des droits à cette place. Ainsi *Moulin*, dès son avènement au Directoire, se trouve condamné à s'y abreuver d'une nullité humiliante, ou à chercher de la célébrité en donnant son appui aux Jacobins dont il fut toujours le partisan. Tout porte à croire qu'il embrassera ce parti, et pour l'y déterminer, on lui soufflera l'envie contre *Barras*, et toutes les passions qui caractérisent un homme violent et ignorant.

“ *Roger Ducos* étoit juge de paix dans son village ; il fut toujours nul, toujours insignifiant dans les crises où il s'est trouvé ; il étoit tout au plus propre à rester l'arbitre de quelques contestations domestiques, ou à venir remplir une place de figurant dans lieu des deux Conseils.

“ *Gohier* voudra singer *Merlin*, il le remplacera même à certain égard ; mais il y a encore loin de *Gohier* à un homme d'état, à un homme surtout tel qu'il le faudroit dans les circonstances pour lier un parti, et le diriger au profit du Gouvernement.

“ *Barras*, s'il étoit capable d'application, seroit celui de tous qui pourroit se conserver le plus d'influence. Ses profusions, ses rapports avec les militaires, l'accueil qu'il leur a toujours fait, une certaine tendance qu' a l'opinion publique vers lui, quelques traits de générosité, quelques services éclatans, lui donnent beaucoup de partisans. Il ne manque d'ailleurs ni de courage ni d'audace, et est bien là un homme d'exécution dans un parti, mais rien de plus. Les Jacobins lui élèveront un rival, un émule dans *Moulin*, et ses différences de caractères, d'habitudes, deviendront le principe des divisions qui doivent précipiter la ruine du Directoire.

“ *Siéyès* est encore plus déplacé là qu'un autre. S'il trouvoit dans le Directoire quatre aides bien fanatiques, bien dévoués, bien serviles, il feroit de la besogne, mais avec l'entourage qu'on lui a donné, il ne fera rien. Il est d'un caractère morose, presque insociable ; il est opiniâtre dans ses idées, incapable cependant de les défendre, pour les faire prévaloir, proposant son avis sans phrases et le retirant de même s'il n'est accueilli avec transport ; ne sachant jamais ce que c'est que de revenir à une opinion qui a échoué, dissimulant l'amour comme la haine. Le petit nombre qu'il entretient dans les Conseils le préconiseront vraiment et se feront ses échos. Ces petits moyens, bons pour mettre en jeu les passions dans une assemblée, ne réussiront jamais à enchaîner les Jacobins impatients d'arriver à leur but, ni à lui donner sur ses collègues l'influence dogmatique qu'il aime à exercer, et sans laquelle il n'est plus dans les affaires qu'un caustique hypocrite, et un censeur enveloppé de dissimulation.

“C’est donc contre ce Directoire dégradé dans l’opinion, sans influence sur l’armée, portant dans lui-même le germe de toutes les divisions, de toutes les rivalités, entourré d’embarras, toujours responsable des revers des armées, que les Jacobins dirrigent toutes leurs batteries. Dans ce moment ils le cernent, ils le circonviennent, ils l’animent et l’exaspèrent, pour obtenir à leurs Séides les premières places. Le Directoire hésite, mais il cède, et insensiblement toute son autorité s’échappe dans les mains de ses plus cruels ennemis.

“Leurs intrigues dans les Conseils ne sont ni moins adroites ni moins directes à leur but. Ils y travaillent sourdement à y créer une force d’inertie contre les volontés du Directoire, ils y propagent des soupçons sur ses intentions, ils murmurent que la dernière révolution a été comme étouffée par ses manœuvres afin de conserver la suprême puissance; ils osent prophétiser que la Dictature se relevera si de bonne heure on ne songe à fortifier les Conseils en y apellant les patriotes qui depuis longtems en ont été exclus; et en les rendant le foyer, le centre, et le levier de l’opinion publique.

“Les avantages qu’ils ont obtenus depuis quelques jours par cette *double* tactique sont incalculables. C’étoit pour eux un coup de parti de faire arriver au Corps Législatif le fameux Antonelle; ils ont réussi; voilà le général, le chef de leur armée; il n’étoit pas moins intéressant pour eux d’avoir dans l’administration centrale de Paris leur partisan, et encore sur ce point ils ont réussi au-delà leurs espérances. *Raisson, Le Blanc, Pottier*, tous trois impliqués dans le procès de Babœuf, tous trois partisans du bonheur commun de la république universelle d’Anakarsis Cloots, viennent d’être nommés administrateurs; et Chanlieu, le Chanlieu si terrible dans la Convention, arrêté par cette même Convention après la chute de Robespierre, est le commissaire près cette administration. Avec une telle organisation les Jacobins ont dans Paris leur armée toute prête, et pour cette fois l’autorité se trouve placée dans les mains de ceux qui doivent la dirriger, la commander. Ils ont arraché au Directoire le droit de faire arriver dans Paris des troupes, ainsi nul moyen de défense pour lui, tandis que ses ennemis ont contre lui la liberté de la presse, les sociétés populaires; ils ont contre lui ses propres divisions, la foiblesse de la majorité du Corps Législatif, et les revers des armées. Avec de tels moyens le succès est infaillible, le Directoire doit succomber, il est même douteux qu’il tente la résistance; il tombera par un dissolution volontaire pour ne pas tomber sous les coups des Jacobins.

“Le Directoire n’avoit qu’une seule ressource pour reprendre la supériorité; il a voulu la mettre à profit, et encore dans cette occasion il a échoué; c’est lorsqu’à la suite de la dissolution de la commission des onze, il a adressé aux Conseils un message sur la situation de la République; à ce message étoit annexé un mémoire rédigé par Threillard qu’on a lu en secret.

“Ce mémoire contenoit quelques vérités hardies sur la situation de la République; les détails les plus affligeants s’y trouvoient

sans ménagemens, la chute de la République s'y trouvoit comme prophétisée si les Conseils ne se hâtoient de fournir au Directoire les moyens de toute espèce pour déjouer la Coalition. Les mesures de l'emprunt, la levée en masse y étoient formellement indiquées. C'étoit à la fois un tocsin d'alarme, et la perspective du plus belles espérances si on avoit la bonté de s'en rapporter aux mesures sages et énergiques qu'avoit déjà médité le Directoire, et pour le succès des quelles il avoit besoin de toute la confiance des Conseils.

“La majorité des conseils, toujours facile à s'allarmer, eut probablement tombé dans le piège, et peut-être eut-elle remis au Directoire régénéré le soin de sauver la patrie. C'étoit ce que désiroit le Directoire; il n'avoit pas voulu attacher son nom au mémoire, parcequ'en pareil cas, si la démarche échoue, on sacrifie le ministre qui s'est mis en avant. C'est à quoi il se verra peut-être obligé dans très peu de temps; à la manière dont on attaque de toutes parts le ministre complaisant, il est douteux qu'il puisse se soutenir. Le Directoire, par cet essai, s'est même un peu décoloré aux yeux des Conseils, et en se montrant artificieux pour dissimuler ses vues, il a donné la mesure de sa foiblesse.

“Tel est en ce moment l'état actuel des choses en France. Il faut une crise pour que le Directoire puisse dessiner sa véritable physionomie. Les symptômes de cette crise se multiplient, mais toutes les probabilités du succès sont contre le Directoire. S'il parvient à gagner du temps, ce sera au dépens de son autorité; mais alors il voguera dans une mer d'incertitudes, il marchera à sa chute, il sera un gouvernement foible et sans force, il descendra lentement dans l'abyme que creusent sous ses pas les Jacobins.

“Que deviendra le République au milieu de tout de crises? Cette question exigeroit trop de développement pour la traiter aujourd'hui.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 24. Harley Street.—“Permettez moi de vous faire ressouvenir sur l'expédition du courier à Monsieur Wickham. Vous avez vue ses justes inquiétudes, et de tous les bien-intentionnés de la Suisse qu'il est utile de rassurer. Vous avez de quoi le faire en lui envoyant ce que l'Empereur a écrit au Général Korssakoff, qui, d'ailleurs, serat prêt alors d'entrer dans ce pays-là. Je profiterois de cette occasion pour écrire à ce général de se concerter en tout avec M. Wickham, et d'avoir aussi confiance dans l'Avoyer Steiguer, car on n'aura pas manqué, sans doute, à son passage par les états de la maison d'Autriche d'apporter de gens pour lui donner des fausse notions sur le pays où il vat. Je vous prie aussi d'envoyer à Monsieur Wickham, par la même occasion, les papiers relatifs à la France qui m'ont été envoyé de Petersbourg, et dont vous avez pris copie pour cet efet. C'est aussi au General Korssakoff que ces affaires sont confié, et je lui

écrirai qu'il ne fasse rien sans consulter votre digne ministre en Suisse. Au lieu de partir jeudi, je ne partirai que samedi. En attendant, je vous supplie de me faire savoir quand vous expédiez ce courier."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 24. London.—This very moment I received the enclosed letter from the Prince of Orange, which I think it material to communicate to you without loss of time. When you have made use of it, I shall be much obliged to you to let me have a copy of it, or to send back to me the original, as I have neither time nor assistance to procure one myself. If your Lordship would write to me something ostensible in answer to this communication I think it would be very useful.

Enclosure.

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE to H. FAGEL.

1799, July 24. Hampton Court.—Ayant réfléchi sur ce que vous m'avez communiqué hier, je crois de mon devoir de suggérer quelques considérations, que je soumets comme de raison au jugement éclairé du Gouvernement de ce pays, qui, voyant l'ensemble du tableau, peuvent mieux juger que moi qui ne vois que ce qui m'en est communiqué. Je dois observer que si la descente du corps commandé par le General Abercromby réussit, il sera, je crains, impossible d'empêcher une explosion de la part des amis de la bonne cause, et de prévenir que, dans les endroits où les François ne sont pas en force, les garnisons qui s'y trouvent ne soient désarmées, faites prisonniers, et peut-être massacrées. Si ceci pouvoit être soutenu tout de suite par une force majeure, ce mouvement pourroit servir la bonne cause; mais si ceci ne peut être soutenu d'abord, je crains que les François ne reviennent en force dans des endroits qui se seront déclarés, et qu'ils y mettront tout à feu et à sang, déclarant rebelles ceux qui s'insurgeront contre le gouvernement actuel et les François. Je désirerois beaucoup que ceci put être prévenu, mais je n'y verrois d'autre moyen que de différer le départ du corps commandé par le Général Abercrombie jusqu'à ce que les forces destinées à soutenir cette expédition, quant elle auroit réussi à s'emparer de la Brille et Hellevootsluys, pussent être prêtes à mettre à la voile d'ici au moment où ces places seroient prises. Peut-être y a-t-il des raisons majeures que obligent à faire partir plustot le corps commandé par le Général Abercrombie, et de ne pas retarder cette expédition; les ignorant, je ne puis pas dire à ce sujet, et ce que je dis n'est que dans la supposition que l'on peut retarder ce départ sans des inconvénients d'une importance majeure. Je dirai encore deux raisons que me font désirer que ce corps, que peut être considéré comme l'avant-garde du corps qui suivra, ne partit qu'à l'époque où, en supposant un heureux succès des sièges qu'il doit faire, et où les villes se rendroient en moins de huit jours, le

corps d'armée put s'embarquer et partir avec le premier vent favorable après l'arrivée de la nouvelle de la prise de ces places ; l'une est que je crains que si, après la prise de la Brille et de Hellevoetsluis, il y ayt une stagnation d'opérations de quelque durée, les amis de la bonne cause se croiront abandonnés et sacrifiés, et que par là leur zèle sera refroidi, et même que cela pourroit en engager une partie à se joindre au parti du Gouvernement actuel et des François ; et l'autre, c'est que souvent dans l'arrière saison les garnisons de ces places sont sujettes aux mêmes maladies que les garnisons de la Zeelande, ou de la Flandre Hollandoise, et qu'il y a des années où ces maladies sont fort meurtrières, surtout pour des troupes qui ne sont point accoutumées à ce climat. La ville de la Brille a toujours été très zélée pour le bon parti. J'espère que l'on l'épargnera autant que possible, et s'il est faisable, qu'elle ne sera pas bombardée, ce que feroit la ruine d'un nombre d'habitans qui ont toujours montré leur zèle pour la bonne cause. Je recommande les habitans de cette ville à la clémence des vainqueurs quant la ville sera prise. En général les habitans du plat pays de l'isle de Voorne et les habitans de Hellevoetsluis ont été aussi bien-intentionnés. J'ai cru de mon devoir de vous suppléer ces remarques, et de vous prier d'en faire l'usage que vous croirez le plus convenable.

“J'ai écrit à mon fils que je me référois à ce que vous écriviez à votre frère, touchant certain marin dont le nom ne lui étoit pas inconnu ; et qu'il falloit qu'il agisse, et ne se contentât pas de donner des paroles, puisque l'on ne pourroit sans cela avoir égard à sa façon de penser, ne pouvant lire dans les cœurs.”

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 24. Jermyn Street.—“I hope your lordship will excuse the delay in returning the enclosed, as well as the rough and imperfect observations on it.”

Enclosure.

Note on combined military operations against France.

“If the general principles on which the present war should be carried on, and terminated, were fixed, it would be less difficult to fix the plan of the operations of the different armies. As affairs now stand, the armies of Switzerland and of Italy have had the most brilliant and solid success. The accession of General Korsakow's corps seems to promise a continuance of it. A large extent of French frontier has been nearly laid open on her weakest side. The temptation to invade her, and to try the real disposition of the bulk of the inhabitants, is great. Should the Archduke withdraw from the present scene of action, the consequences on different points of view might be untoward ; at best, the capture of Mayence could not counterbalance the weakening of the Russians, and it may be suspected that the Austrians in Italy may choose to remain on the defensive. The

whole weight of the campaign may thus fall on the Russians, only supported by the Swiss and the Wirtembergers who never were reckoned good soldiers. Austria certainly is in a situation to afford a corps of observation to watch Mayence, and to act between the left of the Archduke's army and the line of demarcation. Should the King of Prussia be induced to take an active part on Lower Rhine and the frontiers of Holland, the attention of the French would be so engaged that the corps of observation before Mayence might be augmented, and the siege of it formed. If the Archduke shall persist in separating from the Russians, and shall undertake the siege of Mayence, and if the King of Prussia shall remain neuter, France, in that event, will be enabled effectually to assist Holland, and the issue of the present campaign may become more doubtful."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, July 25. Dropmore.—"I cannot let this messenger go without a few lines to you, though my official correspondence which passes through Berlin will have exhausted all my speculations. I trust you will still get us the Berlin declaration notwithstanding the difficulties we have been obliged to interpose; and I am confirmed in this hope by a very long conversation which I underwent yesterday with De Luc. If he has rightly reported what Haugwitz has said to him, our plan would exactly coincide with that of Berlin. But I too well know that between Haugwitz's language and the actions of his Court the conformity is not always very exact.

"The *Sun* will tell you all I could about Lord Keith. It is an anxious interval now till we get some more certain account, but I trust it will be a short one, and I am full of good hope.

"You will see what I have written to Lord Minto. Our whole plan depends on making the Emperor of Russia insist resolutely on keeping the Archduke and his army in Alsace or Franche Comté. I hope I have said enough to Whitworth on this point, but still it may be useful that you should again urge it, as it may strike his imagination more when stated separately, than when involved in all the other things I have to say to him." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1799, July 26. Dropmore.—"My anxiety not to delay this messenger makes me confine this letter to a mere acknowledgment of your private letter of the 9th from Cuxhaven.

"The points you there mention shall be properly attended to, but the most important of them, that of the blockade of the ports, will I trust soon be superseded by the effect of our expedition. I shall wait with much impatience for your first account of Thugut's language, and of the impression which our preparations, and their obvious direction may make on his mind. The imperfect accounts from the fleet, which you will see in the papers, leave us in a state of much anxiety, but of no fear. Any considerable success would be invaluable just now." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 27. Berlin.—“You will have seen by my public despatch that I have spoken my mind pretty plainly at our conference here. Count Panin is already returned to Carlsbad, and I trust that the humiliating step of a letter from the King of Prussia to the Emperor may prevent the only great evil which this little and disgraceful business could have produced; it has been intimated to me that a similar letter would be sent to me for the King, but I shall not take any step to obtain it, though I will not refuse myself to it if it be offered. Count Haugwiz yesterday dined alone with Baron Kinkel, and made to him a long narrative of this transaction, with every possible appearance of shame and regret. He maintains that he has been himself fair and open in all this business, and that he had not the least suspicion of the King's retracting until two days before Count Panin's arrival here; he says that it was a letter from Sandoz to the King which has produced this unworthy retraction; that when the King announced this, and Haugwiz found himself unable to change this decision, he had represented to the King the disgraceful situation in which he himself was placed, as with respect to Count Panin and to myself, by this change of measures, and the impossibility of his continuing in office under such circumstances; then comes a long description of the King's importunity to him to remain, and his own apprehension that, if he retired, the government would grow to be more French; then again a new fit of shame, and a pressing entreaty to the King to give him two months' leave of absence rather than condemn him to the wretched figure which he was to make here with his treaty and his conference; but then again repeated and earnest solicitations from his master, and his own zeal for *la bonne cause* prevailed over his personal feelings, and he was at last persuaded to make himself the martyr of his royal master's most unprincely hopes of escaping from the dangers of rupture with France by trusting to the fair promises of the Ambassador Sandoz and the Director Syéès. I have much reason to believe that, with some exaggeration, this is the real state of the business. In truth, Count Haugwiz could not flatter himself that, by the hopes which he gave, he could influence our measures, for I had frequently and frankly told him that I would never advise a moment's reliance in England upon Prussian expectations until the King of Prussia should be at war with France; he could not mean to gain time, for he would better have succeeded in that object by protracting a correspondence with Panin, than by sending hastily for him from Carlsbad, and bringing the matter thus immediately to issue. The truth is then pretty much what he has confessed to Kinkel; *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*.

“Since I wrote to you my last private letter, I am not quite so well satisfied with my remaining here as I then was; I mean upon public grounds, for I do not allow myself

to think of any others ; but upon public grounds, I have great doubts both of the propriety and the advantage of my remaining here. The declared object of my mission here was for military concert with Prussia, and that is now completely at an end, nor is it easy for me to stay here without seeming to court more from Berlin than in the present circumstances I would even have the appearance of doing ; another objection to my staying is that it makes a stronger contrast between the conduct of Great Britain and Russia than it is prudent or advantageous to shew, particularly with the quick and captious disposition of the Emperor. Under these circumstances my advice to you would be to let me take a civil leave of the King of Prussia for the present, by declaring that the negotiation with Paris has made the object of my mission here no longer practicable or desirable. If this is approved of, I should still then have it in my power to give you what assistance I could in my communications with the Hereditary Prince of Orange, whose disposition to put confidence in me may perhaps, in the present moment, be an object of some little importance. If in England you so consider it, you would do well, I should apprehend, to give me immediate permission either to accompany the Prince, or to go wherever my presence could make me most useful to your present expedition and to the great objects which it is intended to promote ; but you will observe that, to make this arrangement of any use, it must be speedily done, and I must speedily hear of it. In that case if I can return to you before the winter by Helvoetsluys, I shall not grudge my absence from you, although I shall not upon any account wish to prolong it beyond the first struggle for Holland, if indeed there will be any struggle whatever.

“With respect to your difficulties concerning your future Minister at Berlin, I have already said all that I was obliged to say to you concerning it ; but I cannot help adding that I see so much reason for you to be satisfied with Mr. Garlike’s knowledge of the Court and of the Ministers here, he has so much good sense, prudence, and intelligence, that I cannot help very strongly recommending to you rather to avail yourself entirely of him, than to run the risk of any new appointment which may at such a critical time be inconvenient ; he now acts as *chargé d’affaires*, and therefore my going and his staying would make no new sensation ; his talents and temper and the estimation in which he is held will doubtless already have recommended him to you, and my own knowledge of him will well enable me to add all which my testimony can add upon his subject.

“The Prince of Orange, when I last saw him, was determined to go on the 29th to Lingen, near Emerick, and if your expedition holds good for the first days of August, he hopes very shortly to find himself again in his native country. I take for granted that you will understand what I have said respecting a more quick and universal effect from your first body of 10,000 men, to depend entirely upon the best information which we can obtain from the

country; your military plan will doubtless not be much varied on this account, and Sir Ralph Abercrombie is too good a general to depend upon such uncertain grounds; I conclude, therefore, that he will not and ought not to expose his troops to any unnecessary risk upon this information. My chief object in it is, first, to shew you how entirely our friends despair of restraining the country till your second division arrives; and secondly, to prepare you for the possibility of complete success by your first division, in order to lead you to be ready to strengthen that one attack as soon as possible, if Abercrombie should find the situation of the country promising enough not to lock himself entirely up in Goree; but whatever he may ultimately think wise to do, I am sure you will agree with me in thinking that this new Prussian negotiation is a strong motive for not delaying one hour to make some landing upon the coast, and to be in arms in the United Provinces before the new treaty of amity which is sent to Paris shall have been ratified, and carried into execution. I grudge every moment that I am waiting for a messenger to send this letter, although I expressed the same opinion so strongly in my last that I need not fear that this reflection should escape you.

"I agree entirely in your interpretation of Thugut's views respecting the Netherlands. I share with you likewise in your judgment of the embarrassment which arises from them. If there could have been any doubt after Eden's despatch respecting the intention at Vienna of resuming there the sovereignty of the Low Countries, General Starray's proclamation of the 1st July puts it out of all doubt; and yet I am persuaded they renew their claim at Vienna more for the sake of bringing it to market, than from any real desire or intention of retaking it or of defending it when retaken. My objection to your project of nominal sovereignty is, that it will not secure to the Netherlands the certainty of Austrian protection; if the real sovereignty is not enough valued at Vienna to make this possession eligible to them, I do not see how a nominal sovereignty, with a rent-charge upon the country, could better engage their activity and interest in the defence of the country; besides which it seems to me very doubtful whether, with the nominal sovereignty vested in Austria, the authority of Holland or any other country could effectually be maintained there. I still incline to think that every reasonable plan should be pursued first to engage Austria to feel interested in heartily setting to work for the restoration of the Netherlands to the sovereignty of Austria; and that, not by abandoning the attack on France to retake Mayence, but by agreeing with Great Britain for complete military co-operation in the war, and accepting the guaranty of Great Britain for the Netherlands, as you have proposed. I own I have more difficulty in believing that Austria will do this thoroughly, than I have apprehension from Prussia if it were done; Prussia no doubt would like the scramble for the Netherlands better than their return to Austria, but still I do not teach myself to believe that they would even make a military demonstration upon that subject, still less do I

think that they would step out of their neutrality for it; if however (as I much apprehend) Austria will give us no solid security for the protection of the Netherlands, but means to buy by their surrender a supposed right to strip the King of Sardinia or the Elector of Bavaria, or both, then I think you must resist that, by endeavouring to hold back from Austria until she shall consent to consolidate the Low Countries with Holland, an arrangement to which I have no doubt that you may obtain the guaranty of Prussia. As to the immediate object of Vienna to resume the siege of Mayence, I do heartily hope that you will stoutly refuse it; and I cannot help considering that measure as being completely within your reach, by keeping them (from the fear of losing their Russian co-operation in Switzerland) to the execution of the plan which they had accepted; the only fair plea which Austria can have for changing this plan into the siege of Mayence would be that the possession of Mayence is an object to all the states of the Empire who are summoned to pay their contingent, but it is time enough to talk of that when they have furnished their contingents, which certainly as yet they have not done.

“Meanwhile the Prince of Orange is impatient to know your arrangements for furnishing arms and assistance to the insurgents in Flanders, because he wishes to send some Dutch officers into Bois-le-Duc, and I do not like to enter into any new establishments there which may cross in upon the plan of organization which you announce to me. I hope again to see the Prince before his departure, for I cannot quite satisfy myself against the danger of his presence near the frontier contributing prematurely to hasten the explosion in the interior. I mean again to recommend to him to avoid fixing upon any one quarter, and I have earnestly pressed Mr. James Fagel, who accompanies him, to pay the greatest possible attention to guard against this evil, which is, in truth, the only one that can be of fatal prejudice to us. I enclose in this letter the sketch of a proclamation which Mr. Fagel and the Prince have prepared for any moment at which it may be useful; they both insist strongly upon the exception of the five individuals who are named; but they have agreed with me in the necessity of changing the form of that sentence, so as to make the exception bear only upon the names, and not rest upon a description which may give alarm to others.

“I enclose to you my letter to Sir Charles Whitworth, the proclamation of Staray to the *Belges*, and a short letter to me from Stamford upon your last plan of attack.” 2 *Enclosures*.

Enclosure 1.

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, July 24. Berlin.—“On the 21st instant I received your letters by Courvoisier, and I forwarded them by him to London from hence on the same day. This morning I have received despatches for you and Captain Popham by Mason, and I am anxious not to lose any time in sending him on to you, which

circumstance will prevent me from writing to you as much at length as I should otherwise have done respecting the strange turn which the negotiation here has very suddenly taken. Count Panin, however, will write very much in detail by his own courier, and I have to request very earnestly that you would not speak of the contents of this letter before that of Count Panin shall have reached Petersburg. We had for some time been advancing in our hopes of inducing Prussia to join the concert of measures so happily established between London and Petersburg; the conversation of the public as well as that of the Ministers had latterly very much favoured that expectation; in truth although I have known the extreme reluctance of the King to engage in hostile measures, and although you will have observed that I have never expressed any confidence in our prospects here, I had begun to have good hopes, for I had succeeded in obtaining that Count Haugwitz should draw up the sketch of a treaty for the co-operation of Prussia, in which the King engaged to act as soon as the Russian troops offered by the Emperor should have passed the limits of Franconia; this sketch was shewn to the King of Prussia and was approved by him; upon this fair prospect the Prussian Ministers invited Count Panin to return and to conclude the treaty, and I did not fail to state to him the new and promising expectations which had arisen. Count Panin would have had much less zeal and activity than you know in him if he had refused himself to these invitations, which included in them, as you see, everything short of absolute certainty; he came here and we assembled as we thought to discuss and to complete our treaty; you will easily imagine what was our surprise when, instead of the project of our treaty, we found ourselves informed by the Prussian Ministers that His Prussian Majesty had from new circumstances conceived good hopes of obtaining the evacuation of the United Provinces, and the re-establishment of the Stadtholder, without engaging in hostilities; that his intention therefore was to try to obtain this by negotiation with France before he concluded his engagement with the allied Courts for the deliverance of Holland. The immediate answer of Count Panin and of myself was to disclaim on the part of our Courts all share or interest in a measure so weak and so disgraceful; and, in protesting against this measure, we expressed in the strongest terms our sense of the dissatisfaction and astonishment which this intelligence would produce at London and at Petersburg. In addition to this Count Panin leaves Berlin to-morrow, and has asked an audience of the King before his journey, under the impression that H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty] may perhaps not allow him to return to Berlin. If I had not some apprehensions of the bad consequences which may arise from the disgust which this will produce at Petersburg, I should see in it nothing but the shame and disgrace which attaches upon the wretched politics of this feeble and irresolute Government; we have nothing to fear from this paltry and timid policy except the sudden resentment which it may produce in the mind of the Emperor; let Prussia do what it may, the deliverance of Holland

will be effected by the vigour and activity of H[is] M[ajesty's] and H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty's] councils. We have never relied upon any advantage in the assistance of Prussia, we shall have nothing to fear either from its neutrality or from its negotiation, we have but to go forward and we shall scarcely perceive the existence of Prussia in this great scene of splendid and active exertion; and I have the satisfaction of having uniformly assured Count Haugwiz that, in our best and worst hopes of Prussia, we continued steadily to pursue the same course for ourselves, whatever might be the ultimate determination of Berlin. This view of the subject will, I hope and trust, be the only one which will prevail at Petersburg; the proper and just reproach to Prussia will be sufficiently made in the success of the combined armies in Holland, while the Ministers here are still hesitating in the timid and fluctuating fancies of the King and of Köcheritz. The only real mischief which could arise would be that of a very serious rupture between Russia and Prussia, which would indeed be to play the game of the enemy and to give them the only possible hope of safety which now seems left to them. I have said rather more on this subject than my haste should have allowed me, because I know the importance of it, and because I know, too, how much assistance your influence can give in shewing this matter in the light in which, you will agree with me that, it ought wisely to be considered. It is the shame and disgrace of Prussia, but let it not be the loss of the allies, and, in new wars, the triumph of the French Directory." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, July 26. Berlin.—“Plus je médite le plan d'attaque sur la Hollande qui a été arrêté en dernier lieu à Londres, et plus je trouve qu'il écarte une multitude d'inconvéniens inséparables de tout autre projet qu'on voudroit lui substituer. Ce n'est pas qu'il soit tout à fait exempt de difficultés, mais le point de perfection se trouve là où elles sont en moindre quantité. Voici celles que j'y trouve.

“Je suis de l'opinion de ceux qui se persuadent que, dès qu'un corps de troupes étrangères qu'on saura destiné à délivrer le país de ses oppresseurs, se sera montré sur un point quelconque de la Hollande, l'insurrection de la part des habitans, pour accélérer cette délivrance, ne pourra plus être retenue, et qu'elle éclatera, si ce n'est dans toutes les provinces à la fois, du moins dans les contrées les plus voisines de ce point. Voilà donc un événement auquel on devra être préparé; je dirai même, que j'augurerois mal des dispositions tant vantées des habitans, s'il n'avoit pas lieu. Un autre point auquel nous devons également nous attendre, c'est que les insurgés du bon parti éprouveront indubitablement de la part de ceux du mauvais, tant dans les bourgeoisies des villes que dans l'armée, une résistance et une opposition dont on ne sauroit d'avance calculer les effets. Il en naîtra que partout où la lutte ne sera pas en faveur des premiers,

ceux-ci demanderont des secours de la part des troupes du débarquement, qu'il sera peut-être aussi dangereux de leur refuser que de leur accorder, puisque par un refus on courra risque de décourager le bon parti, et que, d'un autre côté, le général commandant le débarquement, s'il n'a pas d'abord assez de troupes pour s'avancer dans le païs, trouvera risquant de s'affaiblir par des détachemens, et jugera convenable de se tenir concentré avec ses forces, en attendant qu'il lui en arrive de nouvelles. Il résulte de là que si les machinations de la Cour de Berlin, qui ne sont guères douteuses, exigent qu'on procède aux descentes projetées avec le plus de célérité et de promptitude possibles, il est tout aussi indispensable qu'on laisse écouler le moins de tems possible entre le premier débarquement et les subséquens. Il est un autre point encore que je regarderois, s'il pouvoit être obtenu, comme pouvant essentiellement contribuer au succès de toute l'expédition; c'est celui où la descente dans l'île d'Ameland et la descente principale pourroient être effectuées en même tems, ou du moins, à des époques fort rapprochées l'une de l'autre. Il naitroit de là, à ce que je m'imagine, une diversion très embarrassante pour l'ennemi, qui ne sauroit où porter la majeure partie de ses forces; la descente dans l'île d'Ameland mettroit probablement les armes à la main à tout ce qui est du bon parti dans la Frise et la Groningue; et si l'on peut soupçonner que les Prussiens méditent de jeter des troupes dans ces deux provinces, et dans l'Overyssel et la Gueldre, ce projet tomberoit tout aussitôt, puisque ce seroit entrer en guerre contre les puissances alliées que de vouloir porter des troupes dans un païs où elles seroient entrées les armes à la main. Pardonnez moi ces réflexions, qui, si elles portent sur des objets auxquels il n'est plus tems de rien changer, vous prouveront du moins qu'ils font constamment le sujet de mes méditations. Au reste, plus je considère l'état actuel des choses, et plus je me sens fondé à espérer qu'avec l'assistance du ciel nous triompherons des difficultés qui nous restent à vaincre. Toute entreprise a les siennes; accorder au hazard le moins que l'on peut, mais ne pas tout lui refuser, c'est, je crois, tout ce que la prévoyance humaine peut faire." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Secret.

1799, July 27. Dropmore.—“ I think it right to send the enclosed for your consideration, and Pitt's, before I answer it, though its arguments have not made the slightest impression on me. If they are good for anything it is only to hasten the sailing of our reinforcements as soon as possible after the first division is landed. And on that point I believe you are both as anxious as I am.

“ The more I think over the subject of the Netherlands the more I am persuaded that the only right suggestion is that which the King made to me on Wednesday, that we should make our force sufficient to be quite certain (at least as much so as the

thing will admit) of occupying that whole country ourselves before the winter. It is only in that way that we can put ourselves in a situation to talk to Vienna in the only style which ever succeeds in making them hear reason.

"If we ultimately decide upon giving those provinces back to Austria, it should, I think, only be in consideration of co-operation afforded (not promised) for the attack on France. For, if instead of this we give them into the hands of Austria during the war, suppose at the close of this campaign, we have then put the whole game out of our own hands, and we have no other tie on the Austrians to make them persevere in the war but honour and gratitude, neither of which they rate very high, or the general interests of Europe, which they consider still less.

"Giving them back to Austria we have still very material interests to stipulate for. We were always looked to as the guarantees of the constitution of those provinces, which we put into the hands of the German branch of the house of Austria under an express engagement that those constitutions should be secured to them.

"We were also guarantees of the barrier treaty, by which the defence of the Dutch frontier was protected; the strong places of the Netherlands being to be maintained in a state of defence, and the garrisons being to be composed wholly or in part of Dutch troops.

"All these stipulations the Emperor Joseph, the first Jacobin of his time, violated in the most insolent manner during the American war, and during the state of weakness that followed here after the peace.

"We may forget the insult, but the interests remain the same, and must be provided for either by a renewal of the same engagements, or by some other mode, before we can consider Holland as secure. I collect from De Luc's conversation that Prussia has some idea of extending the Dutch frontier on the side of the Netherlands, without wishing to decide just now on the final settlement of the rest of that country. And this proposal does, for the reasons I have already stated to you, seem to me to be highly advantageous to us.

"I mention all these ideas to you thus early because you see that, if they are just, they lead: (1) to as great an augmentation as can be made of our present force destined to act on that side; and (2) to the certainty that we shall not find ourselves at liberty, without great reinforcements, to detach in the spring any considerable force to the Somme or the Seine.

"Be so good as to return me the Prince's letter. Let me know what you have determined about Lisbon, that I may write accordingly. My opinion remains the same. In the present circumstances I would not leave them one man, British or foreign." *Copy.*

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 28. Duke Street, Westminster.—"The Prince has sent me to-night his proclamation signed and sealed. I lose no

time in sending you a literal translation of the original, which is in Dutch. I have hardly had time to look it over, and I am afraid it is very bad English. However, that is of little importance, if it only conveys to you the sense of the original. I have endeavoured to give to this a Dutch turn, and to employ that sort of stile which I know well will best suit the generality of the people in Holland. The Prince has adopted my ideas, and made but few alterations in the draft I sent him. I am aware that this paper in the English dress I have given it makes but a very indifferent appearance, but the translation is exact; the ideas are faithfully expressed; and as to the original it is that sort of stile to which the people are accustomed, and which will make most impression on their minds.

"The Prince very much wishes to send a copy of this address and of Sir Ralph Abercromby's proclamation to the Hereditary Prince; and it is certainly absolutely necessary that this should be done as soon as possible, in order to prevent that any publication or proclamation should issue from that quarter not entirely conformable to these two. Your Lordship will therefore perhaps think it right to send a messenger to Berlin the day after to-morrow; and if you should approve of this idea, I beg you would have the goodness to let me know it as soon as possible, that I may inform the Prince and Princess, who will take that opportunity to write to their son. The Prince very much objects to give to Count Rhoon the powers he asks for. I have not time to-night to enter farther into this subject. The first time I have the pleasure of seeing your Lordship I hope to be able to do so. If you approve of the Prince's address I shall immediately prepare a fair copy of it, that it may be in readiness to be printed whenever you shall think proper. If the English is to be printed also, it will be absolutely necessary that my translation which was only made for you, should be revised."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 29. London,—I send you an extract of a letter of the Prince of Orange on the subject of M. de Rhoon's letter, and also an extract of a letter from Emerick.

[Enclosure.]

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE to H. FAGEL.

1799, July 27. Hampton Court.—Quant à la lettre de M. de Rhoon je dois dire que je ne puis donner un acte tel que celui qu'il demande. Les circonstances de ce temps-ci et celles de celui où nous étions en 1794, ne se ressemblent en rien. M. de Rhoon n'a jamais été commandant-général de toutes les bourgeoisies armées, bien moins de troupes de l'état; mais il étoit question de lever dans ces temps-là un corps sous le nom de *Landzaaten*, qui devoient être une espèce de corps de *fencibles*, qui n'étoient engagés à servir que dans l'intérieur de la République, et ne pouvoient marcher hors du

territoire sans leur consentement volontaire; ce corps devoit être payé par des souscriptions volontaires, ne regardoit qu'unique-ment la province d'Hollande, et ne devoit subsister que peu de mois. M. de Rhoon n'a pas été seul chargé de cette besogne, mais j'avois nommé une commission de quelques membres de la Régence et Pensionnaires de villes, avec le général-major Charles Bentinck adjutant de mon fils, pour faire les arrangemens nécessaires pour ce corps; et M. de Rhoon étoit, en effet, le président de cette commission, et n'étant pas bien avec quelques-uns de ces messieurs, je crois qu'il a cessé de se mêler de ce corps quelque temps avant son départ. Ce corps a toujours été fort foible. Je crois que, dans les derniers huit ou quinze jours avant mon départ, on a voulu lever en masse les habitans de la province d'Hollande, et qu'alors M. de Rhoon a eu un acte pareil. Mais il n'a jamais regardé que la seule province d'Hollande, et n'a jamais concerné les autres provinces, et n'a jamais eu aucun effet. Je crois qu'un pareil acte pourroit croiser les mesures que mon fils pourroit prendre, et qu'il ne seroit pas prudent de le donner, et je me propose de l'écrire à M. de Rhoon et de lui dire mes raisons, et je suis assuré qu'il est trop raisonnable pour insister de l'obtenir, puisqu'au lieu de faire du bien il ne pourroit faire que du mal. Le corps qu'il s'agissoit de lever sous la direction de M. de Rhoon étoit indépendant de l'armée et des bourgeoisies, et seulement des volontaires; et, à présent, pareille autorisation seroit le commandement général de la force armée, et, en effet, le faire Lieutenant Capitaine-Général ou Commandant en chef de la force armée. Je crois que l'on ne peut me conseiller de créer un pareil poste, surtout sans stipuler que ce n'est qu'une autorisation provisionnelle et révocable.

Du 28.—Je crois que vous jugerez comme moi qu'il est impossible que je donne à M. de Rhoon pareil acte, et que l'on ne pourroit jamais aller plus loin que de lui donner un acte provisionnel pour organiser des corps de citoyens qui voudroient offrir leurs services dans la province d'Hollande, bornant uniquement son autorisation à cette province. Mais je crois que le mieux seroit de ne pas lui donner un pareil acte, et de lui faire une réponse polie mais déclinatoire.

Enclosure 2.

M. d'IVOY to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, July 17. Emmerick.—“Je suis enfin parvenu à établir une correspondance directe avec le chef des insurgés dans la Campine, ci-joint se trouve son mémoire. On s'occupera de l'organisation d'un comité semblable à celui dont il est question dans le mémoire pour le Luxembourg.

“On désirerait qu'un officier Hollandois peut être nommé, afin de concerter tous les plans et se mettre en relation avec les chefs; en conséquence, nous sommes convenus qu'on admettroit à cet effet que ceux qui seroient munis d'un certificat tel qu'il a été concerté entre nous. Il paroît que le plan sera généralement goûté des insurgés, et il importeroit, en conséquence, d'en donner

connoissance aux chefs, toutefois avec des ménagemens. Relativement au plan d'union en question, il importeroit de connaître quelles sont les projets au sujet du pays de Liège, surtout ce qui a rapport au conflit de juridiction avec Maestricht qu'il est essentiel de conserver. Il est de la dernière nécessité qu'on s'attache les jeunes Belges sortis du pays, qu'on les assiste, qu'on les sonde relativement à la maison d'Autriche afin de pouvoir les employer lorsque la révolution sera mure." *Extrait.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 29. Berlin.—“As Bassett will still equally arrive in time for Thursday's packet, if he leaves this place before this evening, I do not grudge the delay of a few hours which will make no difference in his arrival at Yarmouth. Yet I have little to say to you after the unreasonable length of my last letters which I despatched early yesterday morning. I have had no communication with Count Haugwiz, nor do I see that any is likely to arise; and I am the more satisfied of the necessity of my having immediate discretionary leave of absence and return, the more I consider the subject. I have explained to you that I do not want to slip my neck out of the first risk of Dutch difficulties; on the contrary, my first and great object here having been the deliverance of Holland, I do not think my task is completed till that is done, and I consider my return by Helvoetsluys as, what we used to call in arithmetic, the proof of the sum. I can conceive no solid reason why you should wish my residence here in the present state of affairs; if you have any apprehension of inconvenience from Paget's arrival here, that may, as I think, be much better deferred, and the ordinary course may with much greater advantage be carried on with Mr. Garlike's assistance, which I am taught, by what I hear of the one and observe of the other, to consider as much the most desirable arrangement in the present moment. It is likewise possible that you may have a hankering inclination to see me discuss with Berlin whatever is to be discussed in the case of our military occupation of Holland, or of their peaceable negotiation for it; to this I can only say that if it drags on into length, it is out of my contract, and may be done by Garlike, or if it was of early question I might still do it on my road and in my way to Helvoetsluys; and whenever I can embark from thence I feel myself embarking in triumph, though it is the triumph of your alacrity and energy in England, rather than of any which I can boast of at Berlin.

“The Hereditary Prince of Orange has seen Count Haugwiz, after he had obtained his military leave of absence from the King; the Minister told him that they had sent their proposition from hence to Paris on the 23rd instant (the day of our formal conference), and that he expected his answer on the 11th of August, but he spoke as if three weeks more were likely to pass before the Prussian troops could, in any event, march into the country; if

this calculation be just and be not thrown out to deceive us, and if you adhere to your first week of August, as I earnestly hope and trust you will, all will succeed to our wish, and Prussia will be obliged to come into our arrangements for Holland instead of proposing theirs to us. Since I last wrote to you, I have found that the two Fagels are not as well satisfied as I have been of the H[ereditary] P[rince] being entirely cured of his *Prussomanie*; they have certainly more opportunities than I have of judging the Prince's real inclinations, and their opinion naturally leads me in some respect to distrust my own; but still I cannot help repeating that, although I see in him a very laudable ambition of working out the independence as well as the deliverance of his country, I do not see any traces of his wishing for Prussian connection in preference to English, and I cannot blame him for entertaining the desire, however impracticable, of not depending absolutely on either country. Meantime, I cannot suspect him of any shabby management with them here, because he not only enters heartily into all English discussions with me, but he really seeks to direct his conduct by my opinion, and is anxious that I should advise him, even in this moment, to join in person the Goree expedition; a measure which he would not press so much upon me if he really wished to trust rather to Prussian than to British assistance for the re-establishment of his country and his family. I have, however, determined him to take an intermediate course; he sets out to-night and stops one evening at Brunswick in his way to Lingen, where he expects to arrive on the 3rd of August; if his presence there should only increase the fermentation in the provinces of Groningen and Friesland without an actual explosion, that will embarrass the Batavian government, and in some respect divert their efforts and their attention; and he has promised the most extreme caution to prevent any real and declared rising until the English armament shall have landed. At that moment, if the disposition of the country and the new circumstances of the interior should be as favourable as they promise, it is thought that the Prince may, in that case, almost immediately obtain possession either of Deventer Zutphen or Campen, from which latter place he may immediately have the benefit of the good disposition and assistance of the Texel fleet, if at that time they should declare in his favour. There is likewise a project stirring for Coeverden, which, as you will see, is at no great distance from Lingen on the Ems. These are the speculations in the most favourable cases, and these the chances of the Prince being able to penetrate into the country from the German frontier. If, on the contrary, the first effect of the British possession of Helvoetsluys and the Brill has not the general influence which we are taught to expect, if the country does not in the first moment rise, and if the original plan of the first division waiting absolutely in Goree for the arrival of the Russians be still found necessary and expedient, in that case, as three intermediate weeks will intervene, the Prince then wishes to embark at Norderney in an English sloop or frigate and go round immediately to Brill, from whence he thinks he can then

more usefully communicate with the country. If you approve of this, you should give discretionary orders for a sloop or small frigate to go for that purpose either to Norderney or to Cuxhaven, and you may correspond immediately with the Prince by Harward, as Lingen is only a day and a half or two days from Cuxhaven. Sir R. Abercrombie should likewise be informed of this mode of his communicating with the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange on any subject which may be pressing; from the Brill to Norderney is not more than two days, and from Norderney to Lingen is not so much.

"I do not admire their sketch of the proclamation; but there is a good deal of management necessary for me in the mode and substance of such criticisms; I do not therefore deem it prudent to make any other objection than that relative to amnesty, which it is promised to me shall be amended in a better edition; I cannot help smiling when I am told that it reads much better in good Dutch, and that it has suffered much in the translation; I do not understand Dutch.

"I shall this morning make a large advance to the Prince out of the 13,000*l.* which remains of the 15,000*l.* originally destined to him; for this is precisely the moment and situation in which 5 or 10,000*l.* may be of the most important service to him, and to the success of his exertions. I will blame him when I see him act shabbily or negligently, but in all that I have yet seen, he had conducted himself with great good sense, good temper, activity, and intelligence. I do not much lament the loss of Sir Charles Whitworth's Swedes; if you long to lay out your money in 10,000 more troops, why should you not deal with the Landgrave of Hesse? you will by that means break into one of the strong funds of Prussian neutrality, and I hear so much of his good dispositions that I should think it probable the proposal might succeed.

"I have another overture from the Elector Palatine, but I do not encourage it; he talks of writing to the Emperor of Russia on the subject, and that I do encourage. I cannot believe in the Petersburg speculations of there being any deep plan of intelligence and concert between Prussia and Sweden against Russia; they are much too timid here to entertain any such vigorous notions, and I know that it is a confirmed opinion of Haugwitz that, although a Prussian war with Russia is not to be feared at Berlin in the ordinary comparison of the military power of the two countries, yet, in the present circumstances, their war with Russia would certainly end in the revolutionizing of all the north of Germany; and with this opinion he would never lend himself to such views as the Emperor seems to suspect. I take it that the Swedish proposition arose partly from a desire to partake in the knowledge of the Baltick expedition, and partly in the desire of putting Sweden into the good graces of the Emperor, but that they were not enough in earnest to mean to do the thing unless they had found you so much in earnest as to lose sight of all the rules of arithmetic in the pursuit of it. The only part of the business

which I lament is the strong indication it gives of the angry turn of the Emperor's mind, and the unfavourable moment which it will make for his hearing of our notable conference and our Paris negotiation; yet I flatter myself he will only bully and bluster a little, and they will certainly at Berlin have a very Christian forbearance of resentment, and endure much pecking from the Russian eagle before they turn upon it in hostility. Terror is still the order of the day at Berlin.

"The H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange and Mr. Fagel have just taken leave of me and begin their journey in high spirits; all the accounts which they have just received are of the most promising description. Van Braam thinks it practicable to assure himself of the Texel batteries and hopes to have completed his work within the first week of August; from Grave, Zutphen, and Dorsburg there are very good hopes, and the Prince is told that it is highly probable that he may have Deventer as soon as the English force lands upon the coast of Holland. But the Prince and Fagel have pressed me upon the possibility of my assisting them in the first moment; I have told them that if I see anything which I can do by coming I will come, and I perceive that my instructions have given me latitude enough to allow of my going anywhere that I thought useful. If therefore any striking advantage shall offer by my presence with the Prince, I shall not hesitate to go even without waiting for previous communication from you. I know that you will agree with me in thinking that forms must give way to substance. The Prince is very much bent upon immediately putting a garrison into Nimeguen, as the first military act of his new government. Have you thought of any arrangement for assisting the first expenses? You know that my credit leaves only 5,000*l.* more for the Prince.

"I need not tell you how anxious I am to hear from you.

"2 p.m.—In the instant of sending the messenger I receive your letter, memorandum, and despatch of the 19th. I have no time to answer them, for, if I did, the messenger would lose the packet. You will long ago have seen that *my Prussian treaty* will not stand in the way of your arrangements. I hope that your news of the combined fleet will not retard your Dutch expedition; for God's sake come on, and once in possession of Holland you may talk as you please to Prussia. I do not suspect Prussia to be so hostile as you do to the recovery of the Netherlands to Austrian government; but we must not even suppose that they will refuse themselves to, much less that they will resist it, if we and Russia propose it. Adieu or I shall be too late. Your Portuguese messenger has come a day after the post. Do not fear Ireland, but take Holland first; and do not fear my dislikes, I will do all the good I can."

LORD LOUGHBOROUGH [Lord Chancellor] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 29. Tunbridge Wells.—"I have a great respect for Mr. Miller's character to which I am no stranger, and, as I

should be very happy in any opportunity of testifying my sense of his merit, I shall certainly allow (as far as in me lies) no promotion to take place to his prejudice.

"It has appeared to me, however, extremely improper to make any addition to the number of King's counsel at present. I have the satisfaction to know that this opinion can be of no prejudice to Mr. Miller, because he undoubtedly stands in the same situation upon his circuit that he would do if he had a silk gown, and perhaps with more advantage, because he owes it to the public opinion alone."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 29. Wimbledon.—"Sir Ralph Abercrombie was here yesterday and expressed to me strongly his wishes that a few Dutch officers, that may now be in this country, be directed to attend him for the purpose of intercourse with the inhabitants; and he likewise thinks some person of rank and confidence, to be recommended by the Prince of Orange, should also attend the expedition on the part of the Prince. He thinks this would be decorous to the Prince of Orange, considering the terms of the proposed proclamation, and the grounds on which the expedition proceeded. Such a person would likewise be an evidence of the mode in which the inhabitants were treated. It does not occur to me that there can be any objection to these propositions."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 29. Wimbledon.—"I could not return you the accompanying papers sooner, as I never saw Mr. Pitt till this forenoon, when he called here on his way to Holwood. The Stadtholder's letter certainly makes no variation on the subject. You may depend upon it there shall be no want of exertion to get all the force collected that we possibly can, but I am afraid you are too sanguine in your ideas of our getting possession of the Netherlands without you take into your calculation the idea of a Prussian co-operation. If that comes forward, I think we may look forward with fair hopes to a conclusion of the campaign as extensive as you suppose; but, without such a co-operation, I cannot help doubting the Dutch coming forward to aid the progress of our arms; and if they do not, the conquest of Holland will be more tedious than we calculate upon, and the late season of the year is certainly against us. It is ridiculous perhaps, when we are looking forward so far, to tell you that we have not yet got a person so skilled in the knowledge of that part of the coast, as to ensure us in a confidence that there is a good landing to be got at the mouth of the Meuse. Sir Ralph is gone to arrange his troops at Barham camp. I have wrote to the Admiralty this morning, or at least caused Huskisson to write a private letter to Nepean to tell the Admiralty that transports and ordnance were all at their destined places, and I saw nothing to induce a belief that the embarkation might not proceed at the time appointed.

"I need not mention to you that all you have stated to me in your memorandum does not interfere with our first and immediate business, which is to send off Sir Ralph with the first division. If, in the beginning of next spring, a competition was to arise from a deficiency of troops for both, whether we should go to the Netherlands, or to the Somme or the Seine, it would be a nice point to decide upon, and would depend upon the circumstances of the moment."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 29. Wimbledon.—"I agree with you that your arrangement of our force would be the best, if the Russians were arrived; but while the wind continues where it is, we have no chance of seeing them, and it would be a cruel thing to waste the whole season upon Groningen and Friesland alone. Your ideas, however, shall be duly weighed, and nothing finally settled without perfect knowledge of the grounds on which we proceed. If the Russians would arrive, that would make everything easy. You recollect that it has been stated, and apparently with some confidence, that if we would land with a good force, not very large, in the Eastern provinces, a body of troops to the amount of 20,000 would be immediately formed. Besides, you will observe that an attack upon the Helder would be a great relief to Groningen and Friesland by the diversion it would make. Indeed making both at the same time would mutually assist both. I have not time to trouble you more at present, having a great deal to do to-day.

"A body of cavalry are actually embarked and ordered to sail."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, July 30. Dropmore.—"It is not often that I think you less sanguine than myself as to the result of our measures, but I really believe that in this case you do not allow enough for the situation of the country against which, or rather in which, we are about to act.

"It is very right for a military commander about to undertake an important expedition to make his demands upon Government as on the most unfavourable calculation that can by any possibility be made of the resistance he is to meet with. And you have seen that, so far from arguing against this, I have always urged (in conformity also with your opinion) that our first force should be made as imposing [as possible].

"But this point being now settled, I must on the other hand say that Sir Ralph Abercrombie would neither do justice to himself, nor to us, if he were to apply the same mode of military calculation to his operations, as he has to his demands, and were to act in Holland as if he was in a country armed against him, and where he was to encounter all the difficulties which the local circumstances of the country, considered on military principles, and turned to their full advantage by an effective and disciplined army, would unquestionably supply.

“You know that we have, down to this very hour, accurate intelligence of the amount of French force in Holland. You are aware that it does not amount to 6,000 men, and those too dispersed, as they must necessarily be when our armaments threaten every point of attack from Delfzyl to Antwerp, and when their fears of Prussia are even stronger than our hopes.

“The accurate intelligence received last night of the state of Walcheren and of the Eastern provinces affords a strong confirmation of the former accounts as to the weakness of the enemy; and proves also, in a very satisfactory manner, that they have not yet even turned their attention to our intended point of attack.

“With respect to the *Batare* army, as it is called, there can be no doubt that we must, on the whole, reckon that more with us than against us. I do not say that there will not be found among them some battalions who will act against us, especially if time is allowed to recover the first impression. But I am confident that, in the first moments, that force will be a source of more embarrassment than confidence to the leaders of the French party in that country.

“You will not suppose that, in saying all this, I entertain a doubt that Sir Ralph Abercrombie will push his first successes with the vigour that belongs to an operation that is to partake much more of a counter-revolution than of a conquest. I am confident he will, and difficulties started before the commencement of an enterprise are certainly much better than difficulties which are not found till after it begins. But I beg of you not to let either the one or the other weigh an instant in your mind to prevent our being found in readiness to avail ourselves of the full extent of success to which our present undertaking, if executed with the same vigour of mind with which it has been planned and prepared, must inevitably lead.

“Look at the campaign of 1787; how little time it cost the Duke of Brunswick, with all his doubts, and hesitations, and cautions, and precautions, to march with 25,000 men (no more) from Wesel to Amsterdam; and then let any man tell me what there is in the present circumstances to stop British generals and British soldiers, with the country unanimously in their favour, and with the threatened if not the active co-operation of the whole Prussian army.

“If this were mere speculation of what is likely to happen, it would be a very idle dispute, and would best be settled by the event. If our officers go persuaded that nothing more is required of them than to make what would, on military principles, be considered as a considerable progress in a difficult country, guarding themselves at every step against the danger of a resistance which cannot exist, they may make a blameless campaign, but they will make no counter-revolution. And if we, calculating on this visionary resistance, shall, in like manner, make up our minds to the slow progress of a regular army through such a line of defence, we shall be found unprepared to profit of that success which, on a better principle of action, must attend our army.

"Forgive this dissertation. It is not often necessary to animate you with more hopes than you form, and I may now be wrong. But indeed I do not think your letter speaks of this enterprise in its true light. Make your calculations therefore to preoccupy the Netherlands, and to do so this autumn. If we are disappointed no harm is done; but if it is in our power to do so, and we are not prepared for it, we shall have much to regret.

"I am puzzled what to do about your other letter. No Dutch nobles, or persons of much weight, emigrated out of the provinces at the revolution. We always discouraged their doing so, and it is now well for us that we did, for their influence (though not great) will be much greater in their own districts than in our army. Count Rhoon, the head of the Bentincks, was imprisoned; but he is now at Varel in Oldenburgh, eager to serve, and pressing his services upon me by every post. He has considerable influence in the very places to which we are going. But he is rash, hotheaded, and totally ungovernable. The Prince of Orange has an inveterate dislike and jealousy of him; and he has, on the other hand, pretensions which I do not believe the most unprejudiced and capable man would, in the Stadtholder's place, think it wise to gratify. I have therefore kept him back hitherto; but my intention was, as soon as our expedition had sailed and not before, to invite him over to England, and to send him from hence into Holland. There is no doubt that his vehement ardour and activity may be made of great use there; but I am afraid he will, on the whole, give more trouble than benefit to those who command our forces.

"There is no other emigrant of consideration in Holland. None at all in this country. Great use may, however, be made of the officers of the *rassemblement* who are, in fact, the only emigrants. But you will recollect that, in the very first conversation at which I was present with Sir Ralph Abercrombie, on my starting that subject he expressed a strong desire that he might *not* have them with him in the beginning. I have in compliance with that wish kept the business back, and it is now too late to write into Germany, and to have any of them here before the expedition sails; except the engineer who has been written for long since, but we have not yet received the answer.

"Thinking, however, that much advantage will arise from bringing forward early a Dutch army under those officers, I will immediately write to Berlin, for it cannot be done nearer, and that will take ten days going and as much returning, to desire that the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who has the direction of this whole business, will send over here officers for two or three regiments to begin with, taking them from those who have most weight in the provinces we look to in the first instance. But this leads to a larger question, in which the Hereditary Prince has applied for our direction. It is this; what are we disposed to in this respect in point of expense? Such an army cannot be raised, armed, maintained, or fed, without great expense. As far as the two or three regiments go, of which I have already spoken, I suppose the consideration of expense will not be thought

material, and I will not delay writing to-day for the sake of any consultation; having (I confess) rather reluctantly postponed it hitherto, in compliance with the opinion I have referred to.

“But the large question requires a comparison of means and demands which must be more fully considered. On that therefore I will, if I see Pitt and you to-morrow, converse with you more fully; or, if we should not meet at St. James’s, I could come to you at Wimbledon in the evening, supposing that to suit you.” *Copy.*

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 30. Downing Street.—“Mr. Hammond has just now given me your letter of this morning, of the contents of which I hope to inform the Prince of Orange to-morrow morning, as his Serene Highness comes to town, and I am to see him after I have seen your Lordship. I am quite of your opinion that it will be impossible for the Prince of Orange to appoint any person of the description alluded to in Mr. Dundas’s letter to accompany Sir Ralph Abercromby, as there is at present no person in this country (at least to my knowledge) who answers that description. Sontag will do extremely well as far as that goes, and afterwards Comte Rhoon, and, I hope, the Hereditary Prince will do still better. I should think that the Hereditary Prince’s powers will be sufficient to enable him to do what your Lordship desires Mr. Grenville to suggest to him. I am only afraid that the employing even *Batave* officers will be subject to insuperable difficulties, as I am quite sure that none of those who are attached to the House of Orange would serve with any of the *Bataves* under any shape whatsoever. But I hope to converse on this subject with you to-morrow morning.

“I hope you have received my first letter of Sunday last with a translation of the Prince’s intended proclamation.”

Postscript. “The Princess has already written to the Hereditary Prince to represent to him the necessity of his coming without delay nearer to the frontier; so that I hope Mr. Grenville’s representations on that subject will soon be followed by his Serene Highness’s departure.”

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 30. Hamburg.—“The name of the gentleman formerly a member of the Council of State in Holland, whom I speak of in my dispatch of this date, is Calkoen. His family and fortune being still in Holland, one cannot wonder that he should be most exceedingly anxious that his name should not be mentioned, and that he should not be suspected as communicating with the enemies of the Republic. He, accordingly, made it a positive condition with me that I should not name him even to His Majesty’s ministers. I, of course, would not withhold his name from your Lordship, but I have avoided inserting it in the official dispatch.

"Some persons, I believe, have prejudices against him, but none can deny that he is a man of integrity, and respectability, and capacity, and well acquainted with his own country. I have known him before. He is lately come hither from Holland for the express purpose of conversing with me on the present state of affairs.

"Your Lordship, I hope, will pardon the zeal which induces me to mention to you a person at Vienna who might be made very useful to the British interests, and respecting whom it is perhaps ridiculous to suppose that your Lordship is not fully informed. But as I have reason to believe that others did not think it worth while to make the necessary attempt to gain him, perhaps they may never have mentioned him to you. The person I mean is Monsieur Pelin, formerly secretary to Mirabeau, the man with whom M. de Thugut lives in greater intimacy than with any person whatever.

"He is a man whom I certainly would not trust, but I am sure that great use might be made of him; and I have every reason to believe that he would not refuse a handsome remuneration for his services. He is much employed by M. de Thugut, and his abilities are of the first cast. I should have ventured sooner to mention him to your Lordship had I been informed, which I was not till very lately, that the means which were held out as likely to gain him had been rather slighted."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, July 30. Dropmore.—"You will have seen by my last letter that De Luc had inflicted upon me all his information, from which I collected nothing but encouragement, instead of hearing from him of any new difficulties. The truth, however, is that he is so occupied with the individual importance of De Luc and so overwhelmed with the confidence he thinks Haugwitz reposes in him, that very little reliance can be placed on what he says, though he is full of zeal and good principle.

"The military opinions of the Duke of Brunswick begin to be too ridiculous even for farce, and happily our own exertions have enabled us no longer to look upon them as very serious tragedy.

"You will see that, at two days distance of time, and many hundred miles distance of space, we were writing to each other the same doubts as to the ultimate utility of this famous Prussian co-operation which for eight months together has occupied so much of our time and thoughts. Still, however, I wish we may obtain it, provided we do not buy it too dear; but I should now think any sacrifice of political interests, and any considerable sacrifice of that dignity which belongs to treating on equal terms and on fair grounds, would be too high a price; the mere money I should not regard, because in that light I am sure that the application of a million in this way would be strict economy.

"I do not now think we shall have a Prussian declaration to assist our expedition, and I am confident, contrary to what seems to be your opinion, that we shall not want Prussian aid to enable us to hold Holland; nay, that we shall do better without it. But I still wish to purchase both the declaration and the assistance, in order that the Prussians by occupying the Meuse may enable us to occupy the Netherlands, and having those eleven points in our favour, then to talk with our good allies as to the ultimate arrangement to be made respecting those provinces in the safety of which we have, after all, more concern than all the Powers of Germany together.

"I am less struck with the picture you draw of Haugwitz and his master because, since I have known anything of foreign affairs, I have never known any other state of things at Berlin. Sometimes the King was right and the Minister wrong, sometimes both wrong together, but never both right at the same time. And though I have no doubt that much of what you collect of the King's timidity, indolence, and irresolution is true, yet I am also persuaded that Haugwitz avails himself of these in his negotiations, just as we did of our opposition in Parliament and sense of the nation, whenever we are pressed for anything we do not like to agree to.

"I imagine that his idea of extending his monthly payments beyond December is only this: that he wants to claim the same sum for winter quarters that we could have given for summer operations, and possibly that he thinks this plan may enable him to protract this negotiation on its present footing for some months longer; whereas now, if he does not act till September, he of course loses one month of subsidy, and of eating our bread and forage, instead of consuming his own, or plundering the north of Germany of it.

"Now to this protraction I should have no very great objection, because it pretty nearly supplies the defensive line which I want, were it not for a consideration personal to yourself. It is this. We are now looking to a counter revolution in Holland; we have in that case the same difficulties to overcome which we did not overcome but yielded to in 1787 and 1788. Lord Malmesbury was then much more occupied with his own honours, than with the permanence of the system he had re-established. You know in what hands the direction of foreign affairs here was then placed. Everything was left to take its course, and a worse course things could not have taken. So far from improving the advantages which that revolution had afforded him, the Prince of Orange was found in every respect weaker and more unprovided in 1794 than he had been in 1786.

"This we must now prevent, for you will not think so ill of me as to believe that I should like to leave it to my successor to say of me what I have just said of the Duke of Leeds. I had for this purpose long cherished the hope that you would indeed, as you propose, return from Berlin through Helvoetsluys, but not without making a longer stay in Holland than you reckoned upon. The functions of British Ambassador there at such a

period would not be unworthy even of your talents, nor could your desire of doing real and permanent service easily find more ample gratification elsewhere.

"Latterly, however, seeing the good you are doing at Berlin, and influenced by one consideration only, that of a superior personal knowledge of the individuals which Lord Malmesbury has, and which you have never been in the way of acquiring, I had, notwithstanding my objections to his conduct after the last revolution, looked to sending him there pretty soon after Abercromby's sailing, trusting that though he had done nothing or next to nothing of himself, yet he would well and actively execute the instructions he might receive. He is, however, now so ill as to put this wholly out of the question, for, even if he should so far recover as to be able to bear the voyage, we want there the energy of such a mind as yours, not the languor of a valetudinarian.

"I come back therefore to my original idea, and I come back to it with much more satisfaction than the other project ever afforded me. You must prepare yourself therefore to receive a proposal in form that, as soon as any appearance of Stadtholderian government shall have been re-established at the Hague or elsewhere, you should proceed there to take upon you the character and functions of Ambassador Extraordinary, charged with the whole political direction of that shapeless mass which we must, now or never, reduce into a form of efficient and permanent utility to ourselves, instead of leaving it, as it has been for a century, a dead weight on our exertions whenever it has not been turned against us.

"I have attentively considered, as it is my duty, the means of doing this. It would be too long to detail them now, and I shall have occasions enough of explaining them, as I trust, to his Majesty's ambassador at the Hague, because I am confident the proposal is one that you *cannot* decline, and I hope it is one you would not wish to decline.

"Its effect on your Berlin discussions might be useful, because it would enable you to bring them (if it was then useful to do so) to a definitive issue; and if you should see it in that light, there would perhaps be no harm in yourself hinting to Haugwitz, as I have already done to De Luc, that your stay at Berlin could not be prolonged indefinitely, that you had undertaken the mission only as an extraordinary one, and that it has already far exceeded the limits of time and discussion that you had in view when you had first undertaken it."

H. FAGEL to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, July 31.—"M. Haugwitz ayant communiqué de la manière la plus inattendue au Comte de Panin et à Mr. Grenville que Sa Majesté Prussienne, en conséquence *d'avis reçus*, s'étoit déterminée à entrer en négociation avec le gouvernement François, pour obtenir l'évacuation de la Hollande par les troupes Françaises, les deux ministres témoignèrent au Comte de

Haugwitz, dans les termes les plus énergiques, leur extrême surprise de cette communication, et lui déclarèrent en même tems qu'elle mettoit un terme à leurs négociations avec le Cabinet de Berlin, et obligeoit leurs Cours respectives à poursuivre de concert, et à l'exclusion de la Prusse, les mesures précédemment arrêtées entre elles relativement à la Hollande.

“ Dans cette conjoncture je suis chargé de la part de Lord Grenville de déclarer à s'altesse sérénissime Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, que le gouvernement de ce pays, n'entendant point préjuger de la décision qu'il conviendra à s'altesse sérénissime de prendre sur cet important objet, souhaiteront cependant de savoir si Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange seroit disposé à accéder à la négociation que le Cabinet de Berlin a entamé avec le Directoire, et si s'altesse sérénissime consentirait au rétablissement de sa maison tel qu'il pourra lui être proposé à la suite de la négociation. Dans le cas où s'altesse sérénissime (ne jugeant point de son intérêt de s'en remettre à la négociation susdite) préférât de seconder les mesures que Sa Majesté Britannique, de concert avec ses allies, est occupé à prendre pour effectuer son rétablissement et celui de son illustre maison, il y a deux points sur lesquels milord Grenville m'a prié d'inviter s'altese sérénissime à prendre une détermination.

1. “ Il paroît indispensable que l'expédition projetée dans ce pays, et qui va faire voile dans peu de jours, soit accompagnée d'une personne de marque nommée par s'altesse sérénissime, ayant sa confiance, et munie d'une autorisation de sa part, et qui puisse attester aux habitans des Provinces-Unies que l'expédition en question se fait du seu et avec l'agrément et assentissement de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange; et qui puisse être témoin d'après cela de la manière dont les troupes Britanniques agiront vis à vis des habitans des Provinces-Unies.

2. “ On souhaite que s'altesse sérénissime veuille bien donner une déclaration formelle qu'au cas où elle sera rétablie dans ses hautes dignités, moyennant la puissante intervention de Sa Majesté Britannique et de ses alliés, s'altese sérénissime emploiera toute son influence pour que la république des Provinces-Unies, ainsi rétablie, prenne partie en commun avec la Grande Bretagne (conformément au traité d'alliance qui unissoit les deux états avant la révolution de 1795) à la guerre contre la France; vû que Sa Majesté Britannique, après les efforts qu'elle aura fait pour le rétablissement de la République, ne sauroit en aucune manière consentir qu'à la suite de ce rétablissement, la République rentre à l'égard de la France dans un état de neutralité, dont les suites pour la Grande Bretagne et ses alliés seroient pires que celle de l'état de la guerre actuelle entre ce pays-ci et la Hollande.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, July 31. Holwood.—“ I received your letter, together with the despatch from Mr. Grenville, here last night on my way to Kent. The enclosures in that despatch are the most accurate

information with regard to the places they refer to than any other I have seen, and therefore I have thought it right to send the perusal of them, and likewise your letter to me, to Sir Ralph Abercrombie. He is at Barham camp with his troops. I will see him to-morrow or next day, and will then return the papers to you. I have kept back one of them, and return it to you, as it has nothing to do with the points on which it is proper to inform him.

“Upon the subject of your letter and the observations you offer to me on the subject of our expedition, I subscribe very willingly to all you state; but I confess I am not without considerable anxiety on a measure where so much is at stake. I am noways afraid of the military part of the subject, nor do I entertain any apprehensions of our officers acting up to our expectations, so far as depends on the utmost exertions that can be made. My anxiety rests on another point. Unless the Dutch co-operate with us cordially and *actively*, I do not believe it possible to do as much by the mere force of arms during this campaign, beginning at so late a season, as we flatter ourselves; and if there is anything in which I may perhaps think you more sanguine than me, it is in the confidence you have on that point. I cannot forget the American war, where we were so miserably disappointed in the promised and expected co-operation. Even in this war, with all the disgust entertained both in France and Holland against their oppressors, how little exertion have they made to relieve themselves. And in our present project you must recollect that, whatever the dispositions of the country may be, the power of the country is in the hands of those truly hostile to us; and who, so far as they can, will meet us in landing and everywhere else with all the resistance in their power. Perhaps any shade of difference [that] may be between us on this view of the question, may be accounted for by the superior knowledge you have upon it. You are in the daily habit of receiving the intelligence, and of combining it, and drawing your conclusions from it. I am therefore very much disposed to think that your ideas are more just than mine; and you may rest assured that I am decided to act upon your ideas (in which Mr. Pitt perfectly concurs) rather than upon any doubts of my own. Upon this ground it is my intention to give a final instruction to Sir Ralph Abercrombie before he sails; encouraging him, even if it should be contrary to mere military ideas, to act upon the reasoning of your letter; looking upon himself as going not to conquer a country, but to aid the counter-revolution ready to burst out in it. I think it fair to give him additional instruction founded upon that principle, because, if he should be led to dash more than military rules and tactics would warrant, he may do it upon my responsibility rather than his own.

“I shall not give them an hour’s quiet when I get down till they sail. I have heard surmises of some delays being hinted at the War Office, but be what they may, I will resist them. The enclosed letter from Huskisson will show you what I refer to. I am afraid from Mr. Morland’s letter to me, to which he refers, we shall soon have the French prisoners thrown on our hands.”

BARON DE THUGUT to COUNT DE COBENTZL, at St. Petersburgh.

1799, July 31. Vienna.—“Monsieur le Comte de Razoumowsky a fait connaître ici, d'ordre de sa Cour, que Monsieur Whitworth avait fait à Pétersbourg des offices dans le but d'obtenir que le corps auxiliaire que Sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies avait bien voulu nous accorder en vertu du traité de l'alliance, et qui jusqu'ici a été employé en Italie, fut joint à l'armée Russe destinée à agir par la Suisse; et que Monsieur le Maréchal de Souvoroff, mis à la tête de la totalité de ces forces Russes, put conduire lui-même l'importante expédition qui, après l'expulsion totale de l'ennemi de la Suisse, devait frapper les grands coups dans l'intérieur de la France; Monsieur le Comte de Razoumowsky ajouta, que son auguste maître approuvait la proposition de l'Angleterre, et verrait avec plaisir que Sa Majesté y accédât de son côté.

“Ayant rendu compte à l'Empereur des ouvertures de Monsieur le Comte de Razoumowsky, Sa Majesté m'ordonna de déclarer à cet ambassadeur, que quoique nous ne méconnaissions nullement l'appui précieux et le secours efficace que nous avions trouvés dans la bravoure du corps auxiliaire Russe pour nos progrès en Italie, et quoique nous sentions pleinement la part décisive que nous devons dans nos succès à la valeur signalée et aux grands talents militaires de Monsieur le Maréchal de Souvoroff Rymniksky, Sa Majesté n'hésitait cependant nullement d'adhérer à l'arrangement proposé par l'Angleterre, et agréé par l'Empereur Paul premier; cette résolution de Sa Majesté étant fondée sur sa déférence pour l'avis et les desirs de son allié également, et sur la considération de l'influence majeure que pourrait avoir sur tout le sort de la guerre l'expédition par la Suisse, dont il est, par conséquent, de l'intérêt commun de faciliter et d'assurer la réussite par l'avantage si essentiel d'une masse de forces, composée de troupes de la même nation, sous le commandement d'un chef aussi célèbre que l'est Monsieur le Maréchal de Souvoroff. Comme nous espérons que la prise de Mantoue va très prochainement consolider notre situation militaire en Italie, il ne dépendra alors que de Monsieur le Maréchal de Souvoroff, ainsi que Sa Majesté le lui fera connaître, de placer immédiatement le corps auxiliaire sur les frontières du Valais, en y faisant relever un corps Autrichien d'une force à peu près égale, porté actuellement en observation de ce côté-là sous le Général Haddick. Au moyen de ce révirement très aisé, le corps auxiliaire se trouvera tout posté en Suisse, et pourra attendre dans cette position l'arrivée du gros de l'armée Russe en Suisse du côté de Schaffhouse, sous la conduite de Monsieur le Général de Korsakoff, pour entrer sans délai en pleine communication avec lui, et s'y joindre, ou coopérer en telle autre manière que Monsieur le Maréchal le jugera nécessaire.

“Mais comme la saison, déjà fort avancée, rend le temps désormais précieux, Sa Majesté recommande aux soins de V[otre] E[xcellence] de solliciter l'envoi le plus prompt des ordres réquis à Monsieur le Maréchal de Souvoroff sur ces

différents objets. Sa Majesté va de son côté fixer la nouvelle répartition dans nos troupes, et les projets d'opérations que l'extrême difficulté des subsistances en Suabe à l'arrivée du corps d'armée Russe et, d'une autre part, l'entreprise nouvellement résolue entre les Cours de Petersbourg et de Londres d'une expédition contre la Hollande, vont rendre nécessaires de notre côté ; et dont, aussitôt après les dernières déterminations prises par Sa Majesté, vous serez informé." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENNILLE.

1799, August 1. Teston.--"The conduct of the Court of Berlin is worthy of it, and ought not to surprise us. But it leads to so much *new* consideration, that Dundas and I most anxiously wish to see you. I must earnestly beg you, if possible, to be at Walmer in the course of to-morrow or Saturday, as there is not a minute to be lost in our final decision, which we shall be unwilling to make without you. You will be sure of a bed. Our generals would at all events have been for waiting, at least for the Russians."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1799, August 1. Zurich.--"When you shall have read my despatches, you will certainly agree with me that I came here for my sins. All the rest I could have managed with tolerable ease, but this dispute between Craufurd and Hotzé has placed me in a situation from which, I am persuaded, I shall not escape without making enemies of both.

"There is nothing that I have said in Craufurd's favour in my public despatches that is not perfectly true ; but his manners are sometimes very offensive to the Swiss, and quite intolerable to the Austrian staff-officers, who are used themselves to treat a colonel in their own army as an English officer would not behave to a sergeant.

"Plunkett justifies Hotzé's first note only on the ground that it was written *to a colonel* ; and that the language it contained was such as the general used every day to *colonels* under his orders.

"Whatever decision your Lordship shall take, I trust you will feel the absolute necessity of not leaving these two men together in any situation where the one shall not be entirely subordinate to the other.

"If Craufurd is continued as commissary, Hotzé must not have the command ; but if Hotzé had the command *on his own terms*, he told me himself that nothing would give him greater pleasure than that Craufurd should serve under him, provided his Majesty would give him local rank. Plunkett also told me that the Arch-Duke would, with pleasure, give Craufurd a command, having a very high opinion of his military talents in

the field, provided he had the rank of major-general, and a commission from the King to serve in the Swiss army. The Arch-Duke told me himself he thought Craufurd's talents were quite misemployed in buying shoes and firelocks for an army, instead of leading a division into the field.

"I have not ventured to say anything on the subject in my public dispatch, but, if Craufurd be left here in any situation whatever, I would strongly recommend that he should have local rank; and, if General Hotzé have the command *on his own terms*, then Craufurd must be nothing but a major-general, and you must send out another commissary. I consider this last point as of absolute necessity. I have formed my judgement from seeing the two men together; and your Lordship may rely upon it that there are no human means of making them settle an account where there shall be any difference between them, either about the sum total or any of the items.

"It is quite impossible for me to give your Lordship anything like a notion of the scene of disorder and confusion I found on my arrival. All that I can say is that, had I not arrived when I did, this explosion would long since have taken place; and, had I not been present when it happened, it must have had very unpleasant consequences; Craufurd having considered the general's note as a personal affront, and being determined to treat it as such without my interference. He even told the Arch-Duke that, though he had been over-ruled in his opinion, yet that he must ever consider Hotzés conduct as personal.

"From all that has happened your Lordship will, I trust, see the necessity of sending the person, whoever he may be, that you destine for my successor, to remain here a month or two with me before my return, in a private character.

"With respect to this country, I think I can answer for forming all the old governments, and sending a deputation from each to the Diet; but *there* they must be delivered, *bound hand and foot*, into the power of the foreign Minister whose master shall have the greatest influence at that moment in the affairs of the Continent. They cannot have any will of their own, and, if they had any, they have no force wherewith to support it. So that the great Powers of Europe, if they are unanimous, may make of those states whatever they please, almost without opposition. His Majesty's influence is at this moment very great and, I trust, will soon be still greater among the people of the country; but, I am truly sorry to say, this country is no longer to be reckoned among the *nations* of Europe, and must necessarily belong to the strongest.

"Your Lordship may take for granted what I have here laid down. What consequences are to follow this state of things, and what plans or what system may be formed upon it is what I cannot pretend to say; nor do I believe as yet that the Court of Vienna has formed any determinate system for this country. But it seems most material that his Majesty's Government should have early information of the fact, and that your Lordship's attention should be directed to it, as I am persuaded that, in some shape

or other, this country (that is the number of square miles and acres of which this country is composed) will be made to play an important part in any scheme of general pacification.

"I shall make this the subject of a public despatch immediately; but my time has been so wholly taken up by this confounded dispute between our two military men that, since my return from the little Cantons, I have not known where to turn myself.

"As I cannot bring my ciphers so near the enemy, and as my despatches must generally contain matters of delicacy, if not of importance, I wish your Lordship would consider whether I ought not to have a couple of messengers constantly on this station, whom I might send to Cuxhaven, and no further.

"I have had real difficulty in procuring one to convey these despatches.

"I expect Pichégu every hour. I have seen d'André and made all the arrangements necessary for carrying on the correspondence. De Précý is ill and cannot join me, but I have entered into correspondence with him, and expect soon to have a good communication with Lyons."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 1. London.—"Je reçois à l'instant votre billet, et quoique certainement Lord Mulgrave n'ait pas besoin de recommandation, je lui donnerai un mot pour l'Archiduc qui pourra peut-être lui être de quelq'utilité.

"Les lettres que j'ai reçu hier portent toutes l'impreinte de la meilleure volonté dans nos troupes et *notre Cabinet*. Vous savez, de vous à moi, que je ne parle pas facilement ainsi. Mon père me témoigne son étonnement de ce que je n'avois point encore mandé le départ de M. *Eden*, tandis que ce ministre le disoit déjà depuis quinze jours à ses amis. Mon bon père en conclut que vous avez moins de confiance en moi. J'aime à me flatter qu'il se trompe. J'en serois désolé, parceque je ne l'ai pas mérité, et parceque je vous suis tendrement attaché. Permettez-moi, néanmoins, de vous prier encore de me mander toujours avec bonté tout ce qui pourra vous déplaire en moi, et si j'ai jamais le malheur de vous déplaire moi-même. Autant je suis heureux d'être ici, me croyant aimé et estimé de ceux que j'aime et vénère, vous pardessus tout, autant serois-je malheureux si jamais ces sentimens, qui font mon bonheur et ont fait ma consolation les deux dernières années, venoient à changer.

"Je ne suis pas assez indiscret pour vous rien demander sur tout ce qui se prépare, et que mon métier est de deviner. J'aime à croire que si Lord Grenville l'avait confié à quelqu'ami hors du ministère, cet ami eut été moi, et qu'il me connoît assez pour être convaincu que le dire à *Starhemberg*, s'il l'eut voulu, n'est point été le dire au ministre de la cour de Vienne. La seule grâce que je vous demande c'est de m'en dire autant que vous en ferez confier à Vienne. Vous jugez bien que si on alloit y appercevoir que j'en sais moins que vous ne

voulez qu'on en cache chez nous, on en inféreroit ou que je vous suis suspect, ou que je suis un imbécille. Assurément mon dévouement à la bonne cause, et par conséquent à vous, et ma conduite ne l'eut point mérité. Agréez mes hommages les plus vrais et les plus tendres."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 1. Stowe.—"I am vastly hurt at finding the combined fleet safe out of the Mediterranean; where I fear (from a very detailed account sent to me) that the wretched state of poor Lord St. Vincent's imbecility, and the natural incapacity of his successor, have lost the greatest opportunity that ever presented itself. Perhaps you do not know all the details; but they are shocking. I fear that one painful result of all this is the necessity of locking up some of your regulars in Ireland, who ought to be on board and more usefully employed.

"I enclose to you a paper which the Bishop of St. Pol gave me in consequence of the letter I wrote to him at your desire, and that of Mr. Pitt. The names marked with a cross are known to him, and ought to be sent to France as soon as possible; the others may be equally useful, but are not personally known to him, though they are known to his priests at Portchester, from whom he received the lists under the most solemn assurances of their exactness. But these lists are obtained with the greatest difficulty, as every obstruction is still thrown in their way by the keepers of the prisons; so that, if you expect any number of these names, orders must be given that those priests who have the Bishop's certificate for visiting the sick, may be permitted to enter the prisons and to see the prisoners *alone*."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 1. Berlin.—"I have been obliged to discuss a little more largely than you may think either prudent or necessary for me the extensive subject of your dispatch, because, although I might have rested entirely upon that change of circumstances which annuls here my share of the execution of your last orders, I did not think a single word or two a sufficient answer to the many important considerations which you had brought forward to me. With respect to Berlin, the foundation of your hopes rested upon extending the effects of a Prussian co-operation by a position of a defensive description enough to satisfy them, and of a nature sufficiently menacing to Mayence, to set you free from thence; but the last new *tergiversation* (to take my friend Thugut's word) has absolutely cut across all present hope here, and does not leave much in future; for if the real interest which they take here in Holland will not lead them even to hostile demonstration for that great point, I think it manifest that they are determined not to engage in war. I see by your private letter that you have

some remorse in arresting me in the full march of my prosperous treaty. I do assure you that I have no parental partiality to it; the unlicked shape in which you saw it was most entirely the precious work of Haugwiz, and sensible as I was of the value of Prussian declaration at this moment, I was anxious first to see what the King would consent to, and afterwards to discuss what we might bring him to consent to; but in Sandoz's letter the King and his little confidential circle have seen again their precious neutrality; and the King was not ashamed to recall his consent, nor had Haugwiz enough of the spirit of a man to refuse himself to the disgrace which his Prussian Majesty has heaped upon him. I think you cannot but agree with me in the impossibility of our making a new proposition to them now, other than the proposition which Abercrombie is, I hope, on this day carrying with ten thousand British troops to Goree.

"You will be surprised to see me recur again to the idea of my being obliged to go suddenly to the frontier without waiting for previous advice from England; the truth is that the Hereditary Prince of Orange so strongly pressed me on this subject, and stated so earnestly his wish that if I were really wanted I would come to him, that I did not choose to shelter myself from any risk which it may be useful that I should incur; and I am, upon similar occasions, more disposed to pursue the spirit of my instructions than the letter or the forms of them. If therefore I see that I can be useful in giving to him the person and countenance of an English minister, I shall go without scruple or hesitation; desiring you only to recollect that my contract expires with the deliverance of Holland, and that as soon as the intercourse between Helvoetsluys and Harwich is re-established, I shall claim my fair right of putting an end to my exile, and being among the first passengers of the renewed intercourse with England. When I recollect that I am writing on the very day which you announced for the commencement of this enterprise you will easily believe that my spirits run high, and that I tread with exultation even upon Prussian ground. A momentary fear once shot across me that your doubts, your ignorance, or your information respecting the combined fleet might lead you to suspend the expedition which I am now looking for on tip-toe, but I will not think so ill of your spirit and resolution at home to believe that you will give up to the apprehensions of the moment a sure and important conquest which grows more valuable in proportion to the increased danger of the combined fleet; and surely, as a mere naval measure of defence, you can take none which will be of more effect than the conquest of Holland, by which you give yourself at one stroke the free use of all the fleet that blocks the Texel and all that is within it. But I do you wrong to press this subject, or to suspect that the British Cabinet will hesitate to take possession of Holland because the Lisbon paper announces the sailing of the combined fleet from Carthagenæ; and we, too, have we not a fleet?

“You will observe that I have not discussed the military part of your plan, because, as I have said already, I consider the Berlin share of that plan as being completely out of discussion, and as I do not believe in any Prussian co-operation for obtaining the deliverance of Holland, still less do I believe in any when that object shall have been obtained. I should, however, still be inclined to think that you would do well to continue your former plan of the Russian attack, and to continue to keep Austria rather to the support of that attack than to their new project of the siege of Mayence. Whatever be the issue of the Prussian negotiation at Paris, there still will be a real assistance to the allies upon the Lower Rhine without any formal treaty or convention for that purpose. If Prussia has demanded the left bank of the Rhine, or rather the evacuation of it, in the case of that cession you will have nothing to fear on the side of Mayence or Ehrenbreitstein; if, as is more likely, France refuses that evacuation, then Prussia will still have enough to fear for themselves on that side, and their measures of defence, combined with Hesse and Saxony, will still be a powerful check upon French attack on that side. Still, therefore, I should conceive that in every case you will continue your Russian attack; although it is subject to the remark that you over-calculated the force of Korsakow in calling it 40,000 men, that part of your Swiss levies will probably be obliged to remain in that country, and that the army of Massena is, I believe, daily augmenting in larger proportions than that of the Archduke; but if these considerations hang upon the project of incursion towards Lyons, they are additional motives against breaking the combined force by the detached operation of the Austrian siege of Mayence.

“The point against which this cursed Prussian *tergiversation* tells most is that of the destined command of the Duke of York, because, without Prussian demonstration at least in this quarter, although you may succeed in assisting the insurrection in Flanders, you will scarcely be strong enough to pursue that effort to the good effect which you propose. In truth I very much suspect that you will find another difficulty, perhaps, in the desire which the United Provinces may have to obtain a momentary tranquility by adopting the inactive neutrality of Prussia; and it cannot escape your observation that the partisans of Prussia will speak powerfully for their system in Holland. If their system brings peace, while ours demands from them a continuation of the dangers and expense of war, there are few Dutchmen, I fear, who would long hesitate in this comparative calculation; however promising the prospect of war might be shewn to them to be, and however insecure and insufficient the nominal peace proposed by Prussia, yet, after the long and vehement agitation of that country, there would be found in all parties within it a strong and passionate inclination for cessation from war. Against this inclination you will struggle, and probably have a difficult struggle, but it may be one that will lessen your means

of efficient attack from this side. The Hereditary Prince of Orange is gone through Brunswick to Lingen, where he will be on the 3rd instant."

Enclosure.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, July 29. Berlin.—"Your letters and dispatches by Bassett arrived here yesterday and are on their road to London. I was sorry to perceive in them some disposition to irritation against the Court of Berlin, because that disposition alarms me for the impression which is likely to be made upon the Emperor's mind by the unexpected narrative of the project of treaty, of the conference with the ministers of the allied Courts, ending in a negotiation with Paris.

"I am sure that it is unnecessary for me to remark upon the extreme mischief which would arise from any serious hostility between the two countries of Russia and Prussia in this important moment; and, if I take the liberty of recurring to the same topic, I do so only to express, with my sense of the importance of it, my confidence in the measures which you will take to prevent the fatal consequences which are to be feared from any open rupture. The true punishment of the doubtful and timid politics of Prussia will doubtless be best found in the state of insignificance which it will exhibit under the shock of these great events. The triumph of the allied arms will be the best lesson to Prussian neutralists.

"I am happy to see how well Captain Popham's authority has seconded your zeal and ability at Petersburg.

"The Prince of Orange leaves Berlin this evening in order to approach nearer to the Dutch frontier so as to enable himself to profit of the circumstances as they arise; we shall not, as I trust, be distressed by the loss of our Swedish auxiliaries; I do not suspect either them or Prussia of any very profound or vigorous political arrangements.

"I have no news from England except a belief that the combined fleets are in Carthagera, and there is a report, not confirmed, of their having sailed on the 30th ultimo."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 2. Downing Street.—"Je vous écris ces peu de lignes de votre bureau où je suis venu pour m'informer s'il y a des nouvelles du Vice-Amiral Michell. En attendant j'ai reçu ces deux lettres de Mr. Wickham que je vous envoie. Je vois que les choses vont mal en Suisse, mais je ne comprend pas les détails que Wickham n'avait pas le tems de m'expliquer. Je vous supplie donc de me dire quelle était l'entreprise de l'Archiduc, et pourquoi a-t-il échoué.

"Je suis persuadé que ce brave Prince est dans la dépendance absolue de Thugut, et celui-ci veut décidément ruiner la bonne cause. C'est lui qui pendant quatre mois a forcé l'Archiduc de

ne pas pousser en avant, ce qui a empêché la ruine absolue de l'armée de Massena, la délivrance de la Suisse, et qui a donné le tems au général Français de recevoir des secours immenses. C'est pourtant dans cet état des choses que Thugut veut que les Autrichiens quittent la Suisse, pour que les Russes soient exterminés. Vous aurez beau vous plaindre à Vienne. C'est inutile, c'est à Petersbourg qu'il faut voir toute la perfidie de Thugut, et si on prouve cette vérité à Paul, il est capable, avec sa chaleur dans les bons principes, d'exiger le renvoi de Thugut. Je vous conjure d'ordonner à my lord Minto, à Wickham, et à Ramsey, d'informer de tout le Chevalier Whitewort, afin que, sans perte de tems, celui-ci puisse agir chez nous. Faites moi le plaisir de me renvoyer les deux incluses, et d'avoir la bonté de m'expliquer ce qui c'est passé dans l'attaque échoué de l'Archiduc."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 2. Teston.—"I am very happy to be able to answer your letter shortly and satisfactorily. All military difficulties are completely overruled, and every step will be instantly taken for the immediate embarkation of the troops, which we hope will take place in the course of Sunday or Monday. There seems every reason to hope that a further force of from eight to eleven thousand men will be assembled at Barham by the 12th of this month, and ready to sail by the first opportunity after that day. The decision being finally taken, I have no doubt it will be acted upon with alacrity, and that we shall now hear no more of difficulties. I had a good deal of conversation in the field yesterday with the Prince of Orange, whose sentiments are exactly what one could wish. I hope you will have settled with him the form of a Declaration in his name, expressing his concurrence in our enterprise, and disclaiming all other plans for his restoration. You will probably agree with me that Abercromby ought to be furnished with such an instrument to be published as soon as he lands, in addition to our own manifesto.

"Does not the present state of things remove all question as to the language to be held at Vienna on the subject of the Netherlands? I am sure we need have no tenderness now about Prussia, who can henceforth be managed only through their fears; and on them, by the help of Russia, we may operate to any extent. We ought, therefore, as it seems to me, to offer to Vienna distinctly the guarantee of the Netherlands at the peace, provided till that time they continue to act in military concert with us and Russia in pushing into France; and I should be inclined also, on the same condition, and provided they also furnish an additional army either to relieve ours in the Netherlands next spring, or act elsewhere, as circumstances may require, to hold out to them the prospect of the subsidy we had before destined to Prussia. The place of the Swedes whom we have lost will, I hope, be much better

supplied by an additional division of Russians, which I am glad to find you have applied for. I see you have fixed on an officer for the Netherlands, but, as the business advances, more than one will probably be wanted. O'Connell, who served in the Irish brigade, is, from what I have heard of him, a person likely to undertake such a commission, and to be very useful; but you may easily learn more about him. Windham has also mentioned to me a Captain Jarningham [Jerningham], son of Sir W. Jarningham, and who has himself been in the Austrian service; and a Colonel O'Mahony, who was in the Irish brigade in the French service, who may both, as he thinks, be useful in subordinate capacities. I imagine, however, that no more can be done at present with respect to these or any others than to hold them in readiness; as it would hardly be safe to send them into the country till everything is ripe for general insurrection, and till we can have a force at hand to support it."

Postscript. "I suppose our good ally Paul will want no prompting to assemble, as he certainly ought to do, a threatening army on the Prussian frontier. It may perhaps be more necessary to warn him against an intemperate and precipitate use of it.

"Our military congress is just breaking up, and I am proceeding by sea from Rochester to Walmer, where I shall arrive to-night or early to-morrow morning, and mean to stay till the 12th or 13th, if you think I can decently excuse myself to *Monsieur*. The question seems merely one of ceremony, as his seeing you will certainly answer every purpose, and you can speak in my name as fully as in your own."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 2. Stowe.—"I received a letter this morning from the Baron de Rolle informing me, by your desire, that the Count D'Artois will be here on Wednesday next, and that he goes to Dropmore on the 9th. This will of course derange your ideas of coming to Stowe or Wotton until he has left you, but I hope and trust that you will remember to redeem your promise, particularly if your expedition sails as soon as *we military men* understand that it is to move. I am delighted to find in my Hamburg paper the days fixed for the move of the *Anglo-Russes* to Constance and Schaffhausen, as I fear that the Switzer will not put his confidence in the Austrians, whom he may suppose very capable of retaining some cautionary towns after the French are driven out of them; and I trust I shall be equally delighted in hearing of Captain Popham's Russians and Swedes, though no wind can be more foul for their possible destination than that which is now drowning us from the south-west."

LORD MULGRAVE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 2. Harley Street.—"If I had been aware of your going out of town I should have wished to have seen you, after a very long conversation I had with Starhemberg this morning.

He appeared to me very zealous in the cause, and as open as his situation would admit of; through which I thought I could perceive some strong Austrian objects, particularly a jealousy of the Russians, and an eagerness about the Low Countries, the circumstances and detail of which are too long for writing. Two points, however, appeared to me of importance, and worth mentioning to you; the first was an earnestness that he seemed to feel for my going to Vienna at all events, as if no active and combined efforts could be relied upon unless I should prevail upon Thugut to enter into the plan of concentrated efforts; a principle which he personally seemed to have entirely and cordially adopted. Another point he touched upon as essential, namely, that the two powers should be bound not to make peace but in conjunction and by agreement. To this, as a principle, I had no difficulty of acceding; as I consider it to be the groundwork and foundation of sincere alliance and hearty co-operation. The second important point to which he alluded, or rather urged, was that I should, in case of necessity, have the power of advancing a few thousand pounds to enable the Austrians to act. On this point I told him I had no authority, nor had it ever entered into my contemplation; but I added that, although this was merely the conversation of old friends, and perfectly extra-official between us, I would certainly mention to you what he had said on that head, and take your directions. Upon reading over my instructions this afternoon it occurred to me that, upon the Austrian system of adopting measures which should not hazard nor weaken their army, they would be likely to urge the operations towards Mentz from the very force of our argument against them, on the ground of their not being likely to draw any proportion of the French army to that quarter. This, of course, will be the influencing, and not the ostensible ground of their argument. Whether the application of money to the other line of operation would be likely to turn the balance in its favour or not, you must judge; but an additional instruction will be necessary to give me that power if Mr. Wickham has it not already; and I shall be very happy to see the disposal of money in any other hands than mine. Amongst other things he let out a wish that the disposal and direction of the Russian force should be in the hands of the Court of Vienna, but, as our conversation was *private* and *confidential* and not official, I passed that over without seeming to attend to it; as an expression of my sense of the absurdity of the King's subsidiary troops being at the disposal of any power but his Majesty might, by being reported, have interfered with my endeavours to conciliate the two commanders, and guide the operations to the objects which the King has in view. Stahremberg urged very much his opinion of the advantage of employing the Prince de Ligne in the Low Countries, from his popularity there and from his talents; and said he thought I might influence such an appointment at Vienna. I said I had a high opinion of the Prince de Ligne from my acquaintance with him; but that I should think I went very much out of the line of my employment, and should

incur the disapprobation of M. Thugut, if I were to begin my acquaintance with pointing out to him the officers he should recommend to the Emperor to employ.

"I think, however, that next year when the King's forces shall be employed elsewhere, the Prince de Ligne would be the most likely person to keep the *Brabançons* together, and to hold that country against the French. I think Stahremberg candid and zealous in the right way, notwithstanding the points of Austrian policy which he lets out; and I should have been well pleased to have conversed at large with you upon the subject; but I have written a *dispatch* from London, rather than give you any avoidable trouble. The discretion left to me I shall exercise to the best of my judgment, but I fear nothing will be concluded and resolved without my going to Vienna. The term of Thugut being '*le vrai général*' which escaped from Stahremberg, and his earnestness for my going there convinces me of it. This conversation was entirely on the score of old friendship, and therefore must not be officially considered, or brought into discussion with Stahremberg. I was on that account, perhaps, more guarded than I should have been with a mere minister. He was anxious to know whether I should have authority to inform the Arch-Duke of the object of the depending expedition from this country. I told him I had not yet received my instructions, but that I had no scruple of saying I could not propose a plan of operations to the Arch-Duke without entering upon the objects of this expedition. This, I think, is the substance of our conversation. He gave me every information I required about the Arch-Duke, and pointed out the conduct he thought most likely for me to gain his friendship, and obtain an influence over his conduct; and was very urgent that, if I found any little diffidence or jealousy of me in the Arch-Duke, I should rather write about it to him (Stahremberg) that he might do it away, than make a complaint to the Ministers here which might lead to asperity or contention.

"I shall see the Duke of York at eleven to-morrow. I have not yet received the cypher and the papers mentioned in my instructions; if they come to-morrow, I do not see any obstacle to my setting off on Sunday, unless any of the subjects opened in this letter should induce you to desire to see me again."

SIR C. WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 3. St. Petersburg.—"The messenger Hunter arrived on Wednesday the 31st ultimo with your Lordship's despatches of the 15th, and in order to remove from your Lordship's mind as soon as possible any doubt of the Emperor's consent to adopt the alterations which it has been judged necessary to make in the original plan of operations, I lose not a moment in conveying to your Lordship his Imperial Majesty's entire acquiescence in everything which is now proposed; and

orders are actually sent after the first division, should it have left Revel, and it was ready to sail on Friday last, to proceed immediately to Yarmouth Roads, from thence to be employed in any manner which may then be judged expedient.

“The second division will follow to the same place of *rendezvous* as soon as the English transports already arrived shall be filled, without waiting for those who, for want of vessels, may be detained at Revel till fresh transports shall reach that port from England; so that about 8,000 men may be expected to follow the first division in the course of a week, and soon after the whole body of Russians will be on its way to the place of its destination.

“There exists not the smallest difficulty here respecting the nomination of his Royal Highness the Duke of York to the command of this army; it was always understood and stipulated in the treaty that the senior officer should command the whole; and his Royal Highness was particularly alluded to in this arrangement. The same may be said of the officer commanding the first division, who, being only Major-General, will be of course commanded by Sir Ralph Abercrombie. For the rest, I can only repeat, what I have had the honour so frequently to state to your Lordship, that all plans proposed or adopted by his Imperial Majesty are acknowledged to be subject to such alterations as his Majesty may think expedient, or as the nature of existing circumstances may require. I trust that this will set your Lordship perfectly at ease with respect to this Court. The Emperor has expressed a wish that Captain Popham should be authorised by his Majesty, and by the Commander in Chief, to correspond with me for his Imperial Majesty’s information; and for that purpose that he should keep me fully informed, and as expeditiously as possible, of all circumstances during the progress of the campaign which may be interesting to his Imperial Majesty, and which he may be supposed anxious to learn correctly, and without delay. His Majesty’s sanction to such a correspondence would be very agreeable to the Emperor, if your Lordship should see no inconvenience in it.

“I beg leave to refer your Lordship for every farther particular to my co-operator, whose activity and intelligence cannot be sufficiently commended. I enclose to your Lordship the proposition of his Swedish Majesty, such as it has been communicated by that Court to the Russian Ministers, and by them to me, accompanied by the enclosed letters from Count Rastopsin. Your Lordship will perceive that the ground of the negotiation is entirely changed; from what motives, or with what views, I cannot pretend to determine. The question is now no longer whether His Majesty will consent to take into his pay 8,000 Swedes, for the express purpose of employing them against Holland in the present expedition, as was originally held out; but whether his Majesty is disposed to make any sacrifice for the purpose of gaining the accession of Sweden to the cause, and to subsidise that number of men, to be employed in the first instance in Pomerania, as a demonstration which the Emperor thinks will have the most beneficial effect upon the Courts of

Berlin and Denmark. This being a perfectly new consideration, his Majesty will best judge how far it may affect the general cause; it remains for me only to observe that it is a measure which his Imperial Majesty has much at heart, so much so, that I have scarcely ventured to raise any strong objection, although many present themselves to my mind and will doubtless suggest themselves to your Lordship. I have, however, pointed out to Count Rastopsin not only the reluctance which his Majesty would feel, but also the difficulties which would be encountered, before so large a sum could be appropriated for an object totally unconnected with that towards which our present exertions are directed, and one which promises less solid advantages to the cause; particularly as the demand for preparation money so much exceeds the proportion paid to his Imperial Majesty on the same account. In answer to this I was assured that the original demand would be insisted upon if his Swedish Majesty's troops could be in readiness to join those of his Majesty and of the Emperor against Holland; and that as all hopes of their co-operation are given up, the measure now proposed is the only one that remains to bring forward the Swedes at all, and that it is referred to his Majesty's consideration how far that object is desirable at the expense at which it must be purchased. I beg leave therefore to submit this proposal in the shape in which it is now brought forward, candidly acknowledging that I see no other advantage to arise from it but that of acquiescing in the wishes of a faithful and zealous ally.

"Your Lordship will observe that the whole transaction is to be negotiated between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Stockholm, his Majesty appearing no farther in it than as covering the engagements which his Imperial Majesty may contract. It is needless for me to animadvert on this reluctance on the part of his Swedish Majesty to negotiate directly with his Majesty; it is, however, impossible not to lament that, at a moment when it is so highly important that all personal considerations should give way to the public good, such rancour should exist to impede its attainment as is manifested in the conduct of the Court of Stockholm. It has even appeared in the presence of the Russian Ministers whilst we were discussing the business for which we were assembled; the Swedish Minister continually adverting to the subject of the confiscated convoy, in terms too of more rancour than might have been expected on such an occasion. I did not deviate in the smallest degree from the language which I have uniformly held;—the arguments we have to urge are unanswerable, and they remain, of course, unanswered." *Copy.*

Enclosure.

BARON DE STEDDING, *Ambassador from Sweden*, to
COUNT DE RASTOPSIN.

1799, July 20. St. Petersburg.—"Le roi fera passer en Poméranie sur ses propres bâtiments, et dans le plus court espace de temps qu'il sera possible, 8,500 hommes; y compris 700 hommes de cavalerie, et les canonniers nécessaires pour le service des pièces de campagne.

“Le roi étant décidé de faire les derniers efforts pour contribuer au succès des vues de sa Majesté Impériale, renonce à toute indemnisation des fraix déjà faits, tant pour l’engagement des hommes, que pour leur équipement, armement, *et cetera*; et se borne à demander, pour rendre ce corps mobile et le transporter en Poméranie, 125 mille livres sterlings payables à l’échange des ratifications.

“Les subsides que l’Angleterre s’est engagée de payer à Sa Majesté Impériale pour les 17 mille hommes destinés à l’expédition de la Hollande, qui sont de 44 mille livres sterlings par mois, sont acceptées par le roi pour les 8,500 hommes; ce qui fait 22 mille livres sterlings par mois, sauf à s’arranger pour l’article des fourages. Le paiement de ces subsides se fera toujours d’avance de trois mois en trois mois, et Sa Majesté le roi de Suède souhaiterait d’avoir une bonne maison de commerce désignée à Hambourg, sur laquelle elle pourrait tirer à l’époque des échéances.

“Dans ce corps auxiliaire de troupes Suédoises sera compris le contingent du roi pour l’empire, et les deux souverains contractants s’arrangeront sur la manière de le faire agir.

“Le roi est dans l’intention de fournir les chevaux pour la cavalerie, l’artillerie, et pour les bagages.” *Certified copy.*

SIR C. WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 3. St. Petersburg.—“In addition to what I have said in my preceding despatch on the subject of the Swedish proposition, it is necessary, in order if possible to render this transaction less exceptionable, to mention that his Imperial Majesty has assured me in a conversation which I have had with him since it was written, that it is his intention, in any engagement which he may contract with his Swedish Majesty, to have it plainly understood that the corps to be assembled in Pomerania shall be at his Majesty’s disposal as soon as it shall be seen what effect such a demonstration will have upon the Court of Berlin; and march from thence towards Holland or the Low Countries as may be judged most beneficial, provided the Court of Berlin can be induced by any means to acquiesce in such a measure. This I had from his Imperial Majesty himself, and it is obvious that he mentioned it in order to render this measure, to which he attaches the greatest importance, more palatable to his Majesty.

“His Imperial Majesty, at the same time, informed me, upon condition that I should mention it only to your Lordship, that the conduct of the Court of Vienna appeared to him so unaccountable, and so liable to suspicion, that he had by way of precaution already taken every measure for bringing together the whole body of Russian troops, should he find a disposition (which he had some reason to apprehend) in that Court to abandon him and the cause together. I cannot but think this alarm infinitely exaggerated; it is however sufficient to have excited the Emperor’s uneasiness to an extraordinary

degree. In such an event the corps in Italy, including that of General Rebindar, amounting at the least to 25,000 men, would be joined immediately to that of General Korsakoff and to that of the Prince de Condé, and the whole, forming an army of 70, or 80,000 men under the command of Marshal Suwarrow, would continue the war in the sole name of the Emperor of Russia without any concert with, or assistance whatever from, the House of Austria. Your Lordship will not suppose from this that such an order of things, which might indeed be considered as a real misfortune, is likely to take place; it is meant only that your Lordship should understand that his Imperial Majesty is prepared for every contingency; and it is determined, let what will be the ultimate decision of the Court of Vienna, to prosecute the war which he has so zealously begun, upon his own account.

"This his Imperial Majesty has done me the honour to impart to me himself this evening at the ball at Peterhoff, on my positive promise to communicate the matter to no one but your Lordship.

"Should the jealousy now conceived against the Court of Vienna be productive of such consequences, it is possible that the execution of his Majesty's views of carrying the war into the interior of France may be considerably facilitated. Some ideas are entertained by the Emperor, on what ground I know not, that this important object, from which such beneficial effects may be fairly expected, does not meet the approbation of the Austrian Cabinet; and that the employing their army either in the siege of Mentz or some other equally tedious operation would be preferred; at all events it most certainly would, according to the notions entertained here, prefer penetrating into the Low Countries with the hope of recovering its former possessions, and thus furnish one more instance of the constant policy of that Court in sacrificing on every occasion the public good to its own interests. Without entering into any minute detail on a subject which is not yet become a matter of discussion, I think I can venture to say that the restoring the Low Countries to the House of Austria would be made to depend on the extent of possessions which it might arrogate to itself in Italy; and should their ideas of aggrandisement, as there is but too much reason to presume, be very extensive on that side, that then it would be deemed good policy to assign a part at last of the Low Countries to the House of Orange. I mention this however entirely as a notion on which I cannot yet speak positively. I can only in general state that the possession of Brabant will depend, as far as this Court has any influence in the decision, on the degree of extension which the Court of Vienna may give to its views in other quarters; and that the disposal of that country in favour of the Stadtholder (in the reinstating of whom in the full extent of his authority, his Imperial Majesty's views coincide perfectly with those of his Majesty), would willingly be acceded to upon a principle of its being necessary to strengthen that Government by extending its territory, and to assign it a strong barrier on the side of Flanders.

“His Imperial Majesty, upon Captain Popham’s taking leave of him yesterday, suggested the possibility of the Court of Copenhagen’s being tempted to resist the passage of his troops through the Sound, and ordered Captain Popham to tell him what he conceived would be necessary to do in such an occurrence. His reply was that such an event could be considered in no other point of view than as a declaration of war, and consequently that it would be expedient to retaliate immediately. The Emperor closed with his idea, and has entrusted Captain Popham with eventual orders to that effect, to be communicated by him to Admiral Hannikoff and General Hermann, should it be found necessary to come to extremities. There cannot exist the smallest possibility of such a determination on the part of Denmark, but it is certainly as well to be prepared at all events; and it may be considered as a mark of confidence in his Imperial Majesty towards Captain Popham, and of that zeal for the cause which leads him to anticipate and to overcome every difficulty.

“Your Lordship will observe in the Swedish proposition that it was intended to include his Swedish Majesty’s contingent to the Empire in the 8,500 men to be sent into Pomerania. This point was however immediately given up.

“I propose setting out for Revel the day after to-morrow, at the Emperor’s particular request, to be present at the embarkation of the second division, and I shall return to Petersburg in the course of seven or eight days. Whatever orders I may receive in the meantime will be forwarded to me there.”

Copy.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 3. Walmer Castle.—“My letter of yesterday will have shewn you that neither your first or second remonstrance were necessary; and, on arriving here this morning, we find things in great forwardness, and the remaining transports expected, so as I trust to ensure the embarkations beginning on Tuesday, and being completed by Thursday. I do not wonder if, under all the circumstances, counting by minutes you think this tardy; but I really believe there never was more exertion, nor ever any expedition so nearly punctual to its time. It will be some relief to you to see that the language of the Jacobins respecting Holland will not tend to smooth the way for the Prussian negotiation at Paris. I think you may now venture to look at the Downs, which are at this moment as beautiful to the eye as to the imagination, being crowded with transports on which the sun is shining, as if they had already ensured our success.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

Private.

1799, August 3. Dropmore.—“I have just received your letter. I was perhaps to blame in not having mentioned to you, before you saw Starhemberg, that all conversation with him was *à pure perte*, except as far as goes to mere civility. Thugut

hates his father, and is jealous of him, and keeps him in utter ignorance of all that is done, doing, or to be done : and if one succeeded in interesting him in any of the objects we have in view, his recommendation of it would be much more likely to do harm than good. He will, therefore, have learnt much more in the conversation than he knew before ; and, I am sorry to say, I am by no means convinced of his disposition to make a good use of what he learns, even if he had the power to do so.

“The question of your going to Vienna is a very delicate one, and his judgment is by no means to be trusted upon it. When it was proposed to us to send an officer in your situation, Thugut mentioned that we should send him either to Vienna or to the Archduke’s headquarters. He would obviously have preferred the former, and we had strong reasons to prefer the latter, and therefore took him at his word without further discussion. We have an interest in thwarting that system of directing military operations from Vienna, because it has never been employed but to our disadvantage ; and we were very desirous of engaging, as a party in our measures, the person who is to execute them. We have, besides, a much more advantageous situation with respect to Russia, by treating on this subject at the army, than by discussing it at Vienna. Korsakow is in a manner placed under our orders by those which he has received from Petersburg, and this gives us two voices out of those in the concert. At Vienna the Russian Minister would feel himself quite independent of us, and the present Russian Minister there is completely in Thugut’s hands.

“My wish is, therefore, very strongly that you may not find it necessary to go to Vienna, and I am inclined to think you will not ; but I thought it right not to confine your discretion too much in that respect, because cases may undoubtedly arise that would require it : but you must always remember that by doing so you will incur great risk of disobliging the Arch-Duke : and that the private interests of the latter lead to his pushing this campaign actively, while all Thugut’s jealousy inclines him the other way.

“The question of not making peace but by common consent has been bandied about in all the correspondence between London and Vienna till there is no more to be said upon it. The great objection to such stipulations is that they do bind us because we perform our treaties, and that they do not bind Austria, who broke its engagements with us on this very subject at Campo Fornio, at Leoben, and at Rastadt, or rather at Seltz.

“It belongs however to a more extensive concert than there is yet a prospect of. We may combine our military operations, without having combined our political system ; and perhaps, after all that has passed, the former is the best course to be pursued for attaining the latter ; but if we delay the one till we get the other, Thugut has at once attained *his* object, if

that be delay and inactivity. If, therefore, anything is said to you by the Arch-Duke on that point, I am sure you should put it by as belonging to Lord Minto's mission at Vienna, and by no means to the discussion of a military concert for this campaign.

"The idea of a power of advancing money to them could have been mentioned by Starhemberg only to *pump*. He knows that it is out of the question. The short fact on that subject is, that he signed a treaty with me here, on the faith of which we advanced them money; after which they refused, and still refuse to ratify his treaty, though they took the money. Fifty dirty tricks have been tried to make us acquiesce in this state of things, and give them more money. We have always refused, and *point de ratification point d' argent* has been dinned into his ears and Thugut's, till we are tired of repeating it.

"This determination cannot, however, on any account, or by any pretence or subterfuge, be departed from or eluded, and he knows that as well as I do. No power therefore is given to Wickham in this respect. So far from it that, even when authority was given to Craufurd to expend money in raising Swiss troops, he was directed to do so on an express statement that those troops were not to be under the Austrian orders or command, otherwise than as the King might put them so for the moment.

"You certainly judged quite right in not giving him any reason to think that we would interfere in recommending to the Court of Vienna to employ a general of his choice. His only object in this, which he has tried very often before, is to find out whereabouts we are with respect to the Netherlands; and he will certainly write something or other to his Court as a discovery which he has made through you of our intentions in that respect. But as we do not yet quite see our own way through that difficulty, it will not be easy for him to foretell what path we shall follow.

"I wish I could agree with you in thinking him candid. I have known him too long, and have had too much dealing with him to think so: and I rather regret I did not put you more on your guard against him; though I do not see that any harm can arise from what *has* passed, provided one was sure that he would faithfully report it. But let me intreat you on no account to think of writing anything to him from the army but mere compliment.

"I trust you will receive the cyphers and enclosures to-day, and I am not aware of anything that can make it necessary that we should meet again; though, if you wish it, I am at your orders at half an hour's notice.

"You may easily conceive how delighted I am at this beginning of the Indian war, and at the infinite honour which Mornington must acquire from his able and decisive conduct, which has placed us in such a commanding situation in India."

Postscript. "I am not quite sure that I have enough explained above what I mean as to the Netherlands. It is this. Austria has no right even to enquire, much less to learn what

our ultimate designs may be as to her recovering the Netherlands, unless that discussion is included in the extensive consideration of measures and objects for the prosecution and ultimate termination of the war, into which Lord Minto is, by the instructions to him which you have seen, fully empowered to enter.

"Till then it would, perhaps, be premature even to form our own determination on this point; but it would certainly be very much so to let them know it.

"Even if we had resolved (and such I incline to think will ultimately be our resolution) that it is best for us to replace Austria in the possession of those countries, there will be points of much difficulty to arrange with that government as to the mode of its possessing them. We conquered them, and defended them (that is England and Holland did) with our arms and money. We gave them to the German branch of the House of Austria, who had a doubtful title, and no means of enforcing it but by our aid. We gave them on certain conditions, all of which Austria has broken. We were guarantees of the constitutions of those provinces, and had a strong interest, commercial and political, in maintaining them. Austria violated those constitutions and by so doing lost the provinces, and ceded them to France by a definitive treaty of peace, which she had no power to do, without our express consent. We were guarantees of the Barrier treaty, on which the defence of Holland rested; Austria dismantled the barrier, expelled the Dutch troops, and thereby lost Holland to us.

"The mischiefs must, in any case, be guarded against in future. How this may best be done must depend on events which are still uncertain, but it plainly will not be done by replacing Austria in the state in which she stood in 1794, disengaged by her breach of treaty from those engagements which we had required for our safety when we gave the country to her.

"Recent events, and particularly the conduct of Prussia, may make it proper to enter into earlier and fuller explanations on these points than I thought likely four days ago; but, till they are fully explained, we must be cautious not to commit this country either way upon them; and you will see how very cautiously your instructions on this point have, for that reason, been worded." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 3. Vienna.—"I must begin by wishing your Lordship joy of the surrender of Mantua, with the particulars of which Lord Henley will acquaint you.

"I arrived here on the first instant, and have met with the kindest and most cordial reception from Lord Henley, who affords me every assistance which our common duty can require, or which private friendship can suggest. He presented me to

Baron Thugut yesterday, and I delivered copies of my credentials, as is usually done on such occasions. This visit being merely formal, nothing passed which it is necessary to relate; and, indeed, as I cannot present my letters of credence to the Emperor and Empress till Tuesday the 6th, I feel it to be more becoming that I should defer till that is done the commencement of my official correspondence, which it is the less necessary to begin to-day as Lord Henley's dispatch by this messenger will bring the affairs of this Court down to the latest date. I have however thought it necessary, by Lord Henley's desire, to acquaint Lord Mulgrave with the resolution expressed by Baron Thugut not to authorize the Archduke to concert with his Lordship the future operations of the campaign, and with his proposal that Lord Mulgrave should come to Vienna for that purpose. Lord Mulgrave will naturally judge whether it is expedient, or agreeable to the instructions which he bears, to comply with this proposal. A very well-founded diffidence in my own views on military questions, added to the high opinion I entertain of Lord Mulgrave's talents and judgment, would render his assistance on that great branch of the affairs of the present period most acceptable to me, and I shall take the liberty of expressing this sentiment to him. At the same time I should think it likely that he should wait for instructions before he came to Vienna, and I mention this conjecture that your Lordship may take the steps you think proper for expediting those instructions."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 4. Downing Street.—"J'ai reçu votre billet écrit hier, avec les incluses, c'est-à-dire les deux billets que Mr. Wickham m'a envoyé, et la lettre de Kalitcheff, ainssi que celle que Mr. Wickham vous a adressé sur la misérable affaire de l'Archiduc sur l'Aar.

"Je remi cette dernière à Mr. Hamond, en vous remerciant de cette communication.

"J'ai vue celle que vous avez eu la bonté d'écrire à ma prière à Mr. Walpole à Lisbonne en faveur de B——— Mattiz, et j'ai bien reconu toute votre bonté pour moi.

"Il est inutile d'envoyer un cutter, à ce qu'il me semble, car, si c'est pour trouver nos transports à Elsseneur, il ne les trouvera plus là. Ils doivent être déjà entre le Categat et la cote d'Angleterre. Les croiseurs de votre flotte devraient être muni d'ordres de l'Amiral Duncan au notre Amiral Whitchagoff, pour qu'il aille au Texel, et le premier qui le rencontrera lui signifiera ces ordres, qu'il suivra tout de suite.

"Si vous vouliez envoyer votre courrier à Petersbourg par ce cutter, je vous supplie de considérer que nous avons eu constamment des vents de ouest depuis près de six semaines. Ils doivent donc changer, et dès qu'ils se mettent à l'est, ce cutter sera plus d'un mois en route, tandis qu'un courrier ne met que quatorze jours entre Cuxhaven et Petersbourg. Je vous réitère ma prière de

défférer l'expédition de votre courier jusqu'après demain, vendredi. J'ai besoin d'écrire à fond à Rastopchin sur les intrigues et l'ambition de l'Autriche.

"Kotchoubei, qui comprend bien les affaires, n'est plus probablement en place; sans crédit malgré ses grands talents et sa probité, il étoit résolu de quitter sa place les premiers jours du moi passé. C'est un malheur d'autant plus grand qu'il voyoit come vous et moi les perfidies Autrichiennes, et avoit l'habilité de les déjouer; mais Rastopchin, quoiqu'il connoit et n'aime pas la politique tortueuse de Thugut, il est trop naïf et ne comprend pas assés les affaires. Il faut donc lui expliquer tout et en grand détail. J'étois venu ici pour lire votre lettre à mylord Minto, mais le Duc d'Yorck m'est fait chercher pour que j'aïlle chez lui. Je viendrai ici demain, et Mr. Hamond me lira ce que vous avez permis qu'il me lise.

"Je ne demande pas mieux, et c'est avec un bien grand plaisir que je viendrai à Dropmore avec ma fille, Mademoiselle Jardine, et mon fils, si cela vous conviens samedi, et nous y resterons jusqu'à lundi matin, car ma fille doit aller mardi aux bains de mere."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 4. Berlin.—"You will easily have seen that in the present state of things your side of the water is more interesting than mine; if there is any truth in the assurances of Haugwiz respecting both the shape and progress of their negociation, we have no great reason to fear that Sandoz will move faster than Abercrombie, and I see that our Prussian Minister would give me to understand that the business will not find much activity or success by the assistance given to it at Berlin. I am daily more and more convinced that my present residence here does much more harm than good in the moment; I scarcely believe that anything can be done with our Prussian politicians under the strange mis-shapen shadow of government which prevails here; but if there is any chance of amending their conduct and measures, it is by fear only that this change can be made, a fear arising from their seeing themselves reduced to the solitary position in Europe which they have so industriously carved out for themselves; a fear that the allied Courts will at last abandon the vain effort of active connection with them, an unquiet fear of the dissatisfaction at Petersburg, but more than all a fear that Great Britain will not give itself to a concert of general arrangement with them, now that they shall have suffered Holland to have been re-established without them.

"Their present only confidence arises from a strong persuasion that, however the United Provinces be recovered from France, Great Britain must still come to Prussia for security and solidity to its re-establishment; and that sentiment is as strongly planted in the mind of Haugwiz as any which can take root there. Now, however true it may be that we do want, or rather that we should prefer to any other, the assistance of Prussia for the

security of Holland, it is not perhaps true that we want that assistance more than Prussia herself wants to give it, because without doubt, their frontier is more immediately concerned than ours in securing against France the independence of Holland; if this is so there is no reason why we should be governed by a view of our interest to court them, pay them, or solicit them to do what is felt by them to be as much their own interest as ours. The little and crooked hope of Haugwiz is that we shall eagerly act upon the direct principle of our own interest, and that whatever be the blame which we are intitled to reproach to Prussia, he still thinks that we shall want them so much as to make it necessary for us to come to them cap in hand, although he is almost ready to acknowledge that we should serve them right if we rather came with a good oaken stick in hand; he is however confident that, in spite of all their bad behaviour, present and future, we must come and beg of them to help us to keep Holland. It is for that he now considers me as waiting here, and I do not think it is of little importance to shake this confidence of his, and to shew them that there is a real danger of their being left completely in the lurch by us; at least I feel sure that it is your business to give them enough of this alarm to set the balance even before your general discussions begin. Without this, we shall be placed in the disadvantageous situation of having to court and to crouch to Austria in order to engage them to keep their own Netherlands; and to be in a similar state of dependence upon Prussia, in order to obtain from them that security for Holland which is still more necessary to them, if possible, than to us. I own that I am myself so strongly impressed with this view of the subject, that I should have been tempted to avail myself of the opportunity which their Paris negotiations gave me of asking to accompany Panin in his audience of *cong  * to the King, and in some respects this would have been useful by very much increasing their fears here. I was restrained from doing so, partly because I thought it would have too much the appearance of sudden ill humour, partly because it would have given to France the appearance of full and undisturbed possession of Prussia, and partly because it was not then easy to determine whether I might not better assist your Orange expedition by remaining here than by moving to any other place.

“This last, which was the main reason, no longer subsists; the Hereditary-Prince of Orange is gone, and I trust will in a few days be on his road to the Hague; and of course his departure from hence has removed the only material point of communication which I could assist. If any wish of his, or any reasonable expectation of advantage to the common cause should seem to demand me with him for a very short time, I could in that shape perhaps give a temporary assistance there before I took my new road back by Helv  tsluys; my absence in that case would here do good for the reasons which I have stated; my presence can do no good, as every reasonable person would now, I think, acknowledge.

"It is only after having satisfied myself completely of the good public grounds on which I should desire to return from Berlin that I allow myself to add any of private and personal consideration; you will, however, confess that I have fairly gone through the business which I had undertaken, and that I have worn to a thread the Berlin negotiation for co-operation against France.

"I think nothing more can be done here now to obtain that object, and you know how distinctly I contracted not to engage in any durable residence, and therefore how unwillingly I should see any new business proposed to me here, now that the business which I had to do is fairly worn through. I am not, as you see, quibbling about words, for I fairly acknowledge that I considered the deliverance of Holland as the object which I had to seek at Berlin; and, one way or other, by your help more than by mine, that will have been accomplished. Whatever remains to do towards the first accomplishment of that great object, I am still ready to do if I can give any assistance to it; but I trust that you will understand me well concerning it, and feel with me that no point of duty or obligation on public grounds can demand from me more than to give myself to such risk or such trouble as really belongs to the first act of the Deliverance of Holland; to that I will freely and heartily give, in every possible shape, the best assistance that I can, if there seems any shape in which I can be useful; but that once done, I must fairly say that I think I have worked my passage back to England, and to you, and must send my *sommation* to you not to engage me in any new discussions in Prussia or in Holland. My limit here is providentially marked, for the master of the house in which I write comes into it on the 1st of September, and no human consideration could induce me to look out for another when I have outlived this. I have written, as you see, in the same sense with you to Lord Minto and to Whitworth; it is by Stamford that I hope to learn something of the Landgrave of Hesse Cassell, at his return here from Brunswick. *Eh viva Abercrombie.*"

Postscript. "I add one line of postscript to tell you that I am just now informed of Haugwiz having said to the Austrian *Chargé d' Affaires* here that, as he observed the Court of Vienna was looking for a more sure frontier, and as Mr. Pitt had announced the intention of some indemnities for England, he should think Prussia would likewise require a more sufficient frontier against France. If they have this object, the next thing to know is whether they will negotiate it with France, or state it to us as the condition of their defence of Holland; but I cannot yet believe they will venture to stand out about the Netherlands, if Great Britain and Russia pronounce themselves decidedly upon that subject. Mantua has offered to surrender upon terms which are sent to Vienna, but will probably be refused, because they think it cannot long hold out. A person just arrived from Prague assures positively that the Russian corps does not exceed 33,000 men, and that they cannot be at Schaffhausen before the 20th instant."

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 4. Harley Street.—“I cannot regret having had the conversation with Starhemberg, as it has been the occasion of my receiving your letter, which came last night after I was in bed; and the more especially as I cannot, upon my best recollection, recall anything said by me that could be perverted to any purpose whatever at Vienna. You are already acquainted with the substance of the few answers given by me; the conversation was mostly on his part. I told him that I had not received my instructions, and was only generally acquainted with the object of my mission; namely to concert measures when I should arrive on the spot. You might be very well assured that I should enter into no confidential correspondence with him, but under your directions; and I mentioned his proposal to you (not knowing your opinion of him, or his situation with respect to his own Court,) upon the possibility of your being able to make use of him to clear away difficulties that might not be proper matter of official representation. However, in the light in which you have discovered him to me, that is out of the question. One of my reasons for thinking him candid and even indiscreet was his having stated fully to me the circumstances of the pecuniary transaction you allude to, with the highest praises of Pitt’s bold and liberal conduct on that occasion, and, at the same time, with expressions such as you would have used of the failure on the part of Thugut, after having authorised him (Starhemberg) in repeated letters to sign. His attempt to *pump* out upon these grounds whether money would be advanced after having discussed the subject with you, appears rather weak; as I could only do what I did, assure him that I would mention to you what he had proposed.

“I am particularly happy to have my mission confined as much as possible to *military concert*, and that with the Arch-Duke. I have no stomach for the journey to Vienna, because the objects of the different operations proposed by the King and by that Court are so obvious, according to my conception of them, that I do not think they can be disguised by any military arguments; and the adoption of one or the other will depend in a great measure upon the extent of the influence which his Majesty and his allies have over the conduct of the Court of Vienna. Lest I should have misconceived the real state of the case, I will explain my apprehension of it, which I did not think necessary before, conceiving that I had only to state to you the best military arguments I could collect for the adoption of the King’s plan of operations, and such as I should propose to make use of to the Arch-Duke. The result of the adoption of one or other of the proposed plans, I conceive to be as follows.

“If the Arch-Duke agrees to support the attack upon Lyons by besieging Huningue, Belfort, and Besançon, he employs his army to the great object of the common cause, and Austria rests

satisfied with her Italian acquisitions by this campaign ; Great Britain, by the operation of the Duke of York's army, holding in her hands and at her disposal Holland and the Low Countries ; the French remaining in possession of both banks of the Rhine from Brisach, with the power of again invading Germany, in the event of the operation on the frontiers of Franche Comté being unsuccessful ; this, in the supposition that Prussia does not come forward. In case a Prussian army should march for the reduction of Mayence and Elhrinbreitstien (Holland and the Low Countries being disposed of as above) the northern part of Germany would remain in the possession and under the protection of Prussia, and Austria would thereby see the Low Countries and a great part of the Empire in the hands of the powers of which she appears to be equally jealous. On the other hand, should the last proposal of Thugut, that the Arch-Duke should march against Mayence, be adopted, it is equally obvious to me that His Royal Highness would afford no assistance thereby either to the Russians under Suwarrow, or to the Duke of York ; but would possess himself (without risk to his own army, or any opposition but that of the garrison) of that fortress ; and perhaps of Luxembourg also ; and by approaching the Low Countries might have an opportunity of stirring up Austrian partisans in that country to demand the restoration of the Emperor to his territories there, in the same manner as the Kings of Naples and Sardinia have been restored to their dominions. If this should succeed, the operations of the Duke of York's army in the Low Countries will have been purely Austrian ; whilst the Russian forces in his Majesty's pay will have been only employed to cover the Arch-Duke's operations, by keeping the French in check upon the southern frontiers, and at the same time to guard and secure the acquisition of the Austrians in Italy. Whether the measure of endeavouring to get the Emperor proclaimed in the Low Countries is one that could be undertaken with a prospect of success ; whether it would be so plausible, under all the existing circumstances, as to make it difficult to resist or elude the execution of it, are political questions which I have no business to discuss ; but they are so involved in the negotiation of military operations that it is impossible entirely to omit the mention of them, whilst I am stating to you the objects which occur to me as likely to influence a resistance on each side to the measures proposed by the other. Considering, as I do, the balance of advantage and the weight of influence at the close of the campaign to depend so considerably (if not entirely) upon the adoption of one or other of the measures to be discussed at the Arch-Duke's head-quarters, I should very reluctantly agree to the march of the Arch-Duke's army to Mayence after the deliverance of Switzerland, as the Russians would thereby be, of necessity, put on the defensive. The weakness of the Arch-Duke's army will not, *in fact*, be an obstacle, nor, even in *argument*, a prevailing objection to that measure, for the reasons already mentioned.

"I state all these circumstances thus urgently to you that you may be aware of the difficulties I am likely to meet with if the Arch-Duke should not have the power to determine, and act at once upon consultations to be held at his head-quarters. I am informed by Starhemberg (for what purpose if not sincerely I cannot guess) that, 'excepting his courage, and his *coup d'œil militaire*, I am not likely to think the talents of the Arch-Duke equal to his reputation, but that by endeavouring to gain his friendship and goodwill, he will be easily disposed to concur with me in the measures that may be proposed, if he has authority to act'; and then followed his proposal of going to Vienna. I have recurred again to Starhemberg from a wish to put you in possession, as much as possible, of everything that passed; as you appear by your letter to be under some uneasiness lest any mischief should arise from that conversation. I hope, however, that you will find that no harm has been done, and that I have not *compromised* either you or myself, as yet at least.

"I shall, of course, take Mr. Wickham's opinion of the Archduke's character, and be guided by that, till I have an opportunity of forming my own. If the Archduke should say that he has no authority to act upon the result of our consultation, but must write to Vienna, do you wish I should go thither *in case the Archduke should concur with me* in the plan of operations I am directed to propose? You have already instructed me to endeavour to procure an order from Vienna for the execution of it, in case I should find the Archduke disposed rather to adopt the plan of marching against Mayence.

"I have not yet received the cipher or my passport; I do not know whether it will be necessary to name Captain Foster in it as my *aide-de-camp*, or whether *la suite* will be sufficient for him. Not any of the other papers mentioned in my instructions are sent to me; I only wait for them to set off.

"I felt much gratified, though not at all surprised, at the wise and vigorous measures of Mornington's government; I trust and hope they will lead to our entire relief from the turbulence and dangerous power of Tippoo in India. Mornington has shown great kindness to a person in India with whom I am nearly connected; I beg you will have the goodness to send him my thanks which I enclose, when you have an opportunity of sending letters to him. I write in great haste that I may receive your answer to-night or early to-morrow morning, particularly on the point of my journey to Vienna."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 5. Dropmore.—"I send you a list I have received from the Bishop of St. Pol of royalists in the prisons, whom he wishes us to send to France. As we shall probably have to maintain them now if they remain where they are, I conceive there would be no objection to release them provided means could be found of being certain of sending them back to

France. If you see no reason to be of a different opinion, and will send the necessary orders to Huskisson, I will instruct Frere to settle with him and Woodford the means of doing this." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

1799, August 5. Dropmore.—“I found your letter here last night on my return from Windsor. I think your view of the result of the two different plans a very just one, and it certainly leads to our urging in the strongest manner the adoption of that which we have proposed. The best argument to be used for that purpose seems to me to be the evident insufficiency of Thugut's plan to the main object, to which every rational man must look for the termination of the war, and the security of Europe. The Austrians themselves must feel that whatever may be the *terms* on which they must conclude a peace with the Directory, *that* peace can only be an armed truce; and that Europe can never be really restored to tranquility but by the restoration of monarchy in France. Now the operation against Mayence has no tendency to produce that restoration, whereas the success of that against Lyons affords the best hope for it.

“But it may, I think, be questioned whether the operation against Mayence be one which, in the present state of the Austrian army, it would be safe to undertake. If it be (as I fear it is) certain that, without a very powerful co-operation to the southward, the Russians cannot advance into France after the Archduke is withdrawn to Mayence, the Directory will, after a certain time, find themselves at their ease on that subject; and would, in that case, either move directly to the attack of the besieging army, or would, more probably, make so powerful an attack across the Upper Rhine as would oblige the Archduke to divide his force in such a manner as to render it weak in every point, and by no means equal to the siege of such a place as Mayence. And the result would be, what we have so often seen in the course of this war from divided operations, that neither would succeed.

“Certainly a great deal of this difficulty will be removed if we can come to a satisfactory understanding with Vienna about the Netherlands, which seems every hour to grow more and more probable.

“When you are at headquarters you will, of course, learn from Lord Minto what impression the representations he has already made on this subject have produced; and your going to Vienna must be in some degree regulated by that. If the Archduke is himself adverse to our plan, there remains nothing but to push it at Vienna by every possible exertion; but, if he accedes to it, or professes indifference, or ignorance of the views of his Court, and Thugut hesitates or refuses, the question of delicacy arises. I should, in that case, incline to think that more may be done by your remaining with the armies to urge it there, and trusting to Lord Minto's exertions to press it at Vienna, than by your going to assist in this task at Vienna, leaving it to the chance of some intrigue to spring up in your absence at the army.

“This is, however, a point on which it is really impossible to speak with precision beforehand. Supposing the Archduke strongly impressed with the plan and eager for it, he may urge your journey to Vienna in a way very difficult for you to resist. Other motives, which it would be too long to enumerate, may lead to the same decision. Lord Minto who, I believe, would speak quite candidly on such a point, may himself desire it of you; and, on the whole, I have no doubt of your making a right decision upon it according to the circumstances of the moment; though I wish you to bear in your mind the reasons which I have mentioned to you for my wishing that the course of the business may be found such as to admit of the arranging it at headquarters, rather than at Vienna.

“I hope there will be no more delay in your having your papers. I have written again about it, but if there is any fresh difficulty, have the goodness to see Frere, whom I have directed to do everything that is necessary.” *Copy.*

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, August 5. Lingén.—“Conformément à ce que je vous ai marqué dans ma dernière, je suis parti de Berlin le 29 du mois passé, pour me rendre à Lingén, où je suis arrivé avant hier au soir. À mon passage à Brunswic, où j’ai passé quelques momens avec le Duc, j’ai eu occasion de me convaincre que la tournure que les négociations avec les Cours de Petersbourg et de Londres avoient prise l’avoient profondément affligé, et qu’il étoit pénétré de tout ce que cette conduite renfermoit de peu honorable pour la monarchie Prussienne. Ce que le duc m’a dit à ce sujet m’a persuadé entièrement qu’il n’a eu aucune part directe à la détermination du Roi, et qu’il regrette vivement de voir ce monarque adopter un système qui ne peut qu’affaiblir la gloire et l’influence dont la Prusse est en droit de jouir. Les informations qu’on m’a données à mon arrivée ici relativement à l’intérieur de la République continuent à peindre les dispositions des habitans comme très bonnes, et n’indiquent pas que le Gouvernement fasse de grands efforts pour opposer de la résistance aux troubles qui pourront éclater à l’approche d’une force ennemie. Il y a eu dans la nuit du premier au second de ce mois quelques mouvemens dans la province du Groningue, mais de peu de conséquence, et qui n’ont point eu de suite. Je n’ai point encore reçu de nouvelles de M. Van de Spiegel, mais à mon arrivée ici, l’on m’a assuré qu’il avoit été atteint, il y a 3 ou 4 semaines, d’une attaque d’apoplexie; j’ai tout lieu de croire cependant que c’est un faux bruit, personne n’ayant rien appris d’ultérieur à son sujet.

“J’ai trouvé ici M. de Suyderas; M. de Rhoon, et son frère M. Charles Bentinck, y sont arrivés hier; ces messieurs repartent probablement demain pour Varel.”

[Enclosure.]

MEMOIRE SUR L'INSURRECTION DU BRABANT.

“On a pour la Campère un chef établi à Lommel, dans la mairie de Bois le Duc, appelé Klerke, qui dit pouvoir disposer de 4,000 hommes, et, avec le tems, de beaucoup d'avantage. Il y a l'espoir assuré de sa part d'avoir 7,000 fusils à raison de 6 florins d'Hollande par pièce, autant de poudre qu'il voudra à raison de 30 sols d'Hollande la livre, une imprimerie à raison de 1,000 florins.

“On demande pour chaque recrue 1 couronne de Brabant; pour paye du fantassin 1 escalin de Brabant, pour le cavalier 1½ escalin de Brabant par jour; les bas officiers payés comme en Hollande.

“M. Martens s'engage d'insurger le Brabant. Les Brabançons, Flamands, ne se lèveront en masse que quand ils se verront soutenus par des troupes étrangères, dont le nombre soit respectable, et qui apportent du canon, des obus, des munitions, 40,000 fusils.

“On a près de Bruges un camp de 6,000 Francois; sur la côte de Flandre, y compris ce camp, 8 à 9,000 hommes, pour la plupart conscrits.

“A Lille 700 hommes, à Bergen-op-Zoom 150. D'après les renseignements, on donnera un plan pour surprendre cette ville dès qu'on aura des détails plus circonstanciés et avérés.

“On a établi une correspondance avec ceux de Flandre, au moyen de quoi on sera instruit exactement de l'état des choses dans cette partie-là, et des forces Françaises sur la côte.

“On s'est dit assuré des villes de Louvain, Malines, et Bruxelles; dans Malines il n'y a que 6 ou 7 pièces de canon.

“On a envoyé le long de la côte de Flandre, depuis Bruges jusques dans Lille, un arpenteur, ancien militaire qui a travaillé aux cartes de ferrari; et qui donnera un rapport détaillé de tout ce qu'il y aura d'intéressant.

“On manque de pain dans le Belgique, mais on pourra en acheter dans le Lang Straat. On ne doit pas se fier à la ville de Gand.

“Le Gouvernement provisoire de ce pays, durant l'insurrection, devrait consister dans le magistrat des villes sans le commandant militaire. Mais tout ce qu'on fera provisionnellement. Le point de Blankenberg est le plus favorable à une descente pour les Anglois; on a en Angleterre un pilote très habile—on se fait fort d'en fournir un autre, si la flotte Angloise de débarquement avait besoin.

“On ne peut pas se flatter d'obtenir des succès dans l'entreprise d'insurger ce pays efficacement sans une somme d'argent proportionnée aux besoins. On croit qu'il faudrait pour commencer 400,000 à 500,000 florins pour la Campère et le Brabant. On demande dans ce cas un homme chargé du poste de commissaire ordonnateur, ceux qui se chargeront de la partie militaire ne pouvant pas prendre cette comptabilité sur eux.

“ Il sera très nécessaire de donner aux troupes qui doivent soutenir l'insurrection du Brabant, les ordres les plus rigoureux pour observer une bonne discipline et respecter les propriétés.

“ Il sera nécessaire pour contenir la populace d'Anvers d'y envoyer un régiment d'infanterie et un détachement de cavalerie capables d'y maintenir la tranquillité. Objet qui ne peut être rempli que par un commandant sage et ferme; et qui agisse de concert avec les membres les plus marquants de l'ancien magistrat; on devra s'emparer tout de suite de la citadelle.

“ Il faudra commencer par y rétablir le culte public dans toute sa splendeur, comme dans toute la Belgique; en observant la précaution de faire consacrer le local et la cérémonie, et sans rien négliger sur ce point très important. Il faut pour l'insurrection un chef militaire pleinement autorisé, sans quoi les chefs partiels ne pouvaient pas agir de concert.”

Nota bene 1. “ On sent la nécessité absolue de garder un secret religieux sur le nom des personnes ci-dessus nommées, qui seraient perdus si on les soupçonnoit seulement.

Nota bene 2. “ On est convenu depuis quelques semaines avec les chefs des insurgés, qu'ils ne donneront aucune ouverture de leurs affaires qu'à ceux qui seront muni de la marque convenue avec M. d'Yvoy.

Nota bene 3. “ Les Francois envoient vers la Flandres tous les prisonniers relâchés sur la parole de ne plus servir, et faits en Italie.”

WILLIAM HUSKISSON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 5. Downing Street.—“ Mr. Huskisson will have the honour of forwarding to your Lordship to-morrow the additional instructions to Sir Ralph Abercromby founded on Mr. Dundas's letter, and also those to Colonel Malcolm, both of which have been signed by Mr. Dundas, and are now delivered to the respective parties. Colonel Malcolm proceeds to-morrow to Yarmouth, on his way to Emerick. With respect to Rottier Mr. H[uskisson] has this day sent him down to Walmer with a letter explaining his connection with Starhemberg, and cautioning Mr. Dundas accordingly. Sir Ralph will get what information he can from him, and either take him with him or not as he may think proper.

“ Mr. Rottier is not apprised of Colonel Malcolm's mission.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 6. Canterbury.—“ At the same time you receive this, you will get a letter from me to Huskisson conveying to you information of the precise state in which we now stand regarding our expedition. The battery of Goree secured, of which no doubts are entertained, and the Dutch ships removed from a situation to annoy or rather prevent the landing at the only practicable place, I entertain no apprehensions of our ultimate success; but unless these preliminary points are secured,

with every disposition I have to be sanguine, I cannot bring myself to be confident. As, after all, unsurmountable difficulties may arise to prevent success, I don't think it right that Sir Ralph Abercrombie should sail without provisional instructions founded upon that supposition; and it appears to me that Walcheren and Ameland ought to be the most immediate objects, and the Texel the next. Let me, however, hear from you upon this subject; and unless you will come yourself, I wish you would commit all your ideas to Huskisson, who would bring them down to Mr. Pitt and me, and we would do, after consideration of the whole, what we think best."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, August 6. Dropmore.—"If it had not been for the two lines of postscript which I wrote you by the last mail, I imagine you would have been as much disappointed and mortified at receiving my letter of that date, as I was when I wrote it.

"As it is, everything is going on, I am assured, with activity and dispatch, and the embarkation is to begin to-day. It will not, I trust, be deranged by the account received yesterday by the *Triton* of the combined fleet (40 sail of line) having sailed from Cadiz the 20th, while Lord Keith was still, as we fear, staring about him off Mahon. His conduct seems perfectly unaccountable, but whether he has done right or wrong the mischief is done.

"I suppose Ireland to be the object—probably Brest in the first instance—or perhaps they will only go to Rochefort to release the Spanish ships there, or to take on board the 4 or 5,000 troops. Still, without a more considerable force in troops, they can do us no essential mischief, though, to be sure, they will alarm and distress us a little before our tardy fleet can arrive from the southward.

"I trust however that this will not alter one iota of our measures for the expedition. The Admiralty are, as I understand, collecting a fleet in Torbay; and if it should be necessary for that purpose to weaken Lord Duncan I should not think that much harm was done, for I have no fear of the Dutch fleet at such a moment. The execution of V[an] B[raam]'s promises would be invaluable just now, but I do not think they can be much relied on.

"I believe you are too candid towards your friend Haugwitz when you suppose the proposal to have been made to them through Sandoz. I am confident it originated at Berlin, and our accounts of language held by the Elector of Bavaria after his conference seem to prove it to be so.

"I take it for granted that you will see in this circumstance ground enough for not immediately signing a treaty on the footing which was before in question, supposing that Haugwitz should, as is by no means improbable, have alarmed himself or his master with the fear of Russian hostility, and should have come back on the 24th to cry *peccavi*. It seems quite necessary

to make them feel their own *isolement* a little, though certainly without the smallest idea on our part of breaking with them, or using anything like hostile conduct or menaces. But as the main argument which our adversaries at Berlin have always used against us is the certainty that, let Prussia use us ever so ill, our money will always be at her disposal whenever she will take it, there seems much advantage in proving to them the contrary, now that we are strong enough to do so."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 6. Berlin.—"It is unnecessary for me to pursue that part of your letter of 30th ultimo which I have just received, in which you speak of our Prussian negotiation, because you will already have known that it has vanished into idle air; and with respect to the Berlin hopes of concert with us for the future preservation of Holland, although I certainly think that Prussia *can* furnish to us the most effectual assistance upon this point, yet you will see in all that I have lately written how strongly I am impressed with a sense of the necessity of setting them at defiance upon this subject, in order to bring them down to a more just sense of their own isolated situation, and to shew to them that, if we treat with them about Holland, it must be as upon a point as near to their interests as our own, and not as for a grace and favour which we are to purchase by new objects of advantage to them. My former letters will likewise, in great degree, furnish already to you my notions respecting your new wish to see me linger somewhat longer on my return home, and give myself to somewhat more than a mere passage from Berlin to Helvoetsluys. All that can fairly belong to the great object of the deliverance of Holland, I think myself bound by duty not to shrink from, and even without direct authority to do so, you will see that I had already determined to act upon that principle; do not therefore imagine that I can hesitate to do anything which can fairly be considered as a part of this great and important object, nor even that I desire the grace of making any ostentatious sacrifice of my own ease and comfort in doing so. I should be ashamed to think that I did not better know my duty than to express any doubt as to performing any *such* service which could be asked or expected from me. On the other hand, as I cannot feel any public obligation upon me beyond the purpose of this urgent and important object, when that is accomplished, I must fairly say that no motive can induce me to give myself to the situation of being English Minister at the Hague, or at any other place in any of the four quarters of the globe. While we are fighting this battle which to the whole European world sets all at stake, I am ready to carry either a conference or a musket whenever I can with best effect fire either of them off; but as it is impossible for anybody personally to dislike this diplomatic duty so much as I do, I never can feel any obligation to pursue it beyond the pressure of this critical period.

"You know me too well to suspect that in this language I am courting solicitation from government which, God knows, there is so little motive for me to seek or them to give; but I speak fairly and plainly in order that you may be sure not to mistake me, and that you may know that whenever an English ambassador can sit down peaceably at the Hague, I am not that man. *Dixi.*"

"It seems to me that some effect will be likely to be produced here by my going away, because it will shake Haugwiz's confidence in my waiting to treat with him; yet till Abercrombie opens a way from Goree, or Holland itself opens me a way, I do not well see my road there; perhaps, however, it may be found, and when it is I will not miss it."

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 6. Harley Street.—"I have just received your letter. At twelve o'clock last night Mr. Frere sent me letters for the Archduke, Marshal Suwarrow, and General Korsakow, the fair copy of my instructions, and a parcel of messenger's certificates; but I have not yet got the cipher, or the copy of the dispatch by which his Majesty's officers residing with the armies are placed under my orders, or my passport. I will call upon Mr. Frere this morning, and if I can procure those papers I shall set off in the evening.

"In your letter of the 3rd instant you refer me to Lord Minto's instructions. As I only read them over once, previous to any discussion of the detail of my mission, I have no distinct idea whatever of their contents; if they should be in any respect essential for my guidance, it will be necessary that you shall send a copy after me; if not, I shall confine myself strictly within the limits of my instructions."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE:

August 6. London.—"Mr. Hammond delivered to me this morning in your Lordship's name a paper respecting the conduct of your generals in Holland, which appears to me to be perfectly wise and just. I should wish to know whether you would have any objection to my communicating it to the Prince and Princess. I don't see any myself, but I would not let it go out of my hands without your consent, and shall not show it till I hear from you.

"M. de Heerdt has just now left me, and sets off to-morrow morning early. He is much pleased with his commission, and will do, I think, extremely well.

"I send you a bulletin from Emerick. I wrote to M. d'Yvoy respecting Colonel Malcolm's mission as you had desired me."

Postscript. "I hope you have been satisfied with the Prince of Orange's visit.

"Since writing this Mr. Hammond has informed me of your intention with respect to the *brouillon* of the despatch to Sir Ralph Abercromby. I shall therefore wait to communicate it to the Prince till I receive it in its complete state. I thought I might as well send this note to your Lordship as destroy it."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 7. London.—“I am very much pleased with the idea of sending to the Hague the sort of summons contained in the paper which Mr. Hammond shewed me this morning by your desire. It can do no harm and will in all probability do much good. It strikes me that the hint M. d'Yvoy gives on that subject agrees with a passage in a letter from one of my brothers, of which I communicated an extract to you a few days ago. As to the terms of the message I have no remark whatever to make. M. de Heerdt is, I suppose, by this time with Sir R. Abercromby.”

Postscript. “I see by the French papers that the rulers in Holland begin to grow evidently uneasy.”

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 7. Downing Street.—“The account of Duke Hamilton's death having reached London, I beg leave to remind your Lordship of the application I have had the honour of making to succeed to the green ribbon which is vacated by this event. The very kind manner in which you attended to this wish, when I mentioned it to you, encourages me to hope for your protection and good offices on the present occasion. And I flatter myself that you will be of opinion that, if I had the good fortune of receiving this mark of distinction at this time, it would be a very suitable decoration in the ceremonious representations which I am to make on entering upon my present embassy.

“Lord Spencer will not allow the *Phæton* to sail till further accounts arrive of the grand fleets. And this delay will afford time for his Majesty's decision in regard to this ribbon, in case your Lordship would have the goodness of recommending me now for the vacancy.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 7. Berlin.—“I cannot forward to you the important communication from Dresden of the surrender of Mantua, without congratulating you most heartily upon it. With Turin, Alexandria and Mantua, the success in Italy has acquired a consistency which in that quarter sets at defiance all future chances for this campaign, and, I hope, for more than this campaign. It is very probable that you may have a Vienna courier specially charged with this news, but I like to provide against all accidents, and therefore, at all events, I hurry on from Berlin by *estafette* what I have just received by *estafette* from Dresden.

“By the same channel you will find it confirmed that on the 11th at Madrid nothing was known except an Alicant letter which announced the sailing of the combined fleets from Carthage, but does not give much alarm of their having passed the Straights.

"I have received a letter from Mr. Darell to desire application to be made to the Prussian Government for permission to purchase oats from East Friesland, the exportation of which is now forbidden; I have sent for answer that immediate application will be made by Mr. Garlike, and the result will be communicated to Mr. Darell. Mr. B. Watson would do well to buy his oats under the Imperial protection which I have already hinted to you; for there he would be sure of the assistance which is to be solicited here.

"We have wind and rain and storms, but we have Alexandria and Mantua."

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MULGRAVE.

1799, August 7. Downing Street.—"His Majesty having been pleased to charge your Lordship with a special mission for the purpose of concerting the military operations to be carried on for the further prosecution of the war against the common enemy, I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship letters for his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles, for Marshal Suwarrow, and for General Korsakof, in which the object of your mission is described, and those generals are apprized that full credit is to be given to whatever you shall say or conclude on his Majesty's part.

"Your Lordship will in the first instance proceed to the headquarters of his Royal Highness the Archduke. As your Lordship's mission has been determined upon in consequence of a proposal from the Austrian Government, and has been notified at Vienna, it is hoped that you will find his Royal Highness sufficiently instructed and empowered to enter with you into the discussion of matters to be arranged; and even if that should not be the case, it will still be proper that you should express a desire to enter upon this discussion, provisionally, with the person who is to be charged with so principal a share in the execution of whatever may be settled, either there or at Vienna. The knowledge which both Mr. Wickham and Lieutenant-Colonel Craufurd possess of the character of the different persons in his Royal Highness's confidence, will be of great use to you on this occasion.

"The subsidized Russian force of 45,000 men in his Majesty's pay is by this time probably arrived on the Swiss frontier, or in its neighbourhood. The dispositions which the Emperor of Russia has manifested for the common cause, and the instructions with which he has charged General Korsakoff are such as leave little doubt that this officer will be found perfectly ready to co-operate with your Lordship in everything which may promote his Majesty's views for the success of the war.

"It is, however, now agreed between his Majesty and the two Imperial Courts that, when the French shall have been expelled from Italy, an event which the recent successes there seem to place at no great distance, the whole of the Russian troops should be placed under the command of Field Marshal Suwarrow.

"It must therefore be left to your Lordship's discretion to judge whether the execution of his Majesty's commands will best be promoted by your remaining at the Archduke's headquarters, and corresponding from thence with his Majesty's officers stationed with the other armies who are, as your Lordship will observe by the enclosed copy of a dispatch to each of them, placed under your Lordship's orders, or whether you should occasionally repair to the headquarters of those armies, or even to Vienna. In that case Lord Minto will present you to M. de Thugut, as charged by his Majesty with the discussion and arrangement of the business in question. He will, I am certain, heartily co-operate in everything which can contribute to its success, and he will be instructed, with that view, to communicate to your Lordship unreservedly the state of the political negotiations in which his Majesty may at that time be engaged at Vienna.

"In your way to the Archduke's headquarters your Lordship will pass through Berlin, where Mr. Grenville will, in like manner, be instructed to communicate with you.

"As the object of your Lordship's mission is to concert the future military operations in the direction of which his Majesty is so much concerned from his having at his disposal, by virtue of the treaty of subsidy, the whole of the Russian force now under General Korsakow, it may be proper that I should begin the instructions which his Majesty has commanded to be given for the regulation of your Lordship's conduct in that discussion, by an enumeration of the force which, as it is supposed, may now be applicable to those operations.

"The Archduke's army, including Bellegarde's, which however has always been detached from it, and is now in Italy, was at the opening of the campaign stated at 100,000 men.

"The Italian army did not probably much exceed 60 or 70,000, exclusive of Rosenberg's corps of Russians which were called 22,000.

"Rhebinder's corps of Russians, which is on its march to Italy, is called 12,000, but by the last accounts from Vienna and Petersburg it appears that this corps is to march to Naples. It is not therefore to be reckoned upon in this enumeration, though some use may possibly hereafter be made of it, particularly by embarking it on board the British fleet if any operation should be directed against the south of France.

"Korsakow's corps, now on its march to Switzerland, is called 45,000 men, and Colonel Ramsay, who has seen a part of these troops, expresses himself highly satisfied with their quality and composition. His account, however, and those received from different quarters, give room to expect a considerable deficiency in these numbers, but proper instructions will be given to Sir Charles Whitworth and Colonel Ramsay to ascertain this point with precision.

"Colonel Craufurd had not, by the last account, made any considerable progress in the levy of Swiss troops. His instructions would go to raising 20,000 men, and as there is now great reason

to hope that the Court of Vienna will be induced to adopt a proper line of policy respecting the internal settlement of that country, and especially as that point will now, in great degree, be left to be arranged by the Russian army, and in conformity to Mr. Wickham's suggestions, it may not be difficult to raise as many as 10 or 15,000 men; though even then a fresh embarrassment will arise as to their being induced to serve out of their own country.

"A body of 6,000 Wirtemberg troops has been offered to the King, and there is little doubt that the conditions of service which the King has required will be complied with by the Duke.

"It is also positively stated by the last accounts that the Elector of Bavaria is to join his troops to the Austrian or Russian army; but this article is still too uncertain to be reckoned upon with confidence.

"Without taking this into account, it seems safe to consider—

1. "The Austrian army in Italy at 50,000 men, capable of being augmented by Piedmontese and other Italian troops to nearly twice that amount, if it were necessary to incur that expense.

2. "The Russian force, exclusive of Rhebinder's corps, if all united, and if reinforced by the Swiss and Wirtembergers, at 70,000 men. (Thus: Korsakow, 40,000; Rosenberg, 15,000; Wirtemberg, 5,000; Swiss, 10,000=70,000).

3. "The Archduke's army at 60,000 men; this calculation appears, however, to be put rather too high. In his conversations with Mr. Wickham, the Archduke assured that gentleman that Massena had at least 20,000 more infantry than he had; and Mr. Wickham does not put Massena's at more than from 50 to 60,000 men; probably therefore the Archduke's superiority in cavalry, and even the reinforcements of 13,000 men which he has since received under General Haddick, will not carry his army up to 60,000 men; and he may still have to incur the risks of at least one battle before the enemy is driven out of Switzerland.

"The British force, which his Majesty has been pleased to direct to be now assembled, amounts to 12,000 men; to this will be added a second division of infantry probably of equal force, and a body of cavalry of 6,000 men; or even more will be sent as occasion shall require. The Emperor of Russia has engaged himself to furnish 18,000 men for the same object, of which number 10,000 were to embark at Revel on the 26th of July.

"This force may be confidently taken as sufficient to ensure the recovery of Holland, provided that the French are so occupied in other quarters as to prevent their marching a very large army to the support of the present government in the United Provinces. His Majesty's expectations of success in this enterprise do not, therefore, depend on the co-operation of Prussia, though he has at different periods had reason to expect it.

"The dispositions and conduct of the Court of Berlin must still, however, be considered as very doubtful, and this circumstance offers the greatest difficulty that is to be encountered in the arrangement of any plan of military operations on the Continent.

“A disposition had been expressed at Berlin to negotiate with his Majesty for a subsidy, in consideration of which the King of Prussia was to have engaged in immediate operations for the deliverance of Holland; and although the accomplishment of this object seemed to be in a great degree secured by the extensive preparations which I have described above, yet the advantage appeared so great of placing Prussia in a line of open hostility against France that his Majesty had resolved to encourage that negotiation, and to authorize its conclusion on the grounds above stated, provided that satisfactory explanations could have been obtained respecting the subsequent employment of the troops so subsidized, after the first object, that of the deliverance of Holland, had been accomplished.

“Some of the conditions, however, which were demanded by the Prussian Government in the course of these discussions, appeared to be either in themselves impracticable, or at least to lead to such delay as might defeat the main object in question; and the whole spirit of the negotiation was such, on the part of that Court, as to inspire no very confident expectation of active and zealous co-operation; though such a state of things might perhaps have been obtained as would have justified the expense to be incurred on the part of this country.

“This negotiation, however, has recently been broken off by an intimation on the part of the Prussian Minister of an intended negotiation between his Prussian Majesty and the French Directory, for the peaceable evacuation of Holland.

“By Mr. Grenville’s despatch of the 23rd ultimo, it is still left in some degree doubtful whether this measure would be persisted in at Berlin; but, at all events, the communication already made must greatly diminish even that degree of confidence which could before be placed in the intentions of that Court.

“On your arrival at Berlin, you will learn from Mr. Grenville what may then be the actual state of these discussions; they may ultimately much affect the success of the operations to be pursued in other quarters, and in that respect are very important to the conduct and progress of your Lordship’s mission.

“It had not, however, been in his Majesty’s contemplation that, after the deliverance of Holland, and perhaps of the country between the Meuse and the Lower Rhine, any offensive operations should be allotted to the Prussian army. His Majesty’s idea had been that, when these points had been accomplished, his own forces and the auxiliary Russians serving with them should endeavour to occupy the Netherlands; while the Prussian troops, supported either by a further body of Russians, agreeably to the demand of the Court of Berlin, or by a body of Hessian and Saxon troops, to be supported at the expense of the countries so recovered and defended, should occupy a defensive position from Mayence to the Dutch frontier, and should block, or, if necessary, besiege Ehrenbreitstein and Mayence.

“The want of this link in the line of defence may be productive of considerable embarrassment to the projected plan of operations; especially as the Court of Vienna appears to take so

strong an interest in this point that M. Thugut has already expressed to his Majesty's minister at Vienna a desire that, after the arrival of General Korsakow's army on the Swiss frontier, that of the Archduke should be drawn off to undertake the siege of Mayence, and to penetrate next year into the Netherlands.

"This difficulty does not, however, vary the plan which his Majesty is pleased to direct that your Lordship should, in the first instance, propose to the Archduke.

"The main object of that plan is that the Russian army under Marshal Suwarrow, aided by the Swiss and Wirtemberg troops, should, after the recovery of Switzerland, penetrate to Lyons, so as to occupy that city in force, and to take a proper military position in the adjacent provinces before the winter, in order that the standard of the French monarchy may be erected there under the Comte D'Artois, and that the experiment may be fairly tried whether the dispositions of the country are such as to make it safe for the allies to attempt in the spring to penetrate further into the country, and even to undertake operations in the direction of the capital itself. And although the main army might, after so fatiguing a campaign, be allowed to take up its winter quarters at Lyons, or on such line as should be chosen for the purpose, yet that a sufficient body should be kept in activity to support any exertions of the Royalists in the neighbouring provinces.

"This plan you will consider as the principal object to which your attention is to be directed; and all the other points which are adverted to in this letter, are to be regarded as secondary and subordinate to it, and liable to be varied as may best conduce to its attainment.

"It is obvious, on the first view of the statement of the allied force, that this enterprise cannot be undertaken by Marshal Suwarrow alone with the force supposed to be placed under his command, and without co-operation from the other armies. If, therefore, the principal object above stated should be approved at Vienna, as it has already in great degree at Petersburg, the mode of such co-operation from one or both those armies will immediately become the subject of your discussions with the persons with whom you have to treat.

"In the arrangement of this point, his Majesty is pleased to leave it to your Lordship's discretion to agree in his Majesty's name to any plan which shall appear to you to be reasonably well-adapted to the circumstances of the case, even though it were not the best which might be formed; and which Marshal Suwarrow shall himself judge sufficient for the protection and support of the advancing army to be placed under his orders; without which it cannot be expected that he should undertake such an enterprise. Your Lordship's utmost exertions and address must therefore be employed in facilitating the discussion of this subject, and in bringing forward to consideration, as distinctly and as accurately as possible, the various questions on which it must depend; and particularly in softening the jealousies and animosities which have already manifested themselves

between the Russian and Austrian troops, and which, it is to be feared, may affect the mutual communications of their commanders.

“ The consideration of this last circumstance makes it extremely desirable that the Russian and Austrian troops should be employed in distinct armies, separated from each other, though acting on a well-combined plan of mutual support.

“ The operation which was first proposed by M. Thugut, as proper in this view to be allotted to the Archduke’s army, was that of the sieges of Huningue and Belfort, and it is much to be regretted that any other idea has since been preferred at Vienna.

“ The proposal of the siege of Mayence cannot in any manner be considered as a substitute for it; the success of that operation could afford no direct assistance to the progress of an army in *Franche Comté* or *Dauphiny*; and it is highly improbable that the Directory, neglecting the immediate danger of an army advancing upon Lyons, would detach any considerable portion of their force to the relief of Mayence. The siege of that place would not, therefore, assist the main operation either as an immediate support, or as a diversion. And it is evident that, in the present comparative state of force, the enterprise against Lyons must be relinquished as too hazardous to be undertaken, if the Archduke’s army should be drawn off to Mayence, and unless very great assistance be in that case afforded by the Italian army.

“ If the negotiation with Prussia shall still succeed, notwithstanding the unfortunate appearances of the present moment, it will be easy for your Lordship to prove unanswerably that the defence of the part of Germany adjoining to Mayence will be so completely provided for by those arrangements as to supersede the necessity for the march of an Austrian army to that quarter; and the course of that negotiation seems as well calculated as the nature of the situation will allow, to obviate any jealousy of Prussian interference in the affairs of the Netherlands. The intention being, as I have already stated, that no more should be required of the Prussians than to take a position from Mayence to Cleves, and to provide either by their own force, or with the aid of Russian or Saxon or Hessian troops, for the defence of that line and for the blockade or sieges of Mayence or Ehrenbreitstein.

“ It is true that even this disposition may create jealousy on the part of the Austrians, especially if the course of events should lead to any enterprise of his Majesty’s troops on the side of the Netherlands; should this be the case any such uneasiness can be obviated only by expressions of the most earnest desire on his Majesty’s part to come to a full understanding with the Court of Vienna on this and on every other point of discussion as to the present state of Europe; and by proving to that Court that the deliverance of the Netherlands cannot be accomplished by any effort of the Austrian troops in the course of the present year, and that the interests of Austria are as much concerned as those of his Majesty in the speedy expulsion of the French from those provinces.

"If the negotiation with the Court of Berlin shall have totally failed, your Lordship's endeavours must still be used to induce the Austrians to disregard the danger of any French incursion into Germany on the side of Mayence, and to pursue by active co-operation with the Russian army, that plan of operations which seems to afford the best hope of a speedy and decisive success; such as would ensure to the allies the conclusion of a peace on terms honourable to themselves, and productive of permanent security to Europe.

"The best line of such co-operation, as far as relates to the Archduke's army, appears, as I have already stated, to be that of Huningue and Belfort; the reduction of which places might also be reasonably expected to be followed by that of Besançon, if the season of the year shall not be too far advanced to allow time for it.

"But I have already apprized your Lordship that, in a case where so many different proposals may be made which can not even be foreseen, much less decided upon in all their details at this distance, his Majesty leaves to your Lordship a discretion as to the best steps which can be taken in concert for executing the main enterprize, that of the reduction and occupation of Lyons, and of such part of the adjoining provinces as may be necessary for a military position during the winter.

"With respect to the co-operation to the southward, this may be considered under two different points of view; first, in the case of a positive and final refusal of the Austrians to afford any active co-operation on the right flank of the Russians; and secondly, in the event of the adoption of his Majesty's proposal respecting the Archduke's army, or of any other plan which may, either fully, or at least in some reasonable degree, provide for the same object.

"In the first case a much greater degree of co-operation to the south must be required, in order to enable the Russians themselves to undertake such operations as might be necessary to cover the right flank of the advancing army. Rosenberg's corps, which is now in Italy, would therefore probably in that case be employed to more advantage if, being still under the orders of Marshal Suwarrow, it were, however, not joined to his main army, but were kept on his left flank; supposing that the main army itself could, in that event, be strengthened by Swiss and German troops; and, in this manner, the operations to the southward, instead of being confined to the sieges of Briançon and Fort Barraux, might be so far extended as that a part of the main attack on Lyons itself should be directed from Chamberry and Grenoble.

"In the second case, that of a sufficient co-operation to the northward, the occupation of the two places above-mentioned may be sufficient for the object which is in view, unless it should be found that the subsistence of the advancing army would be better secured by dividing the attack; a measure which it would otherwise appear very desirable to avoid if possible.

"These ideas relate to the supposition of the different cases in which the operation against Lyons shall be judged practicable, and they seem to include all the different modes in which that plan can be pursued.

"Another case may, however, arise in which, from the total failure of all co-operation to the northward, and on a full consideration of the means of acting to the southward, it shall be judged that the enterprize of Lyons is one which can not be undertaken this year, with a reasonable prospect of success.

"Your Lordship will perceive from what I have already stated that this is a decision which his Majesty would very much regret, though he is aware that it may, under some circumstances, become indispensably necessary. In that event it would probably be less urgent to agree to the other ideas which might be brought forward, and your Lordship would, in all probability, have an opportunity of transmitting to me the detail of any such plans for his Majesty's final decision. It would, however, be desirable that, in this event, the attention of those with whom you treat should be drawn to the means of taking up such positions on the frontiers as would most conduce to open a communication during the winter with the provinces of France which I have already mentioned, and with *Provence*; and as would facilitate the undertaking the operation against Lyons in the spring.

"Your Lordship will keep me constantly informed of the course and progress of the negotiations in which you are engaged, and you will occasionally correspond with his Majesty's ministers at Berlin, Vienna, and Petersburg; for which purpose your Lordship is furnished with the cipher H. from the Office, which must however, on account of the peculiar circumstances of a military mission, be sparingly used; and which you are never to expose to the danger of falling into the enemy's hands, but to destroy it on any occasion of danger.

"Your Lordship will on all occasions communicate fully and unreservedly with Mr. Wickham, his Majesty's minister in Switzerland, on everything that relates to the business in which you are engaged. The long attention he has given to the subject, and his knowledge of the dispositions both of the Austrians and the Swiss will, I am persuaded, render his suggestions highly useful to you; and, in the event of the occupation of Lyons, and of any forward movement in France, it is probable that his Majesty will avail himself of his services in that country, and will direct him to assist the Count D'Artois with such suggestions and advice as it may be desirable to offer in his Majesty's name."

Copy.

W. GARTHSHORE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 8. Manchester Square.—"I have the honour of informing your Lordship that I arrived in town this morning, after a very tedious voyage from Cruxhaven. I have delivered to Mr. Hammond the dispatch from Mr. Hailes, which he will

probably forward to your Lordship by this post. I should have had the honour of delivering it myself, but that I understood your Lordship was not at Dropmore. I feel a very sanguine hope that your Lordship will not disapprove of the resolution I took—very much with the advice of Mr. Hailes—to return home. Little, or rather nothing, was to be done at Stockholm, and I thought it much better to return at once to England, to represent to you the real state of things, and to receive your Lordship's instructions, if you thought it necessary that any other should be given.

"I firmly believe that nothing can influence the King of Sweden to have any direct communication with England, upon terms short of the restitution of the convoy; and your Lordship is fully aware that his opinion is not likely to be influenced in any way by those who are about him. I shall not now detain you upon this subject, but shall be happy to endeavour to give you any information in my power, when I have the honour of seeing you.

"I have only to repeat the hope that you will have the goodness to attribute my return to the real cause, the idea that it might do more good than my remaining at Stockholm possibly could do."

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, August 8. Lingen.—"Les informations suivantes sont les dernières qu'on a obtenues sur les préparatifs que se font dans la République. Le général Brune, chargé du commandement général des troupes tant Francoises que Bataves, a fait une tournée sur les frontières du Braband pour y examiner les moyens de défense. Il a fait des dispositions à Grave, et fait mettre cette place en état de défense par un ingénieur Francois, qui y dirige les travaux. De Grave il s'est rendu à Bois le Duc, qui sera ravitaillé pour trois mois, et où on a déjà commencé à former des inondations qui s'avancent déjà de très près de la ville. Il doit passer ensuite dans les provinces d'Overyssel, de Groningue, et de Frise. Cette nomination donne beaucoup de mécontentement à Daendels, qui s'oppose fortement à l'envoi des Bataves au Rhin, et veut les garder dans l'intérieur. Les nouveaux ouvrages aux quels on travaille au Grebbe sont exécutés d'après les plans du général du Moulin; c'est l'ingénieur Van der Plaat qui est chargé de la direction de tous les ouvrages depuis le département du Wael jusqu'au Zuyder Zee; cet officier sert par nécessité, on le dit aujourd'hui fort bien disposé. A Doesburg les Francois travaillent à des ouvrages contre l'avis des ingénieurs Bataves, qui les regardent comme inutiles et fort dispendieux. Les batimens Francois qui étoient à Flessingue, ont mis à la voile pour Nieuport et Dunquerque, et le vaisseau armé *Wálcheren* est parti pour Brouwershaven. Il est question (dit-on) de mettre Bergen op Zoom en état de siège, et il est déjà arrivé 3 batimens chargés de munitions. Au Viene-brug les ordres ont été envoyés de la Haye de suspendre les ouvrages qui y avoient été commencés.

“ Il paroît, non obstant ces informations, que le Gouvernement Batave ne se prépare pas à opposer une grande résistance en cas d'attaque. Il est très probable même qu'on tachera d'entrer en accommodement afin d'obtenir une bonne capitulation. En attendant, on est fort allarmé dans tout le pays des bruits qui se répandent de tous côtés d'une prochaine invasion ennemie ; c'est ce qui a donné lieu à la résolution prise de charger Brune de la défense générale, de mettre en exécution, et de prendre des mesures de précaution dans l'intérieur.

“ Mon arrivée dans ces quartiers n'a jusqu'ici donné lieu à aucun désordre dans l'intérieur. Dans la nuit du premier au second de ce mois il y a ici des mouvemens dans l'oldampt dans la province de Groningue, occasionnés par les réquisitions. Les paysans se sont armés, et se sont avancés contre les troupes envoyées de la ville de Groningue pour les soumettre. Il y a eu à cette occasion quelques hassards de tués et de pris, mais la chose n'a point eu de suite, et a fort heureusement été apaisée à temps, de sorte que la tranquillité est parfaitement rétablie. Francois Fagel est venu à Emmerick voir Yvoy. Il a fait parvenir la lettre à Van Braam par le beau-frère de celui-ci, n'ayant pas voulu la lui remettre en personne de crainte de le compromettre. Il a rapporté à Fagel, que Van Braam ne faisant rien sans Cappelle, qui étoit absent, il ne pouvoit prendre aucune détermination définitive ; que la sortie du Texel étoit sujette à des difficultés, mais que, d'ailleurs, les batteries situées au Helder ne généroient guères, et cela en partie parcequ'il suppose que si de terre on voit appareiller les vaisseaux, personne ne doutera que ce ne soit en conséquence d'un ordre du Gouvernement. Van Braam n'est pas sûr si tous les officiers de sa flotte se préteront à exécuter son project. Waldeck est le seul capitaine au quel il comptait en parler ; du moment où Cappelle seroit de retour, celui-ci répond entièrement de son vaisseau. Van Braam lui-même n'est pas aimé de son équipage, ce qu'il attribue à son premier officier qui est mauvais. Le billet ci-joint, écrit de sa propre main, prouve qu'il désire que l'on ne mette point de précipitation dans la chose, et qu'on le laisse maître de choisir le moment favorable. Comme il est question de quinze jours dans ce billet, et qu'il est d'une date assez vielle, il est probable qu'on ne tardera pas à apprendre que le project a été exécuté.

“ Yvoy et Tuyl sont venu ici avant hiér ; d'après les informations qu'ils donnent il paroît que l'émigration dans la Belgique augmente journellement, et que les Francois mettent tout en oeuvre pour d'arrêter ; ils prennent à cet effet toutes les précautions imaginables, en mettant des entraves au passages du Rhin et de la Meuse. Des lettres particulières de Vienne, écrites par des personnes de marque, et adressées à des individus dans le Brabant, annoncent positivement que l'Empereur renonce à la Belgique ; une seule dit que cette renonciation s'est faite en faveur de l'Archduc Joseph qui épouse une princesse Russe. Les principaux membres des États de Brabant sont fort portés pour une

réunion; on s'occupe dans ce moment à sonder quelques individus prépondérans en Flandres et dans le Limbourg, mais en général on peut assurer que la majorité dans toutes les classes la désire.

“Le chef des Belges compte sur l'assistance de 20,000 hommes qui pourroient se lever en masse dans la campine; on a eu soin de lui faire dire de ne rien presser et de ne pas trop s'avancer. En attendant, il désire vivement que l'état d'incertitude dans le quel on se trouve, relativement au moyens qu'on auroit de les soutenir, puisse bientôt cesser. Effectivement une diversion bien dirigée dans les Pays-bas produiroit dans ce moment le plus grand effèt; et je désire vivement que l'on se décide bientôt à ce sujet en Angleterre, parceque à la longue il sera impossible de les contenter avec de simples promesses de secours. Dans l'intervalle j'ai autorisé Yvoy, avec le consentement de M. Grenville, d'accorder des sommes partielles et modiques pour l'achat de fusils et d'autres armes. Je vous envoie ci-jointe la copie du mémoire de Tuyll auquel je me réfère. Il est retourné à Emmerick avec Yvoy, où ils doivent avoir dans quelques jours d'ici une nouvelle conférence avec le chef en question, du résultat de la quelle j'attends un rapport qui sera envoyé sur le champ en Angleterre, et qui donnera, j'espère, des renseignemens tout-à-fait circonstanciés.

“M. de Rhoon, son frère Charles, et M. M. Van der Haar et Humalda sont venus ici hiér pour faire un rapport de ce qui avoit été fait dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise. Ils garantissent un succès complet au moment de l'explosion. Ces Messieurs ont commencé par faire des difficultés sur l'article de la proclamation relatif à l'amnestie, et surtout aux exceptions qu'on désiroit y faire d'Irhoven, Van Dam, Blaauw, et des quatre personnes qui ont signés le traité d'alliance avec la République Francoise, alleguant que, pour n'en rester qu'à la province de Frise seule, il y avoit d'autres individus tout aussi coupables, qui échapperoient de cette manière; que ce seroit un moyen infailible d'exciter des vengeances personnelles, et que les exceptions étant bornées aux personnes susdites, cela pourroit occasionner un mécontentement général. Après de longues discussions je suis enfin convenu avec eux (et je crois effectivement que c'est la meilleure manière de réunir toutes les opinions sur cet objet qui est d'une nature fort delicate) que la proclamation se borneroit à declarer que je tacherais d'obtenir une amnestie générale, en excluant toutefois ceux qui ne coopéreroient point et mettroient des entraves au rétablissement du Gouvernement légitime. Cette tournure que Humalda avoit proposée, ayant été goûtée par Van der Haar et ces autres messieurs, je m'y suis tenu. Il paroît que Rhoon n'a jusqu'ici presque rien fait relativement à l'organisation de la province d'Hollande, et que ses correspondances dans la plus part des villes y sont fort bornées. Il m'a entretenu fort au long de son projet d'être placé à la tete des bourgeoisies, et de ceux des habitans qui seroient enclins à prendre les armes, et de son désir d'avoir une direction générale; il voudroit à cet effet obtenir une autorisation de ma part que je n'ai pas jugé devoir lui donner telle qu'il la

souhaitoit. Van der Haar désireroit une direction semblable dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, en se réservant la faculté de substituer dans la première de ces provinces le Drossard Guichard. J'ai répondu que, provisionnellement, je ne pouvois rien fixer après les lettres que j'ai reçues hier d'Angleterre, mais que je ne m'opposerais point à un tel plan pour autant que ceux qui auroient une pareille direction agissent de concert et sous les ordres des officiers commandans, et que je voulois me réserver la faculté de nommer d'autres personnes dans le même but.

"Yvoy a eu une entrevue avec Van Straalen du Noordhollande. Celui-ci lui a communiqué ses idées au sujet des premiers changemens à faire au moment de la révolution. Son plan tend à ce que le gouvernement, auquel on confieroit l'administration générale, fut composé d'un conseil de pas moins de 15, et pas au-delà de 21 personnes, choisies d'entre celles qui jouissoient de la confiance et de la considération publique; que ce conseil, tiré des personnes les plus accréditées des différentes provinces, devroit être nommé sous le titre de *Landraad*; et qu'on placeroit à la tête de cette assemblée le Prince Stadhouder ou le Prince Héréditaire en son nom; qu'il seroit nécessaire que les Puissances donnent sous leur nom une proclamation en langue Hollandoise dans la quelle il est ordonné à toutes les autorités de rester en place, jusqu'à nouvelle disposition d'un *Landraad*, au quel, provisoirement, sera déférée l'autorité souveraine, et cela jusqu'au moment où la tranquillité sera rétablie, et la constitution affermi sur la base de l'union, et purgée des abus; que le temps et les circonstances y avoient amenés; que ce conseil invita le Prince Héréditaire à se placer à sa tête, et qu'on donneroit ensuite une proclamation plus détaillée. Les personnes désignées par Van Straalen dans la province d'Hollande pour siéger dans cette assemblée sont, entr'autres, Boetzelaar de Kyfhock, Marseveen, Calkoen, Rojer, Van Staveren; on voudroit en exclure Rhoon, Van de Spiegel, et Repelaar pour éviter le soupçon que ceux-ci ne soient animés par des vengeances personnelles. J'ai fait proposer un entrevue à Van Straalen, de même qu'au conseiller Brantson, et je me flatte qu'elle pourra avoir lieu dans quelques jours. J'espère également pouvoir m'aboucher dans peu avec Mollerus, et lui en ai fait faire l'invitation, et j'attends sa réponse d'un jour à l'autre. Comme il est très probable qu'au moment où on entrera dans le pays, toutes les caisses publiques seront vuides, il est essentiel que je suis informé jusqu'à quel point le gouvernement Britannique sera porté à faire les avances, qui seront absolument nécessaire pour remettre la machine en train, et sur tout pour organiser l'armée, dont on aura dans les premiers moments un besoin urgent. Ainsi je souhaite ardemment recevoir, le plustot possible, les informations nécessaires sur cet objet."

The VICE-CHANCELLOR OF RUSSIA to COUNT DE
RASTOPTCHIN (CHANCELLOR).

1799, August 8. St. Petersburg.—Ayant invité chez moi l'ambassadeur de l'Empereur des Romains, je lui ai communiqué

la traduction que votre Excellence m'a envoyée de la lettre du Feld-Maréchal Comte de Souvoroff Rymniksky à sa majesté l'Empereur, et j'y ai joint la copie de l'ordre au Comte de Razoumowsky de la communiquer à l'Empereur et Roi dans une audience expresse, en lui déclarant qu'on envoie l'ordre au Feld Maréchal, s'il trouve les mêmes difficultés qu'auparavant, de rassembler toutes les troupes Russes, et d'agir avec elles séparément et par lui-même.

“ J'ai observé au Comte Cobenzl que quand je lui avais dit, il y a quelque tems, que le Comte Souvoroff n'avait envoyé aucune plainte ici, je lui avais dit la vérité, et que le Maréchal s'est conduit d'une manière vraiment digne de sa grandeur d'arme [ame]; qu'étant rempli du zèle le plus ardent pour la cause commune, et désirant éviter tous détails désagréables entre les deux Cours, il a sacrifié, pour aussi dire, sa gloire en gardant le silence autant que possible, tandis qu'on savait ici, par les lettres des officiers et autrement, tous les désagréments que ce Maréchal a subis; l'envie, pour ne pas dire la haine, que portent plusieurs généraux envers les notres, et qui, par le mauvais exemple, gagnait l'armée même; que lui, l'ambassadeur, peut bien se représenter que chaque nation doit avoir son ambition et sentir sa dignité; que la Russie a été peut-être blâmée de ce côté-là, mais je ne sais pas si c'est avec raison ou non, mais s'il survient quelque doute là-dessus, il avouera au moins d'autre côté, en parcourant l'histoire, qu'elle a certainement de quoi être fière, et que par là il peut juger, sans parler de la Cour, combien le public même doit être indigné de ces partialités vraiment inconcevables, et surtout pour ce qui regarde le chef que le public respect avec raison audessus de tout; que l'ambassadeur doit être trop bien informé de tout pour ignorer cela, aussi bien que l'étonnement qu'on exprime dans toutes les maisons où l'on entre de ce que dans les papiers publiés par la Cour de Vienne il n'est jamais question, ou bien on ne fait que très peu de mention, des troupes Russes qui étaient partout en avant, comme pour plaire à l'Empereur des Romains, et qui se sont battues d'une manière qui leur est particulière, et perdaient toujours un grand nombre d'hommes. Qu'il doit savoir si son souverain a montré, de quelque manière que ce soit, sa bienveillance envers quelques uns des chefs Russes, dont plusieurs sont couverts d'honorables blessures; qu'il peut juger par là que l'impression que cela fait n'est pas telle comme l'Empereur la désirait; que je dis tout cela de mon propre chef, ayant pour objet le bien des affaires; qu'il connaît les principes et les idées de sa Majesté Impériale, qui sont étrangers à toutes ruses, et sont fondés sur la seule droiture; qu'il faut se conduire envers nous avec bonne foi; comptant sur elle de la part de nos alliés, nous n'avons mis aucunes bornes ni à notre confiance envers eux, ni à l'emploi de tous nos moyens pour les servir; mais aussitôt qu'on n'y répond pas, l'ambassadeur jugera lui-même si on doit l'attendre de notre part. Qu'en m'expliquant ainsi avec lui, je fais peut-être une imprudence, et je donne à sa Cour de grands avantages; car à des finesses on doit répondre par des finesses; mais que je lui répète qu'elles ne sont nullement compatibles

avec la dignité d'une grande Puissance, et avec le caractère de sa Majesté Impériale. Je lui dis, qu'étant sur ce point, je me permettrai encore quelques observations, en l'assurant qu'elles sont absolument les miennes. Pourquoi, par exemple, n'a-t-on pas soufflé le mot, ni ici ni à Vienne, sur l'arrivée dans cette dernière capitale de deux couriers Espagnols de Paris à l'ambassadeur Catholique, qui ont donné lieu à différentes conjectures, et nommément que la Cour de Vienne est entré par le moyen de celle de Madrid dans quelques relations secrettes.

"Le Comte Cobenzl répondit à cette dernière observation, qu'autant qu'il s'en souvenait il n'avait informé, et qu'on ne pouvait avoir le moindre soupçon de leur sincérité, eux qui nous communiquent, pour ainsi dire, tous leurs archives; que les couriers Espagnols avaient été envoyés avec quelques propositions pour le rétablissement de la bonne harmonie, mais qu'on ne s'y était pas prêté, et que les couriers avaient été renvoyés.

"Pour ce qui regarde mes autres observations, l'ambassadeur fut effrayé des mesures prescrites au Comte Souveroff. Il chercha tous les moyens possibles pour réfuter les plaintes faites contre sa Cour, ou contre les généraux des armées, en me répondant à chaque point; sur quoi je trouvais de mon côté des objections en les prenant de la manière de penser du Maréchal, et de sa conduite fondée sur sa reconnaissance pour la manière dont on l'avait reçu à Vienne, et sur son zèle pour la cause comune. Le Comte Cobenzl parla de l'ordre de Marie Thérèse, et dit que son souverain n'a demandé la permission d'en décorer les officiers Russes que pour montrer au monde entier sa reconnaissance; et que si on ne l'a pas encor donné à personne, c'était uniquement parcequ'à peine aura-t-on déjà reçu à Vienne son rapport sur ce point-là. Il m'a prié de la manière la plus forte de représenter à Sa Majesté Impériale, et de la conjurer sur ce que souffriraient les affaires s'il y avait quelque mésintelligence entre les deux Cours Impériales; en s'offrant de s'engager de la manière la plus formelle que tout mésentendue sera examiné avec la plus grande attention, et qu'on nous fera pleine satisfaction. Il s'est étendu sur les avantages du plan proposé par sa Cour, et approuvé par l'Empereur, pour ce qui regarde l'emploi de nos troupes en Suisse, et sur le désir qu'avait son souverain de coopérer avec nous, et de nous aider dans toutes nos mesures.

"Après tout ceci, et beaucoup d'autres protestations et raisonnemens de toute espèce, qui ont duré une heure et demie (et qui prendraient trop de tems pour les mettre sur papier à présent que je me hâte d'envoyer ceci à Votre Excellence pour en faire le rapport à l'Empereur) l'ambassadeur me dit qu'il enverra certainement un courrier à Vienne demain ou mercredi matin; et m'a remis deux copies de dépêches que j'envois ci-joint à votre Excellence, en me priant de nouveau de l'informer si l'Empereur continue à approuver les opérations par la Suisse dans l'intérieur de la France, et s'inquiétant beaucoup de peur que l'amitié entre les deux Cours ne soit altérée. Par les discours du Comte Cobenzl, et par les traits de son visage, on voyait son extrême consternation, et sa grande inquiétude."

Enclosure.

COUNT ALEXANDER SOUVOROW RYMNIKSKY to the EMPEROR PAUL.

Translation.

“ L’envie que l’on me porte comme à un étranger ; les intrigues, la conduit équivoque des chefs subalternes qui s’adressent directement au Conseil Aulique, parceque c’étoit lui qui dirigeait autrefois les opérations militaires ; l’impuissance dans laquelle je me trouve à tout moment d’exécuter ce qui me paroît convenable pour le succès de la bonne cause, sans demander préalablement des ordres à Vienne ; tout ceci, Sire, me force à demander mon rappel, supposé que cela ne change. Je veux que mes cendres reposent dans ma patrie, et prie Dieu pour mon auguste souverain.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 9. Berlin.—“ In the same moment of this morning arrives the office-box with your two private letters of the 2nd instant, and Hertzlett from Petersburg with Sir Charles Whitworth’s dispatches under flying seal. If I avail myself of his departure to write to you, it is only to tell you that everything remains here *in statu quo*, and therefore that Berlin offers no materials for communication to you, public or private, except two letters to me from Fagel of which I send you the copies. For me it remains to wait here till I hear officially from you, unless any such pressing occasion shall arise for my joining the Prince of Orange as in his judgment and in mine ought to be acted upon by me without even that delay ; but to me it does not seem very probable that any such occasion should present itself in the first and earliest days of Sir R. Abercrombie’s approach.

“ I am, however, beyond measure anxious for information concerning the event of the first enterprise, and all my confidence of its success does not prevent me from looking out with a feverish irritation for full and complete assurance of it. If General Brune is really as active as the last accounts describe him to be, he may find it possible to prevent the first explosion being at once decisive ; but I have not the least apprehension of his being able to supply any considerable means of resistance, particularly if all goes on as well as we had expected at the Texel.

“ With regard to Sir Charles Whitworth’s notion, or rather the Emperor’s proposition of some communication which is to supply at Petersburg all the advantage of a congress, without the inconvenience of such a moment as this for such a measure, I own that I have great doubts of the prudence of adopting it *in toto*. A partial use of it might have some advantage, and if we could strongly and forcibly apply the influence of Russia in check upon the insatiable avidity of Austria, it is much to be desired that we should do so ; but in the present circumstances of things I do not well see how we could do more than avail

ourselves of that particular Russian interference which will be listened to at Vienna, as soon as Suwarrow is seen at the head of a Russian army of 60,000 men.

"I wish we could produce the general explanation of the several objects which the great powers have in view ; and if any common concert of means and interests could have been brought about, that general explanation would have been necessary, and in that case might not have been of extreme difficulty ; but in the present circumstances, where there can be no question of general concert, I should fear that an invitation of general discussion might rather produce than prevent all the dangers which are to be apprehended from discussion. With Prussia we cannot at present have any such discussions ; we are not afraid of the invading projects of any power but Austria ; and if the Court of Petersburg will speak stoutly through Suwarrow for the defence of the southern Sardinian frontier, I cannot imagine that they would venture to dispute it ; and if they did, we should not be more advanced in the business by putting it in a shape of more formal negotiation at Petersburg. I had rather trust to Russian influence supported by Suwarrow and backed by us, than to any more formal negotiation."

Enclosure.

JAMES FAGEL to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, August 1 and 5. [Lingen.]—"Dans les conversations que le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange a eues hier au soir avec le Duc de Brunswick au sujet de la tournure que les affaires ont prise à Berlin, il s'est expliqué d'une manière très prononcée en témoignant toute son indignation du rôle que l'on fait jouer au Roi. Il a écrit à ce sujet une longue lettre à Sa Majesté, dont il a lu quelques passages au Prince, dans laquelle il lui donne à connoître que les deux Cours Impériales et l'Angleterre parvenues à rétablir l'ordre en Europe par la force des armes, sans que la Cour de Berlin y prenne également une part active, c'est une flétrissure pour la monarchie Prussienne dont elle se relèvera difficilement, et qui lui fera perdre toute l'influence qu'elle est en droit d'avoir sur le sort de l'Europe.

"Le Roi a répondu de sa propre main une longue lettre de quatre pages, qui paroît l'ouvrage du Secrétaire Bèsme, pour dire que son parti est définitivement pris.

"D'ailleurs le Duc s'est montré réservé vis-a-vis du Prince, ne lui a point fait de questions, et ne paroît pas se douter de ce qui se prépare.

"On dit ici que le Directoire exige du Gouvernement Batave une somme de 10 millions, et l'habillement de 40,000 hommes ; et qu'on est à la veille de former un camp près de la Haye sous les ordres du Général Brune, dont on ne donne point la force.

"Les informations que nous espérons recevoir de M. de Rhoon au sujet des correspondances et de l'organisation générale dans l'intérieur de la province d'Hollande, ne sont pas tout à fait aussi détaillées que nous avions lieu de l'espérer.

“Il paroît que son activité s’est bornée jusqu’ici à travailler avec son frère et avec les personnes qui se sont occupées de provinces de Groningue et de Frise. D’ailleurs ses idées quant au choix des personnes à employer dans les villes de la province de Hollande s’accordent avec celles du Prince, et je n’ai pas de doute que l’on ne parvienne à tirer parti de son zèle et de ses intentions.

“Quant aux provinces de Groningue et de Frise, M. Van der Haer et M. Charles Bentinck continuent à donner les assurances les plus positives que tout y est préparé au point de ne laisser aucun doute sur un succès complet, lorsque le moment de l’explosion sera venu. Leur intention est de réprimer pour le moment, et pour autant que la chose est faisable, les mouvemens ultérieurs qui pourront résulter de ceux qui viennent d’éclater dans le Groningue ; mais si les premières explosions s’étendent au point de ne pas pouvoir les arrêter, leur idée est d’en tirer parti, et de tâcher de se rendre maître de Delfzyl et s’y soutenir s’il est possible. Vous êtes sûrement déjà instruit de la venue du General Don au Continent.

“M. de Rhoon m’a dit qu’il avoit passé quelques jours à Varel, au conjointement avec M. Van der Haer. Il lui avoit donné tous les renseignemens qu’il avoit demandé relativement aux moyens de défense, et ceux des dispositions tant dans les deux provinces, que dans le République en générale.” *Extracts.*

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 9. Fort St. George.—“I was very much distressed to find by the last accounts from England the anxiety and uneasiness you had suffered both on account of Lord Camelford, and your brother Mr. Grenville. It is difficult to describe the sensations with which I read in the newspapers (the only authority I have received) the accounts of his danger and providential deliverance. I trust he will give you full compensation for all your solicitude by accomplishing the important object of his mission.

“For an account of my operations and views I must refer you to the dispatches, and to the printed papers, and to my brother Henry, whom I have persuaded myself to send to Dundas on the occasion of this important crisis. Henry is the only man in India, excepting myself, who is thoroughly master of the whole subject ; and although it is dreadful to me to be separated from him, and left here absolutely alone (Arthur being stationed at Seringapatam) I sacrificed my private comfort to my views of the public service, and resolved to dispatch him to Europe with the Partition Treaty of Mysore, and the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam—*now* a *British* garrison. I anticipate the satisfaction you will feel in the magnitude of the services which I have been able to render within so short a time ; if they are estimated and felt in Europe as they are in India, I have nothing to desire in point of character. I only request you to trace my whole plan in all its parts, and fairly tell me whether

I miscalculated any of my moves; for I cannot admit that I owe anything to chance; on the contrary many chances turned against me, which I might justly have expected to prove favourable; and, had I not been singularly unlucky, Seringapatam would have been taken a fortnight sooner than it actually fell.

"I trust you will approve the Settlement of Mysore; on the whole I think France is now for ever excluded from India, and I trust we are for ever established here, if you in England have the firmness to meet all the clamours of monopoly, and to place the government of your Indian empire on a respectable basis. I think you will enjoy the papers found at Seringapatam; never was there such a *trouaille* since the King of Prussia's famous discovery at Dresden.

"Many thanks to you for your kindness to Richard, of whom I hear very satisfactory accounts.

"My health continues very good, and my spirits improve; I have determined not to send for Lady Mornington; the voyage, the climate might injure her health, and it is my duty not to separate her from my children.

"I know you will omit no exertion to draw from my late services every practicable advantage to my honor and fortune. On this subject, as the first of my friends, I rely principally on you; you will talk with Henry and with my family, as well as with my other friends. My love to My Lady, to whom I send a vast *curiosity*—a tiger's head of gold and jewels, forming part of the ornaments of Tippoo Sultan's throne; which throne the infernal prize agents at Seringapatam pulled to pieces, before I even knew of its existence. Henry will relate the whole history to you. Out of the wreck I have saved a beautiful bird (named the *Huma*, see D'Herbelot) for the King; this I have purchased from the Cormorants on the account of the Company. I have also picked up some of the other ornaments of the throne, which had been scattered among the Army. Henry will tell her Ladyship's Majesty in what manner I think she ought to carry her tiger head.

"You know the tiger was the emblem or armorial bearing of Tippoo Sultan.

"I desire that you will superintend my medal for the army, and admire my device and motto; which latter you may convert into Latin, Greek, or English if you can.

"Send Henry back as soon as possible; he has been of great service to me, and has distinguished himself extremely in the late treaties.

"I hope it is not true that you are all of you so mad as to think of Bob Hobart for Ireland. I am sorry to hear that Lord Cornwallis has not succeeded there."

Enclosure.

MEMORANDUM.

1799, June 7. Fort St. George.—"The enclosed papers from No. 1 to No. 25 are literal copies of papers found in the palace of Tippoo Sultan at Seringapatam after the capture of that place.

"The copies were all attested at Seringapatam by Captain Macauley, private secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, and transmitted by him to Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, Military Secretary to the Governor-General. The mark *pe* is the abbreviated signature or byze of Tippoo Sultan himself. The orthography of the French is extremely incorrect in the original papers, especially in those dated in the year 1797, which appear to have been written under the Sultan's directions by the Captain of a French vessel then residing at Seringapatam. From these papers it appears that Tippoo Sultan has dispatched three embassies to the Isle of France, and thence to the Executive Directory at Paris, since the commencement of the year 1797.

"The first in April, 1797; the second in October, 1797; and the third in June, 1798, but the person who carried it did not leave Tranquebar until the 7th of February, 1799.

"The nature and object of these several embassies is fully explained in the following papers.

"The papers Nos. 5 to 21 contain a detailed statement of the transactions of the Sultan's ambassadors at the Mauritius in January, February and March 1798; of the landing of the French force under the command of M.M. Dubuc and Chapuy at Mangalore, and of their subsequent admission into the Sultan's service.

"In the papers from No. 22 to No. 25 will be found the particulars of the embassy which the Sultan dispatched to France from Tranquebar, at the moment when he professed a desire to receive an ambassador from the British Government."

[Accompanying the foregoing memorandum are copies of twenty-five letters in French, found at Seringapatam and published by Lord Mornington as containing proof that Tippoo Sultan, notwithstanding his friendly professions, had been negotiating with the French authorities of the Isle of France, and at Paris, for help to enable him to destroy British supremacy in Southern India.]

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 9. Walmer Castle.—"Early this morning your despatches, publick and private, from your brother reached this place. I think you will do me justice to admit that there has not been any want of exertions within the reach of my power to make, when you are informed that, notwithstanding very unfavourable weather for it, the embarkations at the different places have so far advanced as to leave no reason to doubt that our expedition will sail on Sunday morning, unless the state of the winds render it prudent to retard it. It must not reach the coast of Holland so as to hover there without being able to land. The wind is at present fair, but much too high for the purpose of disembarking. We can scarcely at this season of the year be so unfortunate as to meet with too long a continuance of it. It

has already lasted for several days, and the storm of wind and rain so very severe yesterday morning as to stop the embarkation, after the men were drawn out and the boats ready. It was accomplished this morning very favourably.

"If I had doubted before, which in truth I did not, of the propriety of our armament getting as quickly as possible on the coast of Holland, your brother's letters received to-day would have removed those doubts; and upon that ground it is that I have resolved of new to instruct Sir Ralph Abercrombie to proceed without delay to Goree. Under all the difficulties which attend the further progress in that quarter, it is impossible to disguise from one's self that the proceeding from Goree to the island of Voorn is attended with most embarrassing and almost unsurmountable difficulties, owing to the narrow channel and very intricate navigation of the Goree Gat. Still, however, I am sanguine in my hopes that the zeal with which our officers embark upon the expedition will surmount those difficulties. But, in the worst view of the subject, I argue that the appearance of our force *speedily* is in itself a great point gained; and, if from impracticable causes, they should not be able to proceed further in that quarter, it is as easy to embark from Goree for another enterprise, as it is to embark from Ramsgate or Deal.

"I will, of course, send you when I write them a copy of the last instructions to Sir Ralph; but at present I may mention to you that, upon failure of making good the landing at Voorn, my present intention is to instruct him to proceed to Helder and the Texel, and, failing that, to Ameland and Delfzyl. I have this moment sent over a cutter with an officer to Lord Duncan to obtain an answer to certain queries prepared by Sir Ralph Abercrombie, the answers to which are to be carried to Sir Ralph at Goree, and will very much decide his option of going either to the Texel, or to Ameland and Delfzyl. General Don joined me here late last night, and brings a good deal of information with him. From his report it does not occur to me Ameland alone would be of the importance we have been led to suppose; and there is no difficulty in finding 1,200 men to do it, (which is perfectly sufficient for the purpose) if it is thought right; but General Don strongly urges, if anything is to be done in that quarter, 5,000 men should be allotted for it, by which we might raise the whole country, and give them effectual support. If the other operations are to go on, it might be difficult to spare 5,000 for this object; but, next to Voorne and Helder, I should clearly feel that Ameland and the provinces of Groningen and Friesland stood next in importance for the occupation of our whole armament. If the inhabitants in the different provinces should come forward in the manner we are led to hope, I entertain great doubts if the best appropriation of our force would not be to divide it into different bodies, in order to give support and countenance to the inhabitants of different parts of the United Provinces at the same time, and thereby preventing the Prussian partisans from having a footing any where. Unless you can be successful in collecting such a force

as both to recover Holland and occupy the Netherlands, I am strongly impressed with an idea that the division of our armament in the manner I have alluded to, would be the most beneficial, with a view to the United Provinces only."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 10. Park Street, Westminster.—"You will see by the enclosed letter of Georges' how urgent it is that what I mentioned in my letter the other day should be sent without delay. A M. de Chatillon, a most respectable old Royalist officer, is happily landed in France; and will before this time, I hope, have seen Georges. But though the accounts which he will give him will serve as an answer to part of his enquiries, they will not do much to relieve his wants. The arms have been applied for, agreeably, I conceive, to your directions, from the Ordnance; and a cutter and *chasse marée* promised by the Admiralty (I think by the way it should be a frigate). But you must authorize Frere to follow up the demand in both instances; and must enable him to accomplish the harder task of obtaining from the Treasury the necessary assistance in point of money.

"You will see in Georges' letter a confirmation of my apprehension that the Royalists will not have an option as to the time when they must throw off the mask. I fear, if the operations in Switzerland continue to stand still as they are obliged to do at present, it must happen before even I should wish it, that is before the allies will have passed the frontiers, and long before we shall be in a state to assist them.

"During the time that I was at Walmer, Mr. Pitt was talking of officers whom he might mention to you as capable of being useful to assist the insurgents in Brabant. I mentioned such as occurred to me upon the occasion. But I mentioned to him what I wish to repeat to you, that in my own opinion, there is a great objection to our sending any officers to Brabant, or giving to the inhabitants any encouragement to revolt; inasmuch as it will pledge us to support them; and thereby continue the effect which I think will be produced so much by this expedition to Holland, of withdrawing our forces from objects that are, in my opinion, likely to be so much more decisive. Though I know I contradict a favourite opinion of yours, I cannot help repeating my apprehensions that this expedition to Holland will destroy in the bud, and before it has come to its proper strength and consistency, an army that, with a little delay, would have exceeded anything that we have seen since the first years of the war; and might then have been employed in a better state, if not with more effect, to the objects which have always been uppermost in my thoughts. Of the troops now sent, and of those that will be sent, a great part are in a state which no officer would describe as fit for service. On the subject of pushing our operations in Flanders, I have already, I believe, troubled you, in part, with the objections which I feel to it. With respect to the effect which it is to have in conciliating Austria, we shall be

doing, I conceive, with forty thousand men what may be done as well by four lines in a dispatch; and, as a military operation, it will surely be bad economy if, to prevent the enemy from drawing from thence ten thousand men, either we or the Austrians are to maintain in that country an army of twenty or thirty. Except in one or other of these views I do not understand in what way the possession of the Netherlands is to be of any use to us. In the meanwhile the expense is enormous; and the force and money employed there will cripple us for any other operation. As to drawing the troops away, if they once get entangled in these operations I put that pretty much out of the question. My only hope from this attempt on Holland is that the business may possibly be soon settled, and the country put in a state to maintain itself for the present by its own forces, and to allow of our troops being withdrawn for other purposes."

Postscript. August 11th.—"I am sorry to add that an account has been received this morning at the Admiralty that Frotté, together with the boat's crew that were conveying him from the ship to the shore, was surprised by an armed boat of the enemy, and taken just as they were landing. I should be afraid that hardly a hope was to be entertained of his escape."

Enclosure.

A letter signed Georges, describing his precarious situation, and requesting an immediate supply of arms, military equipments, and money.

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 11. Walmer Castle.—"I am very glad you thought of sending me the papers you did yesterday, for, notwithstanding all the information which General Don could give, there are two or three of the papers in the bundle you sent to me of very essential consequence. Late last night Captain Hearne, who commands a Yarmouth packet, arrived here. His arrival was very fortunate. He is very intelligent and experienced seaman, and gave much new light as to the navigation of the Meuse and all the various channels in the neighbourhood of Voorne. If the Goree Gat proves not accessible (which I believe to be the case) by large ships of war, there are so many other resources and modes of attack as I confess leaves me very little apprehensions as to the issue. I send you a copy of my final instructions to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, which I put into his hands last night. If it was essential, they might sail to-day; but I am satisfied that, being now completely in possession of all their intelligence, this day will be better spent in minutely arranging their line of sailing and disposition of attack, than it could be by any orders given from on board of ship. They can do this here, or at least after they are two leagues from shore, as well as ever they can do; being in possession of all their intelligence, and their plan of

attack fixed upon. There is another circumstance which has only of late come under discussion. Next Thursday morning the spring tides will be in perfection, and they should not till then reach the coast of Holland. It does not occur to me that I shall have any more to trouble you with for some days. I thought it material to send you without delay a copy of my final instructions, as you may perhaps think it right to send them to your brother."

Postscript. "The accompanying extract of a letter I received last night from Sir Charles Grey will show you how rapidly our second army is getting on. I hope in God the weather will now continue favourable. It makes all the difference in the world to the troops in camp, in respect both to health and spirits."

Enclosure 1.

HENRY DUNDAS to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH
ABERCROMBY, K.C.B.

Secret.

1799, August 10. Walmer Castle.—"Having maturely considered all the intelligence we have been able to collect respecting the approach to Helvoetsluys, and after a full comparison of the objections arising out of that intelligence to the plan of operations pointed out in your instructions, No. 1, with those to which other suggestions appear liable, I have now to communicate to you the determination by which you are to be governed in these respects.

"In the first place I must state to you that the advices lately received from the Continent render it a matter of the most urgent necessity that the expedition should, without a moment's further delay, proceed to the coast of Holland, and as there appears very little doubt of your being able to take possession of the Island of Goree, you are in any case to consider it as the first object to be attacked. Having secured this point it will then rest with the Admiral and yourself to judge whether the facility it will afford you of proceeding against Voorn is sufficient to warrant the attempt. In the event of your agreeing on this point, not a moment is to be lost in carrying it into execution, and from the well grounded confidence I have in the cordial co-operation of the naval force, I should entertain very little doubt of success if the attempt should be resolved upon as one of which, in your judgement, the difficulties may be overcome by the bravery of the troops, without exposing them or the ships to a greater degree of risk than it would be reasonable to incur for the attainment of a position which (if it can be secured by such an effort) appears certainly preferable to every other. On the other hand should the attempt appear altogether impracticable, or so dangerous as to induce you to forego the prospect of the superior advantage to be derived from it, the object next in point of immediate importance is to attempt to get possession of the Helder and the Texel Island. The mode of proceeding to make this attack, as well as the expediency of its being undertaken, are points on which it must be left to your judgement and discretion to decide, after receiving the report of the officer who has been dispatched

to Admiral Lord Duncan to procure information, and such suggestions as his Lordship may have to offer upon the subject. The advantages to be derived from the success of this enterprise, if undertaken, in giving you a secure footing in the Province of Holland, and a safe communication with the shipping, in opening the navigation of the Zuyder Zee, and in all probability giving us the disposal of the Dutch Navy, are of such magnitude as we ought not to lose sight of, in the event of an attack on Voorn being relinquished, without being thoroughly satisfied that they cannot be attained by the force under your command; or without such risk and loss as would counterbalance your success, or render insecure the footing you might thereby acquire in the positions above-mentioned.

“Should you be under the necessity of relinquishing both the above-mentioned objects, there appears little doubt of the facility with which the forces might enter the river Ems, and be landed in the neighbourhood of Delftzyll, of which place they would be enabled to get possession; and from thence to push their operations in such a manner as, according to circumstances and the information you might procure on the spot, might appear best adapted to effect the speedy reduction of the provinces of Groninguen and Friezeland and of the generality of Drent. I have avoided entering into any detail of the military operations which this or the former service might require, wishing to leave entirely to your own judgement to direct the movements of your army according to the intelligence you may procure on the spot of the strength of the enemy, the disposition of the inhabitants, and other circumstances which must govern your discretion in the execution of a plan of this nature.

“Should you be compelled to make the conquest of Groninguen and Friezeland the principal object of your expedition, a larger body of cavalry than is now embarked will, in all probability, be wanted to enable you to push forward and support your operations in that part of the country; and for this purpose I shall take care that not less than 1,000 be held in readiness to embark immediately on receiving a requisition from you to this effect. From several communications lately received from the Continent, there is reason to believe that the taking possession of the island of Amelandt would become the signal for a rising in the provinces of Friezeland and Groninguen; and for this reason, should you direct your operations to this quarter, as well as on account of its local importance with respect to the passage of the Waal, it will I think be expedient that you should send a sufficient detachment to secure and defend the same, whilst you proceed with the remainder of your army to the Ems; and in this case a proportion of the spare arms allotted for arming the inhabitants may be deposited at Amelandt, from whence they may with great facility be passed over to the main land, in case of a rising against the present government. An account of the island of Amelandt, and a plan of attack and defence of the same are herewith enclosed for your consideration.

"Should you determine to make your principal attack upon the Helder, and the Texel Island, I would not, considering the importance of success in this point, restrict you from proceeding with your whole force on this service; but if you should think a sufficient detachment could be spared from it to maintain the possession of Goree for a few days only, until it could be reinforced from hence, it would be very essential not to abandon that point; because in so far as any measures are in contemplation on the Continent under the direction of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who is now on the frontier, to induce the inhabitants to co-operate with his Majesty's troops for their own deliverance, they are probably taken on the supposition that we shall in the first instance, take possession of the Island of Goree. Having stated the various alternatives which suggest themselves for the employment of the present expedition, and my opinion of the respective importance of each, I think it right to add that I do not wish to exclude the exercise of your own discretion, in concert with the Admiral, either in respect to modifying each or either of these plans, or in adopting any other, being perfectly satisfied that nothing which zeal and bravery can effect will be left undone by the officers or men of either service; and that their efforts will be directed to whatever object may appear to you most to correspond with the advantage of his Majesty's service, the spirit of the instructions you have received, and the ultimate success of the campaign." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GREY, K.C.B., to
HENRY DUNDAS.

Extract.

1799, August 10. Barham Court.—"Six more regiments to those already announced to me, are on their march for Barham Down, and will make the whole nearly 18,000 men, exclusive of cavalry. The 5th regiment took their ground this morning, and which the others shall do as they arrive, without stopping at Canterbury, and will be daily."

SECRET REPORT ON FRENCH AND BELGIAN AFFAIRS.

Transmitted by M. DE LA PALUE.

1799, August 12. Emmerich.—"On vient de recevoir une lettre de la personne qu'on a proposée précédemment, et voici comme elle s'exprime. 'Je pense bien que notre commerce ne réussira pas, d'autant plus que nos articles tombent chaque jour dans un tel discrédit qu'ils ne valent plus qu'on les payent à un tel prix; tandis que les vôtres acquièrent, au contraire, tous le jours une telle vogue, que vous n'aurez bientôt plus à redouter aucune concurrence; le ciel en soit loué, je ne demande pas mieux que de voir prospérer votre maison.

“ Les trois derniers Directeurs sont absolument insignifiants. Barras et Syès ne doutent plus que la République ne soit aux abois; le danger qu'ils ont couru, et courent peut-être encore, de la part de Jacobins, les rendrait très accessibles à des propositions quelconques, soit générales soit individuelles. Les conseils sont en général bien-pensans, et il ne faut pas les juger d'après les séances et les discours qu'ils prononcent. Ils sont pour la plupart de forme, de convenance, et souvent de commande. Il y a parmi eux des exagérés, mais très peu d'anarchistes, et ces derniers tombent de jour en jour.

“ Il y a en Bretagne des insurgés, des mécontents en assez grand nombre, mais ils n'ont ni armes ni argent. Il en est de même en Languedoc où ils manquent de même, de chefs, d'argent, et d'armes. Les Chouans se montrent déjà en Poitou, en Anjou, et dans l'Orléanois; ils croissent chaque jour d'une manière inquiétante pour la France. J'en donnerai des détails quand ils seront plus avancés. On peut en espérer beaucoup s'ils sont aidés d'une manière franche et loyale, et surtout par des personnes de leur nation, par quelques chefs puissants. Le numéraire devient chaque jour plus rare: l'emprunt forcé ne produira presque rien, et il est impossible de concevoir comment le gouvernement s'en procurera. Il sera réduit à employer les moyens les plus ruineux. Par les états de l'armée de Massena, elle est, à peu près, de 72,000 hommes; celle du Rhin n'est guères que de 20 à 25,000, et celle des Alpes de 18,000; il y a parmi le soldat un extrême découragement qui ne fera qu'augmenter si on continue à avoir des revers, et si on parvient à ôter aux soldats Français l'opinion qu'on maltraite les prisonniers, et si ceux qui se rallieraient de l'autre côté trouvaient des chefs de leur nation, et un trésorier qui payât exactement *leur paye*.—On ne sait comment approvisionner les armées et les placer. On est obligé de vider les magasins des villes pour faire subsister les troupes. Les Orléanistes sont dans une quantité telle qu'on ne peut s'en faire une idée, et ce parti se renforce chaque jour; la raison en est simple, on croit par là faire moins de pas rétrogrades, avoir moins de compte à rendre, plus de chose à conserver, enfin avoir une plus grande influence.

“ Ce correspondant ajoute à la fin de la lettre, indépendamment des propositions faites et d'après les quelles on se procurerait des renseignemens certains et tels qu'on les désirerait, il ajoute, si quelqu'un demandait une correspondance soit de *gazettes* soit de *curiosités*, on pourrait s'adresser à lui; il connaît un homme de lettres qui en fournirait une du plus grand intérêt; il ne se permettrait aucune réflexion, mais on trouverait chez lui impartialité et vérité, et écrirait deux lettres par semaine, dont les matières régleront seules l'étendue, moyennant 200 francs par mois, payés d'avance. ‘Je joindrais mes factures à ses lettres’ (on entend par factures une manière assez ingénieuse qu'il a imaginée, et dont mon ami m'a laissé sa clef, telles qu'ils en étaient convenus en Hollande). Il finit en disant que si on n'a pas de fonds à employer, il est inutile de lui écrire.

“ Par les autres nouvelles qu'on s'est procurées, il est évident que Barras et Siéyes ont travaillé avec succès les Conseils, et qu'ils ont la majorité contre le parti Jacobin. La dénonciation faite contre eux par Courtois au Conseil des Anciens est de la plus grande force, et a été la cause du décret qui les a chassé de la Salle du Manège. Ils tiennent actuellement séance aux Jacobins, où ils n'auroient plus la protection aussi décidée du gouvernement. On s'attend à une rixe, à une commotion, qui sera sans doute considérable ; il est aisé de voir que le gouvernement est vacillant, se trouve environné de dangers, n'a point de plan, qu'il craint peut-être plus les ennemis du dedans que ceux du dehors. Il cherche à relever l'esprit public par les espérances qu'il fait répandre par les feuilles qui lui sont dévouées, sur l'entrée de la flotte Française dans l'océan. Voici le détail qu'elles en donnent. 26 vaisseaux Français, 20 Espagnols ; 9 Espagnols à Rochefort, 9 à Brest, prêts à mettre en mer. On espère de bloquer le Texel, et joindre les 12 vaisseaux Hollandais ; total 68 vaisseaux. Voici les réflexions épaisses dans les différentes feuilles ; l'escadre Anglaise devant Gênes reviendra difficilement dans l'océan à cause des vents et des courans qui règnent dans cette saison dans la Méditerranée ; on surveillera avec des forces aussi imposantes l'expédition secrète de l'Angleterre, et peut-être même on l'enlèvera, parcequ'elle ne peut avoir eu connaissance de l'entrée de notre flotte dans ces passages ; on peut aller au devant des dix vaisseaux Russes et des transports ; on peut s'emparer des vaisseaux épais qui forment les blocus—il est possible d'interrompre le convoi des Antilles qui arrive dans cette saison. Les escadres combinées sont entrées à Cadix le 23 Messidor (11 Juillet), et ont pris plusieurs bâtimens Américains armés en guerre et commissionnés contre les Français. Les Anciens viennent de rejeter à une grande majorité le décret des 500 qui rapportait la déportation de Barrère.

“ Dans le Brabant il y a quelque rassemblement de conscrits qui se cachent dans les bois et font quelques excursions dans lieux voisins. Les mouvemens sont insignifiants, et les Français paraissent peu s'inquiéter. Il passe à Luxembourg d'assez nombreux transports de recrues pour renforcer l'armée du Rhin, ainsi que d'artillerie de campagne, munitions de guerre, effets de campement ; on les embarque ensuite sur la Moselle. Le quartier-général de Beguinot vient d'être transféré à Gand. Il est arrivé quelques bataillons de l'intérieur pour renforcer les troupes sur les côtes. Florent Guyot, qui succède à Fouché de Nante à la Haye, y est déjà arrivé. Son discours de sa réception a été très modéré et n'offre rien de neuf. Les Jacobins Hollandais travaillent depuis quelques jours avec moins d'activité. Les attaques faites à leurs confrères de Paris paraissent les ralentir.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 12. Walmer Castle.—“ I had a letter from Lord Elgin on the same subject as yours, and likewise one from the

Duke of York. I have spoke to Mr. Pitt respecting it, but he does not accurately recollect whether anything has passed between him and the Duke of Athole, or between the King and the Duke of Athole, which may render it impossible to give the green ribbon to any other than his Grace. His pretensions are certainly very strong, being the only one of his rank in Scotland who has it not; and he was set aside last time to make way for Lord Morton, as he was about the person of the Queen. The situation Lord Elgin is going into and his own rank in the peerage give him certainly a very fair right to ask it, if the Duke of Athole's pretensions do not supersede any consideration of other pretensions. Be so good as explain this to Lord Elgin, and as you will see Mr. Pitt in a day or two, and the King before I see him, you are competent to decide on the business better than I am."

LORD LOUGHBOROUGH [Lord Chancellor] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 12. Tunbridge Wells.—"Mr. Murray, who is Consul at Madeira, has found it necessary in the conduct of the business of his house to remove to Lisbon, and I should be extremely obliged to you if you would have the goodness to allow Mr. Joseph Pringle, the partner in the house, who will continue to reside at Madeira, to succeed him as Consul there. The office has, for a great many years, been in that house, and executed very much to the satisfaction of all who had occasion to resort to the island.

"I feel a very particular interest in this solicitation; because my very near relation the late Mr. Cheap, who had probably the honour of being known to you during the time he was in the East Indian Direction, has left his share in the house to his family, and his son is now the acting partner in London. Mr. Cheap had held the office himself while he resided at Madeira, and was succeeded in it by the partner who remained in the island. The emoluments of it I believe are not very considerable. But it would be a very sensible mortification to be deprived of the sort of consequence which is attached to it, and to see it transferred to any house of more modern establishment; for I believe this house has been settled in Madeira for almost a century."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 13. Downing Street.—"I am just arrived, having left the expedition completely off, and with every circumstance favourable for its speedy arrival and landing. Pray let me know at what hour I shall come to you to-morrow, to call on *Monsieur*."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 14. Harley Street.—"Je vous envoie ce paquet que je viens de recevoir par un courier qui m'est arrivé dans ce

moment. J'ai reçu différente dépêches qui ne pourront être traduite du Russe que demain, et je vous supplie de me recevoir demain entre deux et quatre heures pour que je puisse vous les communiquer. En attendant je dois vous dire qu'on insiste chez nous à ne pas employer le Comte d'Artois. Il paroît qu'on croit en outre à Petersbourg qu'il est très prématuré encor d'employer aucun de ces princes."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 14. Berlin.—"I scarcely know why I sit down to add a few restless words to my dispatch of this day's date. It is from you and of you that I want to hear, and till I do so, till I hear of the arrival of Abercrombie, and of the English comments upon the Prussian negociation, I can say nothing and write nothing but of impatient anxiety; and in truth you will not wonder at it when you recollect the number of long days and hours which have been dragging on from the 5th to the 14th without bringing to my feverish anxiety any satisfactory accounts of the interesting events which are at stake by land and by water. The royal letter to the Duke of Brunswick is curious enough, although it is obviously the composition of Beihm rather than of the King. You see they are completely silent as to their scandalous dereliction of the treaty which they had approved; but General Stamford has completed this narrative somewhat more faithfully in his conversations with the Duke, and His Serene Highness is pleased to be surprised and indignant at it, and writes, as you see, a bit of a letter to Haugwiz, and threatens to write another and a longer to his master; but these are poor devices which will end only in the effusion of much Christian ink, and will leave the Duke, the King, and the Ministers in the same respectable state in which they now stand. Haugwiz, no longer enjoying the light of my countenance and protection, supplies through Baron Kinkel the little whispering commerce which he had been used to carry on with me through his old but respectable and well intentioned philosopher De Luc; he had insinuated much about the prompt answer he was sure of obtaining from Paris, the great probability of his conducting that negociation so as to make it fail, and the good hopes which he had that, at the end of ten days, we should yet see the Prussian army acting as we wished without a subsidy or convention. This was the *bold* language which was to set us all at ease upon the Paris overture, and you may easily imagine that I did not receive these suggestions with more either of faith or of respect than they deserve; but now at last our little minister is sunk, I think, below the point of zero even in his own political thermometer; for his last conversation with Kinkel was a confession that he could obtain no answer from Paris, and a melancholy complaint that even Otto seemed to avoid instead of to court any discussion of that overture. It is scarcely worth while to remark upon the degree of humiliation

in which this places the Court and the Minister of Berlin, but I mention it rather because it affords some ground for speculation on the part of France and the Directory. Are they hesitating upon the measure of the evacuation of Holland; are they considering of the means of doing this without giving way to the establishment of the Stadtholder; are they speculating upon the chance of frightening you out of your expedition by the report of their combined fleet, *quod Deus avertat*; are they too much engaged with the politics of Paris to think in these times of Berlin and the Hague, or does a little of each of these reasons produce that silence which makes at present the despair, real or affected, of the Minister Haugwiz? They begin to be uneasy at the Prince of Orange's stay at Lingen. I hope he will soon relieve their anxiety, and step out of their country into his own; it would well crown this glorious work, if Otto should make the King of Prussia send away his own brother-in-law, to deprecate the wrath of the Great Nation in the hour of its decline."

Postscript. "The Russian courier has, at length, while I was sealing my letters, brought with him the Imperial indignation from Petersburg. I am glad to find that the Emperor, however dissatisfied with Prussia, does not talk of more than withdrawing the whole mission, and therefore that there does not seem any ground to apprehend actual hostility between the two countries. I am likewise well pleased to find that Count Panin's conduct is entirely approved of by his master, both in his coming to Berlin and in his leaving it.

"But though this might have been worse, it is still bad; the recall of Panin was sufficient to mark whatever was due to his just sense of indignation; but the recall of the whole mission will be a harsh measure in the public eye, will give no opportunity of any return to better measures, and will tend to serve at Berlin the cause of Paris."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 15. Berlin.—"I am mortified to find by your letter of the 6th that you had not yet received my second despatch upon the official conference which we held with the Prussian Ministers, because as you will already have seen, I do not think that my present stay here is attended with any other effect than that of nursing the Prussian confidence in their being considered by us as still to be solicited, waited upon, and paid according to their own good pleasure. I do not find that I have anything to write in answer to your dispatch of the 6th, and shall therefore put off the formal acknowledgment of it till I have more occasion to write a public dispatch; I have now scarce time for a few lines, or I shall miss the packet of Sunday.

"I do not think it is safe to stir the question in Holland of Prussian negotiation, and I should much hesitate to do so through the channel of the Hereditary Prince's communications;

but I have desired Stamford to write to the Hereditary Prince to guard him against any false impressions upon this subject, and to furnish him with a true and orthodox view of it. The sickness of the Grand Pensionary, who is quite disabled, seems to me to make it advisable rather that the Greffier should come over to these frontiers than that the Hereditary Prince should pass into England; but I have so far executed your commission as to tell him that it was thought in England that he might deem it prudent to go over thither immediately, but of course that it was for him in his wisdom to decide where and how he could make himself the most useful; if your expedition has taken place (as I pray to God it may, in spite of all the combined fleet of Cadiz), very probably the Hereditary Prince has already found the means of passing into the country, or has succeeded in his projects to possess himself of Deventer or Coevorden. What Elphinstone is doing I know not, but I am still persuaded that every additional danger is, in this state of things, an additional motive for pursuing your expedition with redoubled activity.

"I send you a large packet from Lord Minto, which I have scarcely had time to read with all the attention which it deserved, but which seems to me to offer many great difficulties and embarrassments. The first in time and importance is the plan of the campaign, and you will easily see how embarrassing will be my interview with Lord Mulgrave, when I shall have to tell him that, by Lord Minto's account, they do not propose to concert anything with him for this campaign, but regard their own plan as being already fixed and determined. Nevertheless, if Lord Mulgrave arrives here I shall be disposed to advise him to continue his journey to Vienna, and at least discuss with Thugut the unreasonable change which has been made with respect to the plan of the campaign, and with respect to the share which Austria had solicited Great Britain to take in that plan by sending for an officer to discuss it with them. I own that I think there is an additional inducement to his pursuing his journey (if he has begun it) because I think he will perhaps be useful in bringing back the attention of the government there to those points upon which we had understood them to be less at variance with us than they now seem to be. Lord Minto seems to be perfectly aware of the interested views with which Thugut had adopted this plan of military measures; but the hard task is to struggle with those bad motives, and with all the little under machinery that is at work upon those irregular principles. I wish I had the time to pursue the whole of what appears to me to be important in these Vienna dispatches, but, generally speaking, I cannot help saying that I think they betray so rapacious and so insatiable an appetite for conquest, that I should think it desirable without any hesitation to pronounce decidedly on the part of London and Petersburg against the unbounded projects which are now avowed by Austria; projects that decide, not upon the French barrier of Italy, but upon the open and absolute

territorial possession of Piedmont, Savoy, Venice, and great part of Tuscany. What are we to say, too, when we see that, in addition to all this, they are to re-occupy their Austrian Netherlands; and that our acquiescence in this enormous plan of plunder is to be purchased, not by their acceding to our plans or measures, but by their substituting others for their own distinct advantage; that they are to throw upon Great Britain even the expense of those Russian troops which have helped to save them from being again besieged in Vienna, and that we shall thereby not have augmented the Russian army by 45,000 men, but have augmented our own expense only for the relief of Austria; and when at the end of all this, they will not ratify our convention without having first good assurances that we are to get nothing by it either in money, none being to be paid to us, or in consideration, as the ratification is to be a secret. When all these demands are opened to us on their side, they do form such an extravagant and unreasonable trespass upon every principle of morality, interest, and convenience, that I protest I could not have imagined my old friend Thugut would have ventured to have brought forward in one and the same moment such an ugly heap of disgusting and insatiable desires. I do not yet understand how it is possible that they can have persuaded the Emperor of Russia to give them the poor King of Sardinia tied and bound into their hands; or how he can reconcile this weakness with the better and more worthy conduct which Suwarrow had hitherto successfully adopted in his name; neither can I bring myself to think that it is desirable for us to concur with them in drawing every Russian out of Italy, when it is confessed by them that their motive for doing so is not the military plan which had been agreed on, but is plainly the detestable motive of being at liberty to range unmolested over all the states and territories which could have found protection from the arms of the allied Courts.

“You will observe that I do not say a word of the military part of their new plan, because there is such large demand upon one’s patience in all the details of their political objects; but if they meant fairly only to meet the military danger of the Middle Rhine, why do they not send there the *intermediate* 30,000 men, and pursue in Switzerland with the Allies the general measures which they had already agreed to. This is a point, however, upon which professional men are better able to decide; but it requires the assistance of no profession to determine that the general outline of their views, as described in these four dispatches from Lord Minto, is one which it appears to me to be impossible for a British Cabinet to receive and to adopt. I have lost my time and my patience, and yours too, perhaps, in this hasty blot; and more than all, perhaps I shall risk all chance of catching the post which is to convey it to you, therefore I must conclude. My present notion is to-night to write a few lines by Bassett to Lord Minto; I do not like to give myself the airs of criticising, lecturing, or advising those who are better able upon their own

business to decide for themselves; but as Lord Minto has sent me his dispatches open, I do not think it fair entirely to keep from him the strong impression which is made upon my mind by the demands which are detailed in them. If Lord Mulgrave comes this road, I will read to him as much of Lord Minto's No. 2 as I have had time to have copied, and I shall be inclined to advise him to go on to Vienna, as if he had received no other intimation than that which Lord Henley had sent as the invitation and request of the court of Vienna; when he is there he can perhaps, by recurring to your instructions, fortify the check which I think Lord Minto should, with prudence and discretion, give to the unbounded and inordinate avidity of the Austrian Minister. The discussion would at least give time for you to write from London, though doubtless it is a discussion which Lord Mulgrave will not for his own gratification desire to enter into.

"I do not know why they reckon Korsakow so late in his arrival as the middle of September. Everybody here reckons that they will arrive at Schaffhausen the 20th instant at latest, and probably sooner. I have no messenger for Petersburg, but will send your dispatch to Whitworth by cypher on the first post day."

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 16. St. Petersburg.—"If I presume to take up a few moments of your Lordship's time, I expect your Lordship to pardon me in consideration of the irresistible desire I feel to express to your Lordship my gratitude for the signal mark of protection with which your Lordship has honoured me upon this occasion. Your Lordship will do me the justice to believe that this proof of your Lordship's kindness will never be forgotten.

"I have taken the liberty to address to your Lordship a portrait of his Imperial Majesty, tolerably well painted, and a most striking likeness. I sent it about a week ago by shipping, and I most humbly hope that your Lordship will do me the honour to accept of it. Perhaps your Lordship may think it worthy, from the unbounded zeal of the original, to occupy a conspicuous place in your Lordship's apartment."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, August 16. [Cleveland Row.]—"Whitworth, par une dépêche que j'ai reçu après vous avoir écrit, me mande que le Vice-Chancelier lui avoit donné à entendre que la Suède feroit de nouvelles propositions moins extravagantes que les précédentes, mais, comme il est évident que ces troupes ne peuvent être d'aucune utilité pour l'expédition dont il est question, j'espère qu'il se déterminera (comme il paroissoit disposé) de ne prendre la chose qu'*ad referendum*.

“Je ne vois pas comment il est possible d'accorder des subsides à une puissance qui se met sur le pied de ne pas traiter avec nous. Mais je suppose que pour avoir de l'argent on ne sera pas plus difficile à se desister de cette extravagance que de l'autre.

“Pour le reste il faudra voir ce qu'ils offriront et ce qu'ils demandent.

“Je crois notre expédition certainement allée au Texel. On en avoit le choix si le vent étoit plus favorable pour cette expédition que pour l'autre, et certainement il l'étoit.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 16. Cleveland Row.—“I enclose you Mr. Rolleston's statement of the precautions taken by him respecting the Dutch proclamations. It certainly appears to me to be highly satisfactory in so far as relates to him, or to the possibility that this paper can have become public through any indiscretion or negligence in the Foreign Office. You will, I doubt not, feel the necessity of our pursuing this enquiry as with respect to all the persons who appear, by Mr. Rolleston's account, to have been in possession of the copies. I have already seen Mr. Fagel, who expressed to me the most perfect conviction that it was neither by his means, nor through the Prince of Orange, that the paper became public; but, in a matter which is so important, I shall take the liberty to request from him a written statement on the subject.

“Should other endeavours fail, I have myself no doubt that the Privy Council is competent to call the newspaper printers before them, and to examine them on oath as to the person from whom they received the paper. But before this is done, the Attorney and Solicitor General should of course be consulted.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 16. Cleveland Row.—“I enclose a letter from the Bishop of St. Pol, on a subject on which he spoke to me at Stowe, and which appears to merit attention. After the experience of Quiberon, we cannot certainly listen to any projects of employing these people in our service; but I can see no harm in letting the priests have access to them, which indeed ought on other grounds to be done; nor in releasing and sending back to the Vendée those for whom the Bishop thinks he can answer as Royalists, but who have been forced by requisitions into Government ships, or have got into privateers to avoid being forced into the army.

“If you agree with me in this, it rests with you to give the necessary orders to the Transport Board.” *Copy.*

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 16. Admiralty.—“I have not more expectation than you that anything is at present to be done with the combined fleets in Brest; and I am not at all disposed to renew a

blockade immediately till there is a greater chance of their being in a state to undertake something which it may be worth while to wear our ships out by attempting to counteract.

“Lord Nelson seems by his last letters so little disposed to quit the neighbourhood of Naples, that I am afraid he will not very readily come to Genoa ; if Lord W. Bentinck’s requisition has been very pressing, he may possibly send a detachment there after having possessed himself of Capua and Gaeta ; and his force is now sufficient (considering the enemy’s weakness in that sea) to enable him to attend to all those objects if he chooses.

“What do you think of this report of the Prussian Minister’s being sent away from Paris ?”

Note of a conversation between COUNT HAUGWITZ *and*
BARON KINKEL.*

1799, August 16. Berlin.

KINKEL.—“Je viens pour vous voir, mais aussi pour savoir des nouvelles. Vous ne voulez pas faire la guerre avec les autres, je pense toujours que c’est afin d’avoir le mérite de la faire pour votre propre compte.

[HAUGWITZ.]—“Comment voulez que l’on puisse rien espérer lorsque l’on voit des sottises comme celle que vient de faire l’empereur de Russie. J’ai empêché que le Roi ne prit le mors aux dents ; il y était tenté ; mais je lui ai prouvé qu’une grande puissance ne devait pas négliger les considérations pour écouter les petites vengeances. Qu’arriverait-il si nous donnions l’ordre à Monsieur de Kalkreuth de concentrer 80,000 hommes qui sont déjà sur cette frontière ? L’Empereur abandonnerait la guerre de France, il en avertirait l’Autriche et l’Angleterre par la retraite de les troupes du Rhin de l’Italie, de l’Hollande : la France triompherait, l’Europe serait perdue, et nous-mêmes nous en partagerions le sort : celui qui a la force de punir une insulte ne saurait être déshonoré : voilà comme je raisonne et comme je tâche de faire penser le Roi. Il ne faut pourtant pas que l’Empereur pousse les choses trop loin, et qu’il s’imagine qu’il peut nous faire marcher à sa bannière. Je ne hésite pas de dire que nous sommes la puissance la plus entière de l’Europe.

[KINKEL.]—“J’applaudis à votre patriotisme, et je conviens de votre puissance ; mais convenez avec moi que l’Empereur donne à la guerre contre la France toute son énergie, mais qu’il n’y emploie ses forces qu’avec mesure. Il y a, tout au plus, 80,000 hommes opposés à la France : l’on en donne généralement 300,000 à la Russie : elle compte parmi ses sujets plusieurs nations qui sont armées en masse : avec cela l’Autriche commence à avoir les mains libres. Par conséquent vous risqueriez dans tous les cas en cassant les vitres avec la Russie. Si votre guerre était heureuse, vous feriez triompher la Révolution ; mais si elle était malheureuse, vous seriez interré avec la Révolution, ce qui serait mourir en mauvaise compagnie.

* Transmitted by Mr. Grenville.

[HAUGWITZ.] — “Croyez-moi ce que l'on dit des forces de la Russie est exagéré. Nous les chasserions d'un trait jusqu'à Mittau, jusqu'à Pétersburgh ; mais ce n'est ni notre intérêt, ni notre sentiment.

[KINKEL.] — “Quelles nouvelles avez-vous donc de Paris ?

[HAUGWITZ.] — “Pas un mot, parole d'honneur : j'attribue cela à ce que ces gueux sont menacés de leur chute, et qu'ils ne peuvent s'occuper d'autre chose : aussi la dernière poste n'est-elle pas arrivée. Pour [Otto] je ne l'ai pas vu, et je ne m'embarrasse plus de ce garnement : il faut que l'affaire soit traitée par Monsieur de Sandoz.

[KINKEL.] — “Que croyez-vous qu'ils répondront d'après les derniers événements arrivés à Paris ?

[HAUGWITZ.] — “Je ne saurais vous le dire, mais cela ne changera rien à mon système. Si l'on m'empêche de marcher au but par les meilleurs moyens, j'en chercherai d'autres jusqu'à ce que je parviens ; je voudrais être à St. James pour répondre à la lettre du Roi de Prusse.

[KINKEL.] — “Et, que répondriez-vous ?

[HAUGWITZ.] — “J'accepterais les engagements que le Roi de Prusse prend, et je lui dirais avec force que je m'attendais à ce qu'il les remplirait ; cela ferait plus de bien, pousserait plus à la roue que toutes les négociations et toutes les conversations ministérielles et personnelles ; et sur cela mille choses à ne pas tarir, de l'attachement du Roi de Prusse pour le Roi d'Angleterre, de son désir de former avec l'Angleterre des engagements solides et permanents. Il revint sur l'expédience d'isoler les intérêts des deux puissances et de les traiter exclusivement ; à quoi les affaires d'Hollande, qui ne regardaient que l'Angleterre et la Prusse, fournissaient le meilleur prétexte possible. Il ne se lassait pas de dire que sa lettre renfermait les engagements les plus propres à rassurer le Cabinet de Londres sur la loyauté des intentions de la Prusse.

[KINKEL.] — “Je ne pouvais pas partager cet avis, et je lui fis part de ma crainte que cette pièce ne ferait pas toute l'impression qu'il en attendait, et d'autant moins qu'elle ne laissait pas de renfermer des contradictions.

[HAUGWITZ.] — “Et lesquelles ?

[KINKEL.] — “Si ma mémoire ne me trompe, il y s'agit du gouvernement Français en termes de mépris, tandis qu'elle annonce que l'on va traiter avec eux ; et il y est question de leurs revers, tandis que l'on s'appesantit sur les dangers aux-quels la monarchie Prussienne serait exposée si on leur faisait la guerre.

[HAUGWITZ.] — “Que voulez-vous quand on devrait faire marcher 100,000 hommes sur l'Escaut, ou sur la Meuse, et qu'on ne veut pas le faire. Il faut nécessairement donner des raisons, fussent-elles mauvaises. Le Prince d'Orange nous a donné un bien grand embarras. Tous ses officiers sont en uniformes, et ne veulent pas se soumettre aux lois militaires : ils ont brusqué les postes. J'ai arrangé cela en engageant le Roi de lui écrire. Les deux princes en se quittant se sont faits des révérences et ne se sont pas assez expliqués. Notre idée est qu'il fasse, mais

qu'il n'ait pas l'air de faire; et le Roi, embarrassé de ne pas faire plus pour son beau-frère, n'a pas osé lui dire assez clairement ce qu'il pouvait ou ne pouvait pas admettre.

[KINKEL.]—“ Je suis en vérité bien aise de cet aveu de votre bouche que le Roi est honteux : il a bien raison de l'être, car jamais aucun monarque n'a été appelé aux devoirs personnels de la générosité, et à ceux que lui imposent l'attachement à sa famille, d'une manière indiquée plus fortement par les intérêts de sa couronne; et s'il ne voulait écouter personne là-dessus, il aurait du moins dû accepter sa leçon de ses amis les Autrichiens. C'est la prudence de l'instinct, si on manque d'autres lumières, de ne jamais faire ce que désirent vos ennemis. Leur acharnement a été si grand qu'ils ont mieux aimé risquer dans cette nouvelle lutte les désastres et les défaites, que de s'assurer de la victoire par votre co-opération. La conduite de Monsieur de Cobenzl, et celle de Dieterichstein, et mille autres incidents vous l'ont prouvé jusqu'à l'évidence; et pourquoi ont-ils ce voeu de votre exclusion? Pour vous isoler; parceque vous les embarrasseriez dans leurs projets d'aggrandissement par votre voix au chapitre : ils veulent détacher de vous la Russie, ramener à eux l'Angleterre, et vous travaillez si utilement pour eux, sans conserver même la chance de vous jeter entre les bras de la France, si vous aviez même des politiques assez enragés Jacobins pour conseiller ce parti désespéré. J'avoue que la politique est en cela comme l'amour; on recommence toujours à dire les mêmes choses, et on ne se lasse jamais de les répéter; je vous ai dit ceci si souvent.

[HAUGWITZ.]—“ Cela ne nous a pas échappé, et je puis vous dire à cela une bien singulière anecdote; c'est que depuis peu la Cour de Vienne nous a fait des ouvertures d'une amitié, d'une douceur, et d'une civilité inexprimables. Le Roi en a été frappé, et je lui ai dit que rien n'était plus simple, que nous méritions toute leur faveur en faisant ce qu'ils désiraient. Et une autre anecdote, c'est que Dieterichstein, en partant, nous a donné un mémoire dans le même esprit, que Thugut en a été mécontent, et qu'il a dit, ' ce jeune homme a été maladroit, il a trop fait éclater sa voie.' Et si vous êtes peiné de notre conduite, jugez qu'elle doit être mon affliction, qui ai préparé avec une application sincère et de longue main les mesures que nous devons prendre à l'heure qu'il est. La paix de Basle était indispensable; la guerre se faisait sans accord, sans harmonie; nous n'avions plus d'argent, nous étions embarrassé par nos sottises en Pologne. Elle a été faite, mais je voulais employer le temps pour prendre haleine, laisser par nos stipulations les affaires d'Hollande dans leur entier, et sur la fin de la lutte venir sur cet objet à la rencontre de l'Angleterre. Nous aurions lavé tous nos péchés de Basle et du traité de subsides par notre co-opération, et nous en serions revenus à l'alliance stable et permanente qui est le voeu de mon cœur.

[KINKEL.]—“ Assurément c'est bien dommage, et par l'événement encore plus malheureux pour vous que pour les alliés que vous n'avez pas eu l'influence de consommer cet ouvrage.

[HAUGWITZ.]—"La Cour de Vienne sortira rayonnante de cette affaire ; si la Russie la pousse trop sur la restauration d'un roi en France, elle la plantera, fera une superbe paix. Elle n'a rien à craindre : tous les peuples ont reçu au midi leurs leçons contre la Démocratie, mais nous restons dans notre bourbe d'esprit de révolution. Vous voyez que j'ai suffisamment senti l'état de la question. Quelles nouvelles des flottes et de l'expédition ? Je suis là-dessus dans une inquiétude mortelle, pourvu qu'ils ne reprennent pas haleine.

[KINKEL.]—"Je puis à cet égard vous rassurer : il y a des nouvelles qu'une autre flotte est toute prête pour aller à la rencontre de l'ennemi, et qu'aucune mesure relative aux expéditions du Continent n'a été pour un seul instant suspendue.

HAUGWITZ.—"Grandissime joie.

KINKEL.—"Vous paraissez encore toujours espérer, qu'en dernière analyse, le Roi se prononcera. Il met en avant un principe qui ne paraît pas promettre des résultats favorables ; 'le bonheur de mon peuple est mon seul devoir, et le bonheur ne peut exister que par la paix.' Devant cet axiome il fait disparaître toutes les considérations de dignité, de considération, d'influence, et même de puissance. Voilà comme je fais l'abstraction de son principe, du moins de celui qu'il met en avant.

HAUGWITZ.—"Oui, mais je pars de même principe.

KINKEL.—"Est-ce que l'on a la paix et le bonheur quand l'on est entouré de chiens enragés, et qu'un grand nombre ont déjà pénétré jusques dans votre maison."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [Loughborough].

1799, August 17. Cleveland Row.—"Since I spoke to you I have looked at my memorandum book, and I find an application made some time since by Sir James Pulteney that Mr. Murray might be succeeded by Mr. Smith, who, I think, was stated to be his nephew, and to which I at that time consented. I have never heard any more on the subject, and if the present arrangement for which you interest yourself can be so managed as not to be inconsistent with my engagement to Sir James Pulteney, I shall most willingly obey your commands."
Copy.

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 17. Egglisaw on the Rhine.—"I directed the messenger Dickens to wait at Schaffhausen until he should hear from me from hence, in the hope that I might be able to send your Lordship an account of the Austrians having effected their passage over the Aar. But I am truly sorry to say that they have completely failed, and that the Archduke, at the head of forty battalions, has been baffled by the exertions of three or four thousand French, the utmost that could be collected on the point of attack before four o'clock this afternoon.

"The passage was so far surprised that the batteries were erected, and the first pontoons got well into the water before the enemy discovered the attempt.

"Two bridges were carried about half way across the river, when the first of them was carried away by the rapidity of the stream; and the second was prevented from being finished by the French musketry, though protected by forty pieces of heavy artillery, which the Austrians had placed in battery on their side of the river.

"I believe that the Archduke will renew the attempt to-morrow, as I met twenty-five more pieces of heavy cannon and above three hundred artillery men on their way to the bridge, as I came home this evening.

"M. de Korsakoff and the other Russian Generals expressed much dissatisfaction at the manner in which this attempt was conducted; and the Archduke and his staff-officers looked uneasy and ashamed.

"If the passage be carried to-morrow by the strength of the Austrian artillery, as I trust it will, it must necessarily cost a great many lives. The French were receiving considerable re-inforcements this evening, and were entrenching themselves close to the water's edge, and in the woods behind the landing stage. In the meantime the Archduke has got all his artillery and nearly the whole of his army shut up in a *cul-de-sac* between the Rhine, the Limmet, and the Aar; and I should not be at all surprised if the French were to attempt to take Zurich this night or to-morrow, in which case His Royal Highness's position would become highly critical and dangerous.

"I am truly sorry to add that the French are entirely masters of the canton of Schwietz [Schwyz], where they are committing every sort of excess.

"General Jellachich is at Wangen, having his right on the lake of Zurich opposite Rapperschwyl, and his left in the Weggisthall.

"He has lost a number of men and nearly the whole of his artillery.

"The Swiss legion suffered severely, and behaved admirably in the disgraceful affair of Wednesday last before Zurich.

"Colonel Ramsay would undoubtedly have written to your Lordship a more full account of the affair of the Aar, but he has been detained by the extreme badness of the roads and darkness of the night, and I feel that I ought not to detain the messenger any longer."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, August 16-20. Harley Street.]—"Je vous ai envoyé ma dépêche pour que vous l'arangiez comme vous le voulez. Je n'ai pas d'autre vue depuis que je me souviens que de lier nos deux pays par l'amitié la plus indissoluble, ainssi faite ce que vous voulez; ajoutez, efassez, corigez, attenez, renforcez. Je vous donne ma parole que je fairai copier ma dépêche telle que vous me renverez celle que je vous ai envoyez. Je vous prie seulement de ne pas expédier le courier demain avant quatre heures."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1799, August 18. Downing Street.—“Your letter and despatches which were received here on the 16th have, as you will naturally suppose, thrown me into no small degree of perplexity. The business of the Swiss levies appeared to me however to admit of no delay, and I have therefore settled it as follows, though, for the reason which I shall presently state, I do not yet write to you officially upon it.

“I consider Hotze’s pretension as totally inadmissible. If he wanted to choose the officers himself, this would diminish in reality that influence which this country ought to have in return for its efforts. If he wants only the appearance, he can want that only for the same purpose, and it must therefore for the same reason be resisted. You will therefore be directed to accept, with all due civility and attention, his resignation. Korsakow will by that time be arrived, and I see no difficulty in putting the regiments under his orders as commander-in-chief of the subsidised army; reserving however by express explanation with him;

1st. “That the Inspector-General shall be a British officer, and shall have exclusive command and control over all matters of detail as to the formation of this corps.

2nd. “That the commissions shall be signed by the King, and shall be given by you exclusively, or in conjunction with the Inspector-General.

3rd. “That his Majesty shall reserve to himself, whenever the corps shall be sufficiently large, to name a general officer, of whatever nation he shall think fit, to assume the command of this, as of an auxiliary corps serving with the Russian army; and

4th. “That his Majesty will, when he thinks proper, separate it from the subsidised Russian army, and put it exclusively under the orders of a French Prince; explaining, however, that this is not intended to be done but in the case of actually entering into France, or being on the point of doing so.

“If Colonel Craufurd had even had the rank of full colonel, I would have tried to carry a different arrangement, and to have procured him local rank as Major-General to command the Swiss army under the Russian General; though I am not sure I should have succeeded in this; and, with a Lieutenant-Colonel, it is not to be thought of.

“I mean therefore to offer him, on these terms, the place of Inspector-General and Commissary united. But I trust, at the same time, I shall have the means (and for that I am waiting) of proposing to him to quit the thing entirely, and to take an active situation in the Duke of York’s staff in lieu of it. I should be much hurt to do anything which could injure either his interests or his feelings, for I have a real regard and good opinion of him; but this plan will, I think, be more useful and more acceptable to him than remaining with the Swiss troops on the footing I have mentioned above, and which is the only one that I think practicable.

"I have no doubt that the levies must be made in the way of regular regiments, and that the question about the officers must be referred back to your decision. I cannot think that it would be possible to put Pichégru at the head of the force.

"I fear we shall really drive *Monsieur* to despair. My heart really bleeds for him. He was on the very point of setting out when your despatches arrived; and with them a fresh remonstrance from Petersburg against his being employed. I felt obliged to suspend his journey, but I shall be anxious to see the moment arrive for his resuming it.

"Lord Mulgrave will have explained to you our projects; they were brilliant, but I fear we are too late.

Postscript. "As there is nothing in my intentions respecting Craufurd that is not founded in real good wishes towards him, you will use your own discretion in mentioning them to him or not. The next mail will probably bring you my official letters, and there is hardly any chance of their being in any respect different from what I have here stated.

"If Craufurd does not remain with you, I mean to offer the Inspector-General to Ramsay."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, August 18. Harley Street.]—"Comme vous ne m'avez pas donné de notte des arguments dont vous vous êtes servi, pour me répondre sur les objections que j'étois obligé de vous faire hiér sur l'envoi du Comte d'Artois, et sur la nouvelle instance que j'avois aussi ordre de vous faire sur les subsides de la Suède, j'ai compris le sens de vos objections sans vous garantir les détails et les arguments, ayant la plus abominable mémoire du monde.

"Je vous envoi la copie de ma dépêche. Examinez la, je vous supplie, et s'il y a quelque chose de trop, je pourai l'efacer, et ce que j'ai oublié vous pourrez le marquer au chevalier Whiteworth, auquel je me raporte."

LORD MULGRAVE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 18. Berlin.—"I arrived at this place late last night, and, in obedience to his Majesty's command, took the earliest opportunity of communicating with Mr. Grenville.

"It was with the greatest regret that I received from him an extract of the substance of a dispatch, No. 2, from Lord Minto to your Lordship, as it appears to preclude the whole ground and object of my mission; not only from Baron Thugut's declaration that 'a concert is unnecessary, the plan of operations being not only determined upon, but what remains of it about to be executed'; but also from the nature of that plan of operations, which appears to leave no choice of measures to the Russian forces, but absolutely to confine them to the object of keeping the army of Massena (now, I understand, placed under the command of Moreau) in check, for the sole purpose of preventing its interference with the Archduke's operations against Mayence,

“After the very full military discussion which, previous to my quitting England, I had with your Lordship on the proposed operations either in Switzerland, or on the frontiers of France, it will not be necessary for me to trouble your Lordship much at length to shew that the progressive removal of the army of the Archduke on the arrival of the different divisions of General Korsakow’s army, and the occupation by these of all the posts at present held by the Austrian forces, is relinquishing at once the object of the deliverance of Switzerland; is leaving Piedmont entirely in the power and at the disposal of the court of Vienna; and, at the same time, rendering the subsidiary army of Korsakoff, and the other forces of the Emperor of Russia in that quarter, the mere defensive instruments of the peculiar military and political objects of the Austrians.

“A combined operation of the Archduke’s army with the collected forces of Russia might have driven the French from Switzerland, possibly without an action; or, in the event of their hazarding a battle, with the probable destruction of that last army of the republic; after which the operations against Mayence (as they are obstinately to be persevered in) might have been undertaken with a remaining prospect of a secure position on the frontiers of France for the Russian army, and the opportunity of preparing measures for offensive operations in the enemy’s country at the opening of the ensuing campaign; whereas, an attack with the Russians only on the position of the French army in Switzerland, even should it be successful, must be at such an expense of men as to render all prospect of further service from that army very doubtful, and hardly to be hoped for. These considerations appear so plain and obvious, that I cannot help apprehending something more than the mere choice of military operations to have influenced the decision of the Austrian government on this measure.

“The offer of the co-operation of 30,000 men on the right flank of the Russian army appears to me to be another branch of the system of evasion and fallacy which has, with so much address, been contrived to withdraw the army of the Archduke from the contest in Switzerland to an easy operation under cover of the Russian forces; for, M. Thugut is well aware that the co-operation of those troops at Huningue and Belfort can only be required as a measure subsequent to the French being driven out of Switzerland, which he states himself is the utmost that can be effected this campaign; and he accordingly guards the offer of that co-operation with the term ‘if it is thought expedient by his Majesty at *the proper season*; that is, at soonest, at the commencement of the next campaign.’ M. Thugut states that the Russian army collected will be equal to that of the Archduke now in Switzerland. But (without remarking upon the exaggerated estimate of the Swiss force, and the inclusion of Rhebinder’s corps, which is not within reach), the representation made to Mr. Wickham by the Archduke must be recollected, in which his Royal Highness states that although he might succeed in dislodging Massena, that it

must be effected by the sacrifice of the flower of his army, and such a loss of men as would incapacitate him from further exertions or subsequent operation. The reasons which influenced the Archduke to abstain from the attempt to force Massena's position are intrinsically of equal validity when applied to the Russian army; but the sacrifice does not appear to be equally important in the estimation of M. Thugut, and it seems to have escaped his recollection that the deliverance of Switzerland was proposed to be effected by a combination, and not by a substitution of forces; and that the co-operation on the right of the Russians was to be a consequence only of the favourable result of that combined operation.

"A further question of considerable importance arises, even supposing his Majesty's acquiescence in this employment of the Russian subsidiary force, and the consent of the Emperor of Russia to lend the remainder of his army to the same object; and that is the possibility of taking up winter quarters, and procuring subsistence, on the line from Zurich to the Valois, with a French army on the line from Basle to Geneva. And if that should be found impracticable, it will become a question whether Switzerland should not at once be relinquished, if the Court of Vienna persist in the pursuit of their object at Mayence; and an immediate attempt be made to penetrate into France by the way of Chambery and Grenoble with the Russian forces: their right being covered by the Rhone, and their left by the southern corps already destined for that object. I am aware that the Austrians may refuse their co-operation in a measure which will either oblige them to remain in Switzerland, or to relinquish all the fruits of their operations in that country. The only other measure to counteract the selfish views of Austria would be to withdraw the Russian troops entirely from Italy, and employ them for the object to which the army of the Duke of York is destined on the coast of France, in the event of the deliverance of Holland and the Netherlands by the successful operations of the forces under the direction of his Royal Highness. I am not unconscious that the two last are extreme and violent measures; but in a case so difficult and unforeseen as the march of the Archduke to Mayence previous to driving the French out of Switzerland, and under the circumstance of the whole of the Russian force being trepanned into so delicate a situation, and tethered to the support of the Austrian operation, I have thought it expedient to state to your Lordship everything which suggests itself to my mind.

"I shall proceed to the headquarters of the Archduke (although the object of my mission appears to be precluded by the decision at Vienna) and endeavour to dissuade His Royal Highness from the removal of his army out of Switzerland, at least till the combined efforts of the Russian and Austrian armies shall have driven the French from that country. Should my representations not produce the desired effect, I will repair to the headquarters of Marshal Suwarrow, in the hope of inducing him to unite with me in the strongest remonstrances to the Court of Vienna against this sacrifice of the best

cantons of Switzerland, this waste of the forces employed by His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia for the great objects of the common cause. It is much to be apprehended that the arrival of General Korsakow's corps may have already produced the removal of the army of the Archduke.

"The departure of the courier for England immediately does not allow me time to methodize or correct this dispatch, or to digest and select my ideas, as I should wish to do on a subject of such magnitude and importance; but time is above all things precious at this moment, and I know that your Lordship's judgment and indulgence will correct and excuse all that is defective in my conception of the subject. The awkward situation in which I shall feel myself personally placed by urging my interference, after the declaration of M. Thugut that I am not to be listened to, will chiefly be irksome to me inasmuch as it is connected with the circumstance of my acting in the name and under the orders of His Majesty; but the importance of the object in my mind precludes all considerations of etiquette, even under that powerful impression."

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 18. Berlin.—"I proceed with very little hope of success; indeed with none but what rests on the possibility of persuading the Archduke that the glory of driving the French out of Switzerland, and the completion of what he has so well begun, is of sufficient importance to his own reputation to induce him to undertake that measure upon his own authority, previous to the removal of his army. I fear, however, that we are completely taken in Thugut's trap, which is too well laid and too deeply considered to be evaded. The march by Grenoble, which I have mentioned in my dispatch, is merely stated as the only active operation that can be suggested, and one likely (if it were feasible) to distress the Austrians very near as much as the French; but I fear it is but an imaginary resource, and I think I can even at this distance see insurmountable objections to the adoption of that attempt as an insulated operation.

"As you are already informed of the very serious inconvenience to my own affairs with which I have undertaken and am about to prosecute this journey, and as you must also be aware of the very pretty figure I shall make at the Archduke's headquarters, rejected and disallowed by the Minister at Vienna, and upon a fool's errand to discuss what has been determined without me, I trust there can be no objection to my immediate return from that awkward and irksome situation as soon as I shall have laid my reasons before His Royal Highness. If his army should have marched, it will be hardly necessary to go to Suwarrow. I will not *lâcher prise* if I think I can do anything, but I shall have a most uncomfortable and impatient feel, and no

disposition to stay without good reason. I cannot help regretting that I am not detained till you heard again from hence, as this awkward business might then have been entirely avoided. I am not yet quite convinced that I do right in proceeding, but as it is the most disagreeable decision to myself, I am at least persuaded that I take it without any bias."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

Private.

1799, August 18. Dropmore.—"I could much have wished before I wrote to you to have received Lord Minto's account of his conversation with Thugut; because I think his energy will, in the present moment, *force* out some of those secrets which have hitherto been so carefully concealed from us. But I considered the difficulties in which you would find yourself on the receipt of Lord Henley's letter, and I therefore determined to send this messenger off to you without further delay.

"The intended recall of the Archduke has totally deranged our opinions as to the place of treating; perhaps it is only a pretence thrown out for that purpose and not intended to be executed. I wish it may be so, but our time is too precious to allow of waiting to make this experiment. The conquest of Switzerland ought now to follow rapidly on that of Italy; and although I despair of drawing off the Austrians from their project of besieging Mentz, I do not see why, if the Italian army is allowed to co-operate heartily with us, the project which we discussed here should be despaired of.

"We shall, however, as always happens, be weaker than we expected. Korsakow's army, with the Condé troops, will not as yet be 40,000. The Wurtemburghers will not be got to act separately from the Imperial arms, at least not in time; and the Russians in Italy are said not to be more than 10,000, instead of 15,000 at which we had put them. These are great defalcations, and from Wickham's last despatches they are not likely to be soon supplied by Swiss levies; not, however, that I think that part of the force to be despaired of, if the present confusion is well settled.

"It is, however, plain that the whole army will not amount, at any early period, to more than 50,000 effective troops, and that such a force is not *alone* sufficient to enter France; though, if it were well seconded by an effective operation (not a diversion only) to the southward, I do not see why, in the present state of French force, we might not yet succeed. And to this object I conceive your endeavours must now be principally directed, unless any fresh and sudden change in these fluctuating Austrian plans should give a new opening for pursuing the original idea, which I consider unquestionably the best.

"Very much must, however, depend on the political discussions. If Thugut persists in declining all explanation of his views, we cannot concur in them, for we do not know them, and he will always think that we are thwarting them. If Lord Minto

succeeds in getting him, by fair means or by foul, to speak out, I should be very much disposed to think that we might see without jealousy almost any accession of strength to Austria, provided she would consent to our arranging the Netherlands to our satisfaction ; which would certainly not be by giving them to Prussia, the result which he is, or pretends to be, apprehensive of.

"It is, however, in vain to speculate on these points in the dark. Before you get to Vienna I hope we shall have made some progress in the discussion of them." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to J. H. FRERE.

1799, August 18. Vienna.--"I received yesterday by the post your letter of the 23rd July, and I shall lose no opportunity of making and enforcing the representations which you suggest, concerning the capitulations to be granted to the French garrisons of places surrendering to the Imperial arms. I had indeed been so strongly impressed with the ill consequences which the return of so many disciplined and veteran troops into France must produce, that I ventured to state my sentiments, which I knew also to be those of Government at home, to M. de Thugut, the first time I ever saw him, and before I had acquired a formal title to speak to him on business. I mentioned this subject to him on the occasion of the expected surrender of Mantua. But he told me that, with a view to that particular capitulation, it was too late to take any step, and therefore unnecessary to discuss the point, for he had no doubt the matter was already decided and executed at Mantua. This proved in effect to be the case, for the news of the surrender arrived two or three days afterwards. On this subject the Austrian officers plead the great necessity of expediting the capture of so many forts and towns, and the difficulty of disposing of such a multitude of prisoners, the number in the possession of the Austrians being already immense. With regard to Mantua, the object was so great that one cannot be surprised at their embracing the earliest means to obtain possession of it, and, in point of fact, a very short delay in settling the capitulation would have retarded the surrender of the place very materially, as well as created very serious difficulties in accomplishing that desirable event. A violent inundation took place the same day or the day after, which destroyed or rendered entirely useless the principal works of the besiegers, and the difficulty as well as the delay in restoring them would have been extreme. I am, nevertheless, fully sensible how desirable it is to prevent conditions so favourable to the enemy, and so prejudicial to the main object of the war, from being granted in future where it is possible to avoid it ; and you may depend on my using my best endeavours for that purpose, in compliance with the instructions which your letter sufficiently announces."

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 18. H.M.S. *Isis*, at sea.--"I had the honour of writing you on Wednesday last the 14th instant, in which I stated

my intention of going directly against the Helder as the object of the greatest magnitude, and, with all the risk and difficulties which might attend it, more practicable than the attack on the Island of Voorn. Unfortunately, since Wednesday evening, we have had a continued gale of wind, such as must be considered as very uncommon at this season of the year. We have twice had communication with Lord Duncan, who has promised all the assistance his squadron can afford; at this moment there is no prospect of our being able to avail ourselves of it. Should the weather become more moderate, and should the transports keep together, we shall seize the first favourable opportunity of trying a landing to the southward of Kyck Duyn, where we apprehend we can maintain ourselves against any attempt of the enemy until we have forced the redoubt and batteries at the Helder. I do not presume to say that this can be effected without risk on an inhospitable coast which affords no shelter, and which cannot be approached at any time, with a great fleet, without caution. Hitherto the fleet has kept together wonderfully, owing to the moonlight. If we had lost sight of many of the transports I should not have thought it advisable to have persevered in the attempt, because the force we had at sailing was not more than sufficient for so arduous an enterprize, for once on those shores we could not look to a retreat. This weather seems to preclude any prospect of being joined by the Russians. The only assistance we can expect is from Barham Downs. It is difficult for me to say what I wish on this occasion; if we succeed in landing we shall want immediate assistance, but to send a fresh embarkation of troops to sea, on an uncertainty, is what I should not advise. Let them be embarked and ready to sail, should the weather clear up, directing their course towards the Texel. The transports are only victualled for one month, and some of the troops have been on board twelve days. We have heard nothing of the *Pomona* and *Cynthia* that went towards the coast of Flanders and Zealand." *Copy.*

Postscript. "I shall send a letter to Emden to see what is going on, with a letter to the Hereditary Prince of Orange."

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 18. *Isis*, at sea.—"Although the General has, I suppose, wrote you fully, yet as I promised, I shall state to you the very great anxiety and mortification I have suffered since I last wrote you. The weather that evening was favourable, but the alteration that took place next day for the worse, and its unprecedented continuation at this season of the year I shall ever have cause to lament, as well as the many who are so intimately connected with the success of the expedition, amongst these, Sir, you will in particular.

"The convoy has as yet kept up and together wonderfully, and, if it would only moderate, we should be at issue, and will entertain little doubt of our success, in a short while, as the distance is so trifling. I have at noon, as per log, given you our

situation, by *remarking* the *bearings* of the *Texel*. I trust that whatever may be the result that no blame will be imputed to me in the management of so large a convoy in the narrow seas, in endeavouring to keep a position to approach a given point the moment the weather will permit. We have had little communication with Lord Duncan as yet from the badness of the weather, but must as soon as possible be in sight to the southward of me with part of his squadron. I never could have believed to have had such a length of bad weather in this month. I hope the seamen will not take it into their heads to think my friend the General is a second *Jonas*—they have all been sea-sick. My next I trust will be more satisfactory." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 19. Berlin.—“I have explained to you in my public dispatch the reasons which have induced me to give a short delay to the termination of my residence here; the hasty and passionate measures of the Emperor at this Court require all the assistance which can be derived from the better temper of the English Cabinet; and the present circumstances of Holland and the situation of the Hereditary Prince of Orange have not as yet appeared to admit of my presence on the frontiers giving them any assistance; the moment however that I shall see this change from the impression of Abercromby’s disembarkation, I shall be better able to judge what will be the most useful direction which I can give to my route from hence; meantime I cannot omit the suggesting to you how many important motives there seem to be for your sending the Stadtholder to Brill as soon as the English troops shall have obtained, by the possession of it, the means of placing him there. You are probably no stranger to the contradictory parties and politics which prevail in the family of the Stadtholder, and you certainly have not now to learn that, whatever is the deficiency of his talents for government, he is very entirely determined that neither the Princess nor the Prince shall govern for him; and in spite of the consideration which he shews to her, and the full powers which he has given to him, I am assured that, either absent or present, he will find abundant means of counteracting everything that is done or that is proposed to be done without him. I have already perceived strong traces of this disposition and of the bad effects of it; and although I am aware, that, in some respects, much inconvenience will be produced by the langour and apathy which his presence may bring to the course of active business, nevertheless, upon the whole, I cannot help believing that the unity of councils and measures which would result from his coming to the Brill would, upon the whole, produce more advantage than inconvenience; nor is it a slight motive for this to recollect how much more generally popular is the Stadtholder than the Hereditary Prince in Holland, and how satisfactory an answer the presence of the Stadtholder would give

to the loose suggestions which are thrown out, of a desire to supersede him and to place his son in his room. If you agree with me in this view of the subject, you will not find it difficult to use the influence of the Princess of Orange to obtain his speedy embarkation ; for, doubtless, the manly spirit and intelligence of her character will naturally lead her to wish as soon as possible to approach the scene of action, and to see her husband take as forward a figure as he can in the restoration of the government of his country. In my former letter I stated to you the necessity which there was for the presence of the Greffier, a necessity very much increased by the indisposition and inability of the Grand Pensionary ; and as I presume that the Greffier does not mean to separate himself from the Stadtholder, I cannot help wishing to hear of the prompt arrival of both of them, as soon as the Brill and Helvoetsluys are in our possession ; and though I have yet no intelligence of Abercrombie, I cannot help flattering myself that this event has already taken place.

“Mr. Hammond will have told you that Abercrombie’s and Malcolm’s papers were at Walmer, and therefore that, as yet, I have no knowledge of them. My first recommendation to Colonel Malcolm will be that he should see Le Palue, who is a very good military man, full of zeal and intelligence, and with a good deal more of military science than M. D’Yvoy possesses ; but in these matters you know how exclusively every agent wishes to act, and how difficult it is to make any one draw with any other, their mutual hatreds being so much greater than that of the common enemy. I have still the same horror of splashing into all this Dutch *tripotage*, but, nevertheless, I will work fairly through whatever of it may fairly belong to me if there is any chance of my doing good and real service ; but it is a subject through which, I must very fairly acknowledge, I do not see my way.

“Lord Mulgrave, I know, is not sparing of his pen, and he will probably tell you at length all that has passed between us. The reflection of some days has rather increased than lessened my indignation at the conduct of Austria, and I have done everything which I could to confirm Lord Mulgrave in the prosecution of his journey, in hopes that he will fight a good English battle against these German Jews. I think there is some knavery at Vienna, too, on the part of Rozamousky ; how can it be possible that he should be authorized to approve the siege of Mayence, at the same time that the Emperor of Russia concurs with us in trying to enforce the original plan of campaign ? How can it be that the Russian Emperor consents to surrender the King of Sardinia to the Court of Vienna at the moment when, by Whitworth’s last despatches, he is expressing his apprehensions of their ambitious designs, and proposing to us to make head against them in concert with him ? I have not thought it worth while to notice to you the last proposal from Petersburg, because I think it evident that no such *simulacre de congrès* could now do any good ; a congress to concert operations in the beginning of this campaign was a good measure, if it could have been brought to bear ; but in the present state of the campaign, with the conquests

already made by Austria, and the views which are avowed at Vienna by Thugut to Lord Minto, a congress for the discussion of those views must be a hostile measure towards Austria, and will be so considered by them, and therefore will produce nothing but bickering and ill blood; I do not therefore quote this measure as approving of it, but as a measure which demonstrates at Petersburg the jealousy held there of Austria, at the same moment that Rozamowski is, in the Emperor's name, forwarding and assisting the objects of Austrian ambition. In this state of things I have recommended to Lord Mulgrave to go on immediately to Suwarrow, and learn his sentiments upon the present plan of campaign. We believe here that Suwarrow has unbounded powers from his master, and if he sees the objections which we feel to Thugut's plan, I should recommend to Lord Mulgrave then to go armed with Suwarrow's authority to Vienna, and menace them plainly with the withdrawing the Russian army from Switzerland to Flanders and the *bas Rhin*, if they persist in their Mayence project against the opinion of Russia and of England. If, on the other hand, Suwarrow approves of the Austrian project on Mayence, and will trust for his army to the support of the *intermediate* 30,000 men announced for that purpose by Thugut, then and in that case I should think Lord Mulgrave might lend himself to the concert of this plan. To be sure it will be mortifying enough, because if the operations are to be divided, you had much better originally have sent your 45,000 Russians to the middle Rhine; but now, by this measure of Thugut's, you have all the disadvantage of divided operations by the most roundabout course which could have been imagined for them. I have, however, still some hopes of Suwarrow resisting Thugut, and I find he has new means and motives to do so, for the King of Sardinia has made Suwarrow Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of all his troops, besides calling him cousin and prince and all the fine names which could be furnished from the Herald's Office at Turin; surely the stout old Russian will never let them lock up these honours at Vienna with the poor miserable King that gave them to him.

"It is now long since I have done all I could by means of Castel Alfieri to hasten the return of the King to Turin, and yesterday his Minister told me that he had profited by all my good lessons, and hoped he had succeeded in obtaining the immediate return of that monarch. Do write to Petersburg and scold our friend Paul out of this shabby dereliction of the Sardinian king which they boast at Vienna to have obtained at Petersburg, but which I still think is a mistake, or a treacherous work in the hands of Rozamowsky. I must not finish this subject without informing you from good authority that the King of Naples has just signed a treaty with Vienna to secure to the house of Austria the succession of Naples, in prejudice of the King of Spain; you see that by this measure they declare their intention at Vienna of becoming masters of all Italy if you will let them.

"I must still add to this long letter upon the subject of General Stamford; you who know how highly I esteem him will not

wonder at my desire to retain, as long as I can want it, the benefit of his liberal spirit, of his intelligent and zealous assistance; and I have, though against his inclination, prevailed upon him to consent to pass into Holland whenever I shall be obliged to do so.

“For this purpose I must desire of you to be so good as to obtain a proper letter to him from the Stadtholder. He thinks it best that he should not be recalled from Berlin as *Chargé d’Affaires*, because that would give an improper appearance of hostility between the house of Orange and Charlottenburg; and I agree with him in wishing that he may receive without delay a permission from the Stadtholder to absent himself for a time from Berlin without being recalled from thence. By this means I shall have the advantage of his society and assistance, and he will still be enabled to be useful at Berlin whenever the occasion shall arise. Pray have the goodness to lose no time in sending the proper letter upon this subject from the Stadtholder.

“I have this moment heard from the Prince of Orange from Lingen of the 15th instant, and have the pleasure to find that Vander Spiegel is at Emerick, and is on his road to Weerdt to meet the Hereditary Prince, with whom he is to return to Lingen.

“They have heard of a firing from cannon near Flushing on the 10th, but I believe it was only the *fete* of the 10th August; I wish I could feel confident that it was the *fete d’Abercrombie*. The Hereditary Prince says that all his accounts are good, but the country is so wound up that he fears an immediate explosion, and this fear is another motive for our impatience to hear of Abercrombie.

“Of news I have none, except that Bellegarde is marched with 22,000 men through Savoy to Switzerland, and that Massena, or rather Moreau, has detached two divisions and a half to meet him; surely a fine opportunity for the Archduke to attack.”

Enclosure.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1799, August 15. Berlin.—“The dispatches which you sent to me under flying-seal, and which arrived here this morning, appeared to me to be so important that my impatience to forward them by the messenger of to-day has prevented me from giving to them as collected an attention as they deserved and required. Shall I not, however, confess the general impression which they made upon me? Shall I not acknowledge that it was difficult for me to read of the immoderate and insatiable demands of Austria with all the patience and good temper with which you have written of them? It is fortunate for you, and for the better occupation of your time, that the English dispatches of which Basset is the bearer to you will not allow of my detaining him long enough to give you the full swing of the Berlin commentary.

“I do not undertake to trouble you with any military criticism upon the new military plan which is proposed, but I confess I think it difficult for the Austrian Cabinet to shew why they could

not have satisfied their desire of bringing some force to bear upon the Middle Rhine, by placing there the new corps of 30,000 men, which might still have left the original plan of the allied Courts to its whole and complete strength and effect.

"The complaint which I should feel disposed to make at Vienna is that every single circumstance of every part of the proposals now brought forward by the Austrian Cabinet are each of them conceived in the greediest spirit of separate gain, and there is not even an affectation on their part of accommodating any one of their demands to any other point beyond their own direct and immediate advantage, and that to the most unbounded and immoderate extent.

"What is the change of their plan of operations except a desire of removing from Italy the interruptions which Suwarow gives to their hostile occupation of the dominions of Sardinia? What is the avowed principle of their new march to Mayence but to add to Venice the re-occupation of the Netherlands which they had abandoned for it? Where is it on the whole circle of their territory that they are not looking for and almost announcing their intentions of aggrandisement?

"Their views in Italy no longer rest upon a barrier against France, but openly look to the control of all Italy and the territorial occupation of the greatest part of it; for after Venice, Milan, Piedmont, Savoy, Lombardy, and Tuscany, I know not why the nominal monarchy of Naples should be left, only to do homage to the real sovereign of the whole country; and with this you will observe that they are betraying as restless an avidity on the side of the Low Countries as they could have done if they had lost all their possessions, and were again bargaining for room to breathe round the city of Vienna.

"Look then to the subject of military expense, and see that by the assistance of Russian troops in Italy they have scarcely recovered from their first panic, before they discard their auxiliaries, refuse them bread to eat in the country which they have saved, and desire of Great Britain to pay them and to employ them so as to prevent the French from breaking in upon Austrian Piedmont. If we refuse this we shall be taunted with the failures which will result from it; if we accede to it, instead of multiplying the allied arms by our subsidy, we shall only have relieved the purse of Austria by that of England, without adding new or increased force to be opposed against the common enemy.

"Not to leave the subject of expense, look now at their proposal respecting the convention.

"Thugot tells you fairly that, ratified or unratified, no money can be paid, and no arrears discharged; but what is worse, this ratification, unproductive in payment, is to be equally unsatisfactory even in form, and they will not sign what they have promised to sign, except with the new promise made to them that this signature of theirs shall never be disclosed. What can they think that we want in the ratification if, both in form and substance, it is to be as if it had never happened.

"I will not pursue this harsh and ungracious task which you will naturally think I have too much dwelt upon; but what I chiefly meant to insist upon is, the whole of this heavy account offers not one single article in it which has even the semblance of advantage to the common cause, or to the cause of any power in Europe except the cause of Austria; and surely it a most ungracious proceeding in my old friend Thugut, that in a discussion of common and reciprocal interests, he should not give to us one single article which bears even a friendly seeming in our favour.

"It is very true that his business is to make his demands and to expect yours, but, without some principle of equitable forbearance to be reciprocally applied in these discussions, I do not see how they differ from other acts of hostility, although between the pen and the sword there is some difference in the weapon.

"I must not overlook in my catalogue of Austrian grievances one to which, as to most of them, you are as sensible as I am, though you are more patient and more temperate in treating of them than I am; I mean the solicited mission of Lord Mulgrave, solicited by Thugut himself, and now referred by him to the possible future concert of the next campaign. I was waked this morning by an account that Lord Mulgrave was on his road from Cuxhaven. You will easily believe that I feel for the awkwardness, the indelicacy, and the impropriety of the situation in which he is placed by these projects of Austrian acquisition; but I do not know that in his situation I should feel it incumbent upon me to stop short because Thugut had turned round; I cannot affect to offer any advice to Lord Mulgrave, and certainly he does not stand in need of any, but to me it seems doubtful whether, having come as far as Berlin, he might not with some advantage ask at Vienna through your interference, why he was sent for in July to be sent back in August.

"Upon this point however, as upon the whole of this subject, it will be my province only to hear your decision and his; I wish for his sake he had not come, but he only can decide whether to return or to go on.

"I am ashamed of keeping the messenger from you while I am unprofitably lengthening out this letter; but I have written so much and so freely because I feel confident that you will consider my doing so as the best proof I could give of just and real esteem and friendship.

"I have nothing new to say from Berlin. The King seems confirmed in his neutral system, and rejoices in his escape from his treaty of co-operation; they appear to have no answer yet from Paris. The expedition from England goes on, and I trust that I shall not stay long after the next mail, though I have not yet heard the Cabinet determination.

"The Emperor of Russia has recalled the mission, but that is all; it is very bad, but hostility would have been worse." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August. Stowe.—"Your *gazette* extraordinary is indeed most complete; for the progress of Suwarrow leads (as far as I

can judge) to the most decided consequences to Switzerland, now open to supplies and assistance; and to southern Italy cut off from all intercourse with France. Still however the fortresses of Piedmont are such a formidable barrier that, unless they have been neglected in every part of their appointment, they will give time to the French to recover the effects of the first blows that have stunned them. These blows must be assisted by offensive operations in Holland and Flanders from England, and with a force equal to the object; and I do not despair of seeing the great nation check-mate, even though Tom's Prussian shall continue as obstinately neutral as he has hitherto done. I see the necessity of this offensive system so strongly, that I am miserable in not having yet seen any measures taken that appear likely to enable you to collect the 25 or 30,000 men necessary for such an operation. As to the French fleet, their manœuvre of sending six Spanish ships from Ferrol to the Isle of Aix, *with troops on board*, makes that chapter still more inexplicable, unless the putting into that port has been matter of necessity and not of choice. At all events, I should imagine that the Mediterranean is now the object, as it opens to them a very wide field of enterprise and of relief to their falling cause in Egypt, Malta, Naples; and I fear that you cannot hope to guard against all of the very many contingencies that may turn up as trumps to them in that quarter. I cannot help thinking that more ships might be spared for the reinforcement of Lord St. Vincent without risking Ireland.

"I am now to be a suitor to you on behalf of our friend Praed, who wants to convert a St. Ives parson into a holder of two livings by the magic talisman of a chaplaincy, which I cannot give him, my list being full, and which he and I humbly sue at your hands."

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, August 19. Lingén.—Revenu hier-au-soir de l'entrevue que j'ai eue avec le conseiller Pensionnaire, et à la quelle ont également assistés le Drossard Bentinck et le conseiller Brandsen, je m'empresse de vous informer que j'ai trouvé le premier de ces Messieurs jouissant d'une fort bonne santé, et ayant la tête aussi nette qu'il soit possible de le désirer. Il a pris ses mesures de manière à pouvoir rester jusqu'à ce que nous puissions pénétrer dans la République même. Les idées de M. Van der Spiegel relativement à l'établissement d'une administration provisoire dans les Provinces s'accordent, en général, avec les miennes, de même que sur la convocation des membres qui formeront l'administration de l'union, et prendront la place des Etats Généraux. Vous serez à même d'en juger par le mémoire dont je vous envoie ci-joint la copie, ainsi que de la proclamation telle qu'elle a été définitivement arrêtée après les conversations tenues avec ces Messieurs. Vous remarquerez qu'elle est parfaitement conforme à celles qui ont été dressées en Angleterre, et que les difficultés que le mot d'amnestie paroissoit offrir à bien des personnes, se trouvent levées par la tournure qui a été donnée à cet article, qui, pour le fond, est resté le même.

“ Je m'étois flatté de trouver Aylva et Mollerus au rendez-vous proposé, mais j'ai été trompé dans cet espoir. Mollerus m'a fait savoir que la crainte d'exposer sa femme et ses enfans, et la possibilité qu'il fut obligé de rester hors du pays l'avoient engagé à renoncer à son projet.

“ On m'écrit de Berlin que M. de Haugwitz a continué après mon départ à donner les assurances les plus prononcées sur la rupture des négociations avec le Directoire, mais que, tout nouvellement, il étoit aisé de voir qu'il cherchoit à se rapprocher lui-même des principes d'après lesquels il étoit forcé d'agir, et de justifier le changement par le désespoir, et par la conviction que le parti étoit pris sans retour ; qu'il ne dissimuloit plus que les bases proposées par le Gouvernement Francois tendent à ce qu'aucune des puissances coalisées n'aye des relations dans la République ; en un mot qu'il est question du rétablissement du Stadhouderat accordé par le Directoire à l'intercession Prussienne, et à condition de rester lié aux mesures utiles et avantageuses à la France.

“ L'on mande de l'intérieur que l'isle de Goeree a été canonnée par les Anglois le 4 de ce mois, et qu'il y a eu quelques maisons de brûlées et deux canonniers tués ; que du depuis l'on entend tirer journellement de ces côtés. Je n'ai rien appris de ultérieur de l'affaire de Van Braam, si ce n'est que Verheuil lui a parlé, que tout est en ordre, et qu'il s'est engagé à me faire parvenir sur le champ le résultat de ce qu'il aura exécuté.” *Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 20. Park Street, Westminster.—“ I have been changing backwards and forwards in great uncertainty respecting the choice of a proper residence for *Monsieur* ; but am upon the whole inclined to rest in my original opinion, especially when confirmed by that of *Monsieur* himself, that the Isle of Wight would have too strongly the air of something being intended on the coast of France to be consistent with the system necessarily acted upon at present of keeping back the insurrection of the Royalists as long as possible. If the effect of *Monsieur's* presence in the Isle of Wight was to be the attraction of our thoughts, the drawing down of our blood-sluices to that quarter, I should feel, perhaps, in that consideration a compensation for every other inconvenience. But as I fear it will make no difference in that respect, I yield to my own first apprehensions, backed by a pretty strong opinion on his part, and should prefer to see him placed in some part less declaratory of an intention to make use of him on the side which such a situation as the Isle of Wight would seem to indicate. Perhaps, if the Isle of Wight should ultimately be chosen, as I understand it to be the situation which is at present looked to, a corrective of what I apprehend may be found in the opinion that the placing him there was intended only as a blind ; and that we can never intend any serious operations in France while we are sending all our force to be ingulfed (I beg pardon for the expression) in the bogs of Holland.

That we may not be driven to determine upon the Isle of Wight for want of some other situation let me at least mention that, in talking with Pelham this morning, two places have occurred to him; one a house of Lord Onslow's near Guildford, which he conceives may be at present to be let; another a house of his father's in Sussex, upon the coast indeed and close to the shore, but not in a part which has ever been marked out as being, or which is capable of becoming a place of embarkation. The former of these, in respect of its distance from London, I should say was the most eligible. Cranbourne would appear to me a very proper place, but I am afraid it would not appear so to others. Swinley, I understand, has not sufficient accommodation even for the few persons that *Monsieur* would have with him. The King's house at Newmarket which has likewise occurred, would be objectionable on account of the possibility of his stay being extended till the time of the October meeting. Cheveley, if untenanted, would only partake in the objection of being somewhat too far distant from London. A means of enabling him to quit London, which is what he is most anxious about, cannot fail to be speedily found, if a proper person is employed whose business it should be to make the enquiry.

"I cannot but apprehend a further inconvenience in placing *Monsieur* in a situation which may seem to imply an intention of acting on the coast of France, namely the use which may be made of the circumstance in the Opposition prints. If Parliament were sitting, or if we had any papers that would take up the question on the other side, I should think the circumstance a recommendation. But, in the sort of unoccupied and untenanted state in which men's minds are apt to be upon questions of this sort, I should have great fear of the notions with which they might first be filled, and still more of the impression with such notions might make upon our counsels. If you think that we are proof against this danger, the objection loses of course the greater part of its force.

"There is a matter of another sort which I have often forgot to mention, particularly when I saw you at your house the other day. I have never known distinctly what the sort of minutes were that were kept of the proceedings of Cabinet; or how far those who were present, and have entered no express declaration of dissent, would appear on any sort of record as parties to the measures adopted. It has happened, of course, on numerous occasions that I have felt myself in a minority with respect to questions more or less discussed in Cabinet, without any wish to mark my dissent from the decision generally taken. On the principal questions respecting the negotiations for peace, that dissent, I conceive, was marked, as far as I felt it at the time necessary to be so, by my either being absent or being entered as such. The same happened on some of the questions which seemed to decide on the general direction given to the war in the beginning of '96. But the change of system adopted at that time came on in such a way, and rested, as far as I recollect, so little on any decision of Cabinet formally taken, that I hardly know

whether the opinions of individual members, one way or another, were likely to appear.

“Upon the present occasion my opinion is, I am sorry to think, so decidedly adverse to the course of proceeding adopted, and which has, I know, your particular concurrence, and the subject is of itself so important that, though I have no particular anxiety to mark my dissent, I should naturally feel unwilling to appear on the face of any document as having concurred in it. The course of proceeding which I mean is that of directing our force against Holland and Flanders, instead of reserving it for operations on the coast of France as soon as the allies shall have entered from the other side. In this, as in other cases, the general measure has come on so gradually, and often in a way to be so little of a *res integra* at the time when it has been mentioned that, having no previous notice of the questions about to be proposed, it has been difficult to say where dissent could be distinctly expressed. But I believe you will readily agree that there has been no time in which the coast of France would not have been my primary object, supposing the allies to have been ready to co-operate; or in which I did not declare my wish, so far as occasions occurred of declaring it, that we should leave ourselves open for that object, supposing the case to happen in which alone it could be desirable.

“All, therefore, that I am anxious about is that I may, in some way or another, avoid the appearance of concurring in a system which is directly repugnant to my own ideas. I should have no objection to stating my reasons at length, grounding, of course, my dissent not upon anything arising out of the event, and which in fact is as likely to prove adverse to my opinion as favourable to it, but upon those considerations that have at all times determined me, and with which the event has very little to do. I am not solicitous, however, for more than that I may not be considered as *assenting* to the present measures. In my idea the expedition to Holland can in no degree answer, except in the single case of the country being surrendered to us, so as to admit of our troops being drawn away in time for co-operation with the allies as soon as they may have entered France; and I do not think the probability of that case happening, or the advantages to be expected from it so great as that I should be willing for the sake of that hope to risk the evils which, in different degrees, will arise, as I conceive, upon every other supposition.

“I have delayed this letter so long, in consequence of some matters which have engrossed my thoughts of a private nature, that the first part will, I fear, have become useless. Should anything be necessary on the other subject to answer the purpose which I have stated, I will be obliged to you to let me know.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 21. Downing Street.—“I am very happy to send your Lordship a copy of Captain Reynold’s letter, which

gives as satisfactory an account of the expedition as could I think be hoped. The *Griper* gun boat is arrived at Sunderland. The Lieutenant of her reports that he left the fleet also after the gale (having suffered so much that he was obliged to make for the nearest port) and that the fleet was collected, and none of them appeared to have suffered excepting his own vessel and two of the troop-ships which had lost their main top sail yards.

"Mr. Pitt has desired me to say that he thinks there will be some account before Friday, on which day he will most certainly be in town, but he shall hold himself in readiness for coming to-morrow in the event of any accounts being received in the course of this night or to-morrow morning. Count John Bentinck has been here. He says that Count Rhoon, being anxious to see your Lordship before he sees the Prince of Orange or any other person, will wait upon your Lordship at Dropmore to-morrow morning."

Postscript. "Your Lordship will recollect that the gale of Thursday was the first and most violent we had. Admiral Mitchell's squadron got sight of Lord Duncan's fleet before the *Pomona* parted from the former."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 21. Harley Street.—"Je vous envoi la traduction de la dépêche que votre courier m'a apporté ce matin de Petersbourg. Je joins aussi la lettre confidentielle que j'ai reçu de Comte Kotchoubei. Gardez la première, mais je vous prie de me renvoyer la seconde. Il me semble que les explications que notre Cour demande à ses alliés sont prématurées, et qu'elle a tort de croire que la guerre est sur le point d'être terminée. J'espère que vous ne m'oublierez pas quand vous viendrez en ville, et que vous me ferez savoir quand je pourai vous voir."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 21. Downing Street.—"The shortest way of showing you the progress we have made is to send you the letter and return this morning received. There are transports ready for six thousand men, which therefore can be ordered anywhere within an hour after we receive accounts from Sir Ralph Abercrombie."

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 22. Dropmore.—"I have received your letter with the return, which is indeed highly satisfactory. The intelligence I sent you yesterday speaks of reinforcements being sent to the Helder, and although I trust there is little doubt of our succeeding there in the first instance, yet I submit to you whether the next 6,000 men should not now be embarked without waiting to hear more, and sent to Lord Duncan's *rendezvous*, from whence he would either send them to join Abercrombie, or in case (I hope and trust a very improbable one) of any unexpected misfortune, he would prevent their committing themselves to any risk, and would either send them on to Delfzyl, or return them to you.

"It must be expected that on Abercrombie's first landing every effort will be made that they can make to oppose him. The first week or ten days is therefore the critical period, and if they should be stronger than we expect, a few days either way may be very material.

"When these six thousand have joined him, he will have little less than 20,000 troops, besides the assistance of as many seamen and marines as he can draw from Lord Duncan's fleet; and with that force he will surely be strong enough to wait for the Russians, if not to advance. The next division after these six thousand might therefore I hope go to Ameland. If he should succeed more rapidly than he had hoped, and should himself judge that he does not want the first 6,000, he may send *them* round to Ameland, but this is not likely.

"I am greatly obliged to you for having settled Craufurd's business in a manner which, I trust, will remove all difficulties."
Copy.

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 22. London.—"I need not say anything in answer to your letter of yesterday, as the letter from the Duke of York will have set your mind at ease on the subject of Colonel Craufurd. In truth it is a great convenience to put him in the department along with Colonel Anstruther.

"I have this morning heard from Sir Ralph Abercrombie and Admiral Mitchell. I send you copies.* It is miraculous how they have kept together, and I trust I am not too sanguine in hoping that we are soon to [hear] of their having made good their landing. I have sent the orders for the two brigades at Barham Downs for which we have transports to march immediately and embark. That is all Sir R. Abercrombie suggests; but I confess to you my own feelings dictate that I ought to follow that order with another to sail, even if I should not hear further from Sir Ralph in the course of this day or to-morrow. If under any unexpected disappointment they should be even obliged to return without being of use, I don't think that is a reason which ought to weigh with me, for the chance of a disappointment in the first instance is not to be put in competition with the important benefits that may arise from the arrival of so substantial a reinforcement at a critical moment when they may be wanted."

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 22. London.—"J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-joint une lettre que j'ai reçu du Prince de Salm mon cousin, ci-devant au service d'Angleterre, et toujours dévoué de cœur et d'âme, comme tout bon gentilhomme et honnête homme doit l'être, à la cause du trône et de l'autel. Vous verrez par cette lettre même combien il est important que le pauvre prince ne soit pas nommé ni compromis. Le zèle anime, ce me semble, les deux cousins qui n'ont rien de caché pour l'homme en place que j'aime et respecte, même quand il me tient rigueur.

* See pages 296, 297.

“Je connois cet *Angely* dont parle le Prince de Salm. C'est décidément un gueux, et le Comte de Woronsow, qui le connoit encore mieux que moi, peut vous donner des renseignemens plus circonstanciés sur son compte. D'après cela, je me suis acquitté d'un devoir, et j'abandonne le reste à votre sagesse.

“J'ai reçu hiér dépêches et lettres volumineuses de M. de Cobentzl. Il m'informe en grand détail de tout ce qui s'est passé, se passe, et se passera. J'avois deviné une partie de ce qu'il me dit, et il m'a appris le reste. J'infère du sens de ses écrits et de ses instructions que l'on va enfin en passer par la ratification. *Tandem, tandem*. Il me mande aussi que pour l'aider dans ses négociations futures, M. le Chevalier de Witteworth vous demande un adjoint, et qu'il indique Lord Auckland et Lord Malmsbury. La prévention très déplacée qu'on a pris contre ce dernier, dont je sais pour ma part apprécier les talens, feroit qu'on le verroit arriver avec peine (je parle de ma Cour, s'entend) mais on m'a donné l'ordre d'insinuer que Lord St. Helens seroit fort agréable. Vous savez que mes insinuations se font toujours ainsi de vous à moi, parceque vous ne compromettiez jamais votre ami. Le Comte de Cobentzl me paroît désirer singulièrement ce ministre. Je sais qu'il a bien de l'esprit, qu'il est honnête, aimable, et je suis même lié avec lui, mais ce n'est pas à moi à prononcer. Ne faites, de grace, aucun usage de tout ceci, et croyez à mon tendre attachement.”

Postscript. “J'oubliais de vous dire qu'Angely avait trouvé le moyen de tromper le Prince d'Orange, qui en a été la dupe, et l'est encore, je crois. Il l'employoit autrefois.”

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, August 22. Lingen.—“Les informations que j'ai reçues depuis le départ de ma dernière lettre, ne contiennent rien de nouveau sur la situation intérieure du pays. Le nombre des jeunes gens qui en sortent pour se soustraire à la réquisition augmente journellement, depuis qu'il paroît que cette mesure se poursuit avec vigueur.

“On débite depuis quelque jours, que les ordres ont été donnés pour faire marcher 4 bataillons à Zwoll, ainsi que 1,400 Francois de ceux qui viennent d'être fait prisonniers en Italie, et se sont engagés à ne pas servir de trois ans contre l'Empereur. Cette nouvelle merite cependant confirmation et paroît d'autant moins probable que l'on n'a rien appris jusqu'ici de l'arrivée de ces prisonniers, et qu'il n'est pas apparent que l'on désorganise la Nord Hollande de troupes Bataves pour les envoyer de ces cotés-ci. Ce qu'il y a de sûr, c'est que deux commissaires nommés Dekker et Rutmulder viennent d'arriver à Zwoll, et qu'ils ont ordre d'ouvrir toutes les lettres et d'examiner les voyageurs qui viennent de ces quartiers-ci. Je puis vous mander aujourd'hui que nous sommes en correspondance avec un des principaux ingénieurs, qui a la direction des mesures de defense entre la Meuse et l'Escaut, et qu'il a déjà donné des informations qui

indiquent qu'il est de bonne foi, et qui m'ont décidé à lui faire passer une somme d'argent, et à lui promettre pour l'avenir une pension qui sera proportionné au service qu'il rendra. D'après ses rapports il paroît que les inondations n'ont pas encore été formées à Bois le Duc comme on l'avoit assuré.

"Hiér-au-soir j'ai reçu le rapport ci-joint (A.)^o de la conversation que F. Fagel a eue le 4 et le 6 de ce mois avec Van Braam, et qui n'indique pas une volonté bien prononcée de sa part de remplir ses engagements. Comme, au reste, la conversation est, à ce que je crois, antérieure à l'entrevue que Verheul a eue avec Van Braam, et dont je vous ai déjà donné avis, il est possible qu'il soit décidé à tenir parole; l'événement en décidera.

"Le Collonel Malcolm, nommé par le Gouvernement Britannique pour s'aboucher avec Yvoy, et concerter ce qu'il y aura à faire pour organiser l'insurrection dans la Belgique, est arrivé à Elten, et lui a communiqué ses instructions. D'après ce que Yvoy me mande, elles sont fort étendues, mais il ne paroît muni d'aucune autorisation relativement aux fonds dont on aura besoin pour cet objet. En attendant, il a pris sur lui de faire l'achat de dix mille fusils, et il s'est arrangé avec Yvoy pour l'envoy et la distribution de ces armes.

"Les nouveaux renseignements qui ont été pris dans la Belgique pour sonder les dispositions des principaux membres des États, sont tous satisfaisants. Il en est de même de la généralité de la nation. Toutes les classes paroissent fort portées pour une réunion, au cas que la maison d'Autriche se décide à en céder la possession. Le Vicaire-Général ayant fait une tournée dans différentes villes de la province d'Hollande ainsi qu'à Utrecht et Nimegue, dans le but de disposer les esprits parmi les Catholiques en faveur de la maison d'Orange, en est revenu fort satisfait. Il a trouvé chez les principaux curés dans ces villes des dispositions très favorables, et l'inclination de travailler les esprits, dans le même sens, par tous les moyens que leur religion leur fournit l'occasion d'employer.

"Ci-jointe (B.) je vous envoie la copie d'une Note qui m'a été adressée par l'Evêque de Ruremonde, et qui contient les points sur les quels il souhaiteroit que les Catholiques fussent avantagés. Ces demandes me paroissent modérées, et n'éprouveront, à ce qu'il me semble, point de difficultés. Je vous prierai au reste de vouloir bien me faire parvenir vos ordres à cet égard; en attendant, je me suis borné à donner provisionnellement la réponse ci-jointe (C.)

"Je vous envoie (D.) la copie d'une lettre que j'ai reçue du Roi au sujet des bruits qui s'étoient repandus comme s'il s'effectuait de ces cotés-ci un rassemblement de troupes. Vous trouverez également la réponse (E.) que j'ai faite à Sa Majesté, ainsi que la copie de la lettre (F.) que j'ai adressée au Général de Blucher sur cette affaire. Celui-ci m'a déjà fait savoir, comme vous verrez par la pièce annexe (G.) qu'il avoit fait un rapport fidèle au vrai état des choses, ainsi je n'ai pas de doute que cet incident n'aura aucune suite ultérieure.

“J’ai trouvé moyen de faire prier par un canal sûr les Bourguemaitres Dedil et Van der Poll de vouloir bien, lorsque les circonstances le demanderont, prendre sur eux la direction générale dans la ville d’Amsterdam, et travailler au rétablissement des bourgeoisies, pour prévenir tout désordre, et empêcher en particulier qu’au moment de la révolution le Directoire ne s’y réfugie.

“Ci-jointe (sous lettre H.) se trouve aussi la copie de la proclamation, qui n’a pas pu être envoyée par le dernier courier.”

Note by H. Fagel.

“The enclosures D. E. F. H. being in German and Dutch, I have not thought it proper to trouble your Lordship with. The three first are the correspondence of the Hereditary Prince about the objections made by the King of Prussia to the increased number of Dutch officers upon the frontier.

“The last is the Hereditary Prince’s proclamation, with a few slight alterations adopted in consequence of the Pensionary’s suggestions.”

Enclosure (B).

A letter to the Hereditary Prince from the Bishop of Ruremonde complaining of restraints on the free exercise of the Catholic religion formerly imposed by Dutch authorities under the rule of the House of Orange.

1799, le 19 Aout. Emmerick.—“L’évêque de Ruremonde expose, avec le plus profond respect, qu’ayant eu communication de la lettre de votre altesse sérénissime du 6 Juillet dernier, adressée à Monsieur le Baron d’Yvoi, il a de suite et de conséquence écrit à un des principaux ecclésiastiques du diocèse de Bois le Duc; que son vicaire-général, Monsieur Syben résidant à Nimegue, s’est adressé en suite de la même lettre du 6 Juillet et pour remplir les vues y reprises, à plusieurs et les plus notables du clergé des territoires de Nimegue, Meuse et Waal, et du Pays de Cuyck, faisant tous partie du diocèse de Ruremonde.

“Qu’ensuite de la commission de M. le Baron d’Yvoi, qui lui avoit été communiquée par Monsieur Michiels, le dit vicaire-général s’est porté dans différentes villes et places de la République des Provinces-Unies, que cette commission a été remplie avec autant de promptitude que de succès.

“Le suppliant expose que, sous la juridiction des différents Magistrats, Drossards, et Baillifs des sus-dits pays, situés dans son diocèse, ils se sont rencontré ci-devant plusieurs entraves au libre culte de la religion Catholique, entr’autres, et nommément, que les orphelins Catholiques dépourvus des moyens de subsistance, entrant dans les maisons destinées à leur entretien, y devoient renoncer leur religion, où ils sont maintenant recus sans être contraints de faire un si triste sacrifice, et où ils sont cependant élevés maintenant sous des maitres et des provideurs de la religion Catholique.

“Le suppliant expose de plus, que dans différents villages, il n'étoit pas permis aux Catholiques de bâtir une maison ni d'avoir de ministres pour le culte de leur religion ; et que dans d'autres villages, les prêtres qui se présentoient et qui étoient demandés pour assister les curés, ne pouvoient prêter leur assistance sans une permission qui étoit souvent refusée.

“Et comme il convient pour le bien public que le culte de la religion Catholique soit à tous égards libre et sans gêne, le soussignée supplie très humblement votre altesse sérénissime de daigner y pourvoir de la manière qu'elle trouvera dans sa haute sagesse la plus convenable, et la plus propre pour étouffer à jamais tout espoir de dissension.”

Enclosure (C).

The Prince's reply, expressing a confident belief of his father's desire to grant full toleration to the Catholics of the Dutch Republic.

“En possession des représentations que vous m'avez adressées par le canal de M. d'Yvoy, je m'empresse de vous informer que je n'ai pas manqué de les porter à la connoissance de mon père, ne m'étant pas possible de vous donner une réponse positive aux demandes qu'elles contiennent avant de connoître ses intentions sur ces objets. Il m'est cependant permis de vous assurer, d'après la connoissance que j'ai de la manière de penser de mon père, et ainsi que je l'ai marqué à M. d'Yvoy dans ma lettre du 6 Juillet, qu'il est très éloigné d'avoir les sentimens d'intolérance pour les Catholiques Romains qui lui ont été quelquefois imputés ; qu'au contraire, il est prêt à employer toute son influence, quand il sera rétabli dans les charges héréditaires, pour faire obtenir à tous ceux de cette religion les mêmes avantages dont ils ont joui dans les provinces où ils étoient le moins entravés, à quel égard je me flatte que vous voudrez être persuadé que j'ai les mêmes sentimens. En conséquence j'ose espérer que les points que vous désirez que soient accordés ne souffriront pas de grandes difficultés, et me flatte que tout pourra s'arranger au gré de vos désirs.”

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 23. Off the Texel.—“Since I had the honour of writing you last we have had only two days that afforded us the means of carrying into execution the orders with which we were charged. The 20th was a calm, the 21st moderate; the General Officers came on board the *Isis* and received their instructions to land the troops on the 22nd, between Huyck Down and Callants Oog.

“When we were on the point of landing, the weather became so tempestuous that we had not a moment to lose in getting under weigh, and in going to sea ; it now blows very hard and there is no appearance of any change. We mean to remain here

till Tuesday morning the 27th, when we shall sail for the Ems with one week's provision of water, bread, and beef. Should any opportunity offer to land on the coast of Holland near the Helder, we shall eagerly embrace it. The Admiral will leave cruisers to acquaint any vessels from England of our destination. The convoy hitherto has kept well together. They have not indeed any port into which they can go. With this wind we can fetch no port except the Firth of Forth or Cromarty bay. Colonel Maitland and Captain Winthrope of the navy went to the Texel on the 20th in the evening, and have not brought us back any answer to the summons they carried, owing probably to the badness of the weather. You may rest assured that nothing shall be wanting on our part to fulfil our orders; but the difficulties are not of an ordinary kind." *Copy.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
W. HUSKISSON.

1799, August 23. H.M.S. *Isis*, off the Texel.—“In my last to Mr. Dundas you will find what kind of weather we had experienced. On the 20th a calm succeeded heavy gales of wind; on that day I went with the Admiral on board the *Kent*. Lord Duncan concurred in the attack on the Helder and on the Dutch fleet, and gave Admiral Mitchell ten line of battle ships for that service. The 21st was very moderate; the general officers came on board the *Isis* and received their orders to land next day between Huyck Down and Callant's Oog. We made land about noon, and in the evening Maitland and Captain Winthrope were sent in the *Coburg* cutter with a summons to the Dutch Admiral and officers commanding the land forces, with copies of the Prince of Orange's declaration and the proclamation in my name; they were directed not to deliver their despatches but to the chiefs themselves. We came to anchor in the evening of the 21st, weighed on the morning of the 22nd, but were almost immediately obliged, from the wind and tide, to anchor again, and to stand into the Hack [Mars?] Channel. At noon unfortunately the weather suddenly changed, it blew a perfect gale of wind. We were obliged to put to sea without a moment's delay, and this morning the gale continues. The convoy keeps well together, owing, I believe, to their having no port to which they can possibly run. Maitland and Winthrope are not yet returned. We suppose they were admitted to see Storey and Colonel Genguel the Commandant at the Helder. There did not appear to be any considerable shew of troops near the Helder, nor any batteries except those on the right and left of the Helder Town. The Dutch ships of war were placed to defend the two passages into the Zuyder Zee. On our approach two frigates got under weigh, and one of them came to an anchor, possibly to cut away the buoys if necessary. The buoys leading over the Hack Deep [Mars Diep?] were not removed, and a frigate of ours anchored to secure them. We mean to cruise here till the evening of Monday next the 26th instant, in hopes that the weather may become more favourable; although our

views are now clear, we shall not hesitate to attempt a landing, and we hope to receive reinforcements from the Downs before that day. The state of our water and provisions will not allow us to remain longer; we shall then proceed to the Ems with about a week's water and provisions on board the transports. In the Ems, where we may expect smooth water, the ships of war can afford us a small supply. We shall of course leave cruizers off the Texel to acquaint any ships from England of our destination. I am fully aware that the risk of anchoring with near 200 sail of ships on a beach affording no shelter, and exposed to the prevailing winds, and of then disembarking on a hostile shore a great body of troops, is beyond the rule of prudence and common sense; yet I know that circumstances may palliate at one time what would be inexcusable at another. The island of Ameland is a '*Ridiculus Mus*.' I cannot think of it. A company of marines, from Lord Duncan's fleet, is sufficient for such a conquest." *Copy.*

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 23. Hamburgh.—“I hope I shall not be thought presumptuous in venturing very humbly to state my wishes to your Lordship that if, in consequence of the fortunate turn of affairs which seems to be near at hand, a minister or any person with whatever title should be sent to the Low Countries to observe what passes there (a minister of course will not be sent till it be settled who is to have those countries, and till some government be established) I may be allowed to exchange my present mission for that situation; unless, which I am not vain enough to suppose, your Lordship should have any other destination for me. I do not presume to ask you for promotion, but merely to be allowed to exchange my present employment for one not superior.

“In the event of the communication with England being opened anew by the way of Holland or the Low Countries, this mission, I conceive, would cease to be interesting. One great object of it at least would no longer exist; the present circuitous road would, of course, no longer be taken by the disaffected Irish and English, and the French agents who pass and repass between England and the continent; they would then naturally resort to the towns and ports of the Low Countries. Of course, if I have hitherto been of any use in watching the motions of these people, I flatter myself that I might be of more, in such a state of things, if placed in the Netherlands, than if I continue here; and the experience of a year and a half in this sort of employment may give me some advantages which another might not have.

“Whatever fate my request may have, your Lordship, I hope, will pardon it with your wonted indulgence, and attribute it to a desire, not I trust an illaudable one, of being always in an active scene of employment, as well as that of going to a country infinitely more agreeable to me, and more suited to my circumstances than this.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 23. Stowe.—“Your suspicions respecting your miserable Prince are, as you see by the enclosed, perfectly well founded. I own that I think he had better for his own sake, *and for yours*, go back to Edinburgh, if his voyage is as undecided as when you last wrote; for the idea of the Isle of Wight will exactly leave him, as well as you, open to every plague that can arise out of the *tracasseries* of the *émigrés*; and as he cannot be to remain long in that same isle, you will be at last to move him. Now by letting him (in his present humour) go back to Holyrood, you have the full means of keeping him, without inconvenience, waiting till the *beau moment* arrives. All this is writ under the idea that nothing is in perspective for the coast of France; for if the news of the last mail lead you to believe that anything may arise *there* to which it would be fit to employ *Monsieur*, the Isle of Wight seems a very proper berth for him for the present. I shall merely answer that I take it for granted that, in any arrangement that may be proposed to him, it would be wished to meet his Royal Highness's convenience and comfort, and to reconcile those objects as much as possible with the several means that may present themselves of making his talents and situation useful to the common cause; and therefore I shall recommend him to abide by your advice whatever it may be.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, August 23. Dropmore.—“Je vous suis bien obligé pour votre avis confidentiel, dont je ne manquerai pas de profiter. J'avois déjà donné aux deux ministres du Duc de W[irtemberg] une réponse verbale dans ce sens, et celle que je leur dois par écrit y sera conforme.

“Je vous renvoie la lettre de M. de Kotschouby. Je suis parfaitement de votre avis sur le contenu de la dépêche. Il vaudroit bien mieux continuer la guerre avec vigueur que de commencer déjà à se disputer les dépouilles d'un ennemi abattu, il est vrai, mais pas terrassé. Jamais cette discussion ne produira rien de bon, et il y a cent contre un à parier qu'elle mettra la discorde entre les puissances.

“L'idée d'un congrès de paix à plus d'un mois de distance du théâtre de la guerre est de toute impossibilité—et, d'ailleurs, d'où apprend—on que le Directoire songe à un congrès de paix, lui qui fait des efforts pour mettre en campagne pour l'année prochain cinq cent mille hommes.

“Vous savez que nous avons des nouvelles de notre expédition jusqu'à dimanche. Elle tenoit encore la mer, et le convoi n'étoit pas dispersé. Le temp nous a été bien contraire, et de toute manière.” *Copy.*

SPENCER SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 23. Constantinople.—“I have been honoured with your Lordship's letter of 9 December, introductory of Mr.

Leake, one of the officers belonging to B[rigadier] General Koehler's detachment.

"I need hardly say how perfectly desirous I ever am of shewing the best attention to such a recommendation, but I have to regret, in the present instance, the difficulty which this gentleman's distant behaviour throws in the way of my obedience to your Lordship's commands to the extent I could wish.

"Mr. Leake, in common with the other gentlemen of his Majesty's *military mission*, keep themselves so aloof and insulated, in a manner, with respect to the post I occupy, that although they arrived at Constantinople with the *Charon* so long ago as the 14 June, and have ever since inhabited either this residence, or the same village in the environs that I occasionally resort to for fresh air, and consequently that we have often met, yet it was only on the 11th instant that the General thought proper to make me acquainted with these gentlemen at a visit I paid to him; and it was four days ago that your Lordship's letter was *sent* to me by the bearer; since when I have not been so fortunate as to meet with him at home. I should not be thus circumstantial in my notice of an occurrence of this nature but that the general style and manners of these military travellers, and more particularly their deportment towards myself and the factory, have struck everyone as quite a novelty at this place, and affords room to apprehend misrepresentation or complaints of want of hospitality which, I can assure your Lordship, we always exercise; and that upon the most easy terms to all strangers, and particularly such whose respectability of character, as in the present case, speaks for itself.

"Having my pen in hand in this way, your Lordship will permit me to join in an act of justice which I understand my two noble friends, Lord Nelson and Sir W. Hamilton, have rendered to a very meritorious person. I understand these distinguished personages have written your Lordship a joint letter in favour of poor Foresti, our excellent fellow labourer at Zante.

"It is now near six years that in my public and private capacity I have known Consul Foresti. He is, without exception, one of the most indefatigable men of business, and zealous servant of the king and of the public, I am acquainted with in this part of the world. The *terra firma* jurisdiction of his consulship in Albania brings him partially under mine, and it is difficult to enhance the value of his vigilance and foresight, and the utility of his correspondence during every circumstance of the late and present extraordinary times. His obliging attentions to every wish from hence, and anxious activity of information, his unchangeable devotion to the good cause when under persecution and suffering; in short, take him for all in all, as far as it is possible rightly to appreciate those with whom one has not a personal acquaintance, I do not think there exists a fairer title to some mark of his Majesty's favour, to some indemnification for all he has gone through, in any officer of the line he is in. I cannot suppose the recommendation of my old friend and

colleague, Sir William, and of the gallant Admiral to need such a make-weight as my testimony, but I should really be sorry to be behind and left out in a good office in which perhaps I ought to have taken the lead, as the oldest and most direct correspondent of Mr. Foresti, and the one whose post has perhaps the most benefited by his essential services.

"It is with some reluctance that with such matter I couple such an indifferent topic as *self*; but I have so few opportunities of attracting your Lordship's notice in my individual capacity, that I trust you will pardon me for reminding you of my own situation, having some need of your Lordship's kind patronage, after a stormy and laborious mission, long struggling against untoward circumstances, and under the influence of a climate adverse to my constitution, superseded at the moment I began to reap the enjoyment of a change of circumstances, and of course considered here upon the spot as *half disgraced*; and, to crown all, thrown more back in the world, by the destruction of my property last March, than I was at my first establishment in this country.

"I presume to lay a request before your Lordship for some mark of favour and approbation of my faithful discharge of every duty to the best of my abilities, that may counteract, in the opinion of the Porte and of the public, the disadvantageous impression of Lord Elgin's arrival over my head.

"And if your Lordship should feel charitably disposed to endeavour to assist me to bear the burthen of a loss of rather more than 2,000*l.*, between my wife and myself, in the late fire, I can furnish you with such a precedent as even the economical Court of Vienna having made this catastrophe serve as a pretext to give a gratuity of [to] every officer of the *Internunciature*, from first to last, *burnt* and *not burnt*, equal to a year's salary; while the Court of Russia, ever foremost in example of munificence, has gone considerably beyond that mark, and with less attention to proportionate calculation.

"And lastly, to take leave once for all of a subject I very reluctantly and diffidently touch upon, I make it my humble request that, in case your Lordship can give me no hopes of remaining at the head of affairs here upon the expiration of Lord Elgin's mission, to the success of which his Lordship and yourself may count upon my best exertions, I may be removed to any residence in the southern parts of Europe; my constitution being no longer proof against a northern winter, which I am morally sure I should never survive. Whereas I have the greatest hope that a timely removal to such a climate as Italy would still restore to me the comfort of animal existence which I have more or less been a stranger to during the first years of my employment here, which is a climate *sui generis*. It is not for me to pick and chose, or talk of preferences to my superiors, but if your Lordship would allow me to address you here, not as Secretary of State, but as a patron of a more indulgent description, and indeed the only one I possess at this long and distant separation

from home, I would fain whisper that I know Sir William Hamilton's desires and intentions of retirement, and that your recollection of me upon that occasion confers an obligation that would cease but with my being, and limit the bounds of all my official ambition. I had rather reside at Naples, *with mere bread to eat*, than at any other spot upon the known surface of the globe; and, much more, to obtain an honourable post there in my profession would leave me nothing to ask or wish for. I have thought your Lordship may be interested by the perusal of a letter my brother has sent open through my hands for Mr. Nepean, with some papers probably destined for the public eye. I therefore send this packet in the same way to your Lordship's care."

Postscript. "On reverting lately to your Lordship's public correspondence with reference to my own personal prospect in consequence of the change in this mission, I did not fail to derive much comfort from the notification in No. 16, of 18 December, of his Majesty having been graciously pleased to express his intention of conferring upon me the *additional* character and emoluments of Secretary of Embassy. I, of course, rather studied the *gazette* for the publication of the appointments connected with this post, and not having seen my new character annexed to Lord Elgin's nomination, I have felt rather uneasy lest such official omission should any ways abridge the slender income I have to count upon for the renewal of all my household establishments, and payment of debt to my predecessor. I trust your Lordship's benevolence will obviate the prejudice to me of any such delay if, as it may be, merely accidental. For, in fact, I do not recollect ever seeing my previous appointments ever so made public at all. In the midst of the haste with which I have been obliged to get through these lines I have received a private letter from the squadron, of which I have judged some passages worthy of your Lordship's attention."

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to H. DUNDAS.

1799, August 24. H.M.S. *Isis*, off the Texel.—"Colonel Maitland and Captain Winthorpe returned during the course of the night from on board Admiral Storey's ship in the Texel. They were received with politeness, and had much conversation with Storey, Van Braame, Capelle, and Yurge. They held an equivocal, timid, unmanly language, talked of the situation in which they were placed, and hinted a wish that we should come and relieve them from their embarrassment. From the observations Colonel Maitland and Winthorpe made, the ships appeared ill manned, and the Helder a place of no great strength; the boatmen who conducted them on board their cutter said they were all heartily tired of their situation. Troops and sailors were arriving constantly from the southward. The weather still so severe that we cannot look near the shore. We are short of water and provisions and must run for the Ems. You will naturally see the disadvantages in beginning at this late season

our operations at the extremity rather than in the heart of the country. I have the honour to inclose Colonel Guenguel's answer to the summons sent. I send this by the *Coburg* cutter going in to the Humber to repair. My next letter will be from the Ems. We shall leave cruizers to direct all vessels coming to us to steer for the Ems." *Copy.*

ADMIRAL LORD DUNCAN to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 24. The *Kent*, off the Texel.—“I would not let the cutter go off with the dispatches without a few lines to you; particulars of our situation you will have from Sir R. Abercromby and Admiral Mitchell. The weather has only prevented us from being in possession of the Dutch Fleet; it now looks better, and yet am in hopes we will do something. I shall now only add that the most perfect harmony subsists amongst us, and all seem actuated by the same zeal for the public service and the success of the expedition. The Russians also seem impressed with the same sentiments. The weather now looks better and I still have good hopes.” *Copy.*

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 24. H.M.S. *Isis*, at sea.—“As Sir Ralph Abercromby has wrote you and I myself have much to do, yet I cannot let this slip away without saying a few words. The weather, ever since we gave up the Goree and Voorn attack, has really been so rough and totally so unfavourable for any communication that little was done until last Tuesday and Wednesday. The General and myself went on board the *Kent*, talked and settled all matters in the best possible manner. Wednesday, a fine fair day, the General arranged his matters with his officers and I settled everything with the captains. Ships were sent in and even anchored at the destined spot the squadron was to anchor. In short, everything had the appearance of readiness, and I would have trusted success, but on the Thursday morning, when we approached the shore, the wind freshened up to the southward; it headed the squadron and convoy so much, and with the ebb tide, I was obliged to anchor very close to the Hack sand about 6 o'clock in the morning. By noon it blew a gale, and coming more round to the westward with a heavy swell, I was under the painful necessity of getting under weigh to save the transports; the weather that night was the worst we have experienced since we have been out. Yesterday it cleared up, but blowing so hard that although we made the land again, we could not attempt anything, but we held our own all yesterday afternoon, and to-day it blows fresh. We are now standing in; if it moderates we must be ready and make the attempt. It will break my heart if the weather continues. Never could I have expected at this season, and this month in particular, such constant blowing weather. To conclude, late last night, after closing a despatch for the Admiralty, and when the General

also wrote you, the flag of truce with which Colonel Maitland on the part of the General, and Captain Winthrope on Lord Duncan's and my part returned, late last night, as the request of Lord Duncan to send in the flag of truce on the Wednesday evening. Captain Winthrope's report, as well as the Colonel's, has made me feel most severely indeed; I shall ever have cause to lament the gale of last Thursday, as I am confident if the day had kept moderate it would have been a brilliant day for old England. They certainly expected us, but were in no strength, and from what they could pick up from Admiral Storey and his captains, the whole fleet of Holland and the possession of the Helder and that peninsula and that port, for a future port, to facilitate our further disembarkation of troops and provisions during the remainder of the campaign, would have been the result of that day's work, and that with little loss on our part, either on shore or in the squadron. The numbers on shore on that day did not exceed 1,300 men, and all the captains that were on board were the Prince's men, the other patriot captains were not sent for. Therefore, the loss to me and the general must be felt with great pain indeed; I must hope the best, and bear it up with the best fortitude I can. I shall begin to think my friend the general is a second Jonas. You'll excuse any incorrectness, as I have three or four to address myself to, Lord Spencer, Lord Duncan, the Admiralty Board and I should have begun with yourself, so this will plead in my favour better, my friend the general having only you to act and communicate with. I shall again, when opportunity offers and worth your information, write you.

"I enclose you Admiral Storey's answer to the summons sent in by Lord Duncan and myself." *Copy.*

Enclosure.

ADMIRAL STOREY to ADMIRAL LORD DUNCAN.

"If I acceded to the proposal you made to me as an officer, I should be unworthy of the esteem of Lord Duncan, and would lose the good opinion of every honest man. I know the duties I owe to the flag under which I serve, and to my country. Even if your force was to increase to double their number, my sentiments will remain the same, therefore, my Lord, expect of me a defence worthy my honour and my nation. Meanwhile I send instantly your summons to my Government. Should you choose to wait for their decision, I shall inform you of it."

Postscript. "I beg you will communicate my sentiments to Admiral Mitchell." *Translation.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to H. DUNDAS.

1799, August 24. Off the Texel.—"I have just received your letter of the 22nd, and have sent back the cutter to the Downs, directing the commanding officer of the troops embarked there to join us immediately off the Texel, with what force he can bring. Should the weather prove moderate, we shall once more

attempt a landing, and we shall, at all events, remain here as long as our water and provisions permit, which cannot be many days longer. The weather within these few hours appears more favourable ; but the wind will not permit us to think of landing.”
Copy.

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 24. Downing Street.—“The want of a Lord Lieutenant for Hampshire has been attended with much inconvenience in all our late operations, and several arrangements are actually standing still from that circumstance. I have repeatedly mentioned the circumstance to Mr. Pitt, and was obliged to send to him just now upon the same subject, in consequence of a letter received from Colonel Sloane. He informs me that he delayed the appointment of Lord Bolton in consequence of some conversation with you, and that he had omitted to resume the conversation with you. He is gone out of town ; but if there is not some very pressing reasons for the delay, I wish it was intimated to the Duke of Portland that a Lord Lieutenant may be appointed.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1799, August 24. Schaffhausen.—“I venture to take the liberty of mentioning to your Lordship that it has been hinted to me in the Austrian army that any mark of personal attention or approbation on the part of his Majesty would be particularly well taken by the Archduke.

“I throw this out for your Lordship’s consideration without at all presuming to offer an opinion in what way the thing can be done, or whether it can be done at all. I will only add that if anything of the kind were done, it would be highly gratifying to me to have the slightest part in it. A letter in the King’s own hand, supposing an occasion for such a measure should offer itself, was what was suggested to me.

“I am extremely anxious for Lord Mulgrave’s arrival. At present my situation is very awkward, having neither credentials nor instructions that authorise me to talk either to the Archduke or General Korsakoff as I have hitherto done, and I trust entirely to your Lordship to cover all the sins I have been guilty of.

“I wish for Lord Mulgrave’s arrival on another account. I am truly sorry to say so, but it is my duty so to do, though in the strictest confidence and to your Lordship only, that Craufurd’s manner of writing and talking to the Swiss is so exactly contrary to mine that, were it only for the contrast, he must become odious to them.

“Unfortunately I can see no remedy but his immediate removal, or his being placed under some person of higher rank and more unassuming manners.

"It is not possible for me to interfere as I could wish to do for I cannot change his tone or his temper ; and I should therefore gain nothing but his ill will, and lose besides the little influence I have over him. I doubt also, according to his instructions, which only direct him to consult me on political matters, whether I have really any right to interfere at all with any part of his conduct.

"The appointment of the officers ought, unquestionably, in this country to be considered as *political*, and always was so by every State that raised troops here; but, as my instructions would not bear me out in claiming it, I have thought best to say nothing at all ; but it is absolutely necessary that a new system should be adopted in that respect, otherwise my mission will be a mockery. I wished to have said so when I wrote before on the subject, but the hope of being able to preserve some influence in the appointments prevented me. If I asked it as a favour, Craufurd would do anything for me, but he will neither bear remonstrance nor observation.

"I am entirely persuaded that the Archduke is at last disposed to act with vigour and effect, and I trust that in a day or two I shall have a most satisfactory account to send your Lordship.

"It is difficult to say whether Suwarow is most angry and dissatisfied with the Archduke, or his Royal Highness with Suwarow."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 26. Downing Street.—"Along with this you will receive copies of my despatches received this morning. We are really very unfortunate ; everything has been done that could be thought of to ensure success, everybody employed in the business are doing their duty with zeal and cordiality, and complete success seems to have been almost certain if we had not been frustrated by the extraordinary circumstance of a ten days' hurricane in the month of August. There is still a chance, for they were to keep their ground till the evening of this day. All yesterday and this day are very moderate, and they may have been able to do their business. But the very delay enables the enemy to collect their strength. Upon this point, however, it would appear that all Count Rhone's [Rhoo] information is inaccurate, and if they could have accomplished their landing at the beginning, it would probably have cost very little. Our reinforcements, luckily, got well away yesterday, and I trust will join them in the course of this day ; which, I hope, will afford a counterbalance to any additional strength their opponents may have collected."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 26. Berlin.—"You will easily judge of the feverish impatience in which I am passing my time when I know

from Mr. Hammond and Lord Spencer's letters that the fleet had sailed on the 13th, and when I know that no news of their arrival was known at the Hague on the 16th, or at Lingen upon the frontiers on the 21st.

"Meanwhile, in order to be more within your reach and nearer to the eastern frontier of Holland, I have determined to go on this day se'nnight to Hamburg, and there to wait the course of events, or to move from thence to any spot where I can help them.

"Haugwiz blusters to Kinkel about all that they will do if France does not quickly answer, but I doubt too much the course of his feeble threats to fancy that he will speak loud enough to be heard by Syéès, and now that I have stayed long enough to avoid all appearance of hostile rupture, I think I cannot do better than to go as soon as I can take leave of the King. The last accounts which I have from the interior of the United Provinces describe a good deal of activity on the part of the French at Berg op Zoom, Breda, Venlo, and Juliers, and, as far as I can trace it, the prevailing notion both at Paris and at Berlin is that we shall attack Flanders in the first instance. By this time I do hope and trust that we have made our attack, and if I do not hear of it in 24 hours more I shall really feel entirely at a loss in what manner to account for the slowness of our arrival at a time when two successive packets have crossed over to Cuxhaven, one on the 19th, and the other on the 22nd. Meantime you will be glad to hear that Van der Spiegel is quite well in mind and body, and is now with the Hereditary Prince at Lingen.

"If any new proof were wanting to show you how completely the King of Prussia was sunk into his miserable system of neutrality, I would refer you to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and desire him to show you the King's letter to him of the 16th instant, in which complaints are made of the Dutch officers collecting there; and his Prussian Majesty, instead of assisting the Dutch according to his guarantee, or his brother-in-law according to the ordinary relations of families, quotes upon his own brother-in-law his new line of demarkation, and civilly warns him not to let any of his countrymen trespass upon it. You will easily believe that I have not let pass this opportunity of contrasting upon this subject to the Hereditary Prince the conduct of Great Britain with that of his Royal brother-in-law, and I do not think that the comparison will be lost upon him.

"You will see by my letter to Whitworth that, in my indignation with Razomouski, I cannot help suggesting the expediency of there being some Russian Minister at Vienna who will speak his master's real language, and will support more faithfully and efficaciously the duties of an allied Minister. As yet you will have observed that the only two points on which Lord Minto has desired his assistance, namely, the original plan of campaign, and the restoration of the King of Sardinia, are points upon which he has refused to give it, in the very moment when the Emperor was loudly agreeing with Lord Minto, by his language to Whitworth at Petersburg, If I could have my way I would send Panin to Vienna; he would there do real good."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 26, 11 p.m. Berlin.—“Instead of sending to you by the Dutch officer belonging to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, I am enabled by the arrival of Whitworth’s messenger to forward this more directly to London. I am glad to see that there is no danger of real hostility from Petersburg, and, therefore, that I may safely quit Berlin as soon as I can take leave. I shall still propose to leave Berlin for Hamburg on the 1st or 2nd of September, though I have always told the Hereditary Prince of Orange that I will come to him whenever he really wants me, and, till he does, I do not think that I shall be of any use, but rather in his way and in that of those about him. I have shared all your anxiety about the fleet, but my messenger who is just arrived from Cuxhaven with your letters of the 16th and 20th, tells me the packet-boat which brought them on the 24th had seen the fleet on the 23rd off the Dogger bank a good deal dispersed, but to all appearance without any real injury, and he assures that he counted 136 sail; so if this be correct I hope before now that they are really landed. I have instantly sent to Lingen to tell the Prince of Orange of this new destination for the Texel. I have received half an hour ago, by *estatfette* from Dresden, an account from Vienna of a bloody victory, as you will see, but it is probably the entire ruin of the French army in the Genoese.

“I do not add anything to this letter, because if I detain the messenger he will miss the packet-boat.

“You will have seen by my later letters that the French have destined a camp for North Holland, which seems to have been from a knowledge of your intention. Pray make somebody always write a line upon the occasion of these alterations, as I am misleading my prince as to the point of attack. I have not yet the papers relative to Abercrombie’s instructions, or those of Malcolm, of whom I hear nothing.

“I do not in this hurry say anything about Oxford, but I think your answer seems quite correct. The object of Parliament is answered at Buckingham. All that could recommend the other, is that it is of more flattering and general testimony. If it came in that shape without being sought by me, I do not feel in it any wrong to Windham, and the custom of the University forbids, I believe, the candidate to be active. My answer when I return would therefore be founded upon a wish to engage in no contest on my part, and upon a readiness to feel and acknowledge the compliment of that election, if it were likely to take place without creating anxiety and ill blood. I have never from Windham had any knowledge of his intentions at Oxford; but I will write of this in more quiet times; my dreams are now of fleets and of Dutchmen.

“I do not find that any new promise of success has as yet offered at Deventer, and therefore it remains to be seen how far the impression of an English landing will open a road from

the German frontier ; that road may be immediate upon the first explosion in the country, or it may be delayed until it be opened by military operations beginning from the sea-coast. This result will, I think, be more usefully watched by me in the neighbourhood of the Prince than actually with him, more particularly because he is naturally jealous of control, and uneasy at all which has the appearance of it, and which seems to draw from him the merit of the activity which he so laudably bestows upon this interesting subject. Whenever he seems to wish for me, you will easily believe that I will not be absent, but, in the present state, I have been persuaded that I do better at a little distance than by giving myself more entirely to the circle at Lingen.

"I believe I shall be downright feverish with anxiety till I hear more decisively of this important stroke ; but I must say for you all that you have done stoutly and spiritedly, and that will always be doing handsomely, and generally successfully.

"Do not forget my irritable nerves ; in these interesting days, a post without a letter is as bad as a bullet in the thorax."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Most secret.

1799, August 27. Downing Street.—Count Woronzow having made to me a communication similar to that contained in your dispatch No. 58, respecting the establishing at Petersburg a concert as to the further views and measures of the allies for the prosecution of the war, I have, by his Majesty's command, entered with that Minister into a very ample discussion of that subject ; as far as it is possible to go without further explanation from Vienna. And having at his request transmitted to him a note of the outlines of those instructions which, as I had informed him, her Majesty had directed to be transmitted to you on the subject, I think I cannot better put you in possession of his Majesty's views than by sending to you by this messenger a copy of that paper, which contains a summary of the language to be held to the Court of Petersburg on the subject in question.

"On the first article there is not much to be added. The King's views respecting the course and progress of this campaign have been already communicated to you. The recent advices from Vienna prove that very different objects are, unhappily, in the contemplation of that Court ; and the lateness of the season, as well as the reluctance of the Austrian Government to enter into satisfactory explanations with his Majesty, seem to leave little hope that the plan of undertaking the siege of Mayence will now be abandoned.

"It remains, however, to be considered whether the circumstances of the war will be such as to afford any hope that the Russian forces, which will now be united in Switzerland, will be sufficient to follow up the Austrian successes in that quarter, and to penetrate into Franche Comté or to Lyons. This must in a great degree depend on the strength of the French army in that

quarter, and on the degree of effective aid which is [to] be expected from the Austrian armies to the right and left of the Russians.

"It will therefore be very useful that you should keep the Emperor's mind as much as possible intent on the main object of the campaign, that of taking winter quarters in Lyons, and of raising the standard of royalty there. And it is particularly to be desired that you should succeed in reconciling His Imperial Majesty's mind to the employment of the Count d'Artois, whose situation points him out as so much the fittest of the French Princes to be employed there, and whose character (if it may be judged of by his conduct here) is no longer liable to the objections which might perhaps be justly made to it at an earlier period of his life.

"I had great pleasure in seeing from your despatch No. 64, that the Emperor was himself so much bent upon the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, as to be forming plans for carrying it on even without the aid of Austria. I presume that it is on some such plan as this that the orders, to which the enclosed despatch from Colonel Ramsay alludes, were given to General Korsakow.

"Nothing can be clearer than the understanding of the two Courts on the subject to which that despatch refers, nor than the stipulation of the treaty respecting it. And I should hope that, by the plans which are now adopted, there is even less danger than before of any misunderstanding upon it. Any representation respecting it on your part might, I think, unnecessarily tend to implicate General Korsakow in a manner by no means to be desired, and I trust it will be sufficient if you keep your attention fixed on this subject, and bring it incidentally from time to time under the Emperor's view in its true light.

"It is only on the spot, and by professional opinions, that it can be decided whether after the reconquest of Switzerland it will be possible and prudent to attempt to push the Russian army forward into France, with the aid of no greater Austrian force than the Court of Vienna now proposes to leave in that quarter. But it will be essential that the Russian General should have full powers to pursue this plan if it shall appear practicable, and should be instructed to turn his attention to it preferably to any other.

"The necessity of choosing a more central place than Petersburg for the establishment of a congress for peace is too evident to be dwelt upon, but the expressions used in the dispatch to Count Woronzow from his Court made it necessary for me to say as much upon it as is contained in the second article of the enclosed paper.

"You will remark upon the third article how much it is his Majesty's object to connect with the establishment of a concert of views for the conclusion of peace that of a plan of military operations to be executed by the different powers engaged in the war. A point which is the more important because, without some check of this nature, it is greatly to be apprehended that

the Court of Vienna, finding itself in some degree secure of its own objects, may discontinue or relax its efforts for the common cause, unless it be bound by positive stipulations to pursue them according to a specified plan, to a specified extent, and for certain objects previously agreed upon.

"Nothing more can be said in the present moment than what I have stated to Count Woronzow respecting his Majesty's ideas of maritime peace. And there is, I trust, very little ground to fear that these will be in any respect likely to excite opposition at Petersburg.

"The fifth article includes the King's ideas, first, on the re-establishment of monarchy in France; secondly, on the policy of holding out to the people of that country some security against dismemberment; and thirdly, on the necessity of confining France within her continental limits, such as they stood at the commencement of the Revolution.

"On all these points former discussions have already established a complete union of sentiment between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.

"The remainder of this article relates to the final arrangement to be made at a peace respecting those countries in Germany and Italy which, having been conquered by the enemy or ceded to him by their respective sovereigns, shall now be reconquered by the arms of the allies.

"This is a subject on which the King is not called upon to propose any plan, nor would it become him to do so. It is but too evident that the views of Austria are those of great acquisition and aggrandisement. To refuse to that power all benefit from the success of so brilliant a campaign would perhaps be unreasonable in principle, and would most certainly be extremely difficult in practice. In so far as the accomplishment of those views, whatever they may be, should tend to strengthen the defensive frontiers of Germany and Italy against the restless ambition of France, it could scarcely be looked upon as unfavourable to the interests of England, provided they did not extend so far as, by augmenting too much the Austrian power, to endanger the general balance of Europe.

"On these points, however, it is rather the business of his Majesty to receive than to anticipate the proposals of his allies. This part of my communication to Count Woronzow has, therefore, as you will observe, been confined to very general and indefinite expressions.

"The subject of the Low Countries requires to be treated in another manner, and the greatest advantage which his Majesty hopes to derive from the conferences to be carried on at Petersburg is by obtaining some security that these provinces, which may very probably be liberated from their present oppression by the success of the operations now carrying on by his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, shall not be re-delivered into the hands of Austria without fresh and more effectual engagements of barrier treaty; or (what would be preferred by his Majesty) that they should be united to the

Dutch Republic, forming (with the addition perhaps of the Bishopric of Liege) one compact and independent State, of sufficient wealth to re-establish the fortified barrier, and of sufficient power to defend it.

"These general ideas I have stated to you in order to enable you, if circumstances should require it, to enter upon the conferences without any appearance of delay on his Majesty's part, supposing that the Austrian Minister should be found equally ready.

"But before anything can be finally concluded on these subjects, a considerable time must be expected to elapse; and I shall be enabled to transmit to you, from time to time, such instructions as his Majesty may judge necessary for your conduct in the course of the discussions.

"The pretensions of the Neapolitan Minister are in the last degree extravagant, and I have every reason to think will be disavowed by his Court." *Draft.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, August 27. Downing Street.—"The enclosed despatches to Sir Charles Whitworth, which are sent open to you for your perusal, will apprise you of the nature of the discussion which His Majesty has directed to be entered into at Petersburg. His Majesty has judged that your presence at that Court, and your assistance in the conferences there, might tend very materially to promote their success. His Majesty is therefore desirous that you should for this purpose proceed to that Court. Your recent letters of credence and full powers are sufficiently ample to enable you in that case to enter upon the business in question; and the instructions which I have addressed to Sir Charles Whitworth should be considered as the rule for your joint conduct. But if either the state of your own health, or the pressure of the business which is likely immediately to arise in the quarter where you now reside, should induce you to wish on private and public grounds to decline the service now proposed to you, His Majesty's servants, however impressed with a sense of the great benefit which would in their opinion arise from your presence at Petersburg to the great objects which are in question, have, nevertheless, humbly recommended it to His Majesty that this point should be left wholly to your decision; and even if the result should not be such as they would wish, I can with full confidence assure you of His Majesty's gracious acceptance of the service which you have already performed." *Draft.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, August 28, 12 p.m. Berlin.—"Lord Minto's servant has brought me letters from him which desire me to open his dispatches to you, and I find in them so much important communication that I do not delay his messenger one moment,

and I am writing these few lines while his horses are getting ready. If on the one hand there is some disappointment in the French having broken in upon the Grisons, yet it is something that the common danger should have forced Thugut into measures more of concert and of co-operation than common interests would ever have succeeded in obtaining from him. We know nothing here of the French successes in Swisserland, and therefore I cannot judge what is the extent of the evil or of the loss attending the French eruption. I shall be very cautious not to name it here in the present moment, for I have heard this evening, indirectly from Alvenslaben, that they have this day received from France an answer not only of positive and peremptory refusal, but that refusal couched in terms which are extremely ungracious. The government here have even gone the length of speaking in the strongest terms to their confidential friends upon this subject, and they give themselves the airs of blustering and threatening an immediate march of the Prussian troops. I had already yesterday sent to Count Haugwiz my letter demanding an audience of *congé*, and I am actually waiting the King's pleasure and the communication of it. It is not possible for me to guess how far what they will learn here about Swisserland will damp the warlike fit which has come upon them this evening, but, as far as I can learn by indirect communication, I am told that their notion this evening was to let me have my audience of leave, but still to march themselves with all expedition.

"I have so little faith in this angry burst of courage that I cannot say that I expect anything from it. I have latterly rather avoided than courted any possible discussion with them, although I have been anxious enough to stay and trace their course; and I have avoided them because in the present moment I really trust that we should not want their assistance, and I honestly own that I should rather be afraid of a limited co-operation on their part, than anxious to obtain it. You will see some traces of this in the letter which I sent to Haugwiz, but I must not forget to remind you that, however harsh this letter may seem, it was necessary to allude to the facts which had passed, and to state them, by letter at least, in order to have something like a record of their past weakness and inconsistency. I had anxiously pressed Panin to join with me in an official note for this purpose, but he was unwilling to do so lest his Court should disapprove it, and I did not like to take singly a step which might look like a separation of interests at a time when I wished to have all the effect of the most perfect union. I therefore would not present a separate note, but I have shortly alluded to the chief points in my letter asking for an audience of leave. To this letter I have yet received no answer, except a short one to say that my letter should be laid before His Prussian Majesty.

"I remain therefore uncertain whether this refusal from France will tempt them to try to keep me or no. Perhaps they will do nothing except taking possession of their own trans-Rhene provinces; perhaps they will not do that, but will

remain entirely quiet, which is most in character for them; perhaps they will make some overture to me to stay, and perhaps they will make none, but let me go quietly as if no refusal had been made to them; my present disposition is to continue to urge my departure for the 1st September, and I do not see that any overture ought to induce me to delay it, short of an actual declaration or commencement of Prussian hostility against France. If they will now march in hostility into their own Duchy of Cleves and then into Flanders or Holland, for that event I should be disposed to talk with them and to concert with them, not by pecuniary subsidy, but by such military co-operation as you are now carrying on with Austria. As it appears to me extremely doubtful whether the loud threats of Alvensleben to Baron Kinkel about their French answer this evening, will really produce anything, and as we have such cogent reason for believing that they certainly will never do anything here, I should be sorry to lead you into any new expectation even of the faintest shade; but yet, as you may have better French intelligence which may furnish to you a more authentic and a better grounded comment, I have determined to name the circumstance in a few lines of a public dispatch. I am still full of anxiety to hear of our disembarkation; the only intelligence which I have received is by a note this evening which asserts that a letter is just received from Amsterdam stating that on the 24th the English fleet was at the Helder, the Amsterdam garrison hurrying to defend it, and great confusion prevailing in consequence. This sounds very probable, and I am much inclined to believe it, and not a little anxious to confirm it.

“Lord Minto’s private letters to me are expressed in great kindness considering the vehemence with which I had written to him upon the contents of his four dispatches, and are full of good temper and of laudable desire of conciliation. I see, however, with some regret and concern that he is far from agreeing with me in my objections and apprehensions of Austria taking complete possession of Piedmont; and I should by his letters be afraid that he considers this measure as one which is agreeable to the wishes of more than one or two of the English Cabinet. For my own part, as far as I am yet able to form any opinion upon the subject, I cannot believe that it is wise to give all Italy to Austria; and when Piedmont is added on to the Milanese, to Lombardy, to Venice, and part of Tuscany, I cannot consider the rest of Italy as being other than a more extended Imperial fief. I had yesterday a long conversation upon this subject with M. de Hudelist, the Austrian *Chargé d’Affaires*, and I saw evidently that he not only avowed this intention on the part of Austria, but he went so far as to recommend that, for the sake of establishing an intimate union between London and Petersburg [Vienna?], we had better ourselves propose an arrangement of this nature to M. de Thugut. I hear no motive for this except a security against France; if that is a sufficient motive for Austrian acquisition, their possessions will

be as extensive as their fears, and Swisserland will naturally find its place also in these new and unbounded Imperial title-deeds. When I answer Lord Minto I must again attack him, for I cannot in conscience acquiesce in the monstrous crawl of Thugut."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 28. Walmer Castle.—"The only thing I can say with certainty on the first reading of the mortifying packet you have sent me is that this, and every fresh embarrassment, will be a fresh reason for your brother's going as soon as possible to Petersburg. I will write to you again on all the rest of the subject, as soon as I have thought over a little more the difficulties which arise. In the meantime I should like much to see Lord Minto's despatches themselves, if they are returned and can be spared."

Postscript. "Not a word more yet from our expedition. The wind is against hearing, and, I am afraid, for these two days has been very unfavourable to acting; but I think Sunday and Monday ought to have done the business at the Texel."

THE PRINCE OF ORANGE to COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON.

1799, August 28. London.—"Monsieur le comte Guillaume Gustave Frédéric Bentinck, seigneur de Rhoon et Pendrecht, Varel, et Knipphausen, ayant offert de se charger de l'organisation et de la direction des habitants armés de la province d'Hollande et de Westfrise pour le rétablissement du gouvernement légitime, et la conservation du bon ordre et de la tranquillité, S[on] A[ltesse] a trouvé bon de commettre et d'autoriser à cet effet le dit Comte Bentinck, le tout sans préjudice de l'autorisation générale donnée dans le même but par S[on] A[ltesse] au Prince Héréditaire son fils. S[on] A[ltesse] a trouvé bon, de plus, de recommander au dit S[eigneur] Comte Bentinck de suivre à tous égards, relativement à l'organisation et à la direction des habitants armés de la province d'Hollande et de Westfrise, les instructions qui pourront lui être transmises par S[on] A[ltesse] le Prince Héréditaire: et en outre, afin de remplir le but salutaire pour lequel la présente autorisation lui est donnée, d'agir de concert avec les officiers commandants des villes ou districts de la province d'Hollande nommés par nous, ou, en vertu de notre prédite autorisation générale, par le Prince Héréditaire; de même qu'avec ceux auxquels une autorisation semblable à la présente aurait pu être donnée par nous ou par le Prince Héréditaire, pour quelques villes ou districts de la dite province.

"En conséquence, nous prions et requérons tous ceux que cela peut regarder, de reconnaître, respecter, et assister le susdit Comte Bentinck dans la susdite qualité. Le tout provisoirement et jusqu'à ce que nous ayons trouvé bon de révoquer la présente."

Copp.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 28. Klein Ketten, near the Helder.—“ We have succeeded in an enterprize which, as far as I can be allowed to judge, was most precarious, and which, if I were to give an opinion even after success, ought not to have been risked. We are now to make the most of our success, and as soon as we shall be enabled to procure horses and waggons to carry forward our tents and little baggage, we shall endeavour to push on to Alkmaar, where the country becomes more cultivated and productive. As we have now a scene past, I hope there will be no delay in sending us three or four regiments of Light Dragoons; the want of cavalry is severely felt. Lord Duncan agrees with me in thinking it right to bring directly the Russians to the Helder, and a letter will be dispatched immediately to that purpose. The force that opposed us yesterday was about 7,000 men, well clothed, well armed, and well disciplined. A very considerable desertion amongst them has taken place, being composed mostly of Austrian and Prussian deserters. They may be said to have behaved better than we expected; they certainly at times pushed our people with spirit and perseverance, as they returned several times to the attack. I proposed forming a corps from the Dutch deserters and giving it to Lieutenant-Colonel Sontag, who is very intelligent, and who has been to us most useful. The officers may be taken from the old Dutch officers, some of whom are now with us. I shall consult the Baron de Heerdt on this subject.

“It is impossible as yet to form any opinion on the disposition of the country. We shall observe strict order, and give every kind of protection to people of all descriptions. I could not yesterday sufficiently admire the spirit of the British soldier. Without any sort of discipline, they did in their own way as much as could have been expected from veteran troops. Sir I. Pulteney really surprized me. He shewed ardour and intelligence and did himself honour. I have reason to be satisfied with all the general officers, although they did not all shew the same intelligence. I was unfortunately deprived of Colonel Hope by a wound in his leg, which is not dangerous; he has no fever, and will be soon well. Colonel Macdonald did his part like a brave and skilful officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, whom I highly valued, was killed at my side—he has left a widow and six daughters without a shilling. Lieutenant-Colonel Graham of the 27th, after shewing many instances of heroic courage, is dangerously wounded in the head. If this is a Scotch expedition they have borne the brunt of the day.

“I trust that you will recommend Colonel Hay’s family to the King’s goodness. If I have endeavoured to render any service to the public on this occasion, the only reward is that this poor family may not be left destitute. I cannot conclude this long letter without saying that I observe in Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther very superior abilities. He promises to be an officer of the first class.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 29. Wimbledon.—“As the easiest way of conveying my sentiments to you without having the trouble of writing another letter, I send you a copy of a letter I this morning wrote to Mr. Pitt. I have the same doubts you have as to the probability of landing either Sunday or Monday, and that gave rise to my viewing the subject in an ulterior and contingent light, that we may not be unprepared for any event that occurs.”

HENRY DUNDAS to W. PITT.

Enclosure.

1799, August 28. Wimbledon.—“In the course of the night I have been ruminating upon what directions it might be necessary to give before I leave London, and this has led me to consider of the disposal of our present force, and the objects further to be pursued under the different contingencies which may happen. Perhaps the accounts which may arrive in the course of this day or to-morrow morning may supersede much of what has occurred to me, but it is only the trouble of writing a little more than may be useful, which is of no consequence, and if it should prove otherwise a day may be gained.

“Of course the deliverance of Holland is the primary object to which all our force whether British or Russian must be immediately appropriated. And if the armament under Sir Ralph Abercrombie is successful in making good its landing, and establishing itself in the province of Holland, everything is then plain and simple, and the only order to give is that, as soon as the transports shall return and have received what additional water or other outfit they may be in need of, the troops at Barham Downs shall be ordered to march and embark without delay, and proceed to join the others in Holland. Our idea was that the Duke of York would sail as soon as the Russian troops arrived at Yarmouth. I am very clear this plan should be altered, and I shall immediately communicate to His Royal Highness my reasons, and I know he is ready to go at an hour’s warning. Independent of the Russian troops, we shall have in Holland an army of 24,000 British infantry, besides what cavalry it may be necessary to send. This is certainly a command fit for the King’s son, and I cannot help thinking that, with a view to future connexion, it is desirable that a Prince of the Blood should have a chief part in the deliverance of Holland, and the re-establishment of the House of Orange. Besides, His Royal Highness being on the spot, and having the influence which it is said he has with the Prince of Orange, may be of essential use in the future details we talked over the last time Lord Grenville you and I met together.

“The next supposition is that Sir Ralph Abercrombie may not be able to execute his present plan, but obliged to yield to the weather and make for the Ems. If he goes there, I am not too

sanguine in hoping, after all the information we have received, that the speedy deliverance of Groningen and Friesland will be the consequence; and that accomplished, 5 or 6,000 men is the utmost that, in conjunction with the force of the country, can be requisite to confirm what the success of our arms has achieved. A general officer (probably general Don, from the communications he has already had with the Prince of Orange's friends in those countries, may be thought the best) with a force to that amount being left, there will still remain about ten thousand. These with General Abercrombie and the other officers under his command should either return to the Downs, if they want any additional outfit for the ships and transports, or, if they do not, should be ordered to repair to such *rendezvous* as may be concerted, and along with the troops at Barham Downs to put themselves under the command of the Duke of York. The force will then amount to 18,000 British infantry and a proportion of cavalry, and, with such a force, I should hope when the weather permits, there could be no difficulty in the Duke's successfully undertaking what Sir Ralph Abercrombie, from uncommonly boisterous weather, has been obliged to postpone. Even if the troops under Sir Ralph should not return to the Downs, where the Duke of York proposes to embark, still I should think it right to order Sir Ralph himself to come, in order that he may, before the Duke of York sails, lay before His Royal Highness in detail the plan by which, according to the concert between him and Lord Duncan and Admiral Mitchell, the attack on the Helder and Texel was proposed to be made. This would save a great deal of time; and to make it complete, either Lord Duncan if he is returned, or Admiral Mitchell, or both, should be ordered likewise to attend the Duke of York before he sails. By such a previous well-digested arrangement much time would be saved; and the armament, when it does sail, would be ready, if the weather allowed, to go directly to the execution of its object. I mentioned to the Duke of York the idea of his coming to Walmer Castle before he sailed, and the previous arrangement to which I have referred could all be concerted there. I shall probably see His Royal Highness in the course of this day or to-morrow morning, and in suggesting the other particulars I have detailed to you, I shall at the same time mention to him that he may probably be called upon sooner than I once thought of.

"It will readily occur to you that, in the execution of what I have mentioned, no preparation is requisite that can create any delay; for the transports which would return from the Ems would carry the troops at Barham Downs, within two thousand; and, if I recollect right, there are already prepared supernumerary transports to that amount; but, if not, I shall give orders about it to-day. I shall write to Lord Grenville to communicate to him what I have written to you, in case he has any suggestions to offer to me; and I shall not leave London till Friday, instead of to-morrow, in order that I may receive your answer to this, and give any additional order that may become necessary in consequence of the suggestions I may receive. I take it for

granted it will be no inconvenience to you to take your ride over to Barham, that you may convey to Sir C. Grey and your brother some general idea of the time when the troops now at Barham Downs may be called upon to march and embark.”
Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 29. Dropmore.—“I have read with attention the letter you sent me; and the subject is one which had, of course, occupied much of my thoughts in this painful interval of suspense.

“If Abercrombie lands in Holland, of course the whole thing is clear, and we have only to reinforce him as fast as we can; keeping only in view that when the Russians arrive, or perhaps sooner, we must assist our friends in the Eastern Provinces with some small force; and that when we have our Russians, but not before, we may perhaps wish to make an attack on Walcheren by sea, that being a point the possession of which would be of the utmost importance after we had made a certain progress in Holland. On this subject I send you some intelligence received from the Hereditary Prince, which shews that, there also, the difficulties had been much exaggerated to us.

“In your second supposition, however, I confess I fear you are too sanguine. That our force now under Abercrombie will effect a complete counter-revolution in Friesland and Groningen I have no doubt; but when that is done there will still be some point on that side (say Coverden or the Yssel or what you please) where the French and Batavians will collect whatever force they can, and where you must for some time at least keep together a larger regular force than 6,000 men, and probably a more considerable officer than Don; otherwise we may see all our work in that quarter unravelled while we are pursuing our objects elsewhere.

“The arrival of the first Russian troops at Yarmouth, which may be now daily expected, will put you enough in force to undertake both objects, supposing each to require no more than from 18 to 20,000 men; and allowing even that their execution is to be totally independent of each other. And you will still have a reinforcement of 6 or 8,000 Russians more, besides cavalry, to send where you please.

“If the first Russians, with the British now at Barham, are sufficient for the Texel expedition, being assisted by so powerful a division as that in Groningen, the object, after taking the Helder, would certainly be to push on with them to Amsterdam and the Hague. And this might be much facilitated by transporting the troops which could be spared from the Overysse army across the Zuyder sea from Staveren or Kampen to Enchuysen, according to the Duke of Brunswick’s original plan.

"If these ideas are right, the steps would be (always supposing Abercrombie to have landed at Delfzyl, not in Holland):

1. "To let him push forward in that quarter to the best defensive position he can take to cover the eastern provinces, which position I suppose would be Coverden or the Yssel; and it would be desirable to concentrate it as much as possible, in order to be able to detach from that army.

2. "To keep our Barham Down force in readiness to sail with the Russians to the Texel the very moment the first Russian division arrives.

3. "When the Helder is taken and the fleet secured, to push on to Amsterdam; and for that purpose to reinforce our army in Holland by bringing across the Zuyder sea whatever can, at that period, be spared from Overijssel.

4. "The second division of Russians would be considered as a reserve to be sent to either of these points which wanted reinforcement, and, if both were found strong enough, then to be sent to take possession of Walcheren, from which even its small present defence would in that case probably be withdrawn.

"What would be the best arrangement of your officers in that case you can best decide. You must remember that our command as with respect to Russians is to be decided always by seniority.

"The Duke of York, of course, commands the whole. Lieutenant-General Herman is, I understand, senior to Abercrombie, but there comes only a Major-General with the first division, and he is probably senior to all our officers of that rank.

"It will have occurred to you that if Abercrombie lands in Groningen, he will want some cavalry almost immediately."
Copy.

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August 29. London.—"I have received your letter, with its enclosure from your nephew Sir Watkin. There must be some mistake in it, for it is impossible that Lord Cornwallis would authorise the drafting of a fencible regiment into any other.

"There are many applications from some of the fencible cavalry to go upon foreign service, but there are sound reasons in policy why they should not be sent in preference of the regular cavalry. You would otherwise, for the sake of gratifying (I admit it) a most honourable and meritorious public zeal, deprive yourselves in all future wars of the service of those who, by being kept at home, would be deprived of that experience which alone can make soldiers. If you can keep Austria from being *very* dishonest, and we are thereby enabled at the beginning of next campaign to carry on our operations on the great scale we propose, we may then have room for the service of the fencible cavalry; and none deserves better than Sir Watkin to have every attention paid to the dictates of his ambition.

"No news to-day from our expedition. Mr. David Scott, who has been cruising in those seas for a month for his health, passed over from Lord Duncan's fleet and arrived within these two days. He says he was half-way over on Saturday, that it was perfectly calm early on Sunday morning, and continued so all Monday. It is therefore barely possible that they may have been able to collect their transports in the course of the Sunday, and to land on the Monday. But even in that event it is impossible to be free from anxiety, for their destination being known to the enemy for a period of ten days, when they could not land, every opportunity was given to the enemy to collect their force, and make their defence as vigorous as possible."

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, August 31. Klein Ketten.—"Since the action on the 27th, nothing has passed on the land side. The Admiral has received the Dutch fleet on terms. The enemy has shown no enterprize, and we have been stationary from necessity. We shall move on Monday; Alkmaar is our first object. I trust the Duke of York will soon join us; it is my wish. I think we have a prospect of success, and it is my desire that he should have the credit of it. I shall serve with more zeal than if acting for myself. I hope he will bring some regiments of cavalry with him; they are much wanted. Hitherto we know little of the disposition of the people. Few Dutch deserters have come in; those that we have, either as deserters or prisoners, are Germans or Hungarians. If the Admiral avails himself of the command of the Zuyder Zee, he will alarm Amsterdam, which will influence the whole of the Batavian Republic. General Don went this morning to the Hague with a summons to the Directory, and the Hereditary Prince of Orange is expected. We hear of no movement amongst the Prussians on the frontier of Holland. Sir J. Pulteney, Colonel Hope, and indeed all the wounded officers are doing well." *Copy.*

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to EVAN NAPEAN.

1799, August 31. *Isis*, at anchor.—"It blowing strong from the south-west, and also the flood tide, I could not send away my short letter of last night; I therefore have, in addition, to request you will lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that on the morning of yesterday I got the squadron under weigh at 5 o'clock and immediately formed the line of battle, and to prepare for battle."

"In running in, two of the line of battle ships and the *Latona* frigate took the ground; we passed the Helder point and Mars Deep and continued our course along the Texel in the channel that leads to the Vlieter, the Dutch squadron laying at anchor in a line at the Red Buoy in the east-south-east course. The *Latona* frigate got off and joined me; but as the two line of

battle-ships did not, I closed the line. About half-past 10 I sent Captain Rennie of the *Victor* with a summons to the Dutch admiral, as it was Lord Duncan's wish that I should do so; and in her way she picked up a flag of truce with two Dutch captains from the Dutch admiral to me. Captain Rennie very properly brought them on board, and from a conversation of a few minutes, I was induced to anchor in a line, a short distance from the Dutch squadron at their earnest request. They returned with my positive orders not to alter the position of the ships, nor do anything whatsoever to them, and in one hour to submit or take the consequence.

"In less than the time, they returned with a verbal answer that they submitted according to the summons, and to consider themselves (the officers) on *parole* until I heard from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Prince of Orange, for my further proceedings.

"I have now the honour to enclose you herewith the line of battle in which the squadron advanced, a copy of my summons to the Dutch admiral, and also a list of the Dutch fleet.

"Admiral Story's flag is down, and I have sent an officer on board each of his ships to have an eye over and the charge of them, as they themselves requested that it should be so; I have also furnished them with the Prince of Orange's standard, many of them not having had it before, and they are now all under these colours. To maintain quiet among the crews I issued a short manifesto, of which I also enclose a copy herewith; but I would beg leave to suggest the propriety of sending them to the Nore as soon as possible for fear of accident.

"I shall go on shore and consult the General where I can best assist him for the good of the service we are both engaged in, and shall arrange, with their Lordships' concurrence, a flotilla to secure and assist him to take possession of all the ports in the Zuyder Zee. All the ships of Lord Duncan's squadron should remain with me until I have orders how to dispose of the Dutch squadron. There will be no trusting them without a sufficient force. The animated exertions and conduct of the whole squadron are far above any praise I can bestow on them; but I shall feel most sensibly impressed on my heart their spirited conduct during the whole of this business. We have all felt the same zeal for the honour of our sovereign and our country, and although the conclusion has not turned out as expected, the merit I may say, in some measure, is still not the less due to my squadron; and if I had brought them to action I trust it would have added another laurel to the navy of England in this present war. The Dutch were astonished and thunderstruck at the approach of our squadron, never believing it possible that we could so soon have laid down the buoys and led down to them in line of battle, in a channel where they themselves go through but with one or two ships at a time.

"I have sent Lieutenant Collier with these dispatches, who will give their Lordships every information, as he has been

employed in the whole of the communication with the Dutch squadron, and was also on shore with me, as my aide-de-camp, on the day of landing."

Postscript. "Since writing the above I received the Dutch Admiral's answer in writing, which I enclose herewith." *Copy.*

Enclosure 1.

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to REAR-ADMIRAL STORY.

1799, August 30. *Isis*, in line of battle.—"I desire you will instantly hoist the flag of his Serene Highness the Prince of Orange. If you do you will be immediately considered as friends of the King of Great Britain, my most gracious Sovereign. Otherwise take the consequences. Painful it will be to me for the loss of blood it may occasion, but the guilt will be on your own head." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2.

REAR-ADMIRAL STORY to VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL.

1799, August 30. *Washington*, at anchor.—"Neither your superiority nor the threat that the spilling of human blood should be laid to my account, could prevent my showing you, to the last moment, what I could do for my Sovereign, whom I acknowledge to be no other than the Batavian people, and its Representatives, when your Prince's and the Orange flags have obtained their end. The traitors whom I commanded refused to fight, and nothing remains to me and my brave officers but vain rage, and the dreadful reflection of our present situation. I therefore deliver over to you the fleet which I commanded. From this moment it is your obligation to provide for the safety of my officers and the few brave men who are on board the Batavian ships, as I declare myself and my officers prisoners of war, and remain to be considered as such." *Copy.*

Enclosure 3.

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to the CREWS OF THE DUTCH FLEET.

1799, August 30. *Isis*.—"The undersigned Vice-Admiral, in the service of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, charged with the execution of the naval part of the expedition to restore the Stadholder and the old and lawful constitution of the Seven United Provinces guaranteed by His Majesty, having agreed that, in consequence of the summons to Rear-Admiral Story, the ships, after hoisting the ancient colours, will be considered as in the service of the allies of the British Crown, and under the orders of His Serene Highness the hereditary Stadholder, Captain and Admiral-General of the Seven United Provinces, has thought it proper to give an account of this agreement to the brave crews of the different ships, and to summons them by the same to behave in a peaceable and orderly manner, so that no

complaints may be represented by the officer the undersigned will send on board each of the ships to keep proper order, until the intentions of His Majesty and His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange as Admiral-General shall be known for the farther destination of these ships, an account of which despatches will be immediately sent off; and to make them aware that, in case their conduct should not be so as may be expected from the known loyalty and attachment of the Dutch navy to the illustrious house of Orange on this occasion, any access or irregularity will be punished with the severity which the disorders may have been committed merit." *Copy.*

[J. HOOKHAM FRERE] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, August. Downing Street.—“I have had a very long conversation this morning with *Monsieur*, the result of which your L[ordship] will receive in a series of notes from Dutheil. He was particularly anxious and inquisitive upon the subject of Switzerland, and upon the difficulties which stood in the way of his being employed in that quarter; so much so that I thought I could not well avoid telling him (in answer to his enquiries upon that particular head) that I understood the Court of Petersburg had desisted from their former objections to this measure. I contrived, however, to explain to him (without any mention or allusion to the suspicious views of Austria) that the internal state of Switzerland was such as would make his appearance there a matter of great delicacy and hazard. I found that he was not acquainted with the intention of giving the command of the army of Switzerland to Suwarrow, but so much bent upon making some attempt in that direction that he said: ‘Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville are of opinion that we ought to obtain a footing in France before the winter. The time presses; perhaps General Korsakow may be able to do something even though the situation of Switzerland should make it impossible to raise a Swiss army. If the ministers are of that opinion, I should wish to set off as soon as possible.’

“With respect to the Western provinces, he agreed with me that the best mode was to distribute a quantity of arms and ammunition through the country, but he added that the number of conscripts and deserters and other refugees made it necessary that a certain sum of money should be added for their subsistence; this sum he placed at about £25,000. I observed that a sum of this magnitude would require some greater exactitude in the account of its distribution than had hitherto been required; to which he replied that he had already sent a commissary to collect the accounts as far as was practicable in a service of that nature, and that he desired nothing more than that an English commissary should be employed for the same purpose. With regard to the corps of peasants to be employed, as proposed in your L[ordship’s] note, he said that of the 140,000 men whom he had reckoned upon as ready to take arms, he had deducted 70,000, calculating upon the remaining

half as a regular army ; that the 70,000 thus deducted would be capable of being employed in an irregular way and for limited service. Your Lordship will receive a note on the subject of St. Malo, but I think his Royal Highness is convinced that any immediate attempt of that kind would be very premature, and not likely to be attended with any good effects.

"This is, [I] think, as nearly as I can recollect the substance of a conversation in which I bore a passive part for about an hour and a half."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 1. Berlin.—"I write you one line at the moment I am stepping into my carriage to go to Hamburgh. You will certainly agree with me in considering the new order of movement to the Duke of Brunswick as very important, and very useful in the present moment from the impression it will make in Holland and Paris. I do not believe that they mean here any real hostility, but they mean to re-occupy their Prussian provinces, and to threaten France with a demonstration of force which they will not employ ; perhaps, too, Haugwitz is still looking to the chance of negotiating in Holland itself for evacuation of the French troops, and accession to the line of demarkation ; but in all events their Prussian demonstration is highly valuable just at this moment, whatever may be its object or result. I have desired Stamford to write to the Duke of Brunswick to nurse him up against any military doubts, and I have desired Garlike to write by *estafette* to Vienna and Petersburg, as I myself have not the time. The Prussians will not make war, but if they make a demonstration, why should we not make as if they made war ?

"The Court, King, and Queen have been to the last degree gracious, and his Prussian Majesty announces to me a superb present of porcelain.

"You see by my letter that it has succeeded in softening my asperity ; in serious truth, however, I do think this little step is in this movement a very great event.

"As soon as I am at Hamburgh I shall have to decide upon my future course ; Holland if it is open ; if not, Bremen, or Munster or Hanover."

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and separate.

1799, September 1. Scharhausen.—"Notwithstanding the length of my public dispatch, written last night, I cannot spare you the trouble of reading a private letter, to convey such communications as cannot with propriety be expressed in a public dispatch. I hope, therefore, that these *private* letters are really what they profess to be, and do not go through the Office.

"Nothing can go worse than our affairs in this part of the world. The jealousy and hatred (arising from envy and conceit) which the Austrians feel towards the Russians is beyond all example; and I am convinced that they would be much more gratified by a serious calamity happening to the Russians, than by any success that could be obtained, even by themselves, against the enemy. The situation in which they have left Korsakow gives but too much reason to apprehend they may be gratified in that object. He appears to me himself very ready to fight, but very unequal to command; yet even his readiness to fight the Archduke (in the short conversation I had with him) was disposed most sarcastically to disallow. '*Pour celui-là,*' said he, '*quand l'ennemi est loin il veut tout manger; quand il s'agit d'attaquer, il ne sait plus prendre un parti.*' Such an insinuation from a person in the Archduke's situation, made to me at first sight, and under all the circumstances of the conference, is sufficient to show the inveteracy which exists; and that it cannot be kept within any bounds of discretion, or be in any degree restrained even by that delicacy upon questions of personal courage which officers in general feel so strongly bound to observe towards each other, even in ranks less elevated than that which the Archduke holds, and to persons with far different claims to their confidence than those to which the nature and circumstances of our meeting could entitle me. With respect to effective operation (which you mention in your private letter) or cordial co-operation, they are terms which may be in use at Vienna, but which are not, I believe, construed by anybody there in their literal sense. I am decidedly of opinion that no operation on the French territories will take place, or is intended to take place, with any effectual Austrian assistance.

"It is very doubtful whether it will be possible to clear and to retain Switzerland. I fear it is more likely to be entirely lost. The victory of the enemy over General Jellachick and Colonel Strauch, by which upwards of 7,000 men were lost, has completely barred the communication by Mount St. Gothard; and Suvaroff will have to force his way by an attack of the enemy in that quarter, upon the success of which the relief of Korsakow and the hope of clearing Switzerland of the enemy by another attack (before Zurich) must depend.

"I do not think that the energy of Lord Minto is likely to force anything out of Thugut that will be worth knowing. Lord Minto has too much candour for such a juggler. He cannot even pretend to be open, without tacking a mystery to his communications. When he assured Lord Minto that the orders to the Archduke (mentioned in my public dispatch) should be sent, he concluded by requesting Lord Minto not to communicate that assurance to Mr. Wickham, as his (Thugut's) dispatches would not be sent for two days, and he feared the Archduke might be offended if he heard the determination of his continuance in Switzerland from any other quarter before it should be communicated to him by the Emperor. Lord Minto accordingly desires Mr. Wickham not to mention the circumstance, as it would be

prejudicial to the *frankness* of Monsieur Thugut's communications. The *two days* delay have given time for the march of the Archduke, upon the movement of Moreau, which may or may not have been expected at Vienna. It is worthy of remark, however, that Monsieur Dietreichstein was vehement against the delay of an hour, as fatal to all harmony between the Court of Vienna and those of London and Petersburg. It appears to me highly essential that Lord Minto should be cured of any disposition to trust to the *frankness* of Monsieur Thugut.

"From what I have already told you of the disposition of the Austrians and Russians towards each other, you will perceive how impossible it is for any powers of conciliation to reconcile and unite them; any attempt to soften either party could only end in a loss of all favour and credit with the party attempted to be softened. I see nothing to be done here. I have on a former occasion given you such ideas as occurred to me upon the project of employing the Russians in another quarter, where no concert would be necessary but between the King and the Emperor of Russia. I could enlarge much more on the unpleasant and distressing subjects of this letter, but I have limited myself (for your comfort and my own) to one sheet of paper."

ADMIRAL VISCOUNT DUNCAN TO EVAN NEPEAN.

1799, September 1. *Kent*, off Aldborough.—"I transmit for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a letter to me from Vice-Admiral Mitchell giving a distinct detail of the great success with which it has pleased the Almighty God to crown His Majesty's arms.

"The boldness of the Vice-Admiral in running in on an open shore with so numerous a fleet and in such very unsettled weather, could only be equalled by the gallantry of Sir Ralph Abercrombie and his brave troops landing in the face of a most formidable opposition.

"During the whole of the conflict on Tuesday, I could plainly perceive the vast superiority of the British troops over those of the enemy, though opposed with obstinacy; and, in justice to both the land and sea service, must say that I never in my life witnessed more unanimity and zeal than has pervaded all ranks to bring the expedition to its present happy issue.

"Finding the *Kent*, with several of the Russian 74 gun ships, to draw too much water to be able to get into the harbour, I have returned with them to this anchorage; but previous to my getting under weigh at eight o'clock on Friday morning, I had the pleasure to see Vice-Admiral Mitchell with the men-of-war, transports, and armed vessels in a fair way of entering the Texel with a fair wind, and have not the least doubt but the whole of the Dutch fleet were in our possession by noon on that day.

"These despatches will be delivered by Captains Hope and Oughton, both able and intelligent officers, who will give their Lordships most satisfactory information relative to our successful operations.

"I shall now only add my sincere congratulations to their Lordships on this great event, which I think in its consequences may be ranked amongst the greatest that have happened during the war."

Postscript. "The winds having proved unfavourable has occasioned my anchoring here, but I shall proceed to Yarmouth as soon as the weather moderates." *Copy.*

Enclosure.

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to ADMIRAL VISCOUNT DUNCAN.

1799, August 29. *Isis*, at anchor.—"In a former letter I had the honour to write to your Lordship I there mentioned the reasons that determined Sir Ralph Abercrombie and myself not to persevere longer than the 26th in our resolution to attack the Helder and port of the Texel unless the wind became more moderate. Fortunately the gale abated on that morning, and although a very heavy swell continued to set in from the northward, I thought a moment was not to be lost in making the final attempt. The fleet was therefore bore up to take the anchorage, and I was happy to see the transports and all the bombs, sloops, and gun vessels in their stations to cover the landing of the troops by three in the afternoon of that day, when the signal was made to prepare for landing. The General however not thinking it prudent to begin disembarking so late in that day, it was determined to delay it till two in the morning of the 27th. The intervening time was occupied in making the former arrangements more complete, and by explaining to all the Captains individually my ideas fully to them that the service might profit by their united exertions. The troops were accordingly all in the boats by three o'clock, and the signal being made to row towards the shore the line of gun boats, sloops of war and bombs opened a warm and well-directed fire to scour the beach and a landing was effected with little loss. After the first party had gained the shore, I went with Sir Ralph Abercrombie that I might superintend the landing of the rest, and with the aid of the different captains, who appeared animated with but one mind, the whole were disembarked with as great regularity as possible.

"The ardour and glorious intrepidity which the troops displayed soon drove the enemy from the nearest sandhills, and the presence of Sir Ralph Abercrombie himself, whose appearance gave confidence to all, secured to us after a long and very warm contest the possession of the whole neck of land between Kykdoun and the road leading to Alkmaar and near to the village of Callantsoog.

"Late that night the Helder point was evacuated, and taken possession of by our troops quietly in the morning, as were the men-of-war named in the enclosed list and many large transports and Indiamen by us the next day. I despatched Captain Oughton, my own captain, to the Helder point last evening to bring off the pilots, and he has returned with enough to take in all the ships necessary to reduce the remaining force of the Dutch

fleet, which I am determined to follow to the walls of Amsterdam until they surrender or capitulate for His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange's service.

"I must now, my Lord, acknowledge in the warmest manner the high degree of obligation I am under to your Lordship for the liberal manner in which you continued to entrust to my direction the service I have had the honour to execute under your immediate eye, a behaviour which added to my wish to do all in my power to forward the views of Sir Ralph.

"It is impossible for me sufficiently to express my admiration of the bravery and conduct of the general and the whole army, or the unanimity with which our joint operations were carried on, the army and navy having on this occasion pulled heartily together." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 2. Dropmore.—"If there are insuperable reasons against sending Sir Watkin's fencible regiment over now, in addition to whatever regular cavalry goes to the Continent, you would really much oblige me, and do, I think, an act of justice, if you would contrive to bring them from Ireland, and to station them here as preparatory to their embarking in the spring.

"His regiment was the first that volunteered for that service, and the first that went upon it. You have seen how disagreeable it is found to be to all who are engaged in it, and, without meaning any reflection on Lord Cornwallis, he certainly has not the art of making it otherwise. Sir Watkin, however, has too much right feeling to have pressed in any manner on the Duke of York or on Government his wish of taking his turn of being relieved from it, or rather of being relieved from it so long after his turn is come. But he does not the less strongly feel that wish, and, in confidential conversation, he has told me that his officers also strongly felt it; and though he would not do or say anything so unsoldier-like as to attempt to choose his service even in a case where he had embarked voluntarily, yet I am sure he strongly feels the hardship of being continued there, and seeing so much other force brought away. If, however, the gratification of these feelings, surely not unreasonable in themselves, should lead to any inconvenience to the public service, I can answer for him that, of the two, he would prefer the private to the public inconvenience." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO W. WINDHAM.

1799, September 2. Dropmore.—"When I was last in town I discussed a little with Mr. Pitt the question whether, under all the present circumstances, and with the disposition shewn in other parts of France to rise against the Directory, we were in fact doing right to persevere in the system of discouraging the insurrection in the north-west provinces. The result led, I think, to a pretty

strong impression in both our minds that the time was now come when we ought, by supplying those provinces largely with money and arms, to put them in a situation to co-operate with what is going on upon every side of France. Nothing more, however, was done than my desiring Frere to ask from Dutheil a statement of such means as might be required from us for acting on this plan. A squadron in the bay forms, of course, an essential ingredient in it, and this, I understand, is agreed to at the Admiralty, and on the point of being executed. *Monsieur* expressed to Frere, as I understand, some uneasiness lest this should interfere with our Swiss project, on which he appears to have set his heart. I see no reason why it should, supposing that project to turn out to be practicable; but every fresh letter from Vienna throws us back in that business.

"I do not know whether you have read Lord Minto's last dispatches. If not, pray read them. You will, I think, agree with me that the gross indecency of the conduct held to Lord Mulgrave, and to the King through him, required that we should do and say at least as much as has been done and said on the occasion. My opinion has long been fixed that good words and liberal conduct are both thrown away on Austrian politicians, and that all our measures towards them should be regulated solely by the view of what we think best and most becoming for ourselves. Perhaps if I had been to act quite on my own single judgment I should, in the present case, have carried the application of this principle yet further than I have done; but I cannot be surprised that those who do not keep their attention constantly and undividedly fixed on this object should be less strongly impressed than I am with the conclusion which the experience of six years has produced in my judgment on the subject." *Copy.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 2. Downing Street.—"The dispatches from Sir R. Abercromby and Admiral Mitchell are this moment arrived. I cannot procure the copies now, but I will send them to-morrow morning—they are dated Thursday. Abercromby proposes marching on to Alkmaer, but expresses a desire that cavalry may be immediately sent to him. Two ships of the line and three frigates in the Nieuwe Diep have surrendered; the remainder, 9 sail of the line, had advanced up the Zuyder Zee as far as the shoalwater would admit, and Admiral Mitchell with 13 ships of the line was following them, and, when the officers came away, had a fair wind and was within an hour and a half sail of them. No doubt is entertained at the Admiralty that we shall hear in the course of the night of the whole being in our possession. If they have not surrendered they must be taken without difficulty. A message had come from the Texel island desiring that a British garrison might be sent there, and when the officers came away the detachment was passing over to the island, and the Orange colours were flying on the fort. Sir Ralph Abercromby represents the desertion among the Dutch troops to be very great.

"Our loss at the Helder was sixty-one killed and upwards of 300 wounded. The loss of the enemy in killed alone was 1,000 and upwards. I have not seen the despatches, but I understand that they contain little more than what I have stated.

"Sir R. A[bercromby] in a private letter speaks with rapture of the conduct of the troops."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and most confidential.

1799, September 2. Schaffhausen.—"I received by East, the messenger, your Lordship's letter of the 18th ultimo, on the subject of the Swiss levies, and cannot say how thankful I am that you have given me so very early an answer.

"The arrangements which your Lordship has made will be in every respect satisfactory *as far as they go*. But I feel it *now* a matter of duty, however remiss I may *hitherto* have been in that respect, to say that it will be impossible for me to take any responsibility on myself, either with respect to the levies, or to the general interests of his Majesty in this country (which most essentially depend on the manner in which those levies shall be made and conducted) unless the Commissary, whoever he may be, have clear and positive directions to take no measure whatever of general arrangement, nothing in short that is not really matter of detail, without having first taken my opinion upon it. And, above all, let me press upon your Lordship the necessity of letting it be known that the choice of the officers will really rest with me, and that no official paper, note, or public regulation of any kind be given, but under the signature of the King's Minister.

"I trust that your Lordship knows me well enough by this time to be persuaded that I do not ask these things for my own interest or pleasure, and that I am not given to use the King's name lightly. You will no doubt recollect that my opinion was different when I left London, and that it was at my own desire that Craufurd's hands were left free. It is experience alone that has taught me that, without something like an absolute authority to be exercised by some one known to have the confidence and to speak the opinion of the British Government, no good whatever will be done here.

"I could state many facts that would satisfy your Lordship of the correctness of my opinion, but I trust that your Lordship will give me credit for having formed it on very sufficient grounds.

"I will only say, generally, that public notes have been given and papers signed in which his Majesty's name has been too freely used; and that regulations shocking the national prejudices have been made and enforced without consulting me, or even mentioning them when done.

"Believe me, I do not mention these things with a wish to do Craufurd any harm, nor have I had the slightest quarrel with him. On the contrary, I love and honour his good qualities; I

have the highest opinion of his military talents, which I wish to see employed in the service of his country; and, in the different situations in which I may be placed, it is very important to me and to the public service to have the opinion of such a man to refer to with confidence. It may be said that all my difficulties are personal ones, depending entirely on Crauford's natural character; but if I had no authority or means of doing good in the present arrangement, though I had long personal friendship and mutual good opinion to trust to, what can I hope for from a stranger.

"I have no hesitation whatever in saying, notwithstanding all the difficulties thrown in our way by the Austrians, that with a good military commissary entirely at my orders, and a civil commissary of accounts, I would have answered at this moment for 5,000 regular troops at least.

"It was Crauford's confounded system of paying the militia and the contingents, and his shocking the national prejudices by refusing to let the Legion recruit because he did not like the colonel, and forcing the men to enter into Bachman's regiment, that stopped the recruiting service altogether; and the mischief done then can only be repaired by his absence, and by a different system, which never can be adopted whilst he shall be here, or whilst the mode of raising the levies and the appointment of the officers shall be subject to the caprice of any officer whatever, unacquainted with the prejudices and notions of the people of the country.

"With respect to the person whom your Lordship mentions as Crauford's successor, it is absolutely necessary for my own peace and happiness that I should disburden myself in confidence to your Lordship of what I have heard respecting him; premising that, in all other respects except the point which I am about to state, I have no possible objection to him. But if that point be not cleared up, my life will be made miserable by my own fears and suspicions; besides that, being connected in the same mission with him, I must seriously look about me to see that no imputation fall upon myself.

"When your Lordship first mentioned that person to me I own I startled, having been told by the Duke of Portland that he was strongly suspected of receiving money from foreign officers employed in his Majesty's service; and I know that his Grace, who had his information from John Bentinck, considered the charge as serious. But having consulted confidentially my friend Calvert, who is pure as tried gold, I thought from his character of the man that he was incapable of such an action; and, therefore, I thought myself warranted in saying nothing to your Lordship on the subject, in which I own I was wrong. But there was something so very foul in the very nature of the charge that I wished to forget it had ever been made, particularly when I was persuaded that it was entirely without foundation.

"It is with pain I now mention that, on the Baron de Roll's arrival here, he spoke to me of this suspicion as of a thing generally known, and which he firmly believed to be well-founded;

adding that he had heard an officer say in a public room on hearing of a late appointment, '*Voilà un gaillard qui va faire bien de l'argent.*'

"I asked him to name the officer, which he peremptorily refused. I then pressed him to give me any other proof whatever of his suspicion, affecting entire disbelief of it, and ignorance of its existence. After much hesitation he said that he had no direct proof against the principal, but that he knew *from the persons who had paid it* that his second had received money frequently; that this fact was well known in the Office, where it was generally understood, as well as by the payers, that the principal received his share. He added that he had heard the same insinuations thrown out in Mr. Windham's, or rather Mr. Woodford's office, against the same person (which he admitted might be a jealousy *de métier*). He named M. de Calonne and the Duke of Choiseul, both of whom he was certain had paid money to the second; adding that the thing was generally known among the higher emigrants, and that, if the people in the Office were questioned with ability and discretion, the truth must come out, being known to so many persons.

"These facts may be all true without the participation or knowledge of the principal, but it seems necessary that the attention of some one should be directed, at least, secretly to this object. At the same time I have no doubt that your Lordship will feel it very essential that my name should not appear without absolute necessity; and I particularly wish that, if you think the thing worth noticing in any way, you would speak confidentially on the subject to the Duke of Portland, though I almost doubt whether I have done right in mentioning John Bentinck's name.

"If any change should take place here I will venture to say that my own feelings and wishes would lead me to name the elder Clinton, whom I mentioned to your Lordship when in London, as the fittest person I know. He was then in Ireland, and has since been here, and the more I see of him the more I am persuaded that he would gain the affection and good opinion of the people of this country, without neglecting his duty to his own.

"I agree with your Lordship entirely, on thorough consideration, that Pichégrou would not do as a commander; but on that subject I shall probably write in a day or two an official dispatch."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 3. Stowe.—"My wife has been ill. If anything could distract my attention from an object so near to me, it would be the good news from Holland. I agree with you that, in all probability, that blow is now *decisively* struck; but as I have no confidence in the numbers or the sort of the force that is to be created there to defend your line (whatever it may be) against the Low Countries, in aid of your 18,000 Russians, I fear

that a considerable part of our English force will be to be locked up on the defensive, at a time when certainly every man may be most usefully employed offensively in twenty different points that can be pointed out; but principally on the coast of Normandy, following very much the system and the line of Henry V.'s move, which I have lately studied. Of course, when I talk thus upon paper to you, I do not expect an answer upon details; but only wish to draw your attention where I think it may be usefully employed. I can, of course, be no judge how far it may be *necessary* to send Tom to St. Petersburg; but I own that I had set my heart on seeing Holland in his hands; and I very much doubt (though I urge it slightly because the same idea must have occurred to you) whether six weeks or even six months of your exertion at the Hague can give to the Stadtholder or to the country what both of them so much want.

"As to your 20,000 men from the militia, my heart and soul goes with your exertions on this subject; and if I had the data I would work for you; but before I can look at any other means, I wish to see (what you can get for me in confidence) a return of the numbers already given to the army, distinguishing the regiments of militia from which they have volunteered. I have already writ much to Dundas upon the subject, and I am perfectly ready to meet him at Dropmore to discuss his ideas with him, under the most anxious wishes that some arrangement may be made to give you the largest possible offensive force. But I must have a few materials.

"Adieu; for every reason leave Holland to Tom if possible, for I had rather volunteer to Russia myself by executing your orders at Petersburg, than that you should break in upon his career where he will do so superiorly; and upon your career at home, where I see many reasons for thinking you a *sine quâ non*."

Postscript. "Do not think that I want any of your offices; I want nothing but such an end of this struggle as you and I both wish for; but I am in earnest when I say that, if I can save Tom's mission by doing your orders myself, I would undertake it for six months, rather than *you* should leave England and *he* Holland, in both of which you both are invaluable."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 3. Kleitz.—"I trust that in reading my public dispatch you will give me full credit for the motives which I have there stated as reasons why the letter which you are reading is written by me on my road to Hamburgh instead of on my road to Petersburg. In truth, those reasons are all of a public nature, and though I have been somewhat shaken in health by the winter of the Elbe, I should not on that account only be deterred from encountering the expedition of Petersburg or any other where I could do good; but in this instance, unless I very much deceive myself, I am confident that I would do none; and I am persuaded, when you come to consider how

strongly Thugut is opposed to this measure, you will see that it affords no assistance or security, or promise of any whatever, with respect to Austria. You want no help in negotiation at Petersburg to influence the Emperor of Russia, and it is impossible not to see that Whitworth succeeds with him as much, if not more, than another English minister could do. It is to reach Vienna that you have looked at this project of Petersburg congress; but as you did not then know how violently Thugut pronounced himself against Cobentzel's protection to it, you could not be aware of the insurmountable difficulty which will be created by it. It is no answer to say that Thugut will not venture to refuse it, if the Emperor of Russia insists upon it; perhaps in that case he will not refuse it, but is it possible to imagine that a consent so extorted can lead to a successful negotiation; is it not evident that the distance, delay, and reluctance of the Court of Vienna will make the march of any such negotiation so slow as to exceed the sluggishness even of an Imperial Diet. That Cobentzel, who always means to overthrow Thugut in order to succeed him, should favour a measure which would bring *le bureau des affaires étrangères* into his hands, I do not wonder; but, even if I had not Lord Minto's information upon this subject, I should have felt confident from my knowledge of Thugut that he would never suffer such a project to come to a more prosperous ending than the last silly project of Cobentzel, which ended, as you saw, in complete nullity.

"Do not believe that my partiality to Panin has created the proposition which I hint at in my dispatch; I may perhaps be mistaken, but I am sure I am not misled by my partiality to him in the persuasion that his succeeding Razomowsky at Vienna would give the allied Courts more real efficient strength there than can be obtained by any other arrangement. If you could through this channel, and that of Lord Minto, send fairly to Vienna with any such offer respecting Italy as you can satisfy your conscience in making, I do believe you would advance more in that great difficulty than by any other road which could be taken. I do not either say this lightly. I have conversed lately very much with Hudelist, who is well informed of Thugut's general views and objects, and he has told me in pretty plain words that now that I have left Berlin and relieved Thugut from the fear of a new connection between England and Prussia, now is the moment for our making some offer of arrangement on the side of Italy to Baron Thugut. When I last spoke to him on this matter, I expressed some surprise at Thugut's expecting from us a proposition of this sort which he should more naturally make to us, and Hudelist agreed that it was more reasonable that it should be so; but he appealed to my knowledge of Thugut's reserve against the probability of his doing so; and he said very emphatically two or three times, that such was the reserve of Thugut's character that he would never make a first proposition of this nature, but if any such were made by us, Hudelist repeated that he was sure and confident that we should understand one

another. You know very well how greatly I apprehend the exorbitant expectations of Austria, and I have already both to you and Lord Minto said plainly what I thought of them; but in what I am now suggesting I am alluding to the manner rather than to the substance, and I cannot help believing that whenever you have made up your mind to the sacrifices which you would consent to see made to Austria, you could not do better than to let Lord Minto state them, and if possible to contrive that Count Panin should be the Russian Minister to support them.

“Whether this would succeed or no I know not, but it is impossible for me to conceal from you that the other measure appears to me to be one which would waste itself away in endless delays and difficulties, while Thugut would be counteracting and laughing to scorn at Vienna all that his rival Cobentzel was dreaming of doing at Petersburg. I flatter myself, however, that before this time Lord Minto's dispatches will have created the same impression upon your mind too; upon my mind that impression is already so strongly made that, although you see I will consent to sacrifice my own ease and objects to any of real public service, I cannot honestly say that I should feel the smallest chance of doing the least degree of benefit to the public or of credit to myself in this arrangement at Petersburg. I would, and if necessary I will, now as at all times, put by all reference to myself, but I cannot say that I should carry with me the smallest hope or confidence of doing any good by a great personal sacrifice. Having said this, I am ready to make it, if neither the public motives which I have stated nor the disadvantage of my distrust of the benefit of it should appear to you to be reasons for the government to change their dispositions respecting me in it. I am sure I should do no good, but I will do what is wished, if under all these discouragements it is still wished. I am, however, persuaded that you will agree with me in thinking that, under all these circumstances, I have taken the best course in pursuing my journey to Hamburgh, where I shall probably learn how to join the Prince, and whether any opening into the country appears yet to be practicable.

“I have said nothing in this letter of the difficulties respecting my absence from Holland, because I do really think that if English politics can allow of your coming over and doing the business yourself, it will be sooner and better done than in any other shape; if that cannot be, I still will execute my promise, and will go through as much of that Dutch arrangement as in your conscience you can ask me without making a Sir Joseph York of me; but if that can be, I do most heartily urge you to pursue the notion of giving six weeks to it, and in my heart and conscience I am satisfied that it would be so best and soonest done; in that case, however, I find still an additional motive for declining this unprofitable *simulacre de congrès* at Petersburg which I so entirely distrust, for, in the case of your coming, I will most certainly put off my return to England, and pass with you in Holland whatever time it may be necessary

for you to pass there. I am sure at Petersburg that I can do no good, and this persuasion is so strong that I would not advise you to send anybody there who so entirely disbelieved in any possible advantage to be derived from it; but trusting that you will feel upon this occasion the strength both of my arguments and my prejudices, I feel satisfied that it will not be pressed upon me. I am sure likewise that the benefit of your coming over and doing this business at the Hague would be incalculable, and I am sure I need not tell you how happy it will make me to come and write with you there instead of going and writing to you from thence. In either of these last cases I can perhaps be of some little use, but in that of Petersburg I know I can do nothing but waste my health, my temper, and my patience.

"I do not know what is become of your Flemish project, and of your officer Malcolm, for I have never received his instructions, nor have I a word from him, though I hear reports of his being with D'Yvoy in that country. Henry would have been no embarrassment to me, and as I think it would have been useful to him, I would have taken him if I had gone, but thank God there is now, I trust, no question of that. I am impatient to send away the dispatches to Whitworth, and this letter to Cuxhaven. When I leave Hamburg I will leave directions with Harward and Sir J. Crawford.

"I am delighted with our first success of the 27th, though I have no particulars. I conclude I shall find at Hamburg accounts of the whole thing being done, and I will then go and wait with the Prince of Orange the result of this warm and active measure, instead of going to freeze and shiver at Petersburg without the smallest chance of being useful.

"Of course I return the *separate* dispatch to Whitworth relating to myself, and I have not mentioned to you the future proposal of military operations with which I was to have been charged at Petersburg, because that proposal will be as easily and usefully stated by Whitworth as it could by me; but I cannot help suggesting one word of doubt whether your force as left in Holland will be found large enough in the 20,000 men which you propose, because Flanders, while still occupied by France, will still furnish means too large of attack for a body no larger in Holland than that which you name.

"I presume that Le Palue's friend is already come over to England, but in the last three weeks the Prince of Orange and M. D'Yvoy and M. Thuil have had in their own hands all the Flemish insurrection; and as I have known nothing of Malcolm, who is with some of them, I have not heard of any of the late intelligence from thence. As soon as I see the Prince of Orange, Stamford has promised to join me, and I will employ him about Le Palue's correspondent. I trust you have not forgot the letter I begged so urgently from the Stadtholder to enable Stamford, by leave of absence, to quit Berlin."

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, September 3. Dropmore.—“L’entreprise dont Wickham vous parle étoit une tentative pour passer l’Aar. Je vous envoie sa lettre particulière. Les dépêches sont aujourd’hui avec le Roi, mais quand elles retourneront, Hammond vous en communiquera le contenu. Il n’y a pas de langage pour exprimer l’infamie de cette Cour de Vienne. Lady Grenville et moi désirons infiniment de vous voir avec votre famille ici. Quand pourrez-vous nous donner ce plaisir? Nous y sommes établis pour tout le tems que sa Majesté passera à Weymouth, à l’exception seulement de mes courses occasionnelles en ville. Si vous serez prêt, mon courier partira demain pour Petersbourg, avec les excellentes nouvelles d’hier.

“Vous savez que la première division de vos troupes est arrivé à Elsinour. Elle est d’environ six mille hommes, les autres vaisseaux ayant été maltraités par le vent et ayant retournés à Revel. Ils viendront avec la seconde, qui ne tardera guères de suivre la première. C’est un beau coup que nous avons frappés, et nous voilà déjà dans le cœur de la Hollande, ce qui nous auroit coûté une campagne en arrivant par les provinces d’Outre Yssel.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 4. Dropmore.—“I congratulate you sincerely on the surrender of the fleet, the consequences of which are beyond all calculation. Mitchell may now (as he proposes) arm a flotilla which will block Amsterdam, and oblige it to surrender even before it is invested by land. As I have seen nothing of Abercrombie’s letters but in the *Gazette*, I should be obliged to you to send me copies or originals of any which will explain his situation, progress, and views.

“Huskinson has sent me the two letters from Malcolm and Yvoy. It seems very pressing to take some decision upon them, and, though the sum appears large, it does not seem too much for the object, supposing *that* in a fair way of being accomplished as they assert.

“His demands are: 1, Money, of which you and Pitt will judge; but, 2, If credit to that extent is given a secretary and accountant well used to business seems quite indispensable. Some officer of inferior rank would, I should think, be best for that purpose, and hundreds would be eager for it.

3. “Military rank to enable him to command the whole thing as Brigadier-General. How far this is practicable in itself, and how far he is equal to a command of from 10 to 30,000 men I know not, but I should doubt both. Possibly it may damp his ardour, but it seems fair to tell him that if the thing took so large a shape as that, we must send officers of higher rank to conduct it; and they should be fixed now.

4. “Some English officers to assist him now, which seems very necessary.

"But, 5, the thing which he does not ask, and which seems above all things wanting, is some man of political conduct to direct so intricate and difficult a business precisely in the course that we wish it to take. I am afraid he is not equal to this, and some assistant of this description is absolutely necessary to prevent the Austrian emissaries from turning this, as they do every other exertion we make, solely to the profit of Vienna.

"You will have learnt that I was right in my conjecture, and that Thugut has told Lord Minto plainly that Austria *will not hold* the Netherlands. But there is no doubt she would be glad enough to *take* them by our money and efforts, and to exchange them precisely in the most injurious mode to our interests, by putting there some Italian Prince whose territories she has seized. This we must prevent at all risks, for there is hardly any political event that would be more hurtful to us.

"It is for this reason that I am clearly of opinion we ought to encourage this rising now, and support it by large efforts of arms and money, in order to have it sufficiently strong not to require any very large support of troops. Some British troops as a *noyau* we must let them have when they are to act; but these would, in case of success in Holland, be well spared from our army there, of which they would form the advanced guard.

"I hardly know who to recommend as a political mentor to Malcolm. I had thought of Paget, but with great talents, perhaps discretion and coolness is not his forte. He is, however, a man of uncommon ability (in my judgment) and he has that energy and activity of mind which such a service requires.

"Drake would not do it ill, but he is in ill health, and is named to another mission. Jackson on the whole I think the best that I have to recommend. If Pitt and you can think of any better man so much the better, but it should not be delayed, and therefore, when you have decided, you had best apprise Hammond of it that he may see the person you recommend, though it must be principally under your orders that he must act."

Postscript. "Above all things let Abercrombie keep Rottier where he is, and, by pretending to employ him, or even actually employing him in his flotilla, prevent his acting as Starhemberg's spy on all we do. Starhemberg is so much soured that this point is of more importance than you may think. He certainly would do us all the mischief he could in this business, and think he was serving his Court by it." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1799, September 4. Dropmore.—"You have certainly a most uncomfortable beginning of discussions at Vienna. Kalitscheff has written to Woronzow that, since the surrender of Alexandria and Mantua, Thugut's tone and views are changed, and so I fear it is.

"The abominable lies with which Dietrichstien has opened his career in Switzerland must, I believe, in all fair construction, be

imputed to Thugut himself, whose instrument he seems to be for the purpose of keeping down the Archduke's reputation and influence. When one considers how near these people have been to the very brink of ruin, and how much they have still at stake, their conduct really appears almost incredible, if we were not condemned every day to see it, and suffer by it. They are perfectly incorrigible, and all we can do is to continue to depend upon them as little as possible. Wickham will have told you that they have [been] deceiving him all along about the strength of the Archduke's army. What Thugut now says about Massena's force is equally false, and must be known by him to be so. But if it were true, what excuse could be made for keeping the Austrian army of more than double the enemy's strength (for so the case would then be) acting for two months on the defensive; and at last sacrificing two cantons, and hazarding the bringing the French back into Swabia?

"You will have seen with pleasure our glorious and happy success at the Texel. There, thank God, we depend on no co-operation, and I hope the fullest success is now within our reach.

"If Lord Mulgrave is with you at Vienna, will you have the goodness to communicate to him my dispatches, and to add that I do not write to him, in order to avoid useless repetitions.

"I have urged my brother to go to Petersburg to carry on the discussion which, it is not difficult to foresee, that Thugut will find himself unable to decline. I know not whether I shall succeed in this request." *Copy.*

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE DON to W. HUSKISSON.

1799, September 4. Camp near Petten.—"I am directed by General Sir Ralph Abercromby to acquaint you that I was sent by him on Saturday last with a letter to the Batavian Directory. On my arrival at Schermershorn, the headquarters of General Daendels, he immediately sent an officer to General Le Brune desiring a passport for me. After various delays General Le Brune, this morning at Alkmaar, acquainted me that he had received orders from the Batavian Directory not only to prevent my proceeding to the Hague, but also not to receive any letter addressed to the Directory. From many circumstances which occurred while I was at the headquarters of Generals Daendels and Le Brune, I found that it was entirely owing to the latter that I was prevented proceeding to the Hague; indeed General Le Brune this morning very frankly told me that he would use his utmost endeavours to prevent any intercourse between the British army and the Batavian Directory." *Copy.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 4. Headquarters, Schagen Brug.—"From the 27th of August to the 1st of September the troops continued to occupy the sand hills on which they fought, exposed to the

inclemency of the weather which was uncommonly tempestuous, and labouring under the difficulty of a precarious subsistence from the want of horses to convey their provisions from the Helder; it became a matter, as much of necessity as of choice, to move forward.

"On the 1st instant the army marched and took post with its right to Petten on the German Ocean, and its left to Oude Sluys on the Zuyder Zee, with the canal of the Zuype in front.

"A better country is now open to us. We have found some horses and waggons and a plentiful supply of fresh provisions. The troops are in cantonments on the banks of the canal which abound in houses, and the men are in every respect more conveniently placed than if they were encamped without straw and on wet meadows. The enemy occupies Alkmaar and its vicinity. The Dutch troops are on the right at Scharmer Horn and Avens Horn, and the French in Alkmaar, Bergen and Egmont. The French may be estimated at six thousand men and the Dutch at nine or ten thousand men.

"On the 27th of August they had seven thousand men in the field and at the Helder, and they have since drawn from Friesland, Groeningen, Overysse, and Guelderland everything they could collect.

"The country between us and the enemy is entirely intersected with ditches and canals, except on the right, opposite to Petten, where the sand hills of Camperdown begin. In this situation I have judged it better not to seek an action until the arrival of reinforcements either from England or the Baltic, when the enemy will be forced to quit their present position, probably without fighting.

"The troops continue healthy and behave extremely well; no instance of outrage or even of plundering has occurred. The inhabitants seem to possess a perfect apathy, and our coming amongst them seems to have caused no surprise or emotion. The spirit of moderation which the Prince of Orange's proclamation breathes, gives satisfaction in the towns. The patriots even hope to be well received, and they already talk of a *régence provisoire* in which the moderate men of all parties expect to be included.

"I trust that the Duke of York, with all the force that can be spared, will arrive immediately; should that be the case, we may reasonably hope to penetrate to the *Waal* before the end of the campaign.

"Since the 1st instant, I have had no communication with Admiral Mitchell. I have repeatedly urged him, in the strongest terms, to fit out a number of gun boats and armed *schuyts* and even to threaten Amsterdam.

"Major General Don, whom I sent with a letter to the Batavian Directory, has not been permitted to proceed on his mission and has returned.

"We are in the greatest distress for the want of money, the *Champion* frigate not having arrived which had £200,000 on board. The 11th regiment of Dragoons are arrived, and have

begun to disembark. The transports* have been ordered to return to the Downs, but Captain Woodruffe, the principal agent, informs me that they have received so much damage in the late gales of wind that they could not proceed to sea for a few days." *Copy.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to W. HUSKISSON.

Private.

1799, September 4. Schagenbrug.—“You will see by my letter to Mr. Dundas the situation of the army, and my determination. Send us all the force you can, that this business may be finished. I hear Brune and Daendels are on bad terms, and that the Batavian Directory are not free agents. Place no reliance on the good disposition of the country or of the army. We have had but fifteen deserters, and they are Germans. The transports* cannot, as Woodruffe informs me, sail for the Downes for a day or two, which I regret. We hear nothing of the Russians. The French force increases, they march from all parts of Flanders.” *Extract.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Private and most secret.

1799, September 4. Dropmore.—“As Mr. Grenville’s proceeding to Petersburg or not is in some degree uncertain, and will depend on circumstances of which I shall probably not be apprized till his decision upon it has been taken, I think it necessary to desire of you, in this confidential manner, that if you shall not have learnt from him that it is likely he will arrive there soon after your receiving this letter, you would then take such preliminary steps as may be necessary to prepare the Emperor’s mind for an application which you will shortly be directed to make to him for allowing that a proportion, or possibly even the whole, of the army under General Herman should—if the counter-revolution in Holland takes place as speedily as may now be hoped—be employed this autumn, conjointly with a *larger* body of His Majesty’s troops, in an expedition to the coast of France, the particulars of which will be detailed to him in the greatest confidence.

“As Mr. G[renville] is apprized of the particulars of this subject, it would not be necessary for you to act in this matter without him, if he was likely to join you soon. If not, all that is wished in the present moment is, that you should prepare the way for a favourable reception of this proposal, but so as to preserve the utmost secrecy respecting it.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1799, September 5. Dropmore.—“I send you Lord Minto’s last dispatches, and, when you have read them, I will thank you

* (*Marginal note*)—They are arrived in the Downes.

to return them to the Office. Wickham's I keep to work upon to-day, and will send them to you to-morrow, or the next day at furthest.

"I own it seems to me that the moment is come for going much further than you propose in putting forward the Royalists. By profiting of the present pressure of the Directory, the Royalists might establish themselves in force sufficient to defy any attack from the present Government during the winter. If they do not do this, it is in vain to hope that they will be overlooked. Whenever the allied armies take their winter quarters, four or five months will be left open to the Directory for suppressing this spirit in the Vendée and elsewhere, and they will surely do it effectually if the Royalists are not in force to support themselves.

"Besides this, if we succeed in Holland we shall have a great disposable force (and possibly at no very distant period) to turn to the various operations that have been proposed. Whether these operations should point towards the Netherlands, or to any, and to what part of France, and with what immediate object of attack, it is I conceive now impossible to decide. I am not so wedded to my ideas of advantage in taking into our hands the arrangement of a counter-revolution in the Netherlands, as not to see many possible operations on the side of France to which we ought perhaps preferably to look; but if the Royalists are then still *to be* organized and raised, instead of being actually on foot and in great force, that may decide the question for us.

"I shall, however, wait without taking further steps on this subject till I receive the plan which Duthell is to give to Frere, and I will then state my ideas, not in general, but with reference to the particular things to be done." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 5. Bifrons, near Canterbury.—"I have seen Dundas this morning, and on talking over your letter this morning respecting the Netherlands, we are both clearly of opinion that Malcolm is too young an officer for such a command as may be in question. The person whom we should, without hesitation, name as the best military man for the purpose is Colonel Maitland, and his talents would render him equally fit for the political management, without the necessity of finding any other assistant. Great advantage would arise from the conduct of the whole being thus united in one person. We would not, however, finally determine without knowing whether you see any objection to our choice. I very much hope you will not, as I am sure there is no ground for any jealousy on account of Maitland's former politics or connections, and I am much mistaken if his abilities are not such as to make it a fortunate circumstance to be able to bring him forward.

"I send this letter through Hammond, to be forwarded to you by a messenger, and, if you approve, be so good to desire him to inform Huskisson, that he may lose no time in settling with

Maitland as to his own going, and in consulting with him respecting officers to accompany him.

"There will, I conceive, be no difficulty in giving him, and Malcolm under him, as well as any other officers, sufficient local rank; but we shall be able to settle this more precisely to-morrow after talking with the Duke of York. I have no doubt about giving either to Maitland or Malcolm credit to the extent proposed; and we must look out for some secretary or accountant."

Postscript. "This east wind must bring our Russians and our transports. The moment the latter come, all the troops here will embark."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 5. London.—"J'ai reçu votre billet; nous aurons le plaisir de venir à Dropmore dimanche, et d'y rester jusqu'à mardi matin.

"Mr. Hamond m'a lue votre dépêche à mylord Minto. Je vous remercie infiniment pour cette communication. Elle est trop longue pour ma pauvre mémoire, et trop importante pour je puisse, sans avoir un précis sous les yeux, en faire une dépêche pour ma cour. J'écrirai donc à Rastopchin pour qu'il parle à fond sur ce sujet avec le Chevalier Whitworth. Mais je ne manquerai pas de lui écrire en mon particulier tout ce que je pense sur la conduite de Thugut, d'après les informations que j'ai de Kalitcheff. Je vous envoie la copie de ma dépêche par le dernier courrier, du vingt-sept du passé. Vous verrez que j'ai étendu dans plusieurs points votre *memorandum*, que quand vous ne parliez que de la distance de Petersbourg, j'ai ajouté celle de Vienne et de Londrès, qui, toutes trois, sont hors du centre et peu propres pour un lieu de Congrès. Je l'ai fait pour qu'on ne puisse croire chez nous que c'est Petersbourg seul qu'on voudroit ici exclure.

"J'ai étendu aussi vos sentiments sur vos droites à quelques indemnités maritimes, en entrent dans les dépenses énormes que vous avez fais, et l'acroissement de la dette et de taxes qui s'en est suivi. Il [est] bon qu'on le sache chez nous. Je crois avoir été exacte, car mes calculs sont tirés de l'ouvrage de Monsieur Rose."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, September 6. Dropmore.—"Je vous renvoie les papiers que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer, et que je ne dois plus espérer de pouvoir vous remettre d'ici à quelques jours. Notre hôpital va cependant mieux depuis que je vous ai écrit hier-au-soir, mais il ne faut pas que vous, ni vos enfants, vous exposiez au moindre risque.

"Vous avez supérieurement bien renforcé l'esquisse que j'avois tracé. Certainement mes idées y ont beaucoup gagné, et je trouve parfait tout ce que vous avez ajouté au sujet du congrès, et de nos dépenses. Sur l'article des vues possibles de l'Autriche en Italie, j'aurois peut-être plus de doute.

“Le meilleur arrangement de tous pour la paix de l'Europe auroit été celui qui résulte d'abord de l'application pure et simple de nos principes, qui sont aussi ceux de votre souverain ; mais il n'est pas difficile de prévoir que l'Autriche y repugneroit absolument, et qu'on n'aura jamais le moyen de l'y forcer sans réplonger l'Europe dans le cahos d'où nous voulons la tirer. Ne vaut-il donc pas mieux recevoir la communication de ses plans, les examiner, les modifier dans la discussion qui va s'ouvrir, les diriger s'il est possible vers l'intérêt général, plutôt que de les rejeter totalement, et de premier abord ? Une pareille exclusion ne pourroit-elle pas rejeter cette Cour de Vienne qu'on ne tient que par l'intérêt, ou dans une inaction totale, ou bien dans des négociations secrètes ? Et dans le dernier cas, le Directoire ne lui prodigueroit-il pas des concessions en Italie pour avoir une paix séparée, et rester par là en possession de la Suisse, de l'Allemagne, des Pais-Bas, et peut-être même de la Hollande, où on pourroit alors nous opposer toutes les armées réunies de la France ?

“Je vous prie de pèsér dans votre sagesse toutes ces considérations, et d'examiner ensuite la question si, en rapprochant les frontières Italiennes de l'Autriche, et de la France, on ne se procure pas un grand avantage pour la tranquillité future de l'Europe ?

“L'essentiel est sans doute de concilier tout arrangement à cet égard avec les principes de justice et de bonne foi, dont il ne faut pas se départir pour des avantages particuliers. Je ne le crois pas impossible, et, ne pouvant faire le mieux, il ne faut pas renoncer à l'espoir de faire le bien.

“Toutes ces idées demanderoient, comme vous le sentez bien, une discussion très approfondie. Nous en parlerons à la première occasion. Il y en aura bien le tems. Il ne s'agit aujourd'hui que de ne pas y donner une exclusion précipitée.”

Postscript. “Je vois que je ne vous ai pas parlé de la proposition Bavaoise. Il me paroît peu juste que nous devions payer les princes d'Allemagne pour s'acquitter de leurs obligations vers l'empire. Surtout le Bavière, dont la plus grande partie n'a rien suffert de la guerre.” *Copy.*

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 6. Duke Street, Westminster.—“I am much concerned at the cause that makes you wish not to see me at Dropmore, and very sorry on many accounts that I am deprived at this moment of the pleasure of seeing you. I send you by the Prince of Orange's desire the enclosed papers, amongst which there are some very curious. I am in possession of the Pensionary's *mémoire* on the Constitution. It is in Dutch, but I am going to translate it, and will send it to you as soon as I possibly can. I am sure you will read it with pleasure. I informed the Prince of Orange of the plan you mentioned to me yesterday morning respecting the Dutch fleet after their arrival here. He is extremely concerned and alarmed about it, and is

very much afraid (I must say I think not without reason) that this plan, if immediately executed, will make a very bad impression upon our friends in Holland, and create much uneasiness and distrust there at a moment when it is so much to be wished that the good dispositions of the people may be conciliated and cultivated. I need not dwell upon the force of this argument. I am sure you will feel it as strongly as I do, and I therefore join my entreaties to those of the Prince of Orange that when the Dutch ships arrive here, the plan you mentioned to me may at least be delayed for some time, and the appearance kept up of this fleet being really at the Prince of Orange's disposition, and ready to be restored, in its present state, to the old and lawful government of the United Provinces as soon as it will be re-established. This re-establishment we must hope will take place within no very remote period, and in the meantime the expense of maintaining those ships in their present state cannot be much greater than that which would be incurred by paying the crews two months' wages. I should be very much obliged to you if you could send me some answer upon this subject, and enable me to say something satisfactory about it to the Prince, who takes it very much at heart. If I had had the pleasure of seeing you to-day, as I hoped, I should have been able to enter into more detail upon this subject than I think it necessary or proper to trouble you with in writing.

"I also enclose a note which I received last night from the Princess, and which I beg you will have the goodness to return me when you have perused it. You will find much in it that I stated to you in the different conversations we had upon one of the subjects mentioned in it. The Prince, who is in town, still promised to settle the business of M. de Rhoon in some shape or other to-day."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 6. Stowe.—"I cannot say, whatever may be the urgency at Petersburg, that I shall be sorry (for the reasons I gave you) that Tom should refuse to abandon the object of Holland. Your proposition of six weeks at the Hague *with him* is different; and will, I am sure, be very useful to the cause; but still I am very much in earnest in wishing you not to leave England at moments so critical as those must be that are to roll over us *six weeks hence*. You take my proposition as I meant it. My blood burns to be useful, and when I talked to you of Russifying myself as *your messenger*, I exactly meant to offer one of the things the most unpleasant to me. On the militia subject I would, if possible, avoid the meeting of Parliament; and yet I do not see how it will be practicable to procure for you any considerable accession without the assistance of the law, unless (what I do not know from want of proper returns) a large proportion of the reduced new militia quota of 76,000 men (or in exact numbers 76,542) remain in service. From the few authentic documents in my hands, I cannot imagine that any

very large proportion of these remain *in petto* ; for the return of the rank and file English militia was only 81,303 when the Bill passed, from which if you deduct 57,407 (the reduced $\frac{3}{4}$ of 76,542) the difference is only 23,896, from which are to be deducted the numbers already volunteered.

“If this statement is correct, the only choice is that of encouraging further volunteering of private militia into the line, or the voluntary offers of regiments or detachments to serve for a limited time ; or perhaps both these resources may be necessary ; but to either of them the consent of Parliament is necessary, and therefore I fear that this measure must to a certain degree draw into length.

“I do not like to make up my mind to any system or plan on this subject till I see the whole of the data ; but, from the best consideration that I can give to the matter, I should suppose that you may get 8 or 10,000 more volunteers ; but very many reasons that I could explain will prevent a further accession to the line beyond this number ; and unless some means can be devised to make this reduction fall more evenly upon regiments, jealousies will arise that will obstruct the service. The deficiency can only be made up by the voluntary offers of regiments, or of parts of regiments, to serve for a limited time, in such a manner as should make them most manageable ; and this sort of requisition, supposing it to be done by detachment, should extend to the Scotch and to the Irish militia. I should object very much to the idea of permitting *whole regiments* to volunteer, because I saw the very unpleasant difficulties of this measure (in the Irish business) both with respect to officers and men ; of whom, in every corps, there were very many who refused, and many more who went most unwillingly on service ; the high rank of our commanding officers would be a most serious objection. Such a body of detachments (if only one-tenth man) would give above 9,000 men ; and in the distribution of them the Crown would name the Field and Staff officers, by lending them from the skeleton regiments without expense to the public ; and, as they would be sent complete in arms and accoutrements, they would be ready to embark at a moment’s notice, instead of waiting with the hurry and confusion that has been seen at Barham Downs, for want of arms and accoutrements.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1799, September 6. Schaffhausen.—“I think the remedy proposed in my public dispatch of this day’s date, if extended to the Russian commission, will even meet the evil pointed out in my last private letter to your Lordship, supposing, which I sincerely hope is not the case, that there should have been heretofore any little irregularity of conduct. I know that in the Mediterranean army the place of Commissioner of Accounts has been found to answer every purpose intended, and that the strictest purity of conduct pervaded every department, owing to the active superintendence of this officer.

"If, as I presume must be the case, the subsidies granted to Switzerland are to be regularly voted by Parliament, it seems that it would be better for all parties that the Commissary of Accounts should be appointed by a Treasury Commission; the more so as the military commissary, though appointed in your Lordship's office, is directed to draw his bills on the Treasury, who will be entitled to look after his accounts. Whether this custom of making a profit on the exchange, or on the commission of bills, be of old standing or no I cannot say. If it be, it would be hard to deprive any person of it who has accepted an appointment under such expectation. But that it exists I am certain; and your Lordship will see by the enclosed letter from Sir J. Craufurd that, as to the commission at least, it has even gained the *corps diplomatique*.

"I never was an enemy to profits arising from fees: but those which are made by *handling* of the public money are not less pernicious to the morals of the individual, than hurtful to the State. Secret service money in particular, in its very nature, forbids the deriving any profit, direct or indirect, from its employment; and, if such a thing were once permitted, there would be an end at once of that high sense of honour, and of what is due to his personal character and to his place, which can alone engage a foreign minister to undertake, and support him in the execution of that most unpleasant part of his public duty.

"I have given Sir J. Craufurd a very indirect and somewhat Jesuitical answer, as your Lordship will learn from the enclosed. Pray have the goodness to burn the whole correspondence.

"I do not think, myself, that Ramsay or any other person will be equal to the Russian mission and the *Swiss commissariat* together, unless by his Russian commission he has nothing to do but draw bills. But if he is to be running to headquarters, the thing will not do.

"Believe me, the place of Swiss Commissary, if well executed, will find a man full and sufficient employment. It requires he who holds it should be always to be found, that is always either in his office or riding to see the different corps; but he had better remain in his office, and, as much as possible, make them come to him to be inspected. But, above all, he must not be running about headquarters, or riding to look at every operation of the army as Craufurd was doing; to which I attribute, first, the neglect of his proper business, then dissatisfaction with himself which he was too proud to avow, and lastly, ill-humour and spleen vented on everybody that came near him.

"The business of the Condé army was neglected, and the most extravagant prodigality and disorder took place in the management of their funds from the moment that poor Charles Craufurd was appointed to attend headquarters. In one word, it seems to me quite impossible that the two places should be executed by the same person with advantage to the public service, unless Lord Mulgrave's residence at the Russian army would relieve Ramsay from everything but drawing bills; and, in that case,

indeed, I do not know that there would be any great objection to his exercising the two functions.

"I do not know whether it [is] his Lordship that is intended for the command of the Swiss troops. I am sure that a better appointment cannot be made. But whether he is the person or no, it is most expedient and necessary that he should come and reside here without delay; and I most sincerely trust that no etiquette will prevent his remaining with the Russian army at least, even should he not be able to communicate with the Austrian.

"There is an absolute want of some one here having the real confidence of Government, and, at the same time, invested with authority without which, at this distance from home, and with the people you have to deal with, nothing can be done. Your Lordship will see from my last despatches by East that, with the best intention possible, Craufurd and Ramsay, from not knowing what was really passing at headquarters, or what was the intention and plans of the Court of Vienna and of the Archduke, were giving Korsakoff very bad counsel, which, had he followed, he would most undoubtedly have been in a very serious scrape. The same thing may happen to-morrow; and, unless Lord Mulgrave return, I am liable, with the real secret of Government exclusively in my possession, and precisely because I dare not venture to reveal it, to be counteracted by the opinion and advice which either of those gentlemen may give to M. Korsakoff. Your Lordship therefore must either give to them, or authorise me to give to them, more of confidence; or direct them to take no step when Lord Mulgrave shall be absent without consulting me.

"Certainly both these gentlemen misunderstand the nature of my place, because they sent despatches last night by Colonel Craufurd's servant to Cuxhaven without communicating to me even the nature of their contents; and that at a great expense to the public, as, at the same time, I had Ruff the messenger waiting here, meaning to send him to-day. Your Lordship will see also, by the enclosed note from Ramsay, that express directions were given to the man not to call here if he passed in the night, which he must necessarily do leaving Zurich in the evening, so that I could not send despatches by him. It will not be possible for me to take responsibility on myself if these things be not corrected. I am at this moment collecting every information for Lord Minto that may throw light on the conduct of the Austrians. Those gentlemen, who are at the source of intelligence, not only do not assist me, but they do not even let me know what they themselves communicate to Government.

"I am confident that this is not out of any disrespect to me, but from a mistaken notion of their own places as well as of mine; and perhaps because I do not think myself authorised to communicate to them what I receive from Vienna which they may have taken amiss.

"Recurring once again to the subject on which I have said so much above, your Lordship may be assured that neither the

people of this country nor the Austrians will place any confidence in, or give any attention to any but a General Officer of rank, or the King's Minister duly accredited.

"Charles Craufurd was an exception to this rule, in what respects the Austrians; but you must find another Charles Craufurd (of whom the whole army even now speaks with regret) before you will find another exception."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 6. Schaffhausen.—"I think it necessary to inform your Lordship that I have not written a word to Count Woronzow on the subject of what has passed here since the attempt to cross the Aar until to-day, when I have sent him five lines saying that your Lordship would inform him of everything that was worth knowing.

"Your Lordship is the only judge whether it would be expedient to inform him, what I am sorry to say is the case, that there is an intrigue in the Russian army against Korsakoff, who is generally considered among the superior officers as unequal to the command. In truth he appears to me to be of very second-rate abilities, and to have a degree of indecision about him that would prevent his doing anything great, were his military talents ever so superior.

"I mention this because there seems to be a personal intimacy between the two, and, from the constant questions which Korsakoff asks about Woronzow's daughter, I am inclined to think that there is a marriage in contemplation between the two families.

"I find that there is an intrigue in the Austrian [army] to take Colonel Vinerode away from Marshal Suwaroff. From all that I can learn Vinerode is the man of all others who ought, at any price, to be kept where he is. M. Thugut has left him at headquarters hitherto because the existence of a great portion of the Austrian army was at stake. But the moment that the Marshal shall find himself with Russian troops only under his command, I fear he will be deprived of all effective Austrian assistance; and all accounts agree in this, that the Russian army is unequal to many operations from the want of good staff-officers. I don't know much of Vinerode's history, still less of his fortune and connections; but, if he is accessible to offers of any kind, I think it would be well worth while that Lord Mulgrave or somebody should be authorised to make them, in case the Austrians should insist on removing him.

"The Archduke has left General Hiller with Korsakoff, who is a good officer, but thoroughly Austrian; and, in general, persons of this description only will be placed at Russian headquarters.

"The jealousy of the Austrians, and the manner in which they shew and express it, is so perfectly ludicrous that it would really keep one, if not in good humour, at least well amused, were it not

for the very serious consequences with which it is attended. It is difficult, however, to say whether they are more jealous of the Russians or of Lord Nelson and Sir Sidney Smith. Of late I have observed that they are preparing their batteries against the Duke of York and Sir Ralph Abercrombie."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 6. Walmer Castle.—"I am so hurried all this day, and have been so for some days past, that I could not write to you. At present the Duke of York is here, and as this day is appropriated to the despatch of all business with him, I have only time to send you the only two private letters I have received from Sir Ralph Abercrombie. He clearly means Amsterdam and the Hague when he was in a state to move, which he probably was soon after the dispatch of his last letter, for he had got a regiment of cavalry which I had sent unknown to him, and I would hope the island of the Texel would afford him some horses and waggons, the enemy having removed all the others from the neighbourhood of the Helder. I have directed Huskisson to send you a copy of the Duke of York's instructions. I must send others from time to time.

"With all the exultation of our present brilliant success, it is impossible to look back without horror upon the risk our army run in hazarding a landing under such circumstances; and the steadiness and bravery they displayed under every disadvantage has seldom been equalled."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

Private.

1799, September 6. Dropmore.—"I send this letter to Switzerland by the messenger who carries my dispatches to Wickham, but I think it more than probable it will not find you there. I do not therefore enter into a long detail of the conduct to be pursued in the strange circumstances which the tergiversation and *lies* (for there really is no more diplomatic word to use on the occasion) of Austria have produced. I hope all this will not so far disgust you (though it is disgusting enough God knows) as to induce you to leave the thing while there is any hope of doing good. I have been struggling seven years together against this system of conduct, and though I have met with discouragements enough, yet I have always found that at the end the straightest road is the shortest, and that a little patience and perseverance bore one through, though neither as soon nor as well as the interests we are fighting for required.

"Not knowing where to write instructions to you, I do not know how to frame them, and must therefore content myself, till I hear from you again, with referring you to what I write to Lord Minto and to Wickham, and which will, I hope, be found sufficient for your guidance either in Switzerland or at Vienna."

Postscript. "I have received your letters from Berlin. All the ideas you state are precisely those which had also occurred to

us when we came to the knowledge of the circumstances to which they relate. You will not have been in time to stop the Russians. If you had, that was unquestionably the best thing to do." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 6. Hamburgh.—“I arrived here yesterday and was overtaken by dispatches from Wickham under flying seal, which he desired me to forward to Sir C. Whitworth. In the same moment Mason came hither with dispatches from Petersburg; I have therefore sent him back to Sir Charles with the letters from Wickham, which, as they relate to the retaining in Swisserland the whole of Korsakow's corps against the orders of Suwaroff, I thought it highly important to forward without loss of time.

“I perceive by the letters from Petersburg that my hopes of seeing Panin replace the insufficient Rozamowsky at Vienna are at an end, as the Emperor has destined him to the more honourable but more arduous task of replacing Kotchouby at Petersburg, with the function, though without the title of, Vice-Chancellor; a promotion which, by Panin's letter to me of the 31st ultimo, I perceive he then had no knowledge or expectation of. It is no doubt a great advantage to the objects which we are pursuing at Petersburg that they should be assisted by the good sense, good talents, and good principles of Count Panin. I know that his friends, and none more so than General Stamford, are so impressed with the dangers which he will have to encounter in the intrigues of Petersburg, that they would all have preferred for him at this moment a continuance of his services in the foreign line, rather than any confidential employment in the Russian Cabinet, where they think he will be exposed to great hazards from the advantage which his enemies will have in the personal disinclination which the Emperor is supposed to have to him. I fear this is but too true, and my regard for him makes me see this danger with uneasiness, but yet I must honestly confess that I cannot wish it otherwise; we live in times where so much is at stake that we must every day give to chance more than in human prudence we should be inclined to do; and in pursuing manfully this honourable struggle, we must pursue the advantage of the day, whatever be the risk or the sacrifice of ourselves or our friends. With this impression, as I see a present good in placing Panin where he can be so eminently useful, I rest entirely upon that advantage gained, and will not sully the gloss of it by any doubtful apprehensions for the future. I am to the greatest degree anxious, however, for the result of the effort which Wickham's letter to me of the 25th ultimo announces for the two following days. If that effort be successful, success may give a new shape and colour in that quarter, and may somewhat better conciliate the narrow and selfish views of the Austrian Cabinet to the pursuit of objects of common interest; if unfortunately any reverse should happen in this critical moment of the Archduke's

attack, still one may fairly hope that the increased danger will force these clashing powers and authorities to agree at least in measures of common safety as of mutual preservation. I can easily conceive how much Marshal Suwarrow must have been teased and fretted by the contradictions which he has met with; but if, in these circumstances, he disapproves of Wickham retaining the troops of Korsakow, or remonstrates against Korsakow for acquiescing in them, I shall have less esteem for his judgment and temper than I would hope to have.

“ You will naturally suppose me partial to my own view of foreign politics, and to the general motives which I described in my last letter as inducing me still to think that I could be more useful to you in this quarter of the world than in the northern course which you had suggested, but all the reflection which I have been able to give to the subject since I last wrote to you has hitherto only confirmed me in that opinion; and I am not shaken in it by seeing that Panin’s assistance is no longer to be expected at Vienna, which was, as you recollect, a measure to which I had looked with good hope of advantage. If he is not there in person he will be there in correspondence, and from his new official situation at Petersburg he will shake a little energy into Rozamowsky at Vienna, or shake him out of the mission which he has rendered so ineffectual there; but, with the distance of Petersburg from the scene of action, it is hopeless to make that the point from which the military operations can be directed. I am aware it may be said that the plan may be arranged there liable to such alterations as may become necessary; but see only how ineffectual such a plan would be for the control of Austrian operations, when Thugut could himself create everyone of those cases which, in fair reasoning, ought to be left as cases of exception; with what hope or spirit would it be possible for us to be discussing nice points of military arrangements at Petersburg when one month at least must pass to procure a letter and answer between Petersburg and Vienna, and half as much more, if English correspondence is to be added to it; and these being the obvious and natural difficulties arising only from the local situation of Petersburg, see what they will become when they are to be made the instruments of delay in the hands of Thugut, and the means by which he is to render ineffectual a control which he cannot approve of, and which is so little consistent with the views and with the habits or practice of the Austrian Cabinet. If, instead of this remote and inapplicable control, there was given from Petersburg and from London a large power into the hands of able and active ministers, with proper directions to support each other, and to act promptly and immediately at Vienna, as the occasion should offer, that shape might furnish the control which you wish, and Thugut would have no means of escaping from it until he should feel safe enough and bold enough to quarrel with it. But after all, the objections of this nature are not so arduous as that of Thugut’s natural repugnance to this proposition of Cobenzel’s, a repugnance very naturally felt by him, very strongly expressed by him, and

in itself becoming thereby an insurmountable obstacle to any real or solid negotiation being carried on there. Why does Cobenzel wish it ? In order to draw from Vienna to Petersburg the important discussions which seem to belong to the present state of Europe ; but is that a motive which Thugut will lend himself to, or will wish to encourage and assist the pursuit of ; is it not rather precisely the motive which will most powerfully weigh with him against giving to it any real effect, whatever may be the tone which, in prudence, he will assume concerning it. I believe I am repeating over and over again what I have already said to you more than enough, but, in truth, this latter difficulty arising from Thugut's avowed dislike of the proposition appears to me to be entirely fatal to it, and to leave us nothing to expect from it except the little and wearisome detail of Austrian intrigues to renew at Petersburg the dilatory nothingness of a Rastadt congress. Can Woronzow and you understand each other in the extent of Italian sacrifice which you can endure for the sake of obtaining a thorough good understanding with Austria ? If you can do this, does it not promise a better chance to open this fairly to them at Vienna, and try to hold Thugut to it by the joint influence of the two allied Ministers at the Court of Vienna who, having made their bargain with Thugut, will naturally overlook the due performance of it, and will see that the course of military operations on their side is justly and fairly executed. I own that there is no little difficulty in finding the exact quantum which you may be content to see stripped from the former governments of Italy to satisfy the avidity of the Imperial eagle. I confess there will be a good deal of delicacy likewise in the manner as well as in the matter of this proposition, but at least, when such a proposition has been made to Thugut and accepted by him, whatever has been lost, there will at least have been something effectual obtained ; whereas, at Petersburg and with Cobenzel, you will have all the same difficulty and delicacy in treating with the Austrian Minister there, and you will find, besides, that you have done nothing and advanced not a step as to any efficient purpose ; because you will either be continually referred to Vienna, which will protract your negotiation beyond all bounds, or, if you act independently of Vienna and trust to Cobenzel's conceit of doing the business independently of Thugut, you will find yourself thwarted in the course of it, or you will see Cobenzel unsupported in the conclusion of it. I would not have wearied you again with this repetition if I was not anxious to shew you how strongly I have at least conceived the objections which made part of the ground on which I thought myself obliged to demur to your proposal of my journey to Petersburg. The other and remaining ground of my objection was found in my desire to make myself useful to you in the United Provinces, and in the pressing necessity which seemed to me to arise for my giving myself entirely and absolutely to the assistance of the Hereditary Prince of Orange.

“ You know that the chief object of my latter stay at Berlin was to prevent the mischief of the apparent rupture, and perhaps

the actual hostility, which was to be feared between Petersburg and Berlin; and a subordinate object was that of watching a little the course of the French negotiation with Berlin. I had the satisfaction of leaving these two points very much as I had wished to leave them, and I then hastened to this place upon my road to Lingen to join the Prince of Orange. When I received your letter at Kleitz, I was very much persuaded by all which I had heard that there would be some struggle in Holland, and although I had no doubt of the successful result of it, it seemed not unlikely that it would last some time before the event was entirely decided. In this view I had originally engaged the Hereditary Prince to approach the frontiers, and I had conceived with him the possibility of his penetrating into Friesland and Groningen and hoisting his standard there, while the English troops were fighting for him upon the coasts of Holland and of Zealand. If this had been the case, I had flattered myself that I might very probably have been of some little use to him by giving something of English assistance to an enterprise of a hazardous description. With this expectation I arrived here last night and received the welcome news from Captain Winthorp of the surrender of the Dutch fleet in the Texel, and of the dismay which this had naturally produced upon the enemy. Full of this good news I was this morning preparing to cross the Elbe on my road to Lingen when I suddenly heard that the Prince had passed to Embden on the 3rd instant to embark for the Texel. I instantly sent a messenger to Bremen to the Prince's correspondent there to know all that can be known of his intentions, but I have no doubt that he is already gone; although his last letter to me of the 31st from Lingen described his intention still to be that of penetrating from the German frontier. I have no doubt that he has done perfectly right in pursuing his course immediately from Embden by sea to the army, and I am hourly in expectation of hearing from him what are his objects and intentions; but till I know something more of them, it appears to me that it is to no purpose whatever for me to pursue my journey to Lingen, and therefore I shall wait here for better information, and for the direction of such new circumstances as may arise.

"Among these difficulties perhaps I should also state to you that I have some little doubt how far I am authorised in pursuing any *separate* journey to that country, now that the Hereditary Prince is no longer in question on this side of the Dutch republic. When my mission to Berlin was terminated in my audience of leave, I was directed to apply myself entirely to the subject of the United Provinces, and to give what assistance I could by my communication with the Hereditary Prince. As long as there was any chance of his entering Holland with a separate force of his own friends from the German frontier, I own I had good hopes of making myself useful to him. I have no doubt that he has judged rightly in quitting this frontier to take the protection of the English army, but this change in his situation makes it useless for me to proceed to the frontier, and I have great doubts whether, according to my present instructions, I should be authorised in

the present circumstances to proceed into the country until I should have more distinct directions and authority to do so. You will, however, easily understand me by this to imagine that there is not either in this instant, as it seems to me, any great object in my doing so, because if there should be any such, I have always told you that I should do as well as I could in the pursuit of it, and trust to after-chances for reconciling what was done to the forms and to the routine of office. Another hesitation of the same nature arises, however, from the distant hope which you have held out to me that it might not be impossible for you yourself to come and turn this shapeless mass into good order and propriety; a hope which I really think so full of the best promises that I cannot help recurring to it from every motive public and private, and therefore I would fain measure my steps if possible to make them keep time with yours, and, as I said before, to write with you and for you instead of writing to you; yet, anxious as I am for this good promise, I would not let even that stand in the way of any real good which I could do if I saw any to be done. Upon the further consideration of your last letter to me I am, however, of the opinion that you have not completely and entirely settled your own wishes and arrangements, and therefore I feel still an additional motive for suspending on my part any farther step till I hear, as doubtless I very shortly shall do, what your ultimate resolutions are; and I know not where I can so speedily hope to learn them as by remaining here. Here then I shall remain until I either hear something decisive from you; or until I hear something in which I can be useful to the Hereditary Prince of Orange; or until some new event shall seem to offer so much advantage from my moving as to supersede the necessity of any new instructions to me, or of any new authority to be given to me: any such case I always shall consider as a new instruction, but without it I always feel a scruple to do more lest I should embarrass where I mean to assist.

“I do not write to you of the Dutch news here, because I have none except what is furnished from Sir J. Crawford, who writes it to you by this messenger. I am delighted at our having obtained possession of the Dutch fleet without any engagement, because the Dutch navy has been so generally well affected that I should have been grieved to have seen a sharp battle where there was no animosity.”

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 7. Duke Street, Westminster.—“I wish to lose no time in sending you the Pensionary’s *mémoire*, and as I have no time to make a fair copy of the translation I have made of it, I take the liberty to send you the enclosed *brouillon* as it is.

“I have the pleasure to tell you that Rhoon’s business is adjusted in a manner with which he is perfectly satisfied. The Prince gives him an instruction to settle the affairs of the Admiralties in Holland, without any reference to the fleet that is

coming here. I hope to be able to communicate to you very soon a translation of this paper. Rhoon is now ready to go over to Holland, as soon as he has seen you. He is highly pleased both with what the Prince has done, and with the manner in which he has done it. He wishes that an armed vessel may be appointed to carry him over; that he may be furnished with the pecuniary means he is in want of; and he will be very much obliged to your lordship to give him a letter for General Abercromby. He should wish to have some sort of instruction or commission from you, which he thinks would be the means of protecting him against the danger he would incur if he had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Batavians.

"I am fully aware of your disposition to settle the business of the fleet in the best manner possible, and you may be satisfied that I will do whatever lays in my power (as I have done already) to make the Prince of Orange sensible to the necessity of attending to the circumstances of the case, in order finally to arrange the matter agreeably to your wishes, which I trust may be done in some way or other so as to content him also. In this case I must say, in justice to him, that the uneasiness he expressed at what I stated to him yesterday morning proceeded much more from the fear he really entertained of the impression the thing would produce in Holland, than from any desire of seeing these ships at his disposal. I am fully sensible of the difficulty respecting the officers, and I shall write to the Prince on that subject to-morrow. More of this when I have the pleasure of seeing you.

"I am very happy to hear your patient is so much better. I very much wish to be able to come to you (agreeably to your kind invitation) to-morrow or the day after, but I am afraid it will not be in my power to be with you before Tuesday, as my presence in town is absolutely necessary. However, if you should wish to see me sooner, have the goodness to let me know, and I will come immediately, and defer what I have to do till it suits you."

Enclosure.

Mémoire by VAN DE SPIEGEL (formerly Grand Pensionary of Holland) on the project of uniting the whole Netherlands under the rule of the Prince of Orange. Translated from Dutch into French.

"Seroit-il avantageux pour notre République qu'au moyen d'un arrangement à faire à la paix générale, les 10 provinces ci-devant Autrichiennes fussent réunies aux nôtres, et ne formassent qu'une république ?

"A considérer la question superficiellement on diroit qu'oui ; car il semble qu'un pareil arrangement donneroit un grand accroissement de forces à l'état ; et si l'on fait dépendre uniquement de là le bonheur d'un pays, l'on a raison ; mais il est encore d'autres considérations qu'on ne doit pas négliger.

“En premier lieu la République changeroit par là entièrement de forme, et il faudroit conclure une ligue tout-à-fait nouvelle avec des contrées qui diffèrent de nous par la religion, par les moeurs, les intérêts, quelques-unes même par le langage ; or il est à peu près politiquement impossible d’espérer une réunion solide et sincère entre des élémens aussi discordans. L’Empereur Charles Quint a déjà énergiquement voulu cette réunion, mais il a été obligé d’abandonner son projet à cause des difficultés qu’il y voyoit. On le reprit pendant la guerre avec l’Espagne, et la *pacification de Gand* de 1576 semblait y paver les voyes ; mais on ne tarda pas à s’apercevoir combien il en résultoit peu d’avantages, et, trois ans après, les sept provinces se séparèrent des autres, et conclurent entre elles l’union d’Utrecht.

2. “Notre république est bâtie sur des bases toutes différentes de celles qu’il faudroit alors ; nous avons été une puissance maritime, et nous deviendrions une puissance continentale : la chaîne de fortifications qui avoit été construite contre des attaques qui pouvoient nous être faites du côté des provinces Autrichiennes, devra être placée ailleurs, et comme ces provinces n’ont point de forteresses, on sera obligé d’en construire de nouvelles ; notre politique a toujours été d’empêcher que le commerce ne se transportât de chez nous dans la Flandre et le Brabant, ce qui seroit certainement arrivé au moyen de l’Escaut jusqu’à Anvers, d’Ostende, et d’un canal qu’il auroit été facile de creuser depuis Bruges, si notre république ne s’y étoit constamment opposée par la force et par les stipulations de traités. Maintenant ces maximes devoient être changées, et n’en résulteroit-il pas bien vite que le Brabant et la Flandre redeviendroient ce que ces provinces étoient il y a 300 ans, savoir, le théâtre d’une prospérité sans bornes, tandis que la Hollande et la Zeelande rentreroient dans leur ancien état, et serviroient de nouveau de demeure à quelques pauvres pêcheurs ?

3. “Le voisinage de la France ne nous entraineroit-il pas dans des guerres continuelles ? La politique de nos ancêtres a toujours consisté à éviter ce voisinage, et à avoir plutôt une puissance intermédiaire entre la France et nous ; c’est pour cette raison que le Prince Frédéric-Henri d’Orange n’a jamais pu réussir à faire la conquête des Pays-bas, conformément au traité de partage avec la France, quoiqu’il les ait attaqués à plusieurs reprises à la tête des armées Françaises et de celles de notre république. Mais chez nous on voyoit ces projets avec déplaisir, et on les a toujours traversés. C’est encore pour la même raison qu’en 1701, lors de la grande alliance entre l’Empereur, la Grande Bretagne, et notre République, le Roi Guillaume stipula que les Pays-bas Espagnols serviroient de barrière pour l’état, mais ne cherche jamais à lui en procurer la propriété, ni en tout ni en partie. Le but de cette barrière, qui explique toute notre politique à l’égard des pays-bas Espagnols, étoit d’en assurer la souveraineté à une puissance dont il ne fut pas probable qu’elle devint l’alliée de la France, et qui, en même temps, fut assez considérable pour défendre ses états ; le tout cependant de telle manière que notre république conservât

toujours une influence suffisante dans les Pays-bas pour pouvoir empêcher, soit que le souverain de ces provinces en fit une place d'armes contre nous, ou qu'il y protégeât le commerce au préjudice du notre. Dans ce but nous entretenions des troupes aux Pays-bas, et étions maîtres de la navigation de toutes les rivières dont la France auroit de se servir pour entrer dans notre pays (excepté du côté de l'Empire); pendant que nous étions en même temps en possession du commerce intérieur le long de ces rivières.

“Et c'est là encore à présent l'unique intérêt que nous avons aux Pays-bas; nous n'en avons pas à les posséder en propre, ou à les incorporer dans notre république. S'il est possible d'effectuer quelque espèce de réunion avec ce pays-là, j'aimerois mieux que les 10. provinces des Pays-bas devinssent une république à part, sous le Stadthoudérat de la maison d'Orange, et unies avec nous par ce lien-là; ou qu'elles fussent cédées en souveraineté à la maison d'Orange à titre de dédommagement, pour les posséder *sur le pied de barrière*; ou bien encore qu'afin de prévenir la collision que des intérêts commerciaux pourroient faire naître entre nous et le souverain des Pays-bas, *Anvers, Ostende*, et *Bruges* fussent cédées à notre république, et tout le reste à la maison d'Orange; mais il est peu probable, pour plus d'une raison, que cela arrive jamais; il est toujours utile, néanmoins, de ne pas perdre de vue ces principes de nos véritables intérêts.”

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 7. Wimbledon Park.—“Your questions about the Dutch fleet are not easy to answer, and much must depend on the situation of the officers and men when they arrive here. I do not find any very satisfactory information about this in the letters we have as yet received from Admiral Mitchell, and there will be no means of deciding till we know exactly what he has done.

“The thing most to be wished would be to let the people go home for the present, and lay the ships up in ordinary to be kept for the Stadtholder's use when he shall want them. I should be inclined to think that this measure, properly explained, would perhaps be the most agreeable to the crews, many of whom will not like to be kept here at a distance from their families.

“It is probable that some of the Dutch officers may be to be trusted, but I rather expect to find that those who are supposed to be of this description will have been permitted to go ashore in Holland on their parole; and, in that case, it will be necessary to have some British officers on board the ships here (especially if they continue manned) for the purpose of keeping order.

“As the wind has been fair for these two or three days past, I think we must be better informed on these points by to-morrow or Monday, and it would perhaps be advisable for us to meet for the purpose of fixing on something. I shall be in town all Monday morning, and if you could contrive to come, we might

determine what is best to be done more easily than by writing ; or, if you like it better, I can call upon you at Dropmore whenever you please."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 8. Walmer Castle.—"I have ordered Huskisson to send you a copy of my despatch of this morning from Sir Ralph Abercrombie. I send you likewise a private letter to the Duke of York, and another to Colonel Brownrigg. They, of course, are for your own perusal, as he speaks without any reserve what he thinks of men, and must not be quoted. Return them to me, for I have no other copy.

"The transports are arrived from the Texel, and all the troops at Barham Downs will be embarked to-morrow and Tuesday morning. I wish the wind would change and allow them to sail. It is very high and adverse. The Duke of York gets on board this evening, and, as he is in a frigate, the captain will endeavour to force his passage; but, with so adverse a wind, it will be a bad passage. I suspect the Russian troops will be before him. I shall write to you again to-morrow; we are going to take an early dinner, as the Duke must take his boat at half-past five o'clock."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1799, September 8. Dropmore.—"I cannot have the smallest objection to the choice of Maitland for the purpose you mention. You have solved my only difficulty on the subject. Some management is due to Malcolm's situation, but that, I conclude, Huskisson will take care of. I will endeavour to draw an instruction as to the political part. I think the sum mentioned full large, but if it is in the hands of an economist, and not a schemer, that discretion may be left."

Postscript. "If there is any private letter from Abercromby stating his prospects, pray send it me. I am sure you feel with me that time is every thing." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 9. Harley Street.—"Je suis tout-à-fait de votre avis que l'Autriche, voyant qu'on s'oppose à ses vues d'agrandissement, pourroit peut-être diminuer encor le peu de vigueur qu'elle met aux opérations de guerre là où les généraux sont dans sa dépendence; mais elle n'osera jamais faire sa paix avec la France, à cause du caractère véhément de Paul premier qui se lieroit avec la Prusse contre elle. Ce ralentissement est pourtant très fatal, et c'est une idée aussi malheureuse qu'impolitique que celle qu'on a eu chez nous, d'inviter les alliés à dire ce qu'ils veulent avoir; c'est, comme on dit, vendre la peau de l'ours avant que de le tuer, et c'est faire naître des discordes là où l'harmonie étoit déjà très faible. Il falloit s'en tenir à la sage réponse qu'on avoit donné chez nous au mémoire de Gallo, et ne pas reveiller tout d'un coup une question qu'on

venoit d'écarter avec tant de prudence. Comme la Russie ne veut rien, et que vous ne voulez garder que très peu des conquêtes que vous avez fais sur vos ennemis, et que vous n'avez articulez rien de positif à cet égard, il ne reste donc que les prétentions Autrichiennes à entendre. Le meilleur seroit sans doute de ne pas les discuter ; de ne répondre qu'en termes généraux, sans trop encourager, ni ôter des espérance sur des arrangements convénables, effectués après le rétablissement de la monarchie Française, quand il sera question de régler la paix et d'assurer la tranquillité de l'Europe.

“ Rien ne peut être plus util à ce pays sans doute que de voir l'Autriche en contact immédiat avec la France, si ce voisinage pouvoit les rendre ennemies entre elles : mais malheureusement la Cour et le public de Vienne se sont perssuadés depuis la paix d'Aix-la-Chapelle que, pour posséder la Flandre et le Brabant sans aucun risque, il faut posséder aussi l'amitié et l'alliance Française. Tirer autant d'argent que possible de ces riches provinces, tenir le moins de troupes qu'on peut, et ménager de toutes les manières la cour de Verssaille, la quelle de son coté, sûre de n'avoir aucune guerre avec l'Autriche, diminueoit son armée pour augmenter sa marine. Ce système, inculqué par le Prince Kaunitz, lui a survécu ; il sera constamment suivi par l'Autriche.

“ La cour de Vienne a tenté de troquer ces provinces contre la Bavière, et, à présent, elle ne veut les ravoir que pour les échanger contre la Toscane ou tel autre pays qui se trouveroit à sa bienséance : mais celui qui les aura sans posséder les sept provinces-unies et l'évêché de Liège, sera un très petit prince, tout-à-fait dépendent de la France. On peut objecter contre la réunion des dix-sept provinces, la différence des religions qui y dominant : mais les Catholiques de la Flandre et du Brabant ont trouvé dans Joseph Second un ennemi plus acharné que s'il étoit Calviniste, et la domination sous laquelle se missent ces Pays depuis quatre ans, a détruit tous les cultes sans excepter aucun, de sorte que les Flamands et les Brabançons recevront un Stadhouder de quelque religion qu'il soit, pourvue qu'il leurs garantisse leurs archévêchés, évêchés, abbayes, couvents, et leurs chère université de Louvain.

“ Quand à l'Italie ; pour que l'Autriche puisse devenir la voisine de la France de ce coté, il faudroit dépouiller le roi de Sardaigne du Piémont, de la Savoye, et de Nice. Cela est-il faisable et juste ? Le roi de Prusse le souffrirat-il ? Si on ne veut pas dépouiller tout-à-fait ce malheureux prince, et ne lui otter que ce qui lui fut cédé par le traité de Worms, on le rendra plus faible qu'il ne l'a déjà été, et il ne pourra plus disputer aux Français l'entré en Italie. Au lieux d'être le gardien armé, capable, et prêt à disputer et défendre la porte de l'entré en Italie, il deviendra un petit page prêt à ouvrir poliment la même porte à l'armée Française toutes les fois qu'elle se présentera pour y entrer. Il n'y a donc pas de milieu ; ou il faut le dépouiller de tout, ou ne pas prendre un pouce de son territoire.

“ Pour ce qui est de la proposition Bavaoise, il ne faut pas l'envisager comme un contingent que l'Angleterre ne doit pas payer ; ce n'est pas un contingent, c'est 8,000 hommes qu'on vous offre. Si vous pouvez avoir 20,000 Suisses que vous vouliez lever, vous n'avez pas besoin des compatriotes du Comte Hasseland ; mais si au lieu de vingt, vous n'aurez que six à huit milles Suisse, les Bavaois avec les Wurtembergeois vous compléteroient le corp que vous vouliez lever, ce qui seroit d'autant plus urgent que les Autrichiens ou évacueront tout à fait ce pays-là, ou y diminueront considérablement leur armée ; tandis que le Maréchal Souvorow ne ramenera d'Italie qu'une poignée de Russes, reste glorieux, mais très petit reste, d'un corp que la victoire a constamment couronné dans les sanglantes batailles qu'il n'a cessé de livrer. Tout ce qui sera sous les ordres de ce grand homme est à vous en propre ; plus il sera fort et plus vous aurez d'influence dans le mode et la fin de cette guerre. Le Baron de Thugut, qui a designé vous permettre de vous meller seulement des affaires d'Holande, verat que c'est vous qui déciderez du sort de la France, et, par conséquent, de la paix ; au moins vous pourrez lui disputer la moitié de l'influence qu'il se reserve à lui seul. Rendez l'armée de Souvorow assez forte pour pénétrer en France, et reposez-vous sur son habilité, sur son activité, et sur la terreur qu'il a su inspirer au Français. Un grand effort fait dans une campagne peut décider la guerre. Vous épargnez ou une seconde campagne, ou une paix précaire. Je vous supplie donc de considérer la proposition Bavaoise sous ce point de vue. Vous devez connaître mieux que moi par les rapports de M. Wickham ce qu'il y a à espérer de la levée des troupes Suisses. Le tems presse, et la chose est trop importante pour ne pas l'approfondir ; après quoi, si on en voit la nécessité, on ne sauroit assez en hâter l'exécution. Excusez avec votre indulgence ordinaire, et votre amitié pour moi, la prolixité avec laquelle je vous accable ; c'est mon attachement pour ce pays et mon zèle pour la bonne cause qui m'enhardie à vous communiquer mes sentiments sur les affaires présentes.

“ Nos premiers transports sont arrivés à Yarmouth, et le reste est sur le point de les joindre.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 10. Walmer Castle.—“ I cannot say that I am quite convinced even now that your brother's going to Petersburg would not have been still desirable ; as I think the chief difficulty remaining will be to bring the Emperor Paul to go as far as we may think right, towards satisfying the avidity of Austria. And he could have done this better than it can be done through Sir C. Whitworth, if for no other reason, because he might have had a discretionary power to conclude an arrangement between the three Powers, without repeated reference home. This, however, is now out of the question. The only thing which occurs to me, in order to take the best chance now in our power of settling some joint plan, is to direct Lord Minto

to forward to Whitworth immediately (with proper explanations) the result of the confidential communications which you have authorised him to receive, and to give Whitworth such instructions as may eventually enable him to act upon them. He certainly can not have the same latitude which might have been given to your brother, but would there be any risk in saying to him that, if Austria agrees to giving the Netherlands to Holland or to such third power as shall be agreed upon with us and Russia, we are ready to agree in *any* arrangement of Italy which Austria desires, and Russia can be brought to approve, provided it furnishes a decent equivalent for the King of Sardinia? I believe you agree with me in thinking that the King of Sardinia has, in fact, no solid claim on the allies, and that the object in providing for him is chiefly to bring back to some established situation (if it cannot be to his former dominions) a dethroned and exiled Prince; and, next to that, to prevent Austria from obtaining a larger direct possession of Italy than Russia might think safe for its interests. It does not seem impossible to state our opinions on these points in such a manner as to enable Whitworth to make use of any opening for bringing the whole speedily to a point, if the Austrian views turn out to be such (and *such only*) as from Lord Minto's last letters one may suppose. In the meantime, and for a long time afterwards (at least if the war last) much will be done at Vienna, and the idea of getting Panin appointed Minister there (which I conclude is what your brother refers to) seems to promise great advantage. At all events Rosamousky (or whatever is his name) must be got rid of.

"On the subject of your correspondence with *Monsieur*, I can hardly state any opinion satisfactorily till I learn more exactly the amount of the expense which the plan should lead to. Taking it, however, at the sum you state, I should be much inclined to allow it, provided sufficient checks can be found to ensure that the expense shall only keep pace with the amount of the force brought into a condition for active service. On that supposition the force, if it is raised, will be more than worth the money. If it is not raised, no harm will be done. And it certainly cannot be raised in so short a time as to interfere with our grand scheme for that quarter, supposing we can realize it this autumn.

"I think it is clearly desirable you should write by the quickest conveyance to Peterburg, to ask the Emperor's concurrence in the scheme to which I allude. We shall certainly have no time to spare.

"The wind promised this morning very well for the sailing of our re-inforcement, but it has failed us. However, the oracles on that subject still assure us it is coming to the right quarter, and, in the meantime, what has been a contrary wind here, has brought the Russians.

"I am not sure that I agree with you in wishing Abercromby to have hazarded a forward movement when reinforcements were so near, though certainly there is great reason to think

that with his present force he might have succeeded. His opinions about the disposition of the country, on the grounds he states, are certainly worth very little."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 10. Stowe.—"All is going on according to my wishes. My good wife is recovering, and I am much better, having for some days been seriously unwell; and most happy shall I be to receive you on Wednesday next, when I hope that you will have got some of the militia papers on which I shall be glad to work with you, particularly as I see that your time is so short. After much consideration I abide by my project of giving you the right of receiving into the line more volunteers, and of receiving the voluntary offers of service from detachments not exceeding a given number, suppose a sixth or eighth of each regiment, which appears to me the only probable way of giving an efficient force, and in any number, and without inconvenience to the service. I fear that if *battalions* were authorized to volunteer, the service might be considered as a *corvée*, which officers were not at liberty to put by; and if so, much ill humour would creep into the measure, and probably great division of opinion; whereas, on the contrary, by permitting *only* detachments to go under the orders of captains, there would be in every corps some young officers to whom such a service would not be a grievance; but it would be necessary to give a very handsome allowance to induce the officers to go without expense, and the bounty to the men should be about two or three guineas. I observed to you that this arrangement would send the men complete, *without any further expense*, in arms, accoutrements, and appointments of every sort; and this plan would equally extend to the Scotch and *Irish* militia. On the latter subject, unless I am much mistaken, you have all the necessary powers; for when their Bill was drawn for 5,000 men, the Irish Attorney-General consulted me, and I altered our Bill so as to permit their militia to serve in *any part of Europe*. Whether it was afterwards changed you best know, and can learn at the Council Office; but I know that it was so drawn, and the offers of some of the corps were specifically pointed at Portugal and Gibraltar. If this should prove exact, the business is done. If not, you must employ more Irish militia in Guernsey, Jersey, and Alderney, and withdraw a proportion of the Fencibles from those islands."

"But hitherto I have put by a very important part of the question, and that is, the means of compelling by any means (and to what extent) the co-operation of those colonels or regiments who have hitherto resisted the voice of the charmer. It is clear that the *consent* of the colonel need not be considered for those who volunteer by detachment to serve for a time as militia men, and are to return to their regiments, of which they are always to be considered a part though detached from their colonel; but I do not see how it will be possible to put by that consent for those who wish to quit the regiment and to enter

into the army; and yet the public feels severely the grievance of wanting the men whom they ought to send; the personal sacrifice of vanity (or whatever that sacrifice may be) falls only on the best intentioned officers; and, in a political point of view, it seems improper that the largest proportion of the only remaining national force should be in the hands of those who wish to obstruct the public service at such a moment, and upon a measure so essential.

“I should doubt, as you do, whether it might be wiser or not to define the exact service of Holland, or whether it might not be wise to enable the King to accept their services within the British seas, or any of the coasts or islands belonging to the same. This term would (I believe) carry them anywhere from Holland to Cape Finisterre. I am likewise very anxious (as we now recruit your army *in toto*) that you should enable us to recruit by bounty as fast as we can, for fear of any reverse that may make it necessary for you ultimately to look entirely to us, either at home or in Ireland.”

“Your Mr. Wyndham [Windham?] may be a very clever man, but he is the most indiscreet man I know. Imagine to yourself that the secret which you will not (because you ought not) tell me of the destination of your French expedition, he tells to a Frenchman, *whom he will not consult because he tells him he is not to be employed*; names the place of their debarkation, moots the question whether Government will be able to make up the number of the army to 30 or 35,000 men, exclusive of 5,000 cavalry; and tells him that it must be risked immediately for fear of the Emperor, *qui a laissé entrevoir ses mauvaises dispositions*, making his peace! Can you conceive such weakness? *But remember this is a secret to all but you.*”

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 10. Walmer Castle.—“By a copy of a letter from Colonel Malcolm to me, received here this morning, it appears to me that the business is in a very awkward situation. Huskisson informs me he has sent the original to you, and that Colonel Maitland will be here to-morrow morning. I wish he had sent Maitland first to you, as he would [have] been a very good messenger to have brought me your ideas. From the statement which Malcolm gives, I can have no doubt that the Court of Vienna is playing some underhand game connected with the conduct they have been pursuing all along relative to the Netherlands. The objection started against the Netherlands being brought under the sovereignty of the Stadtholder is a clear proof of it. Maitland and Malcolm, I suspect, will not do together; and I understand Malcolm is more eccentric than perhaps a person in his situation ought to be. My own idea is that the particulars stated by him are a very fair ground to send for him to return home and to wait a further decision. In the meantime Colonel Maitland might be sent to Vienna, to proceed to his destination or not according to the intimation he may receive from Lord

Minto, who will receive instructions from you to probe the business to the bottom, and we shall then know the ground on which we proceed. But it appears to me to be very idle to send Maitland or anybody else to the Netherlands, without knowing whether everything we are attempting is not counteracted by the intrigues of Austria. I throw out these ideas for your consideration. Huskisson writes to me that Maitland is to be here to-morrow morning. I shall keep him here till I have your answer to this. I shall have occasion to write to you again in the course of the day, but I have sent this off by express that I may have your answer as quickly as possible. I have no messenger here, and the post does not go till five o'clock.

"We have this morning a fine wind west-south-west, which, if it continues, will carry off all our troops. There is rather less wind than could be wished, but it will probably increase towards the evening."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 10. Walmer Castle.—"I received your letter enclosing the one you had wrote to Lord Spencer on the subject of the Dutch seamen. Mr. Pitt has expressed a wish at different times to have the Dutch ships employed as transports in the event of our standing as much in need of an aid of that kind as would be the case if all our wishes and prospects could be realised. Amidst the hurry which continues to occupy me here, I have not time to enter minutely into the discussion with him, but I own to you, so far as I can at present make up an opinion on the subject, I am inclined to think that the only use we can make of the Dutch ships is to lay them up in ordinary, and in deposit for the Stadtholder till he assumes the government of his own country, and has the power of government so completely established in his person as to enable him to wield the military strength of it with effect. Till that time comes, they ought to be kept in custody for him without being used at all. If we do use them to any purpose, I am afraid we will create jealousies of our ultimate intentions, and thereby weaken the Orange party in Holland. If my idea is thought to be the right one, the seamen, so far as necessary for the care of the ships, should be placed on board of them, and the remainder mixed in our ships of all kinds, and thereby rendered useful to the public service. The officers who are well disposed to the Stadtholder may remain with their ships paid by Holland, or, if they are prisoners of war, such as Admiral Storey, or disaffected to the Stadtholder, they may be sent home on *parole* not, directly or indirectly, to serve against the Stadtholder or any of his allies.

"I received the paper you sent to me from Monsieur Dutheil. I don't see any positive harm in what he wishes, but I should think the object he has in view could be much better executed by adding to the strength of the Jersey cruisers, or by putting the arms, stores, and other things requisite on board such cruisers as the Admiralty may appropriate exclusively to

cruise on the coast of France; which I hope Lord Spencer means to do to a great extent; for I am positive unless that is made a separate system and service by itself, and not attached to the channel fleet, we never shall prevent the squadron at Brest from being supplied with whatever they want.

"The distant possessions of the Dutch and the commerce of such towns as may come under the government of the Stadtholder will require an early consideration, but I suppose that will be time enough when we meet in town at the meeting of Parliament.

"It was only this morning that I received the materials from the offices in London necessary to enable me to form a precise opinion upon what is proper to be proposed as to the militia. It will be the first thing I will do to-morrow morning, when I will write to you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 10. Hamburgh.—"I believe it is fit that I should send you the Duke of Brunswick's letter, because it is a formal confirmation of the valorous achievements of the Court of Prussia, but yet, if it had not been tempting from my very near neighbourhood to Cuxhaven, I should not have felt very anxious to convey to you what has awakened such splendid expectations in his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick. I am really sick of all his little tricks and mysteries and reserves and confidences, and begin to think him not unworthily placed in the command in chief of the little plaything army of Prussian observation. Meantime you will probably have heard from Garlike that General Stamford having crossed from Berlin to Frankfurt on the Oder, to pass a day with Panin on his road, Haugwiz has likewise disappeared from Berlin and is supposed to have projected to add himself to their society. Such, at least, is the speculation of our friends at Berlin, and I own I think it highly probable.

"I am waiting with great impatience for letters from England and Holland, yet the English mail does not arrive, and the Dutch packet of the 7th from the Hague and Leyden announces nothing new of any sort in the relative positions of the two armies in North Holland, although the numbers of each are said to be considerably increased, on one side by the Russian division, on the Batavian side by French reinforcements. I hardly expect to hear from the Hereditary Prince of Orange; but till I hear from you I shall not stir from hence with any confidence, unless some great and powerful motive should present itself, for, in the uncertain state in which you appear to be in your own destinations and arrangements, I believe I cannot do better by you than to wait the result of them. I am, however, God knows, impatient enough, impatient in England, impatient in Holland, and to the last degree impatient for the important result which Wickham has held before my eyes in Switzerland.

"I cannot finish this uninteresting letter without scolding once again, that I have not to this moment either Abercrombie's instructions or Malcolm's, though your despatch announced them to me as already sent three weeks ago to me.

"I have written again to Lord Minto and to Sir C. Whitworth, but it is not worth while to send you all the repetitions of my lectures upon Austria."

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 10. Constantinople.—"I had hardly sent off my last private letter to your Lordship, in which I took the liberty to allude to some circumstances of my personal position, before I received such a distinguished proof of your benevolent recollection as the dispatch, my answer to which is annexed. I, of course, wished much of what is there expressed, upon the subject of pecuniary difficulties, left unsaid to a superior who thus shows the faithful servants of the King and their country *que les absents n'ont pas toujours tort*, and thus have left your Lordship every particle of the merit attached to the extension of His Majesty's bounty towards me, even to that of the original thought. As it is, I can only say that your kindness calls forth the most lively sentiments of gratitude; and in taking His Majesty's pleasure upon the subject matter of my petition, I hope you will vouch for my thankfulness in advance for whatever may be the measure of his gracious bounty; and make such my respectful thanks acceptable to our royal master."

VICE-ADMIRAL MITCHELL to EVAN NEPEAN.

1799, September 10. H.M.S. *Isis*, Mars Deep.—"I have not a moment to-day. What with sending off all the ships and prizes, getting above 3,000 volunteers from the Dutchmen, who have enlisted with the Hereditary Prince (who came from Embden two days ago) and landing all the marines from the fleet to assist in garrisoning the Helder. The General in want of every soul. There has been a severe cannonade this morning, the *Shannon* and some of the gun brigs have had their share of the village of Patten, where they are at present stationed to prevent the General's right flank being turned. No news from them, but as I must send another letter in a day or two, there will be plenty of letters by that time of information." *Extract.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY
to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 11. Headquarters, Schagen Brug.—"Having fully considered the position which the British troops had occupied on the 1st instant, and having in view the certainty of speedy and powerful reinforcements, I determined to remain till then on the defensive.

"From the information which we had received we were apprised of the enemy's intention to attack us, and we were daily improving the advantages of our situation. Yesterday morning at daybreak the enemy commenced an attack on our centre and right, from Saint Martin's to Petten, in three columns, and apparently with their whole force. The column on the right, composed of Dutch troops, and under the command of General Dendaels, directed its attack on the village of Saint Martin's. The centre column of the enemy, under the orders of General de Monceau, likewise composed of Dutch troops, marched on Crabbendam and Zyper Sluys. The left column of the enemy, composed of French, directed itself on the position occupied by Major-General Burrard, commanding the 2nd Brigade of Guards.

"The enemy advanced particularly on their left and centre with great intrepidity, and penetrated with the heads of their columns to within a hundred yards of the post occupied by the British troops. They were, however, everywhere repulsed, owing to the strength of our position and the determined courage of the troops.

"About 10 o'clock the enemy retired towards Alkmaar, leaving behind them many dead and some wounded men, with one piece of cannon, a number of waggons, pontoons and portable bridges. Colonel McDonald, with the reserve, pursued them for some time, and quickened their retreat. It is impossible for me to do full justice to the good conduct of the troops. Colonel Spencer, who commanded in the village of Saint Martin's, defended his post with great spirit and judgment. Major-General Moore, who commanded on his right, and who was wounded, though I am happy to say slightly, was no less judicious in the management of the troops under his command. The two battalions of the 20th regiment posted opposite to Crabbendam and Zyper Sluys did credit to the high reputation which that regiment has always borne. Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth of that corps, who had the particular charge of that post, received a severe wound in his leg, which will deprive us for a time of his services. The two brigades of Guards repulsed with great vigour the column of French which had advanced to attack them, where the slaughter of the enemy was great.

"I continue to receive every mark of zeal and intelligence from the officers composing the staff of this army.

"It is difficult to state with any precision the loss of the enemy, but it cannot be computed at less than 800 or 1,000 men, and on our side it does not exceed in killed, wounded and missing, 200 men." *Copy.*

THE SAME to THE SAME.

Private.

1799, September 11. Schagen.—"It is possible that my determination to remain on the defensive until reinforced may not meet with the approbation of his Majesty's ministers or of

professional men, yet I am certain that I have acted right. The difficulties of the country in a military point of view are such that to gain any advantage you must pay dear for it; but, independent of that, the risk of a check appeared so hazardous, and the hope of reinforcement so certain, that I trust my judgement is right. I believe I could not give a better proof of it than the business of yesterday—although the enemy had long made preparation for an attack, although they knew every inch of the country, and although they behaved in general with uncommon spirit, yet they were soon and severely repulsed.

“The enemy is certainly in great force; there could not have been less than 12,000 men in the field yesterday, probably more. The Dutch took every opportunity to desert, and, in a short time, near 300 made their escape. The troops behaved as well as I could wish; before the action was over they grew cool, reserving their fire, although full of ardour. The militia men are, I think, a superior race of men, and a great acquisition to the army at this time. I reckon that the troops I have with me are made for this campaign, and up to anything, if they do not receive an unforeseen check. The Hereditary Prince of Orange arrived a few days ago; he has many projects to which I listen, but follow what to me appears for our interest. He has organized 2,500 sailors and deserters, with which he wished to join this army and has solicited levy money and pay for them. My answer has been that they should be subsisted at the usual rate allowed to Dutch sailors and soldiers until I shall receive instructions from home. I have directed them to be sent to the island of Texel, there either to be cantoned or encamped. They shall have some arms, and they may either be employed on the armed vessels in the Zuyder Zee, or on the coasts of Friezeland in promoting a revolution. I really imagine the Prince has been deceived in thinking he had more friends than enemies in this country. If we can advance, everyone will be on our side, but there are few who are willing to risk anything.

“I am very happy the Admiral has been ordered to send to England all the line of battleships, British as well as Dutch—it has been my constant advice to him, but without any effect. Captain Oughton, his captain, has fortunately returned from England. He is a man of sense and alone can manage him. Captain Halkett, who was my brother's aide-de-camp and now mine, is an old officer. He received yesterday a severe wound which broke his jaw-bone. It would gratify my brother if he could get the brevet of major, to which he will be entitled in the first promotion. I shall ask this favour from the Duke of York, and shall be much obliged to you if you would be good as to mention him likewise to His Royal Highness.” *Copy.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY to
W. HUSKISSON.

1799, September 11. Schagen.—“I enclose a letter from the Hereditary Prince of Orange to me. I should be very sorry

to have at this moment 3,000 renegade Dutch sailors and soldiers with me. I have ordered them to the Texel Island, and have directed them to be subsisted as Dutch sailors and soldiers are in Holland. We repulsed the enemy yesterday with considerable loss. Were the Dutch troops, who really behaved well notwithstanding their disaffection, at liberty, they would desert in great numbers, but they are strictly watched, and when any man is found deserting he is shot. Our people behaved wonderfully well, considering they never fired a shot in earnest. I long for our reinforcements. I know you will say why is Sir Ralph Abercromby so long inactive, but I am prepared for that. If no reinforcements arrive, and if I am no longer able to defend my position I must then fight. What an advantage would it be, what a saving would it make, if you had twenty 44-gun ships to act as transports; they would carry 10,000 men with their artillery and baggage." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, September 11. Dropmore.—“ Je vous envoie les dépêches que j'ai reçu par les dernières malles de la Suisse. Je dois croire que le Maréchal Souvarow n'avait pas lu le traité conclu à Petersbourg pour les troupes de Korsakow. Vous sentirez que je ne puis me dispenser de faire des représentations là-dessus à Petersbourg; mais je le ferai du ton qui convient à la conduite qu'on y observe à notre égard (dont nous ne pouvons assez vous louer) et aux ordres que je sais que l'Empereur avoit donné au General Korsakow de n'agir que de concert avec notre ministre.

“ Le Maréchal Souvarow aura, en attendant, reçu l'ordre de Vienne de se rendre avec son corps en Suisse. Son arrivée mettra fin, j'espère, à tout cet embrouillage, et délivrera la Suisse, comme il a déjà fait à l'égard de l'Italie.

“ Thugut consent aujourd'hui à ce que l'Archiduc et son armée restent sur la droite des Russes, et co-opèrent avec eux pour la délivrance de la Suisse, et même pour les opérations ultérieures.”

Postscript. “ Ce n'est qu' aujourd'hui que ces dépêches m'ont été renvoyées par le Roi, autrement je vous les aurois envoyées plustôt, pour vous mettre à même d'écrire dans le même sens que moi sur cette facheuse affaire.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, September 11. Dropmore.—“ I did not write to you by last night's post, because I guessed from the contents of your private letters, of which five reached me at once, that you would be before this time at the Texel. But this morning it has occurred to me that this may be doubtful, and I therefore write these few lines to say that, with the turn affairs have taken, I am quite satisfied that your judgment is infinitely better than ours on this point, and that you will be of ten times the use in

Holland that you could have been at St. Petersburg. As I send this by an extra packet, I will not delay the messenger by adding anything more to this letter, but when I hear of you again I will write fully.

"On your arrival in Holland, or soon after, you will find the Duke of York instructed to consider and communicate with you as the person destined to be his Majesty's Ambassador there, and charged in the meantime to prepare the way for the arrangements which the King has in view; and you will also find instructions there for your conduct in that charge." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 11. Altona.—"In forwarding the messenger Lyell with his Petersburg dispatches, I have nothing to add to my letter of yesterday except that I learn from Garlike, by a letter dated 9th instant, that another courier has arrived from Paris to Otto; Otto has as yet made no communication to Alvensleben, but the language of the French party at Berlin and of the courier himself is, that the French Directory will comply with the demands of Prussia, and that the idea of Prussian war is very unpopular at Paris, especially since the exhausted state of their treasury is known. It is known to the courier himself, as he is said to have declared that they could not give him money enough for his journey to Berlin. This intelligence may make them feel something stouter at Charlottenburg, but will not, as I believe, yet make them act like men. I am disappointed in finding by Sir Charles that no minister is yet named from Petersburg to Berlin, but I have still some hopes of this being effected by Panin's appointment, and by the new demonstration of Prussia becoming more popular with Paul.

"I am harrassed here by the uncertainty of all the Dutch reports, and the total want of any authentic intelligence, but I trust that many hours will not elapse before I shall hear either from the Hereditary Prince or from Lingen. If there is any truth in the extent of the reinforcements sent to Daendels, those reinforcements must surely be made at the expense of what they had collected for the defence of Zealand, and in that case, the second Russian division might perhaps undertake with advantage that difficult attack instead of the more practicable disembarkation at Armeland. Is it not worth thinking of? I could, if I would, feel a little out of humour with the extraordinary apathy of the good people of the United Provinces; they seem to me to be content to stand by and see fair play, as if they themselves took no real interest in the struggle. If my Prince had remained upon the confines at Lingen, I should not have ceased to represent against this universal inactivity at such a moment, and I should have urged him to recommend among his friends in the interior to partake a little more of the dangers of the struggle which we are making for them. I comfort myself, however, with trusting that he is somehow or other employed to the same good purpose by Abercrombie."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 11. Dropmore.—“I am really sorry to trouble you again about Sir Watkin’s regiment, but you will see by the enclosed letters that it is unavoidable.

“Sir Watkin, with his whole regiment, have volunteered for foreign service, and are eager to be allowed to go. This is refused them, and, in the same moment, his men are enlisted out of his regiment to serve in the regulars. He complains to Lord Cornwallis, and receives for answer ‘that this is done by express orders from England.’ I write to you at the same time upon it, and you tell me that the whole must be a mistake, and that Lord Cornwallis knows his business too well to do any such thing.

“While this is going on, and without any previous notice to him, an inspecting general is sent down to his regiment to draft the horses that are judged most fit for service, in order to mount the regulars.

“I leave you to judge whether this conduct can produce anything but incurable disgust, and a total disinclination to aid the plans of those who, instead of animating by encouragement and attention the zeal and activity of young men of this description, are studiously throwing in their way discouragement to which it is now acknowledged that even mere professional soldiers ought not to be exposed.

“Sir Watkin, I see, believes that Lord Buckingham’s Irish *sins* (for so it seems his efforts in the service of his country are considered at the Castle) are punished on him. I am willing to hope that a less unworthy motive has dictated a very unworthy treatment, but, be this as it may, I am sure that Sir Watkin’s claim to justice will not be disregarded by *you*, in whose particular department it lies to do him justice. I have therefore dissuaded him from coming to you at Walmer to state his case, because I really think that nothing can add to the impression which you will receive from the facts themselves, without any addition from his feelings upon them. He remains here to receive your answer to this letter.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 11. Walmer Castle.—“The best way I can convey to you the ideas I entertain respecting the further aid from the militia is to send you the perusal of a letter I have this morning wrote to your brother. It will save me the trouble of writing another to you which, in fact, would be only a repetition of what I have wrote to him. After perusing it you will forward it to Lord Buckingham.

“Colonel Maitland is come this morning. I have desired him to entertain himself the best way he can all the forenoon, as I can say nothing to him till I hear from you.

“Captain Popham came here yesterday morning, and it is my intention to send him to Holland. He knows every inch of the country remarkably well, and, besides that, I think he may

be of great use to keep all things smooth and well with the Russians. Mr. Pitt showed me your brother's letter. I think it right in consequence of that perusal to mention to you that I am afraid you will find more trouble on the subject of the congress at Petersburg than your brother is aware of. Captain Popham says that of all the subjects he [Paul I.?] talked of, he conceived him more eager on that than any other. Independent of his superior *hereditary* Imperial rank, he thought that the predicament in which he stood gave him a right to the congress being at Petersburg in place of Vienna, for that he had nothing to ask, whereas Austria was grasping at everything; and that his character as umpire would enable him to check that spirit, and decide every difference agreeable to the wishes of England. I need not trouble you with all the details of our conversation, but I thought it right to give you this much. From all that I can collect from Popham he is blindly devoted to England, and it is difficult to tell whether he hates Austria, Prussia, or the Duke of Brunswick most.

"I shall write to the Duke of York this morning, and send him the papers you transmitted to me this morning, desiring him to take copies, and send me back the originals, for I have only one writing clerk here to copy anything for me, and I keep him fully occupied. My opinion clearly is that the provinces of Groningen and Friesland should be an object of immediate attention; but I don't like to give any positive instruction to that purpose till I hear that the Russians are arrived, or that our reinforcements can join them. They are all embarked and laying in the Downs, but, unless some wind springs up, they cannot stir. It is at present a dead calm. From the French papers they know exactly our strength, and, if they speak truth, they have already, and will have, a superior force to attack us. I don't believe it, and have no apprehension of the conflict; but the first thing undoubtedly is to beat completely that army which they have collected from all quarters."

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 11. Dropmore.—"I lose not a moment to answer your letter which I have just received, and to entreat you not to think of losing the time that must pass in sending Colonel Maitland to Vienna.

"It is clear Malcolm must be recalled, and unless we mean to abandon the thing altogether, we must have an active and able man upon the spot to take the immediate direction of it. The intrigues of the Austrians are an additional reason for this. We must do the thing for ourselves. We know that Thugut does not mean that his Court should hold the Netherlands, for he has told Lord Minto so quite distinctly. He will therefore not openly oppose our measures, though he will certainly intrigue against them. But we may negotiate with him while we are acting, whereas, if we wait to act till our negotiation has succeeded, he will spin it

out into endless length, and he will at last make a great favour of allowing us by our money and efforts to conquer the Netherlands which he neither means to conquer nor to hold.

"I had hoped to send you to-day the sketch of an instruction which I thought might be given to Colonel Maitland ; but all the mails are come pouring in upon me from Weymouth, and I shall not have time to-day. To-morrow I will send it you without fail, but, as it is very urgent that Colonel Maitland should go and take the business out of Malcolm's hands, perhaps you had best desire him to return to town, and make the preparations for his journey ; and, if he can come here any day that suits him, I shall be very glad to see him." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 12. Harley Street.—"Je vous remercie pour la communication que vous avez eu l'amitié de me faire des papiers que vous avez reçu de la Suisse, que je vais remettre à Mr. Hammond. La conduite du Maréchal Souvorow m'auroit paru étrange hiér-au-soir quand j'ai reçu vos communications, si dès le matin, je n'avois pas compris la facheuse situation de ce grand homme, par les papiers que j'ai reçu de ma Cour par le courier du Chevalier Whiteworth.

"Lisez, je vous supplie, l'incluse que j'ai reçu, et vous verrez qu'il est réduit à l'état le plus facheux, graces aux infamies redoublées de Thugut, du conseil Aulique de guerre à Vienne, et des généraux Autrichiens en Italie, qui tous, dépendent du Baron, ne cessent d'intriguer et de contrecarer ce sauveur de l'Italie, des provinces que l'Autriche a dans ce pays ; et qui auroit sauver l'Europe si on l'auroit laissé faire, en ordonnent en meme tems à l'Archiduc de l'imiter. Emporté par son zèle, il n'a ménagé ni sa perssone ni ses braves compatriotes, qui, à cause de ça, étoient réduit à 6,000 à la bataille de Novi, et peut-être n'en reste-il pas 3,000. A mesure que les Autrichiens gagnent de pays, et voyent diminuer le nombre des Russes, leurs intrigues et leurs désobeissance contre lui doivent augmenter. Si à l'époque du six juillet ce grand homme étoit réduit à supplier son souverain de lui permettre de quitter un comandement d'une armée qu'il ne peut plus conduire, ayant les bras liés, et entouré de basse jalousie et d'intrigues, le mal empirent toujours, dans quel état devoit-il donc être quelque peu avant et surtout après la bataille de Novi ? Je le crois réduit à une poignée de ses propres troupes, les seules sur les quelles il peut se fier ; et je vois avec douleure la possibilité que ce grand homme, dont la vie est si précieuse pour l'Europe entière, succombera sous quelque trahison, dont il ne s'est garantit que par ses propres troupes, qui périront tous avec enthousiasme pour sa conservation perssonelle. Mais ils sont en si petit nombre qu'en vérité ce n'est que la Providence qui le sauvera. L'Autriche est déjà en possession du Milanais, du Piémont, et les légations de Ferare, de Bologne, et de Ravène. Souvorow ne lui est plus nécessaire ; il lui est même dangereux,

car, s'il aide au rétablissement de la monarchie Française, cette même monarchie empêchera l'Autriche de garder ce qu'elle a envahie sur le Roi de Sardaigne et sur le Saint Siège. Je vous prie donc de considérer l'extrémité où il étoit quand il demandoit des renforts Russes à Korssakoff. Je voudrois déjà le voir avec le corp du Général Rebender en Suisse, et quitter cette Italie où, pour prix de ses glorieux travaux, il n'a rencontré que jalousie, intrigues, et contradictions de toutes espèces. Je vous envoie tout plain d'autre communications. Je les ai fais traduire et copier pour vous, ainssi vous pouvez les garder toutes.

"Mon ami Kotchoubei a quité; c'est une grande perte pour mon pays. Le Comte Panin, que j'aime et que j'estime, sans avoir sa place, fera les fonctions. J'aurois mieux aimé pourtant que le premier resta, et le second fut à la place de Razoumoukoi pour tenir tête à Thugut."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, September 12. Dropmore.—"You will probably receive with this a letter which I wrote yesterday, foreseeing the probability of your remaining at Hamburgh. I have little to add to it in consequence of your private letter (No. 57) of the 6th instant, which I received after dispatching my messenger to London. I heartily rejoice that you have judged so much better than we did about your Petersburgh journey, and I am impatient to reap the advantage of your presence in Holland, as while you remain at Hamburgh you are equally undergoing your exile, and we get no good from you.

"The Grand Pensionary has done much since he came out of the country, and his papers are full of good sense and energy. I am not sure that I go along with him in all the detail of what he proposes, but I am impatient to be there *in your person* (not in my own) in order to form a better judgment. Hammond will send you with this an order to any frigate to carry you to the Texel. You will find there instructions from me addressed to you as to the person destined by his Majesty to assume the character of his Majesty's Ambassador to the States General when restored, and a direction to the Duke of York to consider and communicate with you accordingly.

"Any ideas of my going are now far less important. We are going to meet Parliament in ten days, to get 20,000 more militia, and even after that is over, there can be little use in my coming where you are. If on the spot you really think otherwise, I must, of course, decline no duty that I can do.

"I say nothing of our Holland hopes. Abercromby waits the arrival of the reinforcements, and thinks himself then secure of doing without loss what might now cost some considerable sacrifice of men. I hope the winds will not make the interval long, for the loss of time is the only thing that can do us real mischief. We have now fairly 44,000 men there or on their way there. Undoubtedly this is more than enough to do the business.

"Malcolm has bedeviled his business already, and Maitland is going to replace him. He will be put in correspondence with you, and his instructions sent to you, I trust, with more punctuality than Malcolm's were, after I had given the order for that purpose.

"I mentioned to Fagel your wish about Stamford; but he gave me reasons, which I think quite satisfactory, for his not coming to Holland till the old Prince comes; and from what I have already seen of the *priggishness* of the latter, I am sure the longer he stays the better it will be for your comfort, and for the success of his business and yours."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799,] September 12. Walmer Castle.—"You are so much better informed respecting the object of Colonel Maitland's mission than I am, that I have not the least hesitation in acquiescing in your opinion upon it. He has left me and will be with you to-morrow, and return the day after on his way to Emden, where he proposes to land. Be pointed in your instructions to him, and in explaining the full extent of your hopes and views, for I unaffectedly confess myself much a stranger to the subject; and if I am to take the superintendence of it, I should wish you to cause somebody in your Office collect together all the intelligence on which you proceed, that I may make myself thoroughly master of it. Without that I shall proceed very blindly in the business; and, of course, very unpleasantly both to myself and to the public service."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 12. Admiralty.—"No news yet of the arrival of the Dutch ships from the Texel, nor even, that I can find, of their making any movement towards coming away. It is so essential that they should come away that, if it were possible, I should think even now some intimation should be sent from the Prince of Orange of his wish to that effect; more especially as the Hereditary Prince (who, I believe, arrived there on the 7th in the evening) may have thrown some obstacle in the way. I understood from Fagel (or from you) that he had conceived they were to remain at the Texel, and if so, it is not impossible that his opinion may have interfered with the execution of our orders to Admiral Mitchell; and, in that case, I submit to you whether it might not be advisable to get the Stadtholder either to send an order, or write to the Hereditary Prince upon it; in doing which there may probably be little difficulty when he shall have been informed by M. Fagel of the result of your conversation of to-day respecting their ulterior situation.

"I own I shall not feel easy till they are safe on this side of the water."

Postscript. "I am afraid our hopes of the Spanish squadron are vanished, as Warren does not appear to have seen anything of them."

LORD GRENVILLE to HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE
DUKE OF YORK.

1799, September 12. Dropmore.—“Count Rhön, who will have the honour to deliver this letter to your Royal Highness, is charged by the Prince of Orange with two commissions, the one for raising any armed *bourgeoisie* in the province of Holland that may be necessary for co-operating with your Royal Highness's army; the other, for taking a provisional superintendence of the Admiralties of the different Provinces, he having been employed in that department before the revolution. His zeal and activity are, I believe, not unknown to your Royal Highness, and he seems animated, on the present occasion, with the strongest desire to be useful to the common cause.

“As from the circumstance of his birth he is strictly a subject of his Majesty, and not an alien, he has suggested to me whether your Royal Highness might not grant to him such a military commission as might serve as a protection to him, in case of his falling into the hands of the enemy. The fear of retaliation will, I trust, operate as an effectual security in every case of Dutchmen found in arms against the present government of that country. But if your Royal Highness shall not see any objection to comply with Count Rhön's request, it may gratify him, and afford to him a mark of attention and of distinction to which his attachment to his Majesty's interests, under all circumstances of the last twelve years in Holland, seems well to entitle him.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 13. Dropmore.—“Maitland has just left me. We agreed that he should go without delay and that his instructions should follow him. I stated to him that these would turn on four points principally.

1. “Our wish to see the 17 provinces united.
2. “That he was therefore to keep that object in view; but,
3. “To endeavour to inform himself of the disposition of the country respecting it, and
4. “To contrive, if possible, to keep these questions out of discussion, and to direct an immediate insurrection to the sole object of delivering themselves from France; shewing the reasoning men among them, that this must put them in a condition to do themselves justice according to events as they may arise.

“You must certainly recall Malcolm. You will, of course, contrive it with such managements for him as you judge best, but I am satisfied the thing is indispensable.

“I will send you the draft of instructions for Maitland as soon as possible.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 13. Walmer Castle.—“Mr. Pitt has mentioned to me your wishes that I should write to the Duke of York on the subject of your brother coming there. I shall do so

at the same time that I send the official letter which, at your desire, Huskisson has prepared and sent me this morning for my signature. In truth, however, it is not necessary, for, before the Duke went from this, I explained to him your brother and perhaps you might ere long join him in Holland, and we all trusted a good deal to his known influence with the Orange family to forward all the ideas which your [brother] or you might have occasion to introduce. So far from jealousy, he expressed the greatest satisfaction at the prospect of it.

"The telegraph has this moment announced to me the glorious news from India."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 13. Walmer Castle.—"I hardly like to adhere to an opinion so opposite to yours, but, the more I consider the subject, the more I feel persuaded of the urgent importance of endeavouring if possible to reconcile the views of Austria and Russia, instead of leaving the former to settle with the latter as she can, or, in other words, leaving it to chance whether they are to agree at all, and whether the confederacy is to be dissolved, and the best prospects of the war defeated. Woronzow's manifesto seems to me, in fair reasoning, to prove that the very arrangement to which, by Lord Minto's dispatch, Thugut is pointing, is what we ought most to wish; namely, that the possession of the Netherlands should be transferred to Holland, and that Austria should hold the key of Italy. I see nothing in what is proposed that breaks in on our line of probity and morality, or bears the slightest resemblance to the scandalous treatment of Poland and Venice. In both those cases a neutral and unoffending power was sacrificed to a wanton plan of usurpation. Here, a country lost in war by the weakness of its own sovereign, and recovered without his participation by the arms of a third power, is proposed to be retained by that power to the advantage of the general system of Europe, and with an equivalent provided for the former sovereign, though not strictly entitled to any. If I do not deceive myself this is the real state of the case, and if it is, there is surely nothing in it inconsistent either with strict justice or sound policy. If the Emperor Paul cannot be reconciled to it, I admit that we ought not so to urge it as to risk the loss of his cordial friendship and co-operation, to which every other object ought to be secondary. But he cannot be offended by a fair statement of the arguments in its favour. If he is convinced by it, and accedes, we have, I think, a chance of securing something more like real concert with Austria than there is any hope of otherwise. If he refuses his assent, we must acquiesce in it, and make the best of it, and we shall then be no worse than if we now leave Austria and Russia to settle their clashing views as they can, without any attempt to conciliate them. This is the best view I can form of the subject, but I should like much to be able to talk it over with you fully, before anything further need be written. It is not, however, my

present intention, if I can help it, to be in town before to-morrow sennight. Is it quite impossible for you to come down here for a day or two in that interval? If it should, and you want me, I can come at any time on an hour's notice.

"Your proposed instructions for Maitland seem exactly right. I hardly know how to reason on the march of the Prussian troops. It must, I think, do good, unless it creates fresh embarrassment about the Netherlands. I return your brother's letter, and am very glad you are desiring him to proceed to Holland, though I cannot yet rejoice that he is not on his road to Petersburg. Dundas has been working hard at the militia plan, as you have seen by this time from his letter to Lord Buckingham, and I have no doubt we shall digest it thoroughly before Parliament meets. The telegraph just brings us the account of the capture of Seringapatam, and carries one's thoughts to a greater distance than any other event could just now from the opposite coasts."

Postscript. "Dundas, to whom I have read this letter, agrees entirely in the sentiments I have stated."

CAPTAIN HOME POPHAM, R.N., to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 14. Helder.—"Although I did not arrive here before the Duke of York, yet I was so soon after him that he had no intercourse with the Russian troops beyond reviewing the seven thousand men who landed late last night, previous to their march to camp. Everybody is highly pleased with their soldier-like, hardy appearance, and I will be responsible to you their appearance is the worst feature in their character.

"If you look forward to a continuance of the war beyond next spring, I think you may procure a large army in Russia by that time, if the arrangements are made immediately, and if I am not mistaken. On the basis of those arrangements I believe the Emperor has the power of levying recruits in the proportion of one man in ten during a war, but I do not understand that he has exercised this power to any extent. His Imperial Majesty, if he has such power, might raise any given number immediately at our expense, and mix them with his garrison troops, and before the spring they would be very good soldiers, especially as every Russian is more or less a soldier by nature. This may be an object worth enquiring about officially from Sir Charles Whitworth, to whom I will immediately write on the subject."

Extract.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 14. Altona.—"The despatches from Mr. Garlike which are just arrived here to me under flying seal are forwarded by me to sail with to-morrow's packet. I enclose to you a copy of the letter which I wrote to Mr. Garlike, who desired from me my advice upon this occasion, and I add likewise his

private letter to me in order to give you the sum total of the history of Mr. Yorke, of whose intentions there seem to be very strong grounds of suspicion, so strong indeed that I am uncharitable enough to rely more upon them than upon his penitence and conversion in Dorchester gaol; and I have accordingly sent back Garlike's courier advising, as you see, a very close attention to Mr. Yorke, and even his arrest if the suspicious circumstances concerning him should increase enough to warrant it. It is possible that if he has bad intentions, as I apprehend he must, they may be connected with Watson, whom Mr. Garlike expected to be able to find at Berlin. Sir J. Crawford knows nothing of Yorke's arrival except hearing that a man of that name had landed, calling himself a colonel in 2nd Dragoon Guards; he never saw him nor heard Mr. Cockburn speak of him, but I have desired him to trace what has passed at the house of Mr. Parish, and I shall desire Mr. Cockburn, by a line to Cuxhaven, to write instantly to you all that he knows concerning this man.

"We are still without any important intelligence from Holland; the Dutch minister here reports his belief of an attack on the English on the 10th in which our troops were defeated, and a battery taken near Pettun, but nobody in Hamburgh appears to give credit to this Batavian intelligence. The wind is now favourable enough to bring news from England or from the Texel; and I am the more impatient for it as the delay in sending to me Abercrombie's and Malcolm's instructions leaves me quite in the dark about all your last decisions respecting Holland and Flanders. I trust, however, that good use will be made of the Hereditary Prince of Orange in North Holland. Were he still upon the frontiers, I should think it highly necessary to urge, through him, more active and open enterprise in the interior of the country; for there is hitherto an apathy and inactivity among the partisans of the House of Orange in the provinces that requires all his influence and exertion to remove, and I cannot help still wishing that he was upon the frontiers or in the provinces to make his countrymen work a little for themselves.

"I fear, by the last papers from Germany, that the Austrian army had quitted Swisserland without making the promised attack.

"Every hour adds to my impatience; nothing from Lingen, the Texel, or England! The German-Hamburgh paper has just appeared with the Batavian victory of the 10th. I have not time to let Henry translate it. I trust it is not true, and certainly it is not believed. It announces a loss on our side of 8,000 killed and wounded in the defeat of the left wing, and says that our army retreated to Shagerboorg, *quod Deus avertat!*"

Enclosure.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to B. GARLIKE.

1799, September 14. Altona.—"I have just received from Street your two letters of the 11th instant, together with the two despatches to Lord Grenville, and the letter to Count Woronzow.

"I had heard Yorke was tried for sedition, was found guilty, and was sentenced to solitary imprisonment for a certain period. I have occasionally heard that he conducted himself in prison with every appearance of penitence and remorse, and, I believe, that he has written a pamphlet, during his confinement in Dorchester goal, in which he has made a public recantation of his former democratical principles. If I recollect right, the period of his imprisonment is expired, and I have some notion that he has latterly applied for a lieutenant-colonel's commission in some corps of yeomanry, which, however, as I apprehend, was not granted to him. Under these circumstances it might not unnaturally have happened that he was desirous of changing the scene, and of passing some time of purification in a foreign country. His appearance therefore upon the Continent would not much have surprised me, though I confess that his appearance at Berlin would have in some degree engaged my attention in whatever manner it had been accounted for. The manner in which it has been accounted for, in his conversation with you, is certainly very much made to create suspicion of a very unfavourable nature to him. I cannot think it probable that this person should in any shape be employed on business of so very confidential a description. I see no reason to believe that, if the English ministers had any desire to negotiate with the French generals in Switzerland, they would have employed Mr. Yorke for that purpose; still less can I conceive that it is possible that they would direct him to avoid all communication with Mr. Wickham; and, in truth, this latter circumstance is in itself so extremely suspicious that it gives to me an entire distrust of the truth of the whole of his narrative, and would certainly induce me, if I was in your situation, to delay as much as possible his departure from Berlin, and to take care not to lose sight of him till better information shall be obtained of his true and real designs.

"It is impossible not to be struck with the inconsistency of his conduct; he affects to have received orders in England to avoid the appearance of communication with the King's ministers abroad, and yet he claims, from former acquaintance, the protection of the King's Consul at Hamburg, and obtains money under that protection. In addition to this, he ostentatiously attaches himself to one of the King's messengers, who by the bye ought not to have conducted him. He comes to you at Berlin for a passport, which he might have had from Sir James Crawford if his story had been true; and he does not hesitate to draw upon the King's Under Secretary of State for money, at a moment when he professes to have to conceal his communications with the English Government.

"In addition to all this I cannot feel satisfied with the confidence which he expresses in obtaining a passport from Otto, and I cannot put by from my recollection the reason which you had to suspect Dr. Watson at Berlin, nor the possibility of some ill intention arising out of their intercourse, if they have met there. My advice therefore to you is to endeavour, by fair means, to delay his journey till his story is cleared up, to have him

detained if increased suspicion should justify that; but, at all events, not to lose sight of him, nor to fail to give notice of him to Mr. Wickham, Lord Minto, and Lord Mulgrave.

"I hear Mr. Cockburn is at Cuxhaven; if he is I will write a line to him by the messenger who carries your dispatches, and desire him to write by this packet to Lord Grenville concerning Mr. Yorke."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, September 14. Dropmore.—"C'est avec la rage et le désespoir que je vous mande que l'Archiduc s'est retiré à Donaschingen, laissant l'armée du général Korsakow dans une position insoutenable, et abandonnant la Suisse à la fureur des régicides. Il s'excuse sur des ordres positifs de Vienne, et cela *après* que Wickham a reçu de Lord Minto l'assurance très expresse (que Thugut lui avoit donnée) qu'on avoit déjà envoyé à l'Archiduc l'ordre de rester.

"Ordinairement je ne suis pas prompt à me représenter des maux futurs—cette fois-ci, je vous l'avoue, je crains les suites les plus funestes, et pour l'armée Russe, et pour toute l'Europe.

"Quand les dépêches seront retournées de Weymouth, je vous les communiquerai. Je n'attends que la réponse de M. Pitt pour venir en ville, ainsi je crois que ce sera plutôt là qu'ici que nous nous verrons. Ajoutez à cette perfidie l'infâme mensonge par laquelle on attribue cette résolution à la demande, *sine quâ non*, de nos deux Cours, pendant qu'il y a trois mois que nous ne faisons autre chose que d'insister sur la nécessité de soutenir, et de renforcer, de ce côté-là !

"La prise de Seringapatam est venue bien à propos pour me consoler. Ce grand et brillant succès est d'une importance incalculable pour nos intérêts, et j'ai le bonheur de voir qu'il est principalement, je dirais même presque entièrement, dû aux talens et à la fermeté et décision de mon plus intime ami, avec lequel je suis lié depuis l'enfance.

"Vous vous en réjouirez et pour ma patrie, et pour moi."
Copy.

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 14. Harley Street.—"Je me réjouis avec vous, et je vous félicite bien sincèrement sur l'importante victoire qui, d'un seul coup, rafermi votre puissance dans l'Inde. Quel beau paragraphe de plus pour le discours du Roi le mardi, vingt-quatre du mois ! La Hollande et l'Orient vous couvre de gloire. Si nous n'avions que nos ennemis commun à combattre, l'Europe seroit bientôt tranquille, mais la conduite de nos perfide et prétendus amis est ce qu'il y a de plus désespérant. On croit que les Français veulent de nouveau tenter un débarquement en Irlande; je vous avoue que je le désire, suposent qu'on y est bien préparé à les recevoir à bon coup de bayonnettes; espèrent, en même tems, que ce sera une belle occasion à votre flotte pour battre la Française."

Postscript. “ Cette lettre étoit fermé quand j’ai reçu votre billet qui m’accable. Comment est-ce que l’Archiduc a pu manquer à sa parole, après avoir tout concerté pour une attaque en commun avec Korssakoff. Je vous avoue que je regarde l’Europe comme perdue si Thugut n’est pas chassé. Je vous attendrai en ville, et j’espère que vous communiquerez chez nous, *in extenso*, toutes les perfidies de ce maudit Baron Autrichien.”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 14. Vienna.—“ It is literally true that I had concluded the dispatch which accompanies this, and that it was nearly copied fair, before Wiffin arrived. It is impossible for me to detain the India dispatches, and I must therefore confine myself to say that I have been able to give the dispatches brought by Wiffin a very hasty perusal. It is with the most unfeigned satisfaction that I receive such distinct instructions, accompanied by such powerful means of enforcing them; and I will not lose a moment in assuring you that I shall execute your intentions to the full extent, and in the spirit which you direct; observing only that, much having been already gained since the date of the dispatches which you had received when these instructions were framed, some modification in the remonstrances on those parts may be admissible. I flatter myself the Emperor may be brought, without approaching to the danger of a rupture, or to any public indication of such a danger, to the specific measures we may have occasion to demand, although I still apprehend any material change in the manner of *feeling* and *seeing* on the great interests of Europe now depending, in this very particular old man with whom alone the business of this empire can be transacted, must be the effect of a slower process. At the same time I should not despair of this, if his conduct should not continue to be such as to render it impossible, consistently with dignity, to preserve a footing of personal habits with him. But in this, as in everything else, I shall be guided by your instructions. I cannot speak positively to the extent of the Austrian views in Italy, but from the latest notions I have formed, it seems probable that, though their appetites and their wishes would be insatiable, their actual *views* have not extended distinctly beyond the Piedmontese barrier, and perhaps the Legation of Ferrara, if not that of Bologna also. But by their equivocal system of not restoring the old governments, their object is first to establish such a compulsory administration in those countries as to draw from them resources for the war while it lasts, and, secondly, to leave as much open for discussion at the peace as possible. I do not conceive there is any notion of depriving the Grand Duke of Tuscany of his dominions in the end. At the same time these alarms and doubts in the minds of both the countries concerned, and of the rest of Europe, concerning the use to be made by Austria of her victories over the former

invaders of Italy, must be very prejudicial to the character and interests of the anti-gallican cause which we are maintaining. I am, therefore, still convinced of the great expediency of bringing this Court to a clear explanation and understanding with the Allies on these points, by the shortest and speediest course. Thugut often repeats his readiness to enter on this discussion, and expresses a concurrence in the desire which I always repeat to him of seeing every ground of diffidence and alienation cancelled. We shall see what he will do towards it."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 15. Harley Street.—"Je dois vous avertir pour votre propre information que Thugut, ingénieux et persévérant à entraver la vigueur des opérations contre la France, et diminuer le nombre des troupes qui agissent contre elle, s'oppose au traité que le Duc de Wurtemberg étoit sur le point de faire avec ce pays, et que ce faible Duc a envoyé un ordre secret à Mylius de trainer la chose en longueur jusqu'à ce qu'il ai pu avoir lue à Stutgarde la réponse de ce qu'il a écrit à Petersbourg pour demander conseil. Il auroit dû commencer la chose en demandant conseil chez nous, au lieu de permettre que Zeplin signa un traité à Vienne, sans savoir qui payera les troupes. S'il se seroit adressé chez nous, on lui aurait déconseillé de faire de traité à Vienne mais de ne s'engager qu'avec l'Angleterre. Vous voyez donc que les six milles hommes de Wurtemberg sont problématiques: qu'il n'est que trop certain, malheureusement, que vous n'aurez pas de troupes Suisses, et que c'est la France qui les aurat par des réquisitions forcées: il est, par conséquent, fort heureux que l'Electeur Palatin ofre dans ces circonstances dix milles Bavaois, qui joindroient le corp du Général Korssakoff. Hasseland a été ce matin chez moi; il est impatient d'avoir quelque réponse, et il m'a dit qu'il vous écrirait ce soir."

Enclosure.

M. DE KALITCHEFF to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, August 31. Vienna.—"Dans mes précédentes lettres j'ai informé votre Excellence combien le crédit du Baron Thugut influait sur les opérations des armées en général; cela continue encore et entrave à différentes occasions, plus ou moins, les opérations militaires; leur origine vient du genre d'intrigue que les instructions de ce ministre et sa manière de conduire les affaires y introduit par tout. Il aime malheureusement depuis longtems le métier qu'il n'a jamais fait, celui de la guerre. Il y a des anecdotes curieuses à cet égard. Celle entre autres où pour s'être trouvé à une affaire d'avant poste en se rendant en Turquie, il pria Joseph second de le faire Général-Major; c'est véritablement une faiblesse qu'il a indépendamment de l'envie de tout gouverner et diriger. Depuis qu'il est Ministre, il conduit le département de la guerre, et pour

pouvoir le conduire à son gré, il en a éloigné à force de dégoûts le Maréchal Lascey, et il laisse ce département sans Président, sous la direction des Conseillers Turchheim et Tige, qui lui sont entièrement soumis. Dans toutes les armées dont le général ne lui est pas avenglement dévoué, il y forme un parti. Les gens qui le composent l'avertissent de tout, et comme ils connaissent ses goûts, pour lui plaire ils intriguent, blament tout, et font des cabales.

“C'est ce qui met au désespoir l'Archiduc Charles, qui déteste Thugut, et que ce Ministre n'aime pas non plus, et le contrarie tant qu'il peut. Le Comte Diedrichstein, qui est un créature de ce Ministre, a été envoyé en grande partie chez l'Archiduc dans cette vue. En Italie, il a choisi le général Mélas, officier de fortune mais distingué, habile dans son état, mais qui doit être borné sur tout autre objet. Pour suppléer à l'intrigue qui manque à Mélas, et aussi pour tenir sa plume, car il ne sait pas écrire quatre lignes, on a envoyé le général Bellegarde, homme de beaucoup de talent et d'esprit, très ambitieux, très immoral, dévoué au Baron Thugut, quoiqu'il doive sa fortune à l'Archiduc ; mais celui-ci le hait, parcequ'il l'a indignement trompé en se dévouant au Baron. Le Marquis Chasteler, connu pour avoir un grand talent, a été pris en affection par le Comte Souvoroff, et, malgré quelques nuages, cette affection se perpétue. Chasteler, dès lors, a perdu l'affection de Thugut, et a excité la jalousie de Mélas et surtout de Bellegarde. Chasteler a eu l'imprudence d'écrire ici par la poste à ses amis ; il leur exprime son estime pour le Maréchal Souvoroff, son opinion de ses plans, et ce qu'il pense des détracteurs ; ses lettres ont été interceptées : dès lors on a songé à lui donner des dégoûts. Au moment même où il fut blessé, on avait résolu de recevoir sa démission s'il la présentait. Il y a ici un général appelé Lavection, l'ami intime du Baron, et l'objet de la haine de toute l'armée. Ce Lavection est officier de génie et d'artillerie ; c'est lui qui, malgré les représentations de toute l'armée, poussa le Maréchal de Wurmser à s'enfermer avec les débris de son armée dans Mantoue. Ce Lavection est ici l'homme que le Baron consulte en tout et par tout. Il est l'ennemi de Chasteler, et lorsque le Baron veut discuter un plan militaire qui ne lui convient pas, il charge de ce soin Lavection.

“À présent on otera Chasteler de l'armée d'Italie, le Maréchal Sovroroff veut l'y retenir ; c'est pour ce moment en grande partie le sujet des divisions.

“Ces mêmes divisions existent, et plus vives encore, à l'armée de l'Archiduc ; elles sont de part et d'autre le résultat nécessaire de cet état des choses.

“Le Baron de Thugut veut diriger les plans de campagne où les généraux sont sans talents, et, alors, en se soumettant à cette direction, ils sont battus ainsi que l'ont été Beaulieu, Alvinzi, et Wurmser ; ou ce sont des gens capables qui veulent faire eux-mêmes leur métier, et alors l'intrigue du Ministre les environne, et ne cesse de les entraver et les tourmenter. Sans la bravoure, l'intrépidité des troupes Russes, l'énergie du caractère et le talent

du Maréchal Souvoroff, les affaires de l'Italie n'auraient pas eu le succès brillant qu'elles ont eu. On est généralement d'accord que les avantages des armées d'Italie, et surtout de celle de la Suisse, seraient plus conséquents si les intrigues et les cabales du Baron de Thugut n'existaient pas." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 15. Walmer Castle.—“Whatever I may continue to think as to what might have been tried with advantage some time since, I certainly feel that all I have been proposing is put at present quite out of the question by the atrocious, and perhaps fatal, policy which Austria has adopted. The only chance which seems to remain for avoiding the consequences naturally to be expected, is in the possibility that the effect of your instructions to Lord Minto may have produced some change of resolution, before it is absolutely too late. Of this, however, I have not much hope, and rather expect to see the treacherous system of Austria soon completed by another separate treaty with France. In that case we must consider how the war is best to be carried by us and Russia only, unless the new state of things should lead Prussia to come forward; a circumstance which from their want of all energy and decision I very little expect, but which is just possible from the desire they will feel of making use of the present situation to draw Russia to a connection with them to the exclusion of Austria. If any symptom of such a disposition should appear, it may perhaps deserve consideration whether we might not aid it by proposing to them some concert about the Netherlands, which perhaps they would like for themselves, and from which they will certainly wish to exclude Austria. On the other and more probable supposition of our being left to act with Russia only, our means of acting, and with them our plans, must necessarily be much narrowed, but I should hope it may be still possible that the French may not consider their armies on the Swiss frontier enough at liberty to make, for some time, such a new disposition of them as would prevent us from making the attempt on Brest; and, if that should be practicable and successful, we may afterwards look with security to a limited and defensive war, till some new order of things works itself out in the interior of France. We shall probably want much of the aid of Russia, if not all it can give, to keep our hold in Holland. Any solid operation on France, unless preceded by a greater certainty than I ever expect to see before hand of a very powerful co-operation from within, will, I fear, be out of the question. If we have any force to spare, we may probably strike some blow against Spain by a Russian force brought to act with our own in the Mediterranean; but measures of this sort, though fit to be tried as far as they will go, fall wretchedly short of the prospects which seemed so lately within our reach. I hardly know, however, why I have gone so far into these speculations, which will be much better discussed in conversation. I meant

chiefly to say that I have deferred any resolution about returning to town till I hear from you again ; as I think it just possible from what you say, that my last letter may have since determined you to come hither. In that case, I should be very glad not to return to town till the end of the week, but otherwise I shall be ready to set out on hearing from you again, so as to meet you in town any day you name."

Postscript. "I return the papers from Woronzow, and Mulgrave's and Wickham's letters."

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 15. Verona.—"I shall proceed to Vienna, since you have officially directed me to do so, although I confess I do not understand what service I can render there. As the King does not pay any subsidy to the Emperor, our government, of course, can have no real influence at Vienna.

"You have made your option between being twice cheated, or a second time abandoned by the Austrian government ; and are no doubt prepared for the result of the alternative.

"I cannot say what foundation there may be for Suwarrow's intelligence about the objects of negotiation ; but as Thugut does not appear as strongly impressed as your Cabinet with the danger of French principles and a French Republican government, Austria certainly never can hope for a better opportunity of making peace upon mere territorial considerations. It is in this view worth while to advert to the pains which have been taken (in the direction of the latter operations of the armies in Italy and Switzerland) to leave the different territories in the hands to which they are destined by the plan of pacification mentioned by Marshal Suwarrow. Genoa is to remain *in statu quo*. Suwarrow is forbid to proceed after the battle of Novi, which laid that Republic open to him ; and the siege of Coni is to be the only remaining operation in Italy, as that will secure Piedmont, destined to Austria. Tortona, Alexandria, and Turin are garrisoned entirely by Austrians, when their army might have been considerably strengthened by throwing Piedmontese into the fortresses, which are covered by the main army, and not within reach of an enemy. The arms in the arsenal at Turin are refused to the Piedmontese, and claimed as Austrian property. Switzerland is to remain in the hands of the French. The municipality of Zurich has never been removed, and the French army is allowed to become double the number of the allies by the removal of every Austrian out of that country. Suwarrow's movement is very hazardous, and he seems himself to be aware that it is so, by an expression in the minute he delivered to me. Had the removal of Hotze taken place, it would have been impossible to undertake any offensive operations. Should Suwarrow's good fortune carry him through that which he has now undertaken, it will be impossible for him afterwards to maintain himself in the country with the Russians

alone (after Hotze shall have been removed, which he certainly will be) against the army of Massena, increased by the additional force which may be collected from the army of Italy, and perhaps still further assisted by enemies created in the country by the plunder and outrage of the Russian soldiery. The popular conduct of the Archduke, and the particularly rigid discipline with respect to plunder which he maintained in Switzerland, will form a striking contrast to the conduct of the *Cossagues*, which will (I fear) be such as to reconcile the people of the country to the return of the French. We can do nothing in Switzerland without the concurrence of Austria. It is melancholy to think that the gallant poor fellows in the little cantons, who have exerted themselves with so much spirit, should be delivered to the mercy of their oppressors. Yet that seems at present to be the fate to which they are destined by the Court of Vienna.

"I suppose Lord Minto will be entirely cured of the *frankness* of *Thugut's* communications, upon finding that the order to the Archduke to return to Switzerland has so entirely changed its shape *in transitu* as to have arrived in the form of an order to Hotze to withdraw. Thugut reminds me of Gay's fable of *Vice and the Juggler*. In point of ingenious invention and quickness of deception Comus and Breslaw are bunglers to this intellectual juggler.

‘But now and then they cheat the throng,
He every day, and all day long.’

Here *Milor Minto*, I give you an Archduke and his army on the right of the Russians; hold him fast; you see he is there; presto pass! Where is he? in Swabia! Now feel on the left; Hotze gone! The Austrians all conveyed away; the corps which were placed between removed; the Austrians withdrawn; the Russians left alone! The great King of Prussia said, *Quand les Souverains jouent les provinces, les hommes sont les jetons dont ils se servent pour les payer*; but he never thought of *escamoterie* with the same counters. Try Thugut, Lord Minto, and the four corps of troops, with a conjurer, a countryman, and counters, and it will make as good a sleight-of-hand trick as ever was exhibited at a fair. *Je me presse de rire de tout, crainte d'en pleurer.*"

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 17. Walmer Castle.—"I send you a copy of the private letter I have this morning received from Sir Ralph Abercrombie along with his public despatch, and also one to Huskisson. It is vastly comfortable to observe how soon our troops are getting into such a steadiness as to give the confidence in them to the general which he states."^{*}

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 17. Harley Street.—"Je vous envoie la traduction d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir de l'Empereur par votre courier arrivé de Petersbourg. Vous verrez sans doute

^{*} For the letters here referred to, dated September 11, see pages 386-387.

avec le même plaisir que je sens, comme dans toutes occasions l'Empereur de son propre mouvement imagine et saisi tout ce qu'il croit être utile ou agréable à ce pays-ci. C'est, en vérité, une bonne alliance que la notre. De part et d'autre on est franc, bons amis, et on ne cherche qu'à se rendre service cordialement."

Enclosure.

PAUL I, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, August 17. Petersburg.—"Désirant dans toutes les occasions de donner à Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne de nouvelles assurances de notre amitié sincère, nous offrons que si, en conséquence de quelques tentatives du Gouvernement François sur les côtes Britanniques ou sur celles d'Irlande, il existe la nécessité d'augmenter ses forces, dans ce cas on y emploie toutes nos troupes destinées pour l'expédition d'Hollande. En conformité de quoi on a envoyé des ordres au Général Herman."

Postscript. "*Ceci est ajouté de la propre main de l'Empereur.* 'Proposez aussi, en cas que l'expédition en Holland n'ait pas lieu, d'entreprendre quelque chose sur quelque point des côtes de France, entre Brest et Olonne, avec le secours surtout des Chouans ou des Royalistes.'" *Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 18. Park Street, Westminster.—"Whatever our views are respecting the Royalists, all proceedings about them must be at a stand if some new powers are not given to the Ordnance to procure a supply of arms, of which the amount disposable at present, and for a long while to come, is limited to 10,000. Something must be done also to quicken the zeal of the Admiralty, who refuse to send any vessel to the Morbihan upon the ground of danger to be apprehended from the French fleet. 'The sluggard saith there is a lion in the way.' I have not talked again to Lord Spencer, who is gone for a few days to St. Albans. But, if such objections are to prevail, it will be in vain to hope that anything can be done. The case of the Ordnance is, as Lord Howe explained to me yesterday, that the effect of the deficiency left by the Duke of Richmond still continues to be felt, and that, with all their hands employed, they do not expect to get, for a long while, of serviceable arms more than is necessary to supply the home demand; that, of consequence, the only method is to purchase foreign arms which are easily to be had, should they be authorized to send anyone to Hamburg for that purpose. Sir J. Craufurd has, I understand, written to say that he has had offers to the same effect; but the most regular way would be, I apprehend, to send some officer on the part of the Ordnance, as was done a year or two ago.

"The desperate course already begun by the Court of Vienna, with all the suspicions belonging to it, puts one upon the necessity of new plans and expedients; and calls up the question which I have hitherto hardly been willing to take into contemplation, of what it may be possible to do by the force of the discontents in

the interior, with the aid only of England and Russia. Many points must, to be sure, be previously settled, namely, the extent to which we will suffer ourselves to be engaged by operations in Holland and in Flanders; and the security that we can have of the continuance of a force even upon the frontiers of France, so as to prevent the Directory from making any large detachment from the regular armies now employed there. If regrets were of any avail, I should now regret the time which we have lost in putting the Royalists into that state of defence, which on every supposition is agreed to be necessary, and which, I fear, they will hardly attain before the Directory, whether it may be desirable or not, will compel them to act.

“There seem to be two distinct systems that may be followed for the employment of the force existing in the Royalist provinces; either the inhabitants may be considered as a mere body of insurgents, rendering the country in which they are, useless and difficult to the Directory, and facilitating the operations of regular armies that may enter France from without, in which case little more would be necessary than to supply them with arms, and such sums of money as might answer occasional and incidental purposes; or they may be considered as a body of people capable of themselves of furnishing a regular army, and fit to be treated by this country on the same footing in respect of expense as any power which we might subsidize. I have never considered them in this way in anything that I have said upon the subject, because I never saw any prospect of their being so considered by others, and was too happy to get such little assistance as might prevent the cause from absolutely falling to the ground, and the individuals from perishing. But it is a way in which they may very properly be looked at; and all the representations that I have heard from Puisaye’s time down to the present, give me reason to think that such a view of the subject, should we adopt it, or should we [be] driven to it, will not be found to deceive us.

“There are certainly many points of the coast, the Clos-Poulet, the Cotentin, a point not far from Brest, and others, of which with an army of 20,000 men we might be sure to get possession, and in which we might be sure to cover ourselves with an army of twenty or thirty thousand more before the enemy could bring any considerable force to act against us. Recollect that at Quiberon the troops were on shore for eight days before any enemy whatever appeared; and that the whole collected at last, in circumstances more favourable to the Directory than the present, was only 18,000. I can hardly entertain a doubt that a landing of 20,000 English and Russians, with a *proper proclamation* and a *French prince*, would throw the whole of the west of France into insurrection, and give more soldiers than you would know what to do with. Out of these it would not take long to select an army of twenty or thirty thousand, useful, serviceable, and capable of immediate operations.

"I am not checked in this hope by any slowness of operation that may as yet have appeared in Holland. Besides that, as yet, the question has not by any means been tried, the Dutch are a people from whom the same alacrity is not to be expected. It will be as much as we can fairly look to if they should declare in our favour, as soon as our superiority shall be clearly ascertained.

"Whatever is looked to, either as an object purely of hope, or as connected with anything that we are to do, it seems to be agreed that the first step to be taken is to supply the Royalists with what is necessary for their defence; and this, as you will perceive, cannot be done unless measures are taken for providing a supply of foreign arms.

"One word more upon a subject not immediately connected with the above, but very much connected, in my opinion, with the credit and character of the country. The foreign regiments now in our service, namely, Mortemart, Castries, and La Chatre, after having escaped a danger with which I am afraid they were threatened, of being stripped of all their Germans in order to recruit the new battalion of the 60th lately given to Brownrigg (I state the fact not upon any certain authority) are to be sent, as I hear, to join the Duke of York in Holland. If this is so, and that the Duke, as I likewise hear, means to employ these troops upon the outposts, a situation at once implying the greatest trust, and exposing them to the greatest danger, do we mean to leave them in a state of not being protected by the laws of war, but to be liable, in case of falling into the enemies' hands, to be put to death as rebels? It seems to me that our having done so heretofore has left no small reproach upon the country, which, I hope you will agree with me, ought, as much as possible, to be done away by a change of our practice in that respect in future."

Postscript. "Will you send back to the Office, as soon as you have done with them, the last dispatches from Lord Minto and from Switzerland. I cannot but think that, with the recall of Lord Minto, the threat should be held out to Vienna of an appeal upon their conduct to all Europe. Surely the grossness of the falsehood respecting the causes that compelled, as they say, the evacuation of Switzerland, and the flagitiousness of the measure itself, will bring a degree of reproach upon M. Thugut which he will not care to face. At all events the character of governments, good or bad, forms, in the present times above all others, a great part of their strength or weakness; and ours can never appear to so much advantage as when set off on the dark background of Austria. The exposure will deprive Austria in the last extremity of some of the means of mischief, and give to us and Russia some additional means of doing good."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 18. Duke Street, Westminster.—"I send you, at the Prince of Orange's request, the enclosed extract of a letter from the Hereditary Prince, and I add to it the letter I

received myself from M. de Heerdt. I can easily imagine that as they advance they will experience a very great want of money, and will be in great distress on that account. To-night the Prince of Orange has sent me two letters he has received to-day from my brother who is at Lingen, together with one from Stamford. My brother's letters (which the Prince desired me to return to him immediately that he might order copies of them to be made for your Lordship's use) contain a general account of the efforts made in the provinces of Overijssel and Gelderland to make the inhabitants rise, but which efforts have not yet been successful, as no hopes of any assistance could be given to the well-disposed people. My brother also sends the copy of a letter of the Duke of Brunswick to the Hereditary Prince; this I have made a copy of, which you will also find enclosed. The Prince earnestly requests that it may be kept secret, in order that the Prince, his son, may not be committed. I therefore beg you would have the goodness not to let this paper come out of your hands. I don't think it contains much more than we already knew, and it confirms me in the opinion that this measure is meant for nothing more than a mere demonstration. M. de Stamford writes the same thing, and that he is the more willing to believe this, as he is informed no orders have been given to reinforce this corps, nor even to provide it with the necessary field artillery.

"A letter has been received in the city to-day, supposed to be written by a Jew who is in the municipality at Amsterdam, in which he says that if there was any possibility of coming to some agreement with the other party he would willingly contribute to it, that the present rulers would make great sacrifices for the preservation of tranquillity, that perhaps they might even go so far as to resign their places, and consent to the re-establishment of the Stadtholder as chief of the Republic; but that it seems that a complete restoration of the ancient form of Government is in contemplation, which they will not easily consent to. This letter is of the 7th instant; I don't think it signifies much except that it shews they begin to feel some embarrassment.

"The two enclosed letters from Yvoy contain some details on the subject of the attempts made to execute some movements in Gelderland and Overijssel. When you have looked them over I beg you would be so good as to send them back to me, that I may return them to the Princess."

Enclosure 1.

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK to the HEREDITARY PRINCE
OF ORANGE.

1799, September 3. Brunswick.—"J'ai l'honneur d'avertir votre Altesse que je viens de recevoir l'ordre de faire avancer M. le général de Schladen avec dix bataillons, et quinze escadrons sur Wesel, pour se cantonner entre cette place et Rees; mes ordres ne disent que cela, et de réunir un peu d'avantage les troupes qui demeurent sur les derrières. Le Roi recommande surtout de ne

rien compromettre; la réponse du Directoire doit avoir été négative, cependant on continue à négocier avec ces faquins. Si votre Altesse peut quelque chose sur Mr. Grenville, qu'au nom de Dieu il ne se hâte point de quitter le Continent; je crois que le Directoire forcera le Roi à prendre un parti."

Enclosure 2.

[J. FAGEL to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.]

1799, September 11. [Lingen.]—"On est sûrement mieux instruit par les nouvelles directes de Son Altesse Sérénissime de tout ce que se passe dans le Nord Hollande, et de la positions respectives des armées que je ne puis l'être ici sur les rapports, souvent inexacts et presque toujours incertains, des voyageurs qui passent, ou par les lettres particulières que je recois moi-même, et celles qu'on me communique. Les notions que j'ai recueillies, et que me paraissent les plus vraisemblables sont que, depuis le combat qui a suivie immédiatement le débarquement, le General Daendels a transporté son quartier à Puzmeren, qu'il y tenoit à la gauche de sa ligne la ville d'Alkmaer, et couvroit de sa droite celle de Horn. Les Anglais occupaient déjà les villes de Medemblick et d'Enckhuysen avant l'arrivée des 6,000 Anglois que le général Dum [Don] a amenés au général Alberkrombye [Abercomby] et qui faisoit partie de la seconde division attendue incessamment avec le Duc de York, et le reste de la généralité Britannique.

"Ce que j'ai trouvé de plus intéressant dans les rapports que j'ai vus, c'est qu'un officier Anglais s'étoit présenté au quartier de Daendels auquel il avoit demandé un passeport pour se rendre à la Haye, où il avoit de la part de general Albercombye des ouvertures à faire au Directoire; que Daendels n'avoit rien voulu prendre sur lui sans avoir reçu l'ordre du général Brune comme commandant-en-chef les armées des deux nations; qu'en conséquence, Brune s'étoit rendu de sa personne au quartier de Daendels, qu'il y avoit parlé à l'officier Anglais auquel il avoit demandé quelles étoient les ouvertures dont il étoit chargé, et que, sur la refus qu'avoit fait cet officier de lui faire part de ce dont il n'avoit à parler qu'au Directoire même, ce général Brune en avoit écrit sur le champ à la Haye pour y donner formellement à connaître au membres du gouvernement qu'ils ne devoient rien écouter sans en communiquer avec lui avant de répondre. Si cette nouvelle est telle qu'on la détaille, il y auroit des inductions favorables à tirer de la circonspection mesurée avec laquelle Daendels en use avec Brune, et de la precaution de méfiance que ce dernier a prise avec le Directoire Batave.

"L'ordre subit qui est arrivé hiér à nos officiers rassemblés sur l'Ems de se porter sur le champ à Savanaer, vis à vis d'Arnheim, sur le fondement ou le prétexte qu'ils ne pouvaient pas rester plus longtems dans l'intérieur de la ligne de démarcation Prussienne, donne beaucoup à penser sur l'usage qu'on veut faire de ces officiers, ainsi placés à portée des deux provinces de la Gueldre et de l'Overyssell, où le peuple est mal-disposé contre la gouvernement actuel, et où on pourrait assez aisément, sous le conduite de ces officiers, former dans cette partie un rassemblement de gens armées qui, de concert avec les insurgés et insurgents

Brabançons disséminés sur les différens points de la Meuse, pourraient par une utile diversion accélérer rapidement l'affaire des Hollandais, et préparer très avantageusement celles du Brabant, où on me marque que les mécontents de tous les ordres, indépendamment des conscripts, ont l'oeil fort au guet sur tout ce qui se passe, et va se passer chez leur voisins, pour régler d'auprès eux leur marche, quand le moment favorable se présentera. Sans doute alors on se prononcera avec eux de façon à lever dans leurs esprits toute espèce de doute sur la pureté d'intention qu'on aura en les mettant en mouvement; et j'ose assurer qu'on aura alors aussi tout lieu de se louer des efforts et de l'empressement avec lequel ils se déclareront contre le gouvernement tyrannique qu'ils ont tant de raisons d'abhorrer.

“Les 6,000 Russes qu'on avoit dit s'être fait voir dans les eaux de Helvoetsluys n'ont encore paru sur aucun point des côtes Bataves, où ils sont attendus d'un instant à l'autre, et où leur débarquement ne peut manquer de procurer les succès les plus rapides, même sur l'esprit de l'armée, dont les transfuges passent en très grand nombre déjà dans le camp Anglais. En tout, et de tous les cotés, je vois des augures favorables à tirer dans les conjonctures présentes.” *Extract.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 19. Walmer Castle.—“As the points you mention do not seem absolutely to require my being in town on Friday, I shall indulge myself with another day, and not come till towards dinner-time on Saturday. We sent the militia bill to town yesterday evening, as we think very complete. A copy of it is to be sent to you immediately, which will explain fully our ideas. I imagine it would clearly be best to have translations of the treaties prepared, as they ought to be laid on the table, even if nothing is done upon them. I had thought it would be best to exclude absolutely all business but that of the militia. I find, however, that our money would barely hold out to the end of December, and that we should be obliged to meet again before Christmas to provide for the latter part of that month and the beginning of January. It seems therefore much better to take the opportunity of voting the *sugar and tobacco (ci-derant land)* and malt; we then need not interrupt the next recess till the beginning of February, and we shall not add more than three days on this account to the length of the present session.

“We received accounts last night of the arrival of the Duke of York and our reinforcements, as well as the Russians. The army was to move forwards on Tuesday, or Wednesday at latest. We can hardly expect to learn the result till Sunday, or perhaps Monday, or even Tuesday, and, of course, the terms of the Speech cannot be well settled till the account arrives. As the Speech cannot be read till just before the King goes to the House, and as there can be no cockpit, this will be no inconvenience.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 19. Altona.—“I received yesterday from Higgins your three private letters of the 5th, 11th, and 12th instants, and am relieved from very great uncertainty by the satisfaction which you express in my opinions respecting the Petersburg negotiation. I share with you in all possible impatience to be where I can fancy at least that I am doing something, and therefore I saw with some disappointment that the order for a frigate, which your letter of the 12th announces as being enclosed, has not been sent; under these circumstances I am endeavouring to press into this service either the *Pylades* or the *Discovery*, both of which ships are arrived at Cuxhaven to convoy some meal for our army in the Texel; I have applied to Captain Dick of the *Discovery*, who is to take the orders of his superior officer Captain Mackenzie of the *Pylades*, upon it, and I go on to Bremen to-day on my road to Emden, where I hope to find one or other of these two ships. If they fail me, I must then try my influence with Admiral Mitchell, but that will be a great loss of time. All our successive accounts appear to announce so much desertion in the Batavian army that I should imagine your 44,000 men will be as amply sufficient as you can be inclined to consider them; and, in addition to this, I have received from Fagel at Lingen an account of a visit there from Mollerus, commissioned by Van der Goens to announce to the Hereditary Prince of Orange that the Batavian Directory had sent to Berlin to negotiate through that Court with the French Directory for the evacuation and the neutrality of Holland, a negotiation which they profess to be equally ready to open with Great Britain for the same object. You know enough how much I had foreseen this course of events, and I have only thought it necessary to write one line to Mr. Garlike to remind him of the insidious complexion of this offer, because I am persuaded that he will be as much upon his guard against it at Berlin, as you will doubtless be at London; but I mention it now chiefly because it furnishes a strong additional proof how sensible the patriot Batavian government begins to be to its weakness and danger. Under all these circumstances I do not hesitate to take Henry with me to North Holland, partly because I do not believe in his being exposed to the chance of any danger there, partly because, if any such arises, I shall have frequent opportunities of sending him by sea from the Texel, and partly because, until some manifest danger should arise, I think his mother must rather wish him to remain with me than that he should incur the inconvenience unnecessarily of returning to England alone. You will, however, easily believe that although I rather recommend eventful scenes of life as the best lessons to young men, I think, however, there is a just measure in the choice of them, and it cannot be either fit or reasonable that I should expose him to any risk or hazard where he is not called upon by any duty or necessity; and where his only function is to be a spectator, I must take care that he is so no longer than while he

can look on in safety. I repeat this the more to you because, being a good deal pressed in time, I shall not probably be able to say all that I would about it to his mother, though I certainly will write a few lines to her to satisfy her that I have not the smallest idea of letting Henry see anything in North Holland that is more military than the illuminations of Amsterdam when the French shall retire from it. This cannot and must not be the moment of Prusso-Batavian negotiation.

"To you I may venture to say that I should have been better satisfied if Fagel's letter to me from Lingen, in announcing this mission to Berlin, had spoken of it with more decision and more marked disapprobation. I tell myself that I am, perhaps, unreasonably jealous upon this subject, but I cannot by that reflection entirely do away the whole of the uneasiness which I feel when I miss upon this subject a single note of that tone in which our friends should, in my mind, always speak of it. I trust, however, that I shall find no traces of this weakness in the Duke of York nor in Abercrombie, and that it shall not be found to have grown upon the Hereditary Prince in the last month in which I have been absent from him. It will be blame enough to the inhabitants of the United Provinces if their unmanly panic shall prevent their assisting the exertions which we make for their deliverance; but, though their fears may make them inactive, their fears must not enable them to make us so. I rejoiced to hear last night from Captain Dick that Mitchell was on the 10th preparing to accompany a flotilla of sloops, bomb-vessels, and gun boats across the Zuyder Zee before the city of Amsterdam; this is the true course of negotiation and the only one which, in my conscience, I can approve of as long as one French soldier is left within the territory of the United Provinces. I do not know how far you agree with me in this, but I feel that it is so true that I am confident of your assent to it. Judge then with how little patience I am likely to read a letter which quotes the threat of General Brune as an inducement to treat with France for the evacuation of Holland.

"I will not, however, add to this letter; I shall have probably enough to say to you whenever I receive from you the letters and papers which you announce to me at the Texel, but do not forget that, until I know what are the instructions given by you to your general, it will be impossible for me with any advantage to communicate with him upon the political objects which are to be assisted by them.

"I hope I shall be able to see Stamford at Bremen, or rather at Emden, if I am delayed long enough to invite him there from Brunswick, where he now is. His zeal and his talents are too precious to slumber at the Court of the Prussian generalissimo."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE

1799, September 20. Walmer Castle.—"I have perused the recent despatches from the Continent contained in the box which you sent to Mr. Pitt. They are certainly as discouraging as

possible, but I cannot help thinking that, whatever other epithet may belong to the conduct of Austria, they will never be so foolish as to leave Switzerland ultimately to fall into the hands of France, as they must be conscious such an event puts into the most precarious tenure their own favourite project of Italy. Perhaps, however, it is best to look for the worst, and, in that view, I wish you seriously to turn your eyes to another view of the business. Even if Russian troops form a junction and keep themselves safe in any part of Switzerland, the season is too far advanced, and every part of the campaign so disturbed and distracted as to render quite hopeless any further vigorous operations in the course of this year, and therefore we must turn our thoughts to the spring. And, in that view, why should we not from this time look on Russia as our only true ally, and bestow upon them every shilling of subsidy we can afford to give for men; and, on the other hand, the Russian Emperor would, I should hope, be disposed to give us every soldier he can spare from his present army, or any other he can collect. These troops might be gradually and successively brought down in the course of the winter, and *rendezvous* either at Minorca, or in Sicily, or in Malta if it falls; and with an army so collected we might make a serious movement into the south of France as early in the spring as we pleased; and, in that case, I should wish to make up in Minorca a force of our own, or partly our own and partly Russians, who might act under Sir Charles Stuart on such parts of France on the coast of the Mediterranean as might be concerted with a view to distract the attention and harass the army of France which would be, of course, collected by them in the South to oppose the progress of the allied army. This plan of campaign would of itself go far indirectly to relieve Switzerland, as the French would then find business enough at home. But if, in addition to this, we shall be able at the same time in the spring to form an army large enough (of which there can be no doubt) to operate against Brest, or from the Seine and Somme, or both successively, we shall then be in a very promising situation, due pains being taken in the course of the winter to prepare insurrections both in Brabant and the interior of France, all of which, if well-directed, to operate to one result. I throw these ideas loosely out as they have occurred to me in the course of my ride yesterday. I mentioned the same generally to Mr. Pitt last night. He is out all day, meaning to leave this to-morrow; and I thought I might as well mention them in this general way to you. As connected with part of the subject, and that a very material one, I send you an extract of a letter I received from Captain Popham by the last despatches from Holland.

“ Upon the subject of insurrections in the interior of France, I have read the recent communications from M. Dutheil, and I confess myself most exceedingly alarmed by them. If those kind of speculations are not checked and kept back, every idea of any good to arise in *due time* from any good dispositions which

exist in any part of France is at an end. I hope after my return to have an early opportunity of conversing with Mr. Pitt and you upon the subject, and some arrangement must be made on an intelligible footing on which one can act. A despatch, as a matter of course, came to me a few days ago for my signature directing the Transport Board to put two vessels under the direction of the Secretary at War. I returned it without my signature, because how little disposed I am to grudge my own labour, and however much disposed to act upon the confidence to be reposed in other branches of Administration, it cannot be reasonably expected that, on one of the most delicate points in which Government can act, I should blindly proceed and take upon myself a very serious responsibility, without knowing either the objects or the extent of it."

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK TO
HENRY DUNDAS.

Secret and confidential.

1799, September 20. Schlagen Bruch.—“You will receive in my public dispatch the general account of the events of yesterday, in which I am sure that you will join me in admiring the bravery, courage and good conduct displayed on that occasion by both officers and men of his Majesty’s British troops, and in regretting that they were not ultimately crowned with that success to which they were so justly entitled.

“I have as much as possible avoided in my dispatch saying anything against the behaviour of the Russian troops, knowing of what consequence it is to keep the Emperor in good humour, and even if you think that there is now in the letter any expressions too harsh or that may give offence, do me the favour to alter them before it is published. But it is owing to their conduct only that we were obliged to give up the advantages which we had gained, and almost the whole of the poor fellows whom we have lost fell in covering their retreat. I enclose to you a report which I have received from captain Taylor, my *aide de Camp*, whom I had ordered to attend general Hermann, of the conduct of the Russian column, as likewise from general Knox, whom I sent in the latter part of the day to endeavour to bring them on again. I need add nothing to them, as they detail fully everything. I do the Russians full justice for bravery; nothing could behave better than the three Russian battalions in the storm of Warmenhausen, and during the time they were attached to general Dundas’s column, but their discipline is terrible. General Hermann, though a willing, well-disposed, and, in some degree, well-informed man, kept up no discipline; he was likewise very anxious to make himself a name in Russia, and to be as much beloved by the soldiers as Suwarrow is said to be; and, certainly, I am convinced that the affection and confidence that the officers and soldiers had in him was one of the principal causes of their retreating upon his being taken.

"I am very glad to be able to inform you, however, that the Russians (both officers and men) are beginning to recover themselves, and are exceedingly ashamed of their conduct; and I have no doubt if Major-General Essen, who is now the senior officer, will exert himself, which he has promised to do, to restore discipline, that they will behave very differently the next time. With regard to the British I am happy to say that they are not the least depressed by what has happened, and that they are thoroughly sensible of the advantage which they had gained, and which they were alone obliged to give up from the failure of the Russian column.

"In general, I consider this, though unfortunate, as no serious check, at least not difficult to repair. There are five British brigades, making nearly 10,000 men, who were hardly if at all engaged, and who therefore may be considered as fresh troops; and the rear-guard of Russians, consisting of three thousand men, are now at the Helder, and are expected to join this day. Under these circumstances, as soon as I can furnish the Russians with the different articles of which they are in want, we all agree in the determination of making another general attack, which I trust will be attended with success. Before I conclude I must say one word about myself. I send you enclosed the original disposition for the attack, as likewise the separate reports of each general officer commanding a column, in order that you may possess every information, and I shall now wait with patience and resignation for the opinion of his Majesty and his ministers upon my conduct. I can only say that no effort has been wanting on my part—that the plan was thoroughly canvassed, and unanimously agreed to by Sir Ralph Abercromby, Lieutenant-General Dundas, and General Hermann, who were all sanguine in their expectations; and indeed, in my opinion, the event has proved that these expectations were well grounded, as the success must have been very complete and decisive had it not been for the mismanagement of the Russian column." *Copy.*

Enclosing copies of reports from Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, Major-General Knox, Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney, Major-General Coote, and Captain Taylor.

Enclosure No. 5.

CAPTAIN HERBERT TAYLOR to H.R.H. FIELD-MARSHAL THE
DUKE OF YORK.

1799, September 20. Headquarters. Schagen Brug.—
"About 2½ o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Lieutenant-General Hermann told me that Major-General Schutorff with the Russian Jägers and one battalion of grenadiers from Petten had already crossed the canal and was moving forward upon the right. In an hour after a few shot were heard, and although it was still quite dark General Hermann said that as General Schutorff had begun the attack, it was necessary that he should be supported. The first line, therefore, consisting almost wholly of grenadiers, which had for some time been drawn up under the dyke, was ordered to advance along the Slaper Dyke, and to

commence the attack upon the work which the enemy had constructed, as soon as the signal should be given. Lieutenant-General Hermann directed that Major-General Mannern's brigade should move from Petten to its left, and remain in reserve upon the dyke, as well as the four pieces of horse artillery which he observed could be of no use until daylight, and the country became more open. Two squadrons of the 7th were ordered to support Major-General Schutorff on the right, and the others to move with the horse artillery when ordered. The first Russian battalion was formed in a column of divisions, and appeared in the first instance to move forward in very good order, as did also the second. The signal gun was fired when it was still impossible to distinguish any object, but Lieutenant-General Hermann said that although the attack was certainly beginning too soon, the impatience of the troops was such that he could not delay it. When the front reached the enemy's work, they gave a great shout, which was repeated by the whole of the Russian troops, and succeeded by a most violent and irregular fire, which appeared to be as much from the rear division as the front. I am confident that not more than three or four musket shots were fired by the enemy at their first breastwork, and was not a little surprised when General Hermann moved forward (which he did with the second battalion) to find that 30 or 40 of the Russians were lying dead or wounded, in front as well as in the rear of the work. I observed to General Hermann that the troops in the rear must have fired upon those in front, which he admitted was more than probable. The Russian artillery was immediately brought forward and began to fire towards the front, and the fire from their corps upon the right appeared also to be advancing very rapidly. The second work of the enemy upon the same dyke, and in which they had one gun, was attacked in the same way and carried with apparently as little resistance from the enemy, although the number of killed and wounded of the Russians appeared to increase as we advanced. Notwithstanding it was still much too dark to derive the least benefit from the fire of artillery, the Russians loudly and constantly called for their guns, as they moved forward, and these were fired without a possibility of pointing them at any object.

"General Hermann had now reached nearly the head of the column of which the troops, when they had arrived at the extremity of the Slaper Dyke, in part turned to its left towards the village of Groete, in part extended to the right upon the sand hills and joined the corps which had advanced in that direction under Major-General Schutorff, and whose fire incessantly crossed our line of march. To this circumstance and to the fire from the troops in the rear I must principally attribute the very great loss which the Russian troops sustained, and I was confirmed in this impression at the attack of the village of Groete, where the resistance of the enemy was by no means obstinate, but where the shot were flying in every direction. As far as I could judge in so enclosed a country, the enemy

appeared to me to be chiefly upon our left. From that quarter a very heavy, though irregular fire of small arms was kept up; and as it was returned both by the troops who advanced through the villages and enclosures under the sand hills, and those acting upon them, the fire of the latter fell as much upon their own troops, whom they could not distinguish, as upon the enemy. Lieutenant-General Hermann's horse was wounded by a shot from the left after we had forced the village of Groete, and as he seemed to think my red coat drew the enemy's fire upon him, I left him, when he turned to the sand hills on the right above Groete, and went forward to the troops in advance upon those hills. At this time the Russian Jägers had expended all their ammunition, and were of no further use during the remainder of the day. The second line of the Russians had, in the meantime, been brought forward; but not being, unfortunately, kept in reserve, they very soon joined the first and mixed with it.

"The troops continued advancing upon the sand hills in a most irregular manner, regardless of danger, and the loss of a number of their men, and continuing to fire indiscriminately from all quarters. Such was the confusion which prevailed that more than one officer, and among the rest the commanding officer of a battalion, told me they could not find their regiment. I observed repeatedly to those who understood German and French, that their troops were firing upon each other, and that if those of the rear could be formed with some degree of regularity, this would be remedied, and a reserve established in case it should be required. This they admitted, but took no step towards effecting it, except occasionally calling to their men to cease firing, to which, however, no attention was paid. No general officer was with them, and they repeatedly expressed their anxiety for the presence of one who might have some authority over the troops, which they themselves certainly neither had, nor pretended to have.

"In the meantime the troops who were advancing under the sand hills had attacked and carried the village of Schorel, and I went down to them from the sand hills in the hopes of finding Lieutenant-General Hermann, or Major-General d'Essen, but could not see them, or learn where they were. I therefore proceeded with the troops along the road which lay through houses and narrow enclosures of very thick underwood, with a ridge of sand hills close upon the right, and, occasionally, a few openings between the enclosures, which were of much greater extent on the left.

"The fire from the left was very heavy, and we could at times plainly distinguish the French troops in the openings. I pointed out to several officers of the grenadier battalion forming the advanced guard the necessity of extending a little to their left, in order to cover that flank as they advanced, and to establish a communication with the English troops whose fire we begun to perceive considerably to the left. This they appeared willing to do, and actually halted part of the battalion;

but their commanding officer not appearing, they gave up the measure and proceeded in the same manner as before, namely, in a confused irregular column without anything to protect their left, and firing indiscriminately to their front and flanks; while I could plainly perceive their own troops upon the sand hills directing their fire into the road and enclosures through which we advanced towards Bergen. About a mile from Bergen an avenue of trees (flanked on both sides by thick underwood enclosures) commences, which is continued in the same direction as far as the hills above Bergen, where it turns short to the left, and leads into that village; a great number of houses are scattered on each side the avenue, and, about 200 paces before you arrive at the entrance of Bergen, there is a considerable opening to the left, whence we could plainly perceive the Koedyck and the village of Schouldam, with the whole of the country beyond it as far as the Lange Dyck. Here the French had established a battery of several pieces of cannon, at a windmill about 400 or 500 yards distance from the avenue, and they had also drawn up a body of cavalry and some infantry. As we advanced through the avenue to this opening, the fire of musquetry from both our flanks and the village in our front was extremely severe, and we were also exposed to the fire of the battery upon the left. The troops, however, proceeded, and reached the opening, but here they were checked by the fire of the French Artillery which was now directed against the head of the column, and by the appearance of their cavalry and infantry drawn up upon the left. The troops were crowded together in a most confused mass, and were very clamorous for artillery, which was at length brought up with great difficulty, as the horses were hardly able to move. The appearance and fire of our artillery checked the progress of the French corps which was advancing and the Russian troops again proceeded in the same irregular mass, under a most heavy and galling fire which, from the nature of their disposition, proved extremely destructive to officers and men. All was confusion, and no officer who was able or who attempted to get the troops into a little order, was at all attended to. At this moment Major-General d'Essen arrived, and immediately ordered the troops to halt and form; two pieces of cannon were placed at the before-mentioned opening, which might extend about 200 paces from one enclosure to the other nearest to Bergen; and another was advanced upon the road as far as the latter enclosure, and its fire directed against Bergen. One battalion of grenadiers was moved forward in line upon the left through the fields, whilst the remainder of the troops advanced in column along the road. No precaution was at that time taken to secure the right. More troops kept coming up from the rear and with them Lieutenant-General Hermann.

“From the severity of the fire which the enemy kept up from the enclosures upon our left, and that of the infantry and artillery between us and the Koedyck, the grenadiers upon our left were

forced to retreat to the avenue, and we again fell into the same confused mass from which we had for a moment been extricated. Every exertion was used by Lieutenant-Generals Hermann and d'Essen, but the former repeatedly told me that he had no longer any authority over the troops, and they would not obey him.

"We nevertheless continued gradually advancing and got possession of the village of Bergen, where (having at that time the enemy's fire upon our front and left flank only) General Hermann, under cover of the houses, succeeded in forming a battalion of musqueteers in front of the church towards the Koedyck, and one of grenadiers in a street in our front but a little to the right. The remainder of the troops were distributed between the houses and at the extremities of a number of lanes and avenues which led to the centre of the village and the church.

"In this situation we remained about 20 minutes, losing men very fast, and apparently quite at a loss what steps to take, when the Russian troops on the sand hills in our rear having given way (from what cause I know not) the enemy appeared in our rear, and we received their fire upon the right. Almost at the same time the enemy were penetrating through the opening upon our left into the avenue, and the battalion of musqueteers which was formed in front of the church, was ordered by Lieutenant-General Hermann to move to the rear and left, to defend the above entrance into the avenue.

"The enemy continued advancing upon all sides, and every spot in the village was exposed to their fire. Of the three guns in the village two were entirely without ammunition, the third was placed at the entrance of the street in our front, Lieutenant-General Hermann was gone into one of the lanes upon the left, whilst General d'Essen remained near the church. At this moment the enemy penetrated into the village upon the right and front, and the Russian troops, after firing two rounds from the gun placed as aforementioned, gave way and fell back in the greatest confusion into the avenue. Lieutenant-General Hermann was taken prisoner. General d'Essen, having collected the troops which remained, forced his way back through the avenue, and very fortunately, the Russians having again advanced a little upon the sand hills, he succeeded in reaching them and in forming upon the ridge such of the officers and men as could be prevailed upon to make a stand, to which the rapid advance of the British upon the left contributed not a little.

"I came out of Bergen with General d'Essen, and was sent by him to His Royal Highness to report what had happened, and to apply for support. Major-General Manners's brigade was immediately sent by His Royal Highness, but when we arrived near Schorel, the Russians were in full retreat, and had actually abandoned the village of Schorel, which was, however, immediately attacked and retaken by Major-General Manners's brigade under a very heavy fire of cannon and musquetry from the enemy."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, September 20–25. Harley Street.]—"On m'a apporté la boîte que je vous renvoi à neuf heures. Je vous rend mille graces pour les communications très intéressantes que vous avez eu la bonté de me faire. La conversation du maréchal avec le colonel Clinton, est bien remarquable. Elle peint l'homme de génie. Il se pourroit bien qu'il n'eut pas fait tous ces détails d'une manière suivie à ma Cour, mais les auroit écrit à fait mesure que les contradictions lui arivoient de Viéne, ce qui ne présente pas un plan complète de l'absurdité et de la mauvalse foi de Thugut. C'est pour quoi il seroit bon d'envoyer une copie au Chevalier Whiteworth, à fin qu'il le comunique à Rastopchin et Panin à Petersburg.

"Vous voyez combien il est urgent de finire au plus tôt l'affaire avec les Bavares; plus vous augmentez la force du maréchal, plus vous lui donnez les moyens de chasser Massena de toute la Suisse avant l'hiver."

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK to
LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 25. Schlagen Bruck.—"I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 12th instant, which has been delivered to me by Count Rhone Bentinck. I have no doubt that his zeal and activity will be of material use to our affairs in this country, and I do not see the least objection to give him a temporary commission upon the continent of Europe, as he seems to think that it will be some degree of protection to him in case of misfortune; and, at any rate, an honourable mark of his Majesty's approbation."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, September 26. Cleveland Row.—"Lord Spencer assures me that, from the state of the winds, the dispatches I send to-night are likely to be in Holland nearly as soon as you can be expected there. I trust it will be so. I was very desirous of sending my No. 1 sooner, but it could not go without passing through the form of a Cabinet, though I do not think my colleagues are able to give me much aid on this subject. My No. 2, I am afraid, you will think throws it all very open again, but after having clearly explained to you what we think best, it seemed necessary not wholly to preclude the possibility of treating with the present people for an arrangement a little more to their fancy. I do not however expect from such a negociation anything more than to distract and divide the councils of our enemies, for it seems very little likely that they should have the power to do anything in despite of Brune and Dandels.

"A number 3 and 4 I had planned, but on mature consideration thought them best deferred. The first would have related to a

renewal of our alliance with the new Government, including the consideration of terms of peace with Holland ; the second to the Netherlands.

“As to the first of these objects it lays, as I conceive, in a very narrow compass—restoration of the Spice Islands (except Ceylon) and of Demerary, and guarantee of their constitution and territory, on condition of (1) offensive alliance ; (2) actual co-operation in this war till peace be made by common consent ; (3) express renunciation, and under very strong conditions, of claim of neutral commerce when we are at war ; and more than this, I think, we have not to ask of them.

“Negapatam might be thrown into the bargain as a factory only, but subject to our paramount jurisdiction and control—Ceylon, the Cape, and Cochin would not be heard of.

“The 3rd of the points above-mentioned would be most contested—but in truth it is as necessary to our alliance with them as it is to our interests in war, for while they had the bait of immense gain by our wars, it was in vain to look to the stipulations of treaties to insure their assistance.

“As to the Netherlands, *quid dicam, aut quid non dicam, nescis*. Malcolm’s instructions are obsolete and not worth your reading now. He had but little to do, and that little he has bedeviled. Maitland is gone to replace him. He has no written instructions. He goes in the first instance to enquire and learn. The object must be, if possible, to raise the country in order to facilitate and secure our Dutch operations. All other questions are put almost out of sight by the infamous perfidies of Austria. If the country itself rises they will look to us and not to Austria for aid, at least they will receive it from us alone ; and we must take our chance to direct the future course of the business as time and occasion may prescribe.

“God bless you—send us a good victory, for the affair of the 19th has made no good impression here.” *Copy.*

Intelligence communicated by the Prince of Orange.

J. FAGEL to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, September 26. Lingén.—“J’ai l’honneur d’envoyer ci-jointe à votre altesse sérénissime une lettre que M. de Suideras m’a prié de lui faire parvenir, et dans laquelle je suppose qu’il lui rend compte de ce qui s’est passé dernièrement sur les frontières, et des tentatives faites pour exciter des mouvemens dans les provinces de Gueldre et d’Overysse qui pussent accélérer le rétablissement du gouvernement légitime. J’ai déjà eu l’honneur de mander à votre altesse, et elle aura sans doute été informée par Monseigneur le Prince Héréditaire, que les essais n’ayant pas répondu au but qu’on s’étoit proposé, avoient été abandonnés ; il m’a paru que M. de Suideras lui-même étoit convaincu de cette vérité, et j’ai tout lieu de croire que son zèle et sa grande activité ne l’entraîneront pas dans des mesures qui seront infructueuses, tant qu’elles ne peuvent être soutenues par

des troupes, qui ne serviroient qu'à faire des malheureux. Je me flatte que l'époque n'est pas éloigné où l'on pourra mettre à profit les bonnes dispositions des habitans des provinces voisines, et je ne doute nullement qu'elles ne secondent très efficacement les opérations militaires qu'on sera dans le cas de diriger de ces cotés.

“ Une partie des troupes Prussiennes, qui ont reçu ordre de se mettre en marche, s'est déjà avancée entre Wesel et Rees ; on assure positivement que ce corps ne tardera pas à passer le Rhin et à occuper le pays de Clèves. Il ne paroît point que cette démonstration ait fait grande sensation dans la République, et que l'opinion que le gouvernement a taché de repandre s'accrédite que la Cour de Berlin alloit prendre un part active à l'ouvrage de la restauration de l'ancienne constitution. Nous sommes encore dans une ignorance complete de l'issue de la journée du 19, que les *gazettes* Hollandoises representent comme ayant été très favorable aux troupes Françaises et Bataves.

Ce qui suit étoit en invisible.

“ Votre altesse est sûrement instruite par le Prince son fils des ouvertures que M. Mollerus étoit chargé de faire de la part du gouvernement Batave, et dont j'ai eu l'honneur de lui donner connoissance dans ma lettre du 16 de ce mois. Elle sera donc déjà informée que les lettres que Mollerus attendoit ici, et qu'il avoit autorisé M. van de Spiegel à ouvrir, s'accordent sur le grand désir qu'on a de se défaire des François, mais qu'elles n'indiquent point d'inclination à entrer en négociation avec l'Angleterre, ou avec le parti Stadhouérien. La dernière, du 21 de ce mois, dit positivement que l'on est assuré que M. Vos de Steenwyk, que le Directoire a envoyé à Berlin, y sera bien reçu, et qu'il réussira dans l'objet de sa mission, celui d'engager le Cabinet Prussien à insister auprès du Gouvernement François sur l'évacuation de ses troupes, et l'abandon de la Hollande. M. Vos est déjà parti, et a passé le 20 dans ces environs pour se rendre à Berlin. J'en ai prévenu Mr. Garlicke, et je me flatte de recevoir dans peu des informations sur la réussite de cette mission, et sur le succès de ses négociations.”

COLONEL ROBERT BROWNRIGG to W. HUSKISSON.

Private.

1799, September 26. Schagen Brug.—“ Since my last letter to you of the 20th, every exertion has been using to put the army in a situation again to move forward, and which would have taken place by this time, had not the tempestuousness of the weather and constant rains very much impeded our supplies reaching the army from the Helder. The last division of Russian troops under Major-General Emmé arrived in the Texel on the 21st, but they, with three troops of 15th Light Dragoons, could not disembark until the 24th, and the former will not arrive at their place in our line before this evening, consequently our attack will not be

until Saturday—it was intended for to-morrow. Many projects for proceeding against the enemy have been agitated and taken into the most serious consideration, and it is the joint opinion of Sir Ralph Abercromby, General Dundas, and Sir James Pulteney, that the first object is to endeavour to defeat the enemy in his position between Bergen and Alkmaar. There the principal force of the French (estimated at about 14,000 men) is. They are very advantageously posted, and every possible obstacle presents itself to us in our approach, but I believe a determination to conquer prevails throughout the army, and the most sanguine expectations are entertained by our chiefs, and a perfect understanding subsists between us and the Russians; all their generals express themselves sensible of the misconduct of their troops on the 19th, and admit that, had there been any system observed in their attack, they must have been victorious. Even General Hermann acknowledged to Major Dyer of the Guards, who was sent to Alkmaar with a flag of truce, that his defeat was owing to too great *hardiesse* on the part of the soldiers, and that he himself was not aware of the sort of troops he had to act against. At the same time we understand that he has written a letter to the Emperor imputing his disaster to a want of support from the British, and that the Russians were in consequence sacrificed. This letter, it is said, General le Brun lost no time in despatching to Russia. Supposing Hermann to have adopted this mode of exculpation, I do not think it will have any weight with the Emperor, as his assertions will be contradicted by the reports of his brother generals; and the fact that the principal loss the British sustained was in supporting his column, cannot be controverted. Popham has sent Sir C. Whitworth a copy of the Duke's public letter to Mr. Dundas giving an account of the action, for the Emperor's information, and I send you a copy of H.R.H.'s letter to His Imperial Majesty, which I hope will be approved. Should we unhappily fail in our attack, there is little prospect of our being able to make an impression on the enemy with our present force on this side of Holland; therefore, in case of the worst, you must be prepared with instructions for us how in the event to proceed. The Helder point is fortifying so as to make it tenable by 2 or 3,000 men. The provinces of E. Friesland and Groningen present themselves as the objects the army should proceed to in case of failure here. The horse transports are ordered to England, but we shall detain all other vessels until after the business of Saturday. The plan of attack accompanies the Duke's private letter to Mr. Dundas; it has been made with the full concurrence, and indeed at the suggestion of Sir Ralph Abercromby and General Dundas, and in this place I wish fully to explain to you that H.R.H. takes no steps without their being consulted.

"Late last night a mail from England arrived, by which I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 20th. Be assured that our disappointment at not having had it in our power to send home the accounts you expected has far exceeded yours, and that

the event of the 19th has been one of the most mortifying circumstances of the Duke of York's life. The enemy have not carried their threat into execution of inundating the country between us and Amsterdam, nor is it at present believed that they will. When we are in a situation to approach that place, your ideas will be attended to.

"By the papers sent home by this opportunity you will perceive that the Dutch troops, forming under the Prince of Orange, may shortly be expected to be in a state for service; there is, however, at present no means of sending them to Friesland or Groningen, nor can a British force be spared at this moment to accompany them. The Duke heartily wishes your measure of procuring a further supply of troops from the militia success: before you form new corps, do not forget that those here composed of militia volunteers are very deficient in numbers.

"It is intended to send the Russian wounded to Yarmouth, in the transports that are to return to Russia with admiral Tchitchicoff; our wounded will be forwarded without delay to Harwich, according to a memorandum of yours delivered to me by colonel Brinley. Some supplies in clothing and necessaries have reached the army, and our men begin to look a little more like soldiers than when we first arrived. The Batavian troops desert in the proportion of from twelve to twenty every day, and I have no doubt but that the whole of the Batavian troops are disaffected, and only wait an opportunity of declaring themselves. The French do not reckon upon them in the least; about a thousand of the Batavian soldiers that were taken on the 19th have engaged in the Prince of Orange's service; I do not recollect that I have anything further to trouble you with at this moment. I shall conclude by earnestly trusting that my next will be dated from Alkmaar, and that I shall have the happiness of giving you an account of brilliant success." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799 [September 26].—"The enclosed is the private letter I have from Sir Ralph Abercrombie. If you are to make any confidential communications to Woronzow it seems the best I have received, and either you may shew it yourself, or, if you please to return it to me, I will send it with a letter from myself, such as he can send to his Court."

Enclosure.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, September 20. Schlager Bruck.—"You will receive with this an account of an action that took place yesterday between the allied army under the command of the Duke of York and the troops of the French and Batavian republics. As it was not my lot to have any share in it, I shall not enter into any detail. The plan of attack was, I am persuaded, the best that could be devised; it was laid by H.R. Highness before General Hermann,

myself, and General Dundas, and it met with our united approbation. General Hermann declared that it contained all his ideas, and I heard of no difference of opinion on the subject.

"I think it necessary to say so much as General Hermann, who had a great share in the execution of the plan, is prisoner, and cannot write to his Court on the subject. The event of a battle is at all times doubtful, but in this country the difficulties that an attacking army has to surmount are not to be equalled in any country in Europe. The history of the Dutch republic proves this in general, and I am convinced that the account of the action of yesterday will remain a prominent example. From the knowledge I have of the ground, as much was done, and as great advantages were gained as could have been expected. Victory was already in our hands, when, from one of those unfortunate accidents to which the best generals are exposed, it was lost. Having only returned to headquarters this morning at two o'clock, I know nothing of our loss, or of that of the Russians. Some of the best brigades of the army and who had no share in the action are fresh, our numbers are not much diminished, and we are ready to try another attack. The same plan must be followed nearly, I hope with better success, and free from those circumstances which prevented its being more complete yesterday."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 27. Emden.—"I am mortified to find myself still at Emden from the utter impossibility which Captain Winthorp has hitherto found of sailing from Cuxhaven to fetch me; we had yesterday, however, a rather more favourable wind, and I am not without better expectations of his arriving here in the course of this day.

"From the garbled and mangled accounts which arrive here from Delfzyl it is not easy to distinguish the true history of what is passing in Holland, but it seems evident that the general result of the actions of the 19th, 20th, and 21st has been to drive back the enemy to Amsterdam and Leyden with the loss of 3 or 4,000 men.

"It was high time that our numerous troops should have a larger field for action than could be found in the neighbourhood of the Helder, and strongly as I am impressed with the necessity of our making a diversion, I rejoice to hear of our having landed some troops at Staveren. In passing through Leer I found M. Van der Haar and Charles Bentinck earnest in their solicitations for the execution of the promise made to them by General Don; as I knew nothing of that detail, I have satisfied myself with assuring them that nothing but an alteration in the points of our attack could have delayed the execution of General Don's promise to them that they should have a body of English troops upon some part of the coast of their province, and if the Staveren expedition has not taken place, it

shall be my first business, in landing at the Texal, to endeavour to bring about that measure. Bentinck and Van der Haar engage for the immediate co-operation of those provinces as soon as any English troops are landed there, and that co-operation may tell powerfully on the Overysse side of Amsterdam while we are threatening it from Alkmaar and from the Zuyder Zee. Charles Bentinck has told me that he has now vessels enough in the Ems for carrying 2,500 men to any part of the coast of the Zuyder Zee; they have long been engaged in the service of the British government, at the cheap rate of £200 per fortnight, and he was in some doubt whether he should not dismiss them, as he has heard nothing upon the subject since Don was here; but I have desired him to make no change till I have got to the Texel, because it is very possible that these means may be wanted for the attack of Amsterdam.

"I do not yet understand what has prevented the progress of the expedition of bomb-vessels against that city, which sailed from the Texel on the 10th instant, and I am not without some apprehensions that there may be too much disposition to abstain from vigorous measures and to trust to amicable negotiation. As far as I am yet informed, I have no good hope whatever from any such course; it is evident that there is no general principle of enthusiasm in the country, nor any prevalent motive except that of fear; they are afraid of the French, so afraid of them that the country does not stir more now that we have 40,000 men landed than they did two months ago when we had not a soldier there; if this is so, if they can be governed only by fear, we must not let them through that principle serve our enemies by negotiation, instead of assisting the general cause by manly and open action; if they are sensible only to fear, they must be frightened into a better course of conduct, and in this view I had rather trust to one bomb thrown to alarm Amsterdam, than to all that Mollerus can say at head-quarters, or that their Dutch agent can say to Haugwitz at Berlin.

"I must not however go too fast in my speculations till I have good information, and here I have none good or bad, or rather such a mixture of both as serves to perplex more than to inform. The Amsterdam and Haarlem papers of the 23d are arrived and say nothing of any action on the 20th or the 21st, nor do the Lingen letters of 26th at night speak of any such report. M. d'Yvoy writes to me on the 17th to say that Comte d'Aremberg has received a letter from Thugut to tell him that the Emperor has renewed his pretensions to the Low Countries for the sake and for the advantage of his faithful subjects there; d'Yvoy adds that Malcolm is with him waiting for answers from Dundas."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 28.—"I lose no time in sending you the enclosed copy of a letter the Prince of Orange received this morning from my brother who is now at Lingen. It throws a little more light on M. Mollerus's message."

Enclosure.

J. FAGEL to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, September 16. Lingen.—“Depuis la dernière lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre altesse sérénissime en date du 9. de ce mois, il ne s'est rien passé dans ces environs qui méritât son attention. Elle aura vu que tout projet de révolutionner partiellement quelques villes et villages des provinces de Gueldre et d'Overysseel a été abandonné pour le moment, où la difficulté, pour ne pas dire l'impossibilité, de se soutenir, et le danger réel auquel on auroit exposé inutilement un grand nombre de bien-intentionnés, qui ont donné à cette occasion des preuves de dévouement et de zèle qu'on ne sauroit assez louer. Toute entreprise de ce genre a donc été suspendue jusqu'au moment où l'on apprendra avec certitude qu'un corps de troupes Angloises se portera sur les provinces de Gueldre et d'Overysseel, et où l'on pourra tirer parti des bonnes dispositions des habitans pour réunir les bien-intentionnés, et coopérer à la délivrance générale. Je me flatte que ce moment n'est pas éloigné, et que les premières lettres de Monseigneur le Prince Héritaire donneront plus de jour sur les projets ultérieurs du général Abercrombie, et sur les opérations futures.

Ce qui suit étoit en invisible.

“M. Mollerus est arrivé ici avant-hier au soir, croyant y trouver M. le Prince Héritaire et désirant l'entretenir sur un objet de la plus grande importance, puisqu'il ne s'agissoit de rien moins que d'ouvertures de la part du Gouvernement actuel relativement à une capitulation. M. Mollerus, n'ayant pas trouvé M. le Prince Héritaire, se decida sur le champ à partir pour le Texel, après avoir communiqué au Prince de Hesse-Darmstadt, au Conseiller-Pensionnaire, à M. de Grovestins, et à moi le motif de son voyage. Il commença par nous dire que tous les membres du Directoire, à l'exception de Van Hoof, étoient très-portés à entrer en négociation, que cette disposition étoit fondée sur la conviction intime qu'il étoit de toute impossibilité de se soutenir, et de faire une longue résistance, ainsi que sur leur désir de prévenir que la République ne devint le théâtre d'hostilités qui finiroient par ruiner totalement tout le pays; que quoique les deux conseils ne fussent pas animés des mêmes sentimens, plusieurs des membres ne demandoient cependant pas mieux que de faire une bonne fin, mais que le Général Brune seul s'opposoit à toute idée de négociation, et étoit décidé à défendre le pays à toute outrance, et à ne rien épargner pour parvenir à cette fin; que c'étoit uniquement lui qui avoit mis des obstacles à l'admission des parlementaires Anglois, et qu'il étoit à prévoir que si la force des armes l'obligeoit de céder le terrain, il mettroit en exécution la menace qu'il avoit faite de traiter la République en pays conquis. Ces dispositions avoient engagé le Gouvernement à envoyer quelqu'un à Berlin pour sonder les dispositions de cette Cour, et savoir si elle ne seroit pas disposée à traiter avec la République Francoise dans le but d'obtenir pour la Hollande l'évacuation de ses troupes et une

parfaite neutralité. On étoit également disposé, pour peu qu'on en vit le moyen, à traiter avec l'Angleterre, et on ne demandoit que d'être mis sur la voye pour y parvenir. Telles étoient les dispositions du gouvernement Batave ainsi qu'elles avoient été manifestées à M. Mollerus par l'organe de l'agent des affaires étrangères Van der Goes, le seul avec lequel il étoit entré en matière sur cet objet, mais dont la manière d'envisager l'état actuel des choses s'accordoit avec celle de la majorité du Directoire, et de quelques-uns des meneurs du Gouvernement actuel. A cette occasion M. Mollerus dit que le voeu de ceux qui désiroient entrer en accommodement se portoit vers une constitution semblable à celle de l'Angleterre, en rétablissant le Stadhoudérat dans toutes ses prérogatives. M. Mollerus, s'étant décidé (comme j'ai l'honneur de le mander à votre altesse) à se rendre au Texel pour exécuter verbalement auprès du Prince Héréditaire la commission dont il avoit été chargé, on a jugé qu'il importoit que nous eussions quelqu'un à Berlin qui fut prévenu de l'arrivée de l'agent Batave, et du motif de sa mission, et qui put nous mettre au fait des réponses qu'on pourra faire à ces ouvertures. En conséquence j'ai écrit à M. Garlicke pour l'en informer, en le priant de me communiquer ce qu'il seroit dans le cas d'apprendre; et j'en ai également informé M. Grenville, qui est toujours à Hambourg."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 28. Harley Street.—“Eu rentreut chez moi j'ai beaucoup réfléchi sur notre conversation à l'égard des troupes Bavaraises, et je me suis souvenu que vous doutiez qu'elles fussent prêtes, et qu'il falloit encor les léver. Il m'est venu dans l'idée d'éclaircir ce fait, et j'ai écrit au Comte Hassland pour le prier de me dire franchement si les dix milles hommes, que son souverain offre, existent, et sont prette, ou doivent être levés encor. Je vous envoie sa réponse, et come il a une écriture peu lisible, je l'ai fait copier au bas du billet même. Vous verrez que ces dix milles existent, et qu'il ne s'agit que de l'équipement pour entrer en campagne. C'est à dire acheter des tentes, des cheveaux pour leur transport, et pour charier les canons et les munitions de guerre; ce qui se fait dans moins de trois semaines; ainssi ces troupes peuvent joindre Korssakoff avant même celles que le Maréchal Souvorow amènera de l'Italie. Considérez, je vous suplie, toute l'importance politique et militaire de cette mesure, et combien la célérité de l'adopter est utile. Nous sommes dans une époque; en grâce aux perfidies autrichiennes, il faut regarder comme un bonheur et un efet de la Providence qui nous offre un moyen prompt et facile d'améliorer nos affaires si derengées par Thugut.”

Enclosure.

COUNT DE HASLANG to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, September 28. Harley Street.—“Le Comte de Haslang présente ses complimens à M. le Comte Woronzow. Comme

l'état de l'armée de l'Electeur doit être bien plus fort que 10,000 hommes, il n'a pas de doute qu'ils existent effectives, et qu'il ne s'agit que de l'équipement et autres choses nécessaires pour entrer en campagne."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, September 29. Cleveland Row.—"In addition to the packet which you will have received from me, I send you the inclosed, which may be of some but not much use to you. Return it to me, for I have no other copy.

"Fagel has mentioned to me a letter from the Hereditary Prince of Orange, which shews how much you was wanted there. He desires his father to press us for money, and talks of our advancing a million, as Sir F. Wronghead was to have his thousand pounds 'to be doing something.' I have answered drily enough that if our enterprise succeeds at all it will do so only by our acquiring immediate possession of the two richest cities in Holland, which must at once supersede the necessity of all such demands. To have to fight in order to restore them without any exertion of their own is quite enough for us, without having to pay their Government afterwards in order to prevent their being taxed. But it is exactly in their nature to make such demands, and I wish it was more in ours to refuse them steadily.

"We are all in an uproar to-day at receiving letters from the Helder of the 25th, without one word of or from the army. I have no apprehension of their being either surrounded or cut off, because I well know that with common exertion they ought to be now at Amsterdam. But really their being Burgoyned is the only excuse they can make for leaving us five days after their defeat without telling us where they are or what they are doing; when you are within ten or twenty miles of them I well know this will not happen, but that does not excuse them.

"Suwarrow is by this time gone from Italy to Swisserland by the Mount St. Gothard, with all the Russians that were left there. Some people think the march a very hazardous one. I hardly know how to judge of it, but I think it will be so unexpected to the French that they will not be prepared to oppose it with all their means. Thugut has now *beau jeu* in Italy. How came you to escape falling in love with him when you was at Vienna? Eden's successor is ten times more enamoured than he was. *Simul obligavit perfidum votis caput, enitescit pulerior multo?* I have however tried to put a little spirit into Lord Minto, and he promises to be very stout next time.

"All your projects for this autumn are, as you will easily suppose, destroyed by these cruel delays in Holland, and we now look only to the spring.

"Spain has intimated something about wanting to talk *very privately* about peace, but I believe it is only a wretched intrigue

in that most contemptible of all governments, without the least serious intention of extricating themselves from the net in which their fleet is caught.

"Do not you like the man in the Convention who is very angry because the Dutch fleet was not also brought to Brest?"
Copy.

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 29. [War Office.]—"I send you back the Duke of York's papers. I cannot say that I have received from them all the satisfaction that I had been led to expect. A main link of the chain is wanting, that, namely, of the column immediately contiguous to the Russians. The report I conclude was not made in consequence of the Duke of York having been there in person; but it is material, as the question will be asked whether, though the Russians might have been too fast, that was not too slow.

"After all was the plan of attack good? I cannot but suspect that it was not. I do not mean that the Duke of York is to be blamed, or that anyone could be blamed for acting on a system sanctioned by so many great authorities. But I have always thought that the system to which this belongs is wrong; for reasons which I will explain at any time that we may happen to talk upon these matters.

"The immediate failure was clearly owing to the irregular conduct of the Russians, growing I fear out of the bad constitution of their armies; and it is equally clear, or seems to be so at least, that our troops acted everywhere with the greatest spirit. This at least is consolatory in point of national credit."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 29.—"I send for your confidential perusal a letter I have received from Admiral Mitchell. The latter part of what he says respecting the army renders it impossible to communicate the letter to anybody. There is a short letter to the Admiralty, dated on the 25th, but it does not even mention the army. I wonder they have not wrote to explain why they don't move, as even that would be some satisfaction. My own conjecture is that the badness of the weather has put the country into such a state as to render it impossible to move artillery or anything else. Not only the delay itself, but all those other circumstances are too much in favour of the enemy; and, if the weather does not quickly mend, it will affect the health of the troops very rapidly."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1799, September 29. Cleveland Row.—"I have several of your private letters to answer, but I shall hardly have time to enter fully into all the points of which you speak.

"You recommend some mark of attention from the King to the Archduke, but this was before the last events; and although *the whole* blame is not his, yet the relative situation of the Courts is not such as will admit of these civilities towards one of whose conduct (if not of his intentions) his Majesty has so much reason to complain.

"I shall press Lord Mulgrave to accept the command of the Swiss, but I am not very confident of success. If he refuses, I shall be much puzzled to find any other English officer equally [competent] for it, or nearly so.

"I had never an idea that the Commissary for the Swiss levies should act in anything of importance but by your advice, and his own sense ought to tell him so. I write by this messenger to Ramsay to explain this to him quite distinctly. A general in the command of that army (and particularly if that general is Lord Mulgrave) will be entitled to greater latitude; but I believe Lord Mulgrave is fully sensible of the assistance he could derive from your knowledge of the country and its people, and would be very desirous to avail himself of it without any paltry jealousy, of which I think him incapable.

"The particulars mentioned in your private letter of the 2nd were, as you will easily imagine, *quite* new to me. Had I known or suspected any part of them, my conduct would have been different. As it is, I am, on very deliberate reflection, satisfied that no more can be done than is now doing; but that must be quickly done. If you hear more, you have too much friendship for me, as well as too much regard for the public; not to tell it me immediately and without hesitation, and I will then act accordingly.

"If Mulgrave comes to the army, mention to him what you write to me about Venerode, and he will know that he may rely on being approved in any step that he thinks necessary in order to retain him with Suwarow. If he does not come, act for the best yourself, and do not doubt of being supported. The only point of difficulty would be the transferring a foreigner *permanently* to our service in that rank, which you know is impossible.

"I am uneasy at the state of things in Switzerland. Lord Minto has not yet learned to receive Thugut's promises with the distrust with which seven years of painful experience has inspired me. Write to him frequently, and in a style to *inspire* him. Write also to Whitworth, for almost every thing at Petersburg depends on first impressions. If Austrians enough are left to prevent any great calamity befalling the Russians before the winter, my idea will be to negotiate at Petersburg for reinforcing them in the spring with 25,000 more troops, which, with Bavarians, Wirtembergers, and Swiss, will put 100,000 men under Suwarow's orders. This force might be sufficient to act independently of all Austrian co-operation, beyond the mere defence of the Rhine and the Alps. And, by moving forward, Suwarow might quickly obtain a footing in France, and there give one fair chance to the experiment of Royalist armies.

"If our Dutch business succeeds, it is very probable that we may be enabled to co-operate with this movement by an attack in the same moment on the Royalist provinces in the north-west. Keep this plan in your mind, and see what you can do or suggest to facilitate its success, without letting anybody suspect it.

"Some present account, and future successive statements of the amount and distribution of the French armies would, with this view, be very useful to us. I know that the confusion in the administration of the military department is such that it would not be easy for a French Director to have quite accurate information on this point; but try [to] get what you can get, and that as soon as possible, and as often afterwards as you can." *Copy.*

LORD MULGRAVE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, September 29. Vienna.—"I had scarcely quitted Verona before it occurred to my mind that the nonsense which I wrote at the end of my last private letter (sent by Captain Foster) might appear to involve in it some imputation by want of vigilance and penetration on the part of Lord Minto, though I really do not recollect whether it can lead to such a construction. I do not, however, like to incur any risk of the appearance of doing injustice, however innocent it might be in its effect, as you certainly would judge of his conduct from his own correspondence and not from mine. I beg, therefore, to assure you that it never did appear to me that Lord Minto had been further deceived than any wise and honourable man might easily be by a person capable of using a temporary fallacy, which would be the less liable to suspicion and mistrust from the certainty by its being unveiled by the time it had served the turn. I write this at the moment of my arrival, from impatience to prevent any false impression I may unintentionally have made. I do not yet know whether letters from this place go unopened at the Post Office. I shall, however, enclose this to my porter to be delivered at your house, as less likely to raise curiosity than a letter addressed immediately to yourself."

H. FAGEL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, September 30.]—"I have just received the enclosed letter, which I send to you, agreeably to what I take to be the writer's wish. His present situation is really very delicate, and I am afraid he is not quite aware of it. You have no idea to what extent the jealousy and suspicions on his subject are carried."

Enclosure 1.

COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON TO H. FAGEL.

1799, September 25. Helder.—"Je reviens dans ce moment du quartier-général du Duc de York et du Prince Héréditaire,

ainsi que ma lettre ne sera pas aussi détaillée que je l'aurais désiré, parceque la frégate qui m'a menée part demain matin de bon heur, et que j'ai cependant voulu vous donner de mes nouvelles. C'est aussi pourquoi je ne puis pas écrire à milord Grenville, et que je vous prie de lui communiquer.

“ Nous avons eu un bon passage de 14 heures, étant partis le jeudi à 5 heures de la rade de Yarmouth le 18, et arrivé le lendemain, 19 à 7 heures, devant le Texel ; mais obligé par le gros temps de retourner trois lieux en mer. Le temps étant venu plus clair, nous sommes entré avec un assez fort orage, et jeté l'ancre le soir vers les 5 heures à une portée de canon, mais le temps est devenu si mauvais, que bien loin de pouvoir aller à terre, nous avons chassé deux fois sur nos deux ancres, de même que plusieurs transports dont plusieurs se sont abordés, et deux à trois vaisseaux de guerre ont été obligés de se mettre sous voile, et de remonter plus haut pour ancrer autre part. Le 20, nous sommes arrivés à terre vers les midi, le temps ne l'ayant pas permis plutôt. Alors nous avons appris les détails précurseurs de l'affaire du 19, qui étaient assez alarmants. On disait le général Russe en chef, Hardman, et son second prisonniers, et le 3rd blessé, et 6,000 Russes pris, et tués, et blessés ; et l'on craignait que l'aile droite, à Petten, tournée. L'on disait le 35^{me} régiment Anglais taillé en pièce, à l'exception de cinq hommes et d'un garçon ; et le 9^{me} régiment Anglais, 800 hommes tués et blessés ; de sorte que notre pied-à-terre n'était pas fort gai. Mais les choses sont améliorées, et voici le résumé le plus impartial de tout ce que j'ai pu rassembler à la hâte.

“ Les Anglais sont marché au centre et à l'aile gauche, et ont emporté toutes les batteries avec la plus grande valeur, la bayonnette au bout des fusils ; et ce sont emparés de quinze à vingt pièces de canon, ayant fait 2,000 prisonniers que j'ai vu défiler avec près de 60 officiers Bataves, et l'adjutant-général de Daandels, qui lui-même ne s'est échappé qu'avec la plus grande peine, son cheval ayant été tué. Il était déjà entouré lorsqu'il s'est élancé sur un autre cheval. Les prisonniers sont bien intentionnés, la plus part ; et il y en a beaucoup qui sont arrivés ici avec la cocarde orange sur le chapeau. Beaucoup sont passés, et se sont rendus dès qu'ils ont pu, et il y en a déjà plus de 400 qui ont pris service. Il y a parmi eux près de 200 canoniers, et 60 Français. Tout a été placé le soir sur les vaisseaux. J'en ai trouvé plusieurs de ma connaissance ; et ils m'ont dit que la plus grande partie des troupes Bataves, si non toutes, passerait de notre côté dès qu'ils en auraient l'occasion.

“ Pendant que ceci se passait au centre et à l'aile droite, [gauche ?] le général Abercromby, avec une colonne de 12,000, s'est porté sur Hoorn, où il est entré sans résistance, et a fait 200 prisonniers que j'ai rencontré aujourd'hui, et qui sont déjà sur les vaisseaux. Tout allait bien jusqu'ici ; les drapeaux oranges flottaient, et il y avait mis un garnison de 200 à 300 hommes lorsqu' il reçut la nouvelle que les Russes, qui avaient fait leur attaque sur l'aile droite avec 6,000 hommes, après avoir chassé les Français de trois batteries et pris trois villages, la bayonnette au bout du

fusil, s'étaient rendu maître du village de Bergen, à deux heures d'Alkmaar. Mais les Français ayant reçu du renfort, et les Russes ne connaissant pas assez le terrain, et manquant de munitions, furent entourés et chassés à leur tour, leur général-en-chef pris dans le village de Bergen, et le second aussi, et le 3^{me} blessé. La confusion s'y est mise. Alors les Anglais ont dû abandonner leurs avantages, et aller dégager les Russes, ce qu'ils ont fait avec la plus grande vigueur et bravoure, surtout le 9^{me} régiment qui y a perdu près de 500 hommes ; de sorte que tout a été redressé, mais tous les avantages des Anglais inutiles quant au terrain, puisqu'ils ont dû rentrer dans les anciennes positions, et abandonner leurs avantages, n'ayant ainsi pu prendre l'artillerie prise sur l'ennemi faute de chevaux. Cependant on compte la perte des Bataves, d'après le rapport des prisonniers, à près de 5,000 hommes tués, blessés, et pris, ce qui ferait une grande brèche. Et d'après ce que l'on m'a dit au quartier-général, la perte des Russes serait moindre qu'on ne l'a cru, et ne pas sera guère les 12 à 1,800. Le pire de tout est la prise des deux généraux Russes, pour le bruit et les gasconnades dans l'intérieur. Sans ce malheur Alkmaar était à nous.

“ Du reste, l'armée Anglaise se conduit exemplairement, et l'on est aux nues de leur bravoure, de leur conduite militaire, et particulièrement de leur discipline qui est de plus rigide. Voici mon cher ami les détails militaires ; à présent un petit détail du reste.

“ J'ai été reçu, on ne peut plus honorablement, par le Duc de York, et il m'a promis de m'expédier tout de suite une patente de Colonel, ce que je crois sera suffisant. Chez le Prince Héritaire j'ai été fort bien reçu, et fort amicalement, et lui ai fait lire ma pièce, qui ne lui a pas trop plus je crois, car il m'a dit que j'avais plus de pouvoir que lui, et d'un ton à lui propre, m'a dit qu'il était mon serviteur puisque j'étais le représentant de son père, et qu'il ne pouvait, dans plusieurs des articles de la pièce où j'étais renvoyé à lui, me donner son approbation, puisque c'était des choses qui passaient ses pouvoirs, et qu'il devrait, le cas existant, lui-même avant avoir les ordres de son père. Il m'a cependant chargé de prendre sous ma direction, et de lui faire le rapport du magasin et des vaisseaux ici, ce que je ferai demain ; mais il n'a pas encore voulu mettre sous ma direction (quoique sous ses ordres) les officiers et matelots qui sont à terre à l'île de Texel, et avec lesquels il a déjà fait plusieurs fausses démarches (*ceci cependant entre nous et milord Grenville*). J'espère de tout redresser avec un peu de patience. Votre frère François viendra demain chez moi, et j'espère de le garder alors. Il me sera plus facile de vous donner régulièrement nouvelle de tout, car je suis excédé.

“ Le Prince Héritaire m'a fait une sortie assez désagréable sur mes connexions avec les Anglais, surtout de ce que j'avais une patente et un rang, et a voulu me prouver que cela ne se pouvait pas. J'ai tenu bon, et je vous en dirai davantage dans ma suivante ; il a dit qu'il en écrirait à son père, et comme je ne suis pas sûr de l'avoir dit au prince, quoiqu'il me semble de lui

avoir dit, je vous prie de la lui dire. Si vous voulez, si toute fois vous préférerez que non, je le lui écrirai encore d'ici. Je ne puis vous envoyer aujourd'hui le compte que je vous ai promis, je l'enverrai la fois prochaine; en attendant, j'espère que M. Hammond ne fera pas difficulté de me donner de l'argent quand je tirerai sur lui, ce qui sera bientôt, car tout est au poid de l'or ici, et enfin il faut vivre. Du reste j'observe la plus grande économie, et retranche tous les superflus.

"J'ai déjà soigné pour la navigation aujourd'hui, et donné les ordres nécessaires pour remettre les tonneaux qui manquent, et rétablir l'ordre parmi les pilotes, afin que la navigation soit aussi aisée que possible, et le tout de concert avec les officiers Anglais.

"L'Amiral Mitchel est devant Medenblick.

"Guillaume et Robert se portent fort bien."

Enclosure 2.

COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, September 20. Helder.—*Some short reflections on the present state of affairs in Holland.*—"In general there is a great want of horses in the country now occupied by the combined English and Russian army, principally such which are necessary to transport the artillery or provisions of every kind. These articles are of such a great importance to the success of the military operations, that it is to wish the English Government would take them immediately in any consideration. Besides this is Nordholland, a country where every kind of food for horses is infinitely scarce, and which is quite completely hungered out; so that in case the army could not immediately proceed forward, there will be very soon a great distress in everything. It is certainly not by want of troops that the last action of the 19th was not completely successful to the combined army; but attacking always on a point in such a small and difficult country like Holland is till Haarlem, and quite near Leyden, the enemy can always collect all his forces on one side, and putting only some small garrisons in the interior, he can always, knowing the ground and making use of its difficulties, face the army of His Royal Highness from one position or the other to stop her progresses, till the rainy season and the winter coming on, every further operation will perhaps become impossible. But to prevent all this, I suppose the best mean would be to make at the present moment one or two diversions, which should divide the enemy's forces, open the way to the grand army, and awake the good dispositions of the interior in the United Provinces. The first diversion could very well (with a ten thousand man) be made on the side of the islands, Walcheren, Schouwen, and Goeree, or with part of these forces on such points of South Holland which should be judged the most favourable to finish at our advantage the great and bloody struggle in North Holland.

"This seems to be so much easy that we know the enemy's forces to be less considerable in Zealand than we thought at

first; and that, concerning the expedition against Friesland, England finds here the greatest facilities of every kind; as ships and man, only employing to this a body of three thousand men of foot, and any horses, which could consist at first in the brigade of General Don, who took formerly notice of everything concerning the said country; or such other troops which could be found convenient to join more to him who was already designed once for this expedition."

W. WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most Confidential.

1799, September 30. Ravenspurgh.—"I reached this place late last night after having been obliged to abandon successively Zurich, Wintherthur, Frauenfeld, Constance and Moespurg. The enemy entered Constance yesterday at 10 a.m., and before I left Moespurg, had repaired the bridge of Petershausen, passed over into the peninsula between the two small lakes, and secured a number of boats that had been left at Stadt to carry away the Russian and Austrian magazines.

"On Tuesday, the 24th instant, the Russian force under General Korsakoff was stationed nearly as follows:—

"On the side of Baden, or rather below that place, seven or eight battalions.

"On the banks of the Limmat, between Baden and Zurich, about three battalions.

"At the camp of Seebach, either eight or nine battalions.

"In and before Zurich from six to seven thousand men.

"At Rapperschwyl two battalions, which had been detached to cover General Hotzé's right. At Eglisaw and Shaffhausen a small reserve. The cavalry was distributed among these different corps, but in what proportion, I don't know exactly.

"The camp of Seebach was at the distance of about three miles from Zurich, to the left of the road from that place to Kloten, and between the hill which runs from Zurich to Baden and the Glatt.

"From this point the whole force of the camp might easily have been carried in two or three hours to any part of the Limmat above Baden, where the French should have attempted an attack.

"According to the plan of operations proposed by General Hotzé and approved by Field-Marshal Suvarrow, six battalions were detached from the camp of Seebach, about 9 o'clock of the night of Tuesday the 24th, towards Rapperschwyl. These battalions had not left the place above an hour when intelligence (false, and fabricated for the purpose) was received that the enemy meditated an attack on Zurich during the night, in consequence of which General Korsakoff ordered (I believe) two battalions from the camp of Seebach to march to Zurich, so that the whole line from Baden to Zurich was left to the protection of three battalions dispersed along the Limmat.

"Not knowing the exact number of battalions in the camp of Seebach on the 24th, I cannot say with certainty whether any force whatever remained in it on the morning of the 25th. But there probably could not be more than a single battalion.

"About four in the morning a heavy canonade was heard on the side of Höng, a village about a league below Zurich, on the road which leads from that place to Baden along the right bank of the Limmat.

"Being lodged at a country house on the same road about a mile from the town, and being unable to learn anything from Zurich, I mounted my horse at half after six and rode towards Höng. At the distance of about half a mile on this side the village, I overtook General Korsakoff riding very slowly forwards.

"At this time there was a thick mist on the river on the other side of Höng, but the plain before Zurich, the Albis, and the whole of the French position on the hills, was clearly to be seen, and there was not the least appearance of any extraordinary movement in any part of their line excepting that a regiment of dragoons had left the camp and was drawn up on the left bank of the Limmat opposite to the village of Höng.

"The hill on the right was also perfectly distinguishable almost as far as Baden, and certainly at that moment no troop of either army had taken any position on the heights on this side of the river.

"Below the village there was a very heavy canonade and a weak fire of musketry. I could distinctly see the flash of every gun and hear the ball pass so as to judge of its direction; and I am perfectly confident that the enemy had not, at a quarter before seven, one single piece of cannon in battery on this side of the river.

"I could learn nothing from General Korsakoff who appeared not so much alarmed as confused, and uncertain what measures to take; nor can I say at this moment whether he had then received any information of what was going on or no.

"In a few minutes we were met by Colonel Lambert, a French officer in the Russian service, who informed the General that the enemy was not in force, that with his regiment of Dragoons alone he had attacked and driven them back to the point where they had crossed, but that, having received a reinforcement, they had returned to the charge and forced him to retire after he had had his horse killed under him, and had been wounded in the leg; he added, that he did not doubt but that the enemy would be easily driven over the river as soon as any reinforcements should arrive.

"To my utter astonishment General Korsakoff neither questioned Colonel Lambert as to any particulars of the enemy's force, of that which was assembled to oppose them, or of the manner in which they had passed the river.

"At the entrance of the village of Höng we met General Hiller of whom, tho' returning from the side of the enemy, and acknowledged to be an excellent officer, M. de Korsakoff neither

asked information or advice, but continued riding forwards after the common salutations had passed between them.

"I immediately rode up to General Hiller and begged he would give me his real opinion of the state of things. He said that he had been very near the enemy and that he was persuaded they were not in force, but that he saw nothing to oppose them; that he was afraid the battalions dispersed along the river had been either surprized or defeated, as they came up in small bodies, and that it was probable that the enemy had passed in greater force somewhere below; that, in either case, the place where we were was unsafe, as the hill above us was not occupied by the Russians and the enemy might cross it, get into the Kloten road, and cut off our retreat to Zurich; adding that he himself was returning to town to send off an express to General Hotze for the six battalions that had been detached in the evening, with which a position might be taken on the Zurich Berg to cover the town.

"I returned with General Hiller to Zurich, and on our road we observed a column of the enemy (about half after seven) attack the Russian position at Wollishoff between Mount Albis and the lake. Tho' the fire in that quarter became immediately very violent, yet it was evident that it was only a false attack. Unfortunately, however, Monsieur de Korsakoff thought otherwise, left the real point, rode through Zurich without asking the opinion of anybody, and took up his station in the neighbourhood of Wollishoff from whence nothing could remove him till two in the afternoon; when he went to the gate of Kloten and remained there till the enemy was actually firing into the ditch of the town of Zurich from the glacis and covered way, of which they were in possession.

"At 10 o'clock, being informed that General Saacken, who commanded the Russians on the side of Hông, had been driven back into that village, that he had sent successively four *aides-de-camp* and the Honourable Captain Proby to bring M. de Korsakoff back, or at least to obtain some succours from the left bank of the Limmat, and that Colonel Ramsay and the Baron de Roll had also gone upon the same errand, but without success, I determined to go with General Hiller in search of him, in the hope that our joint representations might have a better effect.

"I believe I have omitted to mention to your Lordship that General Hiller is the officer appointed to reside at the Russian head-quarters by the Arch-Duke Charles.

"When we arrived about half after eleven o'clock, on the hill a little beyond Wollishoff, we saw the Russians who had repulsed the French attack, actually at the foot of Mount Albis on the great road leading from Zurich to Lucerne, their *chasseurs* half way up the mountain, attacking the French camp, which seemed nearly abandoned, and a French batallion under arms on the top of the hill ready to receive the Russians.

"We could see nothing however of General Korsakoff, and had no hope of finding him, as he had entered the thick woods which

run from the point where we were standing to the foot of the Albis.

"The hedges and vineyards all about the village were full of wounded and dead Russians, tho' I don't recollect having seen five dead Frenchmen on the whole ground.

"This is easily accounted for from the nature of the country, which is particularly well calculated for the French manner of fighting, and from the mode of attack of the Russians who appear to trust wholly to the bayonet which the French never attempt to stand.

"The firing in our rear having become by this time very serious and approaching very near to the town, we found it necessary for our own safety to return without loss of time, after General Hidler had sent another officer in search of Monsieur de Karsakoff.

"Before we entered the town we rode, however, for a few minutes into the plain of Zurich in front of the Russian camp (*which was still standing*) and were there witness to a sight, which I will endeavour to describe whilst it is yet fresh in my recollection. Certainly nothing like it was ever seen before.

"The Russian camp, as I have said before, was standing, the whole of it greatly within the range of the French cannon in their entrenchments on the mountains, from which however not a shot was fired, evidently that they might not risk the bringing back the Russians (who were running on the road to Lucerne and up the Albis), until the town of Zurich should be carried.

"Before the camp a very fine regiment of hussars, a battalion of infantry and a corps of Cossacks with eight or ten pieces of artillery were drawn up in a line of battle, *with no enemy in front*; the French batteries on the mountain ready to take them on their left flank whenever it should be thought advisable, and the enemy on the opposite side of the Limmat advancing almost on a line with their right flank. Behind us, at the distance of about six miles, were the Russians running like madmen up Mount Albis, actually in possession of the French camp, and apparently inattentive to everything that was passing behind them.

"On the opposite side of the river was a battalion and some detached companies of Russians, supported by a regiment of dragoons, and some Cossacks retiring slowly before the French, and already within about a mile and a half of Zurich. They were firing without knowing at what, and occasionally charging with the bayonet though they could not see their enemy.

"In the vines and hedges before them were two battalions of French chasseurs dispersed in such a manner that you could not see two of them together, and never showing themselves but at the moment when they fired.

"Behind them, along the great road, marched a very strong battalion, formed in a close column, towards which the chasseurs retreated when the Russians charged into the vineyards with the bayonet.

"The regiment of Russian dragoons attempted once or twice to charge this battalion, but before they had gone forty yards,

they were exposed to so severe a fire from the chasseurs in the vines on each side of the road, that it was impossible for them to get on. There was every appearance that the Russians whom we thus saw engaged, were all that remained of the camp of Seebach and of the three battalions stationed on the Limmat.

"The troops on the side of Baden were completely cut off. They appeared, besides, to be occupied in their own defence, as we heard a very heavy cannonade from that side.

"On the Zurich Berg and on the ramparts of the town there was not a man to be seen, so that there was every appearance that the town would be carried in half-an-hour by assault.

"At this moment I observed a regiment of French chasseurs, some squadrons of hussars, and a piece of artillery turn the top of the hill about a mile from the village of Hông and almost on the flank of the Russians. This gun, which was the only one I had yet seen over the water, was immediately unlimbered and began to fire with astonishing quickness on the Russians, whilst the chasseurs and hussars, leaving only a small detachment for the protection of the gun, descended the hill on the other side by a narrow path that leads into the road from Kloten to Zurich.

"The fire from this cannon having obliged the Russians to fall still further back and to come lower down the hill, three pieces were run down by the French to the banks of the Limmat on the left side of the river, within five hundred yards of the point where we were standing close behind the line of Russians and French *redettes*, which your Lordship will find described in the little plan I sent in one of my earliest despatches.

"They immediately opened across the river a very heavy fire on the left of the flank of the Russians, and obliged them to fall back almost to the gates of Zurich and within the protection of their own line of *redettes* on our side of the water.

"Had the hussars and Cossacks charged this artillery they must inevitably have taken all the three pieces, but they were under positive orders not to quit their position.

"It was now evident that the French were not yet in force before the town or they would have risked an immediate attack on Zurich. It was equally so that they had detached their whole strength over the water within the last two hours, and that it would be in a very short time before Zurich, or they would not have sent these three pieces of cannon unguarded in front of a regiment of hussars and a battalion of infantry.

"I left things in this situation at one o'clock, rode thro' the town and went out at the Wintherher gate where I found the hussars and chasseurs who had turned the hill, *actually on the Kloten road* skirmishing with the regiment of dragoons which I left retiring along the banks of the Limmat.

"The two roads are separated only by a common field not five hundred yards over, so that the enemy would unquestionably have been in the town before I left it had not the regiment marched to the Kloten road, for the gate of Wintherhur was open, not a piece of cannon near it, and guarded only by some militia of the town.

“ It was to the judicious conduct of the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Stuart that the town owed its safety at that moment, the Russian officers having entirely lost the faculty of observing what was passing round them. Colonel Stewart took upon him to conduct the regiment there with General Saachen’s consent, and to place it in a position where it covered the town effectually till the arrival of some of the regiments from Rapperschwyl.

“ I have been thus full in stating to your Lordship what I observed myself, not only because from some of the facts I have related your Lordship may learn the nature and causes of the calamity that has befallen us, but because a number of detailed and contradictory accounts will reach England as well as all parts of the world, this day being certainly one of the most extraordinary and memorable of which we have any account in history.

“ What passed after two o’clock I cannot speak with any certainty. I believe the whole was one general scene of disorder.

“ The regiments as they come in from Rapperschwyl and from the Albis, instead of being made to take a position on the Zurich Berg with their artillery, in which case the enemy would never have dared to have entered Zurich, were led successively through the town against the French, who were hourly receiving reinforcements and bringing up artillery, and sacrificed one by one in attacks which were fruitless only because they were made with insufficient force. Without having seen it, it is not possible to have an idea of the manner in which the Russian infantry behaved.

“ In the course of the morning I had an opportunity of conversing with military men of different services, who all agreed in saying that nothing they had ever seen was at all to be compared to it, either for steadiness under fire, or boldness and rapidity of attack.

“ It was a melancholy thing for those who could understand them to hear the poor soldiers on every side repeating the name of Suvarow, and calling on him to come to their assistance. They really expected every moment that he would have appeared on the top of the Albis, on which side they knew he was approaching.

“ About nine in the evening all the surviving troops were shut up in the town with the baggage and the wounded, in a state of the most horrible confusion and disorder.

“ In the morning, the French having brought up some heavy artillery, began firing upon the place.

“ About eleven or twelve o’clock all that remained of the Russians forced their way out of the town and retreated towards Eglisaw ; but under what circumstances, and with what loss, I have not yet been able to learn, nor do we know what has happened to the town, and its unfortunate inhabitants.

“ At the same time that the enemy crossed Limmet, another body of troops passed the Linth at the head of the lake of Zurich; surprised a party of general Hotz’s corps and penetrated to the general’s head-quarters where, the Austrians having rallied, and

being supported by two Russian battalions from Rapperschwyl, the enemy was repulsed and finally driven back over the river.

“But General Hotze and Colonel Plunket having fallen in the early part of the action, and the enemy having effected another passage near Wasen, the Austrians retired in considerable disorder, and by the latest accounts had actually repassed the Rhine at Rhunich.

“The Russian corps at Baden appears to have effected its retreat to Eglisaw, and to have formed a junction with the troops which escaped from Zurich.

“General Nauendorff and the Condé army are also in the neighbourhood of Shaffhausen to-day, and the Archduke is expected in person.

“I have also learnt by an express from general Hiller that Field-Marshal Suwarow had reached Schweitz after having carried the St. Gothard; unfortunately all his magazines were formed at Rapperschwyl, so that I fear, unless he can take some of those belonging to the French, that he will be obliged to retreat for want of subsistence.

“Nothing is yet lost, and if the Archduke will take upon himself to act with becoming spirit and vigour, this business may yet turn to the disadvantage of the French. . . . I am afraid, however, that the loss of the Russians cannot be estimated at less than 10,000 men, so that reinforcements must be obtained from some quarter or other.

“Upon this subject I have already written to Lord Mulgrave and Lord Minto.

“I humbly trust that his Majesty will excuse me if I have sent your Lordship nothing but this hasty and imperfect report. I had hoped to have obtained a moment of leisure (the first since I have left Zurich), but General Hiller has sent a second express to me, to beg most earnestly that I would join him *immediately* at Lindaw, from whence he is in hopes to be able to march forward upon St. Gaul.

“All the English who were in Zurich are safe, and have joined me. Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay is gone to Eglisaw to see Monsieur de Korsakoff; and I shall proceed myself to Field-Marshal Suwarow’s head-quarters, after having seen General Hiller.

“Your Lordships dispatches by Basset, the messenger, were delivered to me on the 24th. I shall pay due obedience to the commands they contain, and will write to your Lordship very fully on their important contents by the first messenger.

“The Advoyer de Steiguer was saved, but not without great difficulty. He refused for a long time to leave Zurich, nor would he stir till the greater part of the Swiss hospital had been removed.” *Copy.*

LA PRINCESSE DE BRUNSWIC to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, October 1. [Brunswick.]—“Stamford me charge de vous dire qu’il s’est occupé ici à concerter avec le Duc un

dernier moyen d'engager le Roi de Prusse à prendre le seul parti qui puisse convenir dans les circonstances actuelles au bien-être présent et futur de ses états et de son peuple ; le Duc a envoyé à ce sujet un mémoire à sa majesté qui n'a fait jusqu'à présent aucun effet ; et elle n'a fait avancer son armée en partie sur le Rhin que pour prendre possession de Clèves si les François se déterminent à le lui céder. Mr. Grenville, en s'embarquant pour se rendre au Texel, lui a envoyé un courrier pour le prier, non de l'y joindre, parcequ'il sait que l'état de sa santé s'y oppose, mais pour le prier de se rapprocher de lui pour la célérité de la correspondance ; il s'est, en conséquence, déterminé à se rendre à Emden, où, en cas d'indisposition ou de maladie, il n'est pas privé des secours de la faculté, et où il est également à portée de correspondre avec Panin qui l'en a prié."

Extrait, en chiffre.

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 1. Harley Street.—"Je viens de recevoir un exprès de notre Général Essen de la Hollande. Je ne veus pas vous écrire officiellement sur la lettre qui est en Russe, mais je vous supplie de permettre que le Reverend Smirnov, notre aumônier, vous traduise quelques passages qui méritent l'attention la plus sérieuse, et les arrangements les plus prompts. C'est lui qui vous remettra celle-ci."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 1. Downing Street.—"I send you a paper from Lord Castlereagh on the subject of representation, which points out difficulties rather than remedies. Pray return it when you have read it. Have you heard anything more from Lord Buckingham on this subject?"

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 1. Emden.—"The date of this letter will sufficiently express to you my impatience under the continuance of the south-west winds which make it impossible for Captain Winthrop and his *Circe* to stir from the river Ems ; in truth, besides the adverse direction of the winds, they have been so violent as not yet to allow me to get any of my baggage on board, but they are quieter to-day and I trust that we may hope at last for the beginning of more favourable weather. Having heard nothing authentic here of the Prince of Orange or of the Duke of York other than the public reports of the loss on both sides in the battle of the 19th, I cannot feel that I

am competent to express any other opinion than that which arises from general observation, and therefore I do not unprofitably waste your time and mine with writing public despatches which cannot be worth reading. It is, however, certain that whatever may have been the prudence which in a military point of view may have restrained the progress of the English army, the cause of which is totally unknown to me, a good deal of inconvenience has arisen from it, and if there was any feeling of enthusiasm in the people of the United Provinces which could have led to any active and vigorous exertion, it has certainly been a good deal discouraged by observing the English army to continue so long in the same uncommunicating position; I presume that this disadvantageous situation must be owing to the disappointment on the 19th from the confusion which took place in the Russian corps on the right, and I trust hourly that I shall hear of some new or more successful effort by which we shall have obtained a larger scope for the operations of so very large a force. To me it has certainly appeared from the first, that whatever was the advantage of landing all the troops at the Texel, the moment that they were landed, there would be many points of the coast of the Zuyder Zee where they might have operated a diversion with much more advantage than could arise from their acting *en masse* in a narrow neck of land where there was hardly room enough for them to stand and move. This remark is, however, so obvious that I take for granted there is some solid military principle which has dictated a different course of operations; I cannot, however, conceal from you that I see with very serious apprehensions this long continuance of a position which has more the appearance of a blockade of our army in North Holland, than that of a march for the deliverance of the United Provinces.

"Much as I had laboured with the Hereditary Prince of Holland upon the subject of interior movement, and uniform as all our accounts had been of the necessity rather to contain than to excite any active efforts in the interior before the arrival of the English troops, I did, however, flatter myself that when they once had landed the good affection and disposition of the people would show itself in one great convulsion, and that the Hereditary Prince would be perplexed only to choose in what course he himself would personally march with the people of the United Provinces to drive out of the country the usurped authority of the French Directory. No movement, however, of any sort has taken place yet, and I see by a letter from the Hereditary Prince to Colonel Bentinck at Lingen of the 23rd, that he had made daily applications for some diversion on the coast of Overysse, but without success, and that he did not expect to see any such diversion take place till after another general battle had been tried. Meantime, I am sorry to observe that the Hereditary Prince is entirely thrown away in his present position, and now that I have no hopes of seeing him heading a considerable diversion, I regret extremely that he has moved from Lingen, and am at a loss to know what was the immediate

object of moving him from thence. I have not neglected in my course hither, and during my residence here, to endeavour to promote more active movement in the provinces of Groningen and of Friesland, and I have for that purpose communicated with Charles Bentineck, Van der Haer, and Humalda. I find from these persons very strong general assurances of the means which they possess to create a general rising there, and of the disposition which the inhabitants have towards it; but I find them all claiming the specific promise made to them by General Don that English troops should be sent to the coast in order to act with them, and they repeat that this condition is considered by their friends as a *sine qua non*, although they do not demand a larger force than 1,000 or at the most 2,000 men. I have done all I can to urge them both by letter and conversation; I have endeavoured to pique them by stating the insignificance of the force which keeps them at check; I have endeavoured to give them confidence by shewing that, with the communication of the Zuyder Zee, they have the benefit of the support and countenance of the whole English army; but although my reasoning is acquiesced in, I cannot flatter myself that my unremitting endeavours will produce any effective movement without the actual present protection of the English troops which they ask for. Now if the Hereditary Prince would put his organized Dutch into some light vessels, and assisted by 1,000 or 1,500 English and Russians would come to Wattum or to Stavener or to any point upon the coasts of those two provinces, I really think, as far as I can trust to the assurances of these gentlemen, the immediate possession might be obtained, and with them both the means of subsistence and of winter quarters for the army, if the military operations in North Holland should be unsuccessful. If, as I rather hope and trust, our army should succeed in advancing, it will still be a great point gained to have cut off from the enemy the resources of Groningen and Friesland, and that diversion might spread to Guelderland and Utrecht in powerful support of the efforts which our army is making on the other side of Amsterdam. Count Charles Bentineck is now with me, and I have desired him to go on immediately to Lingen in order to concert there for a fair prospect which is opening, of engaging the Waldeckers in garrison at Delfzyll and at Nieuschank in the service of the Stadtholder. He has applied to me for money to buy arms, and I understand that he has given an order for 2 or 3,000 muskets to be bought, for which he desires me to direct payment to be made; upon this subject I must refer him in the first place to Lingen, because my course hitherto has been to refer all such demands to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and to furnish money to the Prince, only leaving to his discretion the application of it; in his absence from Lingen I presume that he has entrusted that subject to Fagel and to Colonel Bentineck, and therefore I shall desire Charles Bentineck to endeavour to put it in that course; and I shall at the same time tell him that, if any difficulty arises at Lingen, I will give him a draft upon you for the value of those arms, if he will undertake for the fair purchase and the proper application of them.

“As to the demand for men, all I can do is, as soon as I arrive at the Texel, to endeavour to impress upon the commander-in-chief the extreme importance which seems to me to belong to this diversion, and the great advantage which can probably be obtained by it at very small cost of numbers, and, as I have reason to think, at very little hazard. In truth, I am so much impressed with this object that, if I did not know that you depended upon my immediately going to the Texel, and if I was not anxious to learn what you have already written to me there of new instructions in my new functions, I should have been tempted to have written to the Duke of York and to the Prince of Orange to urge as powerfully as I could this separate expedition; and I could easily have imagined that I should have been of more use in concerting those measures with His Serene Highness than I am likely to be in the narrow circle of the headquarters of Martin's Vonck. It cannot have escaped you, I am sure, how delicate and how difficult is the ground on which you place me when you put me in English headquarters, where naturally I cannot hope for any influence in military opinions, and should not perhaps allow myself to look for any. Whenever the scale of military operations is extended enough to give scope to any political questions in the country, whenever we approach to the semblance of a Stadtholderiat government, I know in some degree how I can make myself useful, and the good disposition of the Hereditary Prince towards me gave me great means of being able to work with him, to which I still look with good expectation; but in a narrow point of North Holland, where there can be no questions except as to the military operations which the commander-in-chief may pursue, you cannot avoid seeing how little I can expect to have or to exercise any influence whatever. I know enough of the difficulties which English ministers have always found at the headquarters of a combined army; but there at least they could speak with authority to powers whom they subsidized, or to Courts with whom their Sovereigns were in alliance; but in this instance the difficulties are increased a thousand-fold, because to the commander of an English army who corresponds with the English Government, it is not easy for an English minister to hope that he can speak with influence and effect. Having, however, allowed myself to state to you the strong sense which I have of the awkwardness of my situation, while things remain as they are, I must add that I am nevertheless anxious to get there, because I trust they cannot long continue as they are. If I was a better seaman than I am I should go to the Texel only in the hope of bringing the Prince of Orange away with me to the neighbourhood of this place; but sick and helpless as sea makes me, I still think that so much real advantage is to be gained by this expedition, that I believe I would make more than one or two such voyages to bring it about, if I could feel confident that my voyages would produce it.

“I have written to Stamford to pursue the project of a correspondence with France as proposed by La Palue. I do not know

your Fagel's reasons for wishing Stamford at present to be kept back, but I acquiesce, though very unwillingly, for I think at this moment he could be of infinite use. The last time I heard from him, he talked to me in his letter of the inutility of his services, and recommended that the English government should no longer put themselves to that unnecessary expense ; I assured him for answer that I would recommend no such measure, and that the opinion held of him would not allow of any such decision. I wish he was employed more actively and more prominently, and whatever may have been the jealousy entertained by the Prince of his governor, I do not fear the consequences of it.

"The weather is milder, but the wind south-west, and I am still grumbling and fretting at seeing 40,000 troops, such as are at the Helder, still blocked up by the Gallo-Batavians."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 2. Harley Street.—"Je vous dois dire avec ma franchise acoutumée, et pour vous seul, qu'ayant parlé avec le secrétaire du Général Herman, qui a été présent à l'affaire du dix-neuf, et cet homme m'ayant expliqué le tout avec beaucoup de sincérité, j'ai vue, à mon grand regret, que tout le désordre dont parle le *Times* a existé vraiment sans aucune exagération. Je vous supplie donc de supprimer ma plainte officielle, et de la regarder come non avenue. Je dois rendre la justice au Duc d'York qu'il a menagé dans sa relation la réputation de nos troupes, parmi les quelles bien d'officiers devroient être punis."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, October 2. Cleveland Row.—"J'ai bien reconnu dans votre billet cette franchise et droiture que j'aime, et que je respecte du fond de mon âme. Je crois certainement que le désordre ne peut être attribué qu'à la faute d'une partie des officiers ; mais j'espère que cette faute aura déjà été bien réparée. Des lettres reçues ce matin annoncent que l'attaque aura eu lieu le vingt-huit, le tems orageux l'ayant nécessairement fait remettre jusqu'à ce jour. Nous en saurons le résultat aujourd' hui ou demain.

"Les généraux avoient les meilleures espérances, et l'armée étoit en *good spirits*." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 3. Harley Street.—"Je n'ai pas pu faire traduire plus tôt les ordres de l'Empereur à moi et au Général Herman que votre courier m'a apporté avant hièr. Celui qui étoit adressé à Herman je l'ai ouverte, parcequ'étent prisonier, et ne pouvant exécuter rien de ce qui lui est prescrit, j'ai voulu voir n'y-a-t-il pas là quelque chose où mon concour seroit nécessaire. Vous verez que tout ce qui nous est prescrit l'a été en

conséquence de vos demandes, et que si nos déclarations eussent été faites au même tems que les vôtres, elles ne seroient pas déplacées peut-être ; mais, à présent, je doute fort de l'à-propos. Au reste, je suivrai vos conseils, et je viendrai les prendre chez vous demain à l'heure que vous m'indiquerez.

“Je suis tout honteux de vous dire qu'on est si ignorant chez nous de vos loix et de votre constitution, qu'on m'ordonne de demander que vous ordoniez à un négociant Anglais d'aller se présenter à Petersbourg pour comparaître devant un tribunal pour une affaire qu'il a contre un autre Anglais, et un Russe. Je sais la réponse que vous me ferez, et je ne viendrai chez vous que pour entendre ce que je sais déjà d'avance sur ce sujet.”

MILITARY STRENGTH OF FRANCE.

Force effective par arme et par armée d'après l'état remis au Directoire par le Ministre de la Guerre le 3rd October, 1799.

This statement reduces the strength of the French armies to 237,000 men.

MAJOR-GENERAL EYRE COOTE to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR CHARLES GREY, K.C.B.

1799, October 4. Bergen.—“Most sincerely do I congratulate you upon the glorious day and victory gained by us on the 2nd instant. At day-break I marched from Petten, having in the night been moved from Schagen to support the Russians. A corps of 8,000 British marched under Sir Ralph Abercromby along the shore towards Egmont. Colonel McDonald's reserve moved along the sand hills. My brigade upon the left of the Russians, who were to march along the road towards Schorell. Lord Chatham's upon my left, and General Burrand's to proceed round by Warmenhousin to attack Shouldam. Sir J. Pulteney with 2,000 Russians, Prince William's, and General Don's brigade to remain as a reserve—in our lines. This was the disposition. General Essen, commander of the Russians, would not however move from the Sloper Dyke until I had cleared the way for him by turning a three gun battery at the end of the Dyke, and, instead of sending one battalion of mine into the sand hills, he would not march until four battalions were placed there to cover his right flank. In short, though contrary to the general disposition and arrangement of His Royal Highness, I was obliged to comply or the Russians would not move. About seven in the morning we got into action in the sand hills. The Russians in an immense column moved on the road upon our left. The battle lasted until three or towards four in the afternoon, at which time, the enemy, all French in the sand hills and in very great force, say 7,000 men, were completely repulsed. We at that time were nearly as far advanced upon the sand hills as Egmont, and consequently in the rear of Bergen and Alkmaar. We remained upon our arms for the night of the 2nd, exhausted completely. In the morning

of the 3rd we found Bergen evacuated, and which town I took possession of, and proceeded within a mile and a half of Alkmaar, sent a short note to the Duke to say I conceived it had been also evacuated, and a detachment of Guards took possession of it last night. The Russians who had advanced no further than Shorel were then ordered to Egmont and Sir Ralph Abercomby took possession of Egmont upon Zee. Thus we are at present stationed, and I suppose we shall proceed this evening towards Beverwick, where I expect another battle. The position is narrow and strong, we must take it, nothing can resist the bravery of these British soldiers. The Russians give us no assistance whatever. I had a company of Russian yangers with me; they all lay down, officers and all, and declared they had no more ammunition. I, suspecting them, opened their pouches and found them nearly full, and their arms in perfect order. The corps principally engaged were the Queen's, 27, 29, and 85; my brigade, 25, Royals, 92, 49, 79; General Moore's 55, 23, Light Infantry and Grenadiers; Colonel McDonald's 31st, three battalions 4th Regiment; Lord Chatham's; and I believe the Grenadiers of the Guards.

"Moore's and McDonald's formed part of Sir Ralph's corps, and were in the sand hills upon my right.

"Lord Chatham's and mine with Burrard's were under Lieutenant General Dundas, who behaved exceedingly well, was clear and distinct. I have lost 212 men, officers included, killed wounded and missing. The other corps British have suffered considerably, say near 1,000 in all; the 92nd I am told in particular, General Moore and Huntley wounded. Our cavalry upon the right were conspicuous at a critical moment, charged and prevented the loss of two guns.

"I had two guns attached to me which, upon entering the sand hills I left in the road, and have never seen them since, as they joined the Russian column. I thought it much better not to wait for them, and proceeded with our small arms and bayonets.

"I have given you in a hurry a long detail, tolerably correct I believe. The business has been well done, and by sending back an immense force of British to our right and to fight in the sand hills, the left of the French army was completely turned. About five last evening the Duke of York entered the town of Bergen, met me in the street, and said he never could sufficiently thank my brigade and myself. He is at least satisfied, and, I dare say, will do the whole British justice, and who well deserve the thanks of their country. I confess I did not expect so great success. *Dash, Dash, Dash* was the cause of our victory." *Copy.*

COUNT W. G. BENTINCK-RHOON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 6. Helder.—"J'espère que vous ne m'aurez pas pris de mauvaise part, que je ne vous aye pas écrit plutôt, mais j'ai eu tant à faire, pour aller et venir prendre des informations de tout, que j'ai eu peu de temps à moi; outre cela j'ai voulu

être au fait de tout, et pouvoir vous mander quelque chose d'intéressant de la situation des affaires icy. En attendant j'espère que vous aurez été content du détail que j'ai envoyé à M. le Greffier Fagel. D'abord, à mon arrivée icy, j'ai été chez Monseigneur le Duc de York qui m'a parfaitement bien reçu, et m'a promis de me donner une commission que je n'ai cependant pas encore reçue. Ensuite j'ai été chez le Prince Héritaire, et vous avez vu par la lettre de M. Fagel, que je n'avois pas lieu d'être tout-à-fait content de lui d'abord ; mais la chose est fort bien allée après cela, et son Altesse Sérénissime m'a entièrement remis le soin de la marine, et des mattelots qui étoient au Texel. En conséquence de quoi je me suis directement mis à l'ouvrage, et le commandant Anglois, le commodore Lawford, m'a directement remis tous les vaisseaux de guerre qui se trouvoient dans le Nieuve Diep, que j'ai directement mis en commission, d'après les ordres du Prince Héritaire, savoir le *Hector* de 44, la *Hellui* de 32, le *Valk*, *Venus*, et *Minerve* de 26, et le *Duyjsse* de 58. Mais le manque de tout ce qui est nécessaire, et que je n'ai pu trouver jusqu'à présent que peu à peu, et dans tous les coins du petit pays que nous possédons, m'a empêché jusqu'à ce moment de finir cette affaire avec la célérité que j'aurois désiré, ayant encore jusqu'à ce jour été obligé de laisser les mattelots dans l'isle de Texel. J'ai aussi été le 26 Septembre chez l'amiral Mitchell, lequel je ne scaurois assez recommander à votre excellence, ayant été, on ne peut plus, content de son zèle, de son activité, de l'amitié et de la loyauté de toute sa conduite, tant à l'égard des habitants, que vis à vis de moi.

"J'ai alors, à sa réquisition, pris possession, au nom du Prince d'Orange, de tous les bureaux, arsenaux, et comptoirs de l'Amirauté, et de la compagnie des Indes, à Enkhuisen, et à Medenblic, et mis autant que possible un ordre provisoire pour empêcher la confusion, et procurer à l'Amiral, et à la flotte, tous les secours que les petits moyens que nous avons encore ont pu permettre.

"A mon retour icy le 29 Septembre, je suis allé le lendemain, le 1 Octobre, au quartier-général à Schager Brug, et y ayant appris l'intention d'attaquer l'ennemi le lendemain, j'y suis resté pour assister à cette affaire ; qui, étant bien combinée, à eue tout le succès possible, m'a faite un sensible plaisir, ayant eu la satisfaction d'en être le spectateur de très près, ayant suivi les colonnes, et été près des batteries qui faisoient un feu d'enfer sur les François ; mais, malheureusement, n'ayant pas de chevaux, j'ai été obligé d'aller à pied, ce qui étoit très fatigant, et m'a empêché d'aller aussi loin que j'aurois bien voulu ; de sorte que je ne puis pas vous en faire un rapport aussi détaillé que je désirerois. En attendant, je vous ferai part de ce que j'ai vu.

"Le soir du 2 Octobre toutes les troupes ont eu l'ordre de porter tous leurs bagages au quartier-général de leurs régiments, et on leur a laissé le choix de garder leur capotte ou leur couverture de laine, et de prendre pour deux jours de viande et de pain. Vers les trois heures tout s'est mis en le 2, avec la plus grande tranquillité ; le Général Abercromby, avec 10,000 hommes, s'est

mis en colonne par Petten sur le bord de la mer ; le Général Coote avec une colonne a pris par les Dunes ; les Russes ont débouchés de Petten le long des Dunes, en s'étendant sur la prairie entre les Dunes et le Zÿpe, par les villages de Camp, Groet et Schoerle. Derrière eux en reserve la brigade du Général Dundas, sur la droite du canal qui va de l'écluse du Zÿpe à Schoerledam, où on avoit fait un pont de batteau à 100 pas de la ditte écluse. A Crabbendam, une reserve de Russes, et un régiment Anglois en face de Schoerledam sur la digue à gauche du canal qui mène par Schoerledam à Alkmaar. Sur le canal même 6 bateaux plats avec des canons de 24lb, armés de matelots Anglois, et commandés par le Capitaine Popenham [Popham]. Sur l'aile gauche le général Sir Murray Pultney et la brigade du General Don. Voilà notre position, autant que j'ai pu observer. Les François avoient tous leurs chasseurs, et tous leurs tirailleurs et l'infanterie légère dans les Dunes, une forte batterie au pied des hauteurs dans le village de Schoerle et à Schoerledam, et une entre d'eux ; et en arrière une forte position de batteries et d'abbattis, dans le Bois de Bergen. Outre cela nous avons tres fort retranché notre position de Zÿpe, de sorte qu'en cas d'accident on avoit une retraite sûre, et une position pour le moment inexpugnable.

“Voilà les positions respectives, autant que j'ai pu observer. A 6 heures du matin le feu a commencé avec les Russes dans la plaine, et au but des Dunes, et ils ont avec le plus grand ordre possible poussés les François pied à pied par le feu d'artillerie jusqu'au village de Schoerle ; et se sont maintenus en faisant un feu terrible en face de ce village, jusqu'à ce que le Général Coote fut venu à bout de netoyer les Dunes, où les François se sont deffendus avec la plus grande opiniâtreté, et ont longtemps maintenu le terrain, en se deffendant d'une hauteur à l'autre ; mais enfin ont été obligé de céder à la bravoure des Anglois, et surtout du 52^{me} régiment Eccossois, qui ont culbuttés quatre fois les François à l'arme blanche. Enfin les François se sont retirés dans les Dunes jusqu'à la hauteur du village du Schoerle ; alors la réserve du Général Dundas, qui étoit formée en collonne sur le chemin du Zyper Sluis à Groet, s'est avancé, et a pris par le village de Groet le long des Dunes, sur la droite des Russes, qui se fut portés plus sur la gauche entre Schoerledam et Schoerle : ce qui a alors forcés les François d'abandonner le village de Schoerle, où ils ont mis le feu pour couvrir leur retraite ; les tirailleurs François s'étant postés derrière le dos d'un ravin, et d'une hauteur à la droite du village, où ils se sont encore maintenus pendant une heure et demie ; mais enfin, vers les 11½ heures les Dunes étoient netoyées, les Anglois maîtres des hauteurs, et attaquant à force du coté de Bergen, et par la communication entièrement ouverte avec le Général Abercrombÿ, qui, pendant ce temps là, s'étoit porté en avant sur Egmont, où il avoit appuyé son aile droite, et joint sa gauche avec les Généraux Coote et Dundas. Pendant ce temps-là les chaloupes sur le canal attaquoient *de front* la batterie de Schoerledam, le régiment

Anglois en reserve à Crabbendam attaque sur la digue à la gauche avec un obusier, et les Russes de la plaine sur le flanc droit du même village, que les François durent abandonner en y mettant le feu ; de sorte qu'à deux heures, les François avoient été chassés de toutes leurs positions de leurs avant postes, et étoient en retraite sur leurs positions principales du Coedyk, Langendyk, et Bergen. Ces postes étoient extrêmement forts, et on s'est occupé à les cannoner jusqu'à la nuit, mais sans avoir pu les entamer, et les Anglois proposerent d'abord d'emporter la position de Bergen avec la bayonette durant la nuit ; mais on a abandonné cette idée, parceque les troupes, et surtout les Russes, étoient tres fatigués, ayant eu un très mauvais terrain ; de sorte que vers le soir à huit heures on a gardé ses positions, et le Général Abercromby se trouvoit sur le flanc des François, sa droite appuyée vers la mer sur Egmont, et la gauche en communication avec le centre de l'armée.

"Si, malheureusement, les François n'avoient pas reçu la nuit de l'attaque un renfort de quelques milles hommes, qui se sont opposés au Général Abercromby, et qui l'ont obligé de se battre tout le long du jour, sans interruption, on auroit culbutté et tourné les François, et l'on seroit entré ce soir à Alkmaar.

"Vers le soir, un régiment de chasseurs à cheval, qui venoit en deux mois de marche de la Vendée, ont attaqué nos troupes, et s'étoient emparés de sept à huit pièces de canon, mais les dragons Anglois les ont tout de suite chargés et repris toutes les pièces, mis les chasseurs en fuite, et fait quelques prisonniers. Le lendemain on a fait quelques préparatifs pour attaquer de nouveau, lorsque vers le midy, on a reçu la nouvelle que les ennemis avoient abandonnés Alkmaar et Bergen, et se retiroient en grande hate vers le Beverwyk ; de sorte que hiér-au-soir le Duc de York, et le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange sont entrés dans Alkmaar, et l'on se prépare à poursuivre les ennemis. L'aile gauche n'a rien pu faire parceque l'ennemi avoit mis le Heere, Hingerwaard, et tout le pays sous l'eau. Les François, à ce que l'on dit, ont perdu beaucoup de monde, et de notre côté peu de morts, mais assez de blessés, dont cependant peu de très graves. Le général Moore a deux blessures dans les chairs, une dans la cuisse avec laquelle il est resté encore deux heures à cheval, et l'autre à la joue. Le collonel Mylord Huntley a une balle à l'épaule, le fils du général Abercromby est blessé à la main. Un capitaine Anglois tué, et quelques officiers blessés. Le Quartier-Maitre-Général Anstruther a eu un cheval tué, et a presque été pris prisonnier. Deux majors Russes, et un capitaine tué, et deux officiers blessés.

"Du reste la perte ne peut être grande d'après les rapports, parceque tout s'est décidé par l'artillerie, et que nous avions la supériorité du calibre.

"Environ quarante déserteurs Bataves sont venu hiér, et une soixante de prisonniers François, et un Lieutenant-Collonel Maurice. Voilà la relation de ce que j'ai vu, et que j'ose croire pouvoir affirmer ; j'aurois pu voir davantage, si je n'avois pas été obligé de me retirer du champ de bataille vers

les trois heures, tant par lassitude, que pour ne pas être surpris par la nuit, que ayant encore quatre lieux (ou 12 miles) à faire avant que d'être de retour chez nous.

“ Du reste il n'y a qu'une voix générale sur toute la conduite de l'armée Angloise, et elle est au dessus de toutes louanges à tous égards, tant pour sa bravoure héroïque sans aucune exception, que pour sa bonne conduite, sa discipline, et sa loyauté vis à vis de habitants ; et il n'y a jusqu'à présent qu'une voix à sa louange, et aucun sujet le plus léger de plainte, *till to the last drummer, they behave all like gentleman* : ce qui me fait un plaisir incroyable.

“ Les Russes ne sont pas si bien du côté de la discipline et de l'ordre, et laissant partout où ils passent des traces, plus ou moins saillantes, de leur passage et séjour. En quelque façon ils sont excusables, parcequ'ils ne sont pas traités comme les Anglois. On leur a offert de leur donner aussi de la viande ; mais le General Hermann (qui a été pris) l'a refusé, de sorte qu'ils en prennent où ils peuvent ; et il me semble qu'il seroit fort bon, puisqu'ils sont à la solde de l'Angleterre, que le Duc de York *reçut un ordre* de devoir les traiter comme les Anglois, parcequ'allors on pourroit aussi les tenir à la même discipline que le reste de l'armée Angloise, et les punir quand ils sont des désordres ; ce qui est très essentiel, parcequ'ils ruineront le pays si cela continue ainsi, diminueront par là le bon effet que la bonne conduite de l'armée Angloise fait sur l'esprit des habitants. J'espère que vous me pardonnerez la liberté que je prends de soumettre cette considération à vos lumières.

“ J'ose encore vous prier de vouloir bien faire renouveler à l'Amirauté les ordres pour l'embarquement de mes chevaux sans lesquels je ne puis rien faire icy, les chemins n'étant pas praticables pour des voitures ; de sorte que quoique le quartier-général n'étoit qu'à 16 miles d'icy, je perdois trois jours chaque fois que je devois y aller (jugez donc à présent qu'il en est à trente miles) de sorte que je ne puis y aller si souvent que je devrois, et par là je ne puis être aussi utile que je voudrois, n'y remplir le tout de votre confiance en moi. Je ne sçais ce qui y manque, mais il est déjà arrivé, et encore avant-hier, un grand convoi où il y avoit plusieurs chevaux qui sûrement ne sont d'aucune utilité à l'affaire, tandis que je suis paralysé par le manque de moyens de me transporter à un endroit où je dois être. J'ai aussi pris la liberté de tirer sur Mr Hammond, étant au bout de mon argent, et on ne peut rien avoir icy qu'au poid de l'or, et encore pas toujours ; ainsi que j'espère que vous voudrez bien donner les ordres à cet égard.

“ Du reste, je ne puis finir celle-cy sans insister encore sur une diversion en Frise, et surtout sur la Zeelande, car les François se retireront sur la frontière, et pilleront tout ce qu'ils pourront prendre avec eux, et la Zeelande est le seul endroit par où on peut leur couper la retraite, de même qu'à nos gens, qui partiront avec les caisses et tout ce qu'ils pourront prendre. Dans ce moment il me vient un officier avec la nouvelle que l'amiral Mitchell a pris le Lemmert en Frise, et qu'il s'y est fortifié.

Postscript. “ Dans ce moment une nouvelle du quartier-général qui dit que l'on avancera aujourd'hui et demain sur l'ennemi; les avant postes Anglois sont a Heyloo, et ceux des François à Limmen.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 7. Harley Street.—“ Je vous renvoi ces papiers avec bien de reconnaissance. La lettre du Duc d'York est parfaite.

“ S'il est vrai que Herman a eu l'infâme bassesse de calomnier vos troupes come s'ils ne l'avoient pas soutenu, j'aurai pour lui autant de mépris que j'avois d'estime; mais j'aime à croire que c'est Brune qui répand ces bruits pour metre la désunion entre les deux nations. J'espère, à présent, que nous enverrons demain vos couriers, et j'espère surtout que l'ennemi sera chassé de la Holande. Cette perssevérence à renouveler l'attaque fait honneur au Duc d'York. C'est un grand vertu en toute chose, et surtout à la guerre; c'est elle qui fait triompher de tout.

“ Je ne puis vous exprimer à quel point cette nouvelle m'a rendu heureux.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 7. Wangen.—“ I have little to add to my public despatches but my earnest and anxious wish that no time may be lost in making such arrangements with the Court of Petersburg as experience has shewn to be absolutely necessary before the Russian army can take the field against the French.

“ Without an increase of pay neither officers nor men can subsist in these countries but by pillage and plunder, by which they must infallibly in the end render the cause of the allies odious. Without a commissariat and without magazines, of which they are in total want, they can make no progress anywhere, and they must have starved in Switzerland had they been obliged to pass their winter there.

“ Without a staff composed entirely, in the first instance, of foreign officers, and without foreign officers attached permanently to every corps, this army cannot possibly act by itself, but must be dispersed in separate bodies among the different Austrian armies.

“ I am aware that all this is very delicate matter for the ear of the Emperor, but truth must be spoken on this occasion or we shall all be undone. Fortunately, the Russian officers, in this army at least, seem now persuaded of their own ignorance and insufficiency, and are themselves calling out for foreign officers to command them.

“ I trust this is a subject upon which your Lordship may speak out with Count Woronzow. I have not hesitated to do so with M. de Stackelberg, who arrived just in time to witness the defeat and disgrace of his countrymen; and I have found him

quite in the same sentiments with myself, though humiliated when he acknowledged it.

"The Condé army is ready at hand if the Emperor will be but magnanimous enough to make a proper use of it. There are also, at this moment, some excellent staff-officers in the Austrian army who, disgusted with the manner in which they have been treated or neglected by their own Government, would readily embrace any advantageous offer that might be made them.

"It seems an essential part in the great system of politics now adopted by his Majesty's Government, putting the war against republican France for a moment out of the case, that the Russian army should be put on such a footing as to keep either Berlin or Vienna in awe; and certainly a more favourable opportunity of arriving at that desirable end can never happen. How it is to be taken advantage of it is for your Lordship alone to say. I only hope and trust most earnestly that it will not be neglected.

"I am still very uneasy about the marshal, though I think it difficult, indeed scarcely possible that his retreat should be absolutely cut off. He has completely lost his head, and in the Mutton—that was as bad as Korsakoff at Zurich.

"Your Lordship might have collected from some of my late despatches that I had a very bad opinion of this great operation, which was in fact too vast and too complicated for anyone to manage. My friend Tinseau, whom I sent some time since to Suwarow with some other officers acquainted with the country, had the same bad opinion of the measure with myself. It failed also precisely there where I thought it would, namely, before Zurich. I always thought that the marshal would succeed from the time that I knew how powerfully he would be supported by the Austrians from the Grisons.

"Notwithstanding all these disasters, and bad as the Russian army is, I am persuaded, provided Suwarow escape with his corps, that, if the whole business be left to the Arch-Duke, he will conquer Switzerland before the winter. I am confident that he has force enough to enable him to achieve this enterprise, great as it is. But then, who is to guard it during the winter? Certainly nothing less than an army, and nothing but an army of Austrians.

"The Russians may be made great use of in the conquest, but I would not trust them to guard the chateau of a bailiff. I shall write to Lords Minto and Mulgrave on this subject to-morrow."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 7. Emden.—"The perverseness of the unchanging south-west wind having still kept me here, I have endeavoured to turn my involuntary stay here to the best account I could by quickening and exciting our friends in Groningen and Friesland. We are, I hope, at the eve of concluding some arrangement with the 4 or 500 Waldeckers who are now in garrison at Delfzyl and

at Niew Schank, to surrender to us and garrison for us those two fortresses; if, on the one hand, I venture in return for this service to accede to their demand of being taken into the pay of Great Britain, on the other hand I shall insist, as a *sine qua non*, that they first become in those two places our garrisons at our orders, instead of those of Gallo-Batavians; if they will surrender Delfzyl to us, I think there is great reason to hope that we can put force enough with them into it to keep it till a small force shall cross over from North Holland, and there may be a good chance that the Orange flag flying in that fortress may put a little better heart into the other parts of these provinces. In addition to our hopes from the Waldeckers, Captain Winthrop has undertaken to cut out the guardship and the six gun-boats which make the naval protection of it, and if he succeeds, as he is confident he will, there will be a good naval protection to the fort as well as to the garrison which is left in it; I heartily wish we had but a stray transport or two with 4 or 500 men, and I really believe the thing could be done without the treaty of Waldeck; but we will do for the best, and at least I shall be saved from dying of spleen and impatience here, by watching our little projects while the winds keep me from mixing in those of greater importance. I continue however to regret most bitterly the waste which is made of the Hereditary Prince in tacking him on to the rear of an English army, instead of giving him some small detached force to enable him to rouse his countrymen from their slumbers, and build upon his own exertions a personal reputation which will be useful and necessary to the future government of the country. Whether his abrupt departure from Lingén prevented him from leaving sufficient directions with Fagel and with Bentinck, or whether they are reluctant to act of their own accord, I know not; but the truth is that very little is done, either at Lingén or anywhere else, by the leading persons of the Prince's party. I must, however, do Charles Bentinck the justice to say that he himself is full of zeal and industry, and now that I have brought him more into contact with the Privy Council at Lingén, I hope that communication will be maintained with better advantage.

"In the midst of these speculations I am not a little disturbed by the letter which I have just received from General Stamford, because it shows me, from Zastrow's authority, how far Haugwiz is advanced in his original Prussian project of fighting with our arms and money for his benefit and for the advantage of his system; I will not believe that it is possible that the tardiness of our progress, and the stationary position of our army on ground where the *Gazette* tells us it cannot act, is to be attributed to our mixing in the discussion of all the proposals which Brune shall dictate to us through the Batavian Directory; I trust we cannot be in such a state of duplicity to our enemies, but yet it is so impossible for me to account for our inactivity on any other principle, that I am reluctantly forced to entertain these apprehensions, and to give more attention than I would to the prevailing reports that we are treating instead of fighting with the Gallo-Batavians. When

I express these apprehensions I confine them however entirely to the councils of the Helder, for I do not imagine that they can reach to the councils of St. James's where you are too well versed in the ways of Haugwiz to regard the overtures of Voss or those of Mollerus. With this additional anxiety upon my mind you will judge that my stay here, where I can know nothing, is a pretty high trial of my good humour ; and there are times in which I am not in perfect charity with you for not making Hammond send a duplicate dispatch to Harward, from which I could have learnt here the true and real state of things, and whether we have 40,000 men in Holland to make peace or to make war with the Gallo-Batavian Directors and generals. I know that you will defend yourself by saying that you did not foresee the probability of a violent south-west wind arresting my progress for so long a course ; but yet, as that improbable event has happened, you must be content to undergo the ill-humour which arises from the complete ignorance in which I find myself.

"The course of every moment furnishes some new proof of the bad effects of our stationary position, and I should not deal fairly with you if I concealed from you the real alarm which I entertain upon that subject from the impression which I see is produced by it; there is already a very current report that the English Government, finding themselves disappointed in their just expectation of assistance from the interior, have already begun to take measures for retiring, and will satisfy themselves with the possession of the Dutch fleet without pursuing any farther the original object of their expedition ; judge too of my surprize when I find the Prince of Orange's Bentinck writing this news from Lingen in a letter of the 6th instant, in which he states his belief that this is true, and describes it as a natural and reasonable conduct for us to pursue ; to this letter he adds that they have heard nothing whatever at Lingen since his letter of the 23rd ultimo. What can be the reason of this universal stagnation of military operations and of political correspondence, is really an enigma which I know not how to solve ; if, however, it should be possible that this letter should reach you before I shall be able to reach the Texel, I do conjure you to represent upon the certain ruin of all our hopes from the interior, if no detachment or diversion whatever is made to encourage them. I talk myself out of breath in endeavouring to urge here the necessity of their acting manfully without waiting for the arrival of English troops, because I cannot feel sure that they will arrive, while I am ignorant of all that is intended to be done with them ; but to you I cannot scruple to ask what possible doubt or hesitation they can have to send 2 or 3,000 men across the Zuyder Zee, when the leading persons, such as Van der Haar, Humalda, and Charles Bentinck, engage in the most direct and solemn assurances that such a force would instantly secure the two provinces of Groningen and of Friesland ?

"They have answered Charles Bentinck from Lingen that the Hereditary Prince's present funds will not allow of the necessary expenses, and therefore that application must be made by His

Serene Highness to me for larger funds ; I naturally answered that I had never heard one word upon the subject from the Hereditary Prince, but that I would converse upon it as soon as I could see him ; and meantime I have told Charles Bentinck that our Waldeck treaty shall not fail if it depends only upon those funds.

“ These are the natural perversities of this business ; if the troops act by diversion all will do well, but let them not stand still to die of a Dutch ague.”

Postscript. October 8.—“ I send you a copy of Stamford's letter of the 29th ultimo and of my answer. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Van der Gros to Mollerus which I received from Lingen ; I do not know that my numerous enclosures are always interesting, but as you may burn them as fast as you please, it is better to send too many than too few.”

Enclosure No. 1.

GENERAL DE STAMFORD TO THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, September 29. Brunswick.—“ Je commençois, je vous l'avoue, à m'affliger sérieusement de votre long silence, quand je reçus votre aimable lettre du 21 de ce mois ; car, comme je vous supposois mieux au courant des événements politiques et militaires qui se passent en Hollande que vous ne l'avez été d'après ce que vous me dites, je m'imaginois que, tout allant peut-être de ce côté-là au gré de vos vœux, vous n'aviez guères le tems de vous occuper d'un homme dont vous ne pouviez vous souvenir sans vous rappeler en même tems cinq mois, qui, sans doute, n'ont pas été le tems le plus agréable que vous ayiez passé en votre vie. Je vois que je vous ai fait tort, et mon cœur, qui vous est bien sincèrement et bien tendrement attaché, vous en demande pardon. Mais si votre lettre m'a entièrement rassuré à l'égard de mes craintes injustes, la lenteur des opérations en Hollande, et la manière peu prononcée dont se montrent les habitans envers leurs libérateurs, ne me rassurent pas également contre la crainte que j'éprouve par rapport aux suites que peut avoir un pareil état de choses s'il ne change pas bientôt. Cependant, le mauvais succès que nous avons eu dans la journée du 19 ne m'a pas découragé un seul instant ; ce que je trouve de très fâcheux dans cet événement c'est la malheur arrivé au général Herman ; mais, ce qui seroit infiniment plus fâcheux encore, ce seroit la confirmation de ce que rapportent les *Gazettes* Hollandaises, savoir que les Russes attribueront leur défaite aux Anglais. Ah ! qu'on prévienne par tous les moyens imaginables la désunion entre les généraux et les troupes des deux nations ! Tout iroit sens dessus dessous, si la disharmonie venoit à se mettre entr'elles.

“ A présent qu'on est maître du Zuyder Zee, and que toutes les troupes du débarquement sont arrivées en Hollande, je ne saurois m'empêcher de désirer qu'on pensât à faire passer un corps de 8 à 10 mille hommes dans la province de Frise où l'ennemi n'a point de troupes, et où les places sont sans défense.

Le corps pourroit y arriver par mer en 7 ou 8 heures de tems, tandis qu'il faudroit à l'ennemi 7 ou 8 jours pour y porter des secours, supposé qu'il en ait dont il puisse disposer. Si une fois on étoit établi dans cette province et celle de Groningue, avec quelle facilité ne protégeroit-on pas une insurrection contre l'ennemi dans les provinces de Gueldre and d'Overyssel, où les habitans ne remueront pas aussi long tems qu'ils verront l'armée Anglo-Russe ne s'avancer que péniblement vers eux, entre et à travers les canaux et sur les digues de la Hollande.

" M. le Duc de Brunswick est de mon opinion quant à la diversion dont je viens de parler ; mais comme il peut exister nombre de circonstances qui empêchent de l'effectuer, et que nous ignorons parfaitement, je vous prie de me regarder ce que je viens de vous dire à ce sujet que comme une idée jettée au hazard, et qui mériteroit peut-être d'être pesée par ceux qui se trouvent sur les lieux mêmes.

" Depuis votre départ de Berlin et mon retour à Brunswick ma correspondance avec M. le Duc, tant de vive-voix que par écrit, a été plus animée que jamais. On accueille avec bonté mes avis aujourd'hui qu'il n'en est plus tems. Vous en jugerez par les copies ci-jointes d'une lettre et d'un mémoire qui me furent remis de la part de ce Prince à mon arrivée en cette ville. Depuis son retour de Potzdam, où le Roi l'avoit invité pour assister au manœuvres, j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec lui un fort long entretien, dans lequel il m'a dit que son mémoire n'a pas fait la moindre impression sur l'esprit du Roi, et que Sa Majesté, tout en convenant de la solidité des argumens y contenus, et en approuvant le motif et le zèle qui le lui ont dicté, n'en demeure pas moins persuadée que le rôle passif auquel elle se condamne, est le seul qui puisse convenir à la Prusse, dans les circonstances actuelles. Sans doute que Sa Majesté trouve plus agréable et commode de jouer la guerre sur les colines autour de Potzdam, que de la faire avec les puissances, qui, depuis les Apenines jusqu'au nord de la Hollande, se battent pour conserver aux rois leur dignité, leur puissance, et leur trône. *Sunt, quos curriculo pulverem Olympicum collegisse jurat.*

" Si l'intervale qui nous séparera lorsque vous serez au Texel, moi étant ici, vous déplaît, comme vous avez la bonté de me dire, je vous avouerai que je ne puis absolument pas me faire à l'idée de me trouver si éloigné de vous. Or, voici ce que j'ai imaginé pour racourcir cette distance. Malgré l'approche de la mauvaise saison qui ordinairement influe d'une manière nuisible sur ma santé chancelante, je me suis déterminé d'aller m'établir à Emden, où j'espère que je serai toléré sous ma qualité d'envoyé de Mönseigneur le Prince d'Orange près de sa Majesté Prussienne, et où je n'aurai pas à risquer d'être appelé dans l'autre monde, sans être expédié dans les formes par la faculté de médecine.

" Si donc vous me faites l'honneur m'écrire après la reception de cette lettre, veuillez m'adresser vos lettres à Emden *poste restante*. J'y serai, s'il plaît à Dieu, vers le 12 du mois prochain, car, avant de m'y rendre, je me propose d'aller voir M. de la Palue

pour m'aboucher avec lui sur l'affaire dont vous me parlez dans votre lettre, afin de pouvoir vous en rendre un compte exact dans la première que j'aurai l'honneur de vous adresser." *Copy.*

Enclosure No. 2.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

1799, October 7. Emden.—“Votre lettre du 29 Septembre m'a trouvé encore ici, toujours retenu par les vents contraires au port d'Emden, toujours ignorant les détails de ce qui se fait ou de ce qui ne se fait pas en Hollande, et toujours d'assez mauvaise humeur en voyant que les événemens ne se prononcent pas assez d'eux-mêmes, mais sont plutôt de nature à demander beaucoup d'explication et beaucoup de commentaire; mais si d'un côté je suis au désespoir de l'ignorance où je me trouve dans un moment si critique, sans lettres quelleconques de l'Angleterre ou de la Hollande, de l'autre côté, je voudrois au moins me persuader que l'état d'inactivité militaire et d'apathie populaire que je trouve tant de raisons à regretter, pourroit être motivé et justifié d'après des faits ou des considérations politiques que jusqu'ici j'ai entièrement ignoré, et que je ne saurai certainement pas avant mon arrivée au Texel. N'ayant donc encore que ces espérances vagues à me consoler, je suis très peu en état de vous offrir des renseignements sur tous les objets importans dont il s'agit actuellement dans la Hollande. La nécessité pourtant d'une diversion puissante me paroît d'un intérêt prépondérant, et je ne manquerai pas de l'appuyer autant que possible dès le premier moment de mon débarquement, quoique je ne crois pas qu'il soit possible qu'une pareille considération n'eût été déjà discutée à l'armée autant qu'elle le méritoit. Cependant je n'ai pas négligé de tâter le terrain pour pouvoir nous procurer dans la Frise et dans la Groningue une déclaration plus ouverte et décidée de la bonne disposition qu'on nous vante avec raison, à ce que je crois, dans ces deux provinces. On revient toujours à demander préalablement la soutien actuel et personnel des Anglois, et jusqu'ici je n'ai pas réussi à faire envisager les quarante mille hommes près d'Alkmaar comme un point d'appui assez sûr pour inviter la coopération de l'intérieur. Effectivement je crois que dans ces deux provinces il y a beaucoup de bonne disposition pour la bonne cause, mais aussi on a si peur des Francois et du gouvernement qu'ils exercent, que personne n'est disposé à se compromettre par une déclaration ouverte sans avoir un détachement Anglois dans son village; et on veut absolument pour la rétablissement de l'ancien gouvernement que personne ne soit exposé au danger qui existe toujours, qui existera toujours, dans les premiers momens de toute révolution dans tous les pays du monde. Avec tout cela il faut être juste, et je dois convenir que dans les personnes du Comte Charles Bentinck, de M. Vanderhaar, et M. Humalda à Leer, on trouve tout ce qu'on pourroit désirer de zèle et d'intelligence et d'activité; mais pour les mettre à même d'appeller leurs amis à entrer en lutte, et tomber sur leurs ennemis et les nôtres avec

courage et succès, il faut absolument ou plus d'enthousiasme de la part des bien intentionnés, ou bien plus d'assistance effective de la part des Anglois dans ces provinces. C'est donc à ce dernier objet que je vais travailler autant que possible dès que j'aurai mis pied à terre au Helder, si avec 40,000 hommes qui sont déjà là, il y a place encore pour un de plus.

“Je n'ai rien reçu du Prince Héritaire d'Orange par la raison qu'il me croit toujours au moment d'arriver chès lui, et par conséquence, je ne connois pas la marche qu'il suit dans ce moment, ni la destination ultérieure qu'il se propose ; mais à moins que des motifs très puissants l'engagent à rester où il est, je serois très porté à croire que Son Altesse Sérénissime se mettroit à la tête de cette expédition dans la Groningue et dans la Frise avec grand avantage, et pour lui-même, et pour le bien public. A la tête des 2 ou 3,000 Hollandois qui sont déjà avec lui, renforcés par un corps d'Anglois et de Russes, il seroit bientôt dans le cas de dominer dans ces deux provinces, d'y former une armée Stadthoudérienne avec laquelle il entreroit dans les provinces d'Overysse et d'Utrecht pour se porter à la tête d'une force respectable, partout où sa présence pourroit devenir utile et nécessaire. J'aime à voir dans ce projet les moyens de le faire regarder chez lui comme le libérateur de son pays, et je désirerois qu'en travaillant à sa propre gloire, il se fit un fond de célébrité et de popularité, tel que les grands hommes ont toujours cherché à se faire dans les situations aussi critiques que celles où il se trouve ; c'est un beau moment pour lui que celui de la crise actuelle, et c'est aujourd'hui qu'il faut qu'il fasse parler de lui parmi ses compatriotes.

“J'ai lu avec beaucoup d'attention le mémoire du Duc de Brunswick, et s'il ne s'agissoit que d'une déclaration de ses opinions politiques, j'en serois assez content, puisqu'il n'y a rien dans ce mémoire qui ne me paroît pas être d'une vérité reconnue ; mais pendant que j'ai la conviction qu'avec plus d'énergie de sa part il pourroit donner à ces raisonnemens une valeur effective auprès du Roi de Prusse, je ne puis pas me satisfaire en lisant l'exposé qu'il a fait de ses sentimens au Roi. Les dangers du siècle où nous vivons ne permettent pas les ménagemens ni le réserve ni les demi-mesures ; et pendant que toute l'Europe est persuadée que l'activité du Roi de Prusse dépend entièrement de l'ardeur et du zèle que le Duc de Brunswick pourroit à tant de titres employer efficacement auprès de Sa Majesté pour cet objet, on se contentera difficilement de la lecture du mémoire que vous avez eû la bonté de me communiquer. Dans les crises si urgentes, le public ne connoît pas les degrés du plus ou du moins ; le Duc de Brunswick ne doit pas s'attendre à jouir impunément de toute sa célébrité passée ; il faut qu'il soit regardé aujourd'hui comme la personne la plus influente dans la monarchie Prussienne, et, par conséquent, comme celui dont il dépend absolument quel seroit le rôle que la Prusse va jouer. On croit qu'il ne tient qu'à lui et à la manière dont il pourroit se prononcer, pour porter l'esprit du Roi à adopter une conduite

plus analogue à ses intérêts, et à sa gloire, et à la sûreté de son trône ; et quelque sévère que pourroit paroître un pareil jugement, on croira que le Duc de Brunswic n'a rien fait jusqu'à ce qu'il eut tout fait que sa célébrité, ses talens, et son influence parroissent exiger de sa part. Voilà, en peu des mots, mais avec beaucoup de sincérité, et avec ma franchise ordinaire, ce que je dois vous dire sur le mémoire du Duc.

“Je suis très sensible à la bonté et à l'amitié que vous me témoignez dans votre aimable lettre, et pour non que le vent contraire me retienne encore trois ou quatre jours, je ne pourrois me résoudre à ne pas attendre encore deux jours à Embden, s'il fut possible de cette manière que je pourrois espérer de vous revoir ici avant mon départ. J'aurois beaucoup plus à vous dire que ce que je puis me permettre de vous écrire, mais je vois, malgré moi, trop d'incertitude dans le moment de votre arrivée pour oser encore différer mon voyage, qui est peut-être plus nécessaire que jamais. Cependant, je travaille ici, et mes nouvelles, quant aux environs de ces provinces, sont encore meilleures cet après diné.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, October 8. Downing Street.—“On Count Panin's setting out for Petersburg to take upon him the duties of his new situation, he had the goodness to desire Mr. Garlike to transmit to me on his part the expression of sentiments by which I cannot but feel in the highest degree gratified and honoured. I transmit to you, under flying seal, a letter which I have written to that minister in return ; and I should be obliged to you if you would deliver it to him with such expressions as may best mark the sincere respect and regard which I entertain for his character, and distinguished talents.”

Enclosure.

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT PANIN.

1799, October 8. London.—“M. Garlike m'a bien communiqué les expressions, infiniment flatteuses pour moi, des sentimens dont vous voulez bien m'honorer. Les bontés que vous avez eu pour mon frère, et la confiance que vous m'avez témoigné à différentes reprises, m'ont paru autorizer en quelque sorte la liberté que je prens de vous écrire pour vous témoigner toute la satisfaction que j'ai ressentie en apprenant votre nomination aux hautes fonctions que vous allez remplir à Petersburg.

“Depuis le moment que le Roi m'a confié le département de ses affaires étrangères, je n'ai jamais cessé de travailler à l'établissement de la plus stricte union entre nos deux Cours, aidé par le zèle et les lumières de mon ami le Comte de Woronzow. J'ai eu le bonheur d'y réussir, et je regarde cet ouvrage comme plus assuré que jamais en voyant l'exécution des intentions justes et magnanimes du grand prince que vous servez, confiée à

un homme dont je sais apprécier les talens et les vertus, quoique je n'aie pas été assez heureux pour le connoître personnellement.

“ Je demande à v[otre] E[xcellence] avec instance la continuation de sa confiance. Qu'elle soit sûre que je n'en abuserai jamais. Je m'estimerai toujours heureux de recevoir ses ordres, et je ne cesserai d'employer tous mes soins pour le maintien d'une union nécessaire pour le bonheur de nos deux païs, et pour le triomphe de ces principes auxquels je sais que v[otre] E[xcellence] n'est pas moins attaché que je le suis.”
Copy.

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 8. Harley Street.—“ Je suis malheureux, accablé de douleur et de rage par quelque nouvelle qui j'ai appris sur l'infâme conduite des troupes Russes dans la dernière affaire. Ce n'est pas la même nation qui est en Italie et en Suisse, ou les généraux et officiers qui les comendent en Holandes sont des infâmes, dignes de la potence. J'espère que vous ferez ce que je fais, et que vous en informerez votre ministre en Russie comme je le fais ce soir, en informant Rastopchin pour qu'il le comunique à l'Empereur. Ces gueux qui sont en Hollande me font rougire d'être Russe. Si vous envoyez votre courier ce soir je pourai écrire plus librement à d'autre perssone que je ne puis le faire par le mien ; c'est pourquoi je vous prie de l'envoyer.

“Faites-moi l'amitié de me dire si Popham a été envoyé par le Duc d'York à Petersbourg. Ce seroit bien malheureux s'il ne l'avoit pas fait, car cet homme actif, et que l'Empereur aime, obtiendrait tout de suite qu'on enverrait d'autres généraux à la place de ceux qui couvrent de honte le nom Russe.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1799, October 8. [Dropmore.]—“ I have had a long conversation with Lord B[uckingham] on the subject of the paper you sent me about Irish representation.

“ We were totally unable to solve the difficulty of deciding who is to receive the compensation of open boroughs, nor indeed do I think it capable of any solution except by arrangement with the persons concerned. If this be impossible the result must necessarily be as follows :

Counties	32	-	2 each	-	64 members.
Cities	2	-	2 „	-	4 „
Open towns	30	-	1 „	-	30 „

98

which, if we adhere to our limitation of an hundred, leaves only two members for 84 boroughs.

“ To extinguish them on the plea of their being created *so late* as the reign of James I., or by enquiring *why* they were created, would be very dangerous in principle ; and the same plea would also, it is conceived, apply to some of the 30 open boroughs which are meant to be retained.

"If therefore this idea must be adhered to, perhaps the best way of doing so would be to avow the plain reason, that of convenience; that the object being to lessen the number, those are abolished which are capable of compensation in money.

"It would then be a question whether to abolish them all instantly and compulsorily, giving the full value, and leaving only the 98 rights above stated, or, whether it would not be best to class the close boroughs in classes of threes, to alternate by Parliaments.

"To do this would abolish two-thirds of the present value, supposing it agreed that the one member to be sent to the United Parliament is equal to the two to the Irish Parliament.

"This two-thirds might be given now compulsorily in money, and would be about 10,000*l.* for each borough. The third of eighty-four is twenty-eight, which, added to ninety-eight, would make the present number of members to the United Parliament one hundred and twenty-six, liable to be reduced as often as any of the classed boroughs should offer to take the other third in money.

"Some bargains of this kind might possibly be made by private contract, before the measure is brought forward. The four Bishops' boroughs which belong to Government might certainly be so arranged, and the immediate increase might probably not be more than to about 115 or 120, instead of the 100 originally proposed. This increase forms therefore a very small part of the objections to this plan.

"The solid reasons against it are, 1st, that while you abandon to so great a degree the principle of the actual representation, and form one quite different from it and very unequal and artificial in its composition, your new system does not rest on any (even plausible) theory, but merely on convenience. It is a total change but no reform, many of the open places retained being, in practice, as much private property as the others, and the places themselves not at all more considerable.

2nd. "That what you retain by preference are practically the very worst species of representation, pot-walloping boroughs and open elections by the mob, where neither property, nor family connection, nor the good opinion of neighbourhood, or any other good species of influence could weigh against adventurers from Dublin or London with large purses, or backed by any temporary clamour.

3rd. "That you admit a principle, or establish a mode of applying it, both which, if good, are quite as applicable to the case of English representation. And that as there will be a general and apparently a well-founded opinion that 650 is too large a body for the House of Commons, this will be suggested as a natural mode of reducing the numbers here, as well as in Ireland.

"These objections are so weighty that I think it well worth while to examine in detail the cases on the apprehension of which this whole plan is grounded. I mean those of the actual owners of the 30 open boroughs, who, it is supposed, may be

indisposed to the measure if any compensation in money is to be given for those boroughs, as it must go to the electors and not to them.

“Considering that this number of 30 is in itself not large, and that several of these persons are probably among the decided enemies of the whole measure, it might perhaps not be impossible, by private and separate discussion with the individuals concerned, to reduce the effects of their apprehended discontent so as to be much less dangerous in its extent than even the influence of the objections I have already stated.

“If this could be done, the plan of a general classing by threes of all boroughs indiscriminately would so very nearly answer in point of number that there could be little difficulty of reducing that to practice.

Thus, 32 counties and 2 cities	-	-	-	68
add $\frac{116}{3}$	—	$38\frac{2}{3}$	-	$38\frac{2}{3}$
				$106\frac{2}{3}$

Deduct two Bishops' boroughs, which are four, and they would diminish this number by $\frac{1\frac{1}{3}}{106\frac{2}{3}}$; and make a further deduction for such others as might, before the measure is brought forward, be bargained for and surrendered by private agreement, and you would find the number considerably reduced, possibly below the 100.

“The inestimable advantage of grounding the whole plan on the present rights without any other change than that of doubling the counties and great cities, is so strong a recommendation of this plan that I should think a large proportion of private accommodation, so arranged as to satisfy the proprietors of the 30 new boroughs, very well bestowed indeed; and I should wish that the means of doing this should be examined in detail by those who are conversant with the subject, before any other plan is resorted to.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES CRAUFORD.

1799, October 9th. Cleveland Row.—“The uncertainty in which everything continues respecting the Netherlands has prevented me from turning my mind to the subject of your letter of the 23rd August. If anything can now be done there it must be by military plans and measures, and what has as yet been done on the subject is directed in that course. Till the state of that country shall assume some more settled shape, nothing more can be said respecting any mission there.” *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 10. Harley Street.—“Par les donnés que j'ai eu mardi passé de l'infâme conduite de notre misérable Général Essen, duquel je n'avois déjà rien à espérer d'après la lettre confuse que j'avois reçu de lui du vingt-trois du passé, et qui me prouvoit qu'il a perdu la tête ou ne l'a jamais eu, j'ai écrit le

même soir qu'on le rappelle, et qu'on envoie tout de suite un autre général. Je sais par un témoin oculaire que le dix-neuf, au lieu de rallier les gens en désordre, il a été le premier à fuir, et se trouvoit dans le camp, où il étoit occupé à regarder avec une lunette d'approche ce qui se faisoit en avant. Je vous conjure de me donner tous les détails qui parviendront par le courrier qu'on attend, et si son Altesse le Duc d'York n'a pas encore ôté le commandement à cet infâme Essen, et à celui qui a commandé le régiment de chasseurs qui s'est si mal comporté dans la dernière affaire, j'espère qu'on lui écrira d'ici de le faire, et qu'il écrira à l'Empereur qu'il a été forcé à cela par ce que ces gens déshonorent les drapeaux Russes. L'Empereur en sera très content. Il est déjà prévenu par ce que j'ai écrit, mardi passé, de l'infâme conduite d'Essen, et de bien d'autres officiers.

“ Je me flatte que vous n'accuserez pas les troupes de ce qui n'est que l'infamie de ceux qui les commandent. Le Maréchal Roumentzow, qui dès l'âge de quatorze ans a fait la guerre, qui a passé par tous les grades, nous disoit toujours que *quand les soldats Russes se conduisent mal il faut pendre sans forme de procès les officiers qui les commandent*, et il avoit raison. Dans six campagnes que j'ai faites, j'ai vu qu'il falloit retenir le soldat pour qu'il ne coure pas trop en avant, au lieu de l'animer. Que s'il s'aperçoit que celui qui le commande manque de courage, il le méprise, se décourage, et cesse d'obéir à des généraux ou officiers méprisables. Je vous réitère ma prière de me donner les informations que vous aurez. En attendant, je suis outré au-delà de toute expression de l'infamie qui rejaille sur les troupes de ma nation.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 11. Harley Street.—“ J'ai toujours crains quelque désastre en Suisse depuis la retraite de l'Archiduc. Comment quarante et quelques milles hommes sur une position aussi étendue que celle qu'occupoient Korssakoff et Hotz depuis le Tirol, les Grisons, jusqu'à Zurich, faisoient la périphérie d'un demi-cercle dont Massena avec soixante-dix milles hommes occupoit le centre, et n'ayent qu'un demi-diamètre à parcourir pour se porter avec toute ses forces contre telle partie du grand arc qu'il vouloit percer. Cette disgrâce est aussi naturelle qu'inévitable. L'étonnant est que Massena a tardé si longtemps à l'effectuer. Vous vous souvenez que Korssakoff m'écrivait que sa position étoit insoutenable, ajoutent ‘vous me demanderez pourquoi j'y reste ? C'est pour qu'on ne disent pas de moi que je suis un général à retrahir ; mais, surtout, pour ne pas abandonner à la rapacité et à la féroce vengeance des Français la petite partie de la Suisse que nous tenons, et qu'il seroit cruel de sacrifier.’

“ Je suis impatient des détails de la Hollande. Quoiqu'ils ne fassent que me chagriner de plus en plus, la seule consolation que j'en retirerai c'est de renouveler mes instances à St. Petersbourg pour le rappel de ce maudit Essen, et pour l'envoi

d'un autre général plus ferme, plus rigide, et qui comenceroit à punire severement tous les coupables ; ce qui remettrait de suite l'ordre dans les troupes."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 11. Emden.—"It is now the 17th day of Emden and the *Circe* is still as fast wind-bound as ever ; you will see with satisfaction that the Captain's time is not however idly spent here, and with my antient hostility to the trade of the Waddens, you will naturally imagine I did not repress the activity of Winthrop by any idle dreams of Prussian neutrality. To avoid all possibility of misrepresentation as to the facts, I have written them to Garlike at Berlin ; to remind him of our claim to fight our enemies by sea whenever we can reach them by sea, is however unnecessary, as I recollect that he felt as every Englishman should do upon this subject. What makes the gallantry of this exploit is the most ample justification of it, for the Dutch ships of war were within half musket shot of the batteries of Delfzyl, and the King of Prussia cannot affect to find his neutrality there without claiming the Dutch side of the Ems as well as the opposite coast. I send you a map of the Emden River to shew you the spot more accurately ; the *Circe* lay 20 miles down the river, and it was from the *Circe* that Winthrop sailed up on a dark night in two Dutch boats, to take away two ships of war manned with 75 and with 40 men, under batteries which would have sunk him a hundred times if he had given the alarm by one single pistol shot. He is a fine fellow of the true breed of British seamen.

"My land report is not so prosperous ; we have done nothing yet with these shuffling Waldeckers, and though our friends here vapour all day long about their means and their influence in Friesland and Groningen, I see that no human means will make them move with any exertion attended with risk to their persons or property ; and it was gravely answered to me the day before yesterday that as soon as our army would send force enough into Groningen and Friesland to disarm the disaffected and drive away the Batavian garrisons, the whole country would rise to a man. I could not help answering that in such a case they might to a man go to bed again, for if they would not stir till the whole business was done to their hands, there was no reason why they should stir afterwards. Such a wretched and lamentable want of all zeal and spirit, public or private, I could never have believed, if I had not been an unwilling witness to it. What that spirit of the De Witts and the Barneveldts originally was, I know not ; it seems to have been exhausted in their persons, for no trace of it is to be found in their descendants ; they talk without shame of the wretched pusillanimous character of their countrymen, and I do not see that those who hold this language correct the faults which they reproach to others, or contribute by their own spirit and energy to restore that which they complain of seeing extinguished throughout the United Provinces.

"This evil is in my mind the greatest difficulty upon the whole subject; when the materials are found the arrangement is only matter of labour and prudence, but here all is to be created, for the more you examine into the account, the more you will be persuaded that there is not in the people of the United Provinces any trace of that national spirit which should form the only solid and certain source of its defence and security. I can say nothing of Flanders till I know what has been said or done there. D'Yvoy's reports are those against which I have always suggested some doubts. I will write more when I know more."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, October 12.] Harley Street.—"Je vous remercie pour la communication des papiers que je vous renvoi. Ils ont servi à adoucir l'amertume et le chagrin où je me trouve, voyant que la malheureuse affaire du dix-neuf, et la captivité de Hermann a été prise mieux que je ne l'espérois. Je me flatte pourtant que le Chevalier Whitworth s'emploiera pour que ce malheureux général soit repris au service.

"Le raisonnement du Chevalier sur le rapel du Comte Tolstoi de l'armée de l'Archiduc est très juste. Il ne faut pas se brouiller avec la Cour de Vienne: il suffit de la connoître, de n'être pas sa dupe, mais il ne faut pas la pousser au bout, et la déterminer à s'accomoder avec la France."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 13. Downing Street.—"The messenger is arrived with the detail of the action of the 2nd, and a short account of another action on the 6th. It was obstinate and long, and ended in our keeping the field; but the generals seem to have been unanimous in their opinion that there was not a prospect of any further advantageous operation, and the army have moved back to the position they left on the 2nd. Colonel Brownrigg is sent over for further instructions, and he is hourly expected. I, of course, expect to see you to-morrow morning as early as you please."

OFFICIAL NOTE.

1799, October 14. Downing Street.—"Despatches have been received from his Royal Highness the Duke of York dated Alkmaar the 7th, giving an account of a severe action which took place on the 6th instant, between that town and Beverwyk, which terminated in the enemy's retiring after sustaining a very considerable loss in killed and wounded. Upwards of 500 prisoners were taken; the loss of the British is stated at 500, and that of the Russians at 1,200 killed, wounded and missing. The difficulty of advancing in a country naturally so strong, the reinforcements daily received by the enemy, joined to the unusually bad weather and impracticable roads, determined his

Royal Highness to re-occupy on the 8th the strong position from which the army had advanced on the 2nd, and there to wait for further instructions."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 14. Duke Street.—"I called twice on your Lordship this morning and had the misfortune the last time to come two or three minutes after you were gone. I wanted to have introduced to you M. de Heerdt who has been sent by the Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince his father, and is to return immediately to join his Serene Highness who writes from the Helder. The Hereditary Prince is extremely anxious to be informed in time of the determination that will be taken, in case of a final retreat, with respect to the 6,000 Dutchmen, sailors and soldiers, who have enlisted under him. In order to lose no time in sending M. de Heerdt back with some answer on this subject, which the Princes take much at heart, I have engaged to accompany him to-morrow to Dropmore, and we mean to be there between 11 and 12 o'clock, and to return immediately after having waited on your Lordship. I am very sorry thus to disturb you, but I am sure you will excuse me on account of the nature of the thing."

The PRINCE OF ORANGE (to) HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, October 15. Hampton Court.—"Mon fils vient de m'envoyer le Baron de Heerdt pour m'informer du mouvement retrograde de l'armée alliée en Nord Hollande et demander mes ordres sur ce qu'il devoit faire dans le cas d'une retraite ultérieure de cette armée. Votre Excellence se rappellera que ce gentilhomme a accompagné M. le Général Abercromby, chargé de ma part d'une commission que je lui ai donnée à la demande du Gouvernement Britannique.

"Mon fils l'a, en même temps, spécialement chargé de me représenter la situation d'un nombre de six à sept mille Hollandois, tant matelots que soldats, qui, animés par la proclamation que le Général Abercromby a émanée au nom de sa Majesté Britannique, et par celle que j'ai publié de mon côté, ont fait preuve de leur attachement à la constitution légitime de la République des Provinces-Unies, ainsi qu'à moi et à ma maison, en quittant le service des usurpateurs du pouvoir suprême dans la République des Provinces-Unies, pour prendre volontairement service, et se laisser employer sous les ordres de mon fils.

"Votre Excellence sentira à quel point la situation de ces infortunés pourroit devenir facheuse si l'armée alliée étoit obligée, à la suite des circonstances actuelles, d'évacuer entièrement la Hollande. Je suis trop persuadé de l'équité de Sa Majesté Britannique, et du Gouvernement, pour ne pas être persuadé que, dans un cas pareil, on ne souffrira pas que ces gens soient victimes de leur zèle et de leur dévouement, et qu'ils ne seront pas abandonnés à la vengeance de l'ennemi; mais j'ai cru de mon devoir le plus

indispensable de ne pas perdre un seul moment pour mettre leur situation sous les yeux de Votre Excellence, et la prier de donner les ordres nécessaires pour qu'il soye pourvu provisionnellement à leur sûreté, ainsi qu'à celle des officiers qui ont été envoyé en Hollande conformément au désir du gouvernement, et des personnes qui ont accompagné mon fils ou sont venus le joindre; en attendant qu'il soye possible de prendre pour leur sort futur des mesures analogues aux sentiments de justice et de générosité que distinguent d'une manière si éminente et Sa Majesté Brittannique et son Gouvernement.

"Votre Excellence m'obligera infinément si elle veut bien m'informer le plustot possible de la détermination qui aura été prise à ce sujet, afin que je puisse en informer mon fils, et lui renvoyer, pour cet effet, M. le Baron de Heerd, qui n'attend que cette réponse pour partir." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 15. Harley Street.—"J'ai reçu hièr ce que vòus m'avez écrit en secret. Le retraite de la Holande est une mesure non seulement très sage, mais elle est même indispensable, car, outres les raisons valables que vous alléguez, il y a encor la considération que d'après les désastres arivés à Korssakoff en Suisse, désastres si perfidement préparés depuis longtems par Thugut et compagnie, les Français peuvent détacher trente à quarante milles hommes de plus de leurs armée de la Suisse et du haut Rhin, et les faire dessentre [descendre] par eau sur ce fleuve, et qui pouroient ariver en Holande dans moins de trois semaines; ce qui rendroit la supériorité de l'armée de Brune sur celle du Duc d'York tout-à-fait disproportionnée.

"Etant malade, je n'ai pas pu sortire hièr et voir M. Hamond, mais j'ai envoyé tant chez lui que chez M. Huskinson mon Révérend Smirnov, qui m'a aprit bien des choses sur ce maudit Essen. Je profiterai de votre courier de ce soir pour écrire à Petersbourg.

"J'ai lue aujourd'hui, avec une consolation extrême, dans le *True Briton*, que le Maréchal Souvorow est à Coir. Il est clair que marchant par Belinzona, Saint Gothard, à Altorf, battent sur son chemin les Français qui vouloit s'y opposer, dès qu'il aprit les disgraces de Hotz et Korssakoff, et qu'il alloit être entouré par toute l'armée de Massena, il a prit tout d'un coup à droite, et avec une dilligence et des marches que lui seul peut faire, il est arivé à Coir à la droite du Rhin, d'où, par un détour assez considerable autour du lac de Constance, il arivera pour se joindre au débris de ses compatriotes."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 15. Stowe.—"Most melancholy indeed is the awful reverse of the last week which, under God's will, has dashed from us so much of the well-founded hopes that had been

entertained ; but the question is not altered in any particular by this reverse, for ' we must fight the course.'

"I am of course anxiously uneasy for the re-embarkation of the army, not knowing what the means are of ensuring the retreat by means of the work at the Helder. I take it for granted that you will hold that fort and the Texel as long as you can, upon principles and with objects very different from those which we had fondly entertained ; for it is obvious that the French must besiege to great disadvantage whatever you leave there, even if it should not be a stronger garrison than 1,500 men ; and therefore that such a force would operate as a solid diversion if besieged, or as a mischievous desultory force if left unattacked. And, at all events, it will hold the key of Holland till it is dislodged, and for that time our detachment of North Sea fleet will lay in the Texel or in the Mars Diep without risk or expense. And I fear that the state of our transports is such, that unless you can send the cavalry horses to the Texel island till you can re-embark them at a proper opportunity, they must be sacrificed. But even this is of less importance compared to the risk of losing any of those brave men to whose zeal and exertion we owe so much. My poor men have indeed suffered severely, but I thank God they have not disgraced themselves. But my sensations upon the subject would be most painful if I was not sure that I have done right in the line which I have taken, and which has ended so fatally for so many of them. Two of my officers (poor Chaplin and Browne) are missing, I hope not wounded. As to my recruiting it has indeed done the regiment the highest credit. My numbers now amount to 327 men, of whom 285 have enlisted for the 4th under their own officers ; 26 more (trained artillerists) have entered for the Royal Artilley, and the remainder for the 16th or Buckinghamshire regiment. My officers and sergeants are indeed entitled to every praise and indulgence, and with this view I have writ to Mr. Dundas, whose kind attentions to me have been unbounded, to propose (under an intimation given me by Major-General Ross that the barracks in this eastern district will be wanted for the Russians, or for some of the new corps, particularly those which will be formed or recruited from Ireland, either as recruits or as militia) that our now very small corps may be sent to quarters, for the first winter since 1791, in the county. This is not within your line, but unless military reasons interfere (to which at once I lend myself) I know it will give you pleasure to assist my wishes, which are strongly interested on this subject, for those to whom I owe so much.

"Lord Chatham's escape has, I trust, decided you and others to whom the public have a right to look, not to suffer yourselves to forego for his very proper feelings as a soldier the dearest interests of the public ; and that, in one word, his further service on the Continent will be negatived ; a sacrifice which, I must say, he owes to the public. For God's sake do not be deterred from doing what I know you will feel your duty on this subject.

"You say nothing of our dear Tom. I suppose he will return immediately to England, unless Petersburg should call for him, which I conceive may be the case."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 18. Harley Street.—“La journée que j’ai passé hier chez un ami dans le Kent, a un peu dissipé mes chagrins, mais votre billet que je viens de recevoir m’a fait encore plus de bien. L’assurance que vous me donnez que l’inappréciable Souvorow a rejoint l’armée battue de Korsakoff me rassure. L’arrivée de cet homme prodigieux contiendra les Français, tous supérieurs qu’ils sont en nombre; et si Wikham lui amène dix milles Bavares, il reprendra avec ce renfort l’offensive, c’est à dire la partie de la guerre qu’il aime et qu’il connoît le mieux. Je crois qu’il n’y a aucun danger à vous et à nous à garantir les possessions Danoises. Qui diable pourroit les envahir? Le bien de l’accession du Danemark viendra de ce que leur marine marchande ne pourra plus approvisionner les ennemis; et c’est beaucoup, car malgré vos capteurs, c’est immense ce que les Danois portoient en France, en Espagne, et en Hollande.

“Je vous envoie ce que j’ai reçu de Kalitcheff par votre courrier de Vienne. Starhemberg a dit à Wedel et Circello qu’il a des preuves officielles que c’est à l’instance des cours de Londres et de Petersbourg que l’Archiduc a quitté la Suisse. Je vais au bureau, d’après votre permission, pour avoir des détails sur la position de Souvorow. Je vous supplie de me renvoyer la lettre de Kalitcheff.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 18. Texel.—“A safe but very tedious voyage has just brought me into smooth water here, and while things are preparing for me to land, I am told that a vessel is instantly sailing for England. I profit of it therefore in order to tell you that we are all arrived safe after a seven days’ voyage which, as you know, I waited three weeks in daily expectation of completing.

“The reports that I hear are all of the most unpleasant nature, and though I cannot find that there has been any defeat, I find the army has resumed its original position, the heavy artillery is embarked, and all men talk of our immediately evacuating Holland. After the entire ignorance in which I have passed the last month I cannot pretend to judge of these extraordinary events, but until I am better informed, I shall confine myself now to the assuring you that I will lose no time in writing to you.

“It is certainly not a very pleasant reception after an extraordinary voyage to find that I shall probably have immediately to re-embark, but it will be gratifying to me to try to the last to do all the good I can; and when I see you, as I probably very shortly shall, we shall meet with satisfaction in that reflection, whatever may be the course of events here, or the extent of our disappointments.”

SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 18. *Tigre*, off the coast of the Delta.—“I have found it absolutely impossible to carry on distant correspondence at a time when that within the immediate sphere of our local operations required every moment that I could venture to take my eye off from the daring enemy we are opposed to; and I should feel myself very remiss toward your Lordship if I had not been certain that every line I wrote to my brother would of course reach you in a more concise form, as being separated from those parts which merely concerned the local arrangements at the Porte, but which, from the pressure of my necessities, naturally became the prominent feature of my correspondence. I don't like to adopt the tone of complaint, but I certainly have ample field, unsupported and cavilled at as I have been. Plague, pestilence, and famine, battle, murder, and sudden death, we are used to, but it is more difficult to bear the unceasing attacks of envy, hatred, malice and all uncharitableness in *the rear*, while the enemy are within pistol shot *in front*. The idea of those who ought to support their zealous servant undermining and pulling him down would be too much for the patience of any man, who had not had the trials I have. The first blow I received in the back after I was grappled with the enemy was from Lord St. Vincent, who misconceived some expression of mine, which literally was no more than that I would go and do my best with whatever I found to work with, supposed to mean that I should take whatever I could find to work with; this at least is the only way I can account for a round accusation and reprimand for ‘having given orders to ships not put under my command by Lord Nelson,’ a thing I *neither did or conceived* an intention of doing till two months after the date of that reprimand, before I knew of it. In the month of March, when actually engaged with the enemy, I ventured to quote the article of war which obliges us all ‘to assist a known friend in view to the utmost of our power’ which that zealous good officer who was killed (Captain Wilmot) accepted as full justification for remaining to help at the labouring oar we had in hand of undertaking to fortify an old, almost defenceless tower, with such materials as could be furnished to seamen and savages; and in the face, nay in the very teeth, of a disciplined European army which had hitherto borne everything before it; that is to say, had never been resisted before. Now, though I cannot in conscience think this a crime, yet such is my idea of the necessity of subordination in *these times* particularly, that I did not hesitate to make an *amende honorable* to Lord St. Vincent immediately that I knew he was offended, thinking that I ought to sacrifice every personal consideration to the good of the service which must be hurt by altercation; and likewise to the friendship of Lord Spencer and yourself in selecting me from the number of more experienced men to fill the post of honour in the advanced guard of the glorious contest in which we are engaged. Illiberality may

construe this *amende honorable* into a confession of guilt to my prejudice, but 'tis better I should suffer than naval discipline be affected.

"I had scarce recovered from the stun of this blow when I received a much more violent one from Lord Nelson. Fortunately the enemy were already beaten, or the certainty I thus acquired of my not being to expect the smallest succour would have weakened my hopes of success, and consequently might have paralysed my efforts. Having got at the cause of this paroxysm of jealousy which his Lordship, I trust, now sees to have been a mere sensation from his extreme sensibility, I feel certain that nothing of this kind will ever happen between us again. I felt my character, public and private, called upon to refute erroneous opinion, and clear up misconception, but I hope I did it with that degree of temper the delicacy the subject required, in which the real respect I feel for Lord Nelson came to my aid; and I must do him the justice to say he did not wait for any justification on my part to come forward with frank approbation of my attempt to emulate his meritorious labours, giving scope to the manly feelings of a fellow soldier. Our two letters crossed each other on the road, since which my very old friend, Sir William Hamilton, who has acted a very conciliatory part between us, has assured me that no rancour remains there, and thus we shall agree very well, for I am sure there will be none on my side.

"These two storms over, I thought myself at liberty to go on as I had begun, smoothing the troubled scene before me, taming even Bonaparte's malice by acting differently from him, while I held him up to the light of truth so as to cause defection in his followers; when on a sudden, I find an attack from the quarter of all others whence it was least to be expected, being from the very man who was sent by your Lordship to co-operate with me, and with whom, from his professions of cordial friendship, I thought I should be able to go hand and glove. Alas! I have been miserably deceived; in the first place, his unwarrantable attacks on my brother from the first moment he set up the pretension of an independent mission, which the Porte don't admit, are indecorous in the extreme in the eyes of such a government as this; and I now find that the success of our labours at Acre, while he was driving a bargain with the Porte for services we had officially notified as a free offer of the King, has occasioned him to make a scape-goat of my brother by the assertion that he has influenced me to keep him in the background; and while he is writing to me in the most flattering terms, he is writing of me in terms of the most pointed censure for making 'arrangements' which he chooses to term 'irregular and disrespectful to his Majesty's minister.' Now, I have borne all the first manifestation of jealousy between 'Army and Navy' (which he ought to correct a subaltern for as I should a midshipman) but this sort of assertion in one of the official folios he chooses to pester my brother with in the middle of his labours to bring him forward, calls for a few marginal notes to correct

mis-statements which might weaken the confidence of his Majesty's ministers in me, and thereby unhinge the ricketty complicated machine I have to regulate here, and which I have hitherto done as well as I could without that assistance from General Koehler I expected and wished for most impatiently. Can it be supposed that any naval man could wish to take such a responsibility on his shoulders as fortifying and defending an almost defenceless place single-handed, without a spade, or a shovel, a fascine, or a gabion, but those he could steal from the enemy? Can it be supposed that any man could see his friends drop off and fall sick, one after the other, from excess of labour, till he was left quite alone, without the most earnest and constant wish for relief and assistance; if I did not cry aloud for it, it was because I thought it impossible that so able and so zealous a man as General Koehler could suffer any consideration whatever to prevent him throwing himself, and any little means he might have, into a besieged place so hard pressed as Acre was known to be. He had a transport at his door, and might as well have come himself as send the single officer, Major Faed, to whose solicitations he at length yielded, even though the Porte might not chose to increase the emoluments beyond the very handsome allowance from England, which is known to be greater than that of all of us put together, while we are doing our best to supply his place till he should come. I don't enter into a paper war on the subject, or send your Lordship whole folios of *procès-verbale* as he does, because I trust they in themselves must have long ago convinced your Lordship that the man had something to cover by such elaborate epistles; but I must appeal to my superiors so far as to place the correspondence within their reach in case they should entertain a suspicion that I have acted alone from any objection to combined operations with the army; so far from it I have all along felt, and most seriously regretted the absence of abler professional men to perform those labours which we did as well as we could from the necessity of the case, and for want of their assistance. When I say this I don't mean to acquiesce under the sentence of exile into the ocean which the General has passed on the whole navy. We don't like to be excluded from contributing our utmost efforts in our country's service, although there may be no enemy's ships in the contest; and I trust my friends Troubridge, Hood, and Hallowel will justify this tenacity of our right to take a walk on shore now and then to learn a part of the art of war which so often comes into play in maritime states. I call on Lord Nelson as my naval chief, and your Lordship as my principal in my present additional duties, to protect me from censure of this sort, which is an interruption when it comes from those on whom we count for cordial co-operation; and I take my leave of the subject by the request that your Lordship will have the goodness to give me a word to satisfy me that I am doing right to go on in the execution of what was concerted at Constantinople, without the necessity of reverting to *Constantinople again* for endless discussion, which after all can only prove that there are but

three ways into Egypt on this side and two on the other. On this side the *desert*, the *river*, or the *Alexandrian road* by which Bonaparte entered it. On the other *Suez*, or the *Mecca road*, and that from *Upper Egypt* by *Cossire*.

“This leads me to the development of the work in hand before I close my letter to your Lordship. The Turks being unequal to a regular siege unassisted by a European *army of strength*, and Alexandria being now very well fortified, famine and discontent can alone allow us to enter by that door. The desert is the only way by which the great bodies of cavalry that compose the best part of the Turkish force can move; more camels are wanted than are now left alive to carry the water that would be necessary for the ten days’ march from Syria to the Nile, by that route, supposing them to go eighteen miles per day, which is a forced march in the sand; and when on the Nile, the army would have to begin an operation which it might as well begin at once by the mouth of the river, having the advantage of fresh water, and a conveyance for baggage, without such a multitude of animals. I proposed to lead Mustapha Pasha by this route, under the protection of my floating cannon, in the flotilla I have created since I have been in the country; instead of which he chose to knock his head against the castle of Aboukir, where there is only one well of brackish water, and he failed accordingly. Still had the gunboats taken the stations indicated long enough before the fatal day, Bonaparte would have lost even more than he did; and these sort of victories discredit him, and increase the discontent in the army, which is my surest game considering the smallness of the English force, and the want of confidence of the Turks in themselves, where they have regular moving bodies opposed to their disconnected multitudes. The whole mass in the plain of Nazareth could not make any impression on Kleber’s single division, and gave way in all directions the moment Bonaparte’s reinforcement of 500 cavalry fired a signal gun from a hill, and encouraged Kleber to form a close column and go through the mob. The Vizier’s weak, irregular, insubordinate army will only afford the plunder of a rich caravan to the first three demi-brigades he finds under arms after passing the desert. If the French risk themselves to fight in the desert they are out of their element, and the Turks and Arabs are in theirs; so, there, the French advanced guard will be beaten, but this encouragement will only make the Turks commit themselves in some new attack, in which case, as I have seen in all our sorties, the brave run on and perish, and the great mass of cowards run away and never reappear otherwise than as the plunderers of their own camp. There is no forming men who are assembled from all quarters by edict, and who obey no voice whatever, still less that of a Christian. The chiefs have just knowledge enough to feel that there is something to know in the art of war beyond galloping and firing at a mark, but they don’t venture to undertake to second the views of the European to teach them soldiering, from prejudice, indolence, and apprehension of shewing that

they have no authority themselves. The supreme chief may assassinate a man authoritatively in private, but he could not flog him for disobedience without making mutiny, to which he would fall an immediate sacrifice. We have just now a melancholy proof of the mutinous spirit and desperate conduct of the malevolent part of this banditti in the assassination of Patrona Bey, the Turkish Vice-Admiral, the moment he took out his firman to read as the act of assumption of his authority. The discontent arose from the stories of the want of water at Aboukir which was not his fault; they reproached him, did not give him time to speak, but, each that could, fired or cut at him till he was a lifeless corpse among them; after which they patiently heard me lay down the law authoritatively by interpreter in perfect silence, because they respect me more than I fear them; and I have got them all afloat under a favourite chief, Seid Ali Bey, and must make them meet the enemy, or else I can't pretend to success from the underplot of the proclamations operating on the *mal du pays* which is strong upon the French army just now. Judge if I can have an ambition to supplant General Koehler in the direction of such a gang. I do it because it is my duty as he is not here, and because my manner with them, being a due mixture of affability and severity, gives me an ascendancy over them; but the next check their stupidity and insubordination exposes them to, the whole will recoil upon me, I know. This consideration, however, shall never prevent me doing the *utmost possible* with the means I have. I wish general Koehler or any general was here to take his share of the labour and the risk; the latter would be none if he had a sufficient number of regular troops under arms to shew and enforce an example with. I would give him all the weight of my acknowledged supremacy, which is but a feather after all, but it is the plume of 'triumph,' and they feel confident from its presence among them; so much so that I had a deputation yesterday of the army to beg that I would not allow the *Tigre* to run out of sight, as she does with ease in chase, 'lest the troops should lose their confidence.' This was partly [a] trick to have a scapegoat at hand for all failures, and fail they will if they go out of reach of the flotilla's guns. So much for the reason of the present 'combination' to attack Damietta on the mouth of the Nile. If I can once get a footing there, I shall persuade the Vizier to transport his army from Gaza where he has given me a rendezvous, or from El Arish by sea, which is now practicable; for the south-east winds set in for the next month, and the Nile is so high that the lake Mazalé forms part of it, making Damietta and every town an island, as I am assured. What a field for a force that was really efficient. But alas! I have no gun-boats, but prizes half-manned, and make-shifts.

"The last news I had from the Red Sea, the *Centurion* was gone down to Mocha, and Admiral Blanket gone to Bombay. Indeed, their presence near Suez without an army would not do much more than encourage the Arabs to continue their predatory war to appear something in our eyes, for we are great favourites;

but it would surely be possible to bring twenty thousand English and seapoys up the Gulf, in which case we may eradicate the 'colony' of Fayoum before it takes such deep root as to become the centre of the Deistical government these modern philosophers and *sarans* are attempting to establish in these regions. I endeavour to balance this in the political scale by the influence of *Les Pères de la Terre Sainte*, whose president's life I saved at Jaffa, and whose gratitude and hope of further protection has induced him to write me the letter herewith transmitted. The guardians of the Tomb of our Saviour surely may well claim the protection of a king whose style and title is 'Defender of the Faith'; and the ally of the Sultan can alone protect them efficaciously, and this without giving umbrage to anybody but old Herod Gezzar, to whom I have preached moderation till he is afraid to tyrannise when I am near. He is a cruel, faithless old monster, fearing nothing under heaven but the *Tigre* and *Theseus*, and despising the Vizier. He has shut himself up in Acre, which he fancies impregnable now, and laughs at him, having discharged all his Turkish troops, and kept nothing but his Albanian regiments, which he is recruiting daily from the the Morea and Bosnia. He has cut off all connection with Constantinople, and he will not take a bill of exchange on it as heretofore (being a monopolist merchant) and there he sits growling among his mortars and old iron picked up in the French trenches, waiting for the Vizier to be gone by before he begins his old trade of fleecing our friends the Christians and Druses in Mount Libanon. When he was within a hair's breadth of perdition, with Bonaparte not only at his gates but on his ramparts, he was happy to find that I had created such a degree of confidence in me among the mountaineers as to be able to draw off that portion of his enemies. He then promised everything in their favour, and I only asked tranquillity for them at his hands that they might not be forced to accept it at the hands of Bonaparte; now he is enraged at my influence in the mountains and jealous of our communication. I have had the formal thanks of the Porte for my salutary interference; the Vizier has, in the first instance, ratified everything I did to secure their allegiance to the Porte and their co-operation against the enemy; but, since that first effusion of satisfaction and gratitude, the interested gang of plunderers who surround his Highness have (I hope it will be found without his knowledge) imposed a greater tax on the mountains as the price of the Vizier's *forbearance* than Gezzar himself ever thought of exacting; and the messenger from the prince (Emir Beshir), the same who was sent to Acre to me during the siege, is detained in the Vizier's camp as a hostage for this sum, although he went there in virtue of the arrangement guaranteed by my word. There is no dealing where one is exposed to breach of faith. Our British character is established on this score, but it may be impeached in this way, not only to our prejudice, but to the prejudice of the cause, by the renewal of the French speculation on the discontents of Syria; discontents fomented among the Christians by the consideration that they

cannot be worse off in the hands of the French than they are under the fiscal governors of Gezzar. The question is a delicate one, and I must manage it accordingly without letting the question of religion mix with it if possible.

"While things are in suspense the prince is reduced to a sad alternative. Placed as he is between Gezzar and the Vizier, he sends me word that, rather than break his word with me, and favour discontent leading to an invitation of a second incursion of the French into Syria, which all the world knows the Vizier's multitude could not oppose, he will abdicate and take refuge on board the first gunboat whose flag he can claim as an asylum; a measure which would place us in an awkward predicament, for it would be contrary to honour and sound policy as standing on good faith to give him up, and by protecting him we should offend some among the gainsayers of the alliance, who publish that the Court at Constantinople is sold to the infidels, for so we are all called in current conversation; though when we are present the term *Giaour* is exclusively applied to the French. It is to be observed that Emir Beshir publicly professes the Mahometan religion, as Henry the Fourth of France did the Catholic, to enable him to hold the government which is necessarily conferred by the Pasha of Seide on a member of the family of Beshir Sheb, being a Mahometan. He is, however, a Maronite Christian, a humane, just, good man, much beloved and respected by all his vassals, the etiquette of the court being a true type of paternal government. The princes of the same house are all treated by the inhabitants with the same external marks of respect with which they treat each other, and particularly the reigning prince, by rising from their seats, which, being troublesome, is never done but by obligation, and the inferior kissing the inside of the thumb near the palm once or twice, according to the profession of affection, carrying the hand so kissed to the head afterwards. I had an opportunity of observing their customs in this respect from the assembly of all the princes to meet me when I visited Emir Beshir in the mountains immediately after the siege of Acre was raised, and that Bonaparte went south instead of north, owing to the little encouragement he met with from our Christian friends. The prince met me half-way from the capital, Der el Kamar, at a country residence of his, six hours from thence, and six hours from Baruth where I landed, the ship being in that bay to water. The several princes and shieks or inferior chiefs came out to meet me as I passed the several villages in the way, drawing up their vassals across the road and firing a *feu de joie*; after which they approached with the most friendly greetings, and it was easy to perceive the most heartfelt satisfaction and affectionate regard pictured in every countenance. These mountaineers are a fine race of people, of good stature, and regular features, expressive of benevolence and energy. They are exceeding good horsemen and always armed; the cultivation of their ground in terraces up the centre of every ravine bespeaks them to be very industrious; and their dress shews them to have

a superfluity beyond the necessities of life. This it invites the cupidity of the Turkish governors at the foot of the mountain on all sides, and their intercourse savours rather of an armed truce than peace and subjection. The Christians and Druses, united by a common interest to resist oppression, live very well together, though the latter are idolaters; professing the Mahometan faith publicly, and practising some peculiar rites secretly, of which there are strange stories not worth repeating. It was thought necessary for an ambassador to come from *each* when our friendly intercourse was first established in April, and the mayor of the capital is a Druse. The prince who governs both is, as I said, a Maronite Christian, professing the Mahometan religion; he was placed in the government by Gezzar, who took him from one of his dungeons, where he kept him two years chained by the neck, and appointed him as successor to Emir Yussuf, his own original patron when he was a refugee from the wreck of Ali Bey's fortunes.

"This same Gezzar was no other than Ali Bey's executioner. His real name is Achmet, the surname Gezzar (signifying cutter) being given him from the terror his sanguinary deeds inspired; he is fond of this surname, always saying 'Gezzar will, or will not, do so and so.' His origin is from Bosnia where his father was a peasant, and he is fond of citing this origin and the poverty of his family, as well to show his ability in having raised himself to the pitch of power and wealth he at present enjoys, as to secure the adherence of his Bosniac and other Albanian troops, whom he counts upon to resist the Grand Signor's troops whenever it may be decided to interfere with his pretensions to independence; a thing I, of course, never have admitted an instant either in conversation or by an act of any kind, our treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman empire. He was sold as a slave in Egypt in his youth, and having, as I said before, been an officer during Ali Bey's usurpation, and having learnt the *tactique* of that sort of power, he became necessary to the almost independent chiefs of Syria. Being a man of herculean strength, and possessing great energy and bravery, he distinguished himself in the civil wars of Syria, and being made governor of Baruth by Emir Yussuf, he shut his gates against the prince who called the Russian fleet (then in the Archipelago) to his assistance, and after a three months' siege obliged him to evacuate the town by a capitulation which allowed him to withdraw by one gate as the Russians entered by the other. He then went into the service of Sheik Daher, governor of Acre, and being sent by him to raise contributions in the mountains, Gezzar ran away with the money to Cairo, after which he lent his assistance to the Porte to subjugate Sheik Daher, whom he put to death, and was rewarded by the government in his lieu. He has constantly harrassed and vexed the mountains ever since, keeping their princes in confinement whenever he could get hold of any of them by treachery or otherwise. '*Divide et impera*' has been his motto, and having got the person of Emir Yussuf into his power, he hanged him at

the gates of Acre, and gave the supreme government of the mountains to Emir Beshir, whom, as I have said above, he took from prison to invest with the pellice of honour, keeping the sons of both these princes at Acre as hostages. I saw the sons of Emir Yusuff at Acre, and very *gentlemanlike*, fine young men they are; indeed, these mountaineers are a fine race of people, *l'air noble* is a strong characteristic of them; and the gentleness of the manners even of the lower class forms a strong contrast with the rough brutality of the Turks. This may fairly be attributed to the difference of religion. The only savage act I witnessed in the mountains was the bystanders, when my health was proposed, all drawing their swords and clashing them together over my head, while the company were drinking it.

“Gezzar’s project at present is to divest Emir Beshir of the government, as he will not tax the people to the extent of his (Gezzar’s) exactions, and to put the two sons of Emir Yussuf in the northern district of the mountains, keeping the other under his own immediate government. This the mass of the people, who are content with Emir Beshir’s administration, resist; although there are, of course, many partisans in favour of the sons of their former prince, and the poor young men are, of course, glad to accept any conditions that shall give them their liberty even to the prejudice of their country. In this state things are, all sides except Gezzar appealing to me, and the Vizier having promised me to reward Emir Beshir’s fidelity at a most critical time; while a demand is made, underhand, for a most enormous sum as the price of this condescension. I am frequently put out of all patience by the interested conduct of every individual with whom one has business to do in this country; everything is bought and sold, fear or cupidity is the *primum mobile* on both sides between the oppressor and the oppressed; and though I, of course, steer clear of any interference, except on great occasions, when the success of our operations are at stake, there are cases wherein our influence must be exerted in concert with the supreme authority of the empire; and having taken a decisive step, all parties must be confirmed in the idea with which they are strongly impressed at present, that we Englishmen, having the rule of right and benevolence for our guide, never make a retrograde step. I know your Lordship, and I am sure you will approve of the line I have traced to myself as his Majesty’s representative in this affair. I don’t make a dispatch of all this narrative in a formal way, because the style of a private letter enables me to introduce many points illustrative of the question which would not appear so well perhaps on record as being apparently trivial; besides, the current language of a private letter enables me to write with the rapidity that is necessary under the pressure of time and the frequency of interruption, while I am attending to the business of navigation, and the internal arrangement of the squadron, now hard pressed for subsistence, and depending on the precarious supply of fresh provisions in ill-fitted transports, *having no salt* provisions for a long cruise. Your Lordship will make any use (you may judge necessary) of this letter for the

information of your colleagues in office, and if you consider any part of this prolix detail likely to be interesting to our good and gracious King, you will, of course, make extracts of such parts in the proper form, as I really have not time to re-copy or compress it into that sort of brief statement which would be proper.

"I write a dispatch to my brother on what concerns the Ottoman Government, as the ground of what they are required to do under existing circumstances. I send him a most interesting intercepted paper written by Bonaparte before his escape, and one by Kleber since I gave him a fair opening to embark, and trusted the *Theseus* and squadron I had stationed off Cape Soliman, 240 leagues to the westward, falling in with him; but alas! her distress for provisions, and the impossibility of procuring more at Rhodes than her bare daily consumption, and not always that, prevented her from reaching her destination in time. We met yesterday, 21 October, off Alexandria, when I learnt her ill success. I have been steering along shore towards Damietta while writing this, and have just now got sight of Seid Ali standing in from sea. We shall join this afternoon, and go to work to do whatever may be practicable immediately."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1799, October 19. Cleveland Row.—"Il me revient de tous cotés que dans toutes vos conversations vous vous efforcez d'attribuer à la demande et réquisition pressante de cette Cour-ci, jointe à celle de Petersbourg, la fatale démarche de la retraite de l'Archiduc, seule cause des malheurs arrivés en Suisse; et je crois même que c'est au langage que vous avez tenu à cet égard, que sont dues les assertions du même genre qui ont été tout récemment répandues dans nos papiers publics.

"Si c'est par ordre de votre Cour que vous tenez ce langage, ce n'est pas à vous que nous avons à nous adresser sur une circonstance aussi étonnante. Si cela n'est pas, et qu'on vous a trompé à cet égard, je vous prierai en ami de suspendre vos assertions jusqu'à ce que vous avez eu l'occasion de vous convaincre de la vérité sur ce sujet, soit par les preuves officielles que je vous communiquerai sans la moindre difficulté si vous le désirez, soit par des informations que vous vous procurerez en écrivant à votre Cour.

"Vous êtes trop honnête homme pour vouloir accréditer une calomnie, vous êtes trop sage pour désirer de nous pousser enfin à des démarches publiques pour faire retomber sur les auteurs de ces malheurs les conséquences de leur malheureuse politique.

"Recevez dans notre amitié cette communication confidentielle, et ne me mettez pas dans la nécessité de vous écrire officiellement sur ce sujet si capable de mettre entre nos deux Cours un germe de discorde, et de division perpétuelle." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 19. Wangen.—"I really think all the contents of Pandora's box are to be poured out on us at once. This last

unfortunate turn of Marshal Suwarow's is the only evil that cannot somehow or other be got the better of. It carries with it all that is calamitous, putting arms into the hands of M. Thugut and the Austrians, which I fear we shall never be able to encounter. It is impossible for anyone to be more thoroughly in the wrong than the Russians now are, and, if M. Thugut had hired them to play his game, they could not have done it better, or entered more thoroughly into the net, if he had spread it for them.

"I have written to Lord Minto and Sir Charles Whitworth in the sense your Lordship desires, but, in truth, what can one say to the former that has not been said over and over again. I assure your Lordship I have sometimes been ashamed of my letters after I had written them, as containing truths which I ought never to have been under the necessity of repeating. With respect to Sir Charles, I know not how I can do more than lay before him the plain facts, desiring him to commit me as little as possible, and to use them with the greatest discretion until he shall hear from your Lordship.

"Suwarow himself trembles at the very name of the Emperor, and the Grand Duke (who, *per parenthèse*, is one of the greatest brutes that ever disgraced the human shape) governs him now with a nod. Whilst the poor Marshal was notorious the Prince was his humble servant all day long, but now he is a tyrant who feels his power and is determined to use it.

"I trust you will be able to keep Prussia quiet, and firm to her line of neutrality. If so, I think with 50,000 men you can maintain Holland *against any force*, with the assistance that your navy, gun-boats and other vessels will give you.

"I will do everything in my power to keep up an appearance of offensive operations as long as possible. But this is all that can be done; therefore I trust in God you will make the best use of your time. After all, my means are small, and, between the shock of those contending powers, I shall think myself very fortunate if I escape without being crushed. I should not fear the Marshal at all, but these confounded people about him are as cunning and treacherous as they are ignorant and brutal. Voltaire said of the Russians, speaking of the best of them, *otez seulement l'habit, et vous sentirez le poil*. With these people you have nothing to take away, they are shag all over.

"I have had much conversation with poor Stackelberg (who is half distracted at what he has seen) about who should be the adventurous rat that would hang the bell about the Emperor Paul's neck, but we have never come to any conclusion excepting that we neither of us know anyone that was fit for such an undertaking.

"I have not the courage to write to Woronzow to-day, and I will be really obliged to your Lordship if you will have the goodness to tell him so. I will endeavour to frame a letter to him by the next post, which he may, if he pleases, send to Petersburg, where I find that all my private notes have been sent, as I learnt from the copy of one of his despatches which the Emperor had sent to the Marshal.

"I will take care of Weyrother (whose name the Austrians, I know not why, always pronounce Vinerode). He has promised never to leave Suwarow notwithstanding the unpleasantness of his situation, and he is under orders to join the Archduke. The Marshal is very much attached to him, and is fully sensible of his merits.

"I will send the best military information I can from France, but it is really, as your Lordship says, that the Directors themselves don't know the strength of their armies. Pichégu has often told me that he never knew the number of troops he had under his command. I will answer the other points in your Lordship's private letter by the first opportunity. In the meantime I have only to beg that you will accept my best thanks.

"If your Lordship has time to see Colonel Stewart, he can give your Lordship many curious and interesting facts respecting the state of the two armies. He is a very good fellow, and an active intelligent officer. I know he was under disgrace for his opposition to Maitland at St. Domingo, but, if his story is to be believed, we may say, the Lord protect us from all new converts.

"I certainly owe my retreat from Zurich entirely to him, and therefore am bound to express my gratitude.

"I send enclosed for *Lady Grenville* a sketch of some Cossacks, which, though not very well done, is yet extremely like the animal.

"Pray don't forget the question of my return. I don't press it now, because it would look like flying from difficulty if not from danger. But let me venture to ask that you will occasionally mention the subject to the Duke of Portland, and let his Grace know that I have myself recalled it to your Lordship's recollection."

Postscript. "Though I have reason to believe that the enemy has reached Coire, yet I do not mention it in my despatches because I have no certain information of the fact.

"I have not named the Grand Duke in my despatches for another reason, namely, because I could really say nothing good of him. I trust in God, however, that some means will be found of removing him."

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, October 19. Cleveland Row.—"I send you the answer from the Prince of Orange about Delftzyll, which is certainly not favourable to my wishes. It is, however, to be observed that he mistakes the question, and supposes that the object in view was to attack that place and not (as is the real case) to keep it when given up to us. Some of the reasons which he states as making it impossible for us to advance *from* thence in the winter are the very circumstances which will render it difficult for the enemy to attack us there in that season.

"This question, however, like that of the Helder, should be considered by military men, and should be reported on by them in detail. If it is really found impracticable to hold the place,

and if in fact it shall have been surrendered to us, some means must certainly be found to bring off the garrison, to whom we are bound in honour not to leave them to be sacrificed.

"On the general question, we were led into more discussion yesterday than I think useful in our large Cabinet. Whatever may be my particular opinions on these military operations, I am very ready to subscribe to the judgment of those who possess better means of information than myself; but I rely on your not suffering us to be drawn, either by sanguine and confident hopes founded on no solid reason, or by Royalist zeal, into an enterprise, in which, if we fail, we must probably lose the greatest part of the only army we have ever had, or ever shall have, during the war.

"There are, I conceive, two very distinct questions as to the enterprise against Brest, and as to any further or different attempt on the interior of France. The first is a limited object, capable as I imagine of military calculation both as to time and force; and, if these are well combined, particularly if the force be effective and sufficiently large, and if the attention of the enemy be called off to some very distant point of attack, I do not see why we should not look with reasonable confidence to succeed in any military project there, which is approved and heartily entered into by the person who is to execute it.

"The second leads us into a wide field indeed. Whatever opinion may finally prevail as to the best mode of *trying* to obtain Austrian co-operation, it would be an act equally wicked and mad to trust any material interest of this country to the hope of such co-operation. I lay it down, therefore, as a principle, from which I trust you will not depart, that in this enterprise you will of course derive all the aid you can from such Austrian co-operation as you may get, but that you will not undertake any plan the success of which (and much less the safety of your army) is to *depend* on that co-operation.

"The two real questions are therefore:—

1st. "Can you collect here a sufficient force to act with safety and success in the interior of France, if unaided by any diversion; or,

2nd. "Can you, with the aid of Russians and Germans, independent of Austria, ensure the making such a diversion from Switzerland as will make the attempt in this quarter practicable.

"To discuss these questions would lead me into a wide field, military and political. I am best able to speak to the second point, and I much fear that, in sober reason, the answer must be negative. I am, however, far from wishing to form, much less to pronounce, a decisive judgment on such a question in so early a stage of the business. I trust the plan will be well considered and digested; and when you are enabled to state what the amount and nature is of the diversion which you would require from Switzerland, I will then lay before you, certainly without any prejudice, the sort of difficulties which I foresee in the execution of that plan, and the only means which I see of meeting those difficulties. But let me earnestly entreat you not to let your

mind proceed step by step imperceptibly to consider the plan as decided, before you have well weighed its extent and practicability, and the consequences of failure. If on full consideration it is ultimately adopted, I need not say that my whole heart and soul must be in its success, and *from that time* you shall hear of no difficulties from me.

“Supposing it should be adopted, there will, I think, be hardly anything so important to its success as the completely deceiving the enemy as to our projects. This can only be well done by giving to our preparations some other fixed and apparent direction, which I conceive should on many accounts be Holland. The French will more readily believe us in earnest as to that object than any other ; having tried it once, and having failed in it after being so very near to complete success in it, they will think it natural that we should resume the attempt. And all our newspapers and Parliamentary language may easily be made to encourage the deception. It is partly for this reason, and partly as a certain means of attracting and keeping a large French force in that quarter, that I am so anxious that we should, if possible, keep some footing there during the winter.

“Something must be done about Maitland. The best would be, I think, to apprize him of the circumstances which have happened, and to desire him to return home with all the information he can collect.” *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 20.—“Je reçois dans l’instant la lettre que vous me faites l’honneur de m’écrire, et je commence par vous remercier du stile de confiance et d’amitié qui y règnent. J’ose me flatter que mes sentimens pour vous et ma conduite le méritent. Quoique les propos horribles que j’entends tenir de tous les côtés sur ma Cour depuis cette malheureuse affaire de Suisse soient faits pour me peiner extrêmement, et qu’il soit impossible que je puisse lire de sang-froid ce que je vois depuis quelques jours dans le *Times* et l’*Oracle*, je crois connaître trop le pays que j’habite et que j’aime, pour m’en offenser. Je sais mépriser les diatribes des gazetiers, et suis incapable de soupçonner un ministère que je revère et chéris comme je le dois, d’y avoir la moindre part, tandis qu’il a tant d’autres moyens de manifester son mécontentement. J’aime à croire que j’ai le droit de m’attendre à la réciprocité si, par hasard, quelqu’un des papiers s’avise avec aussi peu de raison de prendre notre parti. J’avoue que j’ai peu de malheur car ja n’en ai pas rencontré jusqu’à présent. La même franchise qui me fait vous parler ainsi me porte à ne vous pas cacher que non pas *dans toutes mes conversations*, puisque je ne parle d’abord qu’à très peu de personnes, évitant de venir en ville dans un moment où je n’y entends que des choses désagréables ; mais bien dans quelques tête-à-têtes avec un très petit nombre d’amis, M. Frère, M. le Marquis de Circello, par exemple, je me suis permis non pas de parler officiellement, puisque je n’ai aucun ordre à cet égard

mais de témoigner mon étonnement de ce que l'on nous ferait un crime de ce que la défense de la Suisse avait été confiée aux seules troupes Russes, tandis que l'un de nos ministres avec lequel je suis en correspondance m'avait mandé, il y a plusieurs semaines, que cet arrangement militaire était la conséquence d'un désir auquel nous n'avions cédé qu'à regret, et pour le bien de la cause commune. Si vous voulez me donner un moment d'entretien, mardi ou mercredi prochain, je vous ferai lire, mais aussi confidentiellement, seulement la lettre dont je vous parle, et dont j'aime à me flatter que vous ne ferez aucun usage. Permettez-moi, après vous avoir renouvelé l'hommage de l'amitié et de l'attachement que je vous ai voué, de vous répéter encore que ni dans ma qualité de ministre de l'Empereur tant que je continuerai de l'être, ni dans celle de gentilhomme, ni dans celle d'honnête homme, je ne serai capable de petites menées basses ou lâches, et que je vous estime trop vous-même pour craindre que vous puissiez m'en soupçonner."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[*Private.*]

1799, October 20. The Helder.—“*L'homme propose, et Dieu dispose.* After my tedious stay at Emden, and my slow voyage hither, I find that I might as well have spared my pains, for the first news which greeted me was that an armistice was concluded, and that the conditions of this agreement were that the British and Russian army should immediately evacuate the Dutch Republic. The Duke of York informs me that he has sent to England all the papers belonging to this transaction; you have therefore all the knowledge of it which I have, and much more; for probably you were informed of the measures which led to it; I am utterly ignorant of them, as well as of all that belongs to the subject. I could do nothing here; the convention was signed.

“I shall, therefore, re-embark in the course of to-morrow or the next day at furthest, and shall have the joy of seeing you, and the heartfelt satisfaction that neither you nor I have been wanting in our duty upon this occasion

“I have given to the Hereditary Prince of Orange the best hopes which I could that the expedition will be resumed in the spring, and it appears to me that the best conduct to hold now is to shut up the book of regrets, and look only to the new hopes of the spring.

“If I was not following this letter instantly upon its heels it should not be so short.”

Enclosure 1.

GENERAL DE STAMFORD TO THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, October 11. Brunswick.—“Si mon médecin savait racommoder des corps vieux et usés, comme mon charron et mon sellier ont su rajeunir ma vieille voiture et la remettre sur quatre roues neuves, au lieu de dater cette lettre de Brunswick je la

daterais d'Emden. J'avais tout disposé pour m'y rendre au commencement de cette semaine, ainsi que j'eus l'honneur de vous le mander le 29 du mois passé, et de vous le confirmer dans ma lettre du 4 du courant, quand une violente toux rhumatismale vint, il y a deux jours, me jeter sur le grabat, de sorte qu'il n'y a que le ciel qui sache quand je serai en état de me mettre en route.

“Quoique j'eusse le projet d'aller à Emerick avant de me rendre à Emden pour m'y aboucher avec notre correspondant Jean Knout, je ne laissai pas de lui écrire pour lui demander les renseignements que vous désirez. Je m'applaudais d'avoir eu cette précaution à laquelle je suis rédevable de pouvoir vous envoyer sa réponse plutôt que je ne l'aurais pu faire sans cela. Vous la trouverez sur la fenille ci-jointe. (Copied and sent to Lord Grenville 23rd November.)

“Si les propositions qu'il fait vous paraissent acceptables, voici l'arrangement que je prends la liberté de vous proposer pour notre correspondance avec le Sieur Knout. Il vous adressera directement, par la voie d'Emden, les rapports du correspondant de Paris, auxquels il joindra régulièrement les siens propres. Il m'enverra, en même temps, des duplicata des uns et des autres que j'aurai soin de faire parvenir en entier ou par extrait à Monsieur Garlike et Comte Panin, si je juge qu'il peut être utile que les choses qu'ils renfermeront soient d'abord portées à leur connaissance. Le Comte de Panin m'a témoigné qu'il désirait de rester en relation avec moi, ce dont je suis d'autant plus flatté que je sens que ce désir lui est inspiré par l'amitié dont il m'honore, et non par l'espoir de tirer quelque avantage d'une correspondance que je ne puis lui rendre ni intéressante, ni utile, à moins que je ne trouve occasion de lui apprendre des choses intéressantes par elles-mêmes.

“Si le plan du Sieur Knout et l'arrangement que je viens de vous proposer peuvent mériter votre approbation, je vous prie de m'en instruire le plutôt possible. En attendant, je prendrais la liberté de vous observer que la somme demandée par le correspondant de Paris étant très forte, et la friponnerie en France étant tellement à l'ordre du jour qu'il serait possible que ce monsieur eut formé le projet de nous vendre des mensonges pour des vérités, il me semble que deux mois tout au plus suffiront pour nous mettre en état de juger de sa véracité et de l'importance de ses rapports.

“Vous voudrez bien aussi vous rappeler que le terme de l'engagement du Sieur Knout a fini avec le mois dernier, et que si l'on veut le continuer dans son emploi, il faut songer à lui en fournir les moyens. Il a eu jusqu'à la fin de Septembre deux cents Frédéric d'or, dont 20 ont été pour son voyage de Brunswick à Berlin, et de là à Emerick ; la reste a été pour sa dépense à raison de 40 Frédéric par mois. Il demande, ainsi que vous le verrez dans son mémoire, quelque chose de plus, à fin d'être à même de pouvoir envoyer de temps en temps quelque exprès ou émissaire dans la Belgique ; je pense que 20 Frédéric par mois pourront lui suffire à cet effet.

“Quant à ce qui me régarde, vous êtes bien persuadé, je l'espère, que je me trouverai heureux d'employer mon temps et le peu de moyens que j'ai pour le service de la bonne cause, aussi longtemps qu'il me reste un souffle de vie; mais comme la révolution m'a privé à peu près de la moitié de mon revenu, et que de celle qui me reste je ne puis rien sacrifier, je ne demande en renonçant, comme de raison, à la gratification que le Gouvernement Britannique m'accorda durant mon séjour à Berlin, qu'à être dédommagé à l'avenir de mes fraix en ports de lettres, et à être mis en état de pouvoir payer un copiste lorsqu'il se présentera, comme cela arrive souvent, des lettres, mémoires, ou relations, dont je souhaiterais de prendre copies, pour les transmettre à mes correspondants. Quatre Frédéric's par mois suffiront largement à cette dépense. Ce serait m'affliger que de m'offrir davantage.

“Je suis très peu au fait de ce qui se passe en Hollande; c'est par des Hollandais qui demeurent ici que j'apprends le peu que j'en sais. Tous m'assurent que, le deux de ce mois, il y a eu une affaire à l'avantage de notre armée; que le Gouvernement Batave craint de se voir abandonné par les Français; et que ceux-ci font, en effet, des préparatifs qui semblent justifier cette crainte. Dieu veuille que tout cela soit vrai!

“Les affaires en Suisse sont en mauvais état. Comme cette bonne armée de Korsakow y a été incommodée! Il est arrivé ici des lettres de ces côtés-là qui accusent ce général d'être la cause du désastre qui lui est arrivé; elles disent qu'il n'a pas voulu prendre de certaines positions qu'il devait nécessairement garnir de troupes; reste à savoir, s'il en avait assez pour le faire. D'autres lettres disent que l'Archiduc n'aurait pas dû quitter la Suisse avec son armée avant que toutes les troupes s'y fussent mis à portée de la remplacer sur le champ. Ces dernières me paraissent avoir raison; car lorsqu'on a quitté un pays où, peu de jours après, on a été forcé de rentrer en poste, pour y réparer des malheurs, il y a grande apparence qu'on l'a eu quitté trop tôt. Quoiqu'il en soit, l'invincible Suvarow, en s'emparant de la position du Mont Saint Gotthard, a, pour ainsi dire, arraché la victoire d'entre les mains de Masséna, en l'empêchant par là de poursuivre ses succès. Il courait ici hier un bruit que ce dernier avait été battu, blessé, et pris, le premier d'Octobre; en remontant à la source de cette nouvelle, je ne l'ai pas trouvée digne de créance. Puisse-t-elle valoir au moins comme prophétie.”

Postscript. “Je joins à cette lettre une copie de celle que Monsieur le Duc de B[runswick] a écrite à Monsieur de Zastrow en réponse à la lettre dont je vous ai parlé dans ma dernière.”

Enclosure 2.

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK TO COLONEL DE ZASTROW.

1799, October 4. Brunswick.—“Les détails que vous m'avez fait le plaisir de me communiquer en date du premier de ce mois, offrent des preuves parlantes du plan formé par les deux

républiques, tant Française que Batave, pour atteindre le but qu'elles se sont toujours proposé, de gagner du temps et de parvenir à associer la Prusse à leurs intérêts.

“ Il est d'abord incertain si l'Angleterre se prêtera à mettre le fils à la place du père, et si le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange lui-même voudra ou pourra donner les mains à ce changement ; mais, dans la supposition qu'on puisse passer par-dessus cet article (qui n'est pas cependant d'une médiocre importance, et qui, par rapport au droit de succession de la Maison d'Orange, serait formellement lésif de l'ancienne constitution telle qu'elle a été garantie au traité de Loo par la Prusse et l'Angleterre en 1788), et en admettant de plus qu'en conséquence le conseil des douze serait établi, pourrait-il exercer ses pouvoirs sous les yeux de 40,000 Russes et Anglais quand la flotte Batave du Texel, et toutes les colonies Indiennes sont au pouvoir de l'Angleterre ? La France n'exigera-t-elle pas la retraite des troupes étrangères du territoire d'Hollande ? Celles-ci se retireront-elles spontanément et sans y être contraintes, pour abandonner à une négociation, dans laquelle l'Angleterre n'aurait aucune part directe, la destinée d'un état aussi intéressant ?

“ Je n'ai jamais cru à la rétrocession des pays d'outre-Rhin tant que le sort de la Hollande ne serait pas décidé, et que nous ne faisons de notre côté aucune démonstration imposante. La noblesse de l'âme du Roi ne permet pas à sa Majesté de croire à la duplicité, à la scélératesse du Directoire Français et de ses agents.

“ Vous vous rappelerez que je n'ai jamais regardé les négociations d'Otto dans le mois de Juillet que comme des moyens astucieux pour trainer les affaires en longueur, et barrer les négociations entre la Prusse et l'Angleterre. Trois mois se sont écoulés, et depuis cette époque il n'y a pas eu la moindre démarche ultérieure de faite. L'avenir prouvera de plus en plus que nous n'avons à attendre de la part des Français ni l'amitié, ni équité, et que l'unique objet de leur Directoire est de chercher à leurrer la Prusse par les négociations successives qu'ils ont soin de jeter en avant, de paralyser les forces de cette Puissance, pendant qu'ils ont, en même temps, la perfide adresse de faire répandre par leurs adhérents que Sa Majesté Prussienne est réellement disposée à concourir avec efficacité aux intérêts et aux succès de la République Française.

“ Je suis convaincu intimément de la sagesse des mesures que le Roi prendra dans tous les cas pour le bien de ses peuples, mais je n'en suis pas moins persuadé aussi, et *je l'ai toujours été depuis la rupture du Congrès de Rastadt*, que par des simples négociations, si elles ne sont pas soutenues par des dispositions guerrières et vigoureuses qui en puissent assurer l'effet, il n'y a rien à attendre de convenable ni de positif de la France.

“ Justice, équité, et modération sont des vertus qu'on ne peut trouver que dans des Gouvernements basés sur la religion, la morale, et le véritable honneur. Elles ne sauraient se rencontrer dans un prétendu Gouvernement qui ne s'est fondé que sur le pillage et le meurtre, et qui ne peut prolonger son existence que par le mensonge, la mauvaise foi, et la violence.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 20. Wimbledon.—“I received your letter this morning, and I don't think I differ in any material point from any part of your statement; and I rather think you have been led into some misapprehension on one point, I mean where you suppose that there is any disposition in me to be ardent in the pursuit of military exertions in the interior of France. In truth, I am such a sceptic on all that subject, that nothing but an unwillingness to decline taking a trouble which Mr. Pitt and you pressed so earnestly upon me, could have induced me to take the very limited share I have taken in the succours to be afforded to the Royalists in France. It is my earnest wish that I may be mistaken, but I am strongly impressed with a conviction that, however well disposed they may be to the ancient Government, and however eager the generality of the inhabitants of France may be to get rid of their present rulers, none of those considerations will operate upon them so far as to come forward in any manner to justify us trusting to anything but our own means, both of attack when it can be made, or of retreat if it shall become necessary. As to any great operation upon the Seine and the Somme, I think it is very fair to reserve it for future consideration, but by no means ripe for present decision. It must depend entirely on the extent of operations carrying on in other parts of France. Without a most extensive diversion in more places of France than one, I should think it perfect insanity to think of it with any army that the utmost exertions of this country can produce.

“Upon the same principle, but not to the same extent, I argue that without a diversion somewhere else an attempt upon Brest ought not to be made. But if one hundred thousand men can be collected to act anywhere (but particularly in Switzerland) under Suwarrow, I feel confident in saying that we have the resources within ourselves of sufficient extent to justify an attempt on Brest and its harbour; and the prospect of success is of a nature that would render it unjustifiable in us not to attempt it. I don't take it upon me in any military operation, especially one of such magnitude, to promise certainty of success. The nature of the subject does not admit of such certainty, but I see my way very sanguinely to the hope of producing a British army the beginning of May, consisting of fifty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry; and if the Russians now in our possession can in the course of the winter be made up to their full numbers, and disciplined under the eye of better officers than those who now command them, you will have a disposable force of 80,000 men. If I am right in my calculation, and I don't feel it liable to any uncertainty (except the extent that the present levy of English militia and the expected levy of Irish militia will go to) I shall not be satisfied that I do conscientious duty to my country if I do not urge the propriety of one splendid attempt, at one stroke, to annihilate the naval power of France and Spain. If it does not succeed it will not disgrace us; and our army, to a great extent,

will still be ready to attempt any other operations that may be thought most advisable. If it succeed, I deceive myself very much if it will not have the effect to shake from its foundation the power of France, and the authority of its rulers, more than anything else that can possibly happen in any other quarter be what it may.

"From what I have stated you will observe that I distinguish between the attempt on Brest, and any other detailed military campaign in the interior of France. This last I would certainly not think of without more than one great diversion to the armies of France, operating upon that country in different quarters; but if one hundred thousand men can be got to operate in Switzerland and towards the frontiers of France from that quarter, I would, in that case, be of opinion that your British army of 80,000 men should make the attempt on Brest. In the meantime, there can not be a doubt that so much depends upon our force being landed without being expected, and as much as possible being affected by a *coup de main*, that every possible means must be taken to blind the whole subject, and mislead as to the object of it in every possible way.

"I cannot drop this subject without adverting to two topics which dropped from you at our last meeting of Cabinet, where, I agree with you, much more was said than there was any call for at the present moment upon such a subject. I think upon further consideration you will not continue of opinion that there is any similarity between the case of Holland, attempted at a late season of the year in a country rendered more difficult than it even is by nature and art in consequence of the very extraordinary inclemency of the weather; a country where your cavalry, the great feature of your military pre-eminence, was totally useless, and where, I distinctly state to you, I never had the idea of success if you was fairly resisted, and no aid got from the country. In none of those particulars will the attempt upon Brest have any similarity. The army will be larger in proportion to the scene of action to which it will be confined; your cavalry will have commodious field in which to act; the country will not present to you those innumerable difficulties which the dykes, the marshes, and the ditches of Holland present; and if you have any aid from the country it will be *autant gagné*, but you will not rely upon it, and of course will not be disappointed in the want of it.

"In like manner I must confess we will totally differ in sentiment if you continue to think that enterprise is no part of the character of a British soldier. In truth I believe it is their distinguishing characteristic; and such an enterprise as that I am now writing would animate every man from the general to the meanest soldier; and there is no exertion of spirit nor no prodigy of valour I would not look for on such an occasion.

"It is scarcely necessary to trouble you more at present except on one point. I don't wonder you, who have had so much to do both with Prussia and Austria, should be disgusted with both; but, after the best consideration I can give to the subject, I

cannot help feeling with Mr. Pitt that, however mortifying it may be to our feelings, we should take every means in our power to secure if possible the continuance of the Austrian arms in full exertion during another campaign. If they would even do it for three months, it would be an immense point gained to the object I have been dwelling so much upon. Recollect if we succeed at all on the subject of Brest, a month is and must be the whole period required for the execution of it. If during that period not only the Russian but the Austrian arms should be acting with vigour, be the object and motive of the exertion what it may, I need not detail to you the incalculable advantages which would arise from it.

"I have been inadvertently led to a longer dissertation that I had any intention of, but it may probably save a repetition of the same discussion at any other time."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 20. Wimbledon.—"The difficulties stated by the Stadtholder with regard to Dalfzyle are so great as to render it impossible to undertake the business this season ; and with all the disadvantages which would at present attend the attack on Walcheren, I should not look upon it as so desperate as that in the Ems. If we come under any engagements, the garrison must certainly be taken care of ; but I don't think the letters you communicated to me from your brother would justify doing anything with that view without hearing from him again.

"I fancy you had not seen Maitland's despatches when you wrote your letter. I have not seen those to you, but the one I have is not encouraging."

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 21. York Farm.—"Après avoir eu l'honneur de répondre hiér littéralement à la lettre que vous m'avez écrit, permettez que, dans notre ancienne intimité, je me plaigne aujourd'hui à vous de vous-même. Je suis plus que peiné de voir la facilité avec laquelle l'ami que j'aime et révère prend la première impression défavorable que des sots ou des méchants veulent lui donner de moi. Une expérience de sept ans doit vous avoir fait assez connoître mon caractère et mes principes invariables, pour que je sois à l'abri de tout soupçon. Vous avez vu, entendu, et lu la manière hardie et ferme dont j'ai osé souvent blâmer plusieurs transactions de ma Cour. Je n'ai pas craint de l'écrire à Vienne et d'y parler sur ce ton. Le fils du Prince de Starhemberg, qui ne sert que par honneur, n'est arrêté par aucune considération. Quant à la circonstance présente, voici le fait. Vous ne m'avez jamais parlé des mesures militaires adoptées en Suisse. J'entendois tous les jours des gens que ces objets ne regardent en rien, se mêler de critiquer notre conduite et nous imputer tous les malheurs qui arrivent, et, nommément, le dernier à la retraite de l'Archiduc au Rhin. Je n'ai jamais jetté le blâme sur votre ministère, et

vos sollicitations ; fi donc ! que c'est mal me connoître ! Mais j'ai dit à la secrété (comme je devois le croire d'après les informations particulières que j'avais reçu, et que je vous communiquerai confidentiellement) que j'avais lieu de prévenir que cet arrangement avait été fait de concert avec les alliés ; et la manière dont l'Archiduc vient de vôler au secours del'armée battue, était bien faite pour me confirmer dans cette opinion. Rendez-moi donc plus de justice. Je vous suis trop attaché pour ne pas le désirer. Je ne m'inquiète pas du jugement de ceux que je n'estime point. Daignez surtout ne pas oublier que j'ai toujours été le même dans tous les tems, et que je le serai toujours. Mes sentimens personnels sont indépendans des torts, des erreurs, et de l'aveuglement des Cours."

OFFICIAL NOTE.

1799, October 21. Downing Street.—“By a private letter from his Royal Highness the Duke of York to Mr. Secretary Dundas, dated Schagen Brug, 19 October, 1799, it appears that an agreement has been entered into between his Royal Highness and General Brune, in consequence of which hostilities have ceased, and the allied army is to evacuate Holland by the end of November. His Royal Highness promises to send the particulars of the treaty on the following day ; all that can be collected from private letters at present is that the armistice extends to all the naval force in the Zuyder Zee, and stipulates for the restoration of a certain number of French and Dutch prisoners now in England.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 22. Hollwood.—“I received your letter only half an hour ago, and will call upon you as soon as I come to town in the morning. I see nothing, in the first moment, to be advised or to be done but refusing the passport to Holland, and taking the usual precautions to see whether any subsequent correspondence throws any light on the subject. My present impression is that what has now passed is only a stronger proof of the same irregular and eccentric mind, brooding on the same project of somehow or other getting to Paris, God knows for what purposes, but for none, I believe, hostile to this country. Your proposed letter to the Duke of Portland seems, in substance, to include everything you ought to do on so painful an occasion, but, as you cannot now send it till to-morrow, I rather wish you may postpone it till we have talked over the subject.”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 22. Vienna.—“I feel it quite necessary to apologise for the great length of the dispatches carried by this messenger, and to express my wish in general to shorten those I

write to you, being perfectly aware that you cannot afford as much time to Vienna as I who have nothing else to think of. But the matter of these dispatches is important, and will, I hope, reconcile you in some degree to their length.

"After what I have been desired to say concerning Mr. Wyndham's residence at Florence, I think it due to him to add that I believe he is entitled to every sort of commendation for zeal, activity, and good intentions. But if, as an English minister, he is to take an active part in the affairs of that country, it will no doubt be desirable that he should do so under your immediate instructions, as we are otherwise likely to be pursuing different systems under the same authority.

"I thought you might like to see the enclosed specimen of Suwarrow's style. It is certainly a curiosity, but he seems to unite the essential qualities of a great man with singularities that often denote a smaller character. It is a note which he wrote to General Petrasch on giving up a plan of attack which he had before proposed. It was formed by Weinrota, an Austrian officer, acting as his Quarter-Master-General, and when he says the plan is like Alvinzi's behind *Peschiéra*, he means to rally Weinrota, who was also the author of that action in which Alvinzi was beat. I allude to this note in one of these dispatches.

"Lord Mulgrave proposes setting out for England on Thursday, the day after to-morrow. I have not only derived great pleasure from his company, but I think have a little matured my judgment on such military questions as are likely to arise here, from his very instructing conversation on those subjects."

Postscript. "M. de Rozamousky is about to quit his station here. He is to travel for six months (as it is said) at his own desire. M. de Kalitcheff has orders to take on himself immediately the functions of the embassy. Kalitcheff is full of zeal and frankness, and will make a most comfortable colleague."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, October 23. Yarmouth.—"I am this moment safely landed here, having left the Helder the 20th instant in the evening.

"I have no new intelligence to send you. You are informed, as Lord Duncan tells me, of the convention under which our army has till the 30 November to retreat unmolested; we give 8,000 prisoners for this, and we covenant to have evacuated the Dutch territory by the 30 November and to leave the works undisturbed. We met Admiral Dickson yesterday with five line of battle and a frigate in his way to the Helder; he had likewise provisions on board, and three victuallers are to sail from here to-morrow. I shall proceed to-morrow morning, and shall hope to dine with you in town on Friday.

"Why do you not send your Russians to their own principality of Yevern? Popham agrees with me in thinking they would there

be much more nearer at hand. Count Rhoon Bentinck can give you information of the country, and I see much advantage in it and little inconvenience."

HENRY DUNDAS to [W. PITT].

1799, October 24. Wimbledon.—"I return Lord Grenville's paper which, I agree with you, is a very candid statement of the grounds for consideration. As to what concerns the British army I need say nothing except that I do not think he under-rates it. So far as there is any contingency in the business the chances are as likely to lead to less than more. What is to be expected as efficient from Holland is clearly over-rated, unless perhaps he reckons into the number the Dutch collected at the Helder by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and reckoned about 4,000, when properly put together and arranged. The distribution of the British force which I have thought of will not keep the army collected, for that is impossible, but they may be kept in large bodies. 12,000 in Ireland. A large body (the Russians) in the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. Some thousands at Plymouth. Some thousands at Portsmouth; a great body in barracks and cantonments in the eastern district; the same in the barracks and cantonments in the southern district.

"As to the foreign part of the consideration, I have little to add to what is stated by Lord Grenville. A Russian army as large as can be got, and as large as you can afford to pay, is an essential ingredient for every purpose. I feel deeply what Lord Grenville mentions of the total defects of every part of the Russian military system and arrangement; but the more I feel it the more I am alarmed by the contemplation of it; for I greatly doubt if the Emperor will be brought to confess it to the extent of admitting the remedies (and very proper ones) which Lord Grenville suggests.

"Austria is the almost unsurmountable difficulty which presents itself on every hand. It is too long to detail all I think upon it, but the result of my considering the subject very maturely for some days past is that our only chance is to leave the whole arrangement of the continental alliances and their ultimate objects to the Emperor of Russia. I would state to him explicitly that Russia is the basis and *sine qua non* of all our continental connexion, and we shall readily acquiesce in any arrangements he shall make upon that subject, it being understood that himself is the only great power we will agree to subsidize. Let his success in this pursuit be greater or less, I am sure it will be greater than any we can hope for. He may perhaps get both Austria and Prussia to take a part; past experience proves that to be a task beyond our powers of negotiation. We cannot tie one of them fast enough. I think if it is thrown upon him, if he does not secure both, he will at least one of them; and I own I am much confirmed in this sentiment upon the perusal of his paper to Woronzow, which shows that he is meditating upon the subject, and if he lends himself to it

in earnest, it shows that he is allowing his reason to operate, and is not guided solely by his temper. In short my idea is that he knows better, and has better means of improving himself in the knowledge of the jealousies and animosities, with the grounds of them, on the part both of Austria and Prussia than we have, and knows, of course, better how to work upon them than we do. I don't mean by all this that we are to be kept in a state of ignorance as to what is going on. Our ambassador at Petersburg will be attentive to it, and will employ his exertions for the purpose of keeping the Emperor's mind in a right train, but this may be done without our entering into all the minutiae of the intrigues. If we gain our end of having large armies kept in the field, we have in truth very little to do with the subordinate means and arrangements by which this is attained. Indeed it is in every view more eligible to be kept out of them. And we have at all times a just ground of confidence that there is no bias or wrong cast in the mind of the Emperor of Russia which will lead him to acquiesce in any line of conduct or arrangement adverse to any of the principles or substantial interests of Great Britain.

"I am sorry to state it, but I cannot refrain from doing so. I doubt much if the next campaign can be either a very extensive one in its operations, or final as to its results. So much negotiation is to take place, and such extensive military arrangements are to be made, I am afraid we only deceive ourselves if we suppose that they can be so effectually or so early completed in the course of the winter months, as to afford the hopes that the different powers we wish to engage, particularly Russia itself, can be in that state of forwardness at any period of next season as entitle us to look to a brilliant or decisive success. I think, too, in the late interruptions of credit and commerce on the Continent, and likewise in the general scarcity of provisions all over Europe, I could if necessary trace many circumstances which are adverse to a very extensive scale of military operations in the course of next summer. I mention these considerations in the view of inducing Mr. Pitt seriously to contemplate his resources, and to husband them till they can be brought forward in a manner and at a season effectual for the objects in view. Enough in the shape of subsidy must be given to keep a defensive army in Switzerland, and the Austrians must take care of themselves in Italy, but the great exertions of Russia next year must, I am afraid, be employed at home in forming, arranging, and disciplining a powerful army to act with effect when it is so prepared. The effect of extensive preparations will have almost the same effect as an extensive campaign upon the resources of our enemies, for they must be keeping up all the time an immense army, and it will be our fault at home if, by limited exertions by our army and navy, we do not keep them in a state of continual disquietude and alarm. The Walcheren, Belle Isle, Cadiz, Teneriffe [expeditions,] and a moving army of ten thousand men in the Mediterranean would effectually answer that object."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 25. Harley Street.—“ Je vous envoie le portrait du bon et grand Souvorow, en vous prie de me le renvoyer demain, car je veux le mettre dans un cadre plus digne de ce héros. Je vous prie aussi de me renvoyer la lettre de l'Empereur, et d'avoir la bonté de me communiquer ce que vous savez de l'armistice, en cas que le Colonel Clinton est arrivé.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 26. Harley Street.—“ Je vous remercie pour le papier que vous m'avez renvoyé ce matin. Votre billet d'hier-à-soir m'a fait beaucoup de peine, à cause de celle que je vois que vous avez sur les transactions en Hollande, quoique je les ignore. Je suis bien persuadé que si elles sont mauvaises ce n'est que la nécessité seule qui a forcé à les faire, et nécessité n'a pas de loi. Je vous prie de m'indiquer l'heure à laquelle je pourrai vous voir demain. Vous êtes le maître de faire copier le portrait du maréchal. Vous n'avez qu'à choisir le peintre qui doit faire cette copie, et lui ordonner de passer chez moi; je lui remettrai le portrait.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 27. Wimbledon.—“ I wish you to insert nothing into your correspondence that excludes the idea of sending the Russian troops, now in Holland, by the Mediterranean, to go from Genoa to join Suwarrow at any given time. You will not suspect me of any disposition to lessen the army on this side of Europe, but with the nucleus of Dutch force now coming from Holland, and the troops now in Portugal, I can have no doubt of creating a force in the course of the winter superior in point of numbers to the Russians we lose, and in every respect more eligible to act with our army than any Russian force ever can be.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 27. Stowe.—“ But, good God! to what a degree the Duke of York must have felt his danger, or must have been broken in spirit, to have signed a convention which I consider as the most disgraceful to the British character of any document I ever read! The assumption of the *power* or *right* to purchase his retreat (without instructions for that purpose) by the release of Admiral Winter and of 8,000 prisoners of those *not taken by him* is, to my mind, as dangerous a precedent as it is weak and wicked; and though I perfectly agree with him in the principle of not destroying wantonly, yet I feel most strongly that if the risk of the re-embarkation justifies such a price as that paid for it, the destruction of the dykes ought to have been resorted to (as in reality it was by General Brune) rather than the surrender of our national honour, which I conceive gone, and even if possible more disgraced by the delivery of a hostage. I feel all this so

strongly that I should, if I had the misfortune to be a Minister, well weigh the question of the ratification ; but if you should agree to ratify it, I protest I do not know how you can defend it. However, all this is between ourselves, for as I look to the means of getting out of the war by our military exertions, I shall not conceive our prospects and my objects improved by saying or doing anything that can militate with your wishes. And in stating it I only mean to *think aloud with you.*"

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 28. Wimbledon.—“I have this moment received your note. Mr. Pitt passed here yesterday on his way to Bulstrode, and I mentioned to him the idea I had wrote to you ; after a little conversation he seemed satisfied of the propriety of it, and I don't think you need have any doubt of writing to Sir Charles Whitworth in the way you propose.

“I really don't understand what Woronzow can mean by neglect as to the exchange of the Russian prisoners. They are included in the exchange, and many of their officers, I believe, are already arrived. The convention as to the exchange of prisoners actually once broke off on the refusal to include the Russians, and there is actually a ship of Dutch prisoners arrived in this country, brought over in consequence of the convention having stopped on that account, and that ship must now be sent back with its prisoners. I have examined the detail of the armistice, and except that I do not see it made a point to exchange General D. Herman with Winter, I do not see a fault in it, and, when that is explained, perhaps there may be no fault. I have by this night's despatches given a private instruction to get D. Herman's exchange if possible.

“I am afraid you and I unfortunately see this whole subject in so different a point of view that there is little chance of our agreeing upon almost any part of it. As I know not the authority on which you use the strong words in the concluding part of your letter, I can say nothing upon it, except that every channel of information I can apply to, public and private, leads me to a conclusion directly the reverse of what your information has induced you to believe. I yesterday had a long private and confidential conversation with Colonel Clinton, and, if there is truth in man, your information must be erroneous. With regard to the Duke's coming away, all I shall say to him is that I wish, which I certainly do, for many reasons to see him when he can come with propriety. At the same time I cannot enter into your idea of the propriety of his staying while any soldier remains. If there had been no armistice, and the resolution had (for any reason whatever) been taken to remain in the corner of North Holland, as long as there was a soldier alive, I agree with those that may think the Duke ought never to have left a soldier behind him ; but when they are all embarking in safety under an armistice, I cannot see either the propriety or the decency of the Duke remaining with the command of the rear-guard.

"I am not surprised at the temper and moderation with which Woronzow conducted his conversation with you, for, in all the communications I have had occasion to make to him on the subject, I have observed his conduct marked with great candour and great good sense."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, October 28. Cleveland Row.—"This unhappy business of the capitulation in Holland has just presented itself to my mind in a new light, which makes it impossible for me to avoid stating to you in this manner my sentiments upon it.

"I believe, if you will examine the law and practice of war, you will find that a stipulation made by the commander-in-chief of an army for the surrender of prisoners *at home*, not taken in that expedition, nor in any manner under his control or disposal, totally exceeds the powers of such an officer, however high in rank and station. If this should be true, as it must I fear be confessed to be, the duty which we have now to discharge is to consider, not whether we will approve of, or even acquiesce in, a thing already done by competent authority, but whether we will advise the King to confirm or rather to *do* by his act, that which he has not yet either empowered or instructed any person to do for him. And if we determine this in the affirmative, the act is no longer that of the Duke of York of his advisers, but is the act of the King and of his Majesty's advisers here.

"Should this be just reasoning, I should very ill discharge my duty if I did not, in whatever manner it is most becoming for me to do it, express my decided opinion that it would not be proper for the British Government to accede to the terms proposed by General Brune. If it is desired, I am ready to state my reasons at large for that opinion; but, if the deliberate judgment of the King's servants on this subject should be different from mine, I can have no wish to prolong the discussion of so disagreeable a subject, provided it be distinctly understood that my opinion (however little weight it may deserve) has nevertheless been given on this melancholy occasion explicitly and unreservedly, as it ought to be; though always, I trust, with that respect to which his Royal Highness is on every possible account so much entitled. It is not possible for any man to respect the Duke of York's virtues more than I do; but, if the King's Government is to act at all upon this subject, I am bound to give my opinion upon it, though it does not coincide with the measure which he has, with the most upright intentions, thought himself under the painful necessity of adopting." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 28. Wimbledon.—"I have this moment received your letter. I trust I have no occasion to assure you that it must always give me a sensible concern when I differ with you upon any point of importance, especially of the delicate complexion of the one under consideration. I should not say *under*

consideration, for in fact the question is decided. I sent yesterday to the King the draft of the despatch I meant to send to the Duke of York, containing a direct approbation of the armistice he had entered upon with General Brune; and this day the draft was returned with the King's approbation marked upon it in his own hand. There cannot be a doubt of its being in the power of the King to dispose of such a number of prisoners as he pleases, and his approbation of the transaction so given is an approbation of that article of the convention which, with all the others, was before the King when he gave the approbation. I perfectly admit that the Secretary of State who gave him the advice is responsible for it, and, in that mode, any other of his Majesty's confidential servants may with perfect regularity state to the King their dissatisfaction with the advice which he has received and followed; but, except impelled by some such call of duty as that which I have supposed, I am not aware that any other Minister has any necessity imposed upon him to volunteer his disapprobation.

"Under such circumstances I am sure your Lordship will feel that I am not the person to give you advice upon the subject. If you should think it your duty to take the step I have referred to, I can with the most perfect truth and sincerity assure you it will not in any respect alter my feelings towards you. It is impossible from the course of our habits together that you can have any motive for doing it except an irresistible feeling of public and conscientious duty. On the other hand, I feel equally confident you will do me the justice to admit that it is from no principle of arrogance or self-sufficiency if I avow to you that my mind is so firmly made up on the business that, if it had been the determination of his Majesty's Government that the army under the command of the Duke of York should remain in its present position in Holland, I must have been under the absolute necessity of declining to sign the order for that purpose, and must have returned the Seals into his Majesty's hands, in so far as the holding of them had anything to do with any share in the conduct or deliberations of the war. You know that if the Helder fort had been tenable with three or four thousand men, as we were once led to believe, I should have been perfectly satisfied to have retained that position, and, if possible, to add one or perhaps two more to it. Beyond that it would have been impossible for me to concur."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 28. Harley Street.—"Je vous remercie pour la communication de la lettre du Colonel Clinton, du 9, de Coire. Elle ne fait que confirmer la grande habilité du Libérateur de l'Italie. Puisse-t-il être aussi celui de la Suisse.

"J'ai vu hier dans plusieurs papiers du soir un article que j'ai retrouvé aujourd'hui dans *l'Oracle*. Comme cet article se trouve dans la *Gazette Almande* de Hambourg, qui est très exacte, et

comme la lettre énergique du maréchal est tout-à-fait dans son caractère, occupé comme vous êtes, je doute que vous ayez eu le tems de lire les papiers, c'est pourquoi je vous l'envoie.

"Permettez-moi de vous faire souvenir des copies des deux notes que Lord Minto a présenté à Thugut."

Enclosure.

October 5. Frontiers of Swabia.—"Yesterday morning the Russian generals received the following order from Field-Marshal Suworow:—'You will be answerable with your heads for every inch of ground that you shall give up to the enemy. I have advanced by way of Schwitz and am ready to repair your errors; show therefore a courage and resolution which nothing can subdue.'"
Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, October 29. Cleveland Row.—"I am much obliged to you for the friendly sentiments expressed in your letter, and which I can with great sincerity assure you are reciprocal on my part.

"The object of my letter was to express to you, and to such others of my colleagues as might see it, the strong additional reason of dissent from the measure in question which I felt from the new light in which the subject had struck me. In a case where no Cabinet deliberation had been held, I conceive that the regular way of doing this was by communication to the Minister in whose department the business rests. Having done this I have discharged my duty, as those who differ from me have done in advising the approbation of the measure. To remark on what you say respecting the Helder fort would be to renew an argument on the subject after it is decided."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

Private.

1799, October 29. Cleveland Row.—"The task which in my dispatch I have solicited you to undertake so much exceeds the limits of any ordinary commission that I have felt some difficulty in giving you the whole idea in official language. What we mean is this: (1) That you should persuade Suwarow to reconcile the Emperor's mind to the appointment of a foreign staff and commissariat to that army, and of some foreign officers to serve in the line with it. For this Suwarow will be a little prepared by Wickham, as far as relates to the staff and the line, and the matter of the commissariat cannot be deemed unreasonable if we bear the whole expense. (2) That you should yourself take the station of Adjutant-General, or Quartermaster-General to that army, according as you shall judge that you can be most useful. And that you should also, if you think proper, take the command of any Swiss force that may be raised in the King's pay, on any plan like that of last year. (3) That you

should select some English officers to be employed in both departments of the staff, and that you should, in concert with Wickham who knows all the individuals, also choose some Austrian and Condé officers for the same purpose, and for that of the line. (4) That you should reconcile Suwarrow's mind to these arrangements, and also get him to recommend to the Emperor an increase of pay to his troops (officers and men) when serving out of Russia. (5) That in all these matters, and in everything that respects the commissariat, you should act for the best as if you had precise instructions; considering always that the distance will admit of few references either here or to Petersburg, and that in this business time is as valuable as money or troops.

"I need not say that in proposing to you to take such a latitude of discretion, I could not do it without the full confidence that you will receive a support adequate to it, not only personally from myself, but from every department of the King's government. I hope therefore that you will not judge the thing impracticable. Difficult it certainly is, but you will not be discouraged by mere difficulty, nor by the prospect of much vexation and fatigue, where the object in view is so important. Without a Russian army we shall make no solid impression on France; and without these arrangements the most numerous Russian army will, I fear, rather be productive of triumph to our enemies than of advantage to ourselves. But with them what may we not hope, if the French are pressed by Suwarrow on one side, by the Archduke on the other, and, on this side, harassed by the operations which we can undertake with a superior fleet, and a disposable force of 60,000 men.

"You will have learnt the result of our Dutch campaign. It has not been ultimately successful as to all its objects, but it has produced much honour to our troops, and much advantage to the country; and the public spirit will, I trust, remain unabated, and enable us to persevere.

"Let me again repeat that, if in these instructions there is not latitude enough expressly given to you on the innumerable points that cannot be foreseen, or on those that are mentioned, the best service you can do us is to take it first, and *then* ask for it.

"Do for the best, and, rely on it, we will think it the best."
Copy.

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October 29. Duke Street.—"The Hereditary Prince has informed the Prince his father of what has passed in the conference he had with you this morning. The Prince has approved of everything that has been suggested to him in consequence of that conversation, and M. Mollerus, who wishes, if possible, to set out for the Continent on Saturday, is ready to obey your commands and wait on you at any time you will be pleased to appoint. If you will have the goodness to let me know when it will suit you to receive him, I shall inform him immediately of the time you have fixed.

“With respect to the ships, the Prince of Orange will write to you in the manner agreed upon.

“The annexed packet contains a letter from M. de Stamford to the Prince of Orange which his Serene Highness desired me to communicate to your Lordship.”

Enclosure 1.

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1799, October 9. Brunswick.—“L'impossibilité où je me trouve de pouvoir souffrir, moi seul, à toutes les écritures nécessitées par la multitude des correspondances que je suis obligé d'entretenir, a été cause que je n'ai pas pu, aussitôt que je le désirois, rendre compte à votre altesse sérénissime de ce qui s'est passé depuis peu à Berlin, au sujet des affaires en Hollande.

“Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick ayant adressé dans le courant du mois passé un mémoire très circonstancié au Roi, dans lequel il lui démontre les suites facheuses qui ne sauroient manquer de résulter pour la Prusse de son système temporisateur. Sa Majesté lui répondit que tout en convenant de la solidité de ses argumens, et en approuvant surtout le motif et le zèle que les lui avoient dictés, elle n'en demeurait pas moins persuadée que le système qu'elle avoit adopté étoit le seul qui put convenir à la Prusse dans les circonstances actuelles.

“A mon retour de Berlin, Monseigneur le Duc étant en chemin pour se rendre à Potzdam, je trouvai ici une lettre de sa part à la quelle étoit jointe une copie du mémoire dont je viens de parler et que je m'empresserai d'envoyer sur le champ à M. de Grenville.

“Monseigneur le Duc voyant que ses avis en politique ne prévalaient pas à Berlin, et n'étoient pas goûtés par le Roi, s'étoit persuadé que sa correspondance avec Sa Majesté sur cette matière finiroit là, lorsqu'il reçut, ces jours passés, une lettre du Collonel Zastrow, en date du 1^{re} de ce mois, écrite par ordre du Roi, pour l'informer que le Gouvernement Batave venoit d'envoyer à Sa Majesté un nommé Vos de Steinwyk, chargé d'implorer sa protection. La lettre de Zastrow dit que les propositions que cet envoyé a fait au nom de ce Gouvernement sont; que Monseigneur le Prince héréditaire d'Orange soit mis à la tête du Gouvernement de la Hollande, avec des pouvoirs plus étendus que n'étoient aux des Stadhouders précédens, avec la clause, néanmoins, qu'il prendroit un autre titre que celui de Stadhouder, qu'on laisseroit à son choix; que pour établir solidement la constitution, on nommeroit une commission composée de douze membres dont six de la part du Roi ou du Prince et six de la part du Gouvernement Batave actuel: qui, du reste, étoit prêt à se soumettre à toutes les conditions qui pourroient lui assurer la protection du Roi: M. de Zastrow ne dit pas ce que Sa Majesté a fait répondre à ce négociateur, mais il ajoute que ses propositions ont d'abord été communiquées par M. de Haugwitz au Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre, et que le Sieur Vos de Steinwyk est reparti pour la Hollande.

“Aux informations précédentes contenues dans la lettre de Zastrow, se trouva aussi la réponse du Directoire François relative à la retrocession des provinces Prussiennes d'outre Rhin, que la Cour de Berlin demande depuis trois mois. Cette réponse porte en substance que Sa Majesté Prussienne ayant fait avancer son armée de neutralité jusques sur les bords du Rhin, et ce mouvement ayant tout l'air d'une menace, le Gouvernement François ne pouvoit pas acquiescer à la demande sans donner lieu à croire qu'il y auroit été porté par un mouvement de crainte qu'il étoit bien éloigné d'éprouver; qu'à l'égard du motif et des raisons qui avoient engagé Sa Majesté à demander la retrocession des dites provinces, et qui consistoient en ce qu'elle craignoit de les voir traitées comme pays ennemi, s'il arrivoit que l'armée Anglo-Russe parvint à y pénétrer, le Directoire pouvoit assurer Sa Majesté que les troupes Françaises sauroient les défendre; mais que si cependant il arrivoit, contre toute attente, qu'elles s'y vissent attaquées par des forces supérieures, que pour une défense commune, Sa Majesté n'auroit alors qu'à joindre ses troupes aux troupes Françaises qui s'y trouveroient.

“M. de Zastrow dit que cette réponse (ironique et insultante) a d'autant plus surpris le Roi que l'agent du Directoire à Berlin, le Citoyen Otto, en avoit fait espérer une plus satisfaisante, mais il ajoute qu'on ignore quel parti Sa Majesté prendra dans cette affaire. La réponse que Monsieur le Duc a faite à cet officier,³ dont je joins ici une copie, seroit bien faite, si le Roi la voit, à le déterminer à prendre un parti digne de sa Majesté, mais je doute qu'elle fasse cet effet.

“J'avois pris tous les arrangements nécessaires pour me rendre d'ici à Embden, afin de me rapprocher de M. de Grenville qui m'en avoit prié.

“Une toux violente, accompagnée de douleurs rhumatismales dans la poitrine, m'oblige depuis deux jours à garder la chambre; et Dieu sait si, et quand, je serai en état de me mettre en route.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, October ?]—“Permettez moi de vous demander en confidence si vous avez reçu aujourd'hui quelque nouvelle désagréable de Vienne. Vous connoissez ma façon de penser, et n'ignorez pas que vous pouvez me le dire. Ce qui me porte à vous faire cette question c'est le langage extraordinaire et continuellement critique de Sa Majesté ce matin au lever, au sujet de notre Cour. Je vous avoue que cela m'a affligé, surtout à cause de la présence de mes collègues. J'ai présumé que nous avons peut-être fait quelque sottise, ce qui me peinerait beaucoup. Si ce n'est qu'une disposition particulière du Roi aujourd'hui, ou même un conséquence de quelques calomnies de notre ami commun, dont je resterai toujours l'ami, quoiqu'il ne soit plus le mien, je m'en consolerais, *meliora tempora sperans*. Adieu, pardon, mais ma confiance, mon intrusion même, vous prouvent mon attachement.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[October.]—"The Marshal flew, or pretended to fly, into a violent passion, sent the man out of the room, and asked the other where was Ravensburg. 'At 8 leagues from Augsbουργ,' says the man. 'Bon,' says the Marshal; '8 leagues make four German miles, and my troops march 8 German miles a day if necessary. Let the hospital however march only four German miles, in which case it will be here in one day.' The poor man attempted to explain, but orders were given accordingly, and an official letter written in my presence to General Hiller to provide for the hospital on one day's march from Ravensburg. Now from Ravensburg (where, by the by, the hospital consists of above 3,000 wounded) to Waldsee there are 5 leagues; from Waldsee to Warzach, 5; from Warzach to Memmingen, 5; from Memmingen to Mindelheim, 4; from Mindelheim to Schroabumken, 6; and from thence to Augsburg, 4.

"Whether this be ignorance, wit, or madness it is the same thing in its consequences to the poor people of the country where this army resides, and to the generals of the Allies who are to repair, and explain to themselves and to others, all these absurdities.

"In one word we must get rid of these people as fast as possible, or we shall all be involved in the same disgrace and reproach. I could go on for hours with histories of the same kind, to some of which I have been an eye-witness myself, others I have heard from persons who were in every respect unprejudiced. All this evil is, I fear, incurable under the present Emperor. This army is his own creature, and no one dares to speak to him of its defects. His vanity, I understand, passes all bounds, and his violence is still greater than his vanity. Suvarow, who is one of the most cunning, artful men I ever met with on public business, has never yet taken a step of any kind without having first learnt the Emperor's private opinion, if not on the very measure at least on something analogous to it.

"I had a letter from Whitworth yesterday, in which he says that the Emperor reproached him with being a friend of the Austrians. Your Lordship will recollect that Suvarow attempted to pay me the same compliment; among other things I remember he told me on that occasion '*que Whitworth feroit mieux de jouer le God damn, que de se laisser duper par Cobenzell.*' I have since learnt that Colonel Kurtuchoff, who had just then brought him despatches from Petersburg, had told him that Whitworth was not a match for Cobenzell, and that the Emperor had expressed this opinion to Rastopchin.

"I beg pardon for all the nonsense I have been scribbling, but sometimes from such things a spark of light may be struck out, which I am sure your Lordship will not fail to turn to advantage."

[*The beginning of this letter is missing.*]

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, October —. Downing Street.—“I return Woronzow's and Kalitcheff's letters. Lord Minto's I had read as attentively as possible. Your note to Starhemberg seems absolutely necessary, and I have given it to Taylor to forward. It will, I think, silence him.”

APPENDIX.

LORD GRENVILLE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.*

1798, April 18. Downing Street.—“ En conséquence de la permission que votre altesse sérénissime a bien voulu me donner ce matin, j’ai l’honneur de lui expliquer de cette manière l’objet de la communication dont Sa Majesté m’a chargé auprès de votre altesse. La nécessité d’opérer (s’il est encore possible) une réunion entre les grandes puissances du Continent pour s’opposer aux progrès ultérieurs des François, et les difficultés que présenteroient à cet égard les prétensions respectives de l’Autriche et de la Prusse pour s’indemniser aux dépens de l’Empire, ne sont pas inconnus à votre altesse. Elle n’ignore pas non plus combien ces difficultés pourroient tenir à cette stipulation du traité entre le feu Roi de Prusse et la Directoire Français, par laquelle il étoit convenu que votre altesse sérénissime seroit compensée pour sa renonciation au Stadthouderat, par l’acquisition d’une indemnité territoriale dans l’Empire, laquelle seroit en partie le résultat des sécularisations qu’on méditoit alors. Sa Majesté connoissant la justice, le désintéressement, et les sentimens élevés de votre altesse, a pensé qu’il seroit digne d’elle de déclarer formellement tant à Vienne qu’à Berlin, qu’elle renonçoit à ces idées de dédommagement par des acquisitions territoriales aux dépens d’autrui, et rien ne pourroit plus qu’une pareille déclaration contribuer à écarter les obstacles qui s’opposent encore à cette réunion, d’où dépend le salut du continent de l’Europe. Sa Majesté m’a donc chargé de lui en faire la proposition, en ajoutant que si elle ne voyait aucun inconvénient de charger de cette commission si honorable M. le Général de Stamford (dont personne ne connoît mieux le mérite distingué) cela pourroit encore être d’un grand avantage pour le succès des objets majeurs dont il est question. Les sentimens nobles et équitables que votre altesse sérénissime a montrés dès le moment que j’ai commencé de m’acquitter des ordres du Roi à cet égard, ne me laissent rien à désirer quant au rapport que je dois en faire à Sa Majesté, et n’ont pu qu’ajouter à la vénération et au profond respect qui m’ont toujours animé à son égard.”

The following confidential reports from Mr. Liston, British Minister at Stockholm, in regard to the murder of Gustavus III,

* Omitted from a previous volume.

King of Sweden, and the Regency of the Duke of Sudermania, were found subsequently to the publication of Lord Grenville's other papers relating to the same period.

ROBERT LISTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 26. Stockholm.—“As the fate of the conspirators is now finally decided, and I may not again have occasion to mention their names to your Lordship, it may be proper that I should say something of the character of these men, and of the motives which induced them to unite in an attack on the life of their sovereign. The place which their crimes have acquired them in the history of the present times will justify my claiming your Lordship's attention to the subject for a few moments.

“I begin with Count Ribbing, who may be said, perhaps beyond any of the others, to have been the spring and mover of the conspiracy. He had imbibed from his infancy strong principles of republican liberty, and having spent some years in the French service at a very early period of life (he is now only 27) he returned to his native country with a super-addition of the notions which became fashionable in Europe at the close of the American war. The character and measures of Gustavus III. were so incompatible with these sentiments that Monsieur de Ribbing soon discovered an intention to enter into formal opposition to his sovereign; and being of an active and enterprising spirit, and possessed of good abilities, he came to be considered by his late Swedish Majesty as a formidable enemy. On the commencement of the war against Russia, without the consent of the Estates of the kingdom, Monsieur de Ribbing, to preserve consistency in his political conduct, thought himself obliged to resign his commission of Captain in the King's Guards; and a necessity which seemed to cut off his hopes of future advancement had the effect upon a haughty and ambitious mind of converting a spirit of opposition into private enmity to the King's person. His temper was further soured by the disappointment of his hopes of contracting an advantageous marriage. He had made his addresses to a young woman of beauty and fortune, and had been not unfavourably received; but the lady's relations, and in the end she herself also, gave the preference to Baron Essun, one of the King's favourites, in consequence, as Monsieur de Ribbing supposed, of an interference of his Swedish Majesty. He attempted to revenge himself by challenging his rival; but he had the misfortune to be wounded, and Monsieur d'Essun carried off the prize. Count Ribbing afterwards retired to his mother's estate; but he was soon disgusted with the life of the country, and despairing of being able to effectuate anything in opposition to a Prince whose good fortune seemed to triumph over every difficulty, he had formed the resolution of quitting Sweden, when the unexpected rumour of an Assembly of the States to be holden at Gefle, and his accidental

meeting with Ankarström, inspired him with other thoughts. It was expected that the nobility would have made such resistance to his Swedish Majesty's plans at that Diet that he would have been induced to employ violent measures; and as the resolution was taken by the majority of the Opposition eventually to repel force by force, it was thought that the confusion of the struggle would have afforded a favourable opportunity of taking away his Majesty's life. But the nobles, contrary to the wishes and efforts of Ribbing, prevented extremities by the moderation of their conduct, and by their final compliance with the greater part of the King's demands. Count Ribbing appears, however, to have returned from Gefle familiarised with the idea of using violence towards the King, and to have had recourse with little or no scruple to the desperate fanaticism of Ankarström. Determined and zealous as this man was, he seems at the same time to have needed the countenance and exhortations of Ribbing to embolden him to proceed. One of the circumstances which had the greatest effect upon him was that, when he mentioned the subject of the murder, Ribbing used to laugh him to scorn, as having undertaken what he had not the courage to execute. Ankarström still put off the horrid deed on various pretences, and would have done so once more the night of the fatal masquerade had not Ribbing urged that the blow must be struck then or not at all, for that, if it were deferred a day longer, they would infallibly be betrayed. At the consummation of the shocking business, Ribbing not only pointed out the King to Ankarström (who was not sure that he could distinguish his Majesty in mask) but is said to have covered the pistol at the moment of its being fired off with the sleeve of his domino, and even (though this did not appear in evidence) to have supported the trembling hand of the assassin.

"Of Count Horn it is remarkable that he is of the same family with the gentleman of that name who lost his head in 1756 for attempting, in conjunction with Count Brahé, to effectuate a change of government calculated to give the sovereign of Sweden a greater degree of authority; and that his father, who is still alive, was one of the most zealous supporters of the revolution of 1772, and the most enthusiastic and extravagant of the admirers of Gustavus III. It is true this last gentleman joined the rest of the nobility in disapproving of the further alterations in the constitution which the King attempted to make in 1789, and he was one of those who were imprisoned on account of their opposition in the Diet on that occasion. The young Count Horn, a schoolfellow and intimate friend of Ribbing, was educated in the same principles of republicanism, and adopted similar sentiments of disaffection to the late King's government and person. He imitated Ribbing's example in resigning his commission of Major in the army in 1789. He retired to a small country seat, not far distant from Stockholm, married, and had several children; amused himself with the occupations of the country, and with poetry and music, for which he had a considerable degree of genius; and having less ambition and less

ability for public affairs, he had given up all idea of entering into active opposition, and would probably have ended his days in a quiet retreat had he not been roused by the proposals and solicitations of Ankarström and Ribbing. In the progress of the conspiracy, too, he seems at times to have recoiled at the idea of shedding the King's blood, and to have expressed a strong desire that a change of government might be attempted by other means. It was with this view that he engaged Ankarström to traverse with him, in a winter evening, the park of Haga, and to reconnoitre the small palace where the King lodged, in order to see whether it might not be possible to carry off His Majesty and to keep him in confinement till a revolution should be effected, to which they might afterwards extort his consent. But Ribbing uniformly insisted on the impossibility of effecting anything while the King was suffered to live; and Ankarström remonstrated against this enterprise on account of the guards and attendants who surrounded the King at that country seat, and the consequent necessity of admitting a great number of persons into the secret. A singular circumstance is said to have taken place on this occasion. Ankarström's real intention is thought to have been to shoot the King through the window of his apartment at Haga, had he found a proper opportunity; and Horn and he went near enough to see His Majesty sitting in an easy chair alone, in a small room adjoining to his library; but as he was lying much back in the chair, and appeared to them extremely pale, they imagined he had died suddenly and retired without effecting their purpose. The King's appearance is accounted for by the recollection of those who were near his person, that one evening, about the time alluded to, His Majesty had had his hair dressed, and happened to fall asleep without having the powder wiped from his face.

"In the meantime Count Horn's house served as a place of rendezvous to the conspirators, and the momentary fits of remorse to which he seems to have been subject, did not prevent him, in the general course of his conduct, from encouraging and aiding Ankarström in the prosecution of his purpose. He made him frequent visits, procured him a place in a box at the opera, with a view to the intended assassination at that theatre. He afterwards was present at Ankarström's lodgings while the pistols were loaded, accompanied him from thence to the masquerade, and provided himself with arms, to be used in all probability in the bustle which was expected to succeed the King's death.

"Deeply as Counts Horn and Ribbing appear to have been concerned in the murderous plot, a considerable part of the public speak with greater horror of the species of guilt incurred by Monsieur de Liljehorn, Lieutenant-Colonel of the King of Sweden's Guards. This gentleman, the son of an officer who had a large family and no fortune, was educated in the palace of Stockholm (where his mother obtained the place of a chamber-keeper) under the eye, and it may be said at the expense of the late King, who took such a kind care of the fortune of Liljehorn

and of the rest of the family as might have been expected of an affectionate brother. Colonel Liljehorn, in particular, had risen more rapidly than he had any title to expect, and he had reason to look with assurance to future advancement; the King's confidence and generosity towards him remained unabated. He acceded, however, to Count Ribbing's conspiracy against the life of his benefactor, and was an active and eminent agent in preparing the revolution which was to follow the murder. He was the chief bond of connection between the enthusiastic young men who planned the death of the sovereign and the politicians more advanced in years who undertook the task of new-modelling the Constitution. He had already engaged, in case of a rupture between the King and the nobles at Gefle, to have put himself at the head of the Guards, and to have supported the cause of opposition in the capital. Had the wound inflicted by Ankarström proved instantaneously mortal, as was expected, Monsieur de Liljehorn was in like manner to have assumed the command of the Guards, and he had ensured the assistance of some officers of the Artillery, and of the other troops in garrison at Stockholm, in support of the projected revolution.

"A return of gratitude and loyalty prompted him, however, as he pretends in his confessions, to endeavour to prevent the fatal catastrophe by means of the anonymous letter which he sent to the King a few hours before the commencement of the masquerade. But few people are inclined to give him credit for the sincerity of his good intentions in this act. The letter was entrusted by him to a person unknown, whom he happened to find standing in the street. It was uncertain whether it would reach the King's hands, and whether it would be opened, if it did. Besides, Colonel Liljehorn was perfectly acquainted with the King's character. He knew that he had been accustomed to receive numerous threatening letters, without paying any attention to them; and that warning his Majesty against danger to be apprehended in any particular place was the surest way to induce him to go immediately to the spot. And as Monsieur de Liljehorn had at all times free and confidential access to the King, he had it in his power, had he been in earnest, to have personally given such notice as would have had the desired effect. It is not therefore unnatural to infer that his real view was to secure his own pardon, in the event of the failure and discovery of the plot, and had the King recovered, there is no doubt that he would have obtained this end, whatever had been the fate of the other offenders. The King saw him twice after he was wounded, and was extremely affected when he learnt the share he had had in the conspiracy. His Majesty exclaimed in imitation of Cæsar, *Et vous aussi, Liljehorn!* and made it his dying request that *he* at least should not suffer.

"In the course of his defence, Liljehorn urged at great length, and with specious reasoning, that the strain of the letter in question, and the peculiar circumstances stated in it, were of a nature to have attracted the King's serious attention, and consequently to have averted the danger. As the *Gazettes* have in

general given a defective account of that remarkable paper, I take the liberty of enclosing an exact copy of it. But admitting his intentions to have been such as he professes them, he then incurs the blame of having taken a step which tended to the discovery and ruin of his friends engaged in the conspiracy:—for the natural consequence of the intimation if credited (and what would actually have taken place if Baron Armfeldt had happened to sup that evening with the King) was that the doors of the masquerade should have been shut, by command of His Majesty, and a general search made for offensive weapons, which were prohibited by the regulations of the house; the pistols and knife would have detected Ankarström, and torture might have drawn from him the names of other conspirators. The apprehension of this consequence appears indeed but little to have affected Monsieur de Liljehorn. He was no sooner suspected and committed to prison (on the evidence of the bearer of the anonymous letter who happened to recognize his person) than he betrayed the names of his principal accomplices, and in the sequel he related every circumstance respecting everyone of the persons concerned, to the utmost extent of his knowledge.

“It was in consequence of his information that Horn and Ribbing and the other leaders were arrested. A confession was drawn from them, partly by an idea of the inutility of denial after the precise detail into which he had entered, partly by the dread of torture, partly by the honourable desire of freeing the rest of the nobility from the unjust suspicions entertained against them, and from the danger (which in the first moment was not imaginary) of an attack on the whole order by the enraged populace. The confession of Ribbing and Horn occasioned, in its turn, that of Ankarström, who, had they remained silent, would have persevered in denying that he had any accomplices. So that upon the whole, the conduct of Liljehorn alone produced a discovery of the other conspirators, and an explanation of the motives of an event which might otherwise have been attributed to the private revenge of a desperate individual.

“In no particular has the conduct of Liljehorn been more generally or more severely condemned than in his gratuitously informing against Baron Ehrensværd, the fourth person condemned to death for being accessory to the murder of the late King.

“The father of this young gentleman had, in his last will, and on his deathbed, recommended him to the particular care of Monsieur de Liljehorn; and Baron Ehrensværd was drawn into the conspiracy in a great measure by his attachment and respect for his guardian, who indeed enjoyed a universal good character for honour, virtue and good conduct. The young man was fully informed of the purposed attack upon the King’s life, and had engaged to do his utmost to contribute towards the subsequent revolution. But as he received his intelligence from Monsieur de Liljehorn, and had confidential communications on the subject

with him only, a discovery of his guilt was the less necessary ; and Monsieur de Liljehorn had given him his promise that at all events his name should never be mentioned ; an assurance which prevented Ehrensværd from endeavouring to make his escape, which he had time to have done. Yet Liljehorn was no sooner put under examination than he disclosed every particular which could inculcate his young friend ; the consequence of which was his imprisonment, and finally his condemnation to death.

“ Of the remaining offenders the only prominent figure is Major-General Pechlin, a gentleman whose talents have assigned him a distinguished rank in the annals of party in Sweden, but who has not been less noted for duplicity of conduct and indelicacy in the means of attaining his ends. It is remembered and quoted as a trait that sufficiently marks his character, that, when a boy, he essentially served one of the contending factions of the day by concealing himself in a chimney that he might overhear the conferences held with his father, and afterwards betraying the secrets, thus learnt, to his employers.

“ Count Ribbing and his associates were forced to have recourse to this man, because they stood in need of some persons of experience and abilities to direct the operations of the intended revolution, and they felt it impossible to obtain of the Fersens, the Brahès, the De Geers, and the other chiefs of the Opposition, to enter into any plan that was to commence with assassination.

“ I have formerly mentioned that Monsieur de Pechlin had proceeded with so much caution that no legal proof could be brought of his participation in the conspiracy. In this situation with the strongest suspicion prevailing against him, it is remarkable, and extremely fortunate for him, that the moderation of the majority of his judges and the clemency of the Duke of Sudermania prevented his being put to the torture (he only suffered from some irregularities which took place at his first examination before the Master of the Police) ; for it was recollected that he had been active in personally conducting the interrogatories by torture which were adhibited in the trials for Count Brahé's conspiracy in 1756 ; and his enemies thought the present a natural time for retaliation.

“ When I employ the word *torture*, it is proper to explain that the application of any particular instrument for that purpose was abolished by the Swedish Diet so long ago as 1736, and that persons in General Pechlin's situation could from thenceforward be subjected only to what was termed a *strait prison*. But this, in fact, was rendered equivalent to torture. The supposed offenders were thrust into a narrow cell, the floor of which was covered with mud, or with insufferably cold water. They were placed in such a position as to prevent them from lying down to sleep, and were exposed to other inconveniences at the pleasure of the examiners. The late King built up the door of this shocking receptacle, and it was never used during his reign.

“ Persons who are criminals according to the persuasion of the judges, but who obstinately withhold their own acknowledgments of their guilt, which by the practice of the Courts is

necessary in order to their condemnation, are, pursuant to the ancient Swedish law, confined in prison for an unlimited time, till they come to a sense of their guilt, and make confession. An attempt was made soon after the period of Count Brahé's conspiracy to abolish this law, and to enact that the man against whom there was no legal proof of guilt should be fully restored to liberty. But this act was prevented from passing by the warm opposition made to it in the Diet by General Pechlin. And it is singular that he is the first person that has been in the predicament since that time, and who is to suffer in consequence of the protracted existence of the old statutes.

"General Pechlin's confinement is, however, in the first instance, to be considered as a favour to him; for had he been set at liberty at the present moment, he would have been in great danger of falling a sacrifice to the multitude.

"Of the other conspirators, particularly those of the name of Engström, I shall only say that it has been matter of surprise that men advanced in life, of respected characters, and in easy circumstances, should have been induced to engage in a plot of so atrocious a nature.

"It is indeed remarkable that, if General Pechlin is excepted, there was not among the members of the conspiracy (who are known) any one man of profligate manners or desperate fortune; and private animosity seems to have held but a secondary place among the motives of action. They appear all to have been misled by erroneous ideas of patriotism, and blinded by enthusiasm to a degree which made them consider every extremity as justifiable, in order to stop the King's progress towards despotism. Counts Ribbing and Horn used (by a wonderful stretch of imagination surely) to draw a parallel between Nero and Gustavus III., and mutually inflamed their disloyalty by applying to the King the expressions which Tacitus has employed with regard to the tyrant. Ankarström reasoned on the subject with a coolness which struck his judges with astonishment and horror. 'The King,' said he, 'had so often broken his oaths, that he was in my eyes no longer a King, but a tyrant, to whom no allegiance was due. He had set himself above the laws; he was therefore to be regarded as an outlaw whom every man was free to kill. I sometimes indeed asked myself: "But am I not going to commit a bad action?" "By no means," my conscience answered, "if you were in distress and could not extricate yourself, would you not expect that your neighbours, if they could, should relieve you? You have it in your power to relieve your poor country from oppression and misery. It is a merit, it is a duty."'

"Nothing precise can be said with respect to the total number of the conspirators, the steps that were to be taken after the King's death, nor the nature of the revolution that was to follow; the principal conduct of the business having been assigned to General Pechlin and Baron Bielke, the one of whom has observed an obstinate silence, and the other laid violent hands

on himself that he might not be constrained to break it. It is only known, in general, that the Prince Royal was immediately to have been placed upon the throne, and the Queen declared Regent. Her Majesty was to have been assisted by a provisional Council, composed of those who had been members of the former Senate, and some of the most eminent persons in the kingdom. As soon as possible a Diet was to have been assembled, and proposals made for a change in the constitution, concerning which, however, the members of the conspiracy were not perfectly agreed among themselves, the elder part of them having shown a desire to re-establish, with only a few inessential differences, the ancient form of the Swedish Government, or to imitate that of England; while the younger men were eager to adopt the greatest part of the modern ideas of France."

ROBERT LISTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 26. Stockholm.—"As I am on the point of my departure from Stockholm, I propose to carry this letter with me at least as far as Elsinore, and I take the opportunity of adding a few words, without the encumbrance of cypher, to what I have formerly stated to your Lordship concerning the present situation of affairs in Sweden, and the system of administration adopted by the guardians of the young King.

"The Duke of Sudermania appears now to have abandoned himself entirely to the guidance of Baron Reuterholm, assisted by Baron Bonde, and Baron Staël de Holstein, formerly Ambassador at the Court of France.

"I have already had the honour of mentioning Monsieur de Reuterholm.

"Baron Bonde is a man of more art than ability, noted for his opposition to the late King, which he carried so far as to renounce his prospects of advancement in the military service rather than take the oath to the new government in 1789. He has long enjoyed the friendship and confidence of the Duke of Sudermania, and is deeply initiated in the mysteries of Freemasonry and the delusions of the modern illumination.

"Monsieur de Staël's character is probably known to your Lordship by information from another quarter. To me he appears to be a man of slender talents, great self-opinion, and a tiresome loquacity. The commonplace knowlege, however, which he has acquired in the diplomatic career has a certain effect on the Duke of Sudermania, who has not been accustomed either to speak or think much on the subject of politics.

"In ideas of republican liberty Monsieur de Staël is not behind the two others. The late King was so well acquainted with his sentiments, and thought the propagation of them so dangerous that, having ordered him to withdraw from Paris last year in consequence of the suspension of the royal functions, His Majesty had determined to arrest Monsieur de Staël on his arrival in Sweden, on pretence that he had exceeded his orders, which were to *leave France*, but not to proceed further.

"The empire which these gentlemen have acquired over the mind of the Duke of Sudermania accounts for the different colour which his government gradually assumes, and gives room to expect still farther and more consequential changes.

"It is thus that His Royal Highness on his first accession to the regency gave assurances to the public that the laws should have their course against the persons concerned in the murder of the King; but has since consented to alleviate the punishment of the principal offenders. The dissatisfaction which has been felt on this occasion through the country is more extensive and more violent than the Duke seems to be aware; but I beg leave to repeat what I have formerly said, that no serious consequences are likely to ensue. Some attempts were made by the populace in Scania to proceed to extremities against the conspirators, on their passage towards Denmark; but they were easily repressed by the governors of the towns. With the rest of the nation there remains a violent and inactive disapprobation, which will by degrees die away and vanish.

"It has been remarked, with a degree of truth, that greater favour has been shown to the managers of the plot than to the more distant participators in it:—that the destitution of office, and the temporary or perpetual imprisonment which is likely to be the lot of the other accomplices, is a more severe punishment than the simple necessity of leaving the country which has been imposed on Messieurs Ribbing, Horn, Liljehorn, and Ehrensvärd.

"But it is answered that their confinement and imprisonment in Sweden would have perpetuated the remembrance which it is the Duke's wish to efface, and have defeated His Royal Highness's great purpose of general and perfect reconciliation. It has been urged to the Duke that the example he has given of the impunity of regicide is of dangerous effect to the security of his own Government. His answer implied a severe censure of his late brother's administration: 'when Governors,' said he, 'are *strictly just*, it is my opinion that subjects will be loyal and quiet.'

"All those who aided or advised the late King, or who enjoyed any considerable share of his confidence, continue to be removed from the places of trust which they held under him. This is done, however, without any appearance of animosity. The usage of Sweden has been adhered to which forbids any man's being dismissed from the public service without being brought to a previous trial for misconduct. The confidential servants of the late monarch have been therefore advanced to stations of greater dignity, though perhaps less important or agreeable, such as honourable sinecures, or governments in the more distant provinces.

"It is now in agitation, however, to call to an account all those who were entrusted with any part of the public expenditure during the course of the late war. That great malversation took place in the different branches during that period is certain; but there is danger that, in the present moment, enquiry may degenerate into persecution.

"There is no doubt that the gentlemen who surround the Duke of Sudermania mean, if possible, to carry their republican theories respecting government into execution. The only question is when and how they propose to attempt it.

"It is said that Baron Reuterholm had wished immediately to assemble the States, on pretence of regulating matters of finance (in consequence of the discovery of some new debts which the late King had concealed from the Diet of Gefle) and that propositions were to have been brought forward for abolishing all the recent changes, and modelling the form of government to the general satisfaction of the nation.

"But if this overture was actually made by Monsieur de Reuterholm, who had long been absent from Sweden, it was felt by his co-operators that the state of affairs did not by any means make the measure advisable. In calling a Diet, and attempting changes in the Constitution, contrary to the express injunction of the late King's testament, the Duke seemed to contest and annul the only authority by which he himself was entitled to hold the reins of government. And had it been possible to effect alterations, the Acts passed on the subject during the minority of the King, would not have acquired the necessary stability. But the spirit of the country is at this moment so extremely averse to the class of nobility that any propositions made by them would most probably have been rejected. Indeed the great body of the people are too ignorant and too indifferent to find any fault with the innovations introduced by Gustavus the Third, or to wish for any change whatever in the Constitution. There is therefore reason to suppose that the attempt will be deferred till the King comes of age, and that, in the meantime, pains will be taken by the leaders of the Duke's government to pave the way for their projected ameliorations, by spreading information among the people, and endeavouring to acquire popularity for themselves.

"This will account for the issuing of the said edict in favour of the liberty of the Press, which was the more remarkable because the Duke, at the commencement of his regency, not only allowed the late King's prohibition of all newspapers and pamphlets relative to French affairs to remain in force, but requested the Foreign Ministers not to communicate to the people of the country the papers they might receive on that subject.

"To the same motives may be attributed other Ministerial publications; such as an edict abolishing the practice of kneeling before the King; a proclamation against luxury, in the language of admonition, not of command; and more of the same nature may be expected.

"With regard to foreign politics, I have on former occasions mentioned to your Lordship how little the Duke of Sudermania thought the situation of Sweden could justify her interfering in the affairs of France; and His Royal Highness has of late borrowed his sentiments on that subject so much from his conversations with Monsieur de Staël, that I am persuaded he would

now decline giving any assistance to Lewis the Sixteenth, even were the armies of Sweden ready to march, and her finances in the highest state of prosperity.

"His Royal Highness's advisers are on terms of great coldness with the Russian Ambassador; and I think I may add that they are disinclined to the alliance with Russia, and would look forward with pleasure to a change of system, could an ally be found of sufficient weight to balance the dreaded preponderance of that power.

"The Duke of Sudermania behaves to the young King with the affection, but at the same time with the authority of a parent. His Royal Highness says he found a degree of rigidity necessary from the manner in which the Prince had been treated by those that were placed about his person, who had taken care to let him know that he was a prince, but never made him feel that he was a man. The Duke adds he has now perfectly succeeded in repressing the nascent faults of character which were the consequence of this education.

"For the rest, the young Prince promises well. His person is handsome; his manners graceful; his politeness general yet distinguishing, and his conversation sensible beyond his years. His preceptors speak highly of his application, and his progress in his studies, and his dispositions appear to be excellent. If any defect is observable, it is perhaps a degree of reserve and timidity which he has inherited of the Queen his mother, but which begins to wear off as he advances in years."

1799, July.—MEMOIRE by H. FAGEL (*formerly Greffier*) in regard to the changes advisable in the old constitution of the Dutch Republic.

"Il est beaucoup plus facile d'indiquer les défauts auxquels l'ancienne constitution de la République des Provinces Unies étoit sujette, que de hazarder une opinion sur les remèdes qu'on pourroit y apporter.

"Cette constitution avoit des défauts qui lui étoient communs avec toutes les formes de gouvernement fédératives; mais elle en avoit d'autres qui étoient intimement liés à l'histoire de sa formation, et à la nature du gouvernement qui existoit dans les Provinces, du temps qu'elles étoient encore sous la domination de l'Espagne. Il résulte de là qu'il est très-difficile de corriger ces défauts sans toucher à des institutions plus anciennes que la République même. Il seroit aisé de la prouver, mais cela entraîneroit dans trop de détails, et l'on se contentera ici des observations suivantes.

"*L'Union d'Utrecht* a toujours été regardée comme la loi fondamentale sur laquelle la constitution de la République de Provinces Unies est fondée. Si l'on remonte aux temps où cette Union fut conclue, et aux circonstances qui l'amenerent, on verra qu'on ne songea point dans ce temps-là à établir une constitution, mais qu'on eut simplement en vue de conclure un

traité ; par lequel les Provinces et villes qui y prirent part fixèrent les mesures les plus propres à donner toute la consistance possible à leurs communs efforts contre le Roi d'Espagne, avec qui elles étoient en guerre. Si l'intention des auteurs de ce traité, particulièrement du Prince Guillaume d'Orange, un des plus grands hommes d'état de son siècle, avoit été de jeter les fondemens d'une République, ou s'ils avoient pu prévoir seulement que cette ligue serviroit un jour de base à la consitution d'un état destiné à jouer un rôle parmi les principales puissances de l'Europe, il n'est pas douteux qu'ils n'eussent fait adopter un plan tout différent.

“ Tant que la guerre contre l'Espagne et la présence d'un danger imminent et commun firent sentir aux Provinces la nécessité d'une Union intime, c'est à dire tant que durèrent les circonstances et les motifs qui avoient donné lieu à l'Union d'Utrecht, on ne s'aperçut guères de ses inconvéniens. Plusieurs causes contribuerent à les rendre moins sensibles, et ce ne fut sûrement pas une des moindres que l'influence des trois Princes de la Maison d'Orange qui commandèrent successivement avec tant de gloire l'armée de cette République naissante. Le père aussi bien que les deux fils avoient reçu en partage de la nature tout ce qu'il faut pour commander avec succès aux hommes, et leur influence au-dedans fut certainement proportionnée aux services importans qu'ils rendoient à l'état au-dehors.

“ Lorsque l'indépendance de la République fut reconnue par le Traité de Munster en 1648, et après la mort du Prince Guillaume II. d'Orange, les suites de l'union imparfaite des Provinces devinrent plus apparentes. Elles s'étoient déjà fait sentir pendant les négociations qui précédèrent la trêve de 12-ans, mais on les remarqua bien davantage d'abord après la paix de Westphalie. On en vit la preuve dans la convocation, et plus encore dans le résultat peu satisfaisant de la *Grande Assemblée* de 1651. Cependant le génie de De Witt, et ensuite celui du Roi Guillaume comprimerent les élémens de discorde toujours prêts à se développer, et réussirent en dirigeant les volontés vers le même but, à maintenir une autorité prépondérante au-dedans, et à faire respecter la République au-dehors. Elle atteignit certainement le plus haut période de sa gloire dans l'intervalle qui s'écoula entre la paix de Westphalie et celle d'Utrecht.

“ D'abord, après la mort du Roi Guillaume en 1702, mais plus encore après la paix d'Utrecht, les mêmes inconvéniens dont on s'étoit déjà plaint reprirent le dessus. Ils donnerent lieu à la convocation d'une seconde *Assemblée extraordinaire* en 1707, qui se sépara tout aussi infructueusement que la première. Le mal augmenta jusqu'en 1748, et le mécontentement général qui en resulta, joint à d'autres causes et à l'amour qu'une grande partie de la nation a toujours porté à la maison d'Orange, occasionna le rétablissement du Stadhoudérat, qui eut lieu dans cette année. Depuis lors les mêmes causes ont continué à produire les mêmes effets, et dans les derniers temps qui ont précédé l'invasion des François en 1795, le manque d'union entre les confédérés, et

surtout d'énergie dans le Gouvernement avoient tellement pris le dessus, que ce qu'il y a eu de surprenant n'a pas été le renversement de l'édifice, mais de l'avoir vu résister aussi longtemps à la destruction qui le menaçoit.

"Le sentiment des imperfections et de la faiblesse du Gouvernement, tel qu'il existoit avant cette époque, a produit et devoit nécessairement produire le désir d'un changement quelconque. Ce désir est devenu fort général, et a donné naissance à plusieurs projets, surtout depuis que la destruction totale de l'ancien Gouvernement à la suite de la révolution de 1795 semble avoir laissé le champ libre aux amateurs de ces sortes de spéculations. Aujourd'hui que l'apparence d'un changement favorable dans l'état politique de la Hollande augmente de jour en jour, on doit s'attendre de plus en plus à de nouveaux plans de cette espèce. Il y aura autant de projets que d'individus qui se croiront appelés à en faire. Il est facile aussi de prévoir que des vues personnelles influenceront sur ces plans, de même que sur l'opposition qu'ils pourront rencontrer. Malheureusement l'intérêt particulier a toujours prévalu dans les Provinces-Unies sur le bien public. Plusieurs personnes parlent de la constitution Angloise, et de l'avantage qu'il y auroit à l'adopter. Il semble qu'il ne sauroit y avoir (aujourd'hui surtout) qu'une seule opinion sur l'excellence de cette constitution. Mais ceux qui la vantent indistinctement, et qui voudroient la voir établie partout, n'ont peut-être pas assez réfléchi à son origine et à sa formation. Elle est, pour ainsi dire, née avec le pays dont elle fait le bonheur; c'est une production de son sol, qui s'est développée peu-à-peu, qui n'a atteint que lentement, après bien des épreuves et des secousses, le degré de perfection où elle est maintenant parvenue; et qui, transplantée sur un terroir étranger, ne réussiroit peut-être pas également bien. Dans tout pays une bonne constitution doit être avant tout conforme aux usages, aux mœurs, aux loix, et au caractère des habitans: elle doit leur avoir été, pour ainsi dire, transmise de père en fils, formée, réparée et perfectionnée pas les mêmes mains. Ces vérités, établies sur la nature des choses, sont confirmées par l'expérience, et celle de nos jours a suffisamment prouvé quel fond l'on peut faire sur les constitutions qui n'ont que la seule théorie pour base. Cela n'empêche pas qu'on ne puisse s'approprier avec fruit les modèles avantageux qu'offrent des gouvernemens différens du notre, en les adaptant autant qu'il est possible au génie de la constitution qu'on veut perfectionner.

"D'après ces principes on est fondé à croire qu'il faudroit dans les Provinces-Unies tirer de leur ancienne constitution même les remèdes à ses défauts. Il n'est pas inutile de remarquer à ce sujet qu'un des caractères distinctifs de la nation Hollandoise est son attachement à ses anciennes loix, à ses usages, et jusqu'aux préjugés que ses ancêtres lui ont transmis. En modifiant les institutions auxquelles elle a été jusqu'à présent accoutumée, il faudroit éviter autant que possible d'en altérer les formes ou les dénominations. Ce sont des mots, mais des mots auxquels la nation attache d'anciennes idées de

bonheur et de prospérité. Si on les changeoit, il est à craindre que la masse du peuple (surtout après ce qu'il vient d'éprouver en fait d'innovations) ne se prévint dès l'origine contre des établissemens utiles en eux-mêmes, et que cette prévention ne rendit illusoirs les avantages que de pareils changemens pourroient d'ailleurs produire.

“ De l'autre côté il est évident que l'époque du renversement du Gouvernement révolutionnaire actuel sera singulièrement favorable à l'introduction de tous les changemens avantageux qu'on voudra faire, et qu'il sera de la dernière importance de ne pas laisser échapper une occasion pareille sans en profiter. Le gros de la nation est las au dernier point du joug insupportable sous lequel elle a gémi depuis plus de quatre ans. Tout changement lui paroitra un bien, surtout sous les heureux auspices du retour et du rétablissement de la maison d'Orange. Elle accueillera avec faveur et empressement ce qui lui sera présenté comme propre à affermir une autorité qu'elle regarde avec raison comme salutaire et bienfaisante. L'intérêt personnel pourra seul élever un cri contre de semblables propositions. Mais comme l'établissement d'un nouvel ordre de choses ne pourra s'effectuer que par l'intervention d'une force étrangère, l'on a lieu d'espérer (et l'on doit le souhaiter ardemment) que cette force sera utilement employée à faire adopter, sans s'arrêter à aucunes considérations particulières ou personnelles, les mesures les plus propres à assurer le bien-être général. Si alors (comme on a lieu de s'en flatter) les modifications proposées obtiennent l'assentiment de la partie éclairée de la nation, il ne sera pas à craindre qu'au bout de quelques années, et du changement de circonstances qu'un semblable intervalle manque rarement d'amener, on ne se plaigne des changemens introduits comme étant l'ouvrage de la force, et ayant été imposés à la nation contre son gré.

“ Pour se faire quelqu'idée des principaux défauts de l'ancienne constitution il suffit de se rappeler que la République étoit composée de sept Provinces Souveraines et Indépendantes, dont les Députés, formant l'assemblée des Etats-Généraux, avoient la représentation de l'autorité souveraine de l'Union, sans en avoir ni la réalité, ni même aucun des véritables caractères. En vertu de l'*Union d'Utrecht* il falloit dans toutes les affaires importantes le consentement unanime des états de toutes les Provinces, et la majorité ne decidoit que dans les affaires ordinaires. Les pouvoirs des Députés aux Etats-Généraux étant très-limités, on étoit obligé d'avoir continuellement recours à ceux des Provinces. Délà ces délibérations interminables, cette nécessité de tout prendre *ad referendum*, et l'extrême difficulté, pour ne pas dire l'impossibilité, de parvenir dans les objets qui touchoient de plus près au salut de l'état à un résultat satisfaisant. Un des points les plus essentiels que les Provinces s'étoient réservées, et où l'unanimité étoit absolument requise, c'étoit la détermination du *quantum* des dépenses générales, auxquelles chaque Province devoit fournir sa quote-part. Il étoit presque impossible, dans ces sortes d'affaires, de parvenir à une conclusion quelconque. Et malheureusement

les inconvéniens ne se borneraient pas là. En supposant que toutes les Provinces eussent consenti à certaines dépenses, et que chacune d'elles se fut engagée à fournir son contingent, il arrivoit presque toujours qu'elles mettoient de grands rétards dans leurs payemens, et très-souvent ne payoient point du tout. Et comme chacune d'elles étoit souveraine, et l'autorité des Etats-Généraux très-limitée, il n'existoit dans la République aucun pouvoir qui put contraindre les membres de l'union à remplir leurs engagements. Les mêmes imperfections se trouvoient en grande partie dans le gouvernement intérieur de chaque Province, fondé sur le même principe. Seulement, comme les membres qui composoient les Etats des Provinces étoient en plus grand nombre, et leur composition à d'autres égards plus compliquée, la difficulté de parvenir à une conclusion étoit quelquefois encore plus grande dans les Etats des Provinces, qu'à l'assemblée des Etats-Généraux. A ces défauts essentiels de la constitution s'en joignoit un autre dont les conséquences n'étoient pas moins nuisibles. Les commissions des Députés des Provinces aux Etats-Généraux et aux autres *Collèges de la Généralité*, n'étant que pour un terme assez court de 3 ou 6 ans, ces Députés ne perdoient presque jamais de vue l'intérêt de leur Province, ou même de la ville à laquelle ils appartenoient et où ils devoient un jour retourner, et y sacrifioient d'ordinaire le bien général. Un autre inconvénient essentiel de ce régime c'est que le gouvernement se trouvoit entre les mains d'un très grand nombre d'individus, qui tous avoient en principe des droits égaux. L'autorité ainsi divisée et, pour ainsi dire, éparpillée, étoit nécessairement affoiblie. Chacun croyoit avoir un égal droit de diriger les mesures du gouvernement; tous vouloient être consultés; tous étoient mécontents s'ils ne l'étoient point; et très-souvent il resultoit de ce mécontentement, qu'ils prenoient à tâche de contrecarrer autant qu'il étoit en leur pouvoir, et par de petits moyens, les résolutions les plus propres à avancer le bien-être général.

“ Ce tableau n'est qu'une esquisse très-imparfaite des défauts de l'ancien Gouvernement. Ils se faisoient surtout sentir dans les affaires générales de la République, et dans ses relations extérieures. On peut dire avec vérité que dans aucun pays du monde les individus ne jouissoient de plus de liberté, ne gutoient plus en paix et avec plus d'aisance et de douceur les fruits de leur industrie; que nulle part l'action du Gouvernement sur les gouvernés ne se faisoit moins sentir; mais que nulle part aussi le gouvernement, considéré dans son ensemble, et dans ses rapports avec d'autres puissances, n'étoit plus déstitué de force, de considération, et de moyens de s'en procurer.

“ Les vices de la constitution fédérative des Provinces-Unies sautoient tellement aux yeux qu'on a souvent proposé des remèdes, surtout dans les intervalles où la République a été sans Stadhouder. Mais ces remèdes n'ont jamais été adoptés qu'en partie, l'intérêt personnel ayant toujours fait rejeter tout ce qui pouvoit tendre à couper la racine du mal. A dire vrai, les expédiens qui ont été proposés en divers temps, même par les

hommes les plus éclairés, et qui ont le mieux connu l'origine du Gouvernement, son histoire, et ses imperfections, n'ont été que des palliatifs. Le *Stadhouderat* a été considéré de tout temps comme le seul véritable remède. L'expérience a prouvé que dans les époques où la République a eu un Stadhouder à sa tête, les défauts de sa constitution se sont fait beaucoup moins sentir ; et il n'est pas douteux qu'en supposant que les charges éminentes dont les derniers Princes de la Maison d'Orange ont été revêtus soient remplies avec toute l'activité et l'énergie nécessaires, l'influence qui en accompagne l'exercice suffiroit seule pour obvier en grande partie aux inconvéniens indiqués ci-dessus. D'un autre côté il est certain que cette influence ne remédie pas à l'origine du mal ; elle sert plutôt à en prévenir les effets ; et si l'on pouvoit profiter d'un moment comme celui-ci pour tarir quelques-unes de ses sources, il est très sûr qu'on rendroit un service signalé à l'état.

“ Plus on y réfléchit, plus on est porté à croire que le seul moyen *efficace* d'atteindre ce but, en touchant aussi peu que possible à l'ancienne constitution des Provinces et de leurs Etats, ainsi qu'aux privilèges des différens membres qui les composent, seroit de restreindre autant que possible l'autorité des Etats des Provinces, en la bornant aux fonctions administratives, et d'augmenter dans la même proportion celle des Etats-Généraux. Il seroit trop long de développer entièrement cette idée, et il faut sans doute s'attendre à des difficultés de détail dans l'exécution. Mais quel est le plan qui n'en présente point ? et l'on croit pouvoir affirmer que celui-ci n'en renferme pas d'insurmontables. Il faudroit, à ce qu'il semble, établir pour base ; que les Provinces renonçassent expressément au droit de délibérer sur les affaires qui intéressent la généralité de l'Union ; qu'elles se soumissent sans réserve, et sans restriction quelconque, à la décision de la majorité de leurs Députés aux Etats-Généraux ; et qu'à cet effet, elles munissent ceux-ci de pouvoirs illimités pour tous les objets relatifs à l'ensemble de la République. Dès lors la nécessité de prendre toutes les affaires majeures *ad referendum* n'existeroit plus ; et les délibérations des Etats-Généraux ne seroient plus entravées comme elles l'étoient autrefois.

“ Il est sûr qu'au premier abord il paroitroit préférable d'abolir entièrement la distinction des Provinces, et de former d'un certain nombre de Députés choisis dans tout le pays, une *Assemblée Générale*. Mais cette mesure auroit l'inconvénient essentiel de changer entièrement la face des choses ; et les privilèges des différens corps qui composent les Etats, des villes, des corps des nobles seroient annulés, ce qui donneroit lieu à beaucoup de plaintes. En conservant les Etats des Provinces, leur composition pourroit aussi rester à-peu-près telle qu'elle est. L'administration intérieure de chaque Province, la fixation des charges nécessaires pour le fournissement des sommes consenties par les Etats-Généraux pour le service de l'Union, occuperoient utilement toute leur attention, et ces objets seroient même mieux réglés dans des assemblées provinciales que dans toute

autre. Les privilèges des individus et des corporations seroient maintenus, et l'objet principal se trouveroit rempli. L'union d'Utrecht continueroit à faire la base de la constitution : il seroit même à désirer, qu'en adoptant les changemens proposés, les Provinces renouvellassent ce pacte solennel.

“ La plus forte objection qu'on puisse faire à ce plan seroit, qu'en l'adoptant, les Provinces les moins riches et les moins puissantes seroient en état, en obtenant la majorité, de faire prévaloir leurs avis contre celui des membres les plus considérables de l'Union. Mais il y auroit plus d'un moyen de lever cette difficulté. Peut-être pourroit-on établir que chaque Province enverroit aux Etats-Généraux un nombre de Députés proportionné à ses richesses et à ses facultés, en prenant pour base la quote-part de cette Province, telle qu'elle avoit été fixée en dernier lieu ; et qu'alors les Députés aux Etats-Généraux voteroient par tête. Peut-être aussi pourroit-on laisser subsister l'ancienne manière de voter en assignant à chaque province un nombre de votes dans la même proportion. Afin de rendre encore plus efficace l'obligation des Provinces de se soumettre en matières de finances au voeu de la majorité, on pourroit statuer, comme c'étoit clairement l'intention des auteurs de l'Union d'Utrecht, que les mêmes impôts seroient levés dans toutes les Provinces, et que chaque Province seroit tenue de fournir au trésor-général de l'Union la somme à laquelle elle auroit été imposée par les Etats-Généraux, avant de faire aucun autre paiement. En tout cas il faudroit établir comme un principe invariable, que les Provinces fourniroient au trésor, ou à la caisse générale de l'Union, les sommes requises pour les dépenses de l'Union : qu'en conséquence cette caisse seroit chargée de tous les payemens qui regardent la généralité de l'Union, et que ceci seroit en particulier applicable au payement de l'armée ; moyennant quoi tous les payemens des Provinces aux régimens ou corps qui se trouvoient (comme on avoit coutume de dire) *sur leur repartition*, cesseroient, avec toutes les conséquences nuisibles qui cet arrangement entraînoit.

“ Le serment particulier que les troupes prêtoient aux Etats des Provinces devoit aussi cesser. L'armée ne devoit en prêter qu'aux Etats-Généraux. Elle devoit d'ailleurs être absolument aux ordres du Capitaine-Général ; et le droit connu sous le nom de *Droit des Patentes* devoit être laissé au Capitaine-Général dans toute son étendue, et sans restriction quelconque.

“ En général l'autorité du Stadhouder devoit être augmentée et fortifiée par tous les moyens possibles, et le *pouvoir exécutif*, trop confondu dans l'ancien ordre de choses avec l'autorité législative, devoit être concentré dans ses mains. Le Stadhouder dans cette qualité a toujours été regardé comme le *chef éminent* de la République. C'étoit le nom que la constitution lui donnoit. Le bien de l'état exige absolument qu'il le soit en réalité, et non pas seulement en apparence. C'est à lui à diriger la marche du gouvernement, à donner l'impulsion et non à recevoir, et à proposer et à indiquer les mesures du gouvernement. En un mot le Stadhouder doit être l'ame de ce corps

politique : plus il contribuera à lui donner de la vie et du mouvement, plus le but auquel cette haute dignité est destinée sera près d'être rempli.

“ Par une suite de ce qu'on vient de dire, la direction et le maniement des affaires étrangères devraient être exclusivement confiées au Stadhouder. C'est un des points de vue sous lesquels l'utilité du régime Stadhoudérien se fait le plus sentir ; et c'étoit aussi, sous l'ancien gouvernement, un des objets qui avoit le plus indispensablement besoin de réforme. Avant la dernière révolution de 1795, le désordre à cet égard en étoit venu au point que tout ce qui avoit part de près ou de loin au gouvernement prétendoit être en droit de prendre connoissance des affaires les plus secrettes. On étoit obligé de communiquer les papiers les plus importans aux membres mêmes les moins prépondérans des Assemblées Provinciales. Ceci devoit de toute nécessité être changé. Le Ministre particulièrement chargé de ce département devoit être, sous ce rapport, en relation directe avec le Stadhouder seul. Il est indispensable d'abolir ces *Comités* soi-disant *secrets*, où toutes les lettres des Ministres de la République aux Cours étrangères étoient lues, et au moyen desquels les affaires dont le secret importait le plus à l'Etat, étoient divulguées au bout de peu de jours. Si l'Assemblée des Etats-Généraux étoit constituée comme il a été proposé plus haut, il pourroit y avoir un Comité permanent pour les affaires étrangères, ayant à-peu-près les mêmes attributions que l'ancienne *Bésogne secrète*, à laquelle les dépêches qu'on jugeroit devoir être communiquées, pourroient l'être de l'aveu du Stadhouder ; et lequel Comité, ayant à sa tête le Prince d'Orange dans cette qualité, pourroit prendre, en cas de besoin, les résolutions urgentes, sauf à en faire rapport aux Etats-Généraux lorsqu'on le jugeroit nécessaire.

“ La direction de la Marine ne sauroit pas non plus être laissée sur le pied où elle étoit avant 1795. La nécessité de l'abolition des cinq Amirautés, telles qu'elles existoient encore alors, et de l'établissement d'un seul *conseil de Marine* séant à la Haye, sous les yeux de l'Amiral-Général, est aujourd'hui tellement démontrée que, malgré l'intérêt personnel des Régens, il est peu probable qu'il s'élève une seule voix en faveur de l'ancien établissement. Le projet de confier au Conseil d'Etat la direction des finances de l'Amirauté paroît très-bon.

“ Outre les grands changemens qui viennent d'être indiqués, il y en est certainement plusieurs autres qui, quoique moins importans, seroient cependant d'une grande utilité. Tels seroient : la séparation des autorités judiciaire et administrative dans tous les *collèges*, soit provinciaux soit de la Généralité, où ces deux pouvoirs étoient ci-devant combinés : l'établissement d'une cour de justice suprême pour l'Union : l'introduction d'un serment par lequel les Députés aux Etats-Generaux, et aux autres *collèges de la Généralité*, s'engageroient, en entrant en fonction, de ne consulter que l'intérêt général, abstraction faite de celui de la province ou de la ville à laquelle ils appartiendroient.

Les changemens introduits dans l'Assemblée des Etats-Généraux en rendroient peut-être quelques-uns nécessaires dans celles des Etats Provinciaux. Mais ces objets seroient bien aisés à régler, si une fois on étoit convenu des grandes reformes, et il est inutile de prolonger ce mémoire en entrant ces détails.

“ Il se présente enfin une grande question ; c'est de déterminer le mode et la forme qu'on emploiera pour proposer et faire agréer les changemens qu'on jugera nécessaires. Cela demande certainement un mur examen. On se contentera ici d'une seule remarque, c'est qu'il est infiniment à désirer qu'on fasse adopter dans le plus court délai possible les changemens qu'on proposera. Il est à prévoir qu'il pourra être question à cet effet d'une assemblée extraordinaire de Députés de toutes les Provinces. Cette voye sera peut-être jugée la plus convenable. Mais si, dans ce cas là, on ne fixe pas un terme aux délibérations d'une telle assemblée, il est fort à craindre qu'après avoir trainé en longueur, elles ne se terminent sans fruit. L'histoire de la République offre plusieurs exemples qui justifient cette crainte, et rien ne seroit plus facheux, parceque la première ferveur qui suivra une révolution étant passée, les anciens préjugés, les anciens intérêts, et les anciennes passions reprendroient le dessus, et le moment favorable seroit passé sans retour.”

(Enclosure of Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, Oct. 22, Vienna.)

MEMORANDUM by PRINCE ITALISKY, COUNT SOUVAROW RYMNITSKI.

1799, October 14. Feldkirchen.—*Beau et Bon*.—“ Ainsi notre opération sur *Allstädten*, *Saint Gall*, excellemment belle, mais pas bonne ! C'est celle d'Alvintzy derrière *Peschiera* ; c'est la dernière de Zurich.

1. “ Les Russes manquent de forces, vêtements, magasins.

2. “ Ils doivent combattre plusieurs fois sur des terrains arides, montaigneux, et dangereux, perdant conséquemment du monde, dont il en reste peu avant de parvenir à *Winterthur*.

3. “ Massena n'a nulle raison de nous y attendre pour nous battre en détail avec toutes ses forces. Il se jettera sur Korsakoff, qu'il approchera de plus près, puis sur Condé, et déjà il lui en serait allés.

“ Il faut donc changer de plan. Weyrother me fera l'amitié d'écrire à l'Archiduc Charles dans un style court, solide, et bien raisonné—et si on pouvait, il faut tâcher de se mettre même aujourd' hui encore en mouvement, si l'on ne f[ait] même que deux lieues de marche.”

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REPORT

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OF

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THIS Report has been prepared and edited, on behalf of the
Historical Manuscripts Commissioners, by Mr. Walter Fitzpatrick.
The Index has been compiled by Miss M. H. Roberts.

INTRODUCTION.

THE letters and reports contained in Volume VI. of the *Dropmore Papers* embrace a period of one year and five months—from November 1, 1799, to March 31, 1801. They conclude the histories, so far as these are related in Lord Grenville's confidential correspondence, of the second coalition against France, and the passing of the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland, begun in Volume IV. and continued in Volume V. Volume IV. records the formation of the coalition and the abortive attempt to carry an Act of Union through the Irish Parliament early in 1799. Volume V. relates mainly to the Continental campaigns of 1799. Volume VI. deals with the secession of Russia from the coalition; the new alliance of Great Britain and Austria; the abolition of the Irish Legislature in 1800; the negotiations and military operations of Bonaparte and of the allies during the same year; the peace of Luneville and the resignation of Pitt's first ministry, in February, 1801.

The radical weakness of the coalition, its want of cohesion and concord, has been explained in the Introductions of the two preceding volumes; how the British and Austrian Governments, while both leaning on the support of the Tzar, formed their plans not only without mutual communication, but in a spirit of antagonism to each other. Owing in large measure to Russian aid, Austrian plans were crowned with success beyond all expectation; British plans, notwithstanding Russian aid, ended in complete failure. We shall now see how that success and that failure contributed about equally to the disruption of the coalition as originally formed; and how by their mutual antagonism the British and Austrian Governments not only flung away a fair opportunity of accomplishing all their aims in conflict with the French Revolution, but gave the Revolution, in its completed form, of military despotism, an opportunity of establishing its supremacy in Europe for fifteen years.

The discord of England and Austria which had such disastrous results was not an effect of any irreconcilable divergence of principles or interests. It was the outcome of forty years of political estrangement, followed by four years of distrustful and unprosperous alliance, during which all the dislikes, suspicions, and prejudices of unfriendly tradition became incarnate in two able and strong-willed ministers who directed the foreign relations of the two monarchies. The transference of the Spanish Netherlands to the Emperor by the treaty of Utrecht, and the Dutch Barrier Treaty four years later, were arrangements made in the interests of England and the Dutch Republic to secure the Belgic provinces against annexation by France. But Austrian statesmen from the first

regarded the acquisition of those provinces as a burden and a danger. Their ordinary revenues hardly defrayed the expenses of government, even in times of peace. Their old constitutions and privileges, guaranteed by the treaty of Utrecht, gave them immunity from arbitrary taxation, and the possession of them involved constant peril of war with a powerful and ambitious neighbour. Partly as a means of escape from this situation, also, perhaps, in the hope of being enabled by the aid of France to exchange the Belgic provinces for Bavaria with the Elector Palatine, the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa, under the guidance of Prince Kaunitz, entered into the ill-omened alliance with Louis XV., which was cemented by the marriage of the Dauphin with her daughter, Marie Antoinette. This new grouping of European powers proved in various ways hurtful to England. It took away from her an old and powerful confederate against France; and the security it afforded for continental peace allowed the French Government, during the war of American Independence, to diminish its army and enlarge its navy. At the same time it encouraged the Emperor Joseph II. to give free rein to the ill-regulated ambition and restless spirit of innovation which, in a few years, brought the Austrian monarchy to the brink of ruin. In order to extend his authority in the Netherlands, and having nothing to fear from the House of Bourbon, he not only expelled the Dutch garrisons and demolished the barrier fortresses which defended the Belgic provinces on the side of France, but, by systematic violations of their civil and religious rights, drove the Belgians to open revolt. The fatuity of his proceedings, which imperilled the chief benefit derived by England from Marlborough's victories, was only fully seen a few years later, when the French Revolution assumed a militant and aggressive character under Girondin guidance; and Joseph's successor, Leopold II., found himself exposed, both as sovereign of the Netherlands and as brother-in-law of Louis XVI., to the first assaults of Jacobin hostility. Leopold, an able and prudent ruler, contrived by skilful management to convert Joseph's most formidable antagonist, Frederick William II., King of Prussia, into an ally against the French Revolution. But as this statesmanlike policy drew away the Prussian king from the Triple Alliance, and Pitt's short-lived system of non-interference in the internal affairs of France, it gave deep offence in England. It is, indeed, a striking proof of the strength of English prejudice against Austria that, on the very eve of the Revolutionary war, the most pacific prince and the most conservative in his policy among the sovereigns of his time, figures in Lord Grenville's correspondence as the most dangerous enemy of the peace of Europe.

Leopold died before war broke out, in 1792; Prince Kaunitz retired from the political stage; and the reins of Austrian government fell to the hands of Baron Thugut. England joined the coalition of German powers after the conquest of the Netherlands by Dumouriez in the autumn of 1792, dragging reluctant Holland in her wake, and infused a fiercer spirit into the war. From the beginning of their new association against France the relations of

England and Austria were a perpetual jar. In the campaign of 1792 the confederate powers, still governed by the spirit of the Emperor Leopold, had invaded France as allies of a dethroned sovereign against revolted subjects. But memories of the war of American Independence were as yet too recent and bitter to allow of any feeling of sympathy for the House of Bourbon finding admittance into the minds of George III. and the majority of Englishmen. They seem at this moment to have regarded France as an old and implacable foe in which revolution was only a new phase of wickedness, and which, whatever form of government it might choose to adopt, must, in the interests of England, be reduced to impotence. During the year 1793, George III. would not allow either brother of Louis XVI. to set foot in any part of his dominions. And the British Government was able to stamp its own policy on the coalition. The plan of campaign for 1793 proposed at Vienna was a combined march of all the forces of the allied powers on Paris—the English from the insurgent provinces of the west; the Germans from the east; the Spaniards and Sardinians from the Appennines and the Alps—to crush the Revolution in its stronghold and dictate terms of peace to France. But the English and Dutch Governments insisted on making the expulsion of the French from the Netherlands the main object of the campaign; and, as the King of Prussia took the side of the power he intended to make his paymaster, Thugut had to give way. A few months later Lord Auckland, representing England at the conference at Antwerp, carried a resolution that no peace should be made with France that did not provide “indemnity for the past and security for the future.” This resolution altered the character of the war. Begun in 1792 for the defence of monarchy and the order it symbolised, the war became in 1793 a scheme of partition. By this new programme, when the French had been expelled from the Netherlands, and that country had been more effectually secured against future aggression, the British Government was to employ its forces in destroying the naval arsenals and commerce and capturing the colonies of France; while its allies found compensation in stripping the common enemy of the territories she had annexed in Europe since the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV. And under pressure from England the Emperor agreed to relinquish all purpose of exchanging Belgium for Bavaria on condition that the Belgic frontier should be extended to the River Somme. This was Dundas’s policy, warmly approved by the King, and adopted by the Cabinet.* The War Minister himself advocated it as “the only practical policy,” on the ground that the Parliament and people of England could only be induced to bear the burthens of the conflict by showing them that the profit exceeded the loss. Mr. Windham afterwards described the system of his colleague as one of “plunder abroad and patronage at home.” Pushed too far, it saved the French Revolution. Early in August, Valenciennes and Tournay having surrendered to the allies and General Dampierre’s army having been driven in complete rout from the lines of Famars and from Cæsar’s camp, the campaign reached its crisis. France, convulsed

* Introduction to Volume III., Dropmore Papers.

with civil war from end to end, had no longer a force in the field which could resist invasion. The Royalists were victorious in the West. In most other departments, Federalists and adherents of the Mountain were locked in a death-grapple. Lyons, Bourdeaux, Marseilles, and Toulon had risen in revolt against the Jacobin yoke of Paris. In these circumstances the Prince of Coburg, Austrian Commander-in-Chief, following instructions from Vienna, proposed to march with the full strength of the allied forces on the French capital, and thus finish the war. But the privateers of Dunkirk had been preying on the commerce of London; and in deference to the clamour of the city, Dundas sent positive orders to the Duke of York to take that little sea-port, for the benefit of England, before engaging in any larger operations. As a result of these orders, the allied armies separated in order to fritter away their strength and spirit in petty sieges, which brought them disgrace. The generals quarrelled and sulked in winter quarters; while the Committee of Public Safety worked with revolutionary energy, rallying to its standard the patriotism and national spirit of France to save the country from dismemberment. The opportunity thus lost did not return. And from this date it seems to have become a maxim with Austrian statesmen that selfishness was the governing motive of all British policy.

It was only in 1795, when the allied armies had been driven across the Rhine; when Prussia and Spain had abandoned the coalition; when the Emperor could not equip another army, that Pitt, having to face the alternative of resigning the Netherlands to France, entertained the idea of alliance with Austria on any basis of financial aid. He had granted a large subsidy to Prussia in 1794, which King Frederick William spent in partitioning Poland; and he would willingly have renewed it in 1795, with some safeguard against misapplication. But in treating with the Emperor, it was only after long hesitation, and with manifest reluctance, that he consented to guarantee an Austrian loan of £4,400,000. Help thus afforded at a high rate of interest, and asserting a right to criticise and direct the operations of Austrian armies, excited no gratitude, and much irritation. And relations requiring easy and delicate handling were only too likely to become strained to the point of breaking in the tenacious grasp of Lord Grenville or Baron Thugut.

Baron Thugut had risen from low beginnings, by eminent merit, the appreciation of successive sovereigns and good fortune, to the highest position in Germany open to a subject not belonging to a sovereign house. The Empress-Queen, his earliest patron, as we are told, changed his name from Thu-na-gut (do no good) to Thugut (do good). His ascent to power was greatly facilitated by an unusual dearth of conspicuous talent among Austrian officials; and he seems to have been finally lifted into the office of Imperial Vice-Chancellor by the strong recommendation of Count Mercy d'Argenteau, whose own claims to it, from long and distinguished service, were pre-eminent. In that high post his superior ability, knowledge, and assiduity quickly won for him the entire confidence of the young and inexperienced Emperor Francis II.,² and complete control over the Councils of the Empire. This splendid

position was not a bed of roses. Austria, slowly recovering from the disasters that closed the career of Joseph II., found itself prominently engaged in a war against France, with several doubtful allies, and not a single friend. After the Emperor Leopold's death, the King of Prussia, freed from the ascendancy of that able statesman, broke the engagements he had contracted with Austria in order to aggrandize himself in Germany and Poland. This conduct rekindled the jealous rivalries of the leading German powers, which Leopold's skilful policy for a time extinguished. England, long estranged from Austria, did not conceal a preference for Prussia. Catherine II. of Russia, intent on projects of her own in Turkey and Poland which clashed with Austrian interests, gave no support against France. At home the aspect of affairs was hardly more propitious for the Minister. Hatred and fear of the French Revolution made Francis II. and Thugut eager in pursuing the war; the latter impelled by personal ambition as well as by political conviction, though unaffected by any of the motives of religion and kinship which animated the Emperor. But all classes of the Austrian population would have gladly purchased peace by ceding the Netherlands to France. And a proud and powerful aristocracy which filled the chief offices at Court, and nearly all high public employments, looked with scorn and aversion on the low-born adventurer who had climbed into the seat of Prince Kaunitz; and lost no opportunity of thwarting a policy which kept him in power.

We have sketches of Baron Thugut in Lord Grenville's correspondence by different hands. There is a general agreement as to the leading features of his character, but in some pictures the shading is much darker than in others. His career does not entitle him to take rank as a great minister with Kaunitz or Metternich, who filled the same office before and after him; but his great ability, his unwearied industry, his intense devotion to what he believed to be the interests of his sovereign and country, were not denied by candid enemies. On the other hand, the exercise of supreme authority and the impediments, personal as well as public, which he had to encounter, seem to have brought out into greater prominence the defects of a strenuous, vehement, astute, but not lofty nature. His appetite for power grew with the possession of it. He showed himself daily more eager to concentrate the whole direction of the affairs of the monarchy in his own hands; more jealous of possible rivals; more wanting in the patience and self-restraint which Pitt considered the most essential element of statesmanship. Leading a joyless and lonely life, absorbed by cares of state and secluded in what Suvorow called his "infernal cavern," his temper grew sullen and morose. In political conflict he was cunning and unscrupulous. Rubbed against the grain, thwarted in a favourite project, he became obstinate and vindictive, and even reckless of the welfare of the State in order to gratify his spleen. Mr. Wickham, who disliked Thugut as the enemy of Archduke Charles, and made a close and severely critical study of him during several visits to Vienna in 1800, described him as being easily provoked in discussion to indiscreet bursts of anger, during which he blurted out secrets highly damaging to himself. According to the same authority

passion more often than policy governed the old statesman's public conduct. On the other hand, both Sir Morton Eden and Lord Minto, who as resident Ministers at Vienna had more opportunities of forming an impartial judgment, seem not only to have conceived for the Austrian Chancellor genuine admiration and regard, but to have found themselves, often to the great dissatisfaction of the English Foreign Office, in general agreement with his political views. Much also in Thugut's action which unfriendly criticism branded as deliberate deceit, may fairly be ascribed to constitutional caution, seeking the safest outlet from a perplexed or perilous situation. His most pernicious weakness as a minister was, no doubt, an unflinching, but erroneous, belief in his own superior capacity for ordering military operations. He aspired to fill the *role* of Cardinal Richelieu, or Lord Chatham, without possessing the qualifications of a great war minister. In order to have full control of the Austrian armies and to shape their movements in harmony with his political designs, he removed renowned soldiers from the Council of War, and filled their places, and, as opportunity offered, the chief military commands, with his own dependents. This inordinate lust of sway, by fettering the discretion of the ablest Austrian generals, promoting others less capable but more pliable, and especially by depriving his sovereign of the services of Archduke Charles and Marshal Suvorow at critical periods of the war against France, contributed largely to the disasters that overwhelmed Austria in 1800, and brought his own political career to an inglorious end.

Lord Grenville had assumed the direction of foreign affairs in England, under many disadvantages, at the urgent request, and for the convenience of Mr. Pitt. The appointment came as a surprise to the official world. He does not appear to have been specially marked out for the post by natural or acquired fitness. His temperament and habits were rather those of a student than of a man of the world. So late as the year 1797* we find his friend and admirer, Mr. Windham, lamenting the constitutional reserve and the preference for domestic seclusion which prevented his obtaining by social intercourse the knowledge of men and of contemporary opinion so necessary for an English statesman. He had never given his mind to the study of European politics. Foreign travel had not opened to him opportunities of insight into the manners, peculiarities, and interests of other countries, or corrected the prejudices of an insular education. His diplomatic training did not extend beyond two short missions to Holland and France in 1788. Lord Auckland, whose discursive letters from the Hague glanced over the whole range of Continental affairs, seems to have been his chief guide and instructor during the first years of his career at the Foreign Office. Owing in a great measure to self-distrust, arising out of the deep and even painful sense of his own deficiencies expressed in some of his letters, Lord Grenville's influence in shaping the foreign policy of England during the earlier years of the Revolutionary war seems to have been inferior to that of Mr. Dundas. From their first association in the Cabinet, these two chief colleagues and advisers of Pitt appear to have been in constant

* Diary and Correspondence of Lord Malmesbury.

conflict. And in the conferences of the three ministers at Wimbledon or Holwood, when all important measures of government were discussed and settled before being communicated to the whole Cabinet, Pitt, in all matters bearing on the conduct of the war, seems to have almost invariably followed the counsels of Dundas. It was not long, however, before great ability and unwearied application, always directed and sustained by conscientious motive, made Lord Grenville master of all that could be learned from the sources of official information at his command. Intercourse also with the many foreigners of distinction, such as Count Mercy, Talleyrand, Calonne, Malouet, Mallet du Pan, whom the throes of the French Revolution cast from time to time on the shores of England, enlarged and enlightened his mind and increased his knowledge. With knowledge came self-confidence. And the failure of Dundas's "practical system" to cope with revolutionary energy and enthusiasm; the entrance into the Cabinet of leading Whigs, political pupils of Burke, with whom Grenville seems to have found himself, on most questions, in close accord; the strength of his convictions and his tenacity in adhering to them regardless of personal consequences; and his conspicuous success as leader of the House of Lords, gradually raised him to a position in the ministry immediately next to that of Pitt. During the last three years of that famous administration he seems to have been able to make his own views prevail in the Cabinet, on all important questions of external policy. In 1797 we find Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Canning wondering at the extraordinary deference Pitt paid to Grenville's opinion.* And two years later we find Dundas fallen so low as to become a subject for irreverent jest to colleagues over whom he had once towered as a sort of war-god. On December 29, 1799, Pitt wrote to Grenville in reference to some plan of the Secretary for War, "Dundas's geography, you will observe, is as accurate as his language"; Dundas being as superior to grammar as any Roman emperor. In the meantime Pitt's original policy of exacting from France "indemnity and security" gave place to one, adopted too late and followed too timidly, of co-operating with the emigrant princes for a restoration of the French monarchy, with the boundaries of 1792. But, however Lord Grenville's personal position in the ministry may have varied, during the whole period of his tenure of the seals as Foreign Secretary all important papers issuing from his office were drafted by himself, and bore the stamp of his own character. It was a character thoroughly English in its qualities and its defects. Its patriotism was so ardent as to inspire a profound belief that the cause of England in all its developments, and all circumstances, was the cause of right and of civilisation. A high and even haughty spirit, which scorned anything resembling mean trickery or petty evasion, informed his public utterances, and guarded well in times of danger and discouragement the dignity of the British crown and the interests of the monarchy. And he prided himself on maintaining in international relations the high standard of rectitude by which he governed his private conduct. It may be said that no English statesman of his time stood higher in public confidence for

* Diary and Correspondence of Lord Malmesbury.

enlightened views, personal integrity, and fidelity to principle ; although, owing, perhaps, to his secluded habits and a want of popular fibre in his nature, his personal influence fell short of his reputation ; and, beyond the limits of his own social circle, he was respected rather than loved. On the other hand, the very fervour of his patriotism, combined with narrow sympathies, and not enough of imagination to supply the absence of personal experience, made him often unable to appreciate justly the character and situation of a foreign adversary, or to form a correct estimate of forces opposed to him. It made him prone to undervalue an antagonist ; to class Continental statesmen, bred amidst other traditions, representing other national interests, who did not concur in his political views as “ knaves or fools.” For the same reason he was habitually over-sanguine in everything that concerned military enterprises in the planning of which he took part ; easily believing what he wished to believe ; easily forgetting what he did not wish to remember ; jumping eagerly to favourable conclusions in ignorance or neglect of unpleasant, but essential, facts. His public spirit contained a considerable alloy of arrogant dogmatism inherited from his father. He was too much inclined to play the pedagogue. From his vantage ground of moral elevation he castigated neglect of obligation on the part of an ally, or tortuous policy which did not serve English interests, with a zeal which sometimes inflicted irreparable injury on the cause it meant to vindicate. We have seen that the Duke of Brunswick, writing to his sister the Princess of Orange after the treaty of Basle, attributed the secession of the King of Prussia from the first coalition to the offensive tone of Lord Grenville’s despatches. And although so severe a critic of conduct in others which had an injurious effect on English interests, his ethical code allowed him very wide latitude in promoting those interests. The plan devised by Pitt and him in 1796 of obtaining help from the King of Prussia by pandering to that monarch’s cupidity at the expense of petty German states which had given no provocation but helplessness, was stigmatised by George III. as “ immoral ” and “ unjustifiable.”* It was only by the severest pressure that the two Ministers extorted the King’s consent to what he termed their “ Italian politics.”† Pitt sometimes interfered by way of suggestion, and with a studious avoidance of all appearance of dictation, to tone down passages in Grenville’s drafts, which appeared to him unwise or unseasonable. So late as November, 1800, we find him remonstrating against the “ dry and peremptory tone ” of a paragraph dealing with the dearth of food, in a “ King’s speech ” prepared by the Foreign Minister, as unsuited to an occasion of great public distress. In fact, though never wilfully unjust, Lord Grenville too often tempered justice with severity. His natural bent seems to have been to coercion rather than conciliation ; and when the combative mood prevailed, it was harsh and inexorable. Lord Cornwallis wrote to Colonel Ross in 1800 that he had left the Cabinet with little regret, because its decisions were so much swayed by Lord Grenville’s “ unplacable ” temper.‡

* Page 140, Vol. III. † Introduction to Volume III. ‡ Cornwallis Correspondence.

The troubled course of the Anglo-Austrian alliance, under the direction of Lord Grenville and Baron Thugut, down to the enforced submission of the Emperor at Leoben ; the estrangement of the two powers ; their junction with Russia to form the second coalition, without mutual concert or common plan, and with a strong disposition to thwart each other, have been related in the Prefaces of Volumes IV. and V. In all these bickerings and jealousies there had been no cause of complaint that a little of mutual trust and goodwill might not have prevented or removed ; no divergence of interests which might not easily have been adjusted. Lord Grenville's peremptory demand of the ratification of a financial convention, very disadvantageous to Austria, at a moment when that monarchy lay exhausted in the armed grip of France, was not a friendly, nor even a considerate, proceeding. An evasive answer, venial in the circumstances, brought lectures and taunts which goaded Thugut to sullen defiance and flat denial of plain obligation, even after the peace of Campo Formio had left him without excuse. In truth, so filled was the Chancellor's mind with distrust of what he termed in jibe "the disinterested policy of England" that, as we have seen, not even his pressing need of additional financial aid, when a renewal of war with France became imminent, could overcome the fear which possessed him that the British Government would use the ratification which it insisted on as a preliminary to amicable discussion, to distress the Emperor, and obtain control of the Austrian armies for its own particular purposes. On the other hand, Lord Grenville's attitude is fully explained in a letter to Mr. Windham, dated September 2, 1799. "My opinion," he wrote, "has long been fixed that good words and liberal conduct are both thrown away on Austrian politicians, and that all our measures towards them should be regulated solely by the view of what we think best and most becoming for ourselves." He seems to have had a more jealous sense of what was due to the British crown than George III. himself. And there can be no doubt that previous to the renewal of Continental war with France in 1799, he not only, owing to ignorance of the defects of the Russian military system, overrated the advantage to England of an alliance with the Tzar, but was unconscious of the increased strength and importance Austria had derived from the support of Russia, from armies thoroughly re-organised under able commanders and excellent staffs and from a rapid decline in the military power of France.

Unfortunately for the stability of this strange experiment in political construction, the third partner on whom the others depended as the regulating power of the second coalition, to control and harmonize its operations, avert collision, and mitigate friction, was constitutionally incapable of governing himself, and became by force of circumstances another element of discord. Paul I., Emperor of Russia, had reached middle age when he ascended the throne ; but no sovereign of his time was so little qualified by education and experience for the exercise of supreme authority. His mother, Catherine II., for reasons of state, had jealously excluded him during her lifetime from all share in the govern-

ment and all high military command. His resentment at the insignificance to which her policy condemned him, though carefully stifled during her reign, displayed itself on his accession to the throne in the banishment of nearly all the able servants of the Crown, as well as Court minions, who had enjoyed her confidence or favour. Competent witnesses allow him many admirable qualities : deep religious sentiment, love of justice, generosity, chivalrous feeling. But through them all there ran the taint of mental insanity, inherited from his father, and which irresponsible authority developed. His mind too easily harboured suspicions, and became the prey of morbid emotions, which, though repressed for a time, sometimes mastered him, and hurried him away far beyond the bounds of prudence and good sense. Unguarded contradiction threw him into transports of passion, in which he lost all self-restraint. And although he generally showed himself eager when reflection came to repair an injury or act of injustice, the sting of his reckless violence rankled and awakened a sense of insecurity in those most exposed to it, which finally cost him his life. In politics, as in everything else, he was the child of impulse, the sport of capricious fancies, often good and noble, but ungoverned in action, and transient in influence. He entered the coalition in the spirit of a knight-errant rather than in that of a statesman, in answer to appeals from all parts of southern Europe to redress the wrongs inflicted by the French Revolution and restore the old order it had overthrown. Of all the lost or injured causes that claimed his protection, none seems to have so appealed to his imagination, or lain so near to his heart, as that of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, which reflected, however faintly, the faith and self-devotion of the crusader to an age of scepticism and selfish ambition. Early in his reign he had constituted himself protector of the Order ; and later on, by some form of irregular election, its Grand Master extraordinary. General de Stamford thus sketched the Russian autocrat in a letter from St. Petersburg to Thomas Grenville, dated, June 29, 1799. "*L'Empereur est un prince tel qu'il le faut pour le salut de l'Europe ; c'est un ame de feu, pleine de noblesse, sensible à l'honneur et à la gloire, et n'ayant en vue qu'e de faire triompher la cause dont il a embrassé la défense ; mais ces sentimens veulent être ménagés ; un mot, une expression inconsidérée, la moindre contrariété dans sa volonté, cette volonté prévenue ou trop pressée, peuvent tout-à-coup arrêter chez lui les résolutions les plus importantes. Il souffre l'observation quand elle est juste, et il se rend ; mais il faut une grande délicatesse pour oser la lui présenter, et pour qu'il n'en soit pas blessé au début.*"

The chief Continental interest of Great Britain in 1799 was, as it had been in 1793, the permanent separation of the Netherlands from France. Pitt's plan of effecting this object in 1793 was to restore the Belgic provinces to the Emperor, considerably enlarged and strengthened by an annexation of French territory. Since then the policy of dismembering France had been abandoned ; and as the Emperor would only take back Belgium in its old form, with the view of exchanging it for some more advantageous possession, it became expedient to secure British interests by some more durable settle-

ment. Weighty considerations pointed to a union of all the Low Countries under the sway of the Prince of Orange as the most eligible arrangement for this purpose. It was the one most likely to enlist the active co-operation of the King of Prussia, by whose aid the expulsion of the French could be most easily and speedily effected. And it might help other English aims hardly inferior in importance. In 1795 the Prince of Orange, after his flight to England, at Lord Grenville's request, sent instructions to the governors of Dutch colonies to deliver them up to the British Government, in order that they might remain in the safe keeping of an ally until the Stadtholderate was restored. The Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon surrendered, subsequently, to British expeditions; but as to how far these capitulations were influenced by the Prince's letters the Dropmore correspondence supplies no information. During the conference at Lille, in 1797, Lord Malmesbury, by Grenville's instructions, insisted on retaining both colonies as British conquests; and the Dutch Revolutionary Government would on no account consent to cede either of them. That this attitude represented national feeling in Holland Lord Grenville appears to have been fully aware. In reply to a letter from Dundas lamenting the delay that had occurred in annexing also the Dutch settlement of Java, he wrote, on May 13, 1799: "I have always thought the conquest of Java an object of great importance. . . . If the Stadtholder is restored, one of the greatest difficulties we should have to encounter will be the demand for the restoration of Ceylon and the Cape, which, from what I have already seen, will, I am certain, be pressed by Prussia as well as by the Dutch. It would be a great means of putting this by if we had Batavia and Surinam to restore to them." And he seems to have thought that by a union of the whole Netherlands under the Prince of Orange a state might be formed of sufficient strength to repel, or at least withstand, the first rush of French aggression; and that the Dutch might be reconciled by an extension of territory in Europe to sacrifices so advantageous to English interests in the East. The two main objects of British Continental policy at the beginning of 1799—(1) union of the Dutch and Austrian Netherlands under the Prince of Orange; (2) the reduction of France to the limits of 1792, a restoration of monarchy being implied—having been submitted in confidence to the Tzar, were adopted by him as a basis for common action and as leading points in the programme of the coalition. To confirm Paul in his good dispositions the British Government pledged itself to hand over Malta to him when taken from the French, for the Knights of St. John, and to promote the formation of an English branch of the Order.

The first point of the Anglo-Russian programme does not appear to have been communicated, or at least only very partially revealed, to the Austrian Government. In regard to the second, Baron Thugut fully concurred in the purpose of reducing France to its monarchical limits. The conquests of the Revolution had been made at the Emperor's expense. Lombardy, lost at Leoben, had been the richest province of his dominions. Subsequent aggressions of the Directory in Switzerland and Italy had almost annihilated his family

interests in those countries and whatever remained of the ancient prerogative of the Imperial Crown. Belgium, though not profitable to Austria in itself, had its value as an article of barter in the political market. A permanent extension of France to the left bank of the Rhine meant the destruction of the Ecclesiastical Electorates, staunch adherents of the House of Hapzburg in the Imperial Diet. But Francis II. and Baron Thugut had lost all faith in the cause of French monarchy, as represented by the emigrant princes; and would not willingly compromise Austrian interests by espousing it. When the campaign of 1799 opened, their plans and efforts were directed solely to recover all that Austria had lost in conflict with the Revolution. The refusal of concert by the English ministry gave the Emperor liberty of action; the alliance of the Tzar gave him security against Prussian machinations in Germany, and a reinforcement of 22,000 troops under Marshal Souvorow, whom he appointed Commander-in-Chief of his forces in Italy.

Pursuing his own policy, as has been told elsewhere, Thugut held the Archduke on the defensive in Switzerland; while Souvarow's victories accomplished his main object, of restoring the Emperor's supremacy in Italy. But here the policy of Austria came into collision with that of Great Britain. "I have never," Lord Grenville wrote to his brother, June 3, 1799, "felt so confident in my life on any one point as I do that the success of the whole war, and every part of this war, depends on pushing the campaign with vigour in Switzerland." And the English plan for expelling the French from the Netherlands by enlisting the action of a subsidised Prussian army, supported by a large Russian corps on the Middle Rhine, having been frustrated by the pacific temper of the King of Prussia, the British Government obtained the concurrence of the Tzar in two new plans for accomplishing their common objects—(1) an Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland; and (2) the assembling in Switzerland of an army of 80,000 or 100,000 men, Russians, Germans, Swiss, and French, under the command of Marshal Souvorow, to expel Massena from Switzerland with the co-operation of the Archduke, and then march into France to restore the monarchy. The Preface to Volume V. of the Dropmore Papers gives a brief account of the failure of the military operations thus concerted. But a knowledge of the intentions involved in the British plans, and of the conditions under which they were framed and pursued, as revealed in Lord Grenville's confidential letters, is necessary for a correct understanding of that failure and of the events that followed it.

First, as regards the invasion of Holland.

Confidential information sent to him earlier in the year by his brother, Thomas Grenville, British Minister at Berlin, and derived from emissaries and adherents of the House of Orange in the Dutch Republic, enabled Lord Grenville to reckon on the following circumstances as favouring an Anglo-Russian expedition—general impatience throughout the Netherlands of French dictation and rapacity; the reduction of the French army of occupation in the Dutch Provinces to 5,000 or 6,000 men; disaffection to the revolutionary government in the Dutch army and navy; an eager disposition in the Orange party to take arms, if supported

by a foreign force. Reasoning from these facts, he seems to have convinced himself and Pitt that the British Government could, by means of the army of from 40,000 to 50,000 troops at their disposal—18,000 Russians and about 30,000 English—possess themselves of the entire Netherlands in the course of a short autumn campaign; restore the Dutch Stadtholderate on their own terms; and dispose of Belgium in the manner most conducive to British interests, without the co-operation of Prussia, and in defiance of Austria. On July 27, 1799, he wrote as follows to Dundas:—"The more I think over the subject of the Netherlands the more I am persuaded that the only right suggestion is that which the King made to me on Wednesday, that we should make our force sufficient to be quite certain (at least as much so as the thing will admit) of occupying that whole country ourselves before the winter. It is only in that way that we can put ourselves in a situation to talk to Vienna in the only style which ever succeeds in making them hear reason. If we ultimately decide on giving these provinces back to Austria it should, I think, only be in consideration of co-operation afforded (not promised) for an attack on France." Dundas's answer on July 29 inclined to the opinion that Grenville's expectations of rapid success without Prussian aid were too sanguine, and expressed doubts as to the dispositions of the Dutch. Replying on July 30, Grenville insisted that Sir Ralph Abercromby, in command of the vanguard of the expedition, "would neither do justice to himself nor to us" if he acted with the caution becoming a general invading a hostile country instead of with the confidence of one who can count on meeting only feeble resistance and a whole population ready to welcome him as a deliverer. "Look," he continued, "at the campaign of 1787; how little time it cost the Duke of Brunswick, with all his doubts and hesitations, and cautions and precautions, to march with 25,000 men (no more) from Wesel to Amsterdam; and then let any man tell me what there is in the present circumstances to stop British generals and British soldiers, with the country unanimously in their favour, and with the threatened if not active co-operation of the whole Prussian army." On the same day he wrote as follows to Thomas Grenville, at Berlin:—"I do not now think we shall have a Prussian declaration to assist our expedition, and I am confident, contrary to what seems to be your opinion, that we shall not want Prussian aid to enable us to hold Holland; nay, that we shall do better without it. I still wish to purchase both the declaration and the assistance, in order that the Prussians, by occupying the Meuse, may enable us to occupy the Netherlands, and having thus eleven points in our favour, to talk to our good allies as to the ultimate arrangements to be made respecting those provinces, in the safety of which we have, after all, more concern than all the Powers of Germany together." Dundas gave way. After repeating his own views on the Dutch situation very forcibly on July 31, he continued—"You may rest assured that I am decided to act upon your ideas (in which Mr. Pitt perfectly concurs) rather than upon any doubts of my own. Upon this ground it is my intention to give a final instruction to Sir Ralph Abercromby before he sails, encouraging him, even if

it should be contrary to mere military ideas, to act upon the reasoning of your letter ; looking upon himself as going not to conquer a country, but to aid the counter-revolution ready to burst out in it." At or about the time when these letters were written, Lord Grenville was in possession of information from Holland of a more trustworthy character that he could expect to find in reports of Orange partizans. It is contained in a *mémoire* furnished by an independent agent whom General de Stamford despatched to the United Provinces at Thomas Grenville's request, and was forwarded by the latter to London on July 21.* According to this account there were three distinct parties in the Dutch Republic : the Patriots or Democratic Republicans, now in the ascendant ; the Aristocratic or Federal Republicans, historical adversaries of the House of Orange ; and the adherents of the Stadtholderate. They had each different views and interests, and agreed only in disliking French domination. Patriots and Federals, who now filled the offices of state, would combine to oppose a restoration of Orange rule. Outside of these parties there was a large population of Catholics who had been freed by French conquest from civil and religious disabilities, and who, though not French partizans, would not support any attempt to restore the old intolerant system. Public opinion, the writer found, was in a state of chaos ; and it would require much management to frame any settlement likely to secure general acquiescence. Lord Grenville, however, does not seem to have attached much value to this communication. It considerably diminished the importance of the Orange party with which alone the British Government would enter into alliance. What appears more extraordinary is his assumption that Dutch dissatisfaction with France meant unlimited submission to Great Britain ; a theory that can only be explained by misapprehension, or rather obliviousness on his part, of events recorded in his own correspondence, and in which he had been officially and even personally concerned. "We are now," he wrote to his brother on July 30, the letter already quoted, "looking to a counter-revolution in Holland ; we have in that case the same difficulties to overcome, which we did not overcome, but yielded to, in 1787 and 1788. Lord Malmesbury was then much more occupied with his own honours than with the permanence of the system he had re-established. You know in what hands the direction of foreign affairs here was then placed. Everything was left to take its course, and a worse course things could not have taken. So far from improving the advantages which that revolution had afforded him, the Prince of Orange was found in every respect weaker and more unprovided in 1794 than he had been in 1786. This we must now prevent . . . You must prepare yourself, therefore, to receive a proposal in form that, as soon as any appearance of Stadtholderian Government shall have been re-established at the Hague, or elsewhere, you should proceed to take upon you the character and functions of Ambassador Extraordinary, charged with the whole political direction of that shapeless mass, which we must, now or never, reduce into a form of efficient and permanent

utility to ourselves, instead of leaving it, as it has been for a century, a dead weight on our exertions whenever it has not been turned against us." And pursuing the same subject in another letter to his brother, he laid down as the British terms of peace with the Dutch after the re-establishment of the Stadtholder, "restoration of the Spice Islands (except Ceylon) and of Demarery, and guarantee of their constitution and territory, on condition of (1) offensive alliance; (2) actual co-operation in this war till peace be made by common consent; (3) express renunciation, and under very strong conditions, of claim of neutral commerce while we are at war; and more than this, I think, we have not to ask of them. Negapatam might be thrown into the bargain as a factory only, but subject to our paramount jurisdiction and control; Ceylon, the Cape, and Cochin would not be heard of."

In the foregoing letter to his brother dated July 30, Lord Grenville, as may be seen by a reference to the Introduction of Volume III. of the Dropmore Papers, did great injustice to Lord Malmesbury, and even to his own predecessor, the Duke of Leeds. It was, no doubt, the unintentional wrong of lapse of memory, caused by the stress and excitement of the political situation. Malmesbury, or Sir James Harris, as he was then called, had no means whatever of exacting conditions from a government which the King of Prussia had restored; and he did more for England by clever diplomacy than probably any other English ambassador of his time could have accomplished. As regards the Duke of Leeds, Pitt, at the end of 1787, appears to have taken all important business relating to Holland out of the hands of the Foreign Secretary, and confided it to those of Grenville himself. When the Stadtholderate was restored in 1787 Harris and Van der Spiegel, Grand Pensionary of Holland, were equally desirous of renewing the political alliance which had existed between England and the Dutch Republic from the reign of Charles II. to 1780. It was recognised on both sides that the chief obstacle to be overcome was the intense exasperation aroused among the Dutch by what Harris himself termed the "bullying and oppressive conduct" of Lord North's administration, which dissolved that alliance. In the war that followed between England and Holland the only permanent English conquest had been Negapatam. It was of little value, as Pitt declared some years later when proposing to relinquish it. But its loss kept alive the memory of what the Dutch resented as a national wrong. And the negotiators agreed that a voluntary restoration of the place, as a mark of friendship on the part of Pitt's Government, would go far to allay the deep distrust of English designs that existed in the Republic. In a letter to Grenville and Pitt dated 27 December, 1787, urging concession on this point as essential to any cordial alliance, Harris wrote:—"My great object is, if possible, to connect this country by indissoluble ties to Great Britain. This is to be effected partly by affection . . . and partly by specific engagements. Affection will follow complaisance, gentle usage, and not too rough and unqualified an exercise of our influence. The reverse lost us the Republic."* The British Cabinet apparently preferred driving a

* Addenda, Volume III., Dropmore Papers.

hard bargain with a Government depending for existence on foreign support. It would only consent to exchange Negapatam for the more valuable settlements of Trinkomali and Rhio, a proposal to which Van der Spiegel could not venture to listen. And the Dutch Minister only succeeded in obtaining the consent of an assembly of the States-General, packed with his own political friends, to the defensive treaty he concluded with Harris, after long and violent opposition. Shortly afterwards Harris, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by a private visit of the Frederick William II., King of Prussia, to his sister at Loo, persuaded him to enter into a triple alliance with Great Britain and the United Provinces, without consulting his ministers. This arrangement, very unpopular in Prussia as departing from the policy of Frederick the Great, greatly raised the credit of Pitt's ministry on the Continent, and restored England to the place in the European commonwealth she had lost by the war of American Independence. It was for these services that Harris was created Lord Malmesbury. In the same year he separated from Pitt on the Regency question, and was succeeded by Lord Auckland as ambassador at the Hague. The new envoy fully concurred in the opinion of his predecessor and of the Dutch Pensionary, that the defensive alliance they had concluded could not be durable unless strengthened by a commercial treaty, in which the clashing interests of the two peoples should be reconciled by mutual concessions. Auckland had been chiefly concerned in framing a commercial treaty with France in 1786, and no one was better qualified for the more difficult task of treating with Holland which Pitt now committed to Grenville and him. His confidential letters to Grenville, contained in Volume II., give a full account of sterile labours in this new field of pacific effort. The chief point at issue was neutral trade, a main source of the power and prosperity of the Republic, which, in virtue of the treaty of peace concluded with England in 1674, the Dutch had pursued without molestation for one hundred years, down to the war of American Independence. Van der Spiegel, Auckland insisted, offered concessions on this question which no Dutch Government had ever been even asked to make before; and the British Cabinet, inspired by Lord Hawkesbury, answered by demands utterly unreasonable under the circumstances, and which no Dutch minister could possibly concede. As Pitt sided with the President of the Board of Trade, the Dutch negotiation fell through, and with it, as Van der Spiegel lamented, all well-grounded hope of any permanent alliance. The same exacting spirit manifested itself in the political relations of the two Governments, especially after the King of Prussia abandoned the triple alliance. And for the close and cordial union of two nations, designed by Malmesbury and Auckland, was substituted a somewhat galling protectorate, exercised by the Government of Great Britain over a ruling but discredited party in Holland. It was not, therefore, according to the testimony borne by Lord Grenville's own correspondence, owing to neglect on the part of Lord Malmesbury, but rather to the rejection of his advice by the British Cabinet, that "the Prince of Orange was found in every respect weaker and more unprovided in 1794

than he had been in 1786." From later letters of Auckland we know how reluctantly the Government of the Stadtholder, conscious of its own weakness, joined England in war against France, and only when it learned that the French Government would not treat with it separately; how languidly it carried on the war, notwithstanding Lord Grenville's expostulations; how much Dutch ill-will to the English army of the Duke of York facilitated Pichégu's rapid conquest of Holland. George III. wrote to Grenville as follows on December 7, 1794:—"Yesterday my son, the Duke of York, arrived; his account of the unfriendly conduct of the Dutch is far beyond what I before imagined; and what is worse, that the friends of the House of Orange are not behind-hand in animosity to the most violent patriots." Yet, strange as it may seem after this recent experience, Pitt and Grenville appear to have believed that an expeditionary army of less than 50,000 men, of which, as Windham, then Secretary at War, wrote on August 10, "a great part are in a state which no officer could describe as fit for service," could, without aid of any kind from Prussia, bring the Dutch not only to relinquish what they prized most, their chief colonies and their neutral trade, but to incur again the cost and danger of war with France in order to exchange a French for an English yoke. For the Prince of Orange inspired no enthusiasm. His son was unpopular, and the project of uniting all the Netherlands in one state, by which it was apparently hoped to reconcile the Dutch to the sacrifices demanded of them, seems to have found little favour even among the partisans of the House of Orange. Van der Spiegel, still the foremost statesman of that party, objected to it in a memoir sent to Lord Grenville as opposed to the traditions, feelings and interests of the United Provinces.* And before the summer was over Lord Grenville had himself learned that, without the concurrence of the Emperor, the project was impracticable. A letter from Thomas Grenville, dated August 3, 1799, gives us a glimpse of what seems to have been the main current of Dutch political feeling at this time. It ran in favour not of alliance with either France or England, but of being included with North Germany in the neutral zone protected by the King of Prussia. An arrangement of this sort, then under discussion at Paris, would free Holland from foreign occupation, give it peace, increased security for its trade, and some hope of recovering its colonies at the end of the war. The proclamations issued by the Prince of Orange and General Abercromby, by omitting all reference to the points about which the mass of the Dutch population were most anxious, told them that they had nothing to gain from the Anglo-Russian expedition. The English commanders, instead of eager welcome, had to encounter a chilling apathy which froze any spirit of enterprise Dundas's instructions may have infused into them. They had more troops than could be moved in North Holland, yet they did not venture to despatch a few thousand men to help the Orange leaders in Groningen and Friesland although the British Government had pledged itself to send this aid, and a fleet of vessels was kept in readiness, at a cost of £200 a fortnight, to transport it across the Zuyder Zee.† On the other

* Page 374, Vol. V.

† Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Sept. 27, 1799. Vol. V., Dropmore Papers.

hand, the partizans of the Stadtholder in those provinces, whose compressed zeal, according to Mr. Grenville's earlier reports, was on the point of exploding in premature insurrection, refused to budge an inch until the British succour promised to them arrived from the Helder.*

Second, as to the British plan of campaign in Switzerland.

When the Tzar, at the request of the British Government, communicated this plan to the Emperor Francis II., in order to obtain his co-operation, it met with little favour at Vienna. Austria had old connections with Switzerland, where the conservative party had been accustomed to look to the Emperor for support and protection. And although Baron Thugut would not, with more important interests at stake, risk the loss of an army to restore the cantonal governments overthrown by the French, he looked on it as a task deferred, and resented English interference. He knew also that Archduke Charles and his army at Zurich, proud of recent victories, chafing under the restraints imposed on them by his policy, and intensely jealous of Souvorow's laurels in Italy, would not willingly submit to play a minor part in the campaign against Masséna, which they had opened so brilliantly. There were other strong military objections to the English project. Switzerland, which hardly produced sufficient food for its own consumption, could not support three foreign armies. The original plan of operations in Holland, which was communicated to the Austrian Government before war began, placed the Russian troops commanded by General Korsakow on the Middle Rhine to help Prussian operations; and the march of these troops to Switzerland, in consequence of an adoption of new plans by England and Russia, exposed southern Germany to a French invasion. One point, however, in the new scheme—the removal of Souvorow and his Russians from Italy—was most welcome to the Imperial Chancellor as a means of escape from a position of extreme embarrassment. When the Emperor Francis, as a compliment to his northern ally, appointed Souvorow commander-in-chief of his Italian army, Thugut had expected from the Russian marshal the same submission to the orders of the Aulic Council exacted from all other Imperialist generals, not excepting Archduke Charles. He was a timid war minister, slow to incur risks even for large results. Souvorow's instructions from Vienna made the capture of Mantua the main object of the Italian campaign, and forbade him to cross the Adda till that fortress had surrendered. But the Russian marshal, as he told Lord Mulgrave, had accepted an Austrian command in order to crown a long career in arms with the glory of restoring the French monarchy; and in that and all other respects to fulfil the intentions of his own sovereign. Leaving part of his army with General Kray to besiege Mantua, he marched forward with the rest from victory to victory, finding ample supplies of all kinds for waging war at the expense of his enemy in the captured fortresses of Milan, Turin, and Alessandria. All his battles and sieges were won in spite of prohibitions from the Austrian Council of War and obstruction on the part of subordinates devoted to Baron Thugut. It would be difficult to say whether the Imperial

* Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 1, 1799. Vol. V. Dropmore Papers.

Government was more incensed by this assumption of independence or elated by successes which promised to accomplish in a single campaign an old and favourite aim of Austrian policy, the bringing of all Italy, directly or indirectly, under the sway of the Emperor. But Souvorow's unauthorised proclamation restoring the government of the King of Sardinia was regarded by Thugut as an offence of the deepest dye, without any extenuating circumstance. It was, in fact, a public protest by an Austrian general against what had now become the fixed purpose of the Vienna Cabinet, to keep all Italy north of Naples, and particularly Piedmont, with its fortresses, in Austrian hands, either as permanent possessions or to supply the needs of the Imperial exchequer till the conclusion of peace. At the same time Souvorow's complaints of the impediments thrown in his way by Austrian jealousies and ill-will, and the immediate annulling of his proclamation by the appointing of an Austrian governor of Piedmont, greatly exasperated the Tzar. On all these accounts it was felt at Vienna that the removal of the Russians' from Italy had become a political necessity, and should only be deferred until Austrian interests had been secured by the surrender of Mantua and the besieged fortresses of Piedmont. Thugut, therefore, to gain time for these military results before replying to the Tzar, suggested to the English minister, Sir Morton Eden, that the British Government should send a military officer to Vienna or to the headquarters of Archduke Charles, at Zurich, to discuss its plan of campaign in Switzerland. Lord Grenville, assuming the question of Austrian co-operation to be now conceded, appointed Lord Mulgrave to proceed to Zurich to superintend the formation of the army intended for Souvorow, and enter into communication with the Archduke. Before leaving London Mulgrave had a conversation with the Austrian minister, Count Starhemberg. The Count's father, Prince Starhemberg, was a leader of the Austrian aristocracy opposed to Baron Thugut; but the diplomatist himself zealously promoted the war against France. He urged Mulgrave to go in the first place to Vienna. Thugut, he said, was *le vrai général*; nothing of importance could be settled with anyone else. Mulgrave reported this counsel to Grenville, who had gone to Dropmore; but the latter would not listen to it.* "When it was proposed to us," he answered, "to send an officer in your situation, Thugut mentioned that we should send him either to Vienna or to the Archduke's headquarters. He would obviously have preferred the former, and we had strong reasons to prefer the latter, and therefore took him at his word without further discussion. We have an interest in thwarting that system of directing military operations from Vienna, because it has never been employed but to our disadvantage; and we were very desirous of engaging as a party to our measures the person who is to execute them. We have besides a much more advantageous situation with respect to Russia by treating on this subject at the army than by discussing it at Vienna. Korsakow is in a manner placed under our orders. . . . and this gives us two voices out of those [three ?] in the concert.. . . My wish is, therefore,

* Mulgrave to Grenville, August 2, 1799. Vol. V.

very strongly, that you may not find it necessary to go to Vienna. . . . You must always remember that by doing so you will incur great risk of disobliging the Archduke, and that the private interests of the latter lead to his pushing this campaign actively, while all Thugut's jealousy inclines him the other way."* This disposition, which he was not slow to divine, to thwart his policy by what he would call an intrigue with Archduke Charles, his most formidable antagonist, appears to have roused into fierce opposition all that was combative in Thugut's nature. When Lord Grenville's decision was known at Vienna orders went from the Council of War to the Archduke to engage in no operations without its sanction. In answer to the communication from St. Petersburg the Emperor, on August 6, 1799, expressed acquiescence in the removal of Souvorow and his Russian troops to Switzerland and confidence that the Marshal would be able, with the force under his immediate command, to drive out Masséna. The new plans adopted by his allies, he continued, had made a change in his own necessary for the protection of Germany and of his particular interests. War with France restored his rights in Belgium, which he did not intend to relinquish to England and Russia. He had, therefore, determined to move the Archduke's army from Switzerland to Mayence to defend Swabia, occupy Belgium, and thus co-operate with the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland. And in order, still further, to aid Paul's plans, an Austrian corps of 30,000 men would be stationed on the Upper Rhine to co-operate in Souvorow's invasion of France by besieging Belfort and Thuringin at the proper season—namely, in the following year. Thugut had already sent Count Dietrichstein at the end of July with orders to the Archduke to withdraw with all his troops to Mayence when Korsakow's Russian corps arrived at Zurich. The Emperor, Dietrichstein explained, on arriving at the Austrian headquarters, had given this order for political reasons, constrained to it by the pressure put upon him by his allies, particularly by the Government of Great Britain. News arriving soon after at Vienna of the surrender of Mantua, the Emperor wrote to Souvorow to hand over his Italian command to General Melas, and lead his Russian bands into Switzerland. And when Lord Mulgrave reached Berlin on his way to Zurich, in the middle of August, he was met by despatches from Lord Minto, now British Minister at Vienna, announcing Baron Thugut's declaration that military concert with England was at present "unnecessary, the plan of operations being not only determined upon, but what remains of it about to be executed." Mulgrave, however, by the advice of Thomas Grenville, pursued his journey.†

The order to evacuate Switzerland at the bidding of the English and Russian Governments caused deep resentment in the Archduke's army. Mr. Wickham, British Resident Minister, hitherto a welcome visitor at the Austrian headquarters, suddenly found himself

* Grenville to Mulgrave, August, 3, 1799, Vol. V.

† T. Grenville to Lord Grenville, August 15, 1799: Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville, August 18, 1799. Vol. V.

received there with lowering brows and sharp reproaches. And in answer to his protestations of disbelief in Dietrichstein's statement, the Archduke read out to him a passage to the same effect in a letter he had just received from his brother the Emperor. But preparations for departure were suddenly arrested by a vigorous attack of Masséna, which drove in the whole Austrian line, expelled General Jellachich from the little Cantons, captured the St. Gothard Pass, and thus interrupted Austrian communication with Italy.* Wickham's report of Dietrichstein's mission was read in the British Cabinet with anger and consternation. This last move of Baron Thugut had completely dislocated its Swiss plans. Lord Grenville at once instructed Minto to give formal contradiction to the Count's misrepresentations, and to quit Vienna unless the order to the Archduke was immediately recalled. He also invoked the Tzar's interference to save the Russian armies from destruction. Thugut at first refused to listen to Minto's demand. When, however, accounts reached him of Masséna's offensive movement he gave way so far as to promise that the Archduke should remain in his defensive position at Zurich without taking part in any plan of active operations. But hardly had this concession been extorted from him when news of a French foray into Wurtemberg gave him an excuse for withdrawing it.

When Mulgrave reached Switzerland he found the Austrians moving off to Germany. In a short interview he convinced the Archduke of the injustice done to the English Cabinet by Dietrichstein's statement, but was unable to arrest his march. General Korsakow had already arrived at Zurich, but, meeting with an ungracious reception at the Austrian headquarters, drew off his men to a distant position. The Archduke, however, left an Austrian corps of 23,000 men under General Hotze in the Grisons to hold the French in check until Souvorow brought his troops from Italy. Discord, confusion, and discouragement met Mulgrave at every turn. "The jealousy and hatred," he wrote to Grenville, "arising from envy and conceit, that the Austrians feel towards the Russians is beyond all example; and I am convinced that they would be much more gratified by a serious calamity happening to the Russians than by any success that could be obtained even by themselves against the enemy."† Korsakow's army, estimated on paper as 45,000 men, did not exceed 30,000; and 10,000 of these, being Cossack cavalry, were useless in a mountainous country. The infantry was admirable, but had neither magazines, proper equipments, nor a competent commander. Swiss recruiting had failed. In all the cantons, not excepting the two lately occupied by the Austrians, the government was revolutionary. In the mountain districts, old strongholds of the conservative cause, the flower of the male population had fallen in a desperate struggle against the French or taken service under the Emperor. And the arrogant temper of Colonel Crauford, the British commissary, gave general offence. Instead, therefore, of 70,000 or 80,000 troops

* Wickham to Grenville, August 14, 1799, *et seq.* Public Record Office.

† Mulgrave to Grenville, September 1, 1799, Vol. V.

in British pay, as Lord Grenville had calculated in London, Souvorow would hardly have 40,000 under his command, including those he might bring from Italy. And the greater part of this army was now exposed to imminent danger of destruction, in an indefensible position at Zurich, by the folly of General Korsakow, who refused to move to safer ground. Mulgrave, therefore, hurried down into Italy to warn Souvorow of the situation he would have to face after crossing the Alps. He found the marshal in very depressed spirits. Complaints from the King of Sardinia had filled the Tzar's mind with distrust of Austrian designs, which evasive answers from Vienna served to confirm. He therefore proposed that the allied powers should send representatives to a conference, in which the particular aims of each and the general aims of the coalition should be clearly defined. Lord Grenville accepted this proposal. Baron Thugut refused, on the plea that any discussion of terms of peace would be premature until another campaign brought the end of the war into nearer view. Paul, highly incensed by this answer, declared that no more Russian blood should be spilled to feed Austrian rapacity. He announced his intention of continuing war against France in concert only with George III., and sent an order to Souvorow to quit Italy at once. The Russian marshal opened his mind to Mulgrave with the same frankness as later on, with more time at his disposal, in conference with Wickham. And the substance of his remarks in these various conversations, so far as they bore on the British project of a Swiss campaign, is given here. He condemned the British plan of conquering Switzerland by means of an army composed mainly of Russian troops as utterly impracticable. The Russian military system, he explained, was still in a rude stage of development. It provided neither staff, commissariat, nor magazines. His officers were only instructed in regimental duties. The pay of all ranks was miserably insufficient, that of the soldier being only equivalent to 1½d. a day. Russian armies had been accustomed to fight on open plains and to live at free quarters on the enemy's country. They knew nothing of mountain warfare, and must starve in Switzerland, already eaten bare by the French. The proper plan would be to use the Swiss and German levies of the English Government in strengthening the army of the Archduke against Masséna, and to leave himself in Italy to complete the conquest of that country and enter France by forcing the passage of the River Var. It was only by having at his command Austrian military appliances and a trained Austrian staff, which had served him with great devotion, that he had been able to accomplish so much during the present campaign. He had answered a letter from the Emperor Francis II. depriving him of his Italian command by a remonstrance. But the orders of his own sovereign must be obeyed without a murmur. In order to give effect to them he had adopted a plan drawn up by his Austrian chief of the staff, Weinrotha, of a combined attack on Masséna's position by Korsakow, Hotze, and himself, in front, flank, and rear. The date fixed for its execution was September 26th. Of the hazards and uncertainties of this plan by which three bodies of troops, widely separated from each other and without any connecting link, were to advance against an enemy greatly

superior in strength, he seemed to be fully aware. And he insisted on the necessity of the Archduke's immediate return to Switzerland to co-operate with him. Mulgrave's report of this interview expressed profound admiration of the old warrior's genius; of the clear insight and wide grasp of the military situation displayed in his discourse.* But it was with great misgiving as to the issue of the enterprise in which Souvorow was now engaged that the British envoy set out for Vienna to urge compliance with his demand for Austrian co-operation. He arrived in that capital to find his worst fears verified. Souvorow was delayed three days at the foot of the St. Gothard waiting for means of transport. Having forced his way across the pass, he reached Altdorf by the Devil's Bridge on September 28, to find that Masséna, anticipating him, had attacked and routed the armies of Korsakow and Hotze on the 24th, and was inclosing himself in an iron circle from which escape seemed almost impossible. Fighting his way with great loss to Glarus, he led his men thence over one of the most frightful of Swiss glaciers into the Grisons, and finally arrived at Coire without guns or baggage after a march hardly paralleled in military annals. This decisive defeat was also the death-blow of the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, the Directory being now able to send large reinforcements to General Brune. In the conflict between Austrian and English policy in the Netherlands and Switzerland, Thugut had won on both issues. But all the real gain went to France. There is every reason to believe that England and Austria, acting in cordial concert with each other and with Russia against the common foe, might have accomplished with ease in the summer and autumn of 1799 all the aims which were achieved only after fifteen years more of desolating warfare, at a cost of blood and treasure probably unsurpassed in any equal period of European history.

Baron Thugut does not appear to have been much alarmed at first by the prospect of losing a Russian alliance, which had become a hindrance rather than a help to Austrian policy. The Emperor and his minister, flushed with success, confident in the strength and spirit of victorious armies, and growing daily more impatient of dictation from St. Petersburg, which opposed a peremptory veto to their Italian projects, had already determined to dispense with Russian aid in every field of Austrian military operations, except in proportions and on conditions which should bring it completely under their own control. Above all things, Souvarow should not again be placed in command of Austrian troops. At the same time Thugut's acute perception, however clouded by the fumes of political conflict, could not be altogether blind to the risks Austria incurred by setting the Tzar at defiance. A sense of isolation and an urgent need of financial aid led him to seek a secret understanding with the British Government, which had no interests in Italy antagonistic to those of the Emperor. Lord Grenville had early in the summer sent Lord Minto as British minister to Vienna to recover ground supposed to have been lost by Sir Morton Eden's credulity and want of back-bone, and to assert British interests by more vigilant and masterful action. But it seemed to some of his diplomatic colleagues that, in the course of a

* Mulgrave to Grenville, September 12, 1799. Public Record Office.

few weeks, Minto fell as completely as his predecessor had fallen under the Chancellor's spell, and accepted his statements with equal facility. In confidential discussions during the last fortnight in August, Thugut proposed to Minto that the British and Austrian Governments should endeavour, without consulting any other power, to come to an understanding by frankly disclosing to each other the political objects each had specially in view. If agreement could not be arrived at, he said, mutual confidences might be forgotten. The Emperor, Thugut confessed, meant to keep all upper Italy to the River Var, and the three Papal Legations. He did not want Bavaria, nor even the Netherlands, unless enlarged and fortified by the addition of French Flanders. The Netherlands might be given to the King of Sardinia as compensation for loss of Italian territory, or even to the Prince of Orange on condition that England transferred to them the burden of Austrian loans. He asked the British Government to lend its support to these arrangements.

When Minto brought forward the unratified convention of 1797, as an insuperable obstacle to political concert, Thugut replied that the Emperor feared to ruin his credit in Germany by avowing that he had borrowed money at such high interest in the English market. If, however, the British Government would engage to keep the transaction secret till the close of the present war, ratification might be obtained.*

There is reason to doubt whether Thugut, in this apparently frank revelation of rapacity, made a full avowal of the ambitious designs he had formed in the intoxication of rapid conquest. A few months later Lord Keith, commanding the naval forces of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, sent Dundas from Palermo the substance of what purported to be a memorandum on Italy, presented by the Imperial Chancellor to his sovereign.† In this document the policy is insisted on of bringing all the states of that peninsula under the Emperor's sway, either as absolute possessions or as dependencies. In the latter category figure the Kingdom of Naples, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and whatever remnant of territory Austria might leave to the Pope. The communication seems to have been made to Lord Keith by the Queen of Naples, sister of the Empress, both of these ladies being political antagonists of Baron Thugut.

The British Cabinet was quite willing, so far as the Emperor Paul could be induced to consent, to give Austria a free hand in Italy. It was desirable for British interests that stronger barriers should be raised in every quarter against French aggression. Pitt even considered that compensation for the King of Sardinia was rather a matter of favour than of right. As for the wishes or interests of the populations affected by these territorial changes, if they entered at all into the calculations of statesmen at that time, they weighed as chaff in the balance of political advantage. But English distrust of Thugut's methods had not been diminished by Dietrichstein's mission to Switzerland and the explanations of it given at Vienna. Thugut, indeed, vehemently repudiated all responsibility for his emissary's language, but no one seems to have attached any credit to

* Minto to Grenville, 16-31 August, 1799. Public Record Office.

† Keith to Dundas, February 10, 1800. P. 122.

the denial. And the British Cabinet, though placing a much higher value on Austrian co-operation than it had done earlier in the year, still looked on a Russian alliance as the main plank—in fact the only sound plank—of its Continental system. Lord Grenville, therefore, instructed Lord Minto to inform Thugut that the British Government would enter into no negotiation with that of the Emperor without the concurrence of the Tzar, its best ally; and that the financial convention, when ratified at Vienna, must be laid before the British Parliament. These conditions being satisfied, it would do everything in its power to promote Austrian interests in Italy.*

The season for military operations on a large scale in 1799 having now passed, the British Government prepared a new plan of campaign for 1800, which Lord Grenville sent to Mr. Wickham to be laid before Souvorow. Following nearly the same lines as that which had failed so signally, it proposed to assemble in Switzerland an army of 100,000 men in British pay, under the marshal's command, composed as to two-thirds of Russians and as to one-third of Germans, Swiss, and French. But to supply deficiencies of the Russian military organisation there was to be an English commissariat and a staff of English, German, and French officers formed by Lord Mulgrave, who was to fill the post of adjutant or quartermaster general, besides taking command of the Swiss.

Souvorow reached Swabia in very bad humour with the Austrian officials, whom he held responsible for his defeat; with Thugut for removing him from Italy and exposing his army to destruction, with Melas for delaying his march by not furnishing means of transport, with the Archduke for returning too late to Switzerland to give him support. The infantry under his command, including Korsakow's troops, now a mere mob of marauders, did not exceed 28,000 men. They were in absolute need of rest, re-organisation, and re-equipment. Nevertheless he immediately proposed to the Archduke a combined attack on Masséna, who now occupied the position at Zurich so long held by the Austrians. The Archduke, fettered by instructions from Vienna, offered in reply to distract the attention of the French by a demonstration in force, while the Russians assaulted the fortified lines of a victorious and much stronger enemy. This answer, and still more the form in which it was conveyed, stirred the smouldering antagonism of the two generals to open quarrel. Souvorow, on assuming the chief command in Italy, had been made an Austrian field-marshal by the Emperor Francis II. For his subsequent victories his own sovereign had created him prince, with the title of Italiski. The Archduke, animated by jealousy and dislike, would only allow him, in official communication, the rank of Russian Field Marshal. And Souvorow, fiercely resenting the omission of his other titles as a deliberate slight, returned insult for insult, refused an invitation to a personal conference, and prepared to withdraw his troops into winter quarters at Augsburg. This trouble was still brewing when Wickham paid the first of several visits to the marshal to arrange with him a new plan of campaign. The British minister had already conceived almost unbounded admiration for the Austrian army, and particularly for its commander and its staff, with whom he had

* Grenville to Minto, August 31, 1799. Public Record Office.

associated for some months, on a footing of intimacy. It would not be surprising, therefore, if their prejudices and animosities should in some measure, without his knowledge, have coloured his views of the Russian army and its general. His letters certainly deal faithfully with everything in Souvorow's character or conduct that seemed to his sharp scrutiny to savour of eccentricity or invite censure. But they testify, more grudgingly perhaps, but not less amply, than those of Lord Mulgrave, to the extraordinary vigour of mind, clearness of view, and firm grasp of the whole military situation displayed in the Marshal's conversation. And the impression of the old warrior they leave on the reader's mind, as of one easily roused to anger but easily appeased, frank and courteous to strangers, and greatly beloved by all who lived in close relations with him, is certainly pleasing. Souvorow listened attentively, but without approval, to the plan sketched by Lord Grenville; and repeated to Wickham the objections he had already stated to Lord Mulgrave. The idea of a composite staff, hastily gathered from all nations, moved him to mirth. The Swiss and Bavarian levies, he said, should be given to the Archduke to strengthen his army. "I want to go to Italy because my troops and officers are not fitted for mountain warfare. I want to march into France by Dauphiné while the Archduke operates in Switzerland and Franche Comté." If this arrangement could not be made, he still insisted on having an Austrian staff of his own selection and a mixed army of Russians and Austrians under his command. Into the burning question of the pillage and indiscipline of his troops, which provoked loud outcries in Switzerland and Germany, and gave Baron Thugut just ground of complaint, he would not enter. But some of his officers were less reticent, and they enabled Wickham to form some estimate of the difficulty of applying a remedy. The Russian soldiers had been used in their Eastern campaigns to live by pillage. Without better pay and a commissariat they must plunder or starve. His army was a favourite hobby of the Tzar. He was so proud of it, so assured of its perfect organisation by old generals who flattered his foibles, that Souvorow himself did not dare to suggest improvement. It was only from Count Woronzow in London that any hint of deficiency would be tolerated, and then only as an echo of English opinion. Wickham, therefore, proposed to Lord Grenville to make use of Woronzow's reports to open the Tzar's eyes to the wants of his troops. In the meantime the atmosphere in which the Minister lived was hot with strife. The Archduke protested loudly against the withdrawal of the Russians to Augsburg, leaving him to face Masséna alone. Italiskí replied with taunts. Grand Duke Constantine Paul's second son, now serving his apprenticeship to arms, a half-crazed malignant savage, blew the coals of discord with all his might. Wickham, in despair, hastily summoned Lord Mulgrave back from Vienna to mediate between the enraged chiefs. But Mulgrave, finding that he could do nothing with Thugut, had already gone to Berlin on his road to England. Then a passing dread at Vienna of the Tzar's rising anger allayed the storm. The Archduke lowered his tone to entreaty, and the arrival on the scene of Prince Esterhazy, bearing the order of Maria Theresa and friendly greetings from the Emperor Francis to Souvorow and the

Grand Duke, seemed to have reduced conflict to general accord, when an insulting expression applied to him by the Archduke, coming to Italiski's knowledge, provoked a furious retort which put an end to all hope of co-operation between the two commanders. Luckily for Germany the unprovided state of Masséna's army disabled that skilful general from profiting by the discord of his enemies.*

Having learned from Lord Minto that the Imperial Government could not be forced or persuaded to allow Souvorow to resume command of its armies in Italy, and from Mr. Wickham the result of his conferences with the Russian marshal, Lord Grenville drew up a new project of concert against France, and sent it early in November to Sir Charles Whitworth to be laid before the Tzar. By this scheme the Russian troops to be assembled in Switzerland were to be paid at the rates current in German armies. In order to secure the co-operation of Austria, Baron Thugut was to be asked to furnish the general plan of campaign for the coming year, which would be transmitted to St. Petersburg for Paul's approval. And as an additional means of binding the Emperor Francis to act in strict concert with his allies, it was suggested that he should be allowed to retain possession of Piedmont and Savoy, the King of Sardinia receiving Tuscany and the Papal Legations in exchange, and the Austrian Netherlands being handed over to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. In return for this concession to its Italian aims the Austrian Government was to satisfy Souvorow's requirements of an Austrian staff of his own selection and a body of 30,000 Austrian troops under his exclusive orders, and to furnish the magazines, guns, and whatever else might be needful to equip his army for a campaign. To act in co-operation with Souvorow, Lord Grenville added, the Archduke would have 100,000 men on the Rhine and Melas 80,000 in Italy, and 70,000 British troops would be available for descents on the coasts of France to support Royalist insurrections. The internal discord of the Republic and the impaired strength of its Government opened, he considered, a certain prospect that these forces, acting cordially in unison, would accomplish all the aims of the coalition in the course of another campaign. It was also suggested that the 15,000 Russian troops which had returned to England from Holland might be employed in the Mediterranean to conquer Majorca for the Tzar. Whitworth was enjoined to do all in his power to reconcile Paul to these proposals and to remove any jealousies or suspicions that insinuations hostile to England might have sown in the autocrat's mind. He was to state that the British Government would take no step in foreign policy without the Tzar's concurrence; to repeat in the most emphatic manner that it had no selfish designs on Malta, but would place that island, as already agreed upon, at the Tzar's disposition, and would soon propose the formation of an English branch of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. To give more effect to Whitworth's representations Lord Grenville despatched Sir Home Popham, who had won Paul's favour when negotiating the Dutch expedition earlier in the year, on a second mission to St. Petersburg.

Concurrently with these instructions to Whitworth, others went

* Wickham to Grenville, October 17, *et seq.* Public Record Office.

from Whitehall to Lord Minto to apply to Baron Thugut for a plan of campaign, and to require of him the Austrian staff, troops, and military equipments needed for the formation of Souvorow's army in Switzerland. If this demand were refused Minto was to announce that George III. would take no further part in the war on the Continent, and would advise the Czar to follow his example. In the communication to the Tzar we find Lord Grenville, for the first time, urging the necessity of concert with Austria, which Paul had vainly insisted on, when the coalition was forming. It does not seem probable that the modified English project would have been acceptable to either of the powers to which it was addressed; but hardly was it launched when a blast from St. Petersburg swept it into the limbo⁴ of political abortions. Paul's anger had been so excited against the Austrian Government by complaints from Italy, and the evacuation of Switzerland by the Archduke, that news of the defeat of his armies by Masséna produced an explosion of resentment which found vent in a peremptory order recalling Souvorow and his troops to Russia, and in letters to the Emperor Francis II. and King George III. His letter to the Emperor declared their alliance suspended until satisfaction had been given for recent disloyal action, by the dismissal of Baron Thugut from office, and the renunciation of Austrian projects of annexation in Italy. That to George III. announced the rupture of Paul's alliance with the Emperor, and proposed a new league of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden to curb the rapacity of Austria, while continuing war with the Republican government of France. Having himself broken off relations with the King of Prussia for not joining the coalition, Paul suggested that Thomas Grenville should be sent back to Berlin to smooth the way for a reconciliation. With the same object in view he had ordered, he said, Baron Krudener, his Minister at Copenhagen, then returning home on leave of absence, to halt at Berlin, and take advantage of any opening for a renewal of friendly intercourse.* This letter does not appear to have been answered. It had, indeed, a very different effect on British policy from that intended by its author. The quarrel of the Emperors and the recall of Souvorow put an end to British plans of campaign in Switzerland. Lord Grenville therefore reduced the application for Russian troops he had made through Whitworth and Popham to 15,000 or 20,000 men to reinforce the army of Archduke Charles, and 30,000 or 40,000 more, including those already in England, to serve in British expeditions to France and Holland. About the same time—November 26—he instructed Lord Minto to ask Baron Thugut for frank explanations with a view to concert between Great Britain and Austria in carrying on the war against France. On the other hand, jealousy of Austria, always a ruling motive of Prussian statesmen, and now common to Russia and Prussia, could not fail to bring these powers again into accord. Baron Krudener, breaking his journey at Berlin, was welcomed by Count Haugwitz, and the conferences that followed between these ministers restored the amicable relations of the sovereigns they represented.

The answer of the Emperor Francis to the Tzar's letter expressed

* Paul I. to Count Woronzow, October 15, 1799, p. 32.

regret for Paul's dissatisfaction, but ignored his complaints and his demand for reparation, and insisted on the right of Austria to an extension of dominion in Italy. Earlier in the year Count Dietrichstein had arranged a marriage between Paul's daughter, the Grand Duchess Alexandria, and Archduke Joseph, Palatine of Hungary. It was a scheme of Baron Thugut to draw the Tzar away from George III. into closer relations with the Emperor. But although Paul, from affection for his daughter, would not now break off this match, he did not allow it to affect his political attitude. He refused to receive Dietrichstein at his Court, and in a rejoinder to the Emperor declared in emphatic terms his intention to oppose Austrian encroachment on Sardinian or Papal territory. Shortly afterwards, Lord Grenville's representations, supported by the reports of Count Woronzow and the counsels of Count Panin, now Russian Vice-Chancellor, shook the resolution Paul had taken to withdraw from the coalition. At the end of November he sent permission to Souvorow, who was returning home by slow marches, to halt in Bohemia, while negotiations went on at Vienna. But the Emperor and Thugut, now irritated to the pitch of defiance by interference with their Italian projects, refused at first to allow any Russian troops to remain in the Empire. Minto, in great alarm, interposed as a mediator, and hurried off to Prague to patch up a compromise. He found that he had undertaken an impossible task. Souvorow insisted on Lord Grenville's proposal—the command of a mixed army of 100,000 men, with an Austrian staff. Thugut would not give any Austrian troops, nor allow more than 20,000 Russians to remain in Germany. Fruitless altercations consumed several weeks, and were ended in January, 1801, by news of an incident in Italy which brought the two empires to the very verge of war. Ancona, after a long blockade by an army commanded by the Austrian General Froelisch and a Russian naval squadron under Admiral Ushâkow, surrendered to the former, who accepted, without objection, articles of capitulation drawn up by the French commandant in terms grossly offensive to Russia. He followed up this display of ill-will by ordering Russian flags to be torn down from the public buildings of the town and the ships in the harbour. Paul, on receiving his admiral's report, demanded an apology from the Austrian Government and the dismissal of General Froelisch. Thugut, influenced apparently by the spirit of contradiction which sometimes possessed him, threw all the blame on the Russians. Thereupon Paul, justly incensed, ordered Souvorow to return at once, and forbade Count Cobentzl to appear at his Court until the redress he had demanded was given. His hatred of Jacobin government restrained him from resorting to violent measures which might prevent or delay the restoration of the French monarchy. But he arranged with the King of Prussia for joint action to frustrate Austrian projects of annexation, when the time came to settle the terms of a general peace.

Meantime Thugut had produced his plan of campaign at the beginning of December. It discarded Souvorow and excluded Russians from the chief fields of military operations on the Continent. The Austrian armies, it declared, would be quite able to expel the French from Italy and Switzerland if the British Govern-

ment reinforced that of the Archduke with the 30,000 German auxiliaries Mr. Wickham was about to levy ; or, what would answer better, gave a subsidy to the Emperor to enable him to levy them himself. Russian troops, it added, could be used by the British Government with great advantage to the common cause in expeditions to Holland and the coasts of France, with which the Austrian armies might co-operate. In forwarding this sketch to Lord Grenville, Lord Minto reported in cipher that the Austrian Chancellor showed himself more eager every day to come to a thorough understanding with the English Government. In fact, notwithstanding the dogged obstinacy with which he clung to his projects and his antipathies, Thugut could not altogether shut his eyes to the peril involved in the improving relations of Russia and Prussia or his ears to Lord Grenville's repeated warnings against driving the Tzar to extremities. Then, again, financial difficulties weighed on him more heavily every day. His expectations of relief from the resources of Italy had been disappointed. Not only had French requisitions impoverished the country, but a spirit of passive resistance, aroused by the arrogance and ineptitude of Austrian officials, by old dynastic attachments, and by national aspirations, sealed up the ordinary sources of revenue in some of the occupied States. Slowly and with evident reluctance during the early part of December he receded from untenable ground. He reduced the Austrian demand of all Piedmont and Savoy to one for the Novarese, including Alexandria and other fortresses, for which the King of Sardinia should receive full compensation from Genoese territory. He agreed to make the restoration of the French monarchy a leading article of the common programme. Finally, he consented to ratify the financial convention of 1797. Having thus cleared his ground, he proposed as terms of alliance and concert—(1) that the British Government should relieve the Emperor of the burden of the last Austrian loan ; (2) that it should advance to him £1,600,000, soon afterwards raised to £2,000,000, of which £200,000 was required at once for pressing needs ; the whole to be repaid from a new Austrian loan to be floated after the close of the war with the help of British credit ; (3) that it should support the Emperor in the acquisition of the Papal Legations, the Novarese with its fortresses, and the city and territory of Genoa.

These proposals of Baron Thugut, coming immediately after the Emperor Paul's letter to George III., were followed by a complete change in the political attitude of the British Government towards its Imperial allies. The chief agent in effecting this alteration, so far as individual influence operated, was Mr. William Wickham. His mission to Switzerland in 1796-7 had won for him unbounded confidence from Lord Grenville. He returned to that country in 1799 invested with extraordinary powers, and instructed to act at once on his own judgment in all matters requiring prompt decision. Whatever arrangement Wickham should make, Lord Grenville wrote in confidence, he was prepared to approve as the best that could be made in the circumstances, and to give it full support. In the course of this second mission the British minister formed or renewed intimate personal relations with nearly all the Continental leaders of the coalition against France—with Archduke Charles and

Prince Italiski, with Baron Thugut at Vienna, Count Montg  las at Munich, and Advoyer Steiguer in Switzerland ; with the chiefs of the Royalist party in eastern and southern France, Pichegru and Willot its generals, M. D'Andr   its most influential and trustworthy agent, Count de Pr  cy the heroic defender of Lyons. These connections enabled him to throw light on various subjects of high importance, of which the British ministry had only very imperfect knowledge. It was mainly from Wickham's reports of the defects of Russian military organisation and the open hostility of the Russian and Austrian armies, that it learned the impracticability of its plans of campaign in Switzerland. Glowing descriptions in the same reports of the superb condition of the Austrian armies, under able commanders and staffs of extraordinary merit, taught it to form a new and quite different estimate of the comparative importance of Russia or Austria as an ally for accomplishing British aims on the Continent. It was also through Wickham that the Cabinet obtained its most valuable information in regard to the state of France. M. D'Andr   had for many years carried on secret correspondence with prominent men of all parties in Paris. Trimming politicians—and this category included nearly every Republican of note, not a regicide, under the Directory—who shrank from communication with ordinary Royalist agents as perilous indiscretion, confided without fear in D'Andr  , whose wary prudence, though often severely tested, was never found wanting. With like confidence D'Andr   freely disclosed to Wickham information which he withheld from babbling courtiers of the emigrant princes. Through this channel Grenville obtained copies of confidential reports to the French War Office of the diminishing strength of the Republican armies, and undoubted evidence of the internal distraction and financial distress which crippled the Directory. And it was these circumstances—the military superiority of Austria and the opportunity offered by the weakness of France—together with a conviction, founded on the pacific temper and failing revenue of England, that this opportunity must be promptly seized if their own Continental aims were to be accomplished, that shaped the action of the British Government at the beginning of the year 1800.

As an adviser under ordinary circumstances, and in matters with which his mission was concerned, Wickham appears to have been not undeserving of the trust reposed in him by Lord Grenville. He was able, zealous, hard-working, and personally devoted to his official chief ; an acute judge of men and political conditions, and skilful in turning them to advantage. Unsparing of himself, he was by his own confession irritable and exacting in his relations with subordinates whose methods did not please him or whose labours fell below his own high standard of public duty. We may also allow him the credit he claims for himself of being patient and wary in dealing with adversaries. And although his personal integrity was spotless, he seems, when British interests were to be advanced, to have been hardly less hampered by scruples than Count Haugwitz or Baron Thugut. In fact, his qualities as a public servant made him a type of what is called *efficiency*. He had also the defects of these qualities. His self-confidence led him to form estimates

which sometimes proved exaggerated, of the influence he exercised over men and events. Intensely practical, his mind seems to have been but slenderly endowed with the faculty of imagination, and therefore wanting in the insight which recognises genius of a high order, with its power of creating resources and opportunities, inspiring men, moulding events, working miracles. He read Baron Thugut in his changing moods like an open book. He could discern the great abilities and sterling qualities concealed from ordinary observers under the dull aspect of Archduke Charles. The superb order, exact discipline, and military pride of the Austrian army, the scientific methods of its staffs, "unequalled in Europe, and from whom it is more than probable that some of the first generals of modern times will spring," appealed so convincingly to him that he accepted it, at its own valuation, as practically invincible. But Souvorow remained to the end of their intercourse more or less of a mystery to him. It never seems to have entered into his calculations that the substitution of Melas for the Russian marshal as commander-in-chief in Italy could sensibly affect the fortunes of the war. Yet Souvorow's victories had been to a great extent instrumental in raising the military spirit of Austria from a state of profound dejection to that condition of arrogant self-reliance which so moved his admiration. Far more hurtful to the cause for which he laboured was Wickham's failure to see any particular significance in Bonaparte's return to France to grasp the reins of government. It hardly appears to have occurred to him that France under Bonaparte was a more formidable adversary than under Barras. This was, of course, blindness common to the whole British Cabinet. There is nothing more noticeable in Lord Grenville's correspondence at this time than the absence of any recognition of merit in Bonaparte. He is mentioned only to be depreciated. When he became First Consul, *Sa Mājestē très Corse*, figures in letters between Lord Grenville and his brothers as a ridiculous pretender. When the victorious Consul had pulverised the coalition, he became to them all an object of virtuous hatred, an incarnation of evil. But for Wickham, who lived in a broader and less prejudiced atmosphere, and who had seen, at the time of his first Swiss mission, all that he had been able to accomplish during many months of assiduous labour and secret intrigue completely demolished by Bonaparte's marvellous achievements in Italy, there was less excuse.

An instance of Lord Grenville's confidence in Wickham's judgment occurs in connection with a curious negotiation carried on during the year 1799 by the secretary of the Director Barras with the Royalist agents, M. Fauche-Borel and Count de Maison-fort, for the restoration of the French monarchy. The conditions agreed upon are set down at full length on pages 177-184 of Vol. V. The Emperor Paul, at the instance of Count de Provence, afterwards Louis XVIII., requested the British Government to advance the sum of twelve millions of francs demanded on behalf of Barras. Lord Grenville had no faith in the project, which was to be effected by one of the Republican armies, purged by Barras of its Jacobin elements and placed under the command of General Pichégrou, with the support of

the Russian army of General Korsakow. But he referred the whole matter to Wickham, with liberty to decide as he should think fit. What Wickham thought about it does not appear. All the papers relating to the scheme fell into Masséna's hands, together with Korsakow's personal effects, after the battle of Zurich, which crushed it out of existence. Among the incidents connected with the revolution of the 18th Brumaire nothing caused more general surprise than the tame submission of the redoubtable Barras, who had raised himself to power, and kept it, by three successful *coups d'état*, to expulsion from office without even an attempt to make terms for himself. The explanation seems to be that Talleyrand, who had been privy to the negotiation with Count de Provence, revealed it to Bonaparte, and thus delivered the peccant Director into the hands of his former *protégé*, the "little Corsican officer" of the siege of Toulon and Vendémiaire 13.

Although Wickham miscalculated the military power of Austria without Souvorow, and against Bonaparte, the advices he forwarded from France, however coloured by the passions and hopes of the Royalist party from which they emanated, could hardly exaggerate the distress and weakness of the Republic during the last days of the Directory. It was a condition of hopeless bankruptcy, of military inefficiency, of universal discontent rising to armed revolt in eighteen departments of the West. Impecuniosity was a chronic malady of the Republic, comparatively harmless in days of revolutionary fervour, fatal in days of national depression. It had originated in two fiscal innovations introduced by the National Assembly—one abolishing internal indirect taxation, which had supplied one-third of the revenue of the French monarchy; the other transferring the assessment of direct taxation to local authorities chosen by popular election. As these bodies neglected a thankless duty, the collection of national revenue annually fell more and more into arrear, and the widening gap between public receipts and public expenditure was covered by enormous emissions of *assignats*, which swamped the money market, and fell rapidly in value as a medium of exchange. During the dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety, revolutionary energy overcame all difficulties by placing the whole property and population of France under requisition for the public service. But in the re-action that followed the downfall of Robespierre, wholesale confiscation had to be abandoned. The governing authorities had recourse to new issues of paper money, and when these lost all value as national currency, to repudiation of public debt. During the year 1799 all the proceeds of taxation and all the resources of public credit had not sufficed to provide for one-half of necessary public expenditure. Every branch of the service was starved into inefficiency; army contractors, public functionaries, and other creditors of the State were not paid at all, or paid only by "bills of arrears," to be held over till money came into the Treasury, or exchanged for unsaleable national domains. Rich speculators bought up these bills for half the nominal value, and made immense profit by returning them to the Exchequer in payment of taxes. A progressive forced loan, designed by the Directory to fleece these capitalists, failed in its object, and swelled

public clamour. The armies unpaid, ill-fed, unsupplied with winter clothing or munitions of war, could hardly be held together. Especially the soldiers of the army of Italy, cooped up early in autumn by the Austrians in the barren mountains of Liguria, and closely blockaded along the whole coastline by English frigates, perished in great numbers of cold and hunger. Reinforcements supplied by conscription almost immediately abandoned their colours, and covered the roads, particularly of southern France, with brigands and sturdy beggars. And although the victories of Masséna and Brune and the discord of the allies allowed the Directory ample breathing-time in the autumn, it found itself unable to despatch troops to the revolted provinces of the west, where a spirit of resistance, provoked by the law of conscription, and fanned into fury by the law of hostages, blazed up in insurrection from the English Channel to the Garonne. The French 5 per cent. *rentes* fell to 7. After the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, Gaudin, whom Bonaparte made Minister of Finance, found less than £7,000 in the Treasury. Government lived from hand to mouth, as best it could. In the Minister's own words, finance no longer existed in France.*

A leading feature of the original British plan of military operations for 1799 was the despatch of a body of troops to Brittany in the autumn. When the army employed in the expedition to Holland returned to England at the end of October, Lord Buckingham urged that it should be sent at once to help the French royalists. More timid counsels prevailed. Lord Grenville replied that Government could not risk the loss of the 30,000 effectives who had come back from the Helder in an enterprise full of hazard at that late season. Its policy must be to nurse the military strength of the country during the winter, so as to have 70,000 men available for foreign service in the spring of 1800. In the meantime liberal supplies of money, arms and ammunition should be sent to Brittany to feed the insurrection. At the end of November he announced that two such consignments had already reached the French coast.†

On November 30, 1799, Lord Grenville officially informed Wickham that reports of the disaffection of General Masséna and his army to the new French Government had reached England, and authorised him to purchase their aid on any terms that might secure it. Wickham was also instructed to induce deserters from the Republican armies to take service under Louis XVIII. by offering them French military pay at the current rates. Count d'Artois, it may be stated, had been empowered to recruit the royalist forces in western France in the same manner to the extent of 70,000 men. A long *confidential* letter accompanied this despatch. It expressed Lord Grenville's "infinite obligations" for intelligence and advice which had been "his chief guide and direction" in recent difficulties, and had saved him from the error of trusting in Souvorow as the instrument designed by Providence to give victory to Great Britain in a final effort against France. For however able the British Government might be to carry on a defensive struggle for many years, one more Continental campaign was the limit of its power for offensive warfare. He felt confident that, even without Russian aid, Austria would be able to

* Thiers. *Consulate and Empire*.

† Court and Cabinets of George III.

reduce France to the frontiers of 1789, perhaps to restore the French monarchy, if Thugut could be brought to pursue a straightforward course. The English Government on its side was silently preparing for "an immense effort" in the following spring to support the royalists of western France. Bonaparte could only maintain his power by using French armies to repress his Jacobin enemies. This necessity must leave him without troops to oppose western insurgents, or Austrian foes advancing from the east. His only resource, therefore, lay in a negotiation for peace. If this expedient failed him, as it must "if there was a grain of sense in Austrian councils," he should have to choose between deportation to Cayenne and submission to Louis XVIII. In order to force the Consul quickly to one of these issues, Wickham was urged to raise insurrections during the winter in the south and east of France, which might distract attention from La Vendée and co-operate with British expeditions in the following spring. In carrying out these instructions he was to act on his own judgment without fear or delay, and to continue supplying the Cabinet with information and advice.*

On December 13 Wickham replied to these communications by a public despatch and a private letter. In the former he reported that, with the approval of Archduke Charles, he had commissioned General Pichégrou to enrol an army of French deserters to act with the Austrians in Franche Comté; and General Willot to collect another army of the same material in Dauphiné. Willot would concert operations with General Melas and with the British commanders in the Mediterranean. Count de Précý would raise Lyons and the surrounding districts. Trustworthy intelligence had enabled him, Wickham wrote, to form an estimate of the comparative strength of the opposing forces in the next campaign. The Archduke would have under his orders 100,000 Austrians on the Rhine, and Melas the same number in Italy. To the Rhine army Wickham hoped, by Swiss enrolments and German treaties, to add 40,000 men in British pay, and 20,000 Sardinians might also be taken into British pay to reinforce the army of Melas. On the other hand, the military strength of France was greatly exaggerated in official returns. The army of Italy, exceeding on paper 60,000 men, had only 30,000 effectives. Bonaparte by great efforts might be able to place in the field from 150,000 to 180,000 men altogether, a force inferior to the Austrians in numbers, and still more in quality and equipment. As to financial resources, a leading banker of Paris calculated the extraordinary aid the Consul might be able to obtain, by using every means at his disposal, at three and a half millions sterling; a sum utterly inadequate to supply the needs of the French armies. In conclusion, the despatch stated that the new French Government would probably have general support for a time. "It seems possible that the war will be conducted with more talents and energy than has lately been the case." But Bonaparte "cannot steer long between Jacobins and Royalists." If he fails to obtain peace he must lean for support on the former, and forfeit public favour, as he can only carry on war by resorting to revolutionary methods.

In his private letter of the same date Wickham wrote—The question (of carrying on war) is reduced to this: "are you prepared

to throw yourselves into the arms of the House of Austria or no? If not, renounce at once every idea of a Continental war against France, for you can neither carry it on without Austria nor force her to carry it on in any other than her own way." Lord Grenville, he continued, must alter his methods, must flatter and cajole and feign confidence, instead of dictating military operations and criticising political action. By doing with a good grace what he cannot help, giving Austrian strategists a free hand, by praising and occasionally pensioning them, he can exercise considerable influence over the movements of Austrian armies. Above all things, it was necessary to avoid showing distrust of Baron Thugut, however tortuous and irritating the Chancellor's conduct might be. His quarrel with the Russians had fixed him on his throne for ever; reconciling to him his bitterest ill-wishers, the army of the Rhine and the states of south Germany, which had hated him for hating their favourite, the Archduke. He now reigned without rival or possible successor. The British Cabinet, as we shall see, followed this counsel, though in some respects with halting steps.

When Lord Grenville instructed Sir Charles Whitworth in November, 1799, to ask for Russian auxiliaries not only to take part in British expeditions to the coast of France, but also to reinforce the Archduke's army on the Rhine, he must have felt that he was making a hazardous experiment on the Tzar's temper. Writing at the same time to inform Lord Minto of his efforts at St. Petersburg in favour of Austria, he added—"Far from blaming the Emperor of Russia, I must say if I were a Russian minister I should be very deaf to the remonstrances of England on the subject." And this was before news had come of the outrage at Ancona, which aggravated previous injury by public insult. The tacit refusal of the British Government to espouse his quarrel with the Emperor Francis, still more its application to him, urged by Whitworth with indiscreet zeal, to stultify himself in the face of Europe by helping Austria to despoil princes whom he had pledged himself to protect, could not fail to incense Paul, and call down his anger on the diplomatist who identified himself with such a proposal. Ill-feeling also arose out of the failure of the joint expedition to Holland, which prevented any further association of English and Russian troops in a common enterprise. In his reports, official and private, of the attack on Brune's positions near Bergen on September 19, the Duke of York had cast the whole blame of defeat on the headlong indiscipline of the Russian column led by General Hermann. On the other hand, the Russians complained that, having occupied Bergen, they were left without British support, to be crushed by an overwhelming concentration of French troops. And as Mr. Windham remarked in a letter to Lord Grenville, the absence of any report of the movements of the column contiguous to the Russians, and under the immediate command of the Duke, left it open to doubt whether, though the Russians advance had been precipitate, that of the English might not have been tardy. Whatever the merits of the case, Hermann's defeat and capture occasioned recriminations in the allied army which had an injurious effect on its subsequent operations. After the return of the expedition to England, General Essen, Hermann's successor,

both in general conversation and in a report to his sovereign, attributed the bad success of the military operations to the incapacity of the Duke of York. His language aroused great resentment at the Court of George III. and in the highest English military circles. And although Paul, in consequence of advices from Count Woronzow, dismissed both Hermann and Essen from his service, the accusations of the latter general, constantly repeated at St. Petersburg, appear to have rankled in his mind. Under these adverse influences, while Dundas, hitherto an advocate for treating only with Russia as an ally in Continental affairs, now declared that Russian soldiers could only be used with advantage in small detached bodies, drilled and commanded by English officers, the Tzar, when authorising the employment of Essen's troops in an expedition to Brittany, made the condition that they should not be commanded by an English general, and especially not by the Duke of York. About the same time Count Tolstoi, a Russian officer who had been attached to the headquarters of the Archduke at Zurich, returned to St. Petersburg. Questioned by the Tzar, he blurted out the whole truth of the deficiencies and depredations of Korsakow's army. Paul's resentment seems to have fallen on the Russian generals who had shrunk from incurring his anger by dispelling his illusions. Souvorow sank into the grave under the shock of a curt message from an ungrateful master announcing his disgrace. Other Russian generals were deprived of their commands. And Count Vioménil, a French *émigré*, was placed at the head of the 15,000 Russian troops wintering in the Channel islands, with authority, under Count Woronzow's direction, to form a French staff, and supply whatever else was necessary to make them a fighting machine formidable only to an enemy. The disinclination, however, of the British Government to send any of its troops to act with those of Vioménil, on the ground of incompatibility of temper, put an end to the project of an expedition to Brittany, and the Russians returned home in the spring of 1800. Other causes of dissatisfaction at the Court of St. Petersburg were the refusal of George III. to allow British officers who had served in Holland to wear Russian decorations sent to them by Paul, and the convention of El Arish for the evacuation of Egypt by the French, signed on board Sir Sidney Smith's ship the *Tigre* by General Kleber and the Turkish Grand Vizier. Sir Home Popham, who had started for St. Petersburg in November, 1799, bearing a letter from King George to the Tzar, and charged by Lord Grenville with explanations on every point likely to provoke discussion, being delayed by contrary winds, did not reach his destination till late in the following March, when cordial alliance had given place to complete estrangement. Paul's enmity to the Republican government of France had not yet diminished, but it was now counterbalanced by enmity to Thugut and his Italian policy. And he fell back into alliance with Prussia and the Prussian system of vigilant inactivity, to watch his enemies exhausting themselves in a final struggle, and intervene at the crucial moment to dictate terms of peace.

With the end of the year came Bonaparte's letters to the chiefs of the coalition, proposing peace. Lord Buckingham, to whom

Lord Grenville sent a copy of the Consul's letter to George III., as a new year's gift, counselled his brother to return a "moderate" answer, it being for the interests of the Ministry to conciliate public opinion, which inclined strongly to negotiation. The British reply, or rather replies, were wholly written by Lord Grenville, though altered from the original form in deference to suggestions from Pitt and Canning. Thomas Grenville informed Lord Buckingham that the answer to the Consul's letter caused a good deal of dissatisfaction even among supporters of the Government. It was in fact a public declaration of the convictions already expressed in Lord Grenville's confidential letters to his brothers and to Wickham. "His very Corsican Majesty," without adequate resources in men or money for carrying on war, or independent support from either of the two hostile parties that divided France, could only maintain his position by making peace. It would be sheer folly, therefore, on the part of the allied powers to negotiate instead of crushing him, and thus ending the war on their own terms. And this opinion of Bonaparte's extreme weakness found support in the inaction of the French armies during the winter, in striking contrast to the all-conquering energy he had hitherto shown in war. But events in France had already disproved the assumptions on which Lord Grenville based his train of reasoning, making it clear that the great mass of the French population were neither Jacobins nor adherents of Louis XVIII. They would no doubt have preferred some form of constitutional monarchy, such as that accepted in 1791 by Louis XVI. to the feeble and corrupt Jacobinism of a Directory which trampled on civil and religious rights and prolonged war to serve its own selfish ends. But the Frenchmen who would have welcomed back a monarchy of divine right, the *ancien régime* with its inequalities and abuses represented by the emigrant princes, at the price too of national humiliation and diminished territory, formed only a small minority of the nation. The return from Egypt of the victorious general who had dictated the peace of Campo Formio, the most glorious in the national annals, awakened in France a sense of profound relief. His seizing the reins of government was sanctioned by general support. The conciliatory measures that followed, repealing proscriptive decrees, opening the churches for Christian worship, inviting able men of all parties to unite in serving the State, increased public confidence. With confidence, credit revived, and the great obstacle in his way, financial distress, rapidly diminished. Instead of the three and a half millions sterling to which his prospect of borrowing was limited in the reports sent by Wickham, he contrived to raise thirteen and a half millions—an amount insufficient for the needs of the Consular government, but enough to give it a fair start.* If the French people ardently desired peace, Bonaparte also sincerely desired it as necessary for France and for the establishment of his own power. But it was peace on lines not too dissimilar from those of Campo Formio. He knew well that peace on terms to which the British Government would consent must destroy the reputation for success on which his authority rested. It is probable, therefore, that the haughty and scornful answer returned to his overture to George III. was far from un-

* Thiers. *Consulate and Empire*.

welcome to him. Meant as a trumpet blast to rouse up opposition against him, it appears to have produced a contrary effect. It gave Talleyrand an opening for a telling retort. It silenced the cry for peace in France; and it stimulated the opinion which, as we shall see, was rapidly gaining ground on the Continent—that England, from selfish motives, prolonged a war by which she alone profited, while all other nations suffered.

The Tzar took no notice of Bonaparte's letter to him. To that addressed to the Emperor, Baron Thugut returned a courteous reply, putting aside rather than rejecting the overture, and leaving a door open for discussion which continued to the end of the war. This temporising policy gave Lord Grenville and his colleagues no little uneasiness. But Thugut refused to make any disclosure of the First Consul's proposals until the British Government had accepted his terms for an offensive alliance against France. Bonaparte was more successful in restoring the good relations between France and Prussia which had been interrupted in the previous summer. By giving assurances of his intention of withdrawing French troops from Holland at the conclusion of peace, and of supporting Prussian interests in Germany, he came to a friendly understanding with the Court of Berlin. Count Haugwitz testified his good wishes to the Consular Government by fruitless endeavours to reconcile it with the Tzar, and to dissuade the Elector of Bavaria from joining the coalition.

Negotiation did not retard strenuous preparations by all the belligerent powers for the renewal of hostilities in spring. Count d'Artois having notified in December his intention of putting himself at the head of the Breton insurgents, Pitt agreed to send him with a large body of British troops to the peninsula of Rhuis in the following spring, on condition that the plan of this expedition prepared by M. de Rozière, a French strategist, provided a safe landing place, a defensible position on the peninsula, and adequate facilities for re-embarkation in case of defeat. De Rozière insisted that his plan fully satisfied these requirements. But General Sir Charles Grey, to whom Pitt referred it for advice, condemned it in unqualified terms. Before any decision was announced, all opportunity of testing the merits of the project passed away. One of the first matters to which Bonaparte turned his attention on becoming Chief of the State was the pacification of western France. With this object he offered the insurgents full redress of all their grievances in return for submission, and authorised General Hédouville to arrange an armistice in order that terms of peace might be discussed. The theatre of civil war was divided into two sections by the River Loire. During the obstinate struggle for religion rather than for monarchy, ended by General Hoche in 1796, La Vendée, to the south of the river, had been turned into a desert. It still remained in a very impoverished state, besides being, during the greater part of the year, shut in from external aid by a treacherous coast. In the departments north of the Loire, particularly those of Brittany and Normandy, the fire and sword of Jacobin conquest had made much less havoc; and frequent communication with Count d'Artois, and consignments of money and arms from England kept the spirit of insurrection from flagging.

The disintegrating influence of these differing circumstances manifested itself in a conference of Royalist leaders held at Pouancé at the close of the year 1799. The southern delegates, swayed by the advice of Abbé Bernier, an able and politic ecclesiastic who had convinced himself of the stability and good intentions of the Consular Government, were for accepting Hédouville's poposals. Those from districts north of the Loire, following instructions from Monsieur, stood out for an additional pledge that monarchy should be restored, and despatched two of their number—Hyde de Neuville and Andigni—to Paris to treat with Bonaparte on this subject. An interview at the Tuileries effectually dispelled any illusions the envoys may have cherished that the First Consul intended treading in the footsteps of General Monk. And when, on their return, the chiefs at Pouancé sought to gain further time by spinning out negotiations, Bonaparte put an end to the armistice, and placed General Brune, a red-hot Jacobin, at the head of 60,000 troops to proclaim martial law and crush the revolt. The Vendéens immediately accepted the terms offered by Hédouville. The royalists of Anjou, Maine, and Brittany, after a feeble attempt at resistance, laid down their arms on the same conditions. The Norman chief, Count Frotté, who submitted last, was taken and shot in violation of good faith. The other leaders, with the exception of Georges Cadoudal, who retired to England, accepted the new order of things in France with more or less of good will. And the British Government found the chief avenue through which it hoped to assail the Consular Government effectually closed against it. For although it offered shortly afterwards to land Viomenil and his Russians on the Breton coast, it refused to risk British troops in such a desperate adventure.

In the middle of February the British Cabinet had definitely fixed the main lines of its policy for the year 1800 ; and Lord Grenville communicated its decisions to Mr. Wickham, Lord Minto, and Sir Charles Whitworth. Wickham was informed that all his plans had been approved and his advice adopted. He was authorised to conclude treaties with the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and minor states of southern Germany for troops to serve under Archduke Charles, at a cost to the British Exchequer of £1,000,000, afterwards raised to £1,500,000. £500,000 more was placed at his disposal, as secret service money, to defray the expenses of royalist armies under Generals Pichégrou and Willot. And the British Government undertook to send 20,000 British troops to the Mediterranean to co-operate with Willot.

Grenville's despatch to Lord Minto replied, as follows, to Baron Thugut's proposals. In addition to Wickham's expenditure, and £200,000 granted for the pay of Piedmontese troops, to serve under General Melas, £1,600,000 would be advanced to the Emperor in monthly instalments, without interest, to be repaid for a new Austrian loan at the end of the war. George III. renounced all claim to interfere by advice or criticism with Austrian military operations, and engaged to give them powerful support during the next campaign by expeditions to the coast of France. He approved of the territorial exchanges Thugut proposed making with the King of

Sardinia, who should be allowed to return at once to his dominions. If the Emperor did not wish to keep the Belgic provinces, they might be given, at his option, to the Prince of Orange, to Archduke Charles to hold as a fief of the empire, or to the Grand Duke of Tuscany as a means of facilitating Austrian arrangements in Italy. Whichever mode of settlement might be agreed on, the British Government would afford Austria the financial relief Thugut desired by transferring to them the whole burden of recent Austrian loans. In return, the Emperor was required not to consent to the retention of any part of the Netherlands by France, and not to negotiate separately with that power.

This altered attitude in regard to the disposal of Belgium was explained in a private letter to Lord Minto. The Cabinet, Lord Grenville wrote, did not expect repayment from Austria, and had in view an arrangement for preventing a great and constantly recurring waste of time and money in raising and training a new army at the beginning of every war. This was to garrison Belgic fortresses with British troops, and require of the new ruler to pay and maintain the garrisons in lieu of interest on the transferred loans. In this way, it was thought, Belgium might be secured against French aggression, and England, without expense to herself, might possess an army ready for immediate service whenever she found herself engaged in hostilities with any other power.

At the same time Lord Grenville, in a *most secret* despatch, instructed Whitworth to inform the Tzar that the British Government no longer needed Russian troops, and had concluded a new treaty with the Emperor, affording Austria considerable financial aid. He was to use every effort to remove any bad impression this intelligence might make on Paul's mind.

The task here imposed on the English Minister at St. Petersburg would have taxed the skill of a far abler and more tactful representative, after the repeated assurances given to Paul that the British Government would enter into no new engagements without his concurrence. It mattered little, therefore, that Whitworth was no longer in a position even to attempt it. His indiscreet language in conversation with Count Cobentzl, coming to the ears, or probably the eyes, of the Chancellor Rastopsin, who as Postmaster-General had discovered the key to the Austrian Minister's ciphered despatches, gave deep offence at the Russian Court. Paul no longer granted him audience, and at the beginning of February applied through Count Woronzow for his recall. Meantime, the relations of Russia and Austria became every day worse. An Austrian Court of Inquiry found the Russian charges against General Froelisch, commanding at Ancona, proved, and suspended him from his employment. This inadequate penalty inflamed to a higher pitch the anger of the Tzar, who recalled M. Katichew from a special mission to Vienna, and returned friendly letters from the Emperor and Empress unopened. Count Cobentzl, finding patient endurance of the slights daily put on him profitless, retired from St. Petersburg. In these circumstances its avowed preference for an Austrian alliance could not fail to alienate Paul from the British Government. Treating Whitworth as he had treated Cobentzl, he refused passports for the official messengers of

the English embassy. Sir Home Popham arrived late in March at St. Petersburg, and after a month passed in fruitless efforts to obtain audience from a Russian minister, or answers to official letters, returned home. About the same time Whitworth, lately solaced by elevation to an Irish peerage, received leave of absence from Lord Grenville. Paul, who had asked for his recall, then sent orders to Count Woronzow to repair to the Continent for the benefit of his health; and all friendly intercourse between the two Governments ceased.

Lord Minto expected, on receiving Lord Grenville's answer to Baron Thugut's proposals, that it would bring the two Governments into complete accord, and dispel all reserve as to Austrian negotiations with Bonaparte. To his astonishment, it threw the Imperial Chancellor into a towering passion. The British Government, Thugut complained, had not complied with his demands in essential particulars—a loan of £2,000,000, an immediate advance of £200,000, an undertaking to support the Emperor in annexing the Legations. Hot controversy followed, and Minto only averted a quarrel by conceding the points in dispute, with the exception of that relating to the Legations, which he referred to Lord Grenville. Thugut in return made a partial disclosure of his correspondence with Talleyrand, now French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He assured Minto that Bonaparte was willing to allow him his own way in Italy, and that the Emperor only continued the war in defence of English interests in the Netherlands. It was known, however, from Wickham's reports, that Bonaparte refused to surrender the Rhine provinces. And as Thugut felt confident of winning on the field of battle better terms from France than he could now obtain by negotiation, Minto had no doubt of the resumption of hostilities in the spring. Finally, the British Government agreed to advance £2,400,000 to the Emperor in three instalments of £800,000, payable on the first days of April, June, and September, 1800; to advise the King of Sardinia to consent to the exchange of territory required by Austria; to acquiesce in an Austrian annexation of the Papal Legations. The treaty was to remain in operation till February, 1801, and the articles relating to Sardinia and the Netherlands were not to be published. The King of Sardinia, however, rejected the proposals made to him by Lord Grenville on behalf of Austria, and appealed to the Tzar, who promised to defend him. And although all Thugut's demands had been virtually conceded, the Emperor did not sign his new treaty of alliance with King George III. till the sword had again decided the fate of Europe. For some months Austria and Great Britain acted in concert, so far as the latter acted at all, without any binding agreement; Austria receiving no financial aid, and being at liberty to negotiate separately with France. This hesitation astonished, as well as embarrassed, the British Cabinet. But all classes in Austria, as we learn from the despatches of British Ministers at Vienna, opposed a continuation of war for the expulsion of the French from the Netherlands, or a restoration of the French monarchy. And Thugut probably thought that, by one or two Austrian victories at the beginning of the next campaign, he might obtain all he wanted, without committing himself to a pursuit of objects more particularly affecting the interests of Great Britain.

In the meantime Mr. Wickham was making treaties for the hire of German troops with the Electors of Bavaria, the Duke of Wurtemberg, the Circle of Swabia, and finally, the Elector of Mainz. His most difficult task was first accomplished. Bavaria had been saved from annexation to Austria by Frederick the Great of Prussia. Since then the Electors had regarded the Kings of Prussia as political allies and the Emperors as political enemies. Bonaparte spared no effort to keep Bavaria out of the coalition. And King Frederick William III. of Prussia, supported by the almost unanimous voice of public opinion in the Electorate itself, brought all his influence to bear on the same side. On the other hand, the Elector was swayed towards an Anglo-Austrian alliance by Count de Montg  las, a Minister hateful to his states and people as an innovator of the same type as the Emperor Joseph II. As Montg  las's principles naturally inclined him to favour France, Wickham could only account for his political action by a desire to relieve the pecuniary needs of his sovereign, and make him independent of the Bavarian states. It would seem, however, from a remark in one of the English Minister's later letters, that the secret service fund at his command enabled him to use arguments convincing to Montg  las. Distracted by these rival influences the Elector appealed to the Tzar for advice, who, still eager to restore the French monarchy, turned the scale by counselling him to join the coalition, and promising him protection. But though successful in Germany, Wickham found his plans for raising troubles in the interior of France collapse before the growing power and popularity of the Consular government. The pacification of western France, the recall of Souvorow, Bonaparte's energy and comprehensive toleration, cowed or conciliated disaffection in the east and south. Pich  gru found no support in Franche Comt  , nor Pr  cy at Lyons; and Willot went on his mission tardily, and with little prospect of success. Frenchmen of all shades of opinion had rallied to the call of Bonaparte. Political exiles of every class—Carnot and Barth  lemy, former members of the Directory; Malonet and Mounier, devoted servants of Louis XVI., friends and councillors of Lord Grenville when living in England during the Reign of Terror—returned to France as supporters of the new system, and were welcomed back to public employment. Count de Prov  nce sent letters to the First Consul through Abb   Montesquieu and the Third Consul Le Brun; regicides and nobles of historic pedigree jostled each other in the *salon* of his wife. Wickham still inferred public penury from the unprovided state of the French armies. But, as he discovered too late, Bonaparte had already closed the gulf of national insolvency. One of the first measures the Consul obtained from the new Legislative Assembly was an Act transferring local administration, including the assessment of taxes, from councils chosen by popular election to Prefects and Sub-Prefects appointed by himself. From the searching and exact methods of these functionaries, not only a large increase of annual revenue, but a gradual gathering in of accumulated arrears, might safely be expected. The leading bankers of Paris, associated by Bonaparte to form the Bank of France, began to discount Government bills, and the more pressing needs of

the State were thus supplied. Another circumstance adverse to the coalition was the retirement of Archduke Charles in March from his command on the Rhine. This step, attributed officially to ill-health, but resulting mainly from impatience of Thugut's yoke, caused great dissatisfaction not only in the Austrian army, but also in the German states to which Wickham was accredited. Still this minister's letters to Grenville during March and April showed no abatement of confidence. Improvement in the financial condition of France operated gradually; and Bonaparte skilfully concealed his resources as well as his plans. He had transferred Masséna to Italy, and placed Moreau in chief command of the French army of the Rhine, which he raised by reinforcements to 100,000 men. But, as Wickham reported, it was ill-paid, ill-fed, ill-equipped, and discontented. It had no cavalry, the horses having died of famine; and the French Government being unable to purchase others, Moreau could engage in no offensive operations. Moreover, according to the reports, the Consul had exhausted all his resources to strengthen the army of the Rhine, leaving the army of Italy without reinforcement or supplies, in a miserable condition of weakness and want. The army of reserve at Dijon, composed of a few hundred of raw conscripts and invalids, was the jest of Europe. On the other hand, Wickham depicted the Austrian army of the Rhine, which he strengthened daily by German auxiliaries in British pay, as being in the highest state of spirit and efficiency. Marshal Kray, its new commander, the victor of Magnano, and a general of acknowledged merit, enjoyed Thugut's entire confidence. He had the additional advantage of being advised by three famous strategists—Schmidt, Weyrother, and the Marquis de Chasteler—who had been chiefs of the staff to the Archduke and Souvorow. For Weyrother's abilities, Bonaparte, as well as Souvorow, had expressed the highest admiration. "Between Schmidt, Weyrother and Chasteler," Wickham wrote on March 27, "there is at this moment a reunion of talents at the Austrian head-quarters such as never has been assembled before. If all this was destined to be beaten, 'he could only say that Providence has some great object in view beyond the reach of our faculties of which the Consul is to be the leading instrument.' " The accounts from Paris transmitted by him were equally encouraging. Bonaparte, being hemmed in by difficulties of every kind, had formed no plans. The Jacobins, enraged at his monopoly of authority and his partiality for Royalists, conspired against him under Bernadotte and other generals of note. Talleyrand secretly betrayed him. In this state of insecurity he could not venture to quit Paris, and had sent Berthier to represent him at the camp of Dijon. And, while Wickham thus buoyed up the hopes of the English Cabinet, Lord Grenville's frequent announcements to him of formidable British expeditions about to set sail for the French coasts, satisfied the Austrian leaders that no troops could be drawn from the interior of France to reinforce the armies of Moreau and Masséna.

The Austrians were the first to take the field. Early in April General Melas cut in two the long thin line of Masséna's army by a victory at Voltri; forced the French commander, with the greater part of his troops, to fall back into Genoa; and leaving General

Ott with 30,000 men to besiege that city, drove General Suchet, with the smaller section of the beaten army, across the River Var into France. By the general plan of campaign drawn up at Vienna, and communicated by Wickham in cipher to Lord Grenville, Marshal Kray was to remain stationary on the Upper Rhine till the surrender of Genoa should enable Melas to despatch 25,000 men across the Alps to assail Moreau in the rear. Then Kray, choosing according to his discretion one of the plans submitted to him by his three chiefs of the staff, was to cross the river and attack Moreau; while Melas forced the passage of the Var, and supported by Willot's levies and 25,000 British troops brought from Minorea by Sir Charles Stuart, pushed on into the interior of France. Genoa, closely blockaded on land by General Ott and at sea by Lord Keith, was known to be so short of provisions that its capture could be a question only of weeks, or perhaps even of days. But Masséna, by an extraordinary example of resolution and endurance, gained time for Bonaparte to execute a daring plan of counter attack, of which it does not appear that the famous Austrian strategists had formed a conception. Towards the end of April, while Kray, expecting every moment official news of the fall of Genoa, held his army in readiness to move, Moreau, deceiving him by skilful manœuvres, crossed the Rhine at Schaffhausen, turned the left wing of the Austrians, and captured their magazines at Stockach. Pursuing his success, he defeated Kray in well-contested battles at Engen and Möeskirch, and drove him across the Danube to Ulm. Only a great superiority in cavalry and artillery saved the Austrians from a decisive defeat. Their loss in killed and wounded did not much exceed that of the French, but their sudden discomfiture so completely demoralized them that Kray, being badly beaten in an effort to resume the offensive at Biberach, found himself reduced to absolute inaction. Moreau, having secretly despatched 15,000 men to cross the St. Gothard into Italy, and interposed between Kray's army and Switzerland, sat down quietly at Augsburg, to watch his antagonist. In the meantime columns of troops of all arms, fully equipped, marched across France to the head of the Lake of Geneva. When advices reached Paris that Moreau had passed the Rhine, Bonaparte started for Dijon, passed on to Villeneuve, and led 40,000 men across the Great St. Bernard, while 10,000 more crossed the Little St. Bernard. Melas was at Nice when a report reached him that Berthier, with the army of reserve from Dijon, had descended into Piedmont. The news troubled him little, recent intelligence from Vienna having assured him that it could only be a feeble attempt at a diversion. But he returned to Turin, leaving General Ulnitz to carry the *tête du pont* of St. Lorenzo which guarded the passage of the Var. An Austrian officer sent to Chivasso, having recognised Bonaparte, his report opened Melas's eyes to the gravity of the situation, and the Austrian army was ordered to concentrate without delay at Alexandria. General Ott, unwilling to lose a prize that seemed already within his grasp, delayed a day to offer Masséna the most favourable terms of capitulation; and the French general, long isolated from all intelligence, and not having one day's rations for his troops, marched out of Genoa with the honours of war. Ulnitz failed in repeated

assaults on the bridge of St. Lorenzo, and hurried away to the Austrian rendezvous, hotly pursued by Suchet, who formed a junction with Masséna in Melas's rear. In the meantime Bonaparte had turned aside to Milan to meet the French troops sent by Moreau, and take possession of the Austrian magazines in Lombardy. Having accomplished these purposes, he marched against Melas, and won a decisive victory at Marengo on June 14. Two days afterwards the beaten commander signed the convention of Alexandria, which allowed him to withdraw his army behind the Mincio, on condition of giving up Genoa and all the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy to the conqueror. Moreau's prolonged inaction was at first attributed, in accounts sent to England, to weakness resulting from losses in battle. But no sooner had advices reached him of Bonaparte's passage of the Alps than he crossed the Danube, dislodged Kray's army from its strong position at Ulm, and drove it before him like a flock of sheep till it found refuge behind the Inn. Being now master of Munich and nearly all Bavaria, which paid heavily in contributions for the policy of Montgélés, he referred an application from Marshal Kray for an armistice to Paris. And Bonaparte, having entered into negotiations for peace with the Emperor, agreed to a general cessation of hostilities till September.

Wickham's first reports to Grenville of the Austrian reverses on the Rhine, while frankly acknowledging, made light of them. Bonaparte, he wrote on May 8, had relinquished Italy in order to conquer it in Germany. His plans had been most skilfully conceived and admirably executed. He had paid up Moreau's army, and inspired it with such enthusiasm that, as all Austrian officers agreed, it surpassed in fighting power any French army hitherto sent into the field. Nevertheless, he had lost the game. Kray, whose situation was for a time critical, had now gathered all his scattered corps into a safe position, and was superior to the enemy in strength. And the surrender of Genoa, by leaving Melas at liberty to carry out the Vienna programme, must change the fortunes of the campaign. But Kray's disgraceful defeat at Biberach seems to have opened Wickham's eyes. Writing again a few days afterwards he described the Austrian camp as a scene of discouragement and confusion. The three chiefs of the staff were at loggerheads. Weyrother, whose plan Kray had adopted, was disabled by a fall. Schmidt, since the rejection of his plan, would give no further advice. The army hated Chasteler, and had lost all confidence in Kray. Only rest and the return of the Archduke could restore it to efficiency. Moreau's passive attitude puzzled him. And it was not till the end of May that intelligence from France enabled him to read the riddle, and inform Lord Grenville that the campaign would be decided by Bonaparte himself in Italy. His want of earlier information, as he explained afterwards, was a consequence of Thugut's quarrel with the Archduke. Fasbinder, head of the Austrian Intelligence Department, resigned with the Commander-in-Chief; and the branch of the service which he directed fell into complete disorder. At the end of April André sent Fasbinder word that Bonaparte was about to lead 50,000 men over the Alps; and on May 1 sent to Wickham himself full details of the expedition. But

the courier bringing them was detained for eighteen days at the Austrian out-posts, and they reached the English minister too late to be of service. His reports during the following months of the state of the Austrian army gave no hope of improvement without a change in the command. We hear no more from him of its famous Chiefs of the Staff, but his confidence in Archduke Charles seemed to increase with disaster. The ultimate success of the campaign, he wrote on July 15, depends on the question—"Shall we have the Archduke or no? If we have him we shall drive the enemy headlong over the Rhine in a week." And, again, on July 25, "with a commander-in-chief enjoying its confidence, it (the Austrian army) would beat the French army to pieces, even with Bonaparte at its head, and the ghost of Desaix to boot, to direct and encourage it in battle." In the meantime he concluded a new treaty with the Elector of Bavaria for additional troops, those already hired having fought with conspicuous valour. This negotiation, involving a joint guarantee of the Electorate by Great Britain and Austria, took him again to Vienna. He found the whole population—court, nobles, citizens—as he had already found the Bavarians, crying aloud for peace. Thugut alone stood firm against the clamour, governed, Wickham thought, not so much by policy as by passion. His hatred of Souvorow had caused the fatal quarrel with Russia; his hatred of the Archduke led him to reject the sole means of resisting France. Wickham found also at Vienna, as well as in Kray's army, much dissatisfaction with Great Britain. The troops led by Bonaparte into Italy had been drawn chiefly from the west and south of France, to which the British Government had undertaken to send expeditions, so as to keep the whole sea-board in perpetual alarm of invasion. But, it was complained, they had failed to redeem their pledges. This was a reproach which Mr. Wickham must have found it difficult to answer. The military plans and operations of the English Cabinet during the year 1800, as presented to us in confidential letters of Pitt and Dundas, are a strange exhibition of miscalculation, wavering purpose, and ineffectual action. The "immense effort" announced by Lord Grenville to Wickham towards the end of 1799, which was to produce 70,000 troops for expeditions against France in the following spring, does not appear to have given Government the command of 30,000 troops for any enterprise during the whole of the year 1800. At the beginning of this year Pitt, as we have seen, was eagerly bent on sending a considerable force with Count D'Artois to Brittany. When this plan, which included the capture of Brest, hung fire, the Cabinet determined to send all available troops under Sir Charles Stuart to co-operate with the Austrians and insurgent royalists in Provence; and Dundas despatched that general on a preliminary mission to concert operations with Mr. Wickham and General Melas. But Stuart's sudden resignation from dissatisfaction at instructions given to him to restore Malta, when taken, to the Knights of St. John, caused this scheme to be postponed till it was no longer practicable. The English Ministry then turned its attention again to Brittany, and particularly to the capture of Belleisle. Pitt and Grenville seem to have believed for a short time that an attack on that island had

actually begun. But at the last moment the officers employed differed in opinion in regard to the chances of success. And as Dundas would run no risks, the attempt was abandoned. Pitt's mind seems to have veered from week to week, backwards and forwards between Brittany and the Mediterranean, under conflicting arguments of Grenville and Dundas, without ever settling on any definite conclusion. While English ministers discussed and consulted, Bonaparte withdrew every man fit for active service from the menaced coasts to win the battle of Marengo, which, by completely establishing his authority in France, gave them more effectual security against invasion. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who succeeded Sir Charles Stuart as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, in obedience to instructions from Mr. Dundas, employed the forces under his orders, originally destined for descents on France, in less hazardous expeditions to the coasts of Spain.

Probably at no other period of its history did the military reputation of England, in all respects except bravery in the field, fall so low as during Pitt's first ministry. It was not only the Emperor Paul who refused to allow his troops to serve under an English general; neither Baron Thugut nor General Melas could be induced to detach a body of Austrian cavalry to act in France under Sir Charles Stuart. Nor was this unflattering judgment merely the verdict of foreign opinion. The incapacity of British officers specially selected for important duties on the Continent is a subject of constant reproach and misgiving in the confidential letters of Lord Grenville and Mr. Wickham. On March 27, 1800,* Wickham wrote in reference to British officers sent to organise and pay a Swiss army corps—"I have sworn never to have anything to do with your military men again unless they will learn their own business better before they come abroad, or have a more moderate opinion of their own knowledge, and suffer themselves to be instructed. Besides, it is not to be conceived (bravery and presence of mind in the field excepted) how very cheap we are holden on the Continent." Again, on May 8—"Our officers, particularly those that call themselves staff-officers, are totally unfit for anything of the kind; and it is only since I have meddled with military arrangements myself, in consequence of their evident incapacity, that I have been able to judge of the extent to which that incapacity is carried." Lord Grenville replied on May 20—"I have long seen reason to judge as you do of the capacity of our officers. Something may be allowed for want of opportunity to learn; but if when that is thrown into their way they will not learn, they are incurable." Lord Elgin, British Minister at Constantinople, wrote on December 29, 1799, in reference to officers sent from the Horse Guards to train the Sultan's troops in a knowledge of military science: "Seeing Englishmen in authority in Turkey takes away all delight in reading Don Quixote."†

From the middle of July to the end of November, 1800, hostilities between France and Austria were interrupted by negotiations. Immediately after his victory at Marengo on June 14, Bonaparte sent Count St. Julien, one of his prisoners, with a second letter to the Emperor proposing peace. Unfortunately for Austria the envoy arrived at Vienna too late, the treaty with England, so long under

discussion, having been signed by Francis II. on June 20, a few hours before receiving news from Italy of the defeat of General Melas. The Emperor, in order to gain time, despatched St. Julien to Paris, whither the First Consul had returned, with a pacific answer. It gave the messenger no authority to treat; but Talleyrand persuaded him to sign preliminaries of peace; and Bonaparte sent him back with them to Vienna, accompanied by his aide-de-camp Duroc, who had orders to require acceptance or refusal of them within five days. St. Julien had to expiate his indiscretion in a Bohemian fortress. But Thugut wrote to Talleyrand announcing the mutual engagements of the Austrian and British Governments, and the willingness of the latter, as expressed to him by Lord Minto, to join in negotiation for a general peace. Conferring subsequently with Lord Minto on the conditions that might be obtained from Bonaparte, Thugut suggested that the secret articles of the Anglo-Austrian treaty should be abandoned as no longer attainable. But Lord Grenville declared in reply that the British Government would not be a party to any political arrangement which allowed France to retain Belgium. A congress with its protracted discussions must obviously, in the present state of the Continental campaign, be far more advantageous to Austria than to France. At the same time the French garrisons in Malta and Egypt, closely blockaded by British fleets, stood in pressing need of reinforcements and supplies. Talleyrand, therefore, demanded of the British Government, through M. Otto, a French agent in London, a naval armistice, with full liberty of communication by sea, as compensation to France for the benefits that would accrue to Austria from a prolongation of the military armistice. On this condition the French Government was willing to consent to a meeting of representatives of the belligerent powers at Luneville to discuss the terms of a general peace. The British Government desired negotiation as a means of gaining time, Wickham's reports having convinced it that the Austrian armies in their present demoralized condition could not continue the war on the Continent with any prospect of success. On the other hand, it knew that the fortress of Valetta must soon surrender for want of food. It had derived a very erroneous impression of the weakness and unprovided state of the French army in Egypt from intercepted letters of General Kleber and other discontented officers, written after Bonaparte's departure, with little attention to veracity, in order to justify to the Directory an unauthorised treaty with the Grand Vizier, which would enable them to return to France. And it wished to be at liberty to capture Spanish treasure-ships coming to Europe from America at the close of the year. With the view, therefore, of deferring the renewal of hostilities in Germany and Italy on any decisive scale till the following year, without materially compromising the particular interests of Great Britain, it offered to agree to a naval armistice of less than three months' duration, which would allow Valetta and Alexandria to be provisioned for ten days at a time. {Lord Grenville's sanguine temper and disposition to undervalue an antagonist were curiously exemplified in the belief he entertained that Bonaparte would eagerly grasp at this concession. A report reaching him from Paris through a foreign channel that the French

people called loudly for peace with England, he wrote to Pitt that this intelligence "may certainly enable us both to raise our demands as to terms, and to insist strictly on the conditions of our project of armistice."* He also wrote to Lord Minto that if England and Austria only stood firm, they might impose their own conditions on France. And he applied for passports for Mr. Thomas Grenville, whom he appointed to represent Great Britain at Luneville, where Joseph Bonaparte had already arrived as the representative of France. But the First Consul, on receiving Lord Grenville's answer, at once ordered ten days' notice to be given to the Austrian armies in Italy and Germany of the termination of the armistice. He then, as an ultimatum to the British Government, required liberty for six French frigates to go to Alexandria, and return, without scrutiny or hindrance. And on this demand being rejected, he refused passports for Mr. Grenville, and gave Austria the option of separate negotiation or war.

Wickham had reported on July 25, that to send the Austrian army on the Inn again into the field without a change of commanders would be "risking its utter destruction." Later on he wrote that Baron Thugut had made no attempt during the armistice to restore its spirit and discipline either by removing Marshal Kray or ridding it of incapable and jealous generals who caballed against him. When Moreau gave notice early in September of a renewal of hostilities, the Emperor repaired to the camp on the Inn to put an end to disorders by assuming the command. Count Lehrbach accompanied him as Minister in attendance, and General Lauer as Chief of his Staff. He found his army in no condition or disposition to fight. By Lehrbach's advice, but without consulting Wickham, he purchased a prolongation of the armistice for forty-five days, at the price for which alone Bonaparte would grant it—namely, the surrender of the blockaded fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg to Moreau. Wickham would have preferred, as he wrote, "to go back fighting to Vienna," and left the Austrian camp "to avoid committing himself."† Lord Grenville, in a letter to Count Staremberg, condemned this convention of Hohenlinden as "most shameful." Lord Minto wrote that Thugut had shed tears of rage and mortification at the dishonour of his country, and resigned his appointments of Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Emperor then placed Lehrbach at the head of the Foreign Office, with injunctions to be guided by the advice of Thugut, who still held office as Minister for Italy. But the old statesman could not brook this arrangement. If not at his instigation, certainly with his privacy and concurrence, Lord Minto demanded audience of the Emperor, and remonstrated in strenuous language against Lehrbach's appointment as an insult to Great Britain. Francis II., with a spirit which evidently astonished the British Minister, repelled the pretension of a foreign power to dictate to him his selection of public servants. And Thugut, seeing that he had allowed his passions to carry him too far, persuaded Minto to withdraw the obnoxious protest, and formulate the objection to Lehrbach in less offensive terms. The Emperor then placed Count Cobentzl in charge of the Foreign Office; and being incensed against Thugut for what Lehrbach and the public

* Grenville to Pitt, September 23, p. 329.

† Wickham to Grenville, September 20, p. 326.

voice of Vienna denounced as disloyal intrigue, he heaped reproaches on his old favourite, and never fully trusted him again. Having thus cast off the influence by which he had been so long governed, he appealed to Archduke Charles to resume command of the army of Germany ; appointed General Bellegarde to succeed Melas in Italy ; sent Count Cobentzl to Moreau's headquarters to ask for a further prolongation of the armistice ; and applied to the British Government for the second instalment of the £2,400,000 it had agreed to advance. The first £800,000 had been paid in August after the ratification of the Anglo-Austrian treaty at Vienna ; and Lord Minto now wrote that the Emperor was in dire need of the second, to supply the wants of his troops. Archduke Charles being disabled by illness from active exertion, a younger brother, Archduke John, took command of the Austrian army on the Inn, and began weeding out old officers, and making other reforms, which had been too long deferred. Cobentzl, having made his application at the French headquarters, proceeded to Luneville to confer with Joseph Bonaparte ; and thence, of his own accord, to Paris, at the invitation of the First Consul. Pitt and Grenville, inferring from this journey an intention to treat separately for peace with Bonaparte, refused payment of the second instalment of the Austrian loan. But Cobentzl, during a short stay at Paris, firmly refused to discuss any question but the armistice with Talleyrand, except in concert with Mr. Grenville. Returning to Luneville from a bootless mission he tried to persuade the British government to remove the obstacle to a conference by conceding Bonaparte's demand of free communication with Egypt. Lord Grenville refused, declaring that he had yielded too much already. Being now, however, somewhat reassured on the subject of Austrian good faith, he informed Lord Minto that £800,000 would be remitted to Vienna when news reached England of the actual renewal of hostilities in Germany. It was in these circumstances that the French and Austrian armies again took the field in the last days of November.

During the armistice between France and Austria the British government had directed its military operations against Spain. Spain was a member of the first coalition, and followed the lead of Prussia in making peace with the French Republic in 1795. After a short period of neutrality, irritation, caused by attacks on Spanish trade by British cruisers, led the government of King Charles IV. into uncongenial and unnatural alliance with the mortal foes of the House of Bourbon. When, however, the French Directory tottered to its fall in the summer of 1799, the Spanish government, which, owing to the imbecility of the king, meant his queen, an Italian princess, and her favourite, Godoy, Duke of Aleudia, showed a strong disposition to make peace with Great Britain. Bonaparte, partly by presents to Godoy, partly by working on the queen's ambition for the aggrandisement of the House of Parma, whose heir had married her daughter, changed incipient defection into feeble support. For the great monarchy of Charles I. and Philip II., supreme on land and sea during the greater part of the 16th century, had fallen into impotence, even for defence, under Charles IV. In the autumn of 1798, Sir Charles Stuart, in command of a small British force, finding Minorca practically undefended, had taken possession of the

island without firing a shot. A secret report from the minister of Sweden at Madrid, written in August, 1800, and communicated by Mr. Arbuthnot, British consul at Lisbon, to Lord Grenville, gives an astonishing picture of the weakness and impecuniosity of a power which still held sway over the richest countries of the new world.* Still the geographical position of Spain, its magnificent harbours and arsenals, its natural resources and high national qualities which two centuries of misgovernment had done little to impair, made its alliance of considerable importance to England or France. Portugal, since the Methuen treaty of 1703, had been closely united to Great Britain. Although also fallen on evil days, the Prince Regent, a son-in-law of the Spanish King, being unable, according to a confidential report from the British minister, Mr. Frere, to protect life and property even in the capital, it contributed troops and ships for the siege of Malta; and the Tagus at Lisbon afforded a safe and most convenient station for British fleets. In order to deprive Great Britain of this advantage, the Spanish government, by a compact with Bonaparte, undertook to compel Portugal to renounce its ancient alliance. Failing in persuasion, it resorted to threats, but could not equip an army to enforce them. The British government sent a small body of troops to aid its ally, and planned expeditions against Spanish arsenals, and galleons from America, to give the enemy employment at home, and gather in the rich harvest of plunder that lay at the mercy of an enterprising antagonist. In July Sir James Pulteney sailed from Minorca with 15,000 troops to capture Ferrol. The place seems to have been defended at first chiefly by the bravado of the Spanish commander. But this sufficed to hold Pulteney in check, till hasty musters reinforced the garrison; and then he re-embarked his army without venturing on an assault. A small share of the heroic audacity so conspicuous in the operations of the naval service would, no doubt, have made him master of the place.

In October Lord Keith carried Sir Ralph Abercrombie with over 25,000 troops to besiege Cadiz. This enterprise also failed. On closer view it seemed too hazardous to the British general, and he returned to Minorca without loss, but without any increase of honour. Another expedition, under the same commander, sailing for Leghorn, to aid the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Austrians, was forestalled by the unscrupulous energy of the French. General Dupont marching into the country before the armistice terminated, dispersed the Tuscan levies, occupied the capital, and seized an immense depot of British merchandise at Leghorn. Early in September, however, Malta surrendered to General Pigot.

So many miscarriages, and particularly in attempts which had seemed to offer all the conditions of easy conquest, caused great dissatisfaction in England. Dearth of food and of employment produced much misery and turbulence in many parts of the kingdom during the year 1800; and George III. seems to have been averse to despatching troops that could ill be spared at home on such uncertain ventures. It is evident from some of Dundas's letters that his relations, as war minister, with his sovereign, and with

the Duke of York, involved a good deal of friction in the course of the summer. We learn also from the Diaries of Mr. Windham and Lord Malmesbury that a little later in this year, the king meditated a change of ministry, which would have installed those statesmen in the offices of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville. Dundas, however, with little support from the rest of the Cabinet, organised the bold and fortunate expedition to Egypt, in which Abercromby amply redeemed any discredit that might have attached to him from previous ill-success, and closed a meritorious career by a splendid victory. Two letters, written in March, 1801, and included in this volume, from General John Moore, afterwards victor at Corunna, to his father, the author of "Zuleika," give us interesting accounts of the landing of the British army at Aboukir; and the subsequent action, in which Abercromby received a mortal wound.

While the coalition against France crumbled to pieces under the blows of Bonaparte in the south of Europe, a coalition to resist alleged abuses of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain took form in the North. Lord Whitworth's explanation of the rupture of friendly relations between England and Russia was, that the Tzar had gone mad. Paul, he averred, had been spoiled by flattery; in order to bring him to his senses he should be treated with indifference. No doubt Paul had been flattered and humoured to the top of his bent by envoys from many states of Europe imploring aid against the French Revolution. Among these, Whitworth himself had been conspicuous for the assiduity and success with which he paid court to the Russian sovereign. But a review of all the circumstances of this estrangement leaves the impression that a saner autocrat than Paul might well have felt aggrieved by the conduct of his partners in the coalition. The flagrant ingratitude of Austria when, owing in great measure to his support, it had risen from depression and peril to such a height of advantage as, in Baron Thugut's opinion, gave the Emperor control of the political situation, had been acknowledged by Lord Grenville as a just ground of quarrel. Yet the British Government, which had pledged itself repeatedly to act only in concert with the Tzar, in all whose plans he had cordially joined, not only refused to combine with him in saving from Austrian rapacity sovereigns whom he had taken under his protection as sufferers for the common cause, but concluded, without consulting him, a treaty which gave that rapacity free rein, and large help in men and money. No doubt Pitt's ministry shaped its altered course by the light of fuller knowledge of the political and military conditions with which it had to deal. And the credit it might fairly claim of acting from a sense of duty was not affected by the circumstance that its new views of British opportunities and interests, in exaggerating the military strength of Austria, and almost ignoring Bonaparte, proved quite as deceptive, and more disastrous than the old. But the change of policy might have been accompanied with more of consideration for a discarded ally, and more of forbearance for resentment which must have been foreseen. In fact Paul, however intemperate in his manner of treating individuals who incurred his displeasure, seems to have exercised, as a politician, considerable self-restraint. By reinforcing Souvorow's army when it halted on

the Austrian frontier, and listening to the overtures Bonaparte made to him through the King of Prussia, he might have completely paralysed Austria, or compelled the Court of Vienna to give the satisfaction he demanded. And, although he withdrew from the coalition, he continued to help the interests he had joined it to promote. Lord Grenville himself seems to have felt at a later date, as Mr. Pitt certainly felt, that if, in compliance with Paul's wish, an able and tactful diplomatist had been sent to replace Lord Whitworth, and aid the efforts of the Russian Vice-Chancellor, Count Panin, and of Count Woronzow in London, to maintain an English alliance, a violent breach of it might have been averted. But it was one of those emergencies in which Lord Grenville's distinguishing qualities as Foreign Minister asserted themselves. His public spirit was so high that it shrank from even the appearance of condoning an affront, especially from a power of the first rank. And he resented Paul's refusal of pass-ports for Lord Whitworth's messengers as an insult to George III. Moreover, from over-rating the value of a Russian alliance to Great Britain, he had passed to the opposite extreme of undue depreciation. It would even seem as if his tardy discovery of the defects of the Russian military organisation unconsciously brought with it a sense of injury, as if he had been duped. Instead, therefore, of listening to Count Woronzow's appeal to him to overlook the Tzar's breaches of international usage, as freaks of disordered impulse, he followed his own inclination and the counsels of Lord Whitworth, passing abruptly from flattering attentions to "indifference" and "affected neglect." Bonaparte adopted a different line. He considered the friendship of Russia an object of the highest importance for France; and, undiscouraged by the repulses his first advances had met, pursued it with remarkable skill. Having little prospect of being able to relieve Valetta, he offered to hand over the fortress to Paul as Grand Master of the Order of Knights Hospitallers. At the same time he took another step equally adapted to serve his purpose. 6,000 Russian prisoners captured in Holland and Switzerland still remained in France, the British Government having refused to take them in exchange for French prisoners in England. Bonaparte collected these soldiers, had them newly clothed and armed, and presented them to the Tzar as a tribute of respect to the Russian army. These marks of attention, directed to points on which he was particularly sensitive, from one whose exploits excited extraordinary admiration throughout Europe, could not fail to gratify Paul. He accepted both offers; authorised Baron Krudener, his minister at Berlin, to treat for peace with General Beurnonville, the Minister of France; and despatched General Springporten to take command of the Russian troops in France as a garrison for Malta. But though no longer hostile to the Consular government, he entered into no alliance with it, even when old relations with Denmark and Sweden brought Russia into conflict with Great Britain.

The Scandinavian kingdoms had been parties to the Armed Neutrality of the North in 1780, and to the Declaration of Maritime Rights issued in its name by the Empress Catherine II. of Russia. One of the propositions enunciated in this manifesto was that trading

ships of a neutral power, under convoy of a ship of war flying the national flag, were exempted from search by a declaration of the naval officer in charge that the cargoes belonged to the country he represented, and contained nothing "contraband of war." Pitt's government, on the other hand, asserted its right, as a belligerent, to search neutral vessels under all circumstances, for an enemy's goods or "contraband of war"; and British cruisers took forcible possession of Danish and Swedish frigates resisting search, as well as of the merchantmen they convoyed. All parties concerned in these collisions claimed redress for breaches of maritime law. And the violent interruption of their trade, to the great benefit of British trade, stirred public feeling in the countries thus aggrieved to the highest pitch of animosity against Great Britain. In August Lord Grenville sent Lord Whitworth, escorted by a naval squadron under Admiral Dickson, to demand satisfaction at Copenhagen for resistance offered by a Danish frigate in the Downs. Count Bernsdorff retorted that it was not from the victims of unjust violence that reparation was due; and, as Lord Spencer, at the Admiralty, thought the time inopportune for proceeding to extremities, a compromise was patched up, which delayed an open rupture, but settled nothing. The Tzar published a manifesto in defence of his allies, and laid an embargo on British merchandise until Admiral Dickson's fleet left the Baltic. Pitt had an uneasy sense of a storm brewing in the north. The Austrian alliance, on which he elected to lean, had already proved a broken reed; and the whole aspect of Continental affairs was discouraging. He suggested to Grenville, towards the close of summer, to send Mr. Garlike, Secretary of Legation at Berlin, to St. Petersburg, unofficially, but with dormant credentials, to confer with Count Panin. A proposal of the same kind came to Grenville from his brother-in-law, Lord Carysfort, now British Minister at the Prussian Court. Carysfort reported that Russia and Prussia were agreed to set bounds to immoderate views of acquisition whether of France or Austria. From communications made to him by Baron Krudener, he inferred a disposition at St. Petersburg to co-operate with England in re-establishing peace on equitable terms. Lord Grenville, however, gave the project of an unofficial mission only cold encouragement. No one knew better that reconciliation with Paul involved the condition of restoring Malta to the Knights Hospitallers, in regard to which he and his colleagues had changed their minds. The cessation of diplomatic intercourse with Russia he thought fortunate, inasmuch as it deprived the Tzar of an opportunity of putting embarrassing questions on that subject; and he cautioned his brother-in-law against discussing it with Baron Krudener.

Malta, now a rock of offence to several great powers, was given by the Emperor Charles V., in 1630, to the Knights Hospitallers, after their expulsion from Rhodes by Solyman the Magnificent, to hold as a fief of the kingdom of Naples. From that time it had been the headquarters of the Order until surrendered to Bonaparte in June, 1798. A treaty signed at St. Petersburg, in December, 1798, bound the British Government to hand over the island to the Tzar as protector of the Knights, when it should be recovered from the French.

Letters of Grenville and Dundas, written in April, 1800, show that the British Cabinet still adhered to this engagement, and that Sir Charles Stuart threw up his command in the Mediterranean because his instructions ordered him to give effect to it. So late as June, 1800, Sir A. Paget, British Minister at the Court of the Two Sicilies, gave explicit assurances to his Russian colleague, Chevalier Italinski, that the treaty would be scrupulously observed. Meantime, however, glowing accounts of the natural resources and vast advantages of the island began to pour in on Lord Grenville from various quarters. Mr. Wickham was particularly urgent with him not to part with it; and aspired, at the close of his diplomatic mission, to the governorship of it, as an appointment little inferior in importance to any other under the British crown. There is also some indication in Lord Grenville's correspondence with Lord Minto that the Ministry, seeing the hopes it had founded on an Austrian alliance evaporate, resolved to retain the conquests of Great Britain at sea, as a counterpoise to those of France on the Continent. And, in regard to the treaty with Russia, Lord Grenville seems to have considered the British Government absolved from it, by the Tzar's conduct in accepting the island from Bonaparte, and espousing the cause of his Scandinavian allies. At all events, Dundas's instructions to Sir Ralph Abercromby, who succeeded Sir Charles Stuart as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, directed him to take possession of Malta for the British crown. Sir A. Paget reported in September that General Acton, the Neapolitan prime minister, had questioned him on this point, and intimated confidentially that if the British Government no longer intended to restore La Valetta to the Order of St. John, his sovereign would recall the Neapolitan troops engaged in the siege. By this time, however, La Valetta had surrendered to General Pigot, and King George's ensign was floating on the old stronghold of the Knights. The report of this circumstance seems to have so affected the Tzar as to throw him into paroxysms of rage which endangered his life. He confiscated all British property in Russia till the treaty of December, 1798, should be carried out; and issued a proclamation to explain and justify the proceeding. Being still more exasperated by Lord Grenville's answer, stronger perhaps in invective than in argument, he dismissed Count Panin from the office of Vice-Chancellor; sent M. de Kalitchew, Panin's successor, on a mission to Paris, and revived the Armed Neutrality of the North. The King of Prussia, in retaliation for the seizure and confiscation of a Prussian merchantman, sent troops to occupy Cuxhaven, the port of communication between England and the Continent, into which the prize had been carried, and joined the Northern League. The British Government on its side treated the revival of the confederacy as a declaration of war, and despatched Sir Hyde Parker with a naval armament to assail it at Copenhagen, where it was most vulnerable. But the main events of the conflict—the bombardment of the Danish capital by Lord Nelson, the annexation of Hanover by the King of Prussia, the murder of the Emperor Paul, which dissolved the Northern Confederacy—occurred after Lord Grenville's retirement from office, and do not fall within the compass of this volume.

Lord Carysfort's confidential letters from Berlin contained in this volume are valuable as bringing to our knowledge an important element of public opinion on the Continent at this time, in regard to which Lord Grenville's other official correspondents appear to have joined in what may be termed a conspiracy of silence. He was an amateur diplomatist who had accepted a mission to the Prussian Court at Lord Grenville's request. And his independent position and intimate relations with the Foreign Secretary enabled him to speak his mind with candour, and tell unpalatable truths without fear of consequences. His letters leave little doubt that the show of moderation and the pacific efforts which the circumstances of France, and his own, dictated to Bonaparte, contrasting forcibly with the implacable attitude and the oppressive maritime policy of the British Government, had not only arrested the hostile tide of Continental feeling against France, but turned it full against England as the common enemy of Europe. Instead of the honour justly due to the champion of outraged right, ordered liberty, and all the highest interests of civilization which Lord Grenville claimed for her, England under his auspices had become odious—not in one country alone, nor merely to popular prejudice, but, as Carysfort declared, universally, and to educated conviction in its most conservative manifestations, whether political, social, or literary, as a sordid monopolist—keeping war alive for her special objects and particular profit, without regarding the evils her selfish egotism entailed on the rest of the world. It may be mentioned in this connection that, when negotiating early in the year with the Emperor, the British Government demanded Austrian support for its maritime system, as the condition of English support of an Austrian annexation of Genoa and other territory bordering the Mediterranean, Thugut, as Lord Minto reported, preferred relinquishing Genoa to incurring the public odium to which compliance with this demand would expose his sovereign.* Carysfort proposed to employ Gentz, a brilliant German publicist, who stood with Burke and Mallet du Pan in the foremost rank of literary champions of the old order against revolutionary innovation, to combat hostile criticism, and educate foreign opinion to a juster appreciation of British policy. Ill-will, which he thought utterly unreasonable, does not appear to have given Lord Grenville much concern; nor did he care much, perhaps, to convert antagonists whom he so frankly despised as "fools and madmen." Still he allowed his brother-in-law to retain Gentz's literary services to explain and defend English policy, by a pension of £200 a year. An Introductory essay or *Memoire*, by the German writer sent to Lord Grenville, and included in this volume, amply confirms Lord Carysfort's representations, and shows in what discouraging circumstances Gentz advocated a cause which must have seemed well-nigh desperate, until the fears excited by Bonaparte's unbridled ambition caused another revulsion of European opinion.

At the end of November the war between France and Austria entered its last phase. But the issue was no longer doubtful. The French armies, flushed with victory, re-equipped at the expense of Germany and Italy, and re-inforced by Bonaparte, were in superb

* Minto to Grenville, September 2, 1800. Public Record Office.

condition. The Austrians, inferior in number and broken in spirit, had the additional disadvantage of being badly supplied with food and clothing in the depth of a severe winter. The British Government, while constraining the Emperor to continue the war for an object no longer attainable—the separation of Belgium from France—and heaping reproach on the timid expedients by which he had sought to avert imminent defeat, allowed unjust suspicion of his good faith to withhold the money absolutely needed, as Lord Minto wrote, to send his troops into the field, until intelligence should have reached England that hostilities had been renewed. When this intelligence arrived, it was an announcement that the Austrians had suffered a crushing defeat; and then Pitt decided to make no further payment. Archduke John having failed in an attempt to turn the French position between the Isar and the Inn, was beaten by Moreau in the decisive battle of Hohenlinden. He tried to rally his troops at Salzburg for a stand against the pursuing enemy. But, disheartened by want and fatigue, they flung away their arms and fled. Then the Emperor prevailed on Archduke Charles to resume the command. This change, on which Wickham had so confidently relied as the certain harbinger of victory, added disgrace to defeat. The army, taking it to mean a prolongation of the war, could hardly be restrained from open revolt. Its chief officers, without awaiting the arrival of the general who had been their idol, sent Prince John of Lichstentien to the Emperor to represent the absolute necessity of making peace. Archduke Charles, on reaching the camp, found himself confronted, as Wickham wrote, by “a general combination of cowardice and mutiny.” Meantime, General Brune in Italy drove his Austrian opponent, Bellegarde, from the lines of the Mincio and the Adige, back into the passes of the Tyrolese Alps. The unfortunate Emperor, in order to save Vienna, consented to treat separately for peace. He wrote to George III. excusing this breach of a treaty which had still some weeks to run, by the plea of imperative necessity. Lord Minto and Mr. Wickham bore testimony to the scrupulous fidelity with which he had adhered to his engagements under very severe trials, and to the prostrate condition of the Austrian monarchy. The answer of the British monarch acknowledged his ally’s good faith in handsome terms, and gave assurance of undiminished friendship. Thugut seems to have cherished the illusion of being still able to conclude peace on the “Campo Formio basis,” which he had rejected before the campaign opened; and, perhaps, even of luring Bonaparte into a general conference, as barren of results as the Congress of Rastadt. But the First Consul, while consenting, at the request of the Tzar to spare the Kings of Sardinia and Naples and the Elector of Bavaria, compelled the last Roman Emperor to pass under the yoke of unconditional submission. The treaty of Luneville, signed in February, 1801, pushed back the Austrian boundary in Italy from the Mincio to the Adige; forced the Emperor to cede the left bank of the Rhine to France, not only as a German sovereign, but as representative of the whole Germanic body; stipulated that lay rulers dispossessed by this cession should be compensated in Germany, but gave the Ecclesiastical Electors, staunch adherents

of the House of Hapsburgh, no claim to indemnity; deprived the Emperor's brother of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and bestowed it on the son-in-law of the Queen of Spain, who assumed the title of King of Etruria.

After the conclusion of the peace of Luneville Baron Thugut disappeared from the political stage on which for ten eventful years he had filled so large a space. Nothing, perhaps, in his conduct on it became him less than his manner of leaving it. His unavailing struggles, as described by Mr. Wickham, and with more of sympathy and indulgence by Lord Minto, to retain the direction of public affairs, without enjoying the confidence of his sovereign, or being willing to accept arrangements which the welfare of the monarchy made imperative, betrayed a lamentable want of personal dignity and public spirit. The Emperor broke his fall, and acknowledged his services, by the grant of an estate in Galicia.

On the subject of the political measure which involved, as an unforeseen consequence, the downfall of Pitt's first administration, Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland, the correspondence in Volume VI. is significantly reticent. It tells us nothing of the means or methods by which failure in the Irish Parliamentary session of 1799 was converted to success in that of 1800. Lord Grenville, no doubt, was kept well-informed of all essential particulars by the Irish Chief Secretary. But Lord Castlereagh, instead of committing them to paper, appears to have reserved them for personal communication in London. Lord Grenville seems to have been equally cautious in his mode of conveying intelligence to the Marquis of Buckingham, whose eager interest in the measure, chafed under this unaccustomed reserve. Brief notes from Mr. Cooke, Under Secretary at Dublin Castle, recorded for Grenville's information the daily progress of the Bill through the Irish Parliament. These bulletins, though doubtless very acceptable at the time, possess little historical interest. The writer's evident anxiety in regard to the stability of the Government majority, as numbers rose and fell in the division lists during the course of the debates, recalls the Lord Lieutenant's statement to General Ross, that half of those voting for the measure would be at least as much delighted by its defeat as any member of the Opposition. A temperate letter from Lord Farnham, an Irish peer, dealing with the fiscal part of the new settlement, seems to show that the arrangements fixing the proportion of taxation for each island pressed very unequally on Ireland. This communication does not appear to have been answered. Pitt's letters contain no allusion whatever to the Act of Union. A still deeper silence covers everything bearing on the introduction of the measure intended to supplement that Act, by substituting a political for a religious test as a qualification for public employment. Two brief notes from Pitt to Grenville, dated February 1, 1801, refer obscurely to differences of opinion between Ministers and the King, and serious consequences involved. Lord Buckingham wrote to his brother on February 3 warmly approving of the course adopted by the Ministry in resigning office. On the 6th Lord Grenville wrote to Lord Carysfort announcing the resignation of a majority of the Cabinet, in consequence of the King's refusal

to sanction a Bill for the removal of the religious disabilities of the Irish Catholics; the formation of a new administration by Mr. Addington from colleagues and followers of Mr. Pitt; the writer's determination to give the new Ministers zealous support, and earnest hope that his personal connections would follow his example. Of the unlooked for dissensions in the Cabinet, or the secret intrigues disclosed in Lord Stanhope's *Life of Pitt*, we find no hint whatever. One of the earliest appointments made by Mr. Addington gave Lord Hawkesbury charge of the Foreign Office. Lord Grenville wrote on February 11, in most cordial and characteristic terms, to place at his successor's service whatever knowledge might have been acquired by the writer in the course of "ten years' observation of those wretched things which are called governments on the Continent of Europe." Then the King's health broke down under the strain of the political crisis, and the formation of the new Ministry was suspended for several weeks. But Lord Grenville retired to Dropmore, and beyond responding to Lord Hawkesbury's requests for advice and information, seems to have taken no further part, except what was absolutely required by official formalities, in the deliberations of the Cabinet or the transaction of public business.

WALTER FITZPATRICK.

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE,
PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

VOL. VI.

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1799, November 1. Cleveland Row.—“I have little to add to the voluminous dispatches which you will receive by Captain Forster. Certainly M. Thugut will have no reason to complain if, at the moment he is doing us all the mischief he can, we return good for evil, and induce the Emperor of Russia to agree to leave Piedmont in the hands of Austria. This part, however, of the arrangement (if it can be by an ample equivalent to the King of Sardinia be reconciled to the principles of honour and justice) will, I think, in its effect be advantageous to our future interests; as it will so fundamentally overthrow that favourite system of French policy, the surrounding that country with small and weak states. What relates to the Netherlands I do not like as well; but as this is part of the bear-skin which yet remains to be cut off, we may be more liberal of it.

“You will probably think our plans for next year are at least formed on a scale sufficiently large. It is, however, I am convinced, by such efforts only that we can obtain our object.

“It was this year within our grasp, if Austria would have consented to be placed in a state of power, security, and prosperity, such as it has never yet seen. This, however, was not to be, and we must make the best of things as they are. Even so a campaign that has driven the enemy from Verona and Reggio to Nice, is not to be considered as one of inconsiderable glory or benefit.

“I fear we shall have endless difficulties when we come to treat for magazines and supplies with the most shabby set of people in Europe. It will require no small degree of firmness at the outset to convince them that we are not at their mercy, which we really are in this respect, though we must not let them think so.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1799, November 1, at night.—“We have accounts that the whole mass of Royalists in all the north-west provinces of France has risen. We are preparing to support them by money, arms, and stores, if we cannot yet do so by troops. I have just received

the enclosed from Mr. Wickham. The suggestion appears to me so just that I think I cannot do better than send it to you confidentially in his own words. I well know they will accord with your ideas, but Thugut's mind is a most unfriendly soil for the cultivation of any just or liberal sentiment on that subject." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 3. Harley Street.—“ Je vous envoie la lettre que j'ai reçue hier du Comte Stakelberg de Suisse. Comme sa main est difficile à lire je joins une copie à l'original, en vous priant de me renvoyer le dernier. Si vous avez quelques nouvelles postérieures ou plus détaillées sur tout ce qui regarde ces affaires, et particulièrement sur ce qui regarde notre grand maréchal, je vous supplie de me le communiquer. L'idée de prendre ses quartiers à Vienne [Vérone] ou Milan me paroît trop étrange pour être vraie. Je vous rend mille grâces pour l'information secrète de ce qui se fait à Vienne, que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer avant hier.”

Enclosure.

COUNT C. J. STACKELBERG to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, October 15. Feldkirch.—“ Je viens de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 12^e 8^e Septembre. Très flatté de ce que vous avez bien voulu acquiescer à ma demande relativement à l'ouverture d'une correspondance officielle, mon regret est de voir qu'elle cessera bientôt, vu le manque d'intérêt qu'elle auroit pour votre Excellence. Je prévois le terme de l'offensive et la fin d'une campagne qui, sans la perfidie du cabinet Autrichien, auroit été décisive, et peut-être la dernière, par le rétablissement de l'ancien ordre de choses en France. Le Maréchal Souvaroff, victorieux des hommes et des élémens, a poursuivi sa marche triomphale depuis l'Italie jusqu'au Vorarlberg; mais voyant son armée diminuée, manquant de vêtemens, il s'est sagement décidé, au lieu de se porter en avant comme il en avoit été question, à aller vers Shaffhouse se réunir avec M. de Korsakoff, pour où il est parti ce matin, se dirigeant par Bregentz, Mersbourg et Singen. Arrivé dans ces environs, les deux armées amalgamées ensemble, son projet (à moins qu'il ait changé depuis hier) est de mettre le marché à la main à l'Archiduc et de lui offrir un dernier effort sur la Suisse; mais seulement à la condition d'une co-opération loyale et vigoureuse de sa part; si non, d'aller avec son armée réunie prendre des quartiers d'hiver. Sur le choix de ceux-ci, le maréchal n'étoit pas décidé, mais penchoit pour Vérone ou Milan. Je voudrois que ce projet pût être exécuté, devant fort embarrasser la cour de Vienne comme obstacle à ses négociations avec le Directoire qu'on dit reprises chaudement. Dans tous les cas, je me flatte que nous ne ferons la campagne prochaine qu'à bonnes enseignes et avec la certitude de n'être pas la dupe du Baron Thugut. Qu'on conviendra d'un plan d'opérations fixe, avec la spécification précise du rôle que devra y jouer l'armée Autrichienne, enfin qu'on parviendra à faire prononcer la cour de Vienne sur ses prétentions, en cherchant

surtout à la lier de manière à n'être plus dans la continuelle inquiétude de lui voir abandonner la cause commune. En écrivant à Petersbourg, je ne cesse pas de parler en ce sens, mais que pourroit ma foible voix si elle n'étoit soutenu par d'autres, méritants, à juste titre, d'être plus écoutées.

"Tout ce que dans votre lettre vous avez bien voulu me dire au sujet de M. Wickham m'a paru de la plus grande justesse. Son mérite n'a pu m'échaper, et je crois qu'il rendra justice à la confiance que je lui témoigne, sollicitée d'ailleurs par l'union des deux Cours." *Copy.*

W. WYNDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 3. Park Street, Westminster.—"Bad as the present state of things is, it furnishes no reason for relaxing our endeavours, nor, with respect to operations more immediately dependent on us, for changing their direction. The Royalists, however culpable or unfortunate for having begun so suddenly and prematurely, however doomed, I fear, to ultimate and perhaps speedy ruin, must yet be supported to the utmost of our power; and, if we would give to our efforts a chance of success, be supported with all possible promptness and alacrity. The least difference of success or failure in the outset may change the whole face of their affairs; and nothing is more obvious than that such success or failure may depend upon the arrival, sooner or later, of a cargo, or even upon a letter satisfying them to what extent they may depend upon us, and what measures they may take in consequence.

"I allude here particularly to the determination to be taken, and the power to be given to them in consequence, of trying the effect upon the Republican army of taking into pay those who should join the Royal standard. *Without* some impression of that sort, it is difficult to conceive how they should succeed; *with* such an impression, operating even to no great extent, there is no saying what effects may not be produced. The whole tenor of the information which I have at all times received, joined to opinions and facts occurring in the last communications, strongly favour the belief of the possibility at least of such an impression, especially if the trial should be made before any reverses shall have checked the confidence that might be entertained of the final success of their cause.

"With the concurrence of Mr. Pitt, I have thrown out in a letter to one of the chiefs what may encourage them to take that step within moderate bounds, should the necessity of their affairs drive them to the expedient, and the advantages of it appear likely to be important and decisive. In fact it is one of those measures which can hardly operate further than as its operation must be wished. If it should produce great expense, it must produce proportionate advantage. If I had been writing for myself I should certainly have made my encouragement much more explicit.

"Unfortunately this indirect permission, whatever operation it may have, is lying at present on board *Captain Keats'* at

Portsmouth, and may not reach them, I know not when. It is melancholy to think that nearly the first evidence of our good will, the first sign of life that they will receive from us, will not come till three weeks, or a month perhaps, after they have been in full insurrection. It is the more necessary that all possible activity should now be used, and the evidences of our intentions be the most speedy and decisive. Mr. Pitt mentioned your idea of recommending to *Monsieur* to repair to Jersey. I doubt only from the consideration of its quickening the exertions of the Directory before the Royalist party shall have got sufficient consistency; yet the effect of such a proclamation as was proposed I understand, at the same time, may be looked to as very considerable. And if the proclamation is to be issued, there seems to be an end to the objections which might otherwise be felt to placing *Monsieur* at Jersey. I am to see him to-morrow, and, without directly making the proposal, will endeavour to learn what his own ideas and feelings upon the subject are.

"What I had in view principally in beginning this letter was to state some ideas growing out of conversations which I have had lately with De la Rosière. By the way, having come over here for the purpose of attending *Monsieur* when there was a question of his going to Switzerland, he would be much obliged to you, in case his presence here should be further desired, to say a word to Mr. Walpole by which he might stand excused to the Government in Portugal.

"Combining what I collected of his opinions with such as one may form for oneself, it seems as if the course of events between this and the next campaign (supposing that there is to be another campaign, on the part I mean of the Austrians) would of itself necessarily place the Austrians in that position, in which there would be the best chance of making them fall in with our views in the prosecution of the war. If the Austrians should be unable to make peace, which I cannot but think is likely to be the case, and the French should make a winter campaign, which in the event of war continuing may still more be relied on, the part in which, according to Rosière's opinion, the French ought to make their irruption, is low down upon the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence.

"Now this is near the part where, according to the plan which Rosière would form for the next campaign, the allied armies ought to enter France, which he thinks ought to be a little above Mayence, by Spire, Worms, and Manheim.

"His general plan of campaign rests upon what seems to me the only rational basis, namely that of standing on the defensive with respect to all distant possessions, and directing all offensive operations against the body of France itself, aided by a civil war to be raised where the materials for it shall be found most abundant, and most capable of being used to advantage. In this instance his defensive operations would be in Italy, in the Black Forest, and in the Grisons; while his offensive operations, being in fact the only efficacious defence, should be an irruption into France in the quarter above-mentioned, aided by a civil war within.

"Surely if such a general plan were well pressed upon the Austrians, particularly after they may have been beaten into a temper somewhat more tractable by their experience during the course of the winter, the obvious truth of its principles may produce its effect upon their minds, more especially if this royalist war should be capable of being maintained, and they should be taught practically its value by the necessity of looking often to its assistance. I cannot but think, therefore, that good might arise if, by some contrivance, Rosière might be sent to Vienna to explain and enforce his own plan. I don't recollect for certain whether, at the time it was intended he should go, his journey was put off from any considerations that would create an obstacle to his being listened to at present. His name stands high in Europe, and his authority upon a subject of this sort can hardly fail to make some impression. There may be the further recommendation to his plan, that it so far agrees with the favourite project at Vienna as that it brings the chief of their force low down upon the Rhine.

"To return to the insurrection in Brittany; everything must depend upon the vigour and promptness of our exertions. It is a state of things that cannot brook the delays of official or diplomatic proceedings. It is a military operation, the fate of which hangs upon hours. Dutheil informed me to-day that, by intercepted accounts from the agents of the Directory, the situation of Normandy was such, the temper of the people so strongly Royalist, and the difficulty so great of paying the Republican troops that, in their opinion, should the Royalists be supplied with arms and money, the province must be lost. He wished, therefore, above all things, that money should be sent to St. Marcouf. But, alas! no money is to be had. The dollars, except those brought in with the Spanish prizes, are all gone to Hamburg. Surely now is a time when we might have recourse to the measure which I wished for long ago, of coining *louis* at Birmingham. Between Louis XVI. and XVIII. there can never be any difficulty of evading the law, if there could ever have been any uneasiness upon that score; and the apprehension is not now, I conceive, in force about sending coin out of the country. At all events, if from any over-strained scruple, from any remissness or want of attention, we suffer this insurrection to fall to the ground when it might by any means have been supported, there will [be] no end to our remorse, any more than to the reproach which must justly attach upon our conduct.

"Arrangements have, I understand, been made for appointing cruising squadrons; but according to the best judgment I can form, subject of course even in my own mind to further information, the service will never be properly carried on, nor the full benefit be felt of our naval superiority, till Quiberon is made a station for the fleet."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1799, November 4. Dropmore.—"By the Bishop of Lincoln's

desire I send you the enclosed, which I received from him. It certainly well deserves attention; the facts are truly alarming, especially as relating to a part of England where one might least expect to find such a state of things. What must it be in London and its neighbourhood, and in the manufacturing countries? The remedies are good so far as they go, but are, I fear, very inadequate to the mischief.

"I am not now sufficiently acquainted with the extent and nature of the jurisdiction which our bishops may legally exercise over their clergy, to decide whether there is a deficiency in that respect, or only in their practice and habit on that subject. But without wishing, I am sure in the smallest degree, to join in, or to countenance, the cry which is raised for ill purposes against the body of our clergy, I cannot but think that no reformation would be more effectual (though others would certainly be wanted in addition to it) than one which should ensure to every parish the residence either of the parson, or of his curate; and should provide in his ecclesiastical superior a real and practical (not a nominal) inspection and control over the general tenor of his life and manners, and over his regularity and diligence in the discharge both of certain fixed and stated duties, now growing daily more and more into disuse, and of that general duty of attention and care which a clergyman owes to his flock. It is evidently the object and intention of our ecclesiastical constitution that such superintendence and control should be exercised, and without it our church Establishment must be one of less subordination than that of the Presbyterians.

"You are not one of those very wise men who think that the religious habits of a people are indifferent to their civil government. I know it has been a complaint at all times that the principles of religion and piety were gradually losing their hold on the people of this country. But it would be a strange blindness not to see that this complaint, whether just or not at other periods, is now but too well founded. The moment is peculiarly well fitted for applying a remedy to this evil, and I trust you will take it into serious and *active* consideration.

"The only objection I have ever heard against such a regulation as should require residence (either of the parson or curate) in every parish, is the scantiness of the provision in many parishes, which must reduce the person who had no other dependence for his support to a condition far below the decent station of his profession. If that be the case the remedy is in the hands of Parliament, and no reasonable man, or well wisher to the establishments of this country would be dissatisfied with any provisions tending only to remedy this evil, if they were accompanied with suitable restraints to prevent the mischiefs which now exists.

"I know that all these things must be touched with a tender hand, but we live in a period when the old rule *quieta non movere*, excellent as it generally is, has been found inapplicable to almost every branch of our Government. These things are all stirred by the restless spirit of the times, and our duty is to give them a right direction and keep them, if we can, in a due course." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the BISHOP OF LINCOLN.

1799, November 4. Dropmore.—“I was very much obliged to you for the attention you were good enough to pay to the letter with which I troubled you, and I had real pleasure in finding that the evil had been exaggerated to me; though, even on the result of your enquiries, it certainly appears that a number of legal or justifiable excuses in particular cases produces a general state of things such as is by no means to be wished.

“The paper you enclosed to me affords a most satisfactory proof of attention to the subject, and I am confident that good must result from it. The statement of facts is truly alarming, and I consider it the more so because I apprehend those facts must exist in a far greater proportion in London and other great cities and towns, and in their neighbourhood, as well as through all the manufacturing countries, than in such a district as that to which this paper relates.

“I have, as you desired, transmitted it to Mr. Pitt, with some observations that occurred to me on the subject.

“You will, I am sure, not suspect me of wishing to countenance the cry which ill disposed people, or which fanatics, raise against the body of our clergy; nor do I by any means impute to them the blame which ought to fall on the general carelessness and growing irreligion of the people of this country. But there are two points which I think require and admit of correction, and you will not be hurt at my stating them to you freely. I am inclined to believe that in both cases it is the law itself that is as much or more defective than the practice, but of that point I speak ignorantly, and you can easily correct me.

“The first is this; the very constitution of our church Establishment, the very name and function, as I apprehend it, of bishops, supposes a constant superintendence and control over the clergy who are subordinate to them—over their general lives and conduct, and over their zeal and diligence in the discharge of their peculiar duties. A spirit of liberality, a commendable dislike to the appearance of too much assumption and exercise of power over inferiors, and perhaps something of the prevailing ideas of the times extending itself to those inferiors, have, as it seems to me, diminished that superintendence, till it is become in many cases merely nominal; and in hardly any so regular, apparent, and constant, as to answer many of the chief purposes of its institution, particularly those which relate to public opinion. I have occasionally heard in conversation upon this subject, that the legal power of the bishop is really defective in this respect, and that some instances of failure, where the authority has been attempted to be exercised, and has with impunity been set at defiance, have led to a prudent forbearance, in order not to expose a function to irreverence and contumacy which cannot suffer either without great public mischief.

“Should this be the case, I think the remedy is not difficult. No man will suspect the present bench of bishops of a desire to assume that sort of spiritual authority which, extending itself far into the temporal concerns of the laity, has formerly been justly odious in this kingdom; nor would it be necessary, or perhaps

proper, that the proposal should proceed from them, though their assistance would be wanted to frame, to digest, and to execute it. I am persuaded that reasonable and temperate measures tending to give to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the bishop over his clergy such a degree of weight and efficacy as to provide an effectual control and superintendence where our church Establishment supposes it to exist, would meet the approbation of all moderate men in the present moment; because there seems to be among persons of that description a general persuasion that increased exertions are necessary to counteract the dangers with which we are threatened.

"Next to this, and as a part of it, I consider that which is adverted to in your letter. I mean a provision for securing to every parish, and in every case without exception, the constant residence either of the parson or his curate; the cure of souls being unquestionably a duty which cannot be discharged without both the influence and the knowledge which residence alone can give.

"The objection, I know, which is commonly urged against this in practice—for in theory and principle I have heard none—is that the provision is in many cases inadequate, when single, to maintain a clergyman in the decent station which befits his profession, and will compensate the charge of his education. If this be the only difficulty the remedy is in the hands of Parliament, and if the details were attentively collected, and a plan well adjusted to enable the Legislature to enforce residence in all cases—of course I mean prospectively only and so as not to interfere with present rights—I do believe that the expense of supplying the deficiency which might be necessary to be provided for in such a system would be readily and cheerfully borne.

"I have taken the liberty to suggest to your consideration these two ideas, because they arise out of the subject of the paper you sent me, but are not, and could not be expected to be, adverted to there. I am far from seeing any objection to the legislative remedies which are suggested in that paper to the evils there stated, and I cannot but admire and applaud the impression which is there expressed of the necessity of an increased zeal and assiduity as the best mode both of refuting the calumnies, and of counteracting the acts of those who are converting the religious sentiments, where they do still prevail, of the lower orders of the people into a means of destroying the religious establishment of the state.

"I should be very happy when you return to town to converse with you on this whole subject. If it is viewed politically it is of no small concern, but it is not possible to consider it in that relation only." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 5. Stowe.—"I fear from what I hear from Tom that there is very little chance of bringing you down to Stowe, and the roads and weather are very little tempting to induce me to pass to Dropmore for a day or two. I must therefore urge

you by letter to consider what I have been turning very much in my mind for the last eight days; I mean the question of a winter campaign in Normandy, co-operating and combining with it supplies of clothing, arms, and money towards Nantz, where the Chouans appear in such force. When we last talked on this subject, and discussed the inconvenience of a winter campaign, we argued upon it as a question on which we might choose. I fear that this is no longer our situation. I am convinced that the Emperor will be bought off by negotiation during the course of the winter by France unless she really has sufficient confidence in her situation as to deem herself able to overthrow *by force* his situation and government. But they have so much to gain by a peace with Austria, and so much to tempt him with in Italy, that I feel certain that such a peace will be made, leaving them with a secure frontier (for the struggle of the Empire can be nothing) from Holland to the furthest extremity of their old or their new line; excepting only such part of it as Suwarow can threaten with his existing force, cut off by the Emperor's neutrality from reinforcements or even from supplies. Their first operation will be (if it is not already done) to crush every attempt at counter-revolution by the Chouans or Royalists; and in the spring we shall be to expect to see them in that force on their coasts which they will be able to collect, having their arms completely at liberty; a force certainly sufficient to protect Normandy or France against us, and perhaps sufficient, with the support of 53 ships now in Brest and Rochfort waiting only for the Duke of York's present of 8,000 seamen to man them, to give us serious alarms for Ireland. You will likewise remember that we shall not be stronger in point of men than we are at this moment, whilst at the same time the French will every moment be gaining ground by adding conscripts.

"Such are my reasons for thinking that, from the unfortunate *military mismanagement* in Holland, you have no longer the same choice, but that you must, in your own defence, use the 50,000 effective troops whom you now have for offensive winter operations in Normandy. I say nothing upon the plan of your operation, for that must depend upon so many circumstances not within my reach; but the general line of attack and movement seems simple and obvious, and would be much assisted by the operations of the insurgents as far as I can trace them from the newspapers. And, at all events, we shall have, even *malgré lui*, the co-operation of the Emperor added to that of Suwarow; a co-operation which, by detaining French troops on the Neckar, the Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Piedmont, must assist us out of any possible calculation. If you ask me whether I am sanguine enough to hope to finish the war by such an attempt, I dare not answer yes; but I clearly see ruin if we postpone all idea of offence to a period when it will be physically impossible that we should succeed. You will observe that I have not touched upon any of several collateral considerations that must occur to you, if you have the patience to read this letter with attention. I am perfectly sensible that all this must have occurred to you, and yet it is a satisfaction to me to state my thoughts

upon our situation, which I fear will be very critical. I do not, of course, ask you for any detailed answer upon this subject, but pray put my mind at ease by telling me 'that our ideas do not materially differ'; though I am well aware how many contingencies may ultimately be to decide upon your operations."

Postscript.—"You will think me very mischievously inclined when I tell you that I have been reading George II.'s proceedings upon the convention of Closter-Seven; and having clearly settled in my mind that the Duke of York ought to be disavowed, I am equally clear that he will be avowed; and so I must be content, as I am not quite ready to hang you for your share in it."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1799, November 6. Cleveland Row.—"J'ai reçu votre billet au sujet de la négociation de M. le Baron de Mylius. Il est très simple que notre Cour insiste sur l'exécution d'un traité conclus et signé. Il ne l'est pas moins que Sa Majesté ne puisse pas consentir à prendre à sa solde des troupes qui ne seroient pas à sa disposition, et je serois bien éloigné de conseiller Sa Majesté de se départir de ce principe, même pour un objet bien plus important que celui dont il est question. Il paroît donc que la négociation tombe d'elle-même, et je ne vois aucun mezzoterminé capable de concilier ces deux points." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1799, November 6.—"I have been ruminating on some ecclesiastical projects, but I do not know whether I shall be able to bring them to bear, nor do I yet possess all the knowledge of the actual state of things which is necessary in order to enable me to fix my own judgment. They relate to the two points of episcopal jurisdiction and superintendence, and residence of parochial clergy.

"My notion is to strengthen, if necessary, the legal powers of the bishops, so as to give them effective means both of suspension and deprivation in all cases both of improper life and manners, and of remissness in the execution of certain *stated duties* which they are to be required to exact from all their parochial clergy. To enable them, from the chapters in their dioceses, at their own choice, to augment the number of their archdeacons or *visitants*, under whatever name may best suit the old constitutional forms of our Church. To require them, or in their absence the archdeacon or other proper person, to hold fixed and invariable annual visitations, at which, calling if necessary to their assistance a certain number of their beneficed or dignified clergy, they should receive the reports of their archdeacons and other visitants, and should *at such visitation*, or at furthest at the next visitation, proceed by sentence either of suspension or deprivation against all persons who should appear on such reports to be of scandalous life or conversation, to have published irreligious, immoral or seditious books, or to have been remiss in the performance of such *stated duties* as

above. Lastly to compel the bishops to return these reports, and their proceedings thereon at their visitations to their metropolitans, by whom they should be annually laid before the King, with their observations thereon.

“As to parochial residence, the idea would be to require that no person shall, on any pretence, be non resident on his living without appointing a curate to be there *constantly* resident in his room. And to charge on the consolidated fund a sum sufficient to make up every living throughout the kingdom to the amount of £70 *per annum*, with the single exception of such parishes as, being adjacent to each other, it might be fit to *conjoin* for this purpose by the act of proper commissioners to act with the bishop. Where, therefore, the living fell short of £70, the parson would receive the difference from the public, but be compelled to personal and constant residence ; and some provision might be made for the residence and maintenance of his curate in the single case of absence with the bishop's license from *extreme necessity* of sickness. Where the living amounted to £75 or upwards, he would have the choice, as at present, of residing, or finding some legal excuse for non-residence ; but, in the latter case, he would be obliged to provide a curate constantly resident ; and in both cases proper certificates of residence would be required to be produced to the *Visitants*.

“The hardship, whatever it was, which this regulation would bring on the body of the clergy at large (I do not speak of particular cases) would be amply compensated by the addition which the Legislature would thus make to the smaller livings ; and the expense of this last measure would be much more than compensated to the public by the benefit which must arise from the constant residence of a clergyman in every parish throughout the kingdom.

“By what I have called *stated duties* above I mean that, from these resident clergymen who would no longer have the plea of other duty to perform, I would certainly exact, by enumeration, many points of their duty (evening service, catechism, visitation of sick, and other points) which are now growing, or grown into disuse.

“You would much oblige me by your ideas on these points. On the first I have been told that it is no more, or little more, than the law as it now exists. All I can say is that I am sure it is not the practice as it now exists ; and that this is not the only case where it has been found to be highly useful to re-enact, with small variation, the existing law, in order to call the attention and excite the zeal both of those who are to execute the law, and of those who are to obey it.

“You are not, I am very certain, one of those extremely profound politicians who have, among other happy discoveries of this age, found out that the religion of the people has no influence on its morals, or its morals on the prosperity and good government of the State. You will not therefore think that an attention to this subject is either unbecoming Government and Parliament, or is ill suited to such a moment as the present.” *Extract.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 8. Harley Street.—“M. Frère m'a fait savoir

hier-au-soir que vous désirez que je vienne aujourd'hui chez vous, et que ce soir vous enverrez un courier en Russie.

"Je me rendrai chez vous entre midi et une heure ; mais quand au courier, je vous supplie de me faire la faveure de ne l'expédier que demain, samedi au soir ; car le Duc d'York m'ayant ordonné de passer chez lui aujourd'hui à trois heures, voilà toute une matinée employée sans pouvoir rien écrire, et je ne puis m'appliquer à aucun travail après avoir mangé, sans avoir le lendemain une attaque de bile qui me tourmente dix à quinze jours après. Vingt-quatre heures ne vous feront pas une différence, et m'épargneront une maladie."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 8. Somerset Place.—"I do not feel quite at ease upon the result of yesterday's Cabinet. The deliberation was pretty far advanced before I was able to join you, and indeed if it had been otherwise, I am so far from having a separate opinion to state, that I confess myself totally at a loss to figure any speedy effects to arise from Continental alliance ; and, under that impression, the *leaning* of my opinion, for it is really little more than that, would have been to have kept ourselves to a very general declaration both to Vienna and Petersburg that we had exhausted every endeavour we had in our power to unite them in any effectual or beneficial co-operation, and must therefore leave it to themselves to consider very seriously the situation into which those unfortunate jealousies and animosities had brought them ; that if they, taught by fatal experience, and looking distinctly to the probable impending consequences of the triumphs of France, should form any plan in which *the* aid of Britain, by subsidies to Russian troops, could be of real utility, we should be glad to listen to it with every disposition to co-operate with it ; but, if no such plan was laid before us, we had nothing left but, upon our own resources, to maintain firmly the same dignified line of conduct we had hitherto pursued, which was to maintain at all events the power and independence of Great Britain. In my communication with Russia I would, of course, distinctly state that, be the result of the difficulties of the present moment what it may, it was our fixed and deliberate purpose to maintain and cultivate our connexion and friendship with the Court of Petersburg.

"Perhaps when you carry into execution the minute of Cabinet which you yesterday laid before us, it may not go much further than I have stated ; but you will better understand my ground of diffidence on this subject when I state to you that, after the perusal of Mr. Wickham's letters recently received, I am impressed with a perfect conviction that it is in vain to look for any effectual aid from the armies of Russia in the course of next campaign. They are brave men, and are, I suppose, as good materials as can be for the formation of a powerful army ; and, even in their present state, are in Russia itself, or in Turkey, as irresistible troops as can be supposed. But on the other hand if they are to act either

in Italy or in Switzerland, they must be totally new modelled, and every principle in their formation and constitution must be altered and of new arranged. I cannot disguise from myself that, in so far as my judgment goes, this is a work of such extent and so complicated in its operations that, after having come under heavy pecuniary obligations which we must fulfil, we shall find ourselves disappointed in our expectations, and the country so disgusted with repeated mortifications and disappointments as will render it impossible for us to rally their spirits, or to make them submit with patience to the struggle they may be called upon to encounter. Perhaps if the material fortresses of Italy could be garrisoned with Russian troops, where they could be regularly fed, and deprived of the means of plundering, a small Austrian force in Italy might be sufficient for the rest of its defence ; and then the great strength of the Austrian force might be employed in other quarters ; and to that force we might add considerably by subsidizing the Bavarian troops, or any others that the States of Germany could furnish in addition to the proper troops of Austria. By an arrangement, joined to the diversions we would have it in our power to make from home and in the Mediterranean, I think I see daylight before me to lead to a campaign that would occupy all the armies that France could collect. In the meantime the Russian troops at home as well as those employed in garrison in Italy might be forming into such a state of discipline and new arrangement, as would enable them in a future campaign to take their share in active military operations, wherever it may be most expedient to employ them.

“Compte Woronzow is of opinion the Russian troops cannot be sent home without previous communication with the Emperor ; and he is likewise of opinion that Sir Home Popham ought to go by the most expeditious route without any *détour*.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 8. Hollwood.—“Nothing occurs to me on reading the despatches to vary in any degree the line we talked of this morning ; but there arise two separate points on which some answer seems necessary, and on which I should like to know your ideas ; I mean what relates to our own views at the peace, and to the new proposal about the ratification. Would it not be right also to bring under Thugut's view the strong probability that the projects of France may force a winter campaign whether he will or no, and to endeavour to learn whether he is prepared with any and what plan of military operation adapted to that case ?”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, November 9. Cleveland Row.—“I think our decision of Thursday as stated in the minute then taken, and since explained more in detail in the despatch to Lord Minto, does not go a great

deal further than the ideas contained in your letter. But I am, on the whole, of opinion that it is better to take the chance of doing what we can with the Russians next year, and I do not see why we should not reckon pretty confidently on the success of any force composed in the manner which Suwarow has recommended, and on which we have agreed to insist.

"I have talked a little to-day with Sir Home Popham about the Majorca expedition. He seems so much to agree with me in thinking the proposal likely to be peculiarly acceptable to the Emperor, that I own I should be extremely glad to find that it was one which, on further examination, was judged practicable. The possession of those islands and of Gibraltar would, I think, enable us, with an active officer in the command of the Mediterranean fleet, to keep the Spaniards in constant alarm for their coasts and ports in that sea, and would be more likely than anything else to drive them to the necessity of peace. I hope the thing may be so far examined before he goes as to enable him (if it is adopted) to lay it in some detail before the Emperor. And, in that case, the ships ought, if possible, to be ready to sail as soon as the answer is received, which may be in less than two months from this time." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 9. Stowe.—"I am very sorry to see your mind so decidedly made up against the idea of further offensive operations during the winter; because I certainly see very black clouds gathering for the spring, and all collateral assistance by co-operation or diversion most uncertain, I should even say most certainly out of the question. You must see that I do not offer to you this measure as one that I adopt from choice, but from necessity. The communications from the moment the cold weather sets in are as certain as northerly to easterly winds can make them; and if it was possible to begin with the surprise of Havre, Cherbourg, or St. Malo, you would turn the difficulties of the season on the enemy, if you obliged them to make head against their insurgents, as well as against you in winter. Havre may hold a long time against a land siege, so may Cherbourg if the *montagne* is occupied; I know less of St. Malo. I agree perfectly with you that the insurgents have risen too soon; but if they are not supported during the winter by something more than the desultory attempt of landing a few arms, and a little money, the whole of that exertion, whatever it may be, will be crushed very long before your period of March or April; and your fifty thousand men will then most certainly be too weak for the force that will be employed against them. I understand that you had got from this last militia levy twelve thousand men, a few days ago; you bring back, as you say, thirty thousand from Holland; you had seven or eight thousand disposable men who did not go there, such as light infantry of the Guards corps half-completed, and others more forward in point of numbers; exclusive of the garrisons of Jersey and Guernsey, part of whom

would, of course, be applicable to a movement on the coast of Normandy. This would complete your force to fifty thousand, without waiting for your Irish militia recruits, or your exchanged prisoners, or your Dutch royalists. I wish likewise to remind you that from the moment that it is understood you mean to remain quiet all the winter, you must double your Irish garrison, and *pro tanto* you will weaken your offensive army, as it is most clear that the French, acting on their plan of invasion in force (of 1759 and 1779, and again under Hoche in 1796) will not let the months of November and December roll over without an attempt.

"My mind is so strongly impressed with the necessity that I cannot avoid again and again pressing you to adopt some measure of this nature ; but if not, give at least the impression of it, and endeavour to derive some advantage from the experience.

"I do agree with you most cordially and entirely in your ideas respecting the clergy ; and have very long groaned over the very many abuses which I am willing to suppose the Bishops cannot correct, because most certainly they do not wish to grapple with them ; but I conceive that your task is so far easy that a reference to ancient principles and practice will save you much trouble. The idea of constant parochial visitation, independent of that of the Bishop or Archdeacon, exists in the ancient establishment of Rural Deans ; an appointment now hardly known, but spoken of in the highest terms by our ecclesiastical writers.

"Your scheme of a constant resident on each of the 9,000 cures in England and Wales at not less than 70*l.* appears *primâ facie* too extensive, and perhaps unnecessary ; but when you couple with this plan a further idea, absolutely necessary, of meeting the increased population of manufacturing counties by *new* ecclesiastical establishments, to prevent the poor from being forced by want of room into Methodist meeting-houses, I am convinced that the sum wanted from the sinking fund will be very large ; but whatever it may be, I am sure we shall agree in thinking that it ought to be raised and paid if we mean that any good government should exist in times more quiet, and consequently more relaxed than the present. But I contend most strenuously that the Bishops have shewn themselves not, as a body, fit to be trusted with the uncontrolled liberty of allowing non-residence, in the cases in which you seem inclined to give them this discretion. Such a licence ought to be controlled certainly by the Metropolitan, and, if given for more than 12 months, by the Crown. I would propose to you the system of coadjutors to Bishops when infirm or incapable, and possibly some arrangement for the care of dioceses too large or populous. I will likewise put into your hands some clauses drawn for a Bill which I prepared in 1797, for the establishment of a provincial or deanery commission for managing and leasing the parochial lands given in exchange for tithes ; a system that now operates to the ruin of the land (of which no lease can be given) and to the scandal of the Church, by the wicked frauds practised by the clergy in the management of their land ; but, above all, you will strike at a great source of idleness and perversion of

character amongst the parochial clergy, if you will enact that no clergyman shall be qualified to kill game, or to keep dogs, or hunt, or fish, or do anything under the game laws by or in respect of any lands, tenements, tithes, or other property arising out of any ecclesiastical cure or benefice whatsoever. You will easily see that I care not for game; but I do abhor and utterly detest a hunting or shooting parson. You would likewise probably limit in future the dispensation for two livings to a shorter line, and to one more distinctly ascertained than the present, which is most fraudulently uncertain; and it would be wise to put by that distinction of value in the King's books that enables a man to hold three, four, or indeed an indefinite number of livings, and of (what ought to be made real cures) non-cures. But you are doubtless aware what a nest of hornets you are stirring, and of the thankless labour you undertake; but if you do not move in it I am confident no one else will, and I am most willing to work with you *ostensibly*, or in any possible mode in which I can help what, I solemnly protest, I think essential to the being of our Government, independent of other considerations which I know do weigh (and I bless God for it) very much with both of us.

"I have now only to beg that, in some way or other, you will let me *know* or *see* the details of Irish union. I am persuaded that no intention exists on the part of Mr. Pitt to put me wholly out of that question; but I think it possible that the plan may be arranged and sent to Ireland without any further communication with me, which from every reason you would not like, and which I should be sorry for. Remember I do not want to trouble you; but, as my interest and that of my family is now so large in that country, as my residence down to a very late period gives me much the means of judging, and as I have the most anxious wish for the measure, I should like to consider the ideas now under arrangement, and I cannot write to Lord Auckland for obvious reasons. Do not imagine that I am peevish on this subject; but remember that I am most anxious upon it."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 9. Harley Street.—"Vous observerez sans doute que je ne parle pas de l'expédition sur Majorque. C'est qu'en revenant chez moi, et ayant songé sur ce sujet, je trouve qu'outre l'incertitude de la réussite (et il ne faut pas multiplier les non-réussites) cette expédition ne sera pas une diversion pour la France, qui ne s'embarasse pas de l'Espagne. Il faudra laisser une garnison dans l'isle, il faudra par conséquent diminuer l'armée de Souvorow, et ça devient une diversion en faveur de la France. C'est contre cette dernière qu'il faut redoubler nos efforts. Je soumet ces considérations à votre sagesse, et j'attens ce que vous me direz sur ce sujet."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 9. Cleveland Row.—"Je vous restitue le

brouillon que vous m'avez envoyé. Je l'ai trouvé parfait à l'exception peut-être de quelques expressions de la première page. Je suis parfaitement d'accord avec vous que ce sont les idées militaires du M. Suwarrow et nullement celles du Baron Thugut qu'il faudra suivre. Mais je crois, en vérité, qu'il y aura un avantage très réel à demander au dernier son plan pour les opérations de la campagne, avant qu'il connoisse celui du maréchal.

"Si on lui propose un plan, au lieu de déférer aux lumières et aux talens supérieures de ce grand homme, il ne manquera certainement pas d'y trouver des objections. Il y soupçonnera des vues cachées (quand on les a, on les soupçonne toujours aux autres) et il s'y refusera; ou, ce qui seroit encore pis, il mettra des entraves à l'exécution de ce qui seroit convenu. En lui laissant l'initiative, on soumettra ses idées à la considération du Maréchal, on se réservera le droit de les discuter ici et à Petersbourg, on pourra même y faire des changemens, ou des modifications essentielles, mais ce sera toujours la proposition de la Cour de Vienne qui en fera la base, et le Ministre Autrichien n'aura plus de prétexte pour en contrecarrer l'exécution.

"J'apprends que Lord Mulgrave est parti de Vienne. Cela dérange un peu nos plans. Peut-être qu'en rencontrant mes dépêches il y retournera, mais en tout cas, Lord Minto aura les pleins pouvoirs, et il suivra, comme de raison, les conseils du Maréchal, dans la probité duquel on peut avoir autant de confiance que dans son génie." *Copy.*

Private. The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 10. Constantinople.—"I was very sorry on stopping at Palermo to find Sir William Hamilton in a very bad state of health; so much so indeed as to render it most probable your Lordship will soon be called upon to appoint a successor to the mission he now holds; and as this accidental visit has suggested some observations which, in the event alluded to, may probably have some interest with your Lordship, I cannot withhold them under circumstances where no view of my own can by any means exist.

"Your Lordship should have before your eyes the universal confusion occasioned in Italy by the French invasion, and the opinion universally entertained of British greatness and British integrity of character, to understand the importance which the mission of Naples has acquired in the present conjuncture. The want almost of a form of constitution and the weakness of the executive government did, upon the appearance of the French army, carry over to them a greater proportion of persons of family in this, than in any country where the French have hitherto penetrated. And, on the other hand, Cardinal Ruffo in Calabria, and the partisan called *Il Gran Diavolo* towards Rome, used no means of preventing the further progress of the enemy but that of giving to their adherents the pillage of all the country they could get possession of. Accordingly, there exists scarce any family of property in the country some of whose members are

not involved in the crime of rebellion, and whose estates are not materially damaged. Meanwhile the King, who owes the deliverance of Naples solely to the aid of Foreign Powers, and in particular to the operations of the British fleet, has, by remaining 37 days in the Bay without landing at Naples, and prosecuting with the utmost vigour during that time the punishment of those who had assisted the French, shown to his enemies a vindictive and unconciliatory disposition, and to his friends the utmost distrust and pusillanimity. I protest I had no opportunity whatever of knowing enough of what has passed to form a judgment of the propriety or impropriety of the part that has been taken in the name of Great Britain in those late occurrences. But undoubtedly the Court of Naples depends wholly on the countenance of England; the British Minister, as well as the naval officers, are continually called upon to act where it is impossible for them to have the benefit of instructions from home. Whether one considers the spirit which appears to animate the councils of this Government, or the popularity and influence of Great Britain in these countries, I cannot conceive a situation where more steadiness, experience, and independence is requisite than in the British Minister at the Court of Naples."

Private.

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 10. Cuxhaven.—"On my arrival here yesterday I was informed that Captain Foster had left this place the day before on his way to Vienna with dispatches for me. I have sent an *estafette* to recall him, and shall therefore not set off with this day's packet, as I had intended; and I shall wait a short time in the hope of seeing the dispatches he carries for me. I shall, however, not wait beyond a day or two, as I am nearly certain there is nothing in them to detain me.

"Lord Minto and I had felt so convinced that I could do nothing more at Vienna, that I had desisted from accompanying him to Baron Thugut's; and we at length agreed that the best thing for me to do was to return to England, and give you such information as you might require on the subject of my mission. I left Vienna on the 24th of October, and was overtaken a few days afterwards on the road by a very pressing letter from Mr. Wickham requiring my presence in Switzerland. Had I received his letter at Vienna I should have taken the route of Switzerland to gratify that excellent and zealous Minister, although I knew that no measures could be adopted there that did not originate in Vienna, or at least receive a sanction from thence; and although the state of my health would have rendered a lengthened journey very inconvenient, the inflammation of my blood from previous exertions having filled me full of boils and troublesome sore eruptions, I wrote to him from Prague to inform him of the impossibility, from the state of the roads as well as my own, of my arriving in time to concert measures for active exertions in Switzerland, even if there were any discretion or disposition there to adopt my opinions."

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, November 11. Constantinople.—“I feel quite ashamed on finding my correspondence of this day so voluminous, but the difficulty of my situation is peculiarly great, as your Lordship will readily admit, when you consider that removing the French from Egypt (which I conceive of the most important consequence) will leave the Turks entirely at peace, and open to the intrigues of France whose influence here is, I am informed, still very great. But I trust to hear from your Lordship as fully as the case appears to require.

“I enclose, in this private conveyance, copy of a letter I have just received from Tamara. His present idea is inconsistent with the consent he gave to the Turks in his conference. Nor do I see how the allies can deny protection to the French leaving Egypt on capitulation, any more than disregard any other stipulations made by either power in the course of the war.

“I can have no doubt it is your Lordship’s intention that my mission should be the only one, during its continuance, accredited at this Court. Sir S. Smith calls himself still Minister; and although there never can be any misunderstanding between so intimate a friend as he is, and myself, still business may be impeded unless your intentions are known.”

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 13. St. Petersburg.—“After having taken up so much of your Lordship’s time, there remains little to trouble your Lordship with in a private letter. I have the honour to acknowledge that from your Lordship of the 15th ultimo. No one can be more sensible than I am of the truth of what your Lordship alludes to in that letter. The infamous conduct of Essen exceeds, in my opinion, the imprudence of that of his predecessor. I have been obliged, notwithstanding this conviction, to treat this matter with the utmost delicacy; and if your Lordship could be as sensible as I am of the danger, you would approve of my reserve. It certainly cannot be our wish to alienate the mind of one so irritable as his Imperial Majesty; and the less so as he has perhaps but too strong an inclination to give every effect to his ill humour. My dispatches will prove to your Lordship how fruitless have been all our endeavours to prevent the adoption of the fatal measures which have been pursued; and I am well aware that it will require all our attention to prevent those troops which have been employed on the expedition against Holland from being recalled, as are those under the command of Marshal Souvarow. We are in a dreadful crisis, and I scarcely see how we shall be able to calm the Emperor’s mind. His indignation against the Court of Vienna is carried beyond all bounds; and indeed so much so, that one would almost be tempted to suspect it was affected; or at least fomented and made use of as a pretext for withdrawing his troops, and returning to that passive system which we so long

lamented. It is a dreadful consideration to reflect that all these misfortunes are to be attributed entirely to the character of the sovereign, in whom, I am sorry to say, vigour of mind, and patience under adversity are so much wanting as they are necessary. If Baron Thugut is considered, as in truth he may, as dangerous to the cause, those who govern the councils of this Court are certainly but too liable to the same imputation.

"I have this moment heard that General d'Essen is dismissed the service. I cannot vouch for the truth of it; but if this act of justice has not been already done, it most certainly will shortly."

THE BISHOP OF CHESTER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 13. Oxford.—"I have the favour of your letter, with copies of letters to Bishop of Lincoln, Mr. Pitt, and the Marquis of Buckingham which I shall enclose with this.

"I have not seen the paper to which your letter to the Bishop of Lincoln refers, but upon the subject of that paper I have already submitted to Mr. Pitt, by Mr. H. Browne, the evil as it exists in my diocese, and what I conceive one important means of remedying it, namely, the subjecting by Act of Parliament all *tolerated* teachers or ministers, upon the number of which there is not any restraint by law, to those restrictions to which the Established clergy are now by law actually subjected, namely, to bring a certificate of their moral lives, to certify what doctrines they profess to teach, and to be confined in their function to *certain* districts, and in buildings *distinct*, and appropriated to divine worship only.

"At present they hurt the community by immoral lives, by indefinite doctrines, by itinerant functions, and in *secret* conventicles, in buildings not separated from dwelling houses. Their congregations are indefinite, they have often *none*, when they begin to profess dissent.

"I am much flattered with your approbation of my charge; when requested to print it, I could say with truth 'it would be more to the credit of my clergy than that of their bishop.'

"I have little to correct in the conduct of my clergy. To the exception of pluralities in non-residence, I have added only that of schoolmasters; but I have everywhere resident, in those cases, curates upon a fair stipend. The power of the bishops is not inconsiderable, but their authority is weakened by the delays of the courts. I have been seven years in enforcing the residence of an incumbent, at the hazard of much expense had I failed of success; but their power is most impeded where it should be most easy in its operation, in punishing flagrant crimes in the clergy.

"But in an increasing population, the want of churches and of clergy is lamentable. For every thousand pounds expended in gratuitous accommodation of the poor, I could save a thousand persons to the Establishment who now dissent, if the money were managed skilfully, and find a stipend for the clergyman into the bargain.

"The detail of duties you mention are now all strictly incumbent

upon the clergy by law, and though in practice they fail us miserably, they never, I believe, since the Restoration were better enforced on the part of the bishops. The truth is, the connection between the bishops and the clergy is not enough considered except in cases which call aloud for redress in the public opinion. In the ordinary course of duty, the one does not consider himself as responsible to the other. It has not been unusual to reside, or leave residence, indifferently, without notice to the bishop. 'Upon my honour,' said one to me whom I had called back to residence, 'I did not know that a bishop had anything to do with me until upon receipt of your letter I looked into Burn.' Whether that general sense of superintendence ever existed in either party to the degree which is requisite, and which you look for, I cannot say. It gives me singular satisfaction and comfort in the state of mind in which I delivered my charge to find the subject in your contemplation. All who know me know that I unwillingly foresee anything unpleasant; but, without some aid from the Legislature, and without some means of exciting a stronger zeal in the clergy *throughout the kingdom*, for I cannot complain of the clergy in my own diocese, the established religion cannot exist much longer in the country; and I think the line from Manchester through Yorkshire to Richmond, the extremity of my diocese, will convince anyone of this truth who shall pass it on horseback. I wish the Dissenters may not now be the majority in that tract. But I will trouble you with no more on this subject at present, purposing to avail myself of your kind invitation to Dropmore on the 23rd or 24th of this month, if that time shall happen to suit you. The 24th is indeed Sunday, but I in that case shall sleep at Beaconsfield, at the house of Mrs. Cleaver's mother on the Saturday.

"I am glad to find your ingravings so forward. I have written to Porson in hopes of his collation of the valuable MSS. of the *Odyssey* in the British Museum in due time; as it would greatly add to the value of the book."

W. WYNDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 14. Florence.—"The kindness which your Lordship has at all times shown to my family, and the particular favour and indulgence with which your Lordship has honoured me both in recommending me to His Majesty for the situation in which I now am, and during the whole period that I have had the honour to serve His Majesty, encourages me to entreat your Lordship's further protection towards me, and that you will not abandon me under any difficulties which may occur from the intrigues of Vienna, or the consequent necessary dispositions of the English Court. It is therefore to request your Lordship's interference in my favour, and even for promotion at this Court, that I venture to trouble your Lordship with this letter. I can pretend to no claim to your Lordship's intercession in my favour, beyond what may be allowed to real zeal and attention to the duties of my office, my abilities being such as rather to require your Lordship's indulgence

than support ; but I can venture with truth to state to your Lordship that, during the six years I have had the honour to serve His Majesty in Tuscany, I have held a dangerous, expensive, and irksome post, and have maintained and supported the rights and dignities of His Majesty and the British subjects with zeal, perseverance, and unremitted attention.

"His Royal Highness the Grand Duke has often confessed that I have preserved his State for near three years by prudent and judicious conduct, and I have at various times had the repeated satisfaction to receive the honour of His Majesty's approbation through the obliging medium of your Lordship's despatches ; and your Lordship's indulgence has proved that my conduct has had the good fortune to be countenanced by your Lordship.

"His Majesty's subjects composing the factory of Leghorn have on all occasions demonstrated their fullest approbation of my services, and have favoured me with the highest marks of their gratitude and esteem.

"Your Lordship knows that I have at all times been solicitous to obtain intelligence, and have sometimes, I flatter myself, been so fortunate as to have been useful to His Majesty's service. I have acted with firmness and strict obedience to His Majesty's commands, and to the duties of my office upon all occasions, particularly during the two different periods of the invasion of this country by the French, epochs which necessarily involved me in danger and considerable expense. In the latter case your Lordship knows that, in strict conformity to my duty, I was made a prisoner and sent to a distant country, from whence I returned at the earliest intelligence of the insurrection of the Tuscan people, much instigated in its commencement by myself, and afterwards stimulated by the active part my zeal for the cause induced me to take with the army of Arezzo ; in which I not only had a principal share and influence, but, being favoured by the confidence of the Tuscan senate, the Aretin deputation, and the army, I contributed by the exertions of my mind and body to expel the French from the Tuscan territory, and was the first to enter Florence, escorted by only a few dragoons, to deliver the prince and the people from the tyranny of the French yoke.

"I will venture to assert to your Lordship that every rank of Tuscans from the prince to the peasant acknowledged my services and confessed themselves grateful and indebted to me. The plan of the Austrians, confessed to me by their generals, was not to have entered Tuscany by two or three months so early as they did, had not the rapid progress of the Aretins insured them a complete success ; and their progress would certainly have been much less rapid, had I not taken the part which I conceived it my duty to my king and to mankind to embrace. But this was also undertaken with expense and danger, and I beg leave to represent to your Lordship that, as the youngest brother of my family, I have a very small income, incumbered with debts unavoidably accumulating, and have a numerous family of children to support, which, with my present means, is nearly impossible.

"Were I to state my losses and expenses of journeys, voyages,

ruin, and plunder occasioned by the arrival of the enemy in Tuscany, my return to my mission and re-establishment here, I should do myself an injustice were I rate them at less than near three thousand pounds, and I am now in a state of real want of resources.

"This city, though certainly less expensive than many other Courts, and particularly Naples (where no person but of a considerable private fortune can well sustain the character of His Majesty's minister), is infinitely more expensive in every point of view than it was in the time of my predecessors, or even at the commencement of my mission; and I do not exaggerate when I state from demonstrated proofs that the necessary articles of life are more than double since Lord Hervey's ministry at this Court; yet my predecessors, even in time of peace and inactivity, enjoyed the honour of the title of His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary with the salary annexed to it, infinitely greater than that which I now receive after six years hard service.

"I am aware that the present proposition of the Court of Vienna for Mr. Jackson's and my recall may be considered as an obstacle to my request, even should there exist no other; but, if your Lordship should kindly agree to espouse my request, and render me your valid assistance, that obstacle may be got over by various ways; by a temporary residence near the Grand Duke's person, by occasional absence from the capital, or any other means by which I may still have the honour of giving your Lordship intelligence in Italy, and by which the cunning intent of the Baron de Thugut may be done away. Your Lordship must be possessed of more than usual indulgence to pardon this letter, and the boldness of this request, but I flatter myself that I shall at once receive your Lordship's pardon and support. Your Lordship has too much goodness to refuse entering into the circumstances of my case, and it is in that presumption that I dare to recur to your Lordship's generosity to entreat some indemnification for my losses; and, above all, as the primary object of my ambition and happiness, to beg your Lordship to recommend me to His Majesty's gracious favour to obtain the same rank at this Court with which my predecessors were honoured.

"When I first entered into this line of profession, I looked up to your Lordship as my patron and protector, and with the view of meriting your Lordship's future favour I have unremittingly studied to deserve your countenance and esteem.

"I am apprized of the sentiments of my own family, and how anxiously they look up to your Lordship to confer this favour upon me; confident in this and in the tried friendship of my brother Lord Egremont, I have likewise entreated him to join his request to mine that your Lordship will be pleased to advance me here, and I fully rely in your Lordship's kindness and my brother's friendly intercessions to obtain from His Majesty my additional rank at another Court. The expenses attending the journey and removal of effects, the dress and luxuries of other Courts would involve me in new dilemmas, yet, as my whole dependence is on

His Majesty's bounty and your Lordship's protection, and my whole ambition is to serve my King in this capacity, I supplicate your Lordship to interest His Majesty for the post of Naples in my favour, whenever it may become vacant, unless it should be possible to continue me at this Court with the additional rank enjoyed by my predecessors, which is of all other favours that which I covet and desire.

"Besides, without vanity, I may venture to say that the esteem I have acquired at this Court and with the Tuscan people, my knowledge of the laws, the customs, and politics enables me to be of more service here than I could elsewhere, and perhaps more so than many other persons (even of much superior abilities) who might succeed me.

"The salary which the other Ministers at the higher Courts enjoy, though infinitely greater than mine, bear no proportion with the small salary and expenses attached to my mission, for the difference of expenses, for example, between Vienna and Florence are by no means so considerable as the disparity of the amount of the salary, since Florence attempts to copy and rival Vienna in luxury and mode of living, and is a place of passage, both going and coming, for innumerable English and other travellers of distinction, whom the Minister resident from custom is obliged to receive and to treat.

"I therefore entreat your Lordship to recommend me to His Majesty's bounty for promotion in my mission to the Grand Duke in preference to any other Court whatsoever; but, should that be impossible, which I hope and trust will not be the case, I would then request your Lordship's goodness to allow me to succeed Sir William Hamilton whenever the mission to the Court of Naples may become vacant, it being the nearest to this residence, and somewhat similar in point of climate, which is necessary for me on account of repeated complaints on my breast and lungs, which would render it dangerous in the extreme for me to inhabit a cold climate.

"Mr. Jackson, having lately been appointed to the Court of Turin, even whilst the Court is not there, and Mr. Drake and others having enjoyed their rank and salary when absent from the seat of their mission, makes me hope and flatter myself that the Grand Duke's temporary absence will not be considered as an obstacle to my appointment should your Lordship be otherwise inclined to comply with my petition; particularly as every act here is transacted in His Royal Highness's name, His Royal Highness's arms and colours are on all the fortresses and public edifices, His Royal Highness's government continues in his name, his commands are received weekly by the senate, and his seal is affixed to every act throughout the Grand Duchy.

"The sovereign consequently is always present on the throne of Tuscany. I could act, if it met with your Lordship's approbation, as Mr. Jackson has done recently, by paying my respects to His Royal Highness in Germany, and return here for the winter to procure information of all public events, and on account of my health, since my health on account of my breast in winter time

would not permit me to reside in a cold country ; and I am now sure that a residence in a northern climate, and even in England, would very soon terminate with my existence.

"I will not trouble your Lordship any further, nor occupy your time on my account except most fervently to entreat your Lordship's pardon and kind acquiescence in my request, and to believe that I shall never be ungrateful of your Lordship's protection and support."

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE—REPORT BY [MM.
D'YVOY AND DE LA PALUE].

1799, November 15. Emeric.—"Bientôt le sol Hollandais va être entièrement évacué des Anglais ; on assure qu'il ne reste pas à embarquer 2,000 hommes de cette nation, et que le reste consiste en Russes. Les forces maritimes Anglaises ne diminuent pas sur les côtes de Flandres et celles de Hollande. Les dernières nouvelles du Brabant disent qu'on a eu des inquiétudes pour Ostende, où on a aperçu à différentes reprises un nombre considérable de vaisseaux, dont plusieurs sont même entrés assez avant la rade. Le Général Tilli en a été averti par un courier, et s'est rendu à toute diligence à Ostende. On est persuadé maintenant que les efforts des Anglais se dirigeront contre la France, et qu'ils sont résolus de secourir efficacement les insurgés de l'intérieur ; au moins c'est l'opinion des Français qui sont en Hollande ; ils sont persuadés que la moitié de leurs troupes va rentrer dans l'intérieur, et qu'ils n'iront pas sur le Rhin, ainsi qu'on l'avoit annoncé.

"On ne sait comment expliquer le motif de l'ordre envoyé, il y a huit jours, au commandant du Nimégue, celui d'inonder les approches de cette place ; on a repris aussi les ouvrages du Greve, et on va les prolonger jusqu'au Wahl ; on ne conçoit pas le motif de cette précaution qu'on n'avoit point employée dans le moment le plus critique, et qui paraît dans ce moment-ci entièrement inutile ; il est difficile d'appliquer les variantes de la politique.

"L'espoir d'une neutralité pour la Hollande commence à s'évanouir ; on se raccroche à de prétendus articles secrets de la capitulation entre le Duc d'York et Brune. Des personnes sensées assurent qu'il en existe, et qu'ils compensent les avantages que les Anglais ont paru céder. Je sais qu'un membre du Directoire Batave s'est plaint que dans un traité qui regardait spécialement la République Batave, on lui eut fait un mystère de certains arrangements. Nous savons que plusieurs membres des Conseils avoient préparé des discours sur ce sujet, et qu'on leur a fortement imposé silence. Il existe donc, d'après cela, quelque clause particulière entre le général Français et le général Anglais.

"On parle du prochain départ des troupes que nous avons ici et environs. On dit que la ligne de démarcation va s'étendre dans le pays de Berg jusqu'à la *Vupere*, et que le régiment qui est ici ira occuper Erbfefeld. Il est certain que les troupes ne peuvent demeurer où elles sont, elles ont déjà un grand nombre de malades ; le Général Staden doit en avoir rendu compte au Duc, et les officiers s'attendent à une dislocation prochaine.

“ Si on en croyait tout ce qui se dit et s’écrit, les Chouans seraient dans un nombre effrayant, et leurs progrès très rapides. On prétend qu’un de ces matins on apprendra qu’ils sont maîtres de quelque place maritime importante. Lorsqu’ils ont entré à St. Brieux, on a cru que de là ils marcheraient à St. Malo : leur système de guerre est maintenant regulier, et il régné parmi eux la plus grande discipline. Ils ont la confiance des pays qu’ils occupent ou qu’ils traversent. Si on pouvait ajouter foi à ce que m’a dit un prêtre arrivé des environs d’Angers, et même réparti pour y rétourner, tous les membres sont liés par un serment religieux, et les plus utiles ne sont pas ceux qui sont sous les armes. Ils sont répandus partout, et dans tous les états. Ceux-là ne se connaissent pas, et se surveillent mutuellement sans le savoir. Ce même prêtre m’a assuré que dans l’affaire du Mans, ils avaient des leurs [leurres] parmi les troupes républicaines. ‘ Si nous avions de l’argent’, me disait cet homme, ‘ nous aurions pour nous la moitié de ceux qu’on enverra pour nous combattre. Il me tarde que les réponses que nous attendons arrivent pour avoir des renseignements certains sur tous ces objets, et sur bien d’autres qui doivent être importants. Si on répond affirmativement, alors j’entrerais dans les détails qui nécessiteront mon déplacement. D’ici là, ce n’est pas la peine de s’en occuper ; en attendant ma tête travaille sur les moyens de tirer parti de la circonstance. Si une fois j’ai le pied bien fixé dans l’étrier, on peut compter sur mon zèle et mes soins.’ Je ferai gagner l’argent de mon homme ; cet article est le *sine qua non* ; il demande, et cela est juste, qu’on tienne exactement les conditions du traité, et promet de tenir fidèlement ce qu’il a promis.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 17. Stowe.—“ I have not lost any time in considering the first papers transmitted by you to me ; and I will fairly own that I do not yet see my way to my satisfaction through the *principle* by which you are to applot the compensation to the several holders of borough interest ; for, in point of fact, a committee meaning to act equitably on this subject would be much embarrassed ; and as the buyers are to negotiate or to arrange with some of those who are the most hostile, I see less daylight in the possibility of settling any general rule ; and many of the difficulties that disgusted me at last with my own ideas apply almost as strongly to this ; and I fear that, as the last defeat arose from the too great sacrifice of *county-interest*, this plan may suffer from pressing too heavily on the *boroughs*. I agree fully with you that you cannot avow and abide by the principle of paying to borough holders as in contra-distinction to electors ; but I do not see how you can satisfy the holders by giving the compensation to the electors. I likewise agree most fully that the very semblance of these two Houses should be so destroyed that you should alter the clause that assembles the Lords for elections in the House of Lords, and of the Commons for their ballot in the House of Commons ; and you should assemble the Lords in the Court of Chancery, and Commons in the Court of Exchequer, and

make some of the executive officers of those courts the returning officers; and I am sure you will agree with me that the Lord Lieutenant should be instructed to convert the present buildings into some more useful office or to some better purpose than the present, as soon as may be; which cannot be the case if you order by law that they shall meet in the present House of Lords for the next or all future elections. I wish however to think over these points more fully, for I am not satisfied with any ideas that I have yet collected. I have sent you some observations on your first resolutions; those which have occurred to me on the 1st and 2nd appear material, particularly the 2nd if you are not as sure *as you ought to be* of carrying the question triumphantly in the course of the next three months. You have not sent me any thing on the subject of the Catholics. You know that they are your sheet anchor (in this project) with the lower ranks of people, and that every care must be taken to knit them both now and for the future with Government. Their ecclesiastical situations should be now arranged, as well as their schools and seminaries, which ought to be carefully attended to; and I trust that these arrangements will be so far an article, or part of the union, that they may assist in carrying it through, and in upholding it after it is completed. I know the importance of this matter, and am therefore anxious to see the proposed resolution and article respecting it.

“Another very serious difficulty still hangs upon my mind respecting the appeal to the House of Lords. I fear that the expense and distance of such a tribunal would be a very serious inconvenience, even if the accumulation of so much legal business was indifferent. Might you not make the words so general as to admit of a committee, named from our House of Lords, of *Seigneurs Trieurs*, to whom the appeal might be referred upon petition of either party, if the House should approve; and I should see no objection to the same thing for Edinburgh, though there would be probably fewer resident peers there than in Dublin, where the Chancellor and chiefs would always be resident in term time. My father’s bill would likewise be wholly defeated by sending the electors of the county of Galway to a Committee of the House of Commons in London; and I protest that this appears the most difficult of all the doubtful points.”

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE—REPORT BY [MM. D’YVOY AND DE LA PALUE].

1799, November 17. Emeric.—“Les Français n’envoyent pas leurs troupes d’Hollande sur le Rhin, ainsi qu’on l’avait dit. 5 à 6,000 hommes sont déjà rentrés dans le Brabant, et vont, dit-on, marcher dans l’intérieur pour être employés contre les Chouans. On mandait hiér, mais comme un bruit, dans une lettre d’Amsterdam, que cette ville ne serait plus désormais gardée que par des Français, et qu’un corps Batave marcherait en France: on ajoutait qu’on craignait qu’on ne prit des conscrits Bataves pour les incorporer dans les troupes Françaises. Toutes les conditions que ceux-ci exigéront, seront désormais implicitement remplies. On ne doute pas qu’incessamment le ministre Français soit chargé de donner au

Directoire Batave le mémoire des indemnités pour la campagne, et on sait que ces marchands de liberté tiennent leur denrée un peu haute.

“Tous les rapports confirment qu'on a dessein d'établir un modérantisme mêlé de surveillance, qu'on n'en voudra plus aux opinions, mais aux actions. Il est clair que ce nouveau système de conduite est dirigé contre les Jacobins, qu'on veut réprimer, sans cependant les anéantir. On espère par là diminuer le nombre des mécontents, et les accoutumer à l'ordre actuel de choses. Ils ont beau faire; ceux qui veulent avoir part au gâteau trameront sourdement, jusqu'à ce qu'un nouveau 18 Fructidor vienne leur donner des places à remplir.

“Toute la sollicitude Directoriale se tourne en France du côté des Chouans, et on se prépare à leur faire une guerre régulière; on cache avec soin leurs progrès et les avantages qu'ils ont déjà remportés sur des troupes républicaines. On assure qu'ils attirent à eux de vieux soldats par l'appas de l'argent. On parle de 400 hommes qui ont passé de leur côté avec armes et bagages: on dit que cette désertion jette de la confusion parmi ceux qu'on leur oppose, et qu'on redoute de nouvelles trahisons, très difficiles à empêcher et à découvrir dans un genre de guerre où il n'y a point d'ensemble, et où il faut combattre par petits corps. Tout ce que je viens d'écrire m'est transmis par la voie de la Belgique, où il paraît déjà des signes de chouannerie, et qui se manifesteront encore d'avantage, si les Français n'y envoient pas troupes; on assure que le nombre de ce qui y existe actuellement n'excède pas 6,000 hommes.

“Si tous de l'expédition d'Holland, les 15 mille hommes que le Duc d'York disait avoir de trop, parcequ'il ne pouvait les employer, si on les ait jettés sur les côtes de la Belgique, on eut soulevé dans un instant tous les peuples de ces départemens. Il est inutile de revenir sur le passé; il nous reste à souhaiter que l'expérience du passé serve pour l'avenir. On a vu les Français obligés, pour parer au danger, dégarnir des postes importants; si on en eut été instruit comme on pouvait l'être, on eut pu en profiter.

“Il n'y a rien de nouveau dans la situation de ce qui nous entoure; on parle toujours, mais vaguement, de changements.

“Je resterai à mon poste, jusqu'à ce que les réponses soient arrivées, et qu'on m'ait donné mes instructions; il faut me rendre utile; sans quoi, c'est du temps, de l'argent, et de la peine perdus.”

COUNT PANIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 17. St. Petersburg.—“J'ai reçu exactement la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 8 October dernier. Les sentimens dont j'ai toujours fait profession pour vous, par la haute opinion que j'ai conçue de la manière éclairée dont vous dirigez le département qui vous est confié, ont dû me faire ajouter beaucoup de prix à cette marque obligeante de votre attention. J'ai cherché à témoigner à monsieur votre frère, pendant notre commun séjour à Berlin, combien j'étoit pénétré

du désir d'acquérir quelques droits à votre confiance. Les qualités respectables de ce ministre lui avoient acquis toute la mienne, et je ne voyois dans l'union de nos vues et de nos principes qu'un résultat naturel d'un de mes vœux les plus chers, celui de consolider l'alliance et l'heureuse harmonie de nos Cours respectives. Je ne mérite donc point toutes les choses obligéantes que Votre Excellence daigne m'adresser à ce sujet.

“Je désirerois beaucoup de pouvoir, dans le nouveau poste que j'occupe, donner à ces sentimens et à ces principes toute l'étendue dont ils sont susceptibles, et que mes moyens pussent répondre à mon zèle. En attendant je vous prie d'être bien assuré que je me ferai toujours un devoir de justifier votre confiance, et de ne pas me juger en qualité d'homme public sans avoir approfondi les causes. Tout ce qui pourra me venir de sa part aura toujours les droits les plus fondés à mon empressement.”

FRENCH AFFAIRS.

Secret Report from Paris.

1799, November 17. [Paris.]—“Le lendemain que j'ai reçu votre lettre, j'ai été de bonne heure chez la personne qu'elle indiquait ; je lui ai remis le billet qui était pour elle, et je lui ai montré la lettre que j'avais pour son amie de la rue St. Dominique, que j'ai deviné de suite. Elle a lu sa lettre, a désirée voir la mienne, et en me la rendant elle m'a promis de faire son possible pour que je puisse remettre l'autre moi-même. Pendant quatre jours, j'ai été tous les matins la voir pour en presser le moment ; mais je n'ai pu être admis qu'aujourd'hui. J'ai été introduit par un domestique qu'on m'avait prescrit de demander : après avoir attendu une heure et demie, j'ai été conduit dans une chambre où j'ai trouvé la personne que votre lettre m'avait fait deviner (*et chez laquelle votre amie m'avait prévenu que j'allais*) en me nommant le domestique auquel je devais m'adresser. J'ai, suivant votre expresse recommandation, employé toute mon attention à bien retenir tout ce qu'on m'a dit, à bien examiner son visage pour lire dans son coeur.

“ ‘Vous avez ’ m'a t'elle dit (en fronçant un peu le sourcil) ‘une lettre d'une personne de mon pays à me remettre ’ (elle m'examinait avec attention).

“ ‘Oui Madame,’ et je lui ai présenté votre lettre sans adresse ; elle s'est retournée vers la cheminée, elle a examinée le cachet de la lettre un moment, puis elle l'a ouverte avec des ciseaux, elle l'a lue lentement, après elle a encore plus examiné le cachet, se retournant vers moi elle m'a dit. ‘Depuis quand avez—vous cette lettre ?’ ‘Je l'ai reçue depuis peu de jours.’ ‘L'avez vous reçue cachetté ?’ ‘Oui Madame.’ ‘Vous ne savez rien de ce qu'elle contient,’ (me regardant très fixement). ‘La personne qui me l'a envoyée me mande dans celle qu'elle m'écrit, qu'elle désirerait avoir une permission pour exporter des grains, et qu'elle reclame vos bontés pour cet objet ; me recommandant exprèssement de remettre la lettre moi-même ;’ ‘avez vous ici cette lettre ?’ Je lui remis la votre du 9 Novembre, que j'avais apporté, ayant

pensé que peut-être elle désirerait la voir : elle examina d'abord le cachet avec beaucoup d'attention, elle en fit la lecture assez vite, puis elle examina les cachets des deux lettres qui étaient très semblables, et bien marqués, sur le pain à cacheter le c en était très distinct, et entouré de points très profonds ; elle tint les deux lettres à la main quelque tems regardant son feu en réfléchissant. Tournant la tête vers moi, elle me dit ; *'Je serais bien aise de rendre service à la personne qui vous a écrit, mais il faut qu'elle vienne promptement ; je suis étonnée qu'elle ait perdue son activité, elle devrait être ici au lieu de sa lettre : elle devrait savoir que ses affaires ne peuvent se traiter que par elle ; mandez lui de suite qu'elle ne m'écrive plus, et ne cherchez plus à me remettre de lettre de son part.'* Sans me donner le tems de répondre elle ajouta, 'vous n'avez pas besoin de votre lettre, je vais la bruler ;' et de suite, elle a jetée au feu les deux lettres, et sans cesser de les regarder bruler, elle a ajouté, 'vous l'avez sans doute vue à son passage il y a quelques mois, c'est-elle bien changée ?' Je lui dis que vous aviez fait plusieurs voyages en Amérique, que vous aviez essuié beaucoup de fatigues, mais qu'ayant conservée votre gaité, vous jouissiez d'une bonne santé, et que vous étiez moins changée que je ne l'avais imaginé. 'C'est ce qu'on m'a dit ; j'en suis charmée, mandez-lui, le plutôt possible, que je serai bien aise de l'aider dans son projet, qu'elle vienne promptement, avec les pouvoirs de ses associés. Surtout recommandez lui la plus grande prudence ; qu'elle aura des frais nécessaires à faire ; mais qu'il y a beaucoup de grains dans ce pays, et que sa spéculation est très bonne ; écrivez dès ce matin.' Alors elle m'a salué légèrement, et je me suis retiré par la porte par laquelle j'étais entré ; j'ai retrouvé le même domestique qui m'a conduit jusqu'à l'escalier.

"Je rentre dans le moment chez moi ; je ne vous parlerai pas de toute l'inquiétude que cette visite me cause ; je me bornerai à répondre, suivant ce que vous me prescrivez, aux questions de votre lettre, n'entrant dans aucuns détails sur tout ce qui est arrivé ici depuis peu de tems.

"D'abord la personne que j'ai vue est très changée. J'ai trouvé son air naturellement mélancolique augmenté ; je crois qu'elle met beaucoup plus de blanc qu'autrefois, ses dents sont plus mauvaises, elle parle aussi plus lentement, sans doute pour moins ouvrir la bouche ; elle a toujours beaucoup de grâces et son même air de bonté ; elle doit m'avoir reconnu, car elle m'a beaucoup examiné, mais elle ne m'a pas parlé de ses enfans quoiqu'elle ait vu dans votre lettre que vous désiriez que je vous en donnasse des nouvelles. Je lui aurai fait part de votre désir si elle n'avait pas lue ma lettre : mais ne m'en parlant pas elle-même, j'ai craint de lui faire de la peine par mes questions ; elle est très réservée ; elle n'a pas, ni moy, prononcé une seule fois votre nom : c'est encore une très belle et aimable femme. Je ne crois pas qu'elle soit heureuse : mais je crois qu'elle prend encore à vous beaucoup d'intérêt ; je pense que vous pouvez compter sur son amitié pour le succès de vos spéculations. Elle doit être satisfaite de la réserve que j'ai mis dans ma conduite pendant ma visite.

"A présent, mon bon ami, permettez—moy de vous dire que je

suis tourmenté par les plus vives inquiétudes, car s'il faut que vous veniez vous-même suivre vos affaires ici, telles avantageuses qu'elles puissent être à votre fortune, vous devez y renoncer. Les événements arrivés nouvellement ici ne vous présentent pas plus de sûreté qu'auparavant : et malgré les puissantes protections que vous pourriez avoir, vous y courriez de très grands périls. Au nom de Dieu, ne renouvellez pas les mortelles inquiétudes que vous nous avez causées. Je dois d'ailleurs vous observer qu'une affaire sur les grains n'est plus aussi avantageuse, car beaucoup de négociants étrangers, même de chez vous, ont obtenu la permission que vous sollicitez ; il y a beaucoup de blés et d'autres grains achetés pour être exportés, et que les prix en sont déjà considérablement augmentés ; ajoutez qu'il faut beaucoup dépenser en présents.

“ Si la personne qui promet de vous aider vous tient parole, vous pouvez certainement faire de bonnes affaires, mais un de vos associés, un commis entendu, peut les faire de même. Je lui donnerai de bon cœur tous les conseils et les soins que mon âge et mon connaissance des affaires de ce pays pourront me dicter pour vos intérêts.” *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, November 18.] Twickenham.—“ J'ai l'honneur de vous joindre ici un mémoire et les pièces justificatives, le tout très peu intéressant, mais qui m'ont été envoyés d'Italie pour vous les remettre. De grâce, permettez à votre ami de vous prier d'éclairer son ignorance sur des objets qui doivent l'intéresser. Je ne sais plus rien au fond de ma tanière, où je pleurs non pas mes péchés mais ceux d'autrui. J'ignore ce qui se passe dans le monde.

“ Est-il vrai que Buonaparte, Moreau, et Siéyès gouvernent la France, et qu'ils parlent de paix ? Vous m'avez promis de me mander aussi si vous receviez des nouvelles qui vous satisfaisoient ou déplaisoient au sujet de notre calomnie en Suisse ? Savez vous l'objet de l'envoi du Prince Esterhazy en Suisse ? Pardon, pardon de toutes ces questions, mais vous êtes trop juste pour ne pas comprendre ma curiosité. Je ne vous demande pas de secret d'ailleurs. Je sais que, vu les circonstances, ce n'est pas le moment d'en exiger, mais n'oubliez jamais, je vous supplie, que quelques soient les torts des autres, mon caractère personnel ne variera point, et que le pauvre petit représentant de la malheureuse Autriche sera toujours aussi bon Anglais, et surtout *Grenvilliste* de cœur et d'ame, que ceux qui peuvent l'être par devoir, indépendamment de leur sentiment.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 19. Harley Street.—“ Il m'est arrivé un maudit courrier avec des dépêches qui me mettent au désespoir.

“ On n'agit chez nous que par passion et violence. Avec les intentions les plus pures, et les plus généreuses, on n'a pas le moindre brin de la prudence la plus ordinaire. Vous verez par les pièces que je vous communique la manière brusque et imprudente avec laquelle on a rompu chez nous avec la cour de Vienne, et la résolution

qu'on a prit de rappeler l'armée Russe qui est en Suisse ; sans considérer qu'on n'étoit pas le maître d'en disposer, et que cette armée vous appartient, et sans considérer qu'on invite la cour de Vienne par nos incartades à faire sa paix avec la France. On ne sauroit assez se presser d'envoyer d'ici un courier pour faire des représentations très fortes, et un autre à Mr. Wickham pour l'engager à faire son possible de retarder la marche rétrograde du Maréchal ; car il se pouroit bien que la cour de Vienne pourait être intimidé, et chercher à apaiser l'Empereur, ce qui remettrait les choses dans leurs assiete naturelle, et on pouroit alors faire un plan plus fix pour les opérations futures. Je n'ai pas eu le tems de metre au net les traductions du Russes que mon fils a fait, ni de faire copier les copies des lettres de l'Empereur au Roi et à l'Empereur d'Allemagne, c'est pourquoi je vous supplie de me les renvoyer demain. Quand serez vous en ville, et quand pourai-je vous voir pour concerter ce qu'il y a écrire à Petersbourg ? Je ne doute pas que vous ne soyez persuadé qu'il n'y a pas de tems à perdre pour réparer tout ce qu'on gâte chez nous."

Enclosure :—

PAUL I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, October 15. Gatchina.—“ Vous verrez par les copies incluses du rescript au Maréchal, Prince Italique, et des lettres à l'Empereur des Romains et au Roi de la Grande Brétagne, que la conduite de la Cour de Vienne m'a forcé d'en venir à la fin à une tupture avec elle. Son obstination à ne pas s'ouvrir sur ses intentions pour ce qui regarde le rétablissement du gouvernement monarchique en France, l'avidité de faire des acquisitions prouvé déjà par le fait, mes troupes en Suisse sacrifiées par l'envie et la méchanceté, tout cela m'a fait voir que sans le secours et la coopération sincère de la Cour de Vienne, mes forces et celles de l'Angleterre ne sont pas suffisantes pour arriver au but qui a uni ces trois puissances, et que tous nos efforts ne serviront qu'à l'avantage de la cour de Vienne ; et, sans avoir exterminé le gouvernement Français, ils serviront à établir une autre puissance tout aussi dangereuse pour le bien public.

“ Quoique mes intentions et mon plan proposés au Roi d'Angleterre sont déclarés dans la lettre que je lui écris, cependant, pour vous diriger dans vos conférences et dans les affaires que vous aurez avec le ministère Anglais, je vous informerai de mes intentions plus en détail. Ma situation envers le Roi de Prusse est telle que, malgré le désir que j'ai de me lier de plus près avec lui, je ne veux pas risquer de recevoir quelque réponse désagréable ; ainsi vous direz à Lord Grenville que la retour de son frère à Berlin peut être très utile dans la situation actuelle des choses, et peut accélérer le succès désiré, en dirigeant sa conduite de manière que ne demandant aucunement au commencement des démarches actives du Roi de Prusse, et à mesure du consentement du Roi de Prusse aux propositions du M. Grenville, ou de quelque autre plénipotentiaire Anglais, de lui découvrir tout notre plan contre la Cour de Vienne, le faire entrer dans les mêmes vues pour mettre des obstacles à la Cour de Vienne, et l'empêcher d'exécuter son intention de s'emparer

du Piémont, de Gènes, et des trois Légations, au lieu de rendre ces pays à ceux à qui ils appartiennent de droit. Si le Roi de Prusse consentira à ce plan, je suis prêt à lui écrire une lettre pour s'appeller au secours de l'empire Germanique, et pour délivrer l'Italie des l'avidité de l'ambition sans bornes de la maison d'Autriche. On peut faire sentir au Roi de Prusse que dans un tel cas, ni moi ni le Roi d'Angleterre nous ne l'empêcherons pas de faire quelques acquisitions sur le Rhin, en lui laissant à lui-même le choix des moyens. Notre plus grande attention doit être sur la maison d'Autriche, et tous nos efforts pour faire une alliance avec le Roi de Prusse, lequel, joint à la Russie, à l'Angleterre, à la Porte Ottomane, à la Suède, et au Danemarck, fera une très grande force dans le nord, capable de donner la loi à toute l'Europe. J'ai envoyé ordre au conseiller d'état actuel Baron von Krüdener, rappelé de Copenhague, de rester à Berlin, et d'avoir de là une correspondance avec mon ministère, sans prendre sur lui aucune capacité officielle.

La Cour de Vienne, sentant l'impossibilité de résister à la France sans mon secours, conclura certainement une paix qu'elle a déjà entamée, pour qu'en finissant la guerre, elle puisse s'assurer la possession des pays conquis. Il reste à savoir à présent jusqu'à quel point la France consentira aux propositions de paix faites par l'Autriche ; surtout quand elle sera informée de la rupture qui a eu lieu entre moi et l'Empereur des Romains, et de l'ordre donné à mes troupes de revenir en Russie.

Cependant comme, malgré les moyens, les forces, et la résolution du gouvernement Anglais de continuer la guerre contre la France, on ne peut pas combattre éternellement, si la position interne de la France ou l'inclination du ministère Anglais tend vers la paix entre la France et l'Angleterre, vous saurez que cela me sera indifférent, et je préférerois même de voir l'Angleterre en paix avec la France plutôt que la Cour de Vienne, si les conditions de paix étoient les suivantes.

“ 1. De joindre les Pays—Bas à la Hollande, et d'établir le Stat-houder sur les dix-sept provinces.

“ 2. De borner la France à ses anciennes limites.

“ 3. D'établir le *statum quo ante bellum* en Italie, et,

“ 4. La même chose dans l'Empire Germanique.

“ 5. De laisser au Roi de Prusse quelques acquisitions sur le Rhin.

“ 6. De laisser à l'Angleterre ses conquêtes aux deux Indes.

“ Ma propre position envers la France est telle qu'après avoir été dans le courant de cette guerre une puissance auxiliaire contre elle, en quittant l'alliance je rentre dans ma situation antérieure, et je n'ai pas besoin de traiter directement avec elle. Je serai le dernier en Europe à la reconnoître pour République, et je ne le ferai qu'après que l'Angleterre l'aura fait. Vous connoissez les ordres que j'avois donné en 1797 au Comte Panin, et pourquoi ses négociations avec Caliard ont été rompues.

“ Le changement que j'occasionally dans le système politique en rompant l'alliance avec la Cour de Vienne est d'une telle espèce qu'il ne faudra pas perdre du tems à s'arranger avec Berlin. J'espère donc que vous emploierez tous vos efforts pour que le ministère Anglais entre le plus-tôt possible dans ces vues.

“ Depuis le tems que la Cour de Vienne a refusé d’aller en avant contre l’ennemi commun, et qu’elle s’empare de tout pour elle-même, j’ai comencé à perdre l’espérance d’arriver à mon but, ayant pour règle que les intentions intéressées ne peuvent s’accorder avec des affaires honnêtes et justes, Je suis persuadé maintenant de l’hypocrisie de la Cour de Vienne, et j’aurois honte de rester plus longtems son allié. J’attends les succès des bonnes dispositions du ministère Anglais, et de votre zèle pour mon service, qui est aidé par l’estime que vous vous êtes justement attirée dans le pays dans lequel vous remplissez depuis si longtems et si honorablement la place importante qui vous a été confiée.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 19. Wimbledon.—“ I have this morning received the enclosed, and consider it is a question too delicate to be decided upon without mature consideration. If this Russian is delivered up to their General, there can be no doubt that he will be punished with the utmost severity, but that creates the very difficulty. In the case of subjects of any country committing crimes in their *own* country, it is a matter of discretion in the country to which they may fly for refuge whether they will deliver them up on a requisition made to them for that purpose. But here the crime committed is against the civil law of this country, and if you listen to the requisition which is made, you deliver the culprit to be punished in a manner unknown to the laws of the country. Let me know what Mr. Pitt and you feel upon it. I have desired Mr. Huskisson to call upon Count Woronzow, and to state to him that I had difficulties upon the subject, but that I would send an answer without much delay.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 20. Harley Street.—“ J’aurois voulu pouvoir venire demain chez vous, mais il m’est impossible, ayant la tâche pénible à parcourir toute la corespondence entre son altesse Royale le Duc d’York et le Général Essen. Son Altesse Royale m’a promis de me l’envoyer demain. Il faut que je la parcoure, et que je marque à mes secrétaires les pièces importantes qu’ils doivent copier, et que je dois envoyer à l’Empereur pour prouver la mauvaise foi et la mauvaise volonté de ce maudit Général Almand qui avoit pour but visible de broniller les deux pays. Cette besogne m’occupera toute la journée, mais je ne manquerai pas de venire à Dropmore vers les trois heures après demain, vendrédi ; nous causerons avant dîner ; Lady Grenville me donnera, j’espère, de cet excellent puding qu’on ne fait que chez elle : après le café nous ferons avec vous deux parties d’échecs, où, je vous prie, de ne pas faire les honneurs de votre maison et de perdre exprès des parties comme l’autre fois ; et entre sept et huit heures, vous me permettrez de vous quitter, car je suis continuellement bombardé d’affaires courantes et fastidieuses, mais que je dois expédier continuellement et sans rétar, relativement aux troupes qui reviennent du

Helder dans différents ports de ce pays ; et tous ces détachments s'adressent à moi, à tort et à travers, pour tous leurs besoins réels ou factices."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1799, November 20.—Cleveland Row.—"J'aurois du répondre plutôt à vos questions, mais en vérité vous en savez autant que moi. Les papiers publics vous auront annoncé la révolution Française. J'espère qu'on n'aura pas la mal adresse de s'y laisser tromper. Pour les autres objets il n'y a absolument rien. M. Thugut nie de la manière la plus formelle, sur son honneur personnel, et avec toutes les protestations imaginables, qu'il y ait négociation ou armistice avec les François, ou qu'on ait même songé soit à l'une soit à l'autre."—*Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 21. Wimbledon.—"Dundas was not returned from town when I arrived here, and we had not much opportunity to talk over the subject till after dinner. He concurs entirely in the idea that the Russian force can not be employed on the Continent but as auxiliaries, and in every part of the memorandum we formed this morning, except what relates to bringing 30,000 Russians to act with our troops from hence. I am very unwilling to give up that additional chance for making an impression from hence, or to diminish the general mass of force which our plan proposes to employ in the whole against France. But I am not sure that the real defects in the discipline and management of the Russians, added to the deep prejudices which seem to have taken root against them in our service, would not make them rather an incumbrance than an aid. If, on these grounds, we do not ask for any Russian force in this quarter, we might propose to augment the number to be employed in the Mediterranean to 15,000 or 20,000 ; and perhaps (if we succeed in producing a right understanding on the future arrangement of Italy) 10,000 or 15,000 more might be garrisoned in Italy, and so much more Austrian force rendered disposable. On the whole, I am quite confirmed in the opinion that the general outline of this plan promises better success than any attempt to employ any great body of Russian force in operations on the Continent ; and that it is much the best plan we can propose. It is also much the most likely to be satisfactory to both the Imperial Courts, and I should therefore wish to state it with a decided preference, though not to the exclusion of the former plan of Continental operations if, contrary to any probable expectation, those Courts should prefer the latter, and can agree upon it. There occurs to me only one point which did not make part of what we talked of. It is that, even if Russia should refuse to give any troops to act with Austria, or Austria should refuse to receive such a succour, or even if Austria should make its separate peace, still we ought to press to the utmost for Russian troops to be employed in the Mediterranean. Perhaps if they are trained and brought into service there by such an officer as Stuart, it may

be worth while afterwards to augment their numbers; and when we have exhausted all that can be done against Spain, to bring them against other points.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 22. Wimbledon.—“I have seen Popham who enters very fully into the spirit of the proposed new instructions, of which I explained to him the general outline, subject of course to such variations as may arise in completing them. Before they are finally arranged, or at least before they are actually sent away, it seems, I think, almost indispensable that they should be seen by such of our colleagues as are within reach. Perhaps it might be sufficient (if you wish to avoid a Cabinet) to send the instructions, and the despatches on which they are founded, to the reading-room, and to send a circular notice that you have done so, meaning to dispatch them without delay if no objection occurs. If any is stated, I am afraid the Cabinet can not be avoided, and I shall be ready at whatever time you fix. In the meanwhile I am going to Hollywood to stay till Monday or Tuesday, if I have no summons in the interval.”

Postscript.—“Popham mentions again an anxious wish (strengthened he says by Woronzow’s opinion) to be furnished, if possible, with a letter from the King to the Emperor, stating that, in consequence of the good opinion the Emperor before expressed of him, he has sent him back for the purpose of stating fully to the Emperor many important particulars of which he has been an eye-witness, and also of explaining confidentially the ideas entertained here on the late extraordinary events, and on the whole of the present situation of affairs. I rather think something to this effect may be useful, and in some degree necessary.

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 24. Downing Street.—“In consequence of a communication made to me this morning from Compté Woronzow I have come to town for an hour, and I would not feel at ease if I did not call your attention to a circumstance I think it material to be adverted to before Sir H. Popham goes away. You have seen the false and injurious statement made by D’Essen to the Emperor of the affair of the 19th in Holland. This, stated publicly in the Petersburg papers, ought not in my judgment be passed over in silence, if nothing else called for a public interposition. If we acquiesce in it without a becoming remonstrance, the Emperor of Russia is entitled to consider it as all true, and to feel with regard to us accordingly. Whatever defects there might exist in other respects from the general construction of a Russian army, it is certain that, so long as General D. Herman remained at the head of the Russian troops, there was a perfect cordiality between the armies, and a perfect zeal for co-operation on the part of the Russian general; but, from the moment of D. Herman being unfortunately taken, the very reverse has been the case in every single instance, and the same spirit at this moment remains and is operating.

Through a confidential channel in D'Essen's family, Woronzow knows all he writes, and the whole tendency of it is to create ill blood between the two Courts. Is this to go on? or if we do not publicly state to the Emperor our dissatisfaction with the conduct of this general, are we not responsible for all the mischievous consequences likely to result from it? I truly think we are, and in my judgment nothing short of a distinct remonstrance to the Emperor through Popham against General Essen remaining in this country, is adequate to the purpose. Popham will feel no difficulty in supporting by the most unequivocal statements, founded either on his own personal knowledge or on authentic information, the remonstrance I wish to be made, and which I have reason to believe Woronzow wishes to be made. I flatter myself you will give to what I have stated a serious and candid consideration, for I feel much impressed with the force of my statement, and I do not think that with such an officer at the head of the Russian troops, or at all serving with them, you can for a moment be at ease with regard to the consequences either here or in Russia."

Postscript.—"Upon looking over my letter I observe that I have omitted to mention to you that Woronzow does not know that I am aware of his being in possession of General D'Essen's correspondence with the Emperor, and that in no conversation with him or otherwise will it be right for you to allude to that circumstance."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 24. Downing Street.—"In reading over your despatch to Sir Charles Whitworth of the 19th November, I confess I was struck with a part of it, which I have caused to be copied out and enclose to you. I would be uncandid if I did not state to you the serious alarm I feel from seeing upon how low a tone you take the future prospects of this country at the close of the war, whether longer or shorter. I don't say that there is an absolute necessity for this discussion at present, but when I think I have reason to perceive that you, and probably Mr. Pitt, have sentiments with regard to some of the most substantial interests of this country so very different from what I entertain, I do not feel it possible for me to be silent.

"In reading this enclosed paragraph, it is impossible not to feel that, if the war should end satisfactorily in your view with regard to the internal situation of France and Holland, you have made up your mind to restore all the colonial possessions of those countries except the Cape and Ceylon. *My* feeling is that no end of the war can justify such a resolution, for if Martinico in the Leeward Islands is given up to the French, under any circumstances, the knowledge we must all now have of the relative situation of the colonies in the Leeward quarter of our colonial possessions, must convince us those that remain with you are not worth keeping, and you must hold them by the tolerance of France; and if, in addition to this, Holland is to have restored to it *without any reservations* the colonies of Surinam and Demerary, Domingo at the same time an open colony, surely nobody will then seriously maintain that any part

of the colonial trade (that of Jamaica excepted) will remain with this country. It will all pass into the hands of France, of Holland, and of America. In other words these countries will return at once into a situation which will enable them to revive rapidly all their commercial and maritime resources, and proportionably rob us of all the means of strength and pre-eminence by which we have been enabled to perform those miracles of exertion which have distinguished Great Britain in the course of this arduous contest. And I cannot help feeling the more sensibly on this subject, when I perceive that there is no disposition on our part to avail ourselves of the means in our power to open to the manufacturers of this country the market of South America, which might serve as a substitute to the contingent loss of others of which, in the course of events, we may be deprived.

“Upon a further perusal of this paragraph, my alarms do not rest here. It is only stated that we are not *likely* to give up Ceylon, the Cape and other places. I really flattered myself we had all felt for a long time that such a cession was *impossible*. If we do not manfully make up our minds to some determinate stand for the preservation of *British interests* involved in this contest, we are playing the part of spendthrift bankrupts, who for the sake of a few years’ brilliant *éclat*, have made up their minds to terminate their career by a desperate suicide.

“This leads me to ask what is all this for? We were drove from necessity into the war from the best and the wisest motives, because, if we did not then interpose, the frenzy of the principles which reigned in France would have extended itself to this country, and overturned every chance we had of preserving our own constitution. I likewise feel as much as anybody that if, by the continuance of the war and the great exertions we are making for that purpose, we can contribute to the restoration of the French monarchy it is a most desirable event for the future tranquillity of this country and of Europe; but, if the consequence of having successfully contributed to do so is to be an abandonment of all those possessions and all that consequent power upon which our future greatness must rest, I beg to wash my hands of such a system, and I would much rather never see either the King of France or the Stadtholder restored than submit to such consequences, if it is understood to be possible that such consequences can result from it.

“I will likewise frankly own to your Lordship that, although I do most cordially and conscientiously go along with you in the exertions which are proposed to be made in order to take the chance of the best possible termination of the war, I do not feel the same alarm of danger to this country from the situation of France that I once did; nor do I think the contagion of its example, in any material degree, longer dangerous to us. When the delusive and intoxicating system of liberty and equality and the natural rights of man were in full fashion, and uncontrolled either by external power or their own consequent misfortunes, the neighbourhood of France to this country was seriously dangerous and justly alarming; but I am not afraid of any set of men in this country being captivated by a military despotism, or wishing to exchange the mild and happy

government of this country for the cruel, unprincipled and ignominious slavery and oppression which reigns in France. Every nation on the continent of Europe have just cause to dread a great concentrated military power existing among them, and threatening devastation and military achievement in every quarter; but of all others, Great Britain is the last that has reason to tremble. While our countrymen retain their love of their country, and by industry and commerce administer to our naval superiority, we have little to dread from the military enterprise of any continental power.

"I have troubled you with perhaps too long a letter, but I feel the subject most deeply; and, if the leading members of his Majesty's Government have made up their minds to a different view of the subject, I am sure they act most unwisely in keeping me among them."

HENRY DUNDAS to [W. PITT].

1799, November 24. Wimbledon.—"I have very great doubts upon those parts of Lord Grenville's despatch, No. 102, as suppose and wish the employment of so large a body of Russian troops in the Mediterranean, or *any where* in conjunction with our troops. In so far as 30,000 men to act under the Archduke, I have no doubt. In so far as any further addition to that number can be made to place in any garrisons in Italy or elsewhere to relieve Austrian troops for active operations, I have no doubt. In so far as either Minorca, to the extent of 2,000 men, or Gibraltar to the extent of 2,000 men, may by Russian troops relieve our own for offensive operations in the Mediterranean, I have no objection. But I am perfectly clear that no Russian troops can, with any good effect, be employed on this side of Europe in conjunction with British troops; on the contrary I believe they would be productive of mischief. Upon the whole therefore I am of opinion that the 15,000 Russians we already have are all that we can beneficially employ as British troops and as we have an opportunity in course of the winter to habituate them to the habits and intercourse of British soldiers, they appear to me preferable to any other new Russian troops that could be brought into the Mediterranean. My opinion therefore upon the whole subject is that if we subsidize Russian troops *to act with British* beyond our present numbers, we will act unwisely. If there is room for acting upon a more extensive scale in the Mediterranean, *offensively*, than can be done by an union of ten thousand British and ten thousand Russian, I would endeavour to form the remainder by series in the island of Sicily, where, I have reason to believe, under British officers, very efficient corps might be formed. It is impossible for me not to advert on the present occasion to the total forgetfulness we seem to labour under with regard to Egypt. We seem to look upon that as a point totally over both in our naval and military arrangements. While there is one thousand French troops any where in Egypt, I cannot concur in viewing the question in that light."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, November 24. Stowe.—"Be not alarmed at the size of

the packet which I enclose to you ; you know that my habit is to send to you everything which relates to your business, and that I never insist upon your reading more of it than your own curiosity and leisure may induce you to do. Stamford's letter suggests the same destination for himself which you had already thought of, and therefore the sooner you confirm him in it the better it will be for your business, and the easier for his arrangements.

"The report which he encloses from La Palue, under his fictitious name, is curious enough because he appears at a very early period to have been informed of the new stress which the politics of Paris were about to give to the discussions of peace, and if you are as well satisfied as I am with La Palue's communications from Emerick, you will not hesitate to desire General Stamford to renew with him the same engagement for six months more, that which I had made having ended on the 1st of October, although I ventured to promise Stamford that October should also be paid to La Palue ; I apprehend that your easiest mode of settling this business will be by putting it into the hands of Garlike at Berlin, who can remit to General Stamford there as well what will be due for himself as what will be due to La Palue. You have likewise to decide upon the proposal made by La Palue for establishing his French communication ; if you approve of it you have only to say so in your letter to General Stamford, and I presume this payment may likewise best pass through Garlike to Stamford, and through Stamford to La Palue's correspondent. The danger of frost interrupting your communication makes me presume that no time will be lost by you in answering Stamford upon these subjects ; and as I cannot foresee your determination, I shall not write to him until I hear from you, in order that I may refer him to your more regular and official letter to him, my own correspondence with him being only now of a private and unauthorised description.

"I am making out a small bill of extraordinaries due since the last which I presented ; as it will include the rest of Fisher's payment, I wish to know to what day I am to charge it ; I presume his establishment as well as mine limited by the day on which I had my audience of return, and therefore I propose to charge it to that day.

"With regard to the Homerick title-page ; the only books which I have examined have 'εν Οξονια 'εν 'ετει ; but I am content to leave out the second 'εν, and I will write for that purpose if it be not already too late to change it without beginning a new plate.

"I have some letters in concealed ink from Garlike, which I cannot yet decypher till I have made the *producing liquid for them*. I am sorry to see that several from him have miscarried to me through the stupidity, as I conjecture, of my old friend at Hamburgh.

"I know not what answer to send to Stamford about his young *protégé*, nor do I know in what manner he looks to have an English brevet supply the place of that which he had expected from the Stadtholder ; as this however is an application to me, tell me what is to be said upon it. This is fine planting weather, and I hope that you are active among the young beech in spite of all the old politicians."—3 *Enclosures*.

Enclosure 1 :—

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, October 31. Brunswick.—“ J’ai fort bien reçu les lettres dont vous avez eu la bonté de m’honorer en date du 12 et du 20 de ce mois. Si les informations contenues dans la dernière, qu’en partie j’avois déjà reçues d’autre part, m’ont profondément attristé, les tendres assurances que vous m’y avez données de votre bienveillance et de votre précieuse amitié ont été pour moi une source de consolations qui a été cause que je n’ai pas éprouvé toute l’amertume qui se fait ordinairement sentir à une âme sensible, quand elle se voit ravir une espérance qu’elle avoit longuement et fortement nourrie.

“ Je ne me permettrai aucune réflexion sur ce qui s’est passé en Hollande. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui, lorsqu’un projet a échoué, font d’abord sur bout des doigts l’énumération des causes qui ont contribué au mauvais succès.

“ Tel événement heureux ou malheureux peut être produit par des causes si cachées qu’il est impossible qu’elles parviennent à la connaissance du public ; et en fait de causes, qui est en état de discerner toujours celles qui ne sont dues qu’au hasard, de celles qui ont été ou qui ont pu être prévues ?

“ L’expédition sur la Hollande est une opération manquée. C’est un grand malheur assurément ; mais je partage votre opinion que ce n’est pas un malheur irréparable. En effet, je ne vois rien qui puisse empêcher que la même expédition ne soit reprise, ou qui doive faire douter d’un plein succès si l’on veut agir d’après un autre plan où moins de choses soient laissées au hasard, que ce n’a été le cas dans le premier. Les apprêts qu’elle exigera la seconde fois seront moins longs and assujettis à moins d’inconvénients ; ils demanderont par conséquent moins de tems ; et, si l’on en cache l’objet à l’ennemi le plus long tems qu’il sera possible, on le trouvera dans la même proportion moins préparé à la défense. Au reste, je ne puis vous cacher que je n’ai remarqué qu’avec une peine infinie que dans la convention faite avec Général Brune, on n’ait pas transigé pour les malheureux Orangistes qui se sont montrés ; moins le nombre en a été grand et plus il falloit songer aux moyens de les sauver, parceque leur exemple seroit devenu un encouragement pour les plus timides.

“ Je ne puis attribuer qu’à un oubli l’omission d’un article qui eut été en leur faveur, et cet oubli coutera probablement cher à ces pauvres gens.

“ Vous aurez, sans doute, fait sur les campagnes de cette malheureuse guerre une remarque également applicable à la campagne actuelle ; c’est que, quelque brillants qu’aient été nos succès au commencement, les fins en ont toujours été funestés aux puissances alliées. Si nous avons essuï des revers en Hollande, ceux qu’on a éprouvés en Suisse n’ont pas été moins grands, puisque nous y voyons Massena, par la reprise du St. Gotthard et de Domo d’Ossolo, en état de prêter, par Bellinzone, la main à Championnet ou à Bonnaparte, qui probablement va lui succéder.

“ J’attends avec impatience des lettres de notre cher Comte de Panin qui m’apprendront, peut-être, quelque chose de l’effet

qu'auront produit sur l'esprit de son souverain les nouvelles de tant de désastres. Il m'a écrit trois fois pendant son voyage à Petersbourg, où je sais qu'il est arrivé le 26 du mois passé, et il peut avoir reçu déjà deux de mes lettres, mais qui ne lui annonçoient encore rien de sinistre.

"J'ai vu par votre dernière du 20 de ce mois que celle que j'eue l'honneur de vous adresser le 11 ne vous étoit pas encore parvenue. Elle vous auroit appris qu'une indisposition assez grave me retenoit à Brunswick. Cependant, comme je me sentois mieux lorsque je reçus votre lettre de Emden en date du 12, je me préparois à exécuter mon projet de voyage quand, tout à coup, je reçus la nouvelle de l'armistice en Hollande qui me fit changer de résolution, quoique d'abord je voulusse pas croire à cet événement.

"Ma lettre du 11 renfermoit aussi une note du Marquis de la Palu, contenant tous les renseignemens que vous m'aviez demandé précédemment sur le correspondance à établir à Paris. Je vous adresse avec celle-ci un double de cette note, en vous priant instamment de me faire savoir aussitôt que vous le pourrez, si je dois donner, ou non, suite à cette affaire, dans le cas où la chose seroit encore possible, ce dont je ne suis pas encore informé.

"M. de la Palu est toujours à son poste, comme vous verrez par son dernier rapport dont je joins ici une copie. Je pense qu'il nous y sera plus utile que jamais dans les circonstances actuelles où il s'agit de ne pas laisser refroidir les bonnes dispositions partout où il s'en trouve. Mais, quoiqu'on décide à son sujet, je désire d'être mis à même de pouvoir le satisfaire pour les services qu'il a rendus jusqu'au moment présent. Vous vous appellerez qu'il lui a été accordé 40 Frédéric's d'or par mois. Or, comme il a reçu depuis le mois de juin dernier 200 Frédéric's, dont 40 étoient pour son voyage de Brunswick à Berlin et de là à Emmeric, il lui revient encore 40 Frédéric's pour qu'il soit payé jusqu'à la fin d'Octobre.

"Je suis fâché de me trouver dans le cas de devoir vous entretenir d'affaires d'argent, et ce qui plus est, de finir cette lettre par vous parler sur le même objet pour mon propre compte, ce que je ne ferai cependant que pour ménager la délicatesse de M. le Prince d'Orange, qui devroit en parler lui-même par ce que la chose le regarde.

"Vous n'ignorez pas que la dépense occasionnée par ma mission à Berlin a été aux fraix du gouvernement Britannique, qui a bien voulu s'en charger. Sentant plus que personne combien ces fraix surpassoient l'utilité que ce gouvernement en recueilloit, j'en fus d'autant plus empressé à quitter cette mission; qui, pour cette seule raison, me peinoit plus que je ne puis dire. Par la tournure fâcheuse qu'ont pris les affaires en Hollande, je me crois obligé d'aller la reprendre au moins pour quelque tems; car, comme je n'ai quitté Berlin que sous le prétexte d'aller faire une absence de quelques semaines, pour que le Roi ne s'imaginât pas que M. le Prince d'Orange m'eût rappelé par humeur, il me semble que je ne puis guères me dispenser d'y faire une nouvelle apparition.

"J'ose, en conséquence, recourir à votre intercession auprès du Gouvernement Britannique, pour qu'il m'accorde durant le court séjour que je me propose d'y faire encore, le même faveur dont il

m'a fait jouir ci-devant ; si toutefois vous ne jugez pas plus convenable que je renonce à mon dessein, en passant par dessus les considérations qui me l'ont suggéré, et qui, vis-a-vis d'une Cour qui se conduit comme fait celle de Berlin, ne sauroient être d'un grand poids.

"Le Duc de Brunswick, dans un billet qu'il m'écrivit hier, me dit, 'à Berlin on paroît aussi tranquille sur le sort de la Hollande, que sur celui de Seringapatam ! On dit que le Roi de Prusse s'est fait auprès de la République Française un mérite de son inactivité. Sûr est-il que s'il avoit agi c'en étoit fait, au moins quant à la conquête de la Hollande. A-t-il bien ou mal vu ? L'avenir ne tardera probablement pas à éclaircir cette question.' En attendant, il est une considération frappante qui échappe à ce roi philanthrope et pacifique ; c'est que si la paix se fait comme la République Française la veut, c'en est fait des trônes quelsqu'ils soient. Dieu veuille les préserver de ce malheur. C'est là mon vœu de tous les jours.

"Adieu ; conservez moi toujours une part dans votre amitié ; les tendres sentimens que je vous porte au fond de mon cœur ne s'éteindront qu'aux bornes de ma vie."

Postscript.—"Dans le moment que j'allois fermer cette lettre, je reçois une pressante sollicitation de M. Rivière en faveur de son fils. Je prends la liberté de vous l'adresser telle qu'elle est contenue dans la lettre ci-jointe, qu'il m'a écrit à ce sujet.

"Je crois que ce qu'il demande peut lui être accordé, et j'ose hardiment assurer que le père et le fils méritent qu'on s'intéresse à eux.

"Nous ne sommes pas plus attachés à la bonne cause, qu'ils le sont l'un et l'autre. Le père me sert à sonner le tocsin à Dresde, pour éveiller, s'il est possible, l'Electeur qui dort toujours sur le même sofa, ou pour mieux dire, sur le même volcan que le Roi de Prusse. Quoique nous n'ayons pas réussi encore dans cette entreprise, nous nous sommes cependant aperçus à différens symptômes que le sommeil du premier n'est pas une léthargie. Pardonnez-moi la liberté que je prends de vous importuner déjà pour la troisième fois par des sollicitations qui me sont adressées. Je sais combien cela est désagréable, et c'est pour cette raison même que je ne sollicite jamais rien pour moi." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2 :—

LE MARQUIS DE LA PALUE to GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

1799, October 9. Emmerick.—"L'homme que l'on proposoit offroit de procurer des connoissances de l'intérieur de la France, la force des armées, les renforts qu'elles pourroient recevoir, soit en vieilles troupes soit en conscrits, les plans du Gouvernement, les ressources des finances, les moyens ou le manque de moyens pour les subsistances, le nombre des troupes dans chacune des provinces maritimes, les dispositions du peuple de Paris et celles de divers departemens, le but des deux factions qui divisent le Gouvernement, le motif pour croire que l'une ou l'autre l'emportera, le caractère d'une partie des généraux qui sont employés aujourd'hui ou destinés à l'être, la facilité ou la difficulté de les corrompre, ou même ceux qui occupent les premières ou secondes places."

“ On ajoutoit que ces offres étoient très étendus, mais que les raisons qui engageoient à croire qu’il étoit en état de les tenir, c’est que cet homme étoit par ses moyens au-dessus de la classe de ceux qui se chargent ordinairement de ce métier, qu’il étoit attaché à une personne qui occupoit une des premières places qu’un agent de la République puisse y remplir ; qu’il étoit son homme de confiance, qu’il avoit beaucoup d’intelligence et d’activité, et surtout cette connoissance des intrigants, qu’il étoit en général lié avec les Directeurs et le Secrétaire-Général du Directoire. L’ami qui m’avoit fait connoître cet homme, ne me repondoit pas de sa délicatesse, parcequ’il est impossible d’en croire beaucoup à un homme qui se charge du vil métier d’espion, mais il lui en croit plus que n’en ont ordinairement les gens de cette espèce. Mon ami lui avoit fait remarquer que le Gouvernement Anglois désiroit être bien instruit, mais qu’il avoit peut-être plus de raisons encore de souhaiter que les généraux des armées coalisées le fussent autant que lui ; on offroit d’établir une double correspondance, une pour l’Angleterre et l’autre pour le quartier-général de l’Archiduc.

“ Les événemens ont prouvé l’utilité de cette proposition, parcequ’il a été visible que les Autrichiens ont été prévenus, et notamment dans la dernière tentative des François sur la Souabe, faute d’avoir été avertis des desseins de leurs ennemis. Qu’il me soit permis de faire une réflexion, c’est qu’en général le Gouvernement Anglois dépense beaucoup d’argent pour avoir des agens éparses, dont la plupart sont ou infidèles ou ignorans ; il seroit beaucoup mieux servi s’il réunissoit tous ses moyens sous l’inspection d’un homme capable et intègre, en état de juger les différens rapports et l’exactitude ou la vraisemblance des faits qu’on lui transmettroit. Cette besogne seroit encore mieux faite, si des instructions précises enjoignoient les différens objets sur lesquels on voudroit être principalement instruit ; et s’il avoit à sa disposition des fonds à employer pour telle ou telle occasion ; alors on auroit des notions moins vagues, moins isolées, et rien d’inutile. Le Gouvernement Anglois plus qu’aucun de ceux de l’Europe, sait combien les demi-moyens sont souvent nuisibles.

“ Cet homme en question demande pour pris de ses services 125*l.* sterling par mois ; on observoit que cette somme pouvoit paroître forte, mais qu’on devoit songer (1) qu’il courroit les risques du supplice s’il étoit découverte, (2) qu’il étoit impossible d’acquérir les connoissances nécessaires et de former des liaisons sans des sacrifices d’argent.

“ On peut essayer cet homme, s’il n’a pas pris un autre parti pendant l’intervale qui s’est écoulé, en s’en assurant pour un trimestre. La dépense sera de 300*l.*, et de 50*l.* pour le voyage qu’il seroit obligé de faire pour s’aboucher avec moi et recevoir les instructions. On insiste expressément sur la nécessité de recevoir des ordres pour qu’on puisse les exécuter. On conçoit que si on ne limitoit pas cette correspondance sur les objets importans on auroit des remplissages inutiles.

“ On propose donc de confier à la personne qui écrit les fonds nécessaires pour cette correspondance, et de l’autoriser en même tems à ne payer cet homme que par quinzaine, pour s’assurer de

sa fidélité ; d'autant qu'il a demandé à être payé d'avance, et qu'il a insisté sur cette condition.

“ On se croit obligé de prévenir encore que le défaut de moyens a empêché qu'on ne rendit des services plus importants pour le Brabant, et qu'on a été forcé de renoncer à y entretenir des correspondances parcequ'on ne pouvoit se les procurer qu'au poids de l'or, et que d'ailleurs le défaut de réponse les rendoit inutiles ; si on croit nécessaire de les continuer, on demande quelques fonds disponibles pour cet objet, et on espère mériter assez de confiance pour être sûr qu'ils ne seroient employés qu'avec économie et intelligence.

“ On n'a jamais vu ni entendu parler d'un Colonel Malcolm employé en Brabant, et on rendra compte si le successeur qu'on lui donne, M. Maitland, suit l'ordre qu'on lui a prescrit de s'aboucher avec moi.

“ On restera à son poste dès que les services qu'on a pu rendre ont été agréables, et on peut être assuré qu'on redoublera de zèle d'après cet encouragement. On va écrire à l'homme en question pour se mettre en mesure d'entamer la correspondance dès qu'on aura reçu les fonds qu'on y destine. Ce préalable est absolument nécessaire.” *Copy.*

Enclosure 3 :—

LE MARQUIS DE LA PALUE TO GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

Rapport de T. Knout.

1799, October 26.—“ Vous êtes maintenant instruit de la capitulation des Anglois avec les Français ; je ne crois pas qu'elle vaille au de grands éloges, lorsqu'il reparoitra en Angleterre. Il vous paroitra singulier que les Français ayant pu donner la loi et, sans doute, obliger leurs ennemis à la recevoir, on se soit contenté de l'Amiral de Winter, et des 8000 prisonniers, et qu'il n'y soit parlé ni de la flotte ni des magasins du Tével enterrés. L'époque où le rembarquement doit être effectué est encore bizarre, puisqu'on donne jusqu'au 30 Septembre. On persiste à croire qu'il y a des raisons secrètes et une intervention de la Prusse, dont on ignore l'issue. On parle toujours de comprendre la Hollande dans la ligne de la neutralité qui serait reculée jusqu'à la Meuse, et un gouvernement provisoire sous l'autorité Prussienne jusqu'à la paix. Cette opinion, peut-être dénuée de vérité, est universellement répandue en Hollande, et console tous les partis. On espère à ce moyen voir les ports se rouvrir, et le commerce se revivre ; si cela est, les négocians Hollandois vont être les facteurs de l'Angleterre, qui gagnera peut-être plus à ce marché qu'aux succès que ses armées auroient eus dans cette expedition. S'il n'arrive pas quelque événement de ce genre, la Hollande est perdue, et elle va devenir onéreuse même à la France. On sait de bonne part que le Directoire Batave a fait à celui de France les représentations les plus sérieuses, et n'a pas dissimulé l'impuissance où il alloit bientôt être de faire aller le gouvernement sans user de moyens spoliateurs qui seraient le complément de la ruine du pays.

“ Croyez qu'en France, tandis qu'on annonce avec emphase des victoires, qu'on proclame avec enthousiasme le retour de Buona-

parte, que bien des gens voudraient peut-être en Egypte, les gouvernements passent de mauvais quarts d'heure à cause de l'épuisement du trésor national. On a été contraint d'articuler pour l'an 7 un déficit de 130 millions. Je sais de bonne part qu'un membre du Comité des Finances a dit que dans six mois il ignorait comment on s'y prendrait pour payer même les armées.

“ On accoutume le peuple à entendre parler de paix. Boulai de la Meurthe a fait un discours qui ne vous aura sûrement pas échapé. Vous allez voir cet hyver les négociateurs en campagne, et peut-être bientôt une cessation d'hostilités, suivi d'un nouveau congrès, si on n'est pas dégouté de celui de Rastadt ; en deux mots, croyez que la France cache un squelette sous des habits dorés et boursoufflés. Si on n'en est pas la dupe, si la lassitude, l'épuisement de l'autre côté ne fait pas perdre patience, si on se persuade que la resistance seule équivaudra à des victoires, et si on favorise et aide puissamment les troubles de dedans, enfin si on réduit la France aux ferments renfermés dans son sein, on recueillera le fruit de cette salubre politique. Ce que je vous mande n'est point le fruit de mon opinion ni de mes réflexions ; il appartient à un observateur éclairé, qui voit et suit les choses de près.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, November 25. Dropmore.—“ I have this morning received your two letters of yesterday's date. With respect to the first I am sincerely obliged to you for pointing out to me any passage in my drafts to Sir C. Whitworth which struck you as liable to doubt or objection. It certainly was not my intention to take the prospects of this country for the termination of the war on any limited or confined scale. In the course of the negotiations we have hitherto had on that subject, I have more than once found my ideas of the claims and pretensions of this country very much above those of my colleagues, but never once, I think, at all lower.

“ I have altered the last sentence of the passage you refer to, by leaving out the word *now* and substituting *induce* for *enable*. If you had suggested any other alteration, I see no ground to think that I could have objected to it. You have not I think (judging from the tendency of your remarks) observed that, in the first sentence, I do not confine our objects to the security of our eastern territories, but have included the maintenance of our naval power and commerce (in the West Indies as well as in the East).

“ These words would, as I construe them, be consistent with our retaining every conquest we have made or shall make out of Europe, over any of our enemies. In Europe we have made none but Minorca, the possession of which is expressly reserved to us in the stipulations proposed by another of this very set of drafts. Whether, when the time comes to treat for peace, it will be expedient to put our claims so high as to the keeping all our conquests, or what part of them we may safely offer to restore, it is surely now very premature to determine, except as to the Cape and Ceylon ; on which, you will know, my mind was made up, when that opinion was far from general even among our colleagues.

"Where I most differ from you is, first perhaps in your view of colonial acquisitions *on the continent* of America, which I am inclined to think prejudicial to the interests of your old established sugar colonies, and also very dangerous (as indeed they have already proved themselves) to our commercial interests at home, by the field they open for wild and ungovernable speculation. On this point however, if I am wrong, I am open to conviction. But, secondly, I differ greatly with you in your view of the diminished danger from the present state of France. In all these revolutions in that country I have always seen the particular acts of cruelty and oppression soon forgotten and overlooked, while the Jacobin principle has remained unshaken, the centre of all the hopes and wishes of the adherents to that principle in every other part of Europe; and so it will be, as I believe, for a hundred more such revolutions, till the principle itself be attacked and subdued in its citadel at Paris.

"After all, these points are every one of them dependant for their right application on time, circumstance, or degree; and I have meant no more (I think I have done no more) than to leave the King's Government open to provide as they shall judge best for the interests of our country when the moment of decision arrives.

"On referring back to my drafts to Sir C. Whitworth you will find that I have already made some complaint against General Essen, which I did from myself, and with no other knowledge of the subject than I gathered from scraps of private letters. I own I think, if the Duke of York does not mean to acquiesce in General Essen's statement, there is but one manly line for him to follow, which is either to write himself to the Emperor of Russia, to state the truth, and to demand justice for the misrepresentations; or, which I think would be better still, to address to you an official despatch to the same effect, which you would transmit to me, and which I would direct Whitworth to communicate *in extenso* at Petersburg.

"If, for any reason which I do not know, he is unwilling to do this, I am very ready to send, in the same manner, any other statement of facts, prepared and communicated to me in such official form as may be preferred.

"We may daily expect the arrival of General Koutousow. Nothing is more important than that his mind should be conciliated by attentions which, I am afraid, without very special directions, it is not the practice of our officers to shew to foreigners.

"I transmit to you officially a proposal of the Emperor of Russia for conferring orders on some of our officers. I hope it will not escape your attention on this occasion that nothing of this sort has yet been done for any Russian officer, military or naval, except the swords given to Tchitchagoff and another admiral who retired from the command." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 26. Dropmore.—"Popham n'est pas encore parti, mais j'espère bien qu'il ira demain. Hammond vous enverra demain la copie de la réponse du Roi à l'Empereur, aussi bien que

le précis que vous demandez si je puis trouver le tems de le faire aujourd'hui, et je ferai l'impossible pour cela. Je ne puis pas encore vous envoyer de réponse à votre lettre, étant un peu embarrassé à cet égard, ni trouvant pas convenable que les officiers du Roi reçoivent des marques de grâce de la part de l'Empereur données avec profusion, sans qu'il y ait quelque réciprocité. La première fois que nous nous verrons nous en causerons.

"La victoire du fou et du chevalier n'est due entre mes mains qu'à un heureux hazard. Je ne sais si un joueur plus habile que moi ne pourroit pas obliger le Roi de se réfugier dans le coin fatal, mais c'est une leçon pour tous les Rois de se tenir en avant avec fermeté et courage."

Postscript.—"Buonaparte a insisté que tous les soldats prisonniers ici fassent partie des 8000. Il ne sera relâché aucun marin jusqu'à ce que tous les soldats l'aient été. Nous y consentons (comme vous le jugez bien), mais le trait est singulier." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 28. Downing Street.—"Je viens de recevoir votre lettre, et je ne puis assez vous remercier de la communication de vos idées. La nôtre a été de donner à notre ministre à Petersbourg toute la latitude possible pour faire quelque bien, s'il ne peut pas faire le mieux. Il est impossible de douter un instant que le seul vrai plan qu'un homme d'état, ayant à sa disposition les armées Russe et Autrichienne, ferait pour la campagne prochaine ne soit précisément celle de votre lettre. S'il y entreroit quelque possibilité de succès, le Chevalier Whitworth est autorisé de s'en occuper. Mais je doute très fort qu'il y réussisse, et même si le traité étoit fait et conclu, je douterois encore plus de l'exécution d'un plan où les progrès du maréchal Souvorow et de son armée dépendroient toujours de la co-opération effective (et pas simulée) de deux armées Autrichiennes sur sa gauche et sa droite.

"Je conviens, et je sens parfaitement bien, que le second plan n'offre pas la perspective d'un succès qui soit par lui-même également décisif que seroit l'entrée d'une forte armée en Franche Comté sous les ordres du premier général du siècle. Mais ne pouvant y réussir, il s'agira de voir ce que l'on pourra y substituer; et, en vérité, je crois que l'effet des opérations projetées dans la Méditerranée, et dans le canal, réduira d'abord l'Espagne à la nécessité d'une paix séparée, et puis mettra le Directoire (je dois dire le Consulat) dans l'impossibilité de se soutenir contre les Jacobins de l'un coté et les Royalistes de l'autre, et l'obligera d'avoir recours au rétablissement du Roi comme seul moyen de unité pour eux-mêmes.

"Les nouvelles d'Italie par la malle d'aujourd'hui sont très bonnes. Les Autrichiens ont battu les François à deux reprises près de Tessino, et leur ont pris 4,000 prisonniers. Mais ce qui est plus important c'est qu'ils ont enfin reconnu la nécessité de faire ce qu'ils auroient dû faire il y a trois mois, de reconstituer l'armée Piémontoise en ne lui exigeant aucun autre serment que celui de fidélité à leur propre souverain, de reconnoître le Comte de St.

André dans sa qualité du Lieutenant-Général du Roi de Sardaigne en Piémont, et de donner même des espérances à ce Roi pour son prompt retour à Turin.

“Les nouvelles de chez vous ne sont pas également consolantes, mais avec le tems on peut, ce me semble, espérer que la nécessité de se tenir réuni contre l’ennemi se fera sentir.” *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 29. Harley Street.—“Je vous envoie le brouillon de ma dépêche que j’envoie ce soir par mon courier. Je ne sais si vous pourrez déchiffrer ce mauvais barbouillage, et je vous prie de me le renvoyer par le même homme qui porte cette boîte.

“Vous verrez que je vous fais parler, et j’espère que vous ne me désavouerez pas. Je connois le caractère de l’Empereur et comment il faut se prendre pour le faire revenir de ses mesures violentes, mais je ne puis le faire de mon propre cru. Il faut que je me serve de votre nom, et je l’ai fait dans les termes les plus mesurés et le plus flatteurs pour lui. Au reste, ce ne sont que des vérités, et vous pensez sur ce sujet conformément à ce que je pense. Vous verrez que j’indique le grand plan d’opération, mais à son défaut, je fais mentions de ceux que proposera le chevalier Whitworth, en cas que tout est rompu entre nous et l’Autriche. J’espère que vous écrirez au Chevalier sur le grand plan, si nos affaires s’accommodent avec l’Autriche, et que vous songerez aussi à l’envoi de mylord Mulgrave auprès de Souvorow. Je serois venu vous voir si je n’étois pas encor tourmenté de mon rhumatisme.

“Pouvez-vous me dire de quelle date sont vos lettres de Vienne, et si la terrible missive de mon Empereur à celui d’Allemagne a fait quelque effet, car elle devoit être arrivée à Vienne entre le cinq et le six de ce mois.”

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, November 29. Fort William.—“I have received your letter of the 1st of June, and return you many thanks for your kindness to Lady Mornington and Richard. I am quite satisfied with the reasons which the former has given against undertaking the voyage to India; and Richard’s progress is a great source of comfort to me. My health continues excellent, and indeed rather improves; and I begin to conform to the place, and to take great interest in the success of a variety of plans which I have in contemplation for the security and improvement of this magnificent empire: which *now* does not depend on the *thread of opinion*, but is as firmly fixed as any root of the British power in any quarter of the globe, with the single exception of the Island of Great Britain.

“You seem surprised at the earnestness with which I spoke of honours, and you tell me that I must ultimately look to *English effect*. But I must look to English effect through *Indian effect*; and I feel every hour that, *for the latter*, the highest rank and honours are indispensable. This is so much my conscientious opinion with regard to this Government that (if I am deemed unworthy of such

distinctions) my decided judgment is that some person should be sent here who either actually possesses them, or may receive them soon after his arrival. I thought this essential when I wrote to you by the *Eurydice*; but after what has passed, if I am left without such distinctions, it will be imputed either to disapprobation, or indifference towards my late measures, or to neglect of my just claims; and, in any case, my authority will be shaken both with our subjects and allies.

"The opinion of the public here is indeed an honour to me such as I can never receive in the shape of title; unless in as much as that form shall express to me the approbation of my friends and country. But the public opinion here will be affected by any coldness in England—and am I to expect to see my claims undervalued at home? or can I bear, without the most poignant regret, the idea that more justice is done to me here, than by those whom I quitted with so much grief?

"Give my best love to my Lady; I mean to send you a menagerie of birds by the next ships.

"Your Mr. Spenser Smith has not written to me more than once since I have been in India; I wish you would direct your new ambassador to be more communicative. I beg you will not allow any of your tribe to interfere in the affairs of Persia or Candahar without instructions from me; this is a point of great importance."

2 *Enclosures.*

Enclosure 1:—

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GEORGE HARRIS to THE EARL OF MORNINGTON.

1799, November 12. Madras.—"The army which by your Lordship's directions, proceeded to the capital of the late Tippoo Sultan, and achieved the conquest of Mysore, resolved upon the plains of Seringapatam to request your Lordship's acceptance of a star and badge of the Order of St. Patrick, made from the jewels of the Sultan, as a mark of their high respect.

"In the name and by the desire of that army, I have now the honor to present your Lordship with the star and badge.

"In performing this pleasing duty, I am proud to feel and to acknowledge, that the splendid success of the late campaign must, under Divine Providence, be in justice referred to the instructive wisdom and characteristic energy of your Lordship's councils. Those councils have formed a memorable era in the history of India. From their effects the Company has gained a new source of increasing prosperity; and in their operation the wide-spread interests of the British empire in the East, being consolidated and raised on a firm and durable basis, have attained an eminence of elevation and security hitherto unknown.

"The glory of having been made by your Lordship instrumental to the acquirement of some of these inestimable advantages, excites in my mind feelings of satisfaction and gratitude which no language can adequately convey.

"A copy of the letter to me from Major-General Floyd, President of the Prize Committee, I have the honor to enclose." *Copy.*

Enclosure 2 :—

MAJOR GENERAL J. FLOYD to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HARRIS,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

1799, November 9. Choultry Plain.—“The army that under your command achieved the conquest of the empire of the late Tippoo Sultan, in the spring of this year, being anxious to offer the Earl of Mornington, Knight of St. Patrick, Governor-General, whose wisdom prepared and directed that event, some marks of its high esteem, has caused a star and badge of the Order of St. Patrick to be prepared, in which as many of the jewels as could be found suitable were taken from the Treasury of Tippoo.

“I have now the pleasure of sending you the same, in a gold box, and wooden case.

“I have the honor to request you will be pleased to present the star and badge to the Earl of Mornington, in the name of the army, as a mark of its respect.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, November 29. Wimbledon.—“Although the letter you read to me yesterday does not add a great deal to the apprehensions formerly entertained of the improbability of a co-operation of Russian with Austrian troops, it certainly does not diminish them, and we ought to keep the circumstance in view. If it turns out so, it would be wise to make some variation in our plan. In that case, if the troops now under Sovarrow were to come straight to Leghorn, and from thence to join our force in the Mediterranean, the junction would take place months before we could expect any force from the Crimea, and it would relieve us from a difficulty which, I am much afraid, will be found nearly unsurmountable, I mean that of finding transports for conveying troops from the Crimea to the Mediterranean. Russia has no trade, and therefore I don’t well see how there can be ships to carry troops in that part of Russia. There is very little in the Baltic, but as the Dardanelles are shut up against them at all times before the present junction of Turkey and Russia, I don’t well see how there can be any trade in the Black Sea to give us the expectation of any transport for troops beyond what may be got from the ships of war the Emperor of Russia may have in those seas. Of all this however others may be able to inform you better than I can. If we bring Sovarrow’s army down to the Mediterranean, we will then keep the troops now with us to act in the North seas and the Channel, in place of sending them as proposed to the Mediterranean. If we should be drove, from the implacability of Russia, to adopt this plan, it would have one advantage over all others. It would very much facilitate the obtaining and lessening the expense of transports in the course of next year, which I am afraid we shall find our chief difficulties if we are to be carrying on operations on a great scale from this country, whence every material and implement of warfare must be transported by sea. It strikes me to be very material to make demonstrations as early as possible in the Mediterranean, as it will tend very much to distract the enemy as to all our views next campaign, and probably prevent them

from sending as much as they would otherwise do against the Austrian armies."

Postscript.—"You are aware that the above is meant only in the event of our not being able to reconcile the Russians and Austrians to act together."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, November 30. Dropmore.—"I received your letter here yesterday, and I have in consequence of what you there state, in which I fully concur, written another despatch to Whitworth, of which Hammond will send you the draft, which I trust will meet your ideas.

"According to the former plan, shipping would no doubt be extremely difficult to be procured, and as we want to use Popham for the service in these seas, it would be very important to send with him or after him some naval officer capable of doing in the ports of the Black Sea, what he did this year in the Baltic. Where you are to find such a one I know not, but perhaps his recommendation would be the best. If not, you will perhaps apply to Lord Spencer on the subject."

Postscript.—"If Knox does not return immediately from Paris he may be hindered by frost from going. Why should not some active military officer of inferior rank go in the first instance? But do not detain Popham for him. He ought now to be there if it had been possible, and every hour is of great consequence as to his arrival."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1799, November 30. Dropmore.—"It would require another volume as large as that which I now send for your amusement, if I were to enter into any discussion of the eventful scene to which you have been a witness, or were to express to you the infinite obligations which I feel myself under to you for the whole of your conduct in these trying circumstances. Your letters have been throughout the whole my chief guide and direction, and they have, in this last instance, prevented my falling into a very great error. It was very reluctantly that I abandoned the hope that Suwarow was really the instrument destined by Providence to rescue us from all the mischief to which we have been exposed. But this delusion like others is dissipated, and it is plain that the issue of a last effort cannot be entrusted to his hands. When I speak of a last effort you will not understand me to speak of the separate exertions of this country for its own defence. Those, I am persuaded, in spite of difficulties could be continued, and I trust, in spite of discouragements and disappointments, would be continued for several years more, if it could be shewn to the country that it was necessary. But for continental exertion, if the time be not already past, you see enough to be convinced that one more campaign is its utmost limit.

"I am confident that with the Russian auxiliaries, or even without them, the means of Austria are abundantly sufficient to make that campaign decisive. Enough so, I should think to force the restoration of monarchy, but certainly enough to drive France

back to her old limits. Whether Austria will see the thing in this light, or will act for this purpose, depends on the windings of a policy so perverse and crooked that my mind is utterly unable to follow them.

"We are making quietly preparations for an immense effort next year against France itself in support of the Royalists. We are obliged to speak with reserve on this point both to Vienna and Petersburg, that our schemes may not be known long before they are ripe for execution. You can much assist us by your activity and judgment in opening communications with the Royalists in the middle, east, and south of France, and by giving them every degree of encouragement and aid. The insurrection broke out in the Vendée and Normandy sooner than we wished, but, being once on foot, we must endeavour to support it. Our first disembarkation of money and arms has been very happily made. Our second is arrived off the coast, and seems likely to be landed without any difficulty. The situation of affairs at Paris appears to be in the highest degree favourable to the establishment and progress of the Royalist cause.

"Bonaparte's object is understood to be the establishing a sort of American constitution with himself for President. The success of this must evidently depend upon his influence with the army, and on his keeping the Jacobins in subjection by employing the troops in sufficient force in the interior. How this is to be done consistently with the prosecution of an Austrian and Vendée war I cannot conceive, nor, in all probability, has he any such hope. He must therefore look to negotiations of peace. But if there is a grain of common sense in the councils of Austria that resource will fail him; and he will then have no alternative but to prepare for his voyage to Cayenne, or to throw himself upon the Royalists.

"All these hopes, however, are dependant on the co-operation of Austria and Russia for another war, and on our succeeding, first, in establishing the Vendée insurrection in force enough to maintain itself during the winter, and, secondly, in the enterprises which we have in view for supporting and seconding their efforts. It is in these respects that I look with anxiety for your assistance. You will see by my despatches how great a latitude I have thought myself justified in giving you on that subject. We have had experience enough of each other to make us both feel secure, I in giving it, and you in using it. You will, I trust, do so to the very utmost extent of your own judgment. Consider how long a time it requires to ask and to receive instructions in Swabia, especially when our communications with the Continent are often suspended for weeks and fortnights at a time. You see what our object is. It is to find employment for the French Government in the interior, so as to prevent their crushing the Vendée during the winter. It is also to procure active and efficient co-operation for the Vendée, and for ourselves, in the spring and summer. For this purpose we are willing to make large sacrifices. We are doing much on the side of the north-west provinces, and all you can do elsewhere will be highly useful, and acceptable to us.

"Some of our projects point, as you will see, to the south of

France. We are defective in that quarter even as to a general knowledge of the dispositions of that part of the country ; and still more as to any means or projects of co-operation. And indeed, speaking generally, your ideas of the internal state of the whole country, though they would often come late, would always be acceptable to me." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1799, November 30. Dropmore.—“ My packet will be so uncommonly large, that I will not add to it by writing much to you in this form. I see with great pleasure that necessity is doing more than reason or justice could to bring my old friend Thugut to some explanations and advances towards a good understanding with those who are fighting his battles for him. Whatever be the motive, it is clearly our business to make the best of it ; and it is a curious circumstance that, while Sir Charles Whitworth is apprizing us of the failure of an Austrian intrigue to supplant us at Petersburg, we are instructing him to use our influence there to the utmost to support the interests of Austria herself. I really fear it is too late. Far from blaming the Emperor of Russia, I must say if I were a Russian Minister, I should be very deaf to the remonstrances of England on the subject.

“ I will however hope the best ; and you will see that we shall not be discouraged by failing in one or two instances, from making every exertion to obtain from him all the aid he will give, and in whatever shape we can get it.

“ We have a report here that Starhemberg is to be sent to Russia, and that Deitrichstein is to come to replace him. I have no reason to be very fond of Starhemberg, nor is his character one which it is possible to speak of with much respect. But, on the whole, I see no reason to think we should gain by any exchange, unless we could have here a man of sense and candour and probity, and who was in Thugut's confidence sufficiently to undeceive him in many of the points in which he (I trust very erroneously) judges of us by himself. This we certainly should not have in Dietrichstien ; and there would be something so offensive in his nomination after his infamous falsehoods in Switzerland, that I could not but object to it in the King's name, and that most decidedly. It would however be much better to prevent such an *éclat* ; and if the thing be really intended, which I still think very doubtful, I trust to you for preventing its ever coming to the point of a formal notification and refusal.” *Copy.*

INTELLIGENCE FROM BERLIN.

NOTE [FROM H. FAGEL].

1799, November.—“ Le Général de Stamford a écrit au Prince d'Orange, le 28 Octobre dernier, que lorsqu'il étoit arrivé à Berlin M. de Luchesini en étoit déjà parti pour Paris, et que quelqu'un qui se flatte d'être dans sa confidence l'a assuré que sa mission en France

n'a aucun but déterminé ; que ses instructions sont vagues, remplies pour les trois quarts d'éloges de sa personne ; que ce sont ses rares talents et ses profondes connoissances, joints au zèle qu'il a constamment manifesté pour le bien de l'état, qui ont décidé le Roi à le charger d'une mission délicate, où il s'agit d'éclairer les démarches de la cour de Vienne, de s'instruire à fond de la situation intérieure de la France, et de découvrir, s'il est possible, les vues secrètes et les projets que couve le consul, et de sonder ses intentions à l'égard de la Prusse.

“ Que la même personne lui avoit observé que le Marquis, quoique haïssant la maison d'Autriche, étoit parti de Berlin dans des sentimens plus modérés et plus favorablement disposé pour la cour de Vienne qu'il ne l'a été autrefois ; et que voyant, on ne peut mieux, le danger qui menace l'Europe, et la Prusse en particulier, il étoit à presumer que cette vue le rendroit prudent, circonspect, et moins susceptible de se laisser emporter par l'impétuosité de son caractère.

“ Le Général de Stamford y ajoute que, d'après son opinion sur cette mission et celui qui s'en trouve chargé, il voit trop le mal qu'elle produira pour espérer qu'il pourra être balancé par quelque avantage, soit en faveur de l'intérêt général, soit en faveur de de l'intérêt particulier de la Prusse.

“ Il ajoute encore une anecdote qu'il tient de M. de Luchesini, pour faire voir jusqu'où va l'ascendant du Sieur Lombard sur l'esprit du Roi ; c'est que quand Luchesini a pris congé de sa Majesté, elle lui a dit, 'je suis d'autant plus charmé que vous ayez bien voulu vous charger de cette mission que mon secrétaire du cabinet Lombard en est au comble de la joye, et que je sçais que mes intérêts ne sçauroient être en des meilleures mains que les vôtres'.

“ Dans une seconde lettre, en date du 15 Novembre, le Général Stamford écrit : 'il est arrivé hier un courier de Francfort sur le Main, expédié par M. Formey, Résident Prussien en cette ville, portant la nouvelle au Roi que le General Augereau a reçu ordre, le 9 de ce mois par le télégraphe, de dénoncer l'armistice en Allemagne, et qu'il a exécuté cet ordre vis-a-vis de M. d'Albini et du Général Simbschön.' Augereau doit avoir dit qu'il croyoit que la négociation dont se trouvoit chargée M. de Cobenzl n'avoit eu pour but qu'une prolongation d'armistice, mais que c'étoit la paix, et une paix séparée avec l'Autriche, que vouloit la France, et non une simple trêve d'armes.

“ Les troupes Prussiennes, dit-on, prendront poste à Cuxhaven le 23 de ce mois, et M. de Schulz, ministre du roi à Hambourg, quittera cette ville le 20 pour se mettre, comme commissaire civil, à la tête du detachment destiné à occuper ce poste. M. le Duc de Brunswick est chargé de l'exécution pour ce qui regarde la partie militaire. C'est aujourd'hui le ton à Berlin de crier contre ce qu'on appelle la tyrannie Anglaise, ton qui fait rire sous cape la tyrannie Française.”

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, November-December]—“ I forgot to mention this morning that I had been expressly desired by the Hereditary Prince of Orange

to deliver to your Lordship, with His Serene Highness's compliments, copies of the letter and proposals he sent a few days ago to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and to Mr. Dundas, respecting the formation into regiments of the Dutch loyalists now at the Isle of Wight. I have the honour of enclosing those papers."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 1. Stowe.—"The post which brought me your letter announcing a copy of what you had written to General Stamford, did not keep that promise for you, and I have therefore written to Hammond to ask for it.

"I enclose to you copies of two more letters which I have received from Brunswick, the first of which will testify to the disinterestedness of my correspondent, and the second to the zeal and industry of his active mind. I would have waited till I had seen your letter to him, before I enclosed these to you, if I had not thought it useful to send you this picture of his own speculations, before you should finally send to him what is to constitute his instructions for Berlin. I must very fairly own that I cannot feel extremely sanguine as to the success of our old project for detaching Hesse, Cassel and Saxony from Prussian neutrality; but while we feel the inconvenience of this Berlin system, we must either resist it, weaken it, or turn it to our advantage by deriving at least from it such benefit as we may. If we had succeeded in Holland, we might perhaps in that success have found the means of resisting it, not by open hostility, but by the more near and immediate pressure of the confederate armies of Russia and England, strengthened by their joint possession of The United Provinces. We have failed in Holland, and that hope of resisting Prussian neutrality is no longer open to us. General Stamford's attempts to undermine it would seem therefore to be all that is left to us to try in that quarter, unless you agreed with me, as you probably do, that 40,000 Russians may do better active service, if the war continues, than by ranging themselves in the body of an army of observation. If indeed the Emperor of Russia should be so far disgusted with the events of Switzerland as to refuse himself to more active measures in the next campaign, then I should much incline to think that he might be at least persuaded to adopt this idea, and take his share of the northern influence rather than abandon it entirely to the Cabinet of Berlin.

"It is likewise in the same sense that I have talked of the possibility of our deriving some benefit at least from the Prussian neutrality, and as this part of the question depends upon the good or bad hopes for the next campaign, I cannot well judge of it without knowing more than I do of the grounds of your hopes. Be that however as it may, the difficulty of Holland is one which I fear your most sanguine ideas promise no good solution to in the next campaign; if then you look there for nothing good through the course of hostility, is it clear that it might not become prudent to consider whether England and Russia, not able to liberate Holland by themselves or to engage Prussia in hostile measures

against France for that object, might not blend themselves with Prussian neutrality, and obtain through those worse means a better situation for Holland in the moment, and such a share for themselves in the northern neutrality, as may lessen the preponderant influence which the King of Prussia now holds by it in the north of Germany? I am far from being blind to the inconveniences which would result from this, and they are in some lights such as to be extremely discouraging; but if they flag at Petersburg, if they negociate at Vienna, our choice is the choice of evils only, and in that view only it is that I would discuss the question which I suggest to you. You will be soon tired of the letters to me and from me. I hope to see you on Saturday or Sunday, probably Saturday."

Enclosure:—

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1799, November 11. Brunswick.—"Depuis la tournure facheuse qu'ont pris les affaires tant en Suisse qu'en Hollande, je ne cesse de réfléchir aux moyens d'en prévenir les suites pour que nous ne perdions pas tout le fruit d'une campagne dont les heureux succès sembloient nous présager la fin de cette guerre désastreuse qui, depuis huit ans, désole l'Europe. Je vais soumettre à vos lumières les moyens que je crois propres à nous procurer cet avantage, et que je fonde sur les dispositions actuelles des cours d'Allemagne, qui, jusqu'ici, ont adhéré au système politique, ou pour mieux dire, impolitique de la Prusse.

"Après l'espèce de schisme que la paix de Basle a établi entre nord et le midi de l'empire—Germanique, les princes du nord de l'Allemagne avoient considéré le roi de Prusse comme le noyau de la confédération qu'il devoit assurer leur neutralité, et autour duquel ils devoient se rassembler pour cet effet. Tant que les armes des puissances coalisées ont été couronnées par les brillants succès, ils ont pu espérer de la conserver, et de voir même renâître, malgré l'inconcevable inaction du Roi de Prusse, l'intégrité de l'Empire—Germanique qui sembloit perdue par le Congrès de Rastadt. Mais, aujourd'hui tout a changé de face.

"Les revers que les puissances alliées ont éprouvés en Suisse, et en Hollande, l'ascendant décidé que les François semblent avoir pris à Berlin, qui ne permet plus de considérer le Roi de Prusse comme le noyau autour duquel le nord de l'Allemagne peut se tenir réuni, la déclaration de l'Empereur de Russie aux princes Allemands, et le besoin où les François se trouvent d'exploiter et de piller ce nord pour nourrir leurs armées, et fournir à leurs déprédations, désir qui les a dévoré depuis longtems et qu'ils satisfairont aussitôt que les circonstances leur en fourniront le moyen, toutes ces causes réunies ont inspiré le plus justes craintes aux princes du nord de l'Allemagne et les ont mis dans des dispositions propres à leur faire goûter enfin les seules mesures dont ils peuvent attendre leur salut. Outre le peu de sûreté que donne pour la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne la Prusse qui, pendant que la ville de Hambourg contribuoit fidèlement à sa quotepart des fraix pour la ligne

de démarcation, souffroit que le Directoire François extorquât à différentes reprises plusieurs millions à cette même ville, sous les pretextes les plus frivoles ; outre le peu qu'il y a à attendre pour les princes du nord de l'Allemagne d'un Roi qui se croit le plus heureux des monarques s'il peut s'isoler politiquement au point que son influence soit aussi peu signifiante que celle de la Suède et du Dannemarc, et qui ne veut tirer l'épée que lorsqu'il se verra attaqué dans ses propres foyers ; outre, dis-je, ces considérations, il en est d'autres encore d'une conséquence aussi majeure qui dans l'état actuel des choses n'échappent plus à ces princes qui se sont adossés à la Prusse. Ils sentent que si les Cours de Londres, de St. Petersbourg, et de Vienne venoient à conclure une paix avantageuse pour elles, sans l'intervention de la Prusse, ces mêmes Cours pourroient s'accorder à leur imposer des taxes, comme n'ayant pas partagé avec le reste de l'Empire Germanique les dépenses de la guerre, quoiqu'ayant joui de la neutralité la plus lucrative. Ils comprennent qu'il y auroit de la justice à les traiter ainsi, à les décimer pour ainsi dire, et à faire en quelque sorte la paix à leurs dépens ; et ils prévoient que, dans un cas pareil, cette Prusse jalouse de son repos jusqu'à sacrifier ses propres possessions, sa gloire, sa considération en Europe, sa famille, et le respect de sa propre nation, ne prendroit pas les armes pour les défendre. D'après les dispositions que ces diverses considérations ont fait naître chez ces princes, il me semble qu'il ne s'agiroit donc plus que de leur présenter un moyen sûr de parer aux inconvéniens et aux dangers qu'ils redoutent, soit que les Cours alliées sortent victorieuses de cette guerre, soit que la Cour de Vienne quitte la lutte par une paix séparée, ce qui attirera inmanquablement le fléau de la guerre sur ce nord d'Allemagne qui, envisagé par son côté moral, est déjà plus qu'à demi révolutionné. Ce moyen, à ce que je crois, se trouveroit dans une coalition de ce même nord, laquelle, laissant le roi de Prusse dans son inaction et sa nullité politique, garantiroit d'une invasion de la part des François non seulement cette partie de l'Allemagne mais peut-être l'Allemagne entière. Une armée de 40 mille hommes Russes, à laquelle se joindroient 20 mille hommes de troupes des maisons de Saxe, 16 mille des maisons de Hesse, et, s'il étoit possible, 12 mille hommes Hanoveriens, formeroient de 88 mille hommes, qui se portant entre le haut et le bas—Rhin sur le point de Mayence, tandis que les autres Puissances agiroient sur les autres points, changeroit bientôt la face des affaires, et conserveroit intacte toute cette partie de l'Allemagne qui seule encore n'a pas servie à assouvir la rapacité des François. Je sens que cette coalition du nord de l'Allemagne seroit insuffisante pour remplir le but pour lequel je la propose, si la Cour de Vienne sortoit de la lutte ; mais, pendant qu'on est incertain de ce qu'elle fera, je me persuade qu'il seroit à propos qu'on essayât du moins de la former. Vous vous rappelerez, sans doute, que j'ai souvent désiré qu'on cherchât à depouiller la Prusse de tous ces princes qui se sont mis sous ses ailes, parceque je m'imaginois, qu'en y réussissant, on la rattacheroit par ce moyen à la coalition. Mon opinion à cet égard est encore la même, et je suis presque sûr que l'Electeur de Saxe et les Landgraves de Hesse accéderaient volontiers à la mesure dont

je viens de parler si la proposition leur en étoit faite par les Cours de Londres et de Petersbourg. Depuis que nous nous sommes quittés, et que je m'afflige, plus que vous ne pensez, de ne plus vous voir et de m'entretenir avec vous, j'ai cherché de tous côtés à travailler pour la bonne cause, autant que ma position et la pénurie de mes moyens pouvoient me le permettre. En conséquence je n'ai pas cessé depuis mon retour à Brunswick de faire représenter à la Cour de Dresde par son Chargé d'Affaires qui réside ici, le Conseiller de Légation M. Rivière, les dangers auxquels l'expose son adhésion au système Prussien ; et comme je sais par le Duc de Brunswick, que le Duc de Wiemar est venu fortement à l'appui de mes représentations, sans que ni l'un ni l'autre soit informé de mes démarches, j'attribue à celles de ce dernier le changement dans la manière d'envisager l'état des choses qu'on remarque chez l'Electeur de Saxe. Au reste, si le plan dont je viens de vous entretenir avec cette confiance que m'a inspiré l'indulgence avec laquelle vous avez si souvent écouté mes idées, venoit à être goûté, il faudroit nécessairement qu'on mit la main à son exécution sans perdre un seul instant ; car les distances où les Cabinets se trouvent, les uns des autres, et que les vents contraires doublent et triplent souvent, mettent une telle lenteur dans les communications qu'ils ont à se faire, que la marche rapide de l'ennemi et des événemens les trouve presque toujours hors de mesure, quand celui—là porte déjà les premiers coups.

“ J'ai reçu une lettre de notre cher Comte Panin, en date du 19 du mois passé, dans laquelle il regrette de ce que, par un mésentendu, il lui est échappé, pendant qu'il étoit à Gatschina chez l'Empereur, une occasion sûre de m'écrire fort au long sur les grandes affaires, ainsi que sur celles qui le regardent personnellement. Il me fait espérer que cette première lettre sera bientôt suivie d'une seconde. Il en a de moi déjà trois très-volumineuses ; et si vous trouvez que celle—ci le soit trop, vous devez savoir gré à une violente toux qui me déchire la poitrine de ce qu'elle ne l'est pas davantage, car j'aurois encore mille choses à vous dire.”

Postscript.—“ Le Sieur Knout m'a mandé dans sa dernière lettre que tout sera d'abord en règle pour correspondance à établir, dès qu'il en aura reçu l'ordre. Ainsi je n'attends plus que celui que vous voudrez bien me faire parvenir à ce sujet.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 2. Wimbledon.—“ Along with this you will receive for your perusal a letter I last night wrote to Mr. Pitt, with the reason why I did so. I think you mentioned your intention not to be in town this week, and therefore I thought of our all meeting here to-morrow forenoon this week. I don't think there is any chance of having a serious conversation on that or any other subject in town on Wednesday, interrupted by a levée and a Trinity House dinner ; and therefore a meeting either on Thursday or Friday at Wimbledon (unless you are to be in town otherwise on those days) will answer the purpose better. Be so good as

return me the papers when you have done with them. Mr. Pitt does not take the difficulty I feel. I need not say either to him or to you that, of all the ideas that ever entered my head, none can be so favourite a one in every view as a successful enterprise on Brest, and shall be truly sorry if it cannot be attempted on a scale which promises success. It is not on the score of expense that I am alarmed. But I have my serious doubts if all the maritime resources of this country can be so brought and concentrated together in the execution of the details necessary on such an occasion as that of sending to sea *at once*, and directed to *one point*, an army of 70 thousand men, with all its necessary accompaniments."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Private.

1799, December 2. Dropmore.—"I have long been a collector of maps, and have lately been arranging and completing my collection. Among them in which I am most deficient are the maps of Russia. These I am informed cannot now be procured without the special permission of the Emperor, and it seems to me more respectful that I should request you to submit that application to him in my name than that I should take any other mode of applying for it.

"May I further trouble you, if you succeed in obtaining the permission, to undertake for me the commission of procuring the maps, so as to form as good an atlas as can be put together of the Russian Empire, and its different provinces, and to send them to me by a messenger—whenever one happens to be going—secured in such a manner as to be free from danger of spoiling by the sea or rain." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 6. Harley Street.—"Je vous rend mille grâce de la communication que vous avez bien voulu me faire des dépêches du Chevalier Whiteworth. Vous savez vous-même combien je désapprouve la rupture violente et inpolitique de l'Empereur avec son confrère de Vienne, mais que puis-je faire autre chose que de continuer écrire comme je le fais, me servant toujours de votre nom comme vous l'avez vue par le brouillon que je vous ai communiqué. J'ai écrit avec plus de liberté à Rastopchin, et je le ferai encor par un courier que j'enverrai exprès mardi prochain. Vous verrez par la copie de la lettre du Comte Stakelberg que je vous envoie, que si la cour de Vienne fait quelqu'instance auprès de Souvorow, il y a possibilité à le retenir et gagner par là le tems à rapatrier tous les différens. S'il y avoit auprès du généralissime un militaire en qui il auroit de la confiance comme dans mylord Mulgrave, il auroit pu l'engager à aller si lentement qu'au moins il auroit fait si peu de chemin que le contre-ordre arrivé de Petersbourg le ramèneroit bientôt sur le même point d'où il étoit parti. Souvorow ne peut pas désirer de ne pas achever ce qu'il a toujours ambitionné, c'est-à-

dire de rétablir la monarchie en France. Il n'est amoureux que de la gloire, et ce n'est que par là qu'on le gagne et qu'on peut le mener."

Enclosure:—

COUNT DE STACKELBERG to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, November 18. Augsburg.—"J'adresse à votre Excellence la présente uniquement afin d'avoir l'honneur de lui accuser la réception de la lettre qu'elle a bien voulu m'écrire le 14^o Octobre. Sachant votre Excellence parfaitement instruite de tout ce qui a trait à la détermination du retour en Russie de l'armée de Monsieur le Maréchal Prince Italique, je n'entrerai dans aucun détail à ce sujet. J'ai le projet au départ des troupes de me rendre à Munich pour y attendre des instructions ultérieures de la part de la Cour. La marche de l'armée est jusqu'à ce moment déterminé sur deux colonnes, passant l'une sous les ordres du Maréchal par Prague et la Bohême, l'autre sous le commandement du Général Rosenberg par Lintz et l'Autriche. Le départ des troupes est fixé aux derniers jours de ce mois, *mais il ne serait pas impossible que leur marche fut retardée ou ralentie en conséquence d'instances vis-à-vis de Monsieur le Maréchal de la part de la Cour de Vienne.*" Copy.

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to the PRINCESS OF ORANGE.

1799, December 6. Brunswick.—"Quoique je sois très éloigné de me flatter que j'opérerai aujourd'hui plus de bien par ma présence à Berlin que je n'ai fait précédemment, en m'y trouvant dans des circonstances infiniment plus favorables à mes vues, je ne me suis pas moins déterminé sur le champ d'y retourner, sur ce que votre altesse royale m'a fait le grace de m'écrire ; et je me serois déjà mis en route, si ma voiture, non moins détraquée que ma santé par toutes mes courses antérieures, n'avoit pas besoin d'une forte réparation. Le seul bien que je pourrois espérer d'effectuer par mon séjour à Berlin, ce seroit, si je trouvois occasion d'approcher du roi, de faire entendre à sa majesté que le bien ou le mal qui résultera nécessairement pour elle et pour l'Europe de l'événement que vient de se passer en France, dépendra absolument du parti qu'elle prendra. Mais il y a bien peu d'apparence que le roi, dont le répugnance pour tout ce qu'on peut appeler *mesure vigoureuse* va chaque jour en augmentant, veuille écouter des personnes qu'il sait d'avance vouloir lui conseiller des mesures de ce genre. D'ailleurs on commence déjà à croire à Berlin que Buonaparte désire sincèrement le paix ; le Duc lui-même, quoiqu'il s'en cache, vis-à-vis de moi surtout, n'est pas éloigné de cette opinion, come votre altesse royale le remarquera dans la lettre qu'il m'adressa ces jours passés et que je joins ici en original, où cette opinion perce, quelque soin qu'il ait pris de la voiler. Cela n'a fait que m'engager à lui dire d'autant plus franchement la mienne, qui est que rien ne sauroit mieux prouver l'anarchie qui régné en France que l'instabilité de son gouvernement, d'où resulte pour un gouvernement sage et éclairé l'impossibilité de traiter avec un gouvernement pareil, avec lequel il n'y a pas de sûreté à transiger, qu'il n'est lui-même sûr de existence

“ ‘Buonaparte, aujourd’hui le chef phisque de la République dont Seyès est le régulateur métaphisque, va faire jurer encore attachement inviolable à ce nouveau tripotage, ‘qu’on assurera être tout ce qu’il y a de plus parfait sur le terre. On n’en croira rien ; et peut-être que le jour n’est pas éloigné où nous verrons renverser cette statue de boue que dans ce moment on est occupé de dorer depuis la tête jusqu’-aux pieds. Voilà ce que me répondit hier un émigré François à que je demandois son opinion sur l’évènement qui vient de se passer en France, que beaucoup de personnes regardent comme un événement heureux qui donnera la paix à l’Europe. Mon opinion, je l’avoue, ne diffère du sien, qu’en ce que je crois que le dictature de Buonaparte peut durer assez longtemps pour occasioner le renversement de notre nord de l’Allemagne qui jusqu’ici a été si fier de sa neutralité. Si jamais ce héros aventurier se présente devant ce nord à la tête d’une armée, il sera étonné du nombre de partisans de la révolution qu’il y trouvera ; car après ce qui vient d’arriver en France, on doit s’attendre à voir grossir de jour en jour leur nombre actuel. Le gouvernement qui se forme en France, et qui présente des idées d’ordre, de justice, et de paix, montre la révolution sous un aspect bien plus attrayant que n’étoit celui qu’elle offroit quand toutes ses traces étoient teintes de sang ; c’est une reflexion que les souverains éclairés doivent faire, et que beaucoup ne feront pas.

“ Le Marquis de la Palu est toujours encore au poste où M. de Grenville a souhaité qu’il restât. En attendant que M. de Grenville trouve un moment favorable pour répondre à mes questions au sujet de M. de la Palu, craignant de l’importuner en revenant à la charge, et me confiant en ses bontés qu’il voudra bientôt me tirer d’embarras à ce sujet, j’ose supplier votre altesse royale de lui faire parvenir le mémoire et les deux lettres ci-jointes que ce correspondant vient de me faire remettre par M. Rivière, conseiller de légation de Saxe. J’ai trouvé ces pièces si intéressantes que je me permets de prier votre altesse royale de les lire et de les faire lire à Monseigneur le Prince avant de les envoyer à M. Grenville. J’ai accepté l’offre des deux autres mémoires dont il est parlé dans la lettre No. 2, et s’ils sont aussi intéressant que l’est ce premier, je ne manquerai pas de les faire également parvenir à votre altesse royale aussitôt que je les aurai reçus.”

(The *Memoire* referred to as accompanying this letter has not been found.)

Enclosure :—

M. DE LA PALUE to GENERAL STAMFORD.

1799, November 30th. Emerick.--“ On me confirme de France le meme jugement que je vous ai déjà annoncé sur la révolution du 18 Brumaire. On commence à revenir du premier enthousiasme : on ne voit qu’un changement de personnages, et Buonaparte occupant le Luxembourg, n’a guères plus de valeur que n’en avoit Barras. Je vais vous transcrire littéralement ce qu’on me mande.

“ ‘ Cette révolution est aussi loin que toutes les autres de donner aux Franocis un gouvernement stable. On doute même, d’après

quelques symptômes qu'on a déjà observés, que Seyès et Buonaparte puissent faire leurs trois mois de Consulat sans que l'un des deux soit chassé ou assassiné par l'autre. On est revolté de la lacheté avec laquelle les tirans, jusqu'à Barras même, se sont laissé chasser de leur place sans essayer la moindre résistance, sans s'exposer au moindre danger pour la conserver : il faut s'attribuer au mépris qu'inspirent tous les gouvernans à la nation et aux soldats, pas un seul homme ne s'est armé pour leur défense.

“ ‘ Buonaparte, malgré son impénétrabilité ordinaire, n'a pu être assez maître de lui pour n'avoir pas donné occasion d'être déviné. On a remarqué son penchant vers le pouvoir unique, et le désir qu'il a de lui assurer l'initiative ; travaille-t-il pour lui ? On ne le croit pas assés fou, ni assés énivré pour se laisser aller à cet espoir ; on presume qu'au moyen du mouvement qu'il a imprimé, de l'enthousiasme qu'il a causé, il va essayer des ressources qu'ils lui procureront.

“ ‘ La paix sera offerte avec ostentation, mais en même tems on va tacher de frapper un grand coup en Allemagne : c'est de ce côté que vont se tourner tous les efforts, et c'est l'emploi réservé aux 133 millions mis à la disposition du ministre de la guerre. On ne croit pas que ce soit Masséna que soit chargé de l'exécution : on pense quelle est déjà concertée entre Buonaparte et Moreau, et que ce dernier va bientôt prendre le commandement de l'armée d'Helvétie. Si le plan échoue, on est persuadé que l'on fera paroître une poupée constitutionnelle, et c'est au Duc d'Orléans que cet honneur est assigné. On se flatte que cet arrangement conviendra à plus d'un cabinet, et que plus d'une puissance y a déjà songé.

“ ‘ L'intérieur ne se pacifiera pas malgré les offres que l'on fait aux Chouans, si l'Angleterre continue à les aider ; on sait que les Consuls sont mécontents des réponses qui leur ont déjà été faite : ils espèrent leur enlever des partisans par les loix rapportées, et celles qu'on est prêt à rapporter ; on travaille à semer entre eux la division, en gagnant et séduisant leurs chefs ; mais aussi on ne doute pas qu'ils ne fassent d'importantes et nombreuses recrues dans la foule de mécontents et d'opprimés par cette dernière révolution.

“ ‘ On écrit d'Hollande que les soldats François ont fait en rechangeant le serment ordonné aux armées : ils ont dit qu'ils croyoient la constitution de l'an 3 invariable, et que le nouveau serment qu'on exigeoit d'eux seroit sans doute remplacé dans six mois par un autre. On remarque que les addresses de félicitations des armées et des départemens sont rares, et que l'enthousiasme n'a guère dépassé l'enceinte de Paris. On reserre et restreint les autorités en réunissant un plus grand nombre sous une seule personne : ce sont autant de partisans que la révolution s'enlève à elle-même.” *Extract.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 7. Harley Street.—“ J'ai reçu une lettre du Comte Rastopchin dont je vous extrais quelque passage pour votre propre information—‘ Tant que Thugut reste en place jamais l'Empereur ne renouera avec l'Autriche. Razoumoukoi n'étoit pas instruit du mauvais succès de la mission de Didrichstein, a

voulu, malgré l'ordre qui lui enjoignoit de remettre la gestion des affaires à Kalitcheff, rester à Vienne, et prétendoit qu'il ne profiteroit pas de la permission de six mois qui lui étoit accordée de s'absenter, qu'après avoir arangé toutes les affaires relatives aux explications avec le Baron de Thugut. (*Nota bene*, c'étoit Kalitcheff qui étoit spécialement chargé de ces explications). Vous pouvez bien penser comme l'Empereur a pris ceci. On lui a envoyé des lettres de rapel, et intimation de se rendre chez le Maréchal son père. Je crois vous avertir quoiqu'avec répugnance, sachant que vous me paraissiez avoir bonne opinion de la personne, que le Comte Starhemberg a écrit dernièrement à Cobentzel par votre courier *que vous êtes soufflé par Grenville, que vous étiez tout Anglois, et que l'Empereur n'y gagnera pas beaucoup*; or, c'étoit pour être lue ici, et je l'ai lue à l'Empereur, qui a dit, il paroît visible que l'écrivain est aussi de la race des Thugut et des Cobentzel.' Je suis fâché pour Starhemberg qu'il ay prit si décidément le plus mauvais parti possible. Il y a plus de six mois que m'étant aperçu qu'il s'éloignoit du droit chemin, je lui ai parlé en ami, le prie de rester en pavé; d'imiter la sage conduite du ministre d'Amérique qui, depuis que son gouvernement agit mal, reste tranquil sans chercher à faire des affaires, ni à provoquer des discussions pour justifier des choses injustifiables; mais au lieu de suivre cette marche qui lui auroit fait consserver l'estime et la confiance de ceux qui le connoissoit, il a donné telle baissée dans des intrigues, dont il ne pourra jamais se débrouiller sans perdre de réputation. J'attens avec impatience l'arivée du courier de Mylord Minto, et je vous supplie de me faire part de ce qu'il apportera sur l'état qu'a produit la lettre fulminente de mon Empereur."

D HAILES to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, December 9. Stockholm.—"As I have not, I think, troubled your Lordship more than once on the subject of my personal affairs since I left England, I will not offer any apology for the few words this letter conveys to you concerning them, before I speak of other matters.

"I have not received a single line from Mr. Talbot either before or since your Lordship was so good as to direct Mr. Hammond to announce to me his almost immediate departure from London, some months ago: a circumstance which I have to regret on both our accounts, as it has not only exposed me to great inconvenience, but will also probably put it out of my power to be of service to him on his arrival, if that should ever happen; people who inhabit this place finding it necessary to make all their provisions for the long winter season in the autumn, to avoid a double expence, and which I have not been able to do, on account of the uncertainty in which I have remained here. As I ascribe this entirely to the course of public affairs, and to some fresh cause of business which may have arisen to delay Mr. Talbot, I do not complain; but when your Lordship considers what my situation is in other respects, from the frowns of the Court and the discontent of the people, you will, I

am sure, agree with me that it is not a little probationary of a man's patience. I will say nothing of the increased expence of this capital, for if I were to send you a list of the prices of many of the common articles of life, you would scarcely think it credible. Every Swede however will tell you that Stockholm from the cheapest is become the dearest place in Europe.

"I am growing old in the King's service, without having attained to independence; and I confess I have not seen without mortification younger and richer people advanced in this calling before me. Without interrupting you with a recapitulation of what I said on this subject before I came hither, at a moment when I know your mind must be preoccupied by matters of much more concern; and without specifying any particular wish or view, allow me to recall myself to your remembrance, and to hope that my claims on the justice of Government, from eldership at least, will, at length, be allowed.

(*Secret.*)—"It is a very delicate matter to attempt to delineate the characters of kings and princes, and a very difficult one too, when one has not the honor of approaching their persons habitually. For this reason I have foreborne to touch upon that of the young King of Sweden, in any of my public letters; but writing to your Lordship confidentially as I now do, I will venture to give you my idea of him as formed from what I have been able to observe and collect. His mind is far from having been opened by education. I rather think it has been narrowed by it. And the kingdom he now governs, living (if I may say so) on its ancient reputation, is believed by him to be equal to any on earth; so little knowledge has he acquired either from books, or conversation, respecting other countries. His temper is extremely haughty, and he seems unfortunately to think that the science of government has descended to him hereditarily with his crown. No minister, no favorite, nor any intimate counsellor that I have heard of. In matters of finance he recurs to a man (M. Ugglas) who is said to be much less able than interested. In foreign politics he seems to act chiefly from himself, and I am afraid with a great deal of passion; as has indeed been evinced by the detail of his measures transmitted in my public correspondence, such as appointing an ambassador to the Congress at Rastadt, the granting convoys to the trade, his letter to His Majesty, his Declaration as Duke of Pomerania. On the other hand, this young prince (for his youth ought to be taken into the account) is highly commendable for his love of justice, his attention to religion and morals, and his strict observance of order and decorum; while in his economy, by which he hopes, perhaps, to restore, in great measure, the finances of the country, he shews much laudable self-denial and steady perseverance. His Swedish majesty's person is uncommonly slender, although his constitution has gained considerable strength since his adolescence; his deportment is extremely stiff and grave; and, upon the whole, as well in body as in mind, he appears to have more of the Castillian than the Swede in him.

"I shall always speak with reluctance, and certainly with great diffidence, whenever I have to throw blame on the conduct of any

of the Ministers of His Majesty's allies ; but I think I have great reason to be dissatisfied with the Russian ambassador here ; and I think it right to mention it in this private manner, although I have said nothing of it in my despatches, nor have taken any notice of it to Sir Charles Whitworth. M. de Budberg, with whom I lived formerly on a good footing, *and when he did not stand well with this Court*, on resuming the functions of his embassy after the expiration of his leave of absence, was willing to improve his situation here, and therefore did not think fit to give me the countenance he ought to have done on finding me *in disgrace*. Much, I am sure, he might have done in co-operation with me for the common cause, and which he omitted. He is an honest man, but haughty, illiterate, and without experience in business, which lays him entirely at the mercy of an intriguing secretary. Whether it was because he thought, last spring, that I was really returning home I know not ; but he did not chuse to confide to me any thing concerning the negotiations then going on at Petersburg, and to which he was made privy by the King of Sweden at the time. I suspect, however, that he has lately had some injunctions from his Court to endeavour to bring people here to a sense of their respect towards us.

"I am sorry to be obliged to add to the length of this letter, by the recital of a very shocking story. It is briefly this : the Baron de Taube, a gentleman of good fortune, and as much in the esteem and favour of the King of Sweden as anybody here can be said to be, went, some time ago, into Germany, and was accompanied or immediately followed by the Countess of Piper, sister to Count Fersen, the head of the great house of that name ; a lady long distinguished by her intrigues both amorous and political, and with whom M. de Taube, already advanced in life, was well known to cohabit. Before the Baron left Stockholm, he informed one of his several nephews and nieces that he had made his will, and left his fortune between them. M. de Taube afterwards being at Berlin with the lady above alluded to, and frequenting the house of the Swedish Minister, M. Engeström (formerly in England), one evening, on his return home to his lodgings, told his *valet de chambre* that he had drank some wine at Engeström's which he was sure had poisoned him. The physicians whom he consulted, advised him to go to Carlsbadt for the waters ; he followed their directions, went, and shortly after died there. The faculty, on the opening of his body, were unanimous in declaring he had been poisoned ; and it was thought with the *acqua tofana*, which, as your lordship knows, has the property of destroying at a more or less distant period, according to the strength or weakness of the dose administered. Since the Baron's death, stories have been industriously propagated both at Berlin and here, imputing to Engeström the murder of his guest. Nobody there has given credit, I believe, to such an improbable falsehood : but Engeström has many enemies here on account of his politics, the whole of the Russian party who are ready to believe any ill of him ; and besides these, there are many candidates for his place. No one who has as thorough an acquaintance with that gentleman as I have, can entertain the smallest suspicion of his guilt. But besides a very warm testimony lately given at this

Court in his favour by that of Prussia, one of the nephews from whom I derive the whole of these particulars (although not directly) asserts Engeström's innocence in the most unequivocal manner. The nephew of whom I speak is come hither from Denmark where he was the *Chargé d'Affaires* of this Court, on leave of absence, and he is now employed in collecting with great discretion from his late uncle's *valet de chambre*, and others, such legal evidence as he can procure; but how strong and against whom the presumptive proofs must appear I leave to your Lordship to judge, when I tell you that this young gentleman has found the whole of his uncle's fortune transferred by will to Madame de Piper, except some inconsiderable legacies left to the nephews and nieces. Baron Armfeldt, a friend of the late Baron Taube, now in Germany, writes to this nephew, to continue to act with great circumspection, *assuring him that he shall shortly come into power*, and that he is determined to sift the matter to the bottom.

"I know not whether I ought to congratulate your Lordship on the event of the last of the French revolutions. That Proteus-like republic is for ever eluding your grasp under some new metamorphosis. I pray heaven that the noble and unexampled efforts which you and your great friends have made, and are still making, may, however, at last succeed in destroying the monster which one may now almost say: *Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinae.*"

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11. Harley Street.—"Je compte d'envoyer après demain un courier. Ne voudriez vous pas profiter de cette occasion pour vous débarrasser, une foi pour toute, de cette profusion d'ordre et de cordon que l'Empereur envoi aux sujets du Roi, m'écrire une lettre avec les phrases polies que vous savez si bien employer, que Sa Majesté aient pris la résolution de ne pas permettre que ses sujets portent les ordres étrangers, ne s'est dévié de cette résolution deux foi que pour complaire à l'Empereur, son ami et allié, en permettant que Lord Duncan et la Chevalier Popham portassent les ordres que Sa Majesté Impériale leurs a envoyé. C'est pourquoi il seroit agréable à Sa Majesté, si l'Empereur voudroit bien, au lieux des ordres qu'il avoit destiné à plusieurs autre de ses sujets, leur donner quelqu' autre marque de sa bienveillance, puisqu'il les juge digne de ses bontés.

"La même chose écrite au Chevalier Whiteworth co-opérerait à merveille, et vous seriez débarrassé de tout embarras futur."

M. DE CALONNE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11, Hamilton Street—"Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir jeudy dernier, j'ai revu la personne, et ce qu'elle m'a dit ajoute beaucoup aux motifs de proffiter de son zèle, ainsi qu'à la probabilité du succès d'une demarche qui, dans tous les cas, seroit utile, et ne pourroit rien compromettre, étant, comme elle doit l'être, infiniment secrette. Mais son avis est, (et plus j'y

reflechis plus j'en suis convaincu) que la plus grande promptitude est nécessaire, et que l'occasion échapperait si on attendoit que les choses eussent pris une certaine consistance. Si la mesure parait bonne il faut la presser, sans quoi elle cesseroit de l'être, ou le seroit beaucoup moins. J'ay cru devoir vous présenter cette observation, sans vous importuner de la demande d'une nouvelle audience. Si vous voulés parler directement à la personne, elle est à vos ordres ; j'y suis aussi en cas que vous jugiés à propos de lui transmettre par moi une partie de vos intentions. Mais je suis persuadé que si vous acceptés son offre, vous trouverez nécessaire de l'entendre, et j'ose vous répéter que le plutôt seroit le mieux."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11. Stowe.—"The Bishop of Chester is here ; he brought with him the Greek title page which the Delegates have determined upon, and for which, as to the phrase of *κοίνοις ἀναλώμασι τῶν ἐγγενῶν ἀνδρῶν*, they have authority in one of their old printed books.

"This phrase makes it unnecessary to add any words to our plate but demands the addition of the University arms. We have all thought the present sketch perfect, and, if you have no objection, pray send on my letter to Lady Spencer.

"I think I shall probably be persuaded to stay here a few days longer, and therefore look to Saturday se'nnight for Dropmore, if you should be there then."

Enclosure :—

THOMAS GRENVILLE to COUNTESS SPENCER.

1799, December 11. Stowe.—"Do not laugh at the labours of the learned and the unlearned. The Bishop of Chester is this day arrived here, and has brought with him the title page which the Delegates of the Press have determined upon for our Homer. This Greek title page, taken from an old 1400, expresses the printing of the book to be at the common expence of the three brothers and of the University. By this arrangement it becomes on the one hand unnecessary to disturb our plate by the addition either of *Adelphi* or any other words, but on the other hand it becomes necessary to add also the University Arms. It strikes me that this can easily be done without damaging the upper part of the plate by occupying so much of the page (as had been destined to the words) with a pedestal to the column, upon which the University Arms will stand ; and putting two short columns under the little altars. By this device the present plate may, as I am told, easily be altered, and I have therefore desired Lord B[uckingham] to sketch it out as well as he could do it from my recollection. It is again upon your patience that I must trespass to beg to know whether the engraver or you see any practical difficulty that we are not aware of ; if there is no difficulty, I think you will agree with me in considering the plate as improved by removing all words from it. The crests will no longer be applicable to the little altars,

which will be entirely plain. Pray excuse the hurry in which this is written, because I am anxious to hear your opinion upon it, and therefore am hurrying it away by this post. I shall still stay here another week or ten days, and shall then soon hope to see you in London."

COUNT ST. MARTIN DE FRONT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 11. Hampden House, Bucks.—"Retenu à la campagne, où j'étais venu passer quelques jours avec Monsieur Trevor, par un gros rhume de poitrine, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre confidentiellement la copie d'une lettre que M. le Comte de Chalembert, Secrétaire d'état du Roi mon maître, a écrit à son Excellence le Baron Thugut, le 14 Novembre, de Florence. Votre Excellence qui prend avec tant de générosité l'intérêt le plus vif au sort de mon malheureux souverain, et à celui de l'Italie, verra sans doute avec regret combien les espérances que nous avions sur un changement de conduite et de mesures de la part du Cabinet de Vienne à notre égard, ont été illusoire. Comme la continuation d'un tel système de la part de M. de Thugut ne pourrait qu'aboutir non seulement à notre propre ruine, mais à celle de l'Italie, je laisse à la haute sagesse de votre Excellence, *surtout* à ses vues généreuses pour la délivrance de l'Europe, de prendre les déterminations qu'elle croira les plus propres à le faire changer. Je me rendrais en ville aussitôt que mon rhume me le permettra ; et j'ose la prier de vouloir bien ordonner à un de ses secrétaires de m'accuser la réception de cette lettre, uniquement pour être sûr qu'elle est parvenue à votre Excellence." *Copy.*

Enclosure :—

COUNT DE CHALEMBERT TO BARON THUGUT.

1799, November 14.—"J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence par ma lettre du 25 Septembre, que M. Spagnolini, Consul-Général du Roi à Livourne, doit lui avoir remise, que sa Majesté avait nommé Monsieur le Comte de Vallaise pour résider de sa part auprès de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale, dans la persuasion que le choix d'une personne distingué comme lui à tous égards, aurait été agréable à sa Majesté Impériale et à votre Excellence. Dans l'incertitude si ce Ministre sera déjà arrivé à Vienne, le Roi m'a ordonné de m'adresser directement à votre Excellence pour une affaire dont l'importance n'admet point de délai.

"La haute réputation que les talents supérieurs de votre Excellence lui ont si justement acquise, me fait espérer qu'elle verra dans l'exposé que j'ai l'honneur de lui soumettre, non des réclamations intempestives, mais des preuves de l'intention sincère de sa Majesté de concourir à tout ce qui peut être utile à sa Majesté Impériale et Royale en lui proposant les moyens qui y conduisent plus sûrement. M. le Général-en-Chef Baron de Melas a fait proposer, il y a quelque temps, au gouvernement de sa Majesté de réorganiser les troupes Piémontaises sur l'ancien pied. D'après les intentions et les ordres de sa Majesté, le Gouvernement est allé

au devant d'une mesure si salulaire, avec l'empressement qu'il devait y mettre. Il proposa à son Excellence le général Melas les moyens de mettre en exécution ce projet ; mais ensuite monsieur le général a demandé que le nom de sa Majesté ne parût en rien, en alléguant que le Roi serait rétabli dans ses états, mais que, pour le présent, ils devaient être gouvernés comme des pays de conquête. Le roi a fait tous les sacrifices qui lui sont personnels. Il fera tous ceux qui peuvent être utiles à la cause commune pour prouver sa reconnaissance à sa Majesté Impériale. C'est à ces titres mêmes que sa Majesté m'a ordonné de représenter à votre Excellence les conséquences funestes de la désorganisation qui résulterait des changements que M. le général Melas fait appréhender dans toutes les parties du gouvernement et de l'administration du Piémont. Ce pays a déjà prouvé bien de secousses. Cette dernière acheverait d'y porter la trouble et la confusion, et de ruiner le crédit de l'état. Les suites peuvent en être terribles. Quant à l'organisation de l'armée Piémontaise, le Roi connaît que cette opération ne peut avoir l'objet désiré, qu'autant que le zèle et l'amour de ses sujets seront soutenus et excités par la certitude évidente de servir leur souverain. Dans une guerre dont l'origine remonte aux opinions, ne pouvant toutes les réunir, il est bien essentiel de ménager celles d'un peuple dont le courage peut être rendu utile ou non.

“Le roi n'ambitionne dans ce moment d'avoir de l'autorité en Piémont que pour la rendre utile à la cause commune. Il désire consacrer à ce but l'existence d'une armée Piémontaise sous la direction suprême du général en chef de sa Majesté Impériale.

“Sa majesté n'a aucune crainte que ses malheurs aient rendu ses droits moins sacrés auprès de sa Majesté Impériale ; mais elle verrait avec autant d'inquiétude, que de douleur, que l'on s'éloignât des seules mesures qui peuvent remplir l'objet qu'on se propose ; et sa Majesté m'ordonne de dire avec franchise à votre Excellence, qu'elle redoute pour la cause commune les conséquences du plan qui a été communiqué par le général Melas. Au contraire, en alliance que le roi attend de la magnanimité de sa Majesté Impériale, avec ce que son véritable intérêt lui présente, on parviendra au but salulaire que sa Majesté Impériale et le roi ont en vue. Si l'organisation de l'armée Piémontaise est confiée au gouvernement du Roi, qui a les connaissances indispensables des choses et des personnes, l'effet sera aussi prompt et aussi étendu que possible ; et la soumission de cette armée aux ordres du général-en-chef de sa Majesté Impériale ne laissera lieu qu'à une émulation noble et utile.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 12. Harley Street.—“J'envoie mon courrier demain. Par un malheur auquel je ne m'attendais pas, j'avais une lettre depuis huit jours pour le Général Bauer, et que, par négligence, j'avais oublié de lui remettre jusqu'aujourd'hui. Il se trouve que c'est un ordre de l'Empereur qui lui ordonne de rejoindre son régiment, qui est au corps de Condé. Cela m'ôte tout espoir dans le

maudit comendement du corp qui m'est confié, et qui est dans le plus grand désordre par la stupidité et la mauvaise volonté de ce gueux d'Essen. Bauer, en qui j'avois toute confiance, et qui étoit parfaitement calculé pour rétablir tout, est obligé de partir, ruiné par ces coursses qu'on lui font faire, sans lui donner un sol pour ça, parcequ'on croit à Petersbourg que le voyage de Suisse en Angleterre et de là en Suisse est comme d'aller de Petersbourg à Gatchina. Il me laisse seul sans assistance. Je ne puis pas confier le comendement à Essen, quoique je n'ai pas encor de l'Empereur la nouvelle qu'il est congédié du service, parceque s'il n'étoit pas même congédié, je lui ôteroïis le comendement du corp. Je le garde donc auprès des malades à Portsmouth; mais aucun des généraux qui sont après lui ne me sont pas connus, et je ne puis avoir confiance en eux comme en Bauer que j'ai connue dès son enfance, ayant été ami de son père. J'ai perdu tout courage et tout espoir, et je suis à maudire cette expédition de la Hollande, qui me met sur mes épaules des embarras sans fin, et dont aucun travail et peine ne me fera sortir avec honneur.

"Bauer part mardi. J'écris à l'Empereur pour le supplier de me le renvoyer.

"Je vous prie, je vous conjure, d'écrire à Whitworth qu'il en parle aussi sur ce chapitre, qu'il dise ce qui est vrai, et ce que le Roi a dit hier en ma présence à ce général, qu'il a connu son père, qu'il l'a aimé, et qu'il est bien aise de voir le fils ici, qu'il a toute confiance en lui."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, December 13. Cleveland Row.—"Croyez vous qu'il ne seroit pas possible, si je vous en fisse la prière au nom du Roi, que vous puissiez detenir le Général Bauer ici jusqu'à nouvel ordre de l'Empereur; surtout puisque Whitworth me mande officiellement que l'Empereur avoit destitué le Général Essen de tout rang militaire, en lui défendant même d'en porter l'uniforme. Si vous croyez que cette démarche pût être utile, je m'y prêteroïis d'autant plus volontiers que Sa Majesté, en me parlant mardi au sujet du Général Bauer, m'a témoigné sa satisfaction particulière de le voir employé ici, et que M. Wickham m'a écrit les plus grands éloges de sa conduite et de son caractère.

"En tout cas je souhaiteroïis vivement de faire sa connoissance avant qu'il partît, et je vous prierai de me marquer quel jour vous pourriez le mener ici à dîner, puisque je reste en ville toute la semaine, et jusqu'au vendrédi de la semaine prochaine." *Copy.*

OFFICIAL NOTE:—

[GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE].

[1799, December. Downing Street.]—"I have sent your Lordship a note from Dutheil. He says that *Monsieur*, agreeably to the rule which he has prescribed to himself, immediately complied with

your Lordship's decision, and wrote to the persons whom he had proposed to employ to acquaint them that the late change must be looked upon as putting an end to the plan; he is however (Duthiel assures me) convinced that everything which has happened at Paris is in favour of our views for the restoration of monarchy, and that if things are rightly managed now, we may consider ourselves as standing in the same situation which we should have done if the first attempt (in the character of a reaction, of the 18th Fructidor,) had succeeded. This revolution has appeared nearly in the same character, and might, he thinks, without much difficulty (considering the known principles of several of Bonaparte's confidants and assistants, as Berthier, Andreossi, Bournonville, Le Fevre, and others) be converted to the same end. The accounts which Swinburne brings over of the total want of money, of the unsettled state of Bonaparte's authority, and of the tone which his assistants assume with him, give additional weight to this opinion. Berthier (your Lordship knows) desired to have a letter from *Monsieur*, which was sent him by return of the two persons who came here. Andreossi and Le Fevre are in good principles and well known to them. Bournonville was the person whom, in the original project, it was proposed to make minister of war. I have ventured therefore to send for your Lordship's signature two letters to the Treasury for 20,000*l.* in order that no time may be lost in case your Lordship should be of opinion that the business ought to be followed up. If it should be determined to relinquish it, there would be no inconvenience beyond that of having a larger balance than usual in the bankers' hands."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 13. Harley Street.—"Il m'est impossible absolument de retenir le Général Bauer, quelque besoin que j'ai de lui, et malgré que ma situation devient afreuse en le perdant. C'est à lui que l'ordre est envoyé, et je vous l'envoi en traduction. Il est obligé de s'y conformer, et il ne peut pas suivre mes avis quand ils sont contraire à la volonté de son souverain. Je suis malade, corp et d'esprit. Je fairai l'impossible pour pouvoir me rendre à votre obligeante invitation, et je vous amenerai à dîner le Général Bauer dimanche prochain, si cela vous convient.

"J'écris par le courier de ce soir pour prier qu'on me renvoi ce général, et je fais voir la nécessité absolue pour qu'il viene rétablir le désordre introduit par ce maudit Essen."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1799, December 13. Augsburg.—"On account of the immediate importance of my dispatch on the subject of the German levies I send off Ruff the messenger, without waiting to finish what I had to say on the subject of Pichégro and Willot. I will therefore only mention to your Lordship that due preparations are making for the

latter to put himself at the head of the conscripts in Provence, with a number of excellent officers under his orders ; that M. de Précý is preparing to second him ; and that Pichégrou will act with the armies here in the manner stated in my dispatch No. 48. That all their plans suppose the continuation of the war, support given to the Royalists in Brittany and Normandy, and a Declaration on entering the French territory, renouncing all intention of conquest ; and besides, an assurance that the King will be acknowledged as soon as the royalist standard shall be fairly hoisted, with an army to support it, and a Prince of the Blood at its head.

“ With respect to the subject of my long dispatch, there can be no doubt now but that the question is fairly reduced to this, and it is as such that I mean at once to present it ; ‘ are you prepared to throw yourselves into the arms of the House of Austria, or no ? If not, renounce at once every idea of a continental war against France ; for you can neither carry it on without Austria, nor force her to carry it on in any other than her own way.’

“ If this position be true, as long and dear-bought experience has taught me that it is, you must have recourse to another method ; try to flatter and cajole as much as possible, and assume, *if possible*, an appearance of confidence. Your weight and influence will still be great, and it may be usefully employed in directing where it cannot control. I can give your Lordship no idea of the pride and high spirit that now prevails in the Austrian armies, and we must remember that they are now acting with Thugut. This is an instrument on which you may certainly work with advantage, that is when the success of the war alone is considered, independent of political questions ; for instance, the adding these recruits to their army, when presented to them as a mark of confidence in the skill and talents of their officers, will have the effect of making the army consider the British Government as the most discerning, and the best judge of merit in Europe ; and will make them fight better and grumble less about the price of sugar and coffee, when they consider that the profits arising from the sale of those articles are employed in giving them the means of increasing directly the honour and glory of the Austrian arms.

“ Follow this method, consider them only as instruments employed to fight the French (though in their own way), and do not either cross them at head quarters, blame their operations, or submit plans to their consideration, and I think I can answer for your securing the army in such a way as that, perhaps on some very delicate and important occasion, it might not be impossible to engage them in a decisive operation, without the authority, and even against the orders of the Court. I am confident, if I had seen as much of them in the month of August as I have now, that I could have carried the passage of the Limmeth or the Aar on more than one occasion.

“ A few pensions to some of the staff-officers, if well and judiciously applied, will do the rest. This indeed is an instrument by no means to be neglected. Weyrother, as the price of colonel’s pay whilst with Suwarow in Switzerland, and of two horses given him to make up what he lost on the march, keeps no

secret whatever from me, and will give me copies of any the most important paper or plan I may want. An acquisition of this kind will be without price at head quarters. Eckhardt, in consideration of the same service, is equally communicative, and the other night, when he set out for Vienna, he sent me the original letter I had written to Suwarow in August last, treating the Court of Vienna rather roughly ; saying that he supposed I might wish to have it, as, in the hands of the Russians, it might be turned to bad purposes.

"I do not enlarge upon this subject, but your Lordship may be persuaded that there is a large field to work upon.

"As to the Court, your Lordship will hardly believe after all that I have seen that I am one whit more than I ever was a *satellite of Thugut*. I fully expect that we shall be tricked, and teased, and tormented as we have ever been, as long as that man shall remain in place. But there is no one to succeed him ; and besides, the Russians have played their part of the game so shockingly ill that they have fixed him on his throne for ever. He had no two more avowed and deadly enemies than the army and the lesser States of the Empire who are now, and will ever be, his determined friends, as long as the contest shall be between him and the Russians.

"What a game have we not lost by the stupid obstinacy and misconduct of these allies ?

"I will only add that, if I have any powers to treat with the Circles, they should be extended so as to include the Emperor's Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief, general officers, or other persons having due authority on the part of His Imperial Majesty to treat on subjects relating to the Imperial and Austrian armies. And I think that your Lordship will find no difficulty in wording it so as that it may extend to the powers I have already received to treat with the Court of Munich.

"I will say nothing about Switzerland till another occasion, excepting that the recruiting goes on to the satisfaction of all parties, and that before the spring you will have an excellent body of 5,000 infantry fit for service.

"If a change of system with respect to Austria be adopted, I should strongly incline to say that it would be better to have no Commander in Chief for these corps, but leave all arrangements respecting them to be settled with the Arch-Duke.

"I fairly own to your Lordship, in confidence, that, independent of the enormous expense, I dread a combined army here worse than a Russian one. I think it impossible that the Commander should not quarrel with the Austrians (were he an angel he could not avoid it) in less than a month. If, however, such a thing be determined on, rely on my making the same exertions in every respect to further your Lordship's views and wishes, and the interests of my country, as if I had as warmly approved the project as I certainly should have done when I left England, or even at a later period, had it been proposed to me."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 14. Park Street, Westminster.—"In looking

over to-day the draft to Lord Elgin, I did not see any mention of Acre, and of means which it might seem right to take for putting it into a state of defence.

"I mentioned the circumstance at Cabinet the other day, and talked about it afterwards to Mr Pitt, who promised to speak of it to you.

"Acre is certainly a place of great consequence, and one which the enemy have shown that they do not care to leave behind them. It is likely, therefore, to become, as before, the very hinge of the war in those parts should the enemy remain in force; though it may not have the effect of turning things the same way if trusted merely to such miraculous exertions, and such good fortune, as saved it in the former instance. The Turks must now be sensible of its importance, and might, I should think, be brought to accept of offers for putting it in a respectable state, notwithstanding the difficulties which may arise from their present dissensions with Ghezzar. At least it seems to be our duty to do everything for that purpose that depends upon us.

"Have you seen Sir Sydney Smith's letter of the 2nd August, giving an account of the *land* battle of Aboukir? It would surely be right that, in some way or other, this letter should be published; and it does not occur to me, judging upon recollection, that there is much that need be altered or suppressed. People are very anxious to know what has been passing in that part of the world, and the narrative seems to be necessary to place Sir Sydney's merits in their proper point of view."

Postscript — "Might not an arrangement be made for placing Koehler at Acre with a small corps of artillery men to be put under his command, to be paid, if necessary, by us, and formed out of the men now raising for Villetle and Broderick? A man of the name of Daniels, whom I have named at the recommendation of Lord Minto as agent and paymaster to those corps, and who is now at Corfu, assures me that, by a little management, as many men may be had there as could be wanted. He is an active, intelligent man, highly thought of by Lord Minto in respect of honesty, and well acquainted with countries under the Turkish Government. I should think that such an arrangement as that above proposed might possibly become acceptable to both parties; to Ghezzar as strengthening his capital both against the enemy and the Turkish Government; and to the Porte, as furnishing a security against the use which Ghezzar might make of the strength so acquired.

"Another matter, not much connected with the above and which I forgot to mention the other day, was the taking some means, even now, to retrieve the time lost with respect to Malta. You know that, for want of an order from here, Nelson has been disappointed of the means which he wished to employ for the reduction of that place, Sir James Sinclair having refused to furnish the assistance required. Malta, which is in all respects of great consequence, may now become of more so as a means of keeping in good humour our violent friend Paul."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 15. Stowe.—“I return you your *very Turkish* correspondence, from which Tom and I collect (saving always your better information from Lord Elgin or Mr. Smith) that the army of Egypt is probably embarked for Toulon. But if Nelson’s or Sir Sydney’s ships should intercept them, we beg to protest against your orders to carry them back to Alexandria, which we conceive is not consistent with the very clear, and, to our ideas, very proper line of disavowing this capitulation. That disavowal should consider French troops taken at sea whether in French or in neutral ships as enemies, prisoners of war, and as such they should be brought to our ports; but cannot with any justice or law be landed at Alexandria, rather than at Trieste, Naples, or any port of our allies in those parts. Besides this, which we consider as the strict *law and right*, we think that your Turk, who would be content if you either drowned them or carried them to England or to the devil, will be most outrageous at finding them again landed without their leave in Egypt, or any part of their dominions. Why should they not be carried through the Dardanelles to the Crimea and delivered as prisoners to the Russians, who might exchange them at their leisure?”

“I shall certainly not attack your criticisms upon my drawing very roughly, in two minutes, and from Tom’s description (for I never saw it) *your* column and *your* two smoking pots. All that I have proposed is to put your column upon its due proportioned pedestal (and you will not find one insulated column standing upon a plinth in any one book of architecture) in order to fill that lower space which was left for letters, which cannot be inserted in that plate if the delegates persist (as they do) in their title-page. I should prefer the omission of *your* smoking-pots; but if they must stand, they are placed upon truncated columns which (with every submission be it spoken) were *always* and *invariably* adapted to them. As to the Gothic shield of the University arms, I had put them in an oval till I was overruled; and am now ready to be overruled back to my oval, which will leave the *bordure* as much Grecian as that of our arms; and as to the Gothic emblems in *alma mater’s* coat, I think that her crowns and book may pair off with our *tourteauxes* and cross, and that *Dominus illuminatio mea* is not much less Grecian than *Honi soit qui mal y pense*. The Greek description of the three brothers is not *our* account of ourselves, but the description given by the University of us in *their* title page, which *their* delegates claim the right and duty of composing. My modesty therefore is at ease, notwithstanding Madam’s anathema against us; and, if all this is not satisfactory to you, I shall, in the words of Gil Blas’s Archbishop of Grenada, wish you *toutes sortes de prospérités et un meilleur goût*.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 15. Stowe.—“It is with the Bishop of Chester that you must discuss the subject of the title page, and I have no

doubt but that if you express to him your objections to the form of words which he and Randolph have recommended, they may easily be induced to change them. I stated to him very fairly that I thought the allusion to us overcharged, and that it might appear to make us parties in our own praise; but to the first of these objections as well as to the last, he answered that the title page being that of the Delegates, the criticisms upon it could only attach upon them, and that the three brothers are neither 'art nor part in it.'

"Pray let Councillor Charles explain this phrase of Scotch law to Lady Grenville when she supposes that I have been writing myself *noble* and *illustrious*; if *noble* is applied to the three brothers the other two have more of it to answer for than I have, and though I might say the same of the word *illustrious*, yet in truth I consider *ενδοκιμος* as being merely a Greek version of the common and undistinguished word *honourable*, as marking one degree of rank higher than *esquire*. Let it at least be understood that I have no partiality to the wording of this title page, and that I have no doubt but that if you urge your objections to the Bishop of Chester, they will change it to any that you may like better. With these remarks upon the title page, I must proceed to say that, if the Bishop's title page shall stand, it appears to me that it would be a ridiculous and ostentatious piece of vanity, after describing in one sheet the joint partnership of the university and of the brothers, to blazon out the arms of the 3 brothers, and leave unnoticed those of the chief partner in the firm, and I am still of opinion that, with the Bishop's title page, we must either unite with the university arms or not introduce our own. The same remark applies to the word *Αδελφοι* which succeeded very well in our first project, but becomes, as Cleaver calls it, tautologous, after the Bishop's title page. As to the column, you do not yet appear to have understood that the original column was to remain untouched, and the slight sketch which was sent, was sent merely to explain better than in words, the idea of placing a pedestal under the former column, with the university arms upon that pedestal; and with respect to the Gothic deformity of those arms, I do not see that *Honi soit qui mal y pense* is purer Greek than *Dominus illuminatio mea*; or that the tassels which hang from the book are less classical than the half moon, the star, and the spiked balls, whether they be two or four in number. Of the shape of the scutcheon I say nothing, because it was intended to take any such shape as should be found to suit best with the lines of the pedestal. You equally misconceive the rest of the hasty sketch which was sent, and you do not appear to see that all which was intended by it was to give a general idea of filling up the bottom of the plate by introducing pedestal or plinth under the vases or altars which stood in the original drawing. A continued plinth of the height of the main pedestal looked heavy; a small pedestal to the two vases was more perhaps to my fancy than the smaller columns, but little importance was attached to this part of the drawing, which might easily and perhaps better be omitted. The plain case is, if the Bishop's title page stands, I hold it to be impossible to write *Αδελφοι* . . . a second time, and I think it highly exceptionable in that case to use the column

of our arms without those of the University. I see no better way than by the pedestal which I think will be no blemish to the drawing, as in fact the most celebrated columns do stand upon pedestals, the proportion of which is as much established as is that of the column itself. In this state of the question I think that the best thing which I can do will be to desire the plate to be continued as far as regards the column, without finishing the plinth or any of the words; by this arrangement it will still be open to consider how it can ultimately be made to accord best with whatever shall be the Oxford title page, upon which matter you had better say what you wish to Cleaver. He knows from me that I am not partial to the words in question, but if they are used we must make our plate accord with them, and there is no objection which I feel more strongly than that of following *κοινοῖς* . . . with the exclusive ostentation of the Grenville scutcheons.

"I will not end this long disputation without reminding you that if we retain our original column either with or without a pedestal, we should be forced to incur the expence of engraving a second plate for *ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑ*, if you engrave *ΙΑΙΑΣ*; which cannot be worth while to do; we should therefore not use these words, or if we do, they should be printed on the plate or not engraved; but my own predilection is still for the column upon a pedestal and no words in the plate.

"I have this moment received from Garlike an ample explanation of the electrical lamp which I enclose to you for the evening amusement of Dropmore. Its cost, including packing, is five louis'd'or all but three dollars; but as the Silesian glass account is still unclosed, I think we had better not pay Garlike till the whole bill is made out. The last time that I wrote to him I desired him to order two vases for the corners of the library, *analogues* to the larger one, at 40 dollars each, by which means the whole expence of the three will, as I understand, be 120 dollars = 20*l*.

"Stowe is alternately filling and emptying, or rather is successively filling without emptying. The weather is still fine enough for exercise, and when I do not walk I collate Homer all morning, and play at German back-gammon all evening. They assure me that I grow fat and lusty by rubbing against my brother, and as corpulence is a symptom of good health in one's old age, I am better pleased to be one of the round-bellied than of the *ευγενων και ευδοκιμων*.

"I am told in a London letter that my old friend Dietrichstein, who arrived at Petersburg with the Palatin, was quickly sent to the right about when he arrived there; and this is explained by the circumstance of Suwarrow's having intercepted a letter written by Dietrichstein to M. de Chastelar, during the siege of Turin, in which he tells him not to push on too fast; '*que l'on ne se soucioit pas à Vienne que ce spadassin Russe vint faire l'important avec ses conquêtes rapides, et encore moins que son maître s'avisat de se mêler de leurs affaires d'Italie.*'"

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1799, December 16. Cleveland Row.—"As the messenger is

waiting, and I am anxious not to delay him, I have only time to acknowledge your private letters. The grounds, in point of policy, of our determination respecting the Egyptian army are sufficiently obvious, and had, I observe, not escaped your attention. The principles of the laws of nations, and of war, are perfectly clear, and indisputable; and they are proved by a bare reference to the constant practice of all capitulations where combined forces are employed. When the Neapolitan forts capitulated, the articles were signed by Neapolitans, English, Russians, and Turks. What pretence then can there be for the latter to claim to capitulate solely with an enemy whom we alone have reduced to the necessity of capitulating at all? If the Turks are our allies they cannot act without our concurrence; if they are not, they cannot bind us by their act.

"These points will be discussed more at length hereafter, in a separate dispatch, but it was important to lose no time in doing the thing, and we may assign the reasons for it afterwards." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1799, December 17. Cleveland Row.—"I did not add any thing to my dispatch on the subject of Acre because it seemed to me evident that the attention of our officers there is very much alive to it, and because, in the present state of things (as far as we know it) between Ghezer and the Grand Vizir, there seems great delicacy in the mode of our interference on that subject, which therefore I think it better to leave to those on the spot.

"Keates' account seems highly satisfactory." *Copy.*

[GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.]

[1799, December. Foreign Office, Downing Street.]—"Dutheil has been with me by *Monsieur's* direction to acquaint me for your Lordship's information with his intention of passing into La Vendée some time towards the latter end of next month—he says that his sense of honour and duty will not permit him to remain in London while his friends are fighting his battles in France, that he wishes to know what force or what means [ministers] might have it in their power to assign to him; that he is very sensible that circumstances may make it impossible for them to afford him assistance of the nature or to the extent which they might wish; but that his determination is fixed, and that he considers the motives upon which it is grounded to be such as do not admit of any compensation.

"*Monsieur* proposes to send several persons into Guyenne and Languedoc; they will go in the first instance to Bourdeaux—he wishes them to be allowed 1,000*l* for their expenditure, and that 4,000*l*. more should be put at the disposal of the *Commissaire du Roi* for the service of those provinces.

"I have written to Mr. Pitt upon the subject of *Monsieur's* proposed departure."

The MARQUESS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 18. Stowe.—"The arrangement of Grand

Consul does not promise much more permanence than the nomination of Grand Elector ; and hitherto we have not been alarmed by symptoms of any very increased vigour, not even at their new Admiralty Board, notwithstanding the admirable device of giving the French Lord Spencer 3 votes at his Board. The *Chouans* appear to be gaining strength, and I see with pleasure that you have lost no time in supplying them ; but still I fear that the Austrian Manheim-armistice will grow (particularly if they take Coni) into a general armistice, which will enable France to move her force into the *Chouan* country early in the spring. Did you ever see the *Guerre de la Vendée, par le Général Turreau* ? It is well worth your reading at this time, though I take it for granted that you have looked into it formerly. You will observe how much he dwells on the difficulties which the Vendéens found in supplying themselves with powder ; and as this partial armistice gives you the means of sending such supplies, I am sure you will consider powder as your first article ; and unless you contrive to employ the Consulate there, I have little doubt but that they will employ you in Ireland."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Secret.

1799, December. Downing Street.—“There is still one case which is not provided for in my other dispatches of which Captain Sir H. Popham is the bearer : and this letter is therefore intended to supply that deficiency.

“It is possible that the Emperor of Russia may finally persist in his determination not to leave any auxiliary Russian troops in Germany, but may agree to place the army now under Marshall Suvarow at His Majesty's disposal, and to reinforce that of General Koutousoff by ten or twelve thousand men, which would make two armies each of about thirty thousand men to act in the British Channel and in the Mediterranean in lieu of the two of twenty thousand supposed in the other plan. If this arrangement should take place, to which His Majesty would not be unwilling to consent if it should be found really impossible to obtain the auxiliaries for service in Germany, but not otherwise, the shortest mode of executing it in that case would be to march Suvarow's army to Genoa and Leghorn, with directions there to place themselves under the command of General Sir Charles Stuart (for this point is considered as indispensable to all Mediterranean operations) and to leave Koutousow's Army here during the winter with power to that general to concert with His Majesty's Government for the attack of the island of Walcheren (for which its present force is undoubtedly sufficient) as soon as the season of the year will permit. The detail of this last point will be better explained to the Emperor by Sir Home Popham than by any one else, but I apprehend such an attack would, in any ordinary season, be very practicable *before* the setting in of the vernal equinox. Whatever assistance in artillery, engineers, and gun-boats, such an enterprize would require would of course be supplied by His Majesty, and even if it was necessary, a small body of troops for the first disembarkation, that

being a service to which His Majesty's officers and troops are peculiarly accustomed. But the object would be, after that, to keep the two armies quite distinct, to avoid the disputes and jealousies inseparable from joint expeditions. But you will not fail to observe that, according to this plan, a reinforcement of not less than 10,000 men to Koutousow's army would be absolutely necessary to be made as soon as the season would allow it." *Draft.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 19. Stowe.—“The moment that the University adopt for their title page the common and ordinary imprint, there can be no objection to the pursuing the project which we had agreed upon for our engraving.

“I have no partiality for the words *Homeri Ilias* (Odyssea), but that they will distinguish the plate from that of an ordinary set of coats of arms, and that, as the space is left for some words or drawing, it will look awkward if it is left blank. Upon this however, as upon the genitive of *ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ*, if you please yourself you will please the rest of the brotherhood; and I can offer no opinion as to the page which you refer me to, because the Oxford *Cyropædia* is not here. If my drawing would not reconcile you to a pedestal, no other means were likely to succeed; pray send however through Lady S[pencer] whatever directions on this matter you may determine to give to the engraver.

“It is something to hear that your Austrians talk stoutly, though in truth, whatever be their projects whether of war or peace, it is equally necessary for them to bluster or to vapour upon all that they will do. If the weather of Piedmont is like that of Buckinghamshire, Coni is besnowed as well as besieged. Will they succeed there, and at Genoa? If they do, will it give them courage to go on and turn Swisserland, or will they make out of their success there a claim only to a better line of defence in a peaceable division of Swisserland between themselves and the great nation? If your navy could make a Vendée war in Provence and Languedoc to assist that of Brittany, it would perplex the Grand Elector in the moment of his power, and perhaps expedite his absorption.”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1799, December 19. —.—“An application was made to me some time since in behalf of Sackville Hamilton, whom I knew as Under-Secretary in Ireland, and for whom I have a very real regard, to endeavour to get his son sent out as a writer to the East Indies. Hamilton's public merits are a strong claim for success in this request, independently of my good wishes for him. But as I do not know one of the Directors, I have no other way of forwarding this request than by troubling you with it. If you can assist him I really should be much obliged to you to do so.” *Copy.*

LEGISLATIVE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.
1799, December 21. London.—

Answers.

Done as to the 7th.

Yes.

To be submitted to the Lord Lieutenant's consideration, with an expression of preference on our part.

Points upon which Lord Castlereagh requests to be instructed previous to his return to Ireland.

"A more detailed explanation of the Articles of Union, particularly of Articles 6 and 7, in which are comprehended Commerce, Revenue, and Debts.

"The principle for settling the representation as suggested by the Lord Lieutenant, seems approved, and the mode of obviating the inconvenience of bringing over evidence to Westminster in the case of controverted elections and Private Bills, has been considered, and a remedy proposed.

"The mode of choosing the Peers who are to sit in the United Parliament, is detailed in a note; query, whether this arrangement is finally decided on?

"It certainly would be desirable that Lord Castlereagh should be in possession of the opinion of the Cabinet on all these points in detail, previous to his return. If the measure is to be submitted to Parliament, in the shape of propositions, it is requisite that the resolutions should be drawn here; as there will be hardly time after his return to have them prepared in Ireland, and sent over for consideration.

"If the treaty is to be managed by Commissioners, it will be sufficient that Lord Castlereagh should be instructed on the general outline; the detail need not be absolutely concluded on till the conferences are held, and Ministers see what shape the Irish claims or opposition assume.

"An explanatory sketch particularly on Articles 6 and 7 wanted for publication.

"Instructions as to the mode

Irish Parliament meets 22nd,
and 14 days to be allowed for
the call.

Done.

Certainly.

Ditto.

of proposing the subject to Parliament.

"A paragraph for the Speech to be prepared here.

"Whether the Crown may not be authorized by address, instead of bill, to appoint Commissioners.

"Where shall the Commissioners first hold their conferences? In Ireland immediately after their appointment, or in London after the Irish Bills are passed?

"A call of the House will be desired—this necessarily postpones the question on the address, if complied with, for about 10 days.

"A dispatch to my Lord Lieutenant which should enable him to state to individuals, in the strongest manner, the serious purpose of the English Cabinet to persevere in the measure till accomplished, and to support it with all the weight of Government.

"Query—Whether the Lord Lieutenant should not be directed, if he meets with difficulty in the present Parliament, to consider whether a dissolution might not be expedient.

"Whether Lord Castlereagh should not be authorized to bring the leading members of the Administration to a point on the question before it is brought into discussion.

"Whether Sir John Parnell should not be spoken to before he leaves London.

"An intimation to the Lord Lieutenant, that engagements made with a view to this measure, and approved of by ministers here, will be given in charge to subsequent Governments to have precedence of other claims.

Secret Service.
Amount and Restrictions.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret.

1799, December 22. Bromley Hill.—“ I had a very satisfactory conversation yesterday with *Monsieur*. He entered exactly as one should wish into all our notions respecting Brest ; and promised, under the strictest obligation of secrecy, to employ De la Rosiere in giving us full information on the subject. He seemed also extremely satisfied with the prospect of our being possibly enabled to send him, accompanied by fifteen thousand men, to the coast towards the beginning of March ; but he understands clearly that nothing of this sort can be engaged for until we are perfectly satisfied, by a detailed account of the port in question, that it can be occupied with the strongest probability of maintaining it, and with a certainty of being able (in case of necessity) to re-embark without material loss. In the meantime I agreed that he should write immediately to his agent in Brittany to communicate to the Royalists his earnest desire to join them in person, and *his own hope* (but so as in no degree to commit us) that he may soon be enabled to fix a time when they may expect to see him accompanied by a considerable regular force. I am to see De la Rosiere again to-morrow, and expect to receive from him his detailed statements of the grounds on which he represents the port as a secure one ; I mean to lay it immediately before Sir Charles Grey and Lord St. Vincent for their opinion, both on the military and naval part of the question. One of the points on which I am most apprehensive is the difficulty from the season ; but, if this can be surmounted, and the plan in other respects seems fit to be adopted, I am not sure whether we should not do better to send at once from thirty to forty thousand men, which I am sure we should have no difficulty in collecting by the time proposed, or even sooner. And we should then have a reserve of about twenty thousand (exclusive of cavalry) to follow whenever it is thought expedient. On this plan our army, aided only by the Royalist force already in arms, would be clearly superior to any troops the enemy could collect without detaching from the frontiers ; and, in the interval before such detachments could arrive, the confidence which our superiority would inspire would probably have produced a general rising in all the provinces on the west and north-western coasts ; and I should hope there would be a chance that we might also be commencing our operations in the south from the Mediterranean. I have written very fully to Dundas on the general view of the subject, and will send him the further particulars as soon as I obtain them. I will write to you from town to-morrow about the Dutch ships and troops, and will endeavour to take care of all the other points you mention in your note.

“ Pray send me a copy of your ecclesiastical paper for the Bishop of Lincoln, who is in town. He talks of staying till about Tuesday or Wednesday sen'night, and as you will probably not be in town in the course of that time, will be very glad to come with me for a day to Dropmore if you think it will be of use. Either Saturday or Monday sen'night, as far as I can judge at present, would I think be most likely to suit me best.”

Postscript.—“ The new constitution is a more undisguised con-

trivance for giving absolute power to Buonaparte than I expected, and, as such, must I think do good."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, December 23. Downing Street.—"I have had a second conversation with De la Rosiere which seems to me to promise most favourably with respect to both the means of retaining, and the power of retreating from the port he has suggested. And he has drawn up a paper on the subject which is good as far as it goes, but not so full or convincing as the statement I collected from himself. I will send it you as soon as it is copied, and will immediately see Sir Charles Grey and Lord St. Vincent on the subject.

"De la Rosiere proceeds on the supposition that, in addition to our own force of 15,000 men, we may depend on 25,000 serviceable Royalist troops to assist in defending this position, which, he undertakes, would in that case have nothing to fear from an enemy with 60 or 70,000 men. I think it very possible that in a very short time a Royalist force might be regularly formed to the number he mentions, or perhaps more; but it does not seem wise to count on this for our security; and I am therefore strongly inclined to think that we ought to endeavour to bring our own force, if not in the very first instance, at least by very speedy reinforcements, to between thirty and forty thousand men; and, with proper exertion, I am much in hopes this may be done. I am sorry however to observe that Lord Spencer, as far as I can judge from the conversation I have had with him to-day, is strongly inclined to imagine difficulties against the whole plan from our naval force being chained down to support an expedition of this nature, and from an apprehension (for which I see very little foundation) that the French fleet might make use of the opportunity to come up the channel or threaten Ireland. And this notion, with a sort of general prejudice against any operations combined with the Royalists, seemed to make him not much disposed to give the project a fair consideration. I think it very possible that this is only a first impression which will subside on reflection; but I mention it because, without taking any notice of what I have said, there is a channel through which you may perhaps be able to inspire him with more enterprising ideas. The conversation I have had respecting Brest nearly puts that project out of the question in the mode to which Sir Charles Grey looked to it, but suggests another which is well worth examining, and which if it turns out as well as on the first statement, may be combined with the operations from [illegible] and not require more than what will be our disposable force in the course of the summer."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, December 24. Admiralty.—"When Paget called here the other day to apply for a passage in a frigate, he said positively that he could not be ready by the time the *Cormorant* was to sail, which

is the only frigate which can be appropriated at present to this service, and is destined to go with a convoy as far as the Streights, after which she will be at liberty to make the best of her way to any part of Italy. It is very unfortunate that the urgency of his departure did not occur three or four days ago, because the frigate which was sent with your last despatches to the Mediterranean could have carried him out with as much expedition as could be wished; and I should suppose that a day or two will not make much difference to him, which is all that probably could arise from his going with a convoy, if they sail with a fair wind. As to Popham, I saw him to-day, and he said he was going back directly to Harwich; so I concluded he had given up his scheme, which I continue to think a very wild one; for, the moment there is any southerly or westerly wind, he will be able to go over to some part of the coast, though he may not perhaps get into the Elbe or Weser; and the very great uncertainty of going through the Streights and up the Mediterranean at this season makes it most probable that his passage that way would be much longer delayed than through Sweden or the north of Germany.

"We have no frigate to spare that is now ready but the *Cor-morant*, and, if she is sent away, all the Lisbon and Mediterranean trade must be stopped for want of convoy. The damages sustained by our frigates in the Dutch expedition, and the increased demand for them off Brest and in the bay in consequence of the supplies sending out to the Royalists, occasions this scarcity at present; otherwise I should be equally desirous with you to attain the object of placing an active person at Naples, of which the necessity has long since been very evident."

SIR W. SCOTT, Judge-Advocate General, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 27. Easley Court, Reading.—"I have now perused the plan which your Lordship transmitted to me, and have considered it as well as I am able. I entirely agree with your Lordship that the mischief is great and requires a remedy, and I likewise think that it is very fit that some remedy should be tried in practice; but I cannot say that, in my judgment of the matter, this plan is at all entitled to such an experiment; on the contrary, I think it so fundamentally wrong in many respects that, as a sincere friend to the Church of England, I should be extremely concerned to find that it attracted any respectable patronage.

"My objections to it are numerous, and therefore might be better stated in conversation than within the compass of a short letter; but I shall take the present opportunity of mentioning a few of them, though briefly and without regard to order.

"I object to it that it does most materially alter the constitution of the church by taking the care of it in a very great degree out of the hands of the bishops, and putting it into the hands of a set of trustees, who are to have an unlimited power of dividing large livings and uniting small ones as they think fit, and compelling the bishops as well as the patron to submit to those alterations

however they may disapprove them. These same trustees are to have a power of making augmentations of livings, and to have a power of purchasing advowsons, thereby creating a new estate in the Church independent of the bishops, and controlling the bishops in the exercise of their own proper episcopal authority, and possessing means of increasing influence and authority to a very dangerous extent. The author of the plan [Dr. Paley] has not stated what the fund is which he calls unappropriated. It is impossible that he can mean the *Bounty Fund*, because that is appropriated by many Acts of Parliament, and is very honourably and usefully employed, although improvements might certainly be made in its application. What other fund it can be I cannot conjecture; but if it is to be so vested and employed, I think it will give a mortal blow to the episcopal constitution of the Church of England.

"I object to it, that this unlimited power of clipping large livings and uniting small ones, without the consent of the patron in either case, is not only grossly injurious to the rights of lay patrons, but has a dangerous tendency to introduce that parity in the provision for the clergy, which has been deemed by no means desirable for the interests either of Church or State. Large livings are family provisions for the sons of the nobility and gentry of the country, who are invited by them into the church, and, by holding preferments in it, connect the safety of its interests with those of the other great establishments of our ancient Constitution. They are likewise provisions for men of superior ability and attainments. It is on all accounts a fit thing that there should be a disparity in the parochial provision of churches; whereas the effect of this will be in time to produce a Presbyterian equality, fit enough to answer the purposes of a democratic establishment of Church and State, but very incompatible with the peculiar nature of our own.

"I object to it, the impropriety of laying down as an inflexible rule for plurality that no man shall hold more than two benefices, when the fact is notorious that in many parts of the kingdom a man may hold two benefices, and even three, without receiving £40 a year from them.

"I object to it, that it proposes to lay down certain fixed legal rules for residence, which no discretion is to relax under any circumstances whatsoever. In my opinion this is a matter which *must* be left to a proper constitutional discretion—that of the bishops,—from the very nature and necessity of the thing. The cases that occur in the variety of circumstances under which so numerous a body as the clergy is placed (particularly in times of severe pressure upon the fortunes of individuals) makes it unavoidable that this subject shall, in all instances, be under the control and management of a prudent personal discretion, attending to the general interests of the Church, and with some humane consideration of the indulgence which may be due in particular cases, impossible to be foreseen and provided for by any rigid rule of law. I am not unaware of the complaints which have been occasionally indulged against the ecclesiastical superiors for undue lenity in this matter, and of the little expectation that can be, in the judgment of those

who make these complaints, entertained of a vigorous administration of the laws of the Church ; on which I have only to observe, that I have always found those complaints to come from persons entirely unacquainted with the existing difficulties that obstruct the exercise of authority at present. Strengthen the hands of authority, and, by so doing, take away not only the present excuse for doing little, but the present impossibility of doing much. If these are taken away, and after that nothing is done effectually, it may be then time enough to proceed to a violent alteration of the constitution of the Church.

“ I object to it, that whilst it diminishes in a great degree the already too feeble authority of the bishops, it loads them with new duties, incessant, and painful, and productive of expense for which no fund whatever is provided. He is to hold by himself or his commissary a visitation *every year* in certain places of his diocese. He is there to receive the reports of rural deans, who are entirely to supersede, as it should seem, the offices of the archdeacons of the kingdom, containing (amongst other things) complaints of *any general misconduct* of the clergymen of the several parishes from *any reputable parishioner*, that is from any man whose private enmity or conceitedness may lead him to misrepresent his minister. He is then, forthwith, to enquire into the same, taking these same deans to his assistance, and may censure or suspend, with the consent of these deans, and he is then, if occasion requires, to prosecute them to deprivation. For all these purposes of visiting, of enquiring, (let these purposes require ever so much time and expense) and afterwards of prosecuting (perhaps through three courts of justice by appeal) the bishop is to have no consideration whatever, not even in the simple reimbursement of the enormous charges which the execution of such a business must unavoidably throw upon him.

“ I object to it, that it does not appear in this scheme that it has at all occurred to the author in what manner the bishop is to exercise the powers of enquiry on which sentences of suspension or of other censure is to be founded. How is he to compel the attendance or the examination of such witnesses as may be necessary to support charges that are to lead to such serious effects ? or how is the person charged to compel the attendance of his witnesses ? Who is to pay the expenses of these witnesses, if they attend ? or is the bishop to act merely upon the reports of these deans, as conclusive upon all matters contained in them ?

“ I object to it, that whilst it lays down as indispensibly necessary that the ecclesiastical superior should notice not only immoralities but slighter deviations from that decency of conduct which belongs to the sacerdotal character, it supplies no new rules by which so delicate an inquiry is to be conducted or determined. The rural deans are to receive reports to this effect from churchwardens, *or any parishioner*, and they are to transmit them to the bishop. How the bishop is to act in cases of this nature otherwise than at present, no information whatever is given.

“ I object to it that it extends the attention of these deans to the places of worship of Dissenters. Everything which they can

collect by information respecting such places is to form a part of their report, although they have no power of direct enquiry to be addressed to the members of such congregations, nor the bishops any authority to proceed upon their reports respecting them.

"I object to it, that it imposes a most unjust and impracticable condition on Dissenters respecting their registries, by requiring that the householders who apply for them, shall give security not only for their own conduct but also for *that of other persons resorting to the same*, as if any man could be expected to stipulate for the good behaviour of other persons who might think fit to go to the same place of worship, from which it is not in his power to shut him out. Similar to this is another provision by which they are required to give security for the *good principles* of their minister.

"These are *some* of the objections I feel to this scheme; you will excuse my having thrown them together in a very rough way, conceiving that you wished to have what occurred to me, as if we were conversing on the subject. If I knew how to send the paper safely to Dropmore, I would return it immediately; but, for fear of accidents, I will keep it until I return to town the latter end of next week, unless I should understand by a line directed here that your Lordship wished to have it before.

"I really think that no small proportion of the mischief complained of might be remedied in an easy, natural, and constitutional manner, and I should very seriously lament that violent and new measures should be resorted to, before the inefficacy of methods more congenial to established laws and usages was fairly demonstrated upon a just experiment."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 29. Wycombe.—"I send you Dundas's letter which I received yesterday evening, and likewise one from Sir Charles Grey. The former is upon the whole very satisfactory, as it shews that Dundas's mind is open to a fair consideration of the subject, and his suggestion with respect to Bellisle, and also with respect to the time of the operation, falls in a great measure with the plan we talked of yesterday. Sir Charles Grey's letter is very loosely written and bears strong marks of prejudice with respect to the Royalists, as well as of perfect ignorance with respect to the composition of their force. No real inference can be drawn with respect to the safety or prudence of the project from his opinion till it is given on a more deliberate view of the subject, and the grounds of it explained. In order to bring the business to a point as soon as possible, I think it best to return to town to-morrow instead of Tuesday, and will call on you soon after breakfast.

Postscript.—"Dundas's geography, you will observe, is as accurate as his language.

"The account from Italy and the Rhine and, in most respects, the Archduke's proclamation promise well."

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799, December 29. Constantinople.—"Nothing short of in-

dispensable necessity could have induced me to place Mr. Smith's conduct in an unfavourable point of view, as I have this day done in my public correspondence ; nor have I done it before I had employed every effort of friendly persuasion to put matters on a footing by which business could be properly carried on. I have been the more disappointed that I had looked forward to much useful co-operation with him. I had found him remarkably clever, and, with proper management, he might, I doubt not, be brought to be exceedingly useful. But unfortunately his habits have been acquired in this country, without any guide. And having been known to the Turks in situations very inferior to the diplomatic character he now holds, he has imagined it requisite to adopt a peculiar degree of haughtiness in his demeanour, which has drawn upon him the ill-will not only of the Turks, but equally of all descriptions of persons with whom he has to do. I have been repeatedly enjoined in the conferences not to mention to him what has been communicated for your Lordship's information ; and very serious remonstrances have been made to me by persons who, though in public situations, have received private directions from him limiting their correspondence. In a word, never having had the advantage of observing at home the principles and the mode on which affairs are conducted, and having been always acting at this great distance from responsibility and immediate direction, he has acquired a tone of superiority which prevents his submitting to aid me. He admits the utmost degree of personality in his selections and in his judgment in public matters, and is involved in the miserable intrigue of this country.

" I will cite one occurrence which I select the rather as my silence upon it, in my public correspondence, must have appeared striking to your Lordship. Above a fortnight ago, accounts were received from Aleppo of Vice-Consul Barker's having proceeded to the violent arrest of a quantity of goods and letters found in the possession of one of the express Tartars. Mr. Smith told me of his having received a quantity of papers on the subject ; I begged to see them as well as the public correspondence to that date from Aleppo. After several days' delay, he sent me a packet, accompanied by a note stating that what I then received was the whole of one side of the question, and, when I had done with that, he would furnish me the remainder. Notwithstanding my having explained to him verbally the absurdity of this proceeding, I am yet without what I have asked for, although the *Internonce*, the Danish and Swedish *Chargés d'Affaires*, and others have sent in the strongest remonstrances and reclamations against Mr. Barker, which I am, of course, still unable to take into consideration.

" I wish I could point out any mode of remedying the inconvenience I complain of, consistent with your Lordship's very natural wish of not altering the nature of the mission here during my extraordinary embassy. But I confess nothing does occur to me on that subject unless your Lordship should think proper to send to Mr. Smith a temporary leave of absence, instructing me to superintend the business of the company during that period, and to receive all the public papers. Some such arrangement would meet the exi-

gency of the case, without any interruption to Mr. Smith's present emoluments or future prospects. But whatever is done, ought to be done very positively. Notwithstanding your Lordship's instructions, he still employs a dragoman in daily communications with the Porte as before my arrival, and never has once mentioned to me the business he is carrying on.

"I need say nothing to your Lordship about Sidney Smith. The error he has fallen into will very easily be remedied. That must come from your Lordship; though I was very sorry to hear from Lord Nelson at Palermo that the tone Sir Sidney assumed had drawn upon him some unpleasant remonstrances. In a vessel of his which came lately here, his orders to the commanding officer (a midshipman of the *Tigrè*) were signed by S. S. *Minister Plenipotentiary*.

"I have had a most unpleasant reconciliation to manage between the Reis-Effendi and General Kœhler. The latter having called of his own accord on the Minister, and complained, in strong language of being detained some little time before admittance, it was highly resented. Unfortunately General Kœhler, who styles himself *commanding His Majesty's land forces in the Ottoman Dominions*, really claims to himself the respect paid to a Buonaparte or a Suwarow. On the other hand, he has disgusted all his officers. Seeing Englishmen in authority in Turkey, takes away all delight in reading *Don Quixote*."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, December 20-31].—"I have received with all due humility the Dropmore criticisms upon the productions of Stowe; the Bishop of Chester was already out of the reach of them, being returned to Oxford well satisfied that the joint result of our labours was too perfect to admit of change or amendment. To him it is that you must address yourself in respect to the Greek title-page, because you will observe that the form of it is already decided upon by them, and that they certainly do not in any way admit that the large paper books are separately printed by the *Ἀδελφοί*; they consider the whole as one joint adventure, and they justly maintain it so to be, because by their profit upon the large paper copies, which we consent to take; they will be enabled to sell the small paper at a much lower rate than they otherwise could; but they distinctly mean to say that the title-page is and must be the act of the University Delegates of the University press, and that the phrase to which I objected as well as you, if we were parties to it, is the act of the University Delegates only. When I found that this title-page was already fixed, I doubted at first whether any arms or emblems of ours should appear; but Cleaver, wishing to retain our arms as the best way of naming the *Ἀδελφοί*, and agreeing with me in thinking the University arms should appear with ours in a work which their title-page describes to be at common expense, the only question to decide was how the Oxford arms could best be added to the plate on which ours are engraved; and with all due deference to your spectacles, and to the little woman's unglazed eyes, I still think

there is no better way of accommodating this new device to the old column than by a pedestal to receive the arms of the University. With respect to other columns or pedestals or plinth on which the little altars stand, it is perfectly useless to have any, if it is not thought that the same or a greater necessity exists for them when the main column is raised, as when it stood upon a low plinth.

“Having now shewn you, what you seem to have overlooked, that the title page is and will be the act of the University, and that some such alteration as that proposed is necessary to make our plate accord with their title-page, I must refer you to fight that battle with the two bishops who have determined it upon their own judgment and upon antient precedent; reminding you however, for your better understanding of this controversy, that they consider themselves as bound to make their own title page, and that they do not regard the large paper as a separate adventure which is our separate property and concern. In truth one of their chief motives for the title page which they have chosen is to hold out, by the shape of it, a temptation to other *illustrious characters* to engage in similar undertakings for the encouragement and advantage of the University press. *Ohe, jam satis est.* Begin now your battle with the bishops when you please; the imagination of the Stowe Committee is completely exhausted in the proposal of the pedestal, but the drawing was a rough sketch without any regular proportion being sought for in it. What is most material is that, upon a very close examination of the first six books, I am beyond measure delighted in proving to myself the merit and accuracy of the new edition; it only waits for the plate.”

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, December 31. Duke Street.—“I communicated to the Hereditary Prince of Orange what you desired me, the last time I had the pleasure of seeing you at Dropmore, to mention to him respecting the getting in readiness as soon as possible the Dutch corps now at the Isle of Wight, so that it might be fit for active service. He assured me nothing would be wanting on his part to accomplish this object. He had been informed that the convention, by which these troops are to be taken into British pay, was to be signed on the part of this Government by your Lordship; and, in the supposition that this information was correct, he desired me to write these few lines, and to beg that you would have the goodness to let him know as soon as possible at what time and place it will best suit you that this should take place.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, [December]. Palace Yard.—“The enclosed accounts give the state of our commerce according to the true value of all the articles. They are of a kind entirely new, and have been prepared in the Offices with much labour.

“I shall probably try to explain some considerations which

they present to me as affecting the Irish question, and as tending forcibly and necessarily to an union. But I am not likely to find a proper occasion in the first debate.

"In the meantime, you may wish to cast your eye over the statements, and will, at your leisure, direct them to be returned to me.

"I apprehend that we are proceeding with the Royal bills, and that you have not delivered the Royal message.

"The Chancellor cannot attend till after the holidays; I presume, therefore, that, after the Tuesday's debate, your Lordship will adjourn the Irish question for ten or twelve days."

Enclosing a general statement of imports and exports prepared by order of the House of Lords, dated March 6th, 1799.

M. DE LA PALUE to GENERAL DE STAMFORT.

1800, January 1. Emerick.—"Le dernier courier de France n'a apporté en événement remarquable que l'annonce du mécontentement qui régné dans les armées, et la desertion qui en est la suite. Les soldats se plaignent que Buonaparte les a trompés, et qu'on ne leur teint point parole, que ne sont ni payés ni habillés; ils disent qu'ils vont aller à la Vendée, où on ne les laissera manquer de rien. Avant hier à Cleves, un bataillon allant sur le Rhin y a passé, 160 hommes ont déserté dans la nuit, et leurs hôtes ont rapporté une partie de leurs armes à la municipalité. On ne doute pas que le même esprit ne régné dans l'armée du Rhin; on sait l'effet qu'il a produit dans l'armée d'Italie. Cette disposition pourroit nuire aux projets de Moreau qui doit être arrivé à Strasbourg, et qu'on assure être chargé de tenter une expédition dans le cas où la rupture entre les deux cours Impériales n'ait pas lieu, comme on s'en étoit flatté en France.

"Je vais vous transcrire une partie d'une lettre que j'ai reçu hier de Paris par la voye de la Hollande; quoiqu'elle ne contienne rien d'absolument neuf, elle confirme plusieurs notions que je vous ai transmises dans mes précédentes. 'Il n'est pas aisé de répondre à toutes les questions que vous me faites, parcequ'on n'a jusqu'à présent que des conjectures à former. Je vais vous tracer l'opinion la plus reçue sur Buonaparte. Il n'a tenu qu'à lui d'envahir le pouvoir; des gens sages le lui ont conseillé; mais soit qu'il ait été effrayé par les obstacles, soit qu'il ait cru nécessaire de préparer la nation à une transition aussi subite, il a affecté le système de modération, et il n'a retenu du pouvoir que ce qui est nécessaire pour faire marcher le gouvernement. Le but est de rallier tous les républicains sous le même drapeau, de ne donner qu'une impulsion. Voilà la pierre philosophale en politique. Il existe en France des élémens incompatibles, des partis ennemis, qui ne peuvent jamais traiter de bonne foi. Nos gouvernans font un rêve philanthropique dont le reveil sera funeste. L'habitude de l'indépendance, de l'intrigue, de la cupidité ne sera comprimé que par des mesures rigoureuses, dont le Gouvernement ne connoît que trop les effets. Il sera, malgré lui, entraîné dans des mesures dont il ne peut prévoir ni l'étendue ni les résultats. Voilà ce que les gens instruits apperçoivent, et ce qui n'échappe pas même à quelques—uns de

ceux qui tiennent les rênes de la République. Il en est même parmi ceux qui conviennent que ce que l'on fait, n'est qu'une expérience. Un d'eux disait avec naïveté : *Si elle ne réussit pas, il faudra revenir au point d'où l'on est parti, et alors, sauve qui peut.* L'état actuel a donc pour objet de tout niveler, de tout rapprocher, de réparer quelques injustices. On est persuadé que les Fructidoriens seront réhabilités, et rappelés. On auroit bien voulu en faire autant d'une certaine classe d'émigrés, mais la vente de leurs biens est une barrière impossible à franchir ; ils n'ont, et ne peuvent avoir d'espérances que dans le renversement total de la République. Vous me demandez ce que je pense des Chouans. La conduite de Buonaparte avec eux vous servira de réponce. Les soins qu'on prend de les désunir, tout ce qu'on fait pour gagner leurs chefs, les avantages qu'on leur offre, à eux et à leurs familles, aux quelles on promet de rendre l'état de citoyens, leurs biens, tout doit vous prouver l'importance que l'on met à détruire ce ver rongeur. On craint l'argent de l'Angleterre ; on ne se dissimule pas que la moitié de l'armée se rangeroit sous les drapeaux de celui qui aura une caisse militaire réglée ; si on ne réussit pas à pacifier l'intérieur, on espère que les troupes qu'on rassemble suffiront pour donner la loi aux insurgés. On fait reparoitre des idées de fédéralisme, comme une ressource à opposer en cas d'échecs. En tout, on vit au jour le jour. Le sujet de toutes les sollicitudes sont les finances. On succombe sous le poids des charges ; on convient généralement que cet état ne peut durer, et que la paix est le seul remède à nos maux ; mais on ignore par qui, comment, cette paix si désirable peut se faire ; en tout. le moment paroît manqué pour certaines gens, et le restaurateur n'a point encore paru. Voilà tout ce que je puis vous dire au milieu des ténèbres qui nous environnent." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 2. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour la communication intéressante que vous venez de me faire, et pour la promesse que vous me faite de me communiquer la réponse négative qu'on fera d'ici. Je n'aurois jamais pu croire, tel impertinent que soit Bonaparte, qu'il eût pourtant l'audace d'écrire de pair à compagnon au Roi de la Grande Bretagne. La tête de cet aventurier Corsse est tournée. Ses proclamations comencent par *nous*. Il tranche du souverain, et il est probable que, dans très peu de tems, il périra comme Cezar qu'il semble vouloir imiter, sans avoir les grand talents de ce tyran de la république Romaine.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 2. Downing Street.—“ These papers, which come from *Monsieur*, seem to shew that there is still a considerable want of arrangement and communication in the mode of sending succours to the Royalists. Pray bring them with you to the

Cabinet to-morrow, as we may be able then to speak to Lord Spencer and Windham."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 2. Stowe.—"Your new year's gift is indeed most curious, and perhaps, as a diplomatic piece, is unique. The first paragraph is the only *real communication*, namely, a notification to King George of the accession of King Bonaparté; the 2nd is a tirade of general observations on war; the 3rd is a civility which is in truth a great concession, in as much as it grants that the King, at the head of the conspiracy of despots, has one only object of making his nation happy; and the 4th styles the aforesaid communication, tirade, and concession, an *overture to a general pacification*. All this may be answered by a tirade as general, and by repeating all that has been constantly said by the British Ministry for the last eight years. But the result of any answer you may give will most certainly be a second letter, proposing Lord Malmesbury's terms as a basis for negotiation; and exactly in proportion as Bonaparté sees or thinks he sees your disinclination to entertain a negotiation, he will hold out facilities, whether his ultimate object be peace or war. Your precautions therefore in thinking over such an answer as you state, cannot be too carefully considered, as it is most clear that, from conceiving the danger less immediate, and from the pressure of the taxes, the tribe of those who, though well inclined to Government, will clamour for peace will be very great indeed. I who see no safety but in a peace made with the restored French monarchy, should personally not dislike a very short answer to this overture; but as I well know that there is not one man in a hundred who thinks with me, I must hope that your answer will be moderate, because I am persuaded that you will be forced to negotiate (at least to entertain a negotiation) and that the opinion of the country will compel you to hear *what Bonaparte has to propose*; and that you will stand upon stronger ground for the ultimate breaking off the negotiation, by humouring the first impressions that will undoubtedly arise on John Bull's mind for peace. I am well aware of many reasons that should urge you to endeavour to prevent France from proposing Lord Malmesbury's terms to you; but I feel persuaded that you cannot prevent this obvious difficulty by anything you can say in answer to this letter without risking too much of that popular opinion that can alone carry us through the war; and that Bonaparte will even, if necessary, offer to negotiate on such points *beyond Lord Malmesbury's propositions* as may have taken a new shape from the altered state of the confederacy, and of the war. You will observe that in all these observations I argue against the line which *personally* I should prefer. Pray send me a copy of your answer *en toute confiance*, for we are most anxious to see it. Tom suggested an idea that seems worth attention, namely, that of sending back this courier with a verbal answer that the answer would be sent by a courier of our own; which courier, if he was well chosen, might find means to forward a short ciphered note to Berlin, and, at all events, would bring you back the French papers and his observations."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 3. Wimbledon.—“I send you a despatch I received last night from St. Helena, from which you will perceive to what an extent the Portuguese flag is carrying its cover of Spanish property. I hope our cruisers will catch those ships, and prevent so much treasure getting into the coffers of our enemies. I have wrote to Lord Spencer that he may take every precaution he can.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 3. York Farm.—“J’ai été, on ne peut pas plus, sensible à la nouvelle preuve d’amitié, d’estime, et de confiance que vous venez de me donner, et il est en vérité bien doux et bien satisfaisant pour moi de pouvoir me rendre justice à moi-même en osant vous assurer que je n’en suis pas indigne. Mon attachement à *la bonne et vraie cause*, et mes sentimens personnels pour vous doivent me mériter la continuation de vos bontés, qu’en tout état de choses, l’honnête homme que vous avez honoré du titre de votre ami, réclamera toujours. Soyez assuré que je ne ferai usage de votre communication que pour mon instruction particulière, et que je n’enverrai la pièce curieuse de *diplomatie consulaire* à ma Cour que lorsque vous m’y aurez autorisé et par courier. Daignez ne pas oublier de m’envoyer votre réponse que vous avez bien voulu me promettre. Je me flatte de connoître assez vos principes pour la deviner. Adieu, j’aime les anciens usages et je ne puis en conséquence m’empêcher de vous prier d’agréer mes vœux à l’occasion du renouvellement de l’année. Puissions-nous réunir enfin à écraser tous ensemble l’anarchie, et à rendre le repos et la paix à l’Europe en rétablissant le *vrai Roi véritablement* sur son *vrai trône*.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 3. Downing Street.—“Canning has suggested, and I think rightly, that it would be a great improvement to put your answer in the shape of a note or declaration in the King’s name in the third person, beginning with the second paragraph; and to put the first sentence into your separate letter to Talleyrand, or rather substitute it for that you have written. If you approve this, the alteration is easily made. I am clear it will be much for the better.

Postscript.—“You avoid the awkwardness of two letters to the same person, and yet do not directly address Bonaparte. And the paper will be in a simpler and more dignified form, and fitter for publication as a manifesto.”

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, January 5. Dublin Castle.—“I have to acknowledge the honour of your Lordship’s letter of the 27th, which, with its enclosures, has been communicated to Lord Cornwallis.

"His Excellency's opinion perfectly coincides with your Lordship's—that it is by no means an object to follow up Lord R. FitzGerald's suggestion; and considers your Lordship's answer as likely to produce every good effect that can be derived from his interference.

"I have learnt that the Duke has, within these few days, received a very long letter from his brother on the subject; and that, at *the moment*, it produced a strong impression; but Mr. Ponsonby has since been with him, and, as his Grace generally takes his impression from the last person with whom he communicates, I conclude whatever opposition it is in his power to command, which, I believe, is altogether confined to his single vote in the House of Lords, and to considerable local influence amongst the disaffected in Kildare, will be given to the measure. I return Lord Robert's letter."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 12. Stowe.—"Tom and I could not avoid smiling at the eagerness with which you speak of the publication of your Egyptian interception, as your new year's gift to *Sa Majesté très Corse*; in which measure though there is a proper mixture of sense of duty, yet possibly there may be a little malice such as you will not disavow. We only beg that your publisher may not *for his own job* keep it as long in the press as he did the first Cairo-mail; but that you will contrive to have it published in weekly numbers, till the public curiosity is exhausted; as we agree that it is very essential to put down the character of *Sa Majesté* aforesaid as much as possible (even before Parliament meets) in the mind of John Bull; and much of the effect will be lost if your publisher keeps this collection for six or eight weeks in the press. All this will facilitate your decision of not suffering the Turk to export their wretched remnant of army, and may possibly end in another chelink for Sir Sydney's cap. I begin to grow uneasy about Keats's *Chouan* convoy. It ought to have arrived on the coast on the 23rd or 24th, having sailed on the 19th; and we have in the Paris papers accounts from Hedouville, dated the 29th, which do not speak of any embarkation being on the coast. And I am the more uneasy about him and Captain Riou's convoy as Gardiner is returned with the fleet to Torbay, and three or four ships from Brest might overthrow all your arrangements. In the course of a late correspondence with Simcoe he presses warmly for an attempt in the spring on Brest, which he considers very practicable with 25,000 men, and quotes Sir C. Stuart or Sir C. Grey as persons equally persuaded of this, and as most proper for such a command. He speaks from very late enquiries, and so confidently, as to claim some attention; for the object is in every point of view so essential. Would you wish me to pursue this *as from yourself*, or shall I say nothing more about it to him. You know how much I should be delighted in seeing a war carried on upon its *true principles* of doing as much mischief as you can; not being at all more reconciled to your new rights of war, than to your new rights of men."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 14. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis bien obligé de la communication des papiers Egiptiens que Mr. Hammond m'a communiqué par votre ordre. Vous avez bien raison de ménager les Turcs, et de soustraire à la connaissance du public la conduite louche de ces pauvres gens. C'est leurs faiblesse qui les fait agir de cette manière, et il ne faut pas la dévoiler ; mais il me semble qu'il est bon d'en avertire ma Cour afin qu'elle ordonne à Tomara de les surveiller, et de leurs inspirer plus de fermeté et constance ; car je le crois un peu mou, témoin la facilité avec laquelle il avoit consenti à donner des passeports à l'armée de Kleber.

“ Avez vous lu l'ouvrage Jacobin intitulé *Coup d'œil politique* ? Il est attribué à un certain Saladin, Génévois, qui semble l'avoir écrit sans la dicté de Sa Majesté corse. Croyez vous qu'il convient ou non de pourssuivre cet ouvrage composé, quoiqu' indirectement, contre le système suivi par le gouvernement Britanique et ses alliés.”

GENERAL SIR CHARLES GREY, K.C.B., to W. PITT.

1800, January 16. Hertford Street.—“ Herewith I have the honour to return the answers given by Monsieur Rosière to the queries put relative to his memoir on an expedition to *Rhuis*, and which indisposition has prevented my doing until now.

“ Monsieur Rosière, answers by no means give me a more favourable opinion of the plan than I have uniformly had, but on the contrary, I cannot avoid remarking that the very replies he makes to the queries tend, in a great measure, to prove the futility of such an enterprise. He admits there are hardly any, or rather no resources on the peninsula for such an army, and even on the quality of the water he is silent. That *Vannes and Auray* are not tenable by the Royalists ; and with respect to *his proposed redoubts*, the very landing of the fascines, gabions, and other materials wanting, require more time than he proposes to allow for perfecting them. It is not here necessary to form any supposition as to his abilities as an engineer, but if a line is to be forced by an enemy of superior strength, there can be but little resistance expected by a chain of redoubts 400 yards asunder. In fact many of the queries remain unanswered, and such as are, except relative to the supposed numbers of the Royalists, militates most completely against such an enterprise. And with respect to the Royalists themselves, if they are in such force in the field as he wishes to represent, it cannot be the situation of *Vannes and Auray* that creates the difficulty of possession, but the actual inferior force of the Royalists, compared with the Republican troops in this part of the country. In this situation of matters, it may be very fairly concluded, that if such a body of 15,000 men are landed on the peninsula, they would very shortly be obliged to retire, or surrender without effecting any one purport of the expedition.

“ I have taken the freedom to speak fully out on this occasion, having been indulged by you to do so on every military question you have honoured me by a reference to ; and allow me truly to

add that wishing from my heart, as I have ever done, every honour and success to attend your plans, I earnestly hope you will not embarrass yourself with this enterprise ; for what dependance can be placed upon a force composed of *sailors, conscripts and deserters*? most assuredly discomfiture and disgrace."

Enclosure :—

ROYALIST INSURRECTION IN BRITTANY.

Réponses.

1. L'arrondissement de *Vannes* et d'*Auray*, y compris le *Morbihan* qui en fait partie, est au moins de 30,000 hommes, dont 17,000 sont armés : Georges, qui commande dans cet arrondissement peut porter le nombre des Royalistes jusqu'à 70,000.

2. Ils sont bon Royalistes ; On en ignore le nombre.

3. La masse peut se monter à 150,000 ;
Leurs points de rassemblement varient, selon les circonstances.

4. Sans aucune doute ; ils se montrent de jour, ayant la cocarde blanche au chapeau.

5. La formation est composée de divisions, commandées par un Colonel, un Lieutenant Colonel, et un Major. La division est de 3 ou 4 bataillons, selon la force ; le bataillon de 8 compagnies. A chacune de ces divisions est attachée une troupe de cavalerie, et une d'artillerie. La discipline est maintenant fort bonne et fort exacte.

6. L'espèce d'hommes dont ils sont composés sont habitants du pays, matelots, conscrits, et déserteurs, dont le plus âgé à 30 ans ; ils sont susceptibles de s'accroître beaucoup en leur en fournissant les moyens.

Questions.

1. Quel serait le nombre des Royalistes ou de Chouans bien décidés dans un arrondissement de huit lieues d'*Auray* et de *Vannes*.

2. Les habitants de ces villes ainsi que ceux des isles dans le golfe de *Vannes* sont-ils Royalistes ? quel en pourroit être le nombre dans chacun de ces lieux ?

3. Quel est le plus grand nombre des Royalistes qu'on ait jamais vu rassemblé ? et quels sont ordinairement leurs points de rassemblement.

4. Les Royalistes sont ils assez en force pour paraître le jour, ou se bornent-ils à des opérations nocturnes.

5. Quelle est l'organisation de ces rassemblements, et à quelle discipline sont-ils assujettis.

6. Quel seroit l'accroissement ou la diminution de leurs forces selon les derniers rapports, et de quelles classes d'hommes sont ils composés.

7. Pas une.

8. *Vannes* et *Auray*, y compris le *Morbihan* et environs.

9. *Vannes* et *Auray* sont des ports de Marée, où il ne monte et ne peut monter que des bâtiments marchands de 100, et au plus de 200 à 300 tonneaux.

10. On ne connaît pas le nombre de ces bâtiments, mais quelqu'il soit, les habitants de *Morbihan* étant tous Royalistes, il serait très possible de s'emparer de ces bâtiments, de les conduire dans la rade de Quiberon, ou de les détruire.

11. Les frégates peuvent entrer et mouiller dans le golphe, mais peu de distance de son ouverture. Il n'y a aucune batterie sur la côte, qui ne puisse être soumise, soit par les Royalistes, soit par les chaloupes canonnières, dès que l'escadre sera mouillée dans la rade. Les Royalistes étant maîtres de toutes les isles du golphe, et la plupart de ces isles devant être fortifiées et armées pour protéger au besoin la défense de la presqu'isle, il ne peut y avoir rien à craindre de leur part.

12. Les Royalistes, pourvus de quelques pièces de canon, s'empareraient sans difficulté de *Vannes* et d'*Auray* ; ils auraient le temps de faire évacuer de ces ports les bâtiments qui s'y trouveraient, ou de les détruire ; mais, attendu la position dominée des deux villes, il ne leur serait pas possible de s'y maintenir.

7. Ya-t-il parmi eux des personnes qui ont figuré avant la Révolution ? qui sont-ils et quelles sont les communications qu'on a eu avec eux.

8. Est-ce dans le voisinage de St. Briaux ou celui de *Vannes* et d'*Auray* que les Royalistes sont le plus nombreux ? Ou bien dans quelle partie de la Bretagne ?

9. Jusqu'à quel point les rivières de *Vannes* et d'*Auray* sont-elles navigables, et pour quelle espèce de bâtiments.

10. Quel est le nombre de vaisseaux ou de bâtiments d'une moindre force dans les rivières et le golfe ? serait-il possible de s'en emparer ou de les détruire. Les habitants seraient-ils disposés à les offrir pour notre service.

11. Quelle est la force des plus grands bâtiments qui pourraient entrer et rester à l'ancre dans le golfe de *Vannes*. Ces bâtiments ne seraient-ils pas exposés au feu des canons et de mortiers en entrant, ou même tandis qu'ils restaient à l'ancre, dans le cas qu'on ne s'en emparât pas des isles les plus proches de la presqu'isle.

12. Le débarquement fait, les Royalistes seraient-ils assez en force pour tenir les villes d'*Auray* et de *Vannes* contre le nombre de troupes réglées qui est actuellement dans le pays, sans autre secours que ce qu'on leur fournirait en armes et munitions de guerre.

13. La longueur de la presqu'île de *Rhuïs* [Ruys], depuis la hauteur de l'est de *Sarzeau* jusqu'au *Port Navale* est d'environ 3 lieues, et sa plus grande largeur de 2 lieues ; son pourtour, excepté les anses qui s'y trouvent, est presque partout élevé et escarpé ; et son intérieur offre des plaines assez espacieuses pour faire manœuvrer des troupes. En cas de retraite la presqu'île d'*Arzon*, qui tient à celle de *Rhuys* et qui en fait partie, doit être fortifiée de manière à favoriser et à assurer le rembarquement.

14. Des redoubtes distantes l'une de l'autre d'environ 200 toises selon que le terrain le permettrait. On estime qu'il faudra les construire tant pour le camp retranché que pour la presqu'île d'*Arzon*, 13 ou 14. Chacune de ces redoutes devant être occupée par cinq ou six cents hommes, elle exigerait 400 travailleurs, et deux ou trois jours au plus pour être mise en état de défense, mais il faudrait que les fascines et les piquets fussent préparés à l'avance, et portés sur le terrain.

15. Le camp retranché en avant de *Sarzeau*, entre la mer et le golphe, y compris les flancs, aurait environ 1,700 toises d'étendue, c'est à dire une digue de 8 ou 9 redoutes.

16. Les inondations seraient pratiquées dans les valons en avant du camp, par la retenue des eaux des marais et des ruisseaux dont cette partie de la presqu'île est coupé. L'escarpement naturel ou celui qu'il y aurait à faire sur les bords de la presqu'île du côté de la mer, joint aux rétranchements qui y seraient construits, mettraient cette partie en sûreté.

17. Les chemins de la presqu'île, comme ceux de la province

13. Quelle est la nature de la presqu'île, est-ce que la cavalerie y pourrait agir ? y a-t-il des positions près du lieu de débarquement dont on pourrait se servir pour couvrir la retraite ?

14. Quels sont les ouvrages qu'on se propose de construire non seulement pour couvrir la retraite, mais aussi pour la défense de la presqu'île ? quel serait le temps et le nombre d'hommes qu'ils exigeraient pour leur construction ?

15. Quelle est l'étendue de terrain du côté du golfe et sur l'isthmus sur laquelle il faudrait construire des ouvrages ?

16. Quelle portion de l'isthmus pourrait-on inonder du côté des salines. Cette inondation resterait-elle toujours pendant les marées basses. Dans le cas contraire, est-ce que les Républicains ne pourraient pas en détruire l'effet en rompant la digue ?

17. Quel est l'état des chemins sur la presqu'île ? Convient-

en général, ont besoin de quelques réparations pour être praticables aux troupes et à l'artillerie ; mais ce travail ne saurait être difficile ni long ; on y emploierait les habitants. Les ressources en fourrages sont à peu près nulles, ou du moins peu considérables. Quant au bois, il s'en trouvera près du château de Sucin, et l'on sera toujours à portée de s'en procurer soit par le golphe, soit par la côte.

18. Tout le pays étant peuplé de Royalistes et les ports de Vannes et d'Auray ayant été évacué de la manière qu'on a indiqué ci-dessus, il n'y aurait aucun débarquement à craindre du côté du golphe. Au reste, il n'y a pas de mauvais temps qui puisse empêcher les bâtiments de guerre de tenir en dedans de l'ouverture du *Morbihan*.

19. Excepté les vaisseaux de ligne, les batiments de guerre et ceux de transport peuvent être mouillés assez près de la côte, pour que la communication avec la presqu'île soit aussi facile et aussi prompte que le temps le permettroit.

20. Il n'y a sur la presqu'île aucun ouvrage de fortification, et les batteries établies sur la côte au *Port Navale* et ailleurs, ne sont pas susceptibles de défense contre bâtiments de guerre.

21. On peut mettre à terre autant d'hommes à la fois qu'on le jugera à propos, ou que les bateaux plats pourront y en porter ; et comme il est très vraisemblable que le débarquement se fera sans opposition de la part de l'ennemi, on aura le temps et la facilité de le faire par divisions.

22. Il y a sur le pourtour de la presqu'île, soit du côté du *Morbihan*, soit du côté de la

elles à l'artillerie ou à la cavallerie ? et quels sont les ressources pour la forage et le chauffage ?

18. Dans le cas que les bâtiments ne pourraient rester dans le golfe, et qu'on ne s'emparât point des petits bâtiments de ce côté-là, ne serait-on pas exposé à des débarquements par l'ennemi ?

19. Quand les bâtiments ne seraient pas dans le golfe, à quelle distance du lieu de débarquement pourrait-on placer les vaisseaux de guerre et de transports, et quelle seroit la facilité de communication ?

20. Y a-t-il maintenant de batteries ou d'ouvrages quelconques sur la presqu'île ? de quelle espèce sont-elles, et en quel état ?

21. Quand on aurait le nombre de bateaux nécessaire et un vent favorable, quel nombre d'hommes pourrait-on débarquer à la fois ? et en quel temps pourrait-on débarquer une seconde division avec les mêmes bateaux ?

22. Les vaisseaux chargés de vivres étant à l'ancre dans le golfe, et l'armée postée près de

rade, plusieurs anses où le débarquement des vivres et d'autres objets pourra se faire sans difficulté.

23. La presqu'isle est arrosée par plusieurs ruisseaux ; il y a d'ailleurs des fontaines et des puits : on ne prévoit pas qu'on puisse y manquer d'eau, ni qu'elle soit de mauvaise qualité.

24. Il est possible qu'il se trouve sur la presqu'isle et dans ses environs quelques bois propre à faire des fascines, des piquets, mais il est plus sûr d'y porter ces objets, d'autant que pour les 13 ou 14 redoutes qu'il y aurait à y construire, il ne faudrait pas moins de huit à neuf mille fascines, et trois fois autant de piquets. Au reste, c'est un calcul à faire avec exactitude, et qui regarde l'ingénieur qui devra être à la tête des travaux.

25. La petite ville de *Sarzeau*, chef lieu ; *St. Gildas* et *Arzon*, bourgs ; et plusieurs villages. La population du tout, y compris quelques isles voisines, peut être de 4 or 5,000 âmes des deux sexes et de tout âge. On ne le sait pas positivement.

26. La presqu'isle étant généralement bien cultivée, on peut assurer qu'il y a des bestiaux, mais on en ignore le nombre et l'espèce.

27. Il y a de *Sarzeau* à *Vannes*

4 lieues,	
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Auray</i>	4 lieues
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Brest</i>	45 „
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Rennes</i>	24 „
de <i>Vannes</i> à <i>Nantes</i>	30 „
d' <i>Auray</i> à <i>Brest</i>	41 „
d' <i>Auray</i> à <i>Rennes</i>	28 „
d' <i>Auray</i> à <i>Nantes</i>	34 „
En général les chemins de la Bretagne, surtout depuis la Révolution, ont été négligés : mais avec quelques réparations, ils seront toujours praticables pour les troupes et l'artillerie.	

l'isthmus, trouverait-on des facilités pour débarquer des vivres près des salines ?

23. Quelle est la qualité de l'eau sur la presqu'isle ? En trouverait-on assez pour les troupes et pour la cavalerie ?

24. Y a-t-il du bois suffisant pour les fascines ? quelle quantité faudrait-il nécessairement faire venir d'ici ?

25. Quel est le nombre de villages et d'habitants dans la presqu'isle ?

26. Y a-t-il beaucoup de bétail dans la presqu'isle et dans les isles ? Quel jugement pourrait-on former sur le nombre ?

27. Pourrait-on procurer une liste des villes et des chemins qui conduisent à *Vannes* et *Auray*, jusqu'à quinze ou seize lieues de rond, en marquant l'état de ces chemins et des forces républicaines dans les villes ? Serait-il possible de procurer les mêmes renseignements pour une étendue de soixante lieues ?

On compte dans cette province mille lieues de grands chemins ou de chemins royaux, et beaucoup d'autres pour différentes communications : tous ces chemins sont généralement connus. Suivant les derniers rapports arrivés de *Bretagne*, le nombre des troupes Républicaines employées dans les places fortes, dans les isles, et dans les postes de la côte est de 30,000 hommes des deux armes ; on n'a pas l'état de l'emplacement de ces troupes.

28. Ou trouvera parmi les Royalistes tous les pilotes, et tous les guides dont on pourra avoir besoin. 28. Quels seraient les moyens de procurer les guides et les pilotes ?

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 16. Harley Street.—“Mille grâces pour la communication de la lettre de Lord Nelson. Elle est intéressante parce qu'elle est postérieure aux dates sous lesquelles le papiers Français anonçoient des soulèvements à Naples et en Sicile.

“Quand à Saladin, c'est moins à le punir qu'à le réfuter qu'il faut s'ocuper. On traduit déjà l'ouvrage en anglois, et il fera un malheur efet sur ceux qui, quoiqu'attaché au gouvernement, ne soupirent que pour la paix, parcequ'ils n'aiment pas les taxes de la guerre, et n'ont pas assez de jugement pour comprendre l'impossibilité de cette paix dans les circonstances où est la France.

“Il fera aussi efet sur ceux qui, par indolence ou ignorance, n'ont pas d'opinion à eux, et prennent pour oracle la dernière brochure qu'ils lisent, ou le dernier propos qu'ils entendent débité ; et malheureusement le public est composé au moin de trois quarts de cette espèce de gens. Il seroit donc bien util qu'une plume comme celle de Mr. Canning réfute, *ex professo*, le venin du Genèveis Jacobin.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 16. Dublin.—“The House is just up. The numbers for the amendment 96, against it 138. Grattan took his seat late in the debate, and made a wretched speech. I did not stay it out, but I am told Government had the advantage in debate as well as in number. Corry, the new Prime Sergeant, and the Attorney General spoke remarkably well. I think the union may now be looked upon as certain, though you must not expect to retain your majority to the last without paying pretty handsomely, in addition to what it has already cost. Every one I have talked

with agrees that the people in general are well inclined to the measure, and that, even in Dublin, the spirit against it is much softened. Not a syllable was said in the House of Lords. Mr. Butler, Lord Ormonde's brother, voted in the minority. David Latouche spoke strongly and well for union, but all his family voted against.

"The two lines you sent me were excellent. My only objection is that they are too good for the rest, and perhaps that poetical cast of expression . . . is not quite suited to the epigram. Watkin objects to the mention of Ierne, as the monument is to serve for those also who are to fall in the next expedition you send abroad."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 16. Dublin.—"Our debate on the address terminated at $\frac{1}{2}$ past eleven this morning with a majority of 42—138 to 96. Sir L. Parsons opened with an amendment declaring the House would maintain the constitution. Savage, Lord Downshire's member, seconded. The debate was warm and personal—well maintained on our side in excellent spirit and tone. The galleries quiet; the Speaker very correct; no clamour in the House. Lord Castlereagh, the Attorney General, Mr. Fox and the Prime Sergeant spoke very well, and carried the war into the enemy's quarters. Ponsonby was not so good as usual; Bushe very inflammatory and declamatory; Plunket sharp and bitter; and Sir J. Parnell was in earnest. Grattan, who had been elected for Wicklow at midnight, came in about 8 o'clock in the morning, feigned illness for some time, but, being allowed to speak sitting, he gave us a declamation in his old style of two hours. Corry replied to him with excellent animation and effect.

We have moved all our writs, which exceed 30.

Lord de Clifford's members seem against us. We shall have a severe struggle; all depends on the tone of the country; if we can keep that right I believe all may do well."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 19. Harley Street.—"On vient de me dire que les trois fils du dernier Duc d'Orléans sont arrivés dans ce pays. Si le fait est vrai, ne se pourroit-il pas que ce soit Syès qui les a fait revenir de l'Amérique en Europe pour qu'en cas que si la République croulle, il puisse placer cette nouvelle dinastie au préjudice de celle à qui le trône appartient de droit, et de la quelle cet infâme prêtre apostat a tout à redouter.

"Il me semble aussi que par l'affectation de ne citer que l'exemple de Guillaume trois, au lieu de la réstoration de Charles deux, Talleyrand n'a eu en vue que d'excuser d'avance ce qui est peut-être projeté en secret entre lui et Syès. Si ces trois princes sont arrivés, il n'y a pas de doute qu'ils se tiendront cachés, et passeront au plus vite sur le continent, ou ils resteront à Hambourg ou dans les états du roi de Prusse jusqu'à ce que le chemin du trône leurs

sera facilité en France. Ne croyez-vous pas qu'il seroit prudent de s'emparer de ces prétendants et de les tenir au centre du pays, loins des côtes, et sous très bonne gardes, car, dans tout événement, ce sera des bons ôtages à garder.

"J'enverrai, mardi prochain, un courier avec les nouvelles propositions, et votre réponse que vous avez eu la bonté de me promettre de me donner. Je ferai cette expédition pour me presser de détruire les faux bruits que le France propagera en Europe d'une négociation existante entre elle et ce pays."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 19. Stowe.—"I feel how unreasonable I am in pressing upon time so fully employed as yours is, but my insatiable curiosity for your intercepted correspondence must be gratified; and therefore I depend upon your giving one moment to the task of sending to me by the post of to-morrow a copy of this interesting publication.

"I am not surprised at seeing (in the papers) that the courier *de Sa Majesté très Corse* is returned; and I think it almost an equal wager whether the aforesaid Majesty will sing to you a song *très Gasconne*, or *très mince*. But it seems clear that his game is to press the peace as much as possible, whether he looks to his French or to our English politics. Lord Holland at the Whig Club seems to have spoken the text of the party, and I have very little doubt but that this same text of 'peace' is well settled with their French friends. Pray send me the copy and answer as soon as it is fitting, and let me know your day of motions either for peace or for Dutch enquiry, as I may be tempted to partake of those delights, though not of the joys of your first day.

"As to the attempt on Brest, I am satisfied that it is good, and it is very right that you should tell me that it is good for nothing; so we are both satisfied."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 20. Stowe.—"Many and most cordial congratulations to you on the Irish division, which promises all that you could wish. I hope and trust that you will not suffer this iron to cool, and that no time will be lost in pressing the union to its conclusion. I wish you to let Tom state to you my ideas respecting a tribunal for trying Irish controverted elections, which, from every day's reflection, I am convinced cannot be tried at Westminster; and which, for every reason, cannot be changed *after* the union is formed; though I can see no difficulty that ought to prevent a different arrangement of tribunal to be made by Ireland as a step previous to her union. Pray think this very well over, for the consideration haunts me as one that will be very important, and *I know* that many quiet people in Ireland feel the objection to a Westminster trial very strongly.

"I am very sorry for the primate's death, because it will make

serious difficulties in arranging his successor. I have not a wish or thought distinct from that which I ought to feel on a subject so interesting to the Church of Ireland ; but I do earnestly put it to your duty and conscience to resist archbishop Agar's succession ; and I will fairly own that I think archbishop Beresford's nomination would (though not so objectionable on the score of his moral character or conduct) be an improper choice. As to the other Irish bishops they are, I am persuaded, out of everybody's thoughts ; and of the English on the Irish bench, Jones, Lord Bristol, Hawkins, Percy, Law, and Bennet, you cannot look upon one of them. The enclosed will shew you that Euseby Cleaver is in contemplation, and I verily believe is very decidedly the most fit ; but I very much wish it were possible to find an English Bishop who would undertake it. I do not think that *our* Cleaver would ; and if so, I verily think Euseby would be the best."

Postscript.—"Remember the intercepted correspondence.

"Since writing this, I understand from another letter that the Duke of Portland's bishop O'Beirne talks confidently of succeeding. I do hope and trust that a nomination so very highly improper is impossible."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 23. Tunynghame.—"I should not have thought it necessary to write to you if I had any certainty of getting away from this even to-morrow ; but I am shut up here by a hurricane of wind and a storm of snow which is still as violent as it was in the morning, when my post boys, declaring their inability to proceed, obliged me to return from the carriage. I have desired Huskisson to send you a despatch I have received from Colonel Grant at Jamaica respecting St. Domingo. It appears to me that you ought to lose no time in speaking to the American Minister on the breach of faith so marked both on their part and that of Toussaing. If they conceive that they are to colleague together to take care of themselves exclusive of us, we have no choice but to declare the island of St. Domingo in blockade, and to prevent any supplies going to them from America. It is not from the value I attach to the commerce in the present state of the island that I entertain that idea, but the honour of the country seems to require that we should not submit to such a violation of faith."

Report on the AFFAIRS of the NETHERLANDS.

1800, January 25. Emeric.—"J'ai eu hiér une conversation assez longue avec un ancien chef d'insurgés de Brabant qui en arrivait pour y conserver, m'a-t-il dit, ses amis et ses intelligences. Il prétend qu'on y est très disposé à suivre l'exemple des Chouans de la France, et qu'ils ont fait faire des propositions à l'Angleterre, auxquelles on n'a pas encore répondu, ou du moins pas d'une manière satisfaisante. J'ai aperçu à travers tout ce que m'a dit cet homme, que les choses sont au même état que l'année dernière ; que les gens aisés s'accoutument à leur état, que tout ce qui a

quelque chose à perdre ne prendra aucun parti s'ils n'ont pas une armée qui vienne à eux. Si on excitait quelque mouvement parmi eux, ce ne serait composé que de bandits détestés des deux partis ; que les chefs seroient des gens sans avœu, sans principes, et prêts à piller amis et ennemis. Il est certain que si une armée marchait sur le Rhin et menaçait la Belgique, alors la position des Français y serait très mauvaise, et nul doute que le pays ne s'élèvat contr' eux ; mais à moins de cela, tout ce qu'on fera ou tentera sera à pure perte. S'il se trouve des personnes qui promettent d'avantage, il sera prudent de n'y pas prendre confiance.

“ On fait sur les côtes d'Hollande des préparatifs de défense, comme si on croyait être menacé d'une nouvelle expédition de la part de l'Angleterre. Semonville n'a encore rien mis au jour. On ignore quelles sont ses intentions ; il a la même figure, le même langage pour tout le monde. On se flatte qu'il n'y aura point de changement dans le gouvernement, quoique bien des personnes assurent le contraire. Les neutres ont donné un peu de mouvement au commerce ; il se fait quelques affaires à la Bourse ; avec cela la pauvreté et l'abattement sont à leur comble, et les Français peuvent trancher et décider comme ils le voudront. Les départemens sont beaucoup moins soumis en France que ne le sont les Bataves. Il faudrait de grandes secousses pour les relever de leur abattement ; ils n'ont à présent d'autre sentiment que celui de la peur. Voilà tout ce que notre horizon nous laisse apercevoir jusqu'à présent, et ce calme doit bientôt cesser. Nous attendons ce qui va sortir des écritoirs et des portefeuilles : on les dit fort occupés de tous les côtés.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 27. Harley Street.—“ Comme ce n'est pas l'envoyé d'une Cour étrangère, mais votre ami, et votre tout dévoué serviteur qui vous écris ce billet, il vous parlera à cœur ouvert et sans reserve.

“ Je suis désespéré de la manière plus que bizarre dont on traite chez nous les affaires politiques. Je suis honteux et humilié de notre diplomatie. Votre courier m'a apporté la détermination malheureuse qu'on avoit prit chez nous, et au sujet de laquelle vous devez avoir eu tous les détails par le Chevalier Whitworth, car il m'en a écrit. Aussi, un moment après, un de mes courier arivat avec une dépêche de cinq jours plus fraîche que la première, avec un apendix par lequel on m'ordonne de vous en dire le contenu. Cette dépêche est un peu moins alarmente que la première, mais néanmoins il se trouve tant d'incohérence qu'il est impossible de pouvoir la redire de bouche sans être soupçonné de l'avoir estropié en ôtent ou ajoutent quelque chose pour la défigurer exprès. Je vous l'envoi donc en traduction, et je vous envoi d'ami à ami, afin que vous n'en fassiez que l'usage le plus indispensable, et en ne comuniquant à vos confrère que ce que vous ne croirez pas être capable de refroidire la bonne intelligence entre les deux pays ; car, quoiqu'on agit mal chez nous, on est dans des bons principes,

on aime l'Angleterre ; mais on n'a pas le jugement de voir qu'on la choque sans le savoir. Comme tout ce fait avec précipitation et par l'impulsion du moment, je crois que dans peu on reviendra à d'autres mesures. J'espère aussi que l'arrivée de Popham produire un changement plus heureux. J'espère aussi que la dépêche que j'ai écrit au sujet de la lettre de l'Empereur à celui d'Allemagne, dépêche dont je vous ai montré le brouillon, fera aussi quelque effet. Je ne cesse d'écrire à Rastopchin pour lui représenter le malheur de ces résolutions précipitées et l'incohérence d'une conduite toujours passionnée et contradictoire ; et quoique, jusqu'à présent, je pers mon Latin avec lui, je ne discontinuerai pas de lui écrire sur le même sujet, et le même ton.

“ Pour ne pas vous faire attendre, je vous envoie la traduction en brouillon pour ne pas perdre du tems à la copier. Vous ne sauriez assez vous représenter combien je suis affligé et honteux de la conduite de ma cour. Brûlez ce billet je vous supplie.”

Enclosure :—

PAUL I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

Secret.

1799, December 2. Gatchina.—“ Par les copies ci-jointes de mes rescripts au généralissime, et au général de cavalerie le Comte de Viomenil, vous verrez le changement survenu dans mes intentions à me détacher de la coalition, en faisant rentrer toutes mes troupes dans les limites de l'empire de Russie. Je les laisse encore à présent en Allemagne jusqu'au printemps, afin de voir pendant cette intervalle quelle tournure prendront les affaires en Europe, de sauver l'Allemagne, et de recommencer la guerre à condition qu'il me sera donnée une parfaite satisfaction par l'Empereur des Romains, dont la principale sera l'éloignement du Baron de Thugut, et le rétablissement du *statu quo ante bellum* en Italie au commencement de l'année 1798. Quant aux troupes qui hivernent en Angleterre, je les y laisse de même jusqu'au printemps, dans l'intention qu'elles puissent être ensuite employées ensemble avec l'escadre du Vice-Amiral Macaroff dans une tentative sur les côtes de France, en fixant leurs opérations dans la distance de Bordeaux jusqu'aux Sables d'Olonne. Je demande à l'Angleterre de surveiller la flotte Française, et de co-opérer dans cette entreprise, comme on vous a déjà fait l'offre, sans soumettre toutes fois mes troupes à leurs chefs, et exigeant, nommément, qu'on n'emploie pas à cette expédition comme commandant le Duc d'York. J'écris sur tout cela au préalable, mais vous communiquerai tout ceci au Ministère Anglois, en l'assurant que je n'accéderai autrement à la coalition qu'après le changement total du ministère Autrichien, et de la conduite de la Cour de Vienne ; mais lorsque je commencerai à agir, ce sera indépendamment des autres. C'est pourquoi vous devez prendre des informations, quels subsides l'Angleterre pourra donner et pour combien de milliers d'hommes ?

“ Par la copie du rescript à l'Amiral Ouchakoff vous verrez quelle destination aura son escadre. De tout ce qui vous est écrit ci-dessus, il en a été fait communication ici au Chevalier Whitworth

par le Conseiller Privé actuel Comte Rastoptchin ; et le Conseiller Privé Comte Panin en a fait part à St. Petersburg à l'Ambassadeur de Suède et aux Ministres de Naples, de Dannemarc, et de Portugal.

“Après avoir terminé sur ce sujet vos entretiens avec le ministère Anglois, vous me communiquerez leurs idées et leurs intentions là-dessus. Ce que je fais à cet égard, je le suppose comme le seul et le dernier moyen de sauver l'Europe, de détruire le Gouvernement François, et d'empêcher la maison d'Autriche de doubler sa puissance par les acquisitions injustes.” *Translated into French.*

COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 27. Morres's Hotel, Lower Brook Street.—“J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer cy-joint un extrait de la lettre que j'ai reçue de M. Charles Bentinck, dans l'incertitude si par l'irregularité des postes, vous avez eu quelques nouvelles de la Hollande ; étant charmé de voir par là les confirmations des bonnes intentions des habitants qui m'ont été affirmées par d'autres canaux, les Patriotes mêmes désirant plus que jamais de pouvoir réunir leurs efforts pour se délivrer des François.

“J'ose me flatter que vous êtes persuadé que ce n'est uniquement par discretion que je ne me suis pas présenté depuis longtemps à votre porte pour avoir l'honneur de vous voir, sachant les affaires nombreuses qui vous occupent ; je serois cependant charmé d'avoir l'honneur de vous voir un moment, à la fin de cette semaine ; et je passerai à votre porte pour m'informer quand cela pourra vous convenir.”

Enclosure :—

COUNT CHARLES BENTINCK to COUNT BENTINCK-RHOON.

1799, December 3. Varel.—“Je me flatte que les événements ne refroidiront pas le bonne volonté de nos amis en Angleterre vis-à-vis des personnes avec qui j'entretiens une correspondance, si suivie depuis tant d'années. *Elles sont toujours à leur poste, et nous sommes prêt d'un moment à l'autre de remplir nos engagements vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre,* pourvu que l'on s'en tienne aux donnés, sur lesquels nos assurances de co-opération sont fondés, et dont nous ne pouvons absolument pas nous départir. Jusqu'à présent, ce n'est que l'arrivée d'un corps de troupes étrangères, *envoyées par l'Angleterre,* qui peut réunir tous les partis contre les François, dans les provinces de ce côté de l'Yssel.

“Nous avons les assurances les plus positives de la constance et de la bonne volonté de l'intérieur, qui, autant que nous pouvons en juger par nos relations, n'ont pas souffert du contretemps que nous avons essuyés.

“Et vos amis à Leer, ainsi que dans tous les endroits où il s'étoit formé des rassemblements, *ne se sont séparés qu'après avoir donnés, et reçus, toutes les assurances qui peuvent faire espérer de recommencer, avec fruit,* à la première occasion favorable.

“En attendant, l'on est fort curieux et fort impatient de voir

l'effet que la nouvelle révolution de Paris produira sur les opérations militaires.

"On dit que la grande partie des troupes Françaises qui doivent quitter la Hollande ont reçu contre-ordre.

"On s'attendoit aussi à une révolution à la Haye. Daendels doit y jouer le rôle de Bonaparte ; *Ermerins* et *Verbeck* sont les consuls désignés. Je ne vous garantis pas cette nouvelle, quoiqu'il y aye plus de 3 semaines qu'on nous l'écrive de tous côtés.

"Jusqu'à présent le changement qui a eu lieu à Paris, et l'avènement de Bonaparte ne paroissent pas avoir produit tous l'effets que bien des personnes en attendoient sur les armées Françaises. Leurs efforts sont bien foibles, du moins en Italie, et en Allemagne. Ils ont de nouveau été battus en Italie par le Général de Melas, et une partie de l'armée Autrichienne *est, dit-on, entrée dans le Dauphiné.*

"En Allemagne les paysans armés, réunis aux troupes de l'Empire, ont de nouveau eu des avantages—qui ont fait lever le blocus de Philipsbourg pour la quatrième fois. Je crois que vous connaissez le Rhyngrave de Salm, qui se distingue si fort dans la défense de cette place." *Extract.*

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, January 27. Fort William.—"I received your very affectionate letter of the 27th September on the 13th instant with most cordial satisfaction. The reception which you have all given to the news of the fall of Seringapatam and of Tippoo surpassed even my expectations ; I thought it reasonable to expect that you would have waited for the settlement of our conquests. Before this period I trust in God you have seen Henry, and that my treaties have not disappointed you. It would be vain to attempt to describe my sentiments under the idea of your being the person to move the thanks of Parliament to me for the greatest event ever accomplished in this quarter of the globe. I can truly assure you that one leading consideration in my mind was the pleasure which I know your heart must have experienced on such an occasion. Nothing can exceed the happy consequences resulting in this country from our late war and peace ; I meet and feel them in every branch of our affairs ; in our internal tranquility, in our foreign relations, in our revenue, commerce, public and private credit, and, above all, in the general tone and spirit of the whole Government. The whole of this vast machine now bounds to the slightest touch of the main spring. I cannot express my gratitude for Lord Buckingham's kindness ; what a fortunate circumstance for me that he should have moved the address !

"I anticipate glorious news from Holland, and am anxious on every account for the arrival of the packet under dispatch when the overland express left London. I continue very well, and the better because I am very busy.

"I hope you will like my plants and seeds ; I know Lady Grenville will be perfectly happy with her birds, if they should arrive safe. Pray be civil to Major Davis."

1 *Enclosure* :—

The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRIS.

1800, January 7. Fort William.—“Any mark of the respect of that gallant army which achieved the conquest of Mysore, must ever be esteemed by me, as a distinguished honor.

“The Resolution now communicated to me by your Excellency, having been adopted by the army in the hour of victory, and on the field of conquest, affords a most satisfactory testimony of their intention to associate my name with the memory of their unexampled triumph.

“Under this impression, the sentiments of public zeal and the just sense of honorable ambition concur to render me sincerely desirous of accepting the gift of the army, and of wearing it, as an emblem of their glory, and of their good will towards me.

“I am satisfied that it never was in the contemplation of the Legislature of Great Britain to prohibit the acceptance of such honorary marks of distinction. But an attentive examination of the laws relating to the government of the British possessions in India will convince your Excellency that I could not accept the gift, which you present to me in the name of the army, without violating the letter of existing statutes, and without creating a precedent which might hereafter become the source of injury to the public service.

“I must therefore request your Excellency, in assuring the army of my high estimation of the honor which they design to confer upon me, to signify that my acceptance of it is precluded by the positive letter of the law.

“I return your Excellency my thanks for the obliging expressions of your letter; it is the unfeigned wish of my heart that your Excellency may long enjoy the grateful recollection of your eminent public services; and that you and the unrivalled army employed in the late glorious war, may receive from your King and country every public demonstration of the same sentiments of admiration, gratitude, and affectionate respect which your conduct has excited throughout the British empire in India.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, January] Sunday morning, 7 o'clock.—“I send you Mr. Grant's observations, which were put into my hands just as I stepped into my chaise. I have looked them over; they contain all that caution suggests; at the same time I am free to confess that the only serious apprehensions I entertain from the quarter of America is what is contained in the three first pages of the paper. But that cannot be prevented by treaty, and must depend on the *economical* conduct of the commerce of the East India Company, and a ready facility given to bring home the fortunes of India directly to Great Britain. But even this mode of preventing the Americans from having a trading capital will not be effectual to retard their commercial progress unless some means can be fallen upon to discourage British merchants affording their aid of capital

either as creditors to or co-partners with the Americans in the Indian trade. All this however is perhaps foreign from the present business of the treaty, and belongs to internal arrangement."

COUNT RASTOPCHIN to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, February 1. St. Petersburg.—"Voici un courrier avec une nouvelle inattendue. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire ce qui a attiré ce mécontentement de l'Empereur à Monsieur Whitworth. Vous le devinerez sans que je vous le dise, mais pour conserver la bonne harmonie si nécessaire entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, il faudrait un homme qui fût plus sur ses gardes, et ne se permit pas de suivre des impulsions de colère, provoquées par des personnalités. Le Chevalier Whitworth en servant sa Cour, exécutait naturellement ses ordres, en désirant que la guerre fut continuée contre la France; mais il s'est trop oublié vis-à-vis l'Empereur, et ce n'est pas en donnant des idées aussi bizarres sur le compte d'un souverain que l'on peut le faire servir de pivot dans les crises journalières du moment.

"Je vous écrirai peu. Je suis malade d'esprit bien plus que de corps. La Cour de Berlin saisit avec empressement tous les moyens qui peuvent opérer un rapprochement avec l'Empereur. Ils ont nommé Lusy ministre à notre Cour, et Monsieur Krüdener est accrédité à celle de Berlin. Mais ce désir ne peut être bon que pour nuire à la maison d'Autriche, qui, petit à petit, s'isole d'elle-même, et sera un jour victime des grands projets de son petit Ministre.

"Haugwitz avait glissé à Krüdener que Bonaparte désirait s'entendre avec l'Empereur, et que lui, Haugwitz, aurait été charmé d'un rapprochement quelconque. Mais l'Empereur a défendu à Krüdener de traiter cet objet, et de ne se permettre aucune liaison avec le ministre Français ni ses agents. Le Roi de Suède ayant témoigné à notre maître quelque inquiétude sur l'issue de la Diète qu'il est obligé de convoquer à Narköpping, l'Empereur lui a offert, si le cas pouvait l'exiger, les troupes qui se trouvent à Jersey et Guernsey, et on lui a envoyé des ordres pour vous, pour le Comte Viomenil et Monsieur Macaroff; mais je ne crois pas que les choses viennent à cette extrémité, et il faut que le Roi de Suède se voie déjà abandonné et obligé de fuir de son royaume pour appeler à son secours des troupes étrangères. Thugut compte trop sur Bonaparte pour se désister de ses profits, et à peine le seul royaume de Naples peut-il rester intacte, car il paraît que la Maison d'Autriche veut s'emparer de toute l'Italie, en créant un phantôme de Pape, et en dépouillant le Roi de Sardaigne.

"Dumouriez est ici à ne rien faire, car ses projets de descente en France ne peuvent avoir lieu, vû la résolution décidée de l'Empereur à reprendre toutes ses troupes: ainsi prenez ceci pour règle dans ce qui pourra arriver dans l'intervalle. Je soupire après une vie tranquille, sans quoi je créverais. C'est dans un village que je puis être utile à ma famille et peut-être à l'état, en soignant l'agriculture et mes hôpitaux.

"Hier est arrivé un courrier avec la nouvelle du départ de Prague

de l'armée avec le généralissime. Elle va revenir en Russie. Son entrevue avec Bellegarde était une formalité, et on n'a rien arrêté.

"Thugut désire que nos troupes quittent la Bohême, et il ne les aurait employées que séparément pour se défaire du Prince Italisky. Le pauvre Koch est mort hier d'une fièvre bilieuse, nerveuse.

"Je vous renvoie ci-joint une lettre que vous m'avez communiquée."

Postscript.—"Les ordres dont je vous ai parlé ont été envoyés au Roi de Suède pour en faire usage s'il le jugeait nécessaire. Ainsi, le cas échéant, c'est déjà Sa Majesté Suedoise qui vous communiquera les ordres de l'Empereur en vous instruisant de la marche à suivre, et en vous indiquant le lieu qu'il destinera pour le débarquement de ces troupes, ce qui regardera Messieurs Macaroff et Vioménil." *Copy.*

ROYALIST INSURRECTION IN FRANCE.

Verbal communication from Count D'Autichamp.

1800, February 1. [Downing Street].—"Left his brother 31st December 1799; went on board Captain Keats's ship 5th January 1800; quitted France 21st January, arrived at Falmouth 28th January, arrived in London 31st January.

"Monsieur de Suzannet the elder left D'Autichamp 11th January. Sailed the same day for La Baï's D'Aiguillon, which is a point not tenable till the end of April.

"Monsieur de Suzannet the son was to meet his father with 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry. The Royalist chiefs, so far from intending to make peace, had given their words of honour to commence hostilities on the 18th January if any of them were attacked; if not, they were to wait till the 21st January. There is reason to think that hostilities recommenced on that day.

"The peace, if any, that has been made, can only be with the Abbé Bernier, who with Monsieur Forrestier and one or two others, *particularly Monsieur de la Garde*, have for a long time been separated from the other Royalist chiefs. Bernier did not send delegates to Pouançé.

"The delegates at Pouançé were
 D'Autichamp.
 Frotté.
 Chatillon.
 Bourmont.
 Georges.
 Prévalaye.
 Le Leroux.

"Georges had 24,000 armed men. The regicide forces against them did not exceed 6,000 men. The whole of the regicide force from Havre to Sables d'Olonne is about 30,000 men.

"The Royalists had obtained or intercepted Bonaparte's correspondence with Hedouville, in which he says, 'I send you Brune who is himself an army. I have not a man to dispose of I want 200,000, on the frontiers.'

“Travelled from Angers to Quiberon openly.

“The principal towns the Royalists occupy are—

Le Graïs	..	2,500	Inhabitants
Machecoul	..	5,000	„
Candé	..	2,500	„

“Georges and Bourmont would be the first attacked, as the first communicates with the sea, and the second intercepts the communication with Paris. Hedouville had made no difficulty to promise that the Royalists should be allowed to keep their arms. The 11th January, the conference at which an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte’s attended was broken off.

“A great desertion in the Republican forces.

“Royalist troops which can be marched into other parts of France.

Infantry	18,000	}	D’Autichamp.
Cavalry	600		
Infantry	7,000	}	Chatillon.
Cavalry	195		
Infantry	10,000	}	Bourmont.
Cavalry	400		
24,000			Georges.
3,000			Prévalaye.
3,000			Frotté.
1,800			Mercier.

Infantry	66,800.
Cavalry	1,195.

“Howitzers the most useful kind of ordnance.”

CHARLES PHILIPPE COUNT D’ARTOIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 2. 55 Welbeck Street.—“Le Comte d’Artois accepte avec plaisir la proposition de Lord Grenville pour mercredi 5 du courant ; il se rendra à Cleveland Row ce jour-là sur la heure après midi.

“Le Comte d’Artois remercie Lord Grenville des pièces qu’il lui a envoyés avant hier-au-soir, et il le prie de recevoir l’assurance de tous ses sentiments de haute estime et de considération.”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, February 4. Vienna.—“I have omitted in my despatch to mention the arrival of Mr. Wickham on the 29th January. We have seen Baron Thugut twice together, and every thing that Mr. Wickham had to treat with him seems likely to be settled pleasantly. Mr. Wickham has definitely settled the treaty with Bavaria for 12,000 men, who will be ready at a very short notice indeed. The treaty is not signed, but all points are agreed. Mr. Wickham will himself write on this and other subjects by Hunter in a few days. Wiffin and two of my servants arrived on the 31st January ; Hunter arrived by the way of Augsburg yesterday. The story of Rheinart’s mission to Swisserland is hitherto without foundation. Something, however, has certainly passed between Paris and Vienna

on the subject of peace, which I am sorry to say Baron Thugut does not as yet choose to communicate. He declares, however, that no negotiation exists at present, and that the Emperor will listen to none until the answers expected on several points from England arrive. Much will turn on those answers ; and although I expect them with impatience, I confess I shall not open them without some anxiety."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 5. Duke Street.—"Enclosed you will find the two *mémoires* I mentioned to you yesterday morning, and the decyphered letter of which you wished to have a copy.

"You are certainly informed that Baron Stackelberg, whom the Emperor of Russia had sent some months ago to the Prince of Orange, has been recalled by that monarch. He took leave of His Serene Highness a few days ago."

Enclosure :—

M. MOLLERUS to H. FAGEL.

1799, December 4. Hague.—"Je vous ai écrit dans ma dernière de Lingen les motifs qui m'ont déterminé à me mettre en route pour retourner chez moi. J'y suis arrivé sans rencontrer la moindre difficulté en route, et, au moins pour à présent, je ne crois pas avoir à craindre des poursuites ou désagréments. Je ne sais pourtant ce qui pourra arriver au cas que l'autorité qui doit me protéger (et c'est principalement celle de Van der Goes) aye moins de force, et c'est ce qui doit me rendre ma conduite très circonspecte, surtout par rapport à la correspondance. J'ai tardé quelques jours après mon arrivée à vous écrire, non seulement parceque j'ai cru avoir alors une occasion sûre pour l'envoi de celle-ci hors de la république, mais aussi parcequ'il a fallu avoir plus d'une conversation avec Van der Goes, et prendre quelques renseignemens avant de pouvoir vous marquer dans quel état j'ai trouvé les choses.

"Le résultat est, qu'après tout ce qui s'est passé, les esprits (représentatifs) ne sont pas moins aigris contre la France, et qu'on a encore la même et peut-être plus de désir d'être délivré de ce joug ; que lui, Van der Goes, et plusieurs membres, aussi bien de ceux qui appartiennent au pouvoir exécutif que de ceux des deux chambres, sont persuadés que l'ordre actuel des choses ne peut subsister, qui même voudroient bien concourir aux moyens de le faire cesser, mais, qu'au moins pour le moment, les individus ne sont pas en nombre suffisant ni assez d'accord pour (raisonner), on peut les envisager comme parti avec lequel on pourra entrer en négociation. C'est surtout leur situation vis-à-vis, et leur entière dépendance de la France, qui fait qu'ils n'osent se prononcer, ou hazarder la moindre démarche qui, connue, pourroit déplaire au gouvernement François. Au reste, après tout ce qu'on m'a dit, je puis vous informer que je ne me suis pas trompé dans l'opinion que, supposé même les meilleurs dispositions, on croit se trouver, dans l'état actuel des choses, dans l'impossibilité de concourir à

des mesures qui auroient pour but de chasser les troupes Françaises de la République. On a dit ceci très-décisivement : vous savez que je l'ai prévu, et je puis encore moins en disconvenir après l'état dans lequel j'ai trouvé les choses ici.

"On m'assure même que pour le Gouvernement actuel, et même pour ceux qui seroient plus disposés à co-opérer à des arrangemens ou changemens, il seroit non seulement très-dangereux mais d'une impossibilité absolue d'entamer à present quelques négociations avec le gouvernement Anglois, quoique concertées de la manière la plus secrète : qu'eux ne peuvent que s'adresser à la Cour de Berlin, que, quant à eux, tout doit se faire par l'entremise de la cour de Berlin, qui pourra se concerter avec ceux-ci, et de telle manière qu'elle jugera à-propos.

"Quant à la mission de Vos Van Steenwyk à Berlin, je suis fondé à presumer que, pour autant qu'il est entré en matière en s'expliquant sur les points qui pouvoient faire les bases d'un arrangement, cela est venu de lui, sur la demande de développer ses idées : qu'ici on n'avoue pas cette note ni le mémoire y joint ; qu'au contraire l'intention de sa mission n'a été que de faire des instances auprès de la cour de Berlin pour qu'elle voulut se interesser à la situation de la république, et concourir aux moyens qui pourroient la préserver de sa ruine totale ; qu'ils sont encore dans les mêmes sentimens que les propositions ou moyens d'arrangement ne doivent pas venir de leur part, mais que la Cour de Berlin doit leur proposer ces moyens ou conditions, sous lesquelles elle voudroit se mêler des affaires de la république. Vous voyez par tout ceci que le cas supposé dans la note de Lord Grenville n'existe pas, et qu'ainsi il n'a pas été question, au moins jusqu'ici, d'en faire le moindre usage. C'est (disent-ils toujours) la Cour de Berlin qui, quant à eux, doit arranger l'affaire, et c'est par ce canal que les négociations (quant à eux) doivent être entamées ; qu'en cas que l'on voulut seconder cela de notre côté, peut-être il pourroit en resulter quelque chose de bon.

"Voilà tout ce que j'ai à vous écrire pour le présent. Je tacherai de ne pas rompre entièrement ces liaisons, et quand je saurai quelque chose de plus, je vous en ferai part. Je soupçonne qu'il y a des circonstances qui font que pour le moment ils sont plus réservés. J'ignore pourtant quelles sont ces circonstances. Je ne puis supposer qu'ils ont lieu de craindre d'être culbutés par les révolutionnaires.

"Je répète que je ne puis être assez prudent, et vous concevez cela aisement." *Copy.*

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 6. Dublin Castle.—"Lord Castlereagh opened his budget to-day with an excellent and impressive statement of two hours and three quarters. He was not quite well, but he excited himself. His plan was received with satisfaction by our friends, and I think it had real effect on the moderate.

"We had a good and favourable debate, and our friends were hearty, and we had really the best of the debate considerably.

"I am sorry, however, to say that the activity, the intimidation, the subscription purse of the enemy has been employed with effect.

"Bagwell and his two sons went off; Martin, Sir R. Butler, and Sir Thomas Fetherstone, all country members, left us. Whaley and Sir R. St. George were decoyed from us; and they had several recruits, so that, on a division, they had 115 to 158. The question was to take the message into consideration in a Committee of the whole House, on Wednesday next.

"We are a little alarmed at this increase of Opposition, and the means used to increase it of money and terror. And, certainly, all our friends are not hearty, though we have many firm and resolute.

"There was a little tendency to mobbing, but nothing of real consequence.

"We did not break up till past 12 to-day."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1800, February 6. Dublin.—"The House of Commons divided about noon, 158 to 115. The majority falls very far short of the sanguine expectations which had been formed. But I still think it is sufficient to ensure success, provided the public is early impressed with a conviction of the determination of Government in England to persist. Three gentlemen (Bagwells of Tipperary) who voted against the amendment the first day of the session, and who had pledged themselves unequivocally, deserted; and two more who were not present before, but who were considered as decidedly for Government, voted in the minority. On the other hand, I know of four staunch and honourable friends to the cause, who have not yet taken their seats, namely, the member for the County Kerry, one for Tuam, one for Maryborough, and one for Donegal. There is another brought in by Lord Landaff to support Government, but some doubts, I hear, are entertained about him. Of the seventeen that remain, many are known to stand out upon terms. I have, therefore, no doubt but that they will be secured, and I am told, and believe, that there are very few indeed of the majority who may not be relied upon in future. I cannot but express my earnest hopes that you will not relinquish the attempt. I honestly believe the measure may be carried through, and am confident that the country will acquiesce, the moment it is no longer doubtful that it will pass. But, if it should be given up, the consequences would probably be most fatal. The present system is shaken to its foundations, and will never again possess the confidence or respect of the people, or the crown. The Government will have exhausted, in this great effort, all the means of influence, and cannot rely upon a continuance of support from those who have been bought for the present occasion; nor would a dissolution procure any additional support. There is one point which I am sorry Lord Castlereagh touched upon, as he was not prepared to state any outline of a plan that would be palatable, or even practicable. I am speaking of the mode of trying controverted elections. He talked of committees being ballotted in the usual way, to consist wholly of Irish members,

and to sit in Ireland. It would be very dangerous to have even a committee of the House sitting in Ireland, though empowered only to try one question; and to make a distinction of English and Irish members would be still more impolitic. Besides that, four petitions would be sufficient to employ nearly the whole of the Irish representation, and abstract them wholly from public business. Lord Buckingham is justly solicitous upon this point. At his desire I have thought a little upon it, and have a plan which I will write out and send you to-morrow, which, though I am not quite satisfied with it, I think not so objectionable as what was stated by Lord Castlereagh. It is a subject of great importance to which, I hope, you will apply in good earnest, and settle it for us, for it will never be done here."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, February 8. Cleveland Row.—"My dispatch, though its contents are little more than heads of the plan to be pursued, will however, I think, enable you to keep Thugut steady to his warlike system till the full powers and the more particular instructions arrive. I hope I have not neglected any thing very material, but twelve mails coming at once overwhelm all one's ideas both with the multiplicity of the points to be attended to, and with the vexation of seeing how much time has been lost by these unfortunate frosts, and how many advantages are irrecoverably gone by.

"I am assured, but it is through the medium of Sardinian and Prussian ministers, that Bonaparte has actually offered to Vienna, through the channel of the Spanish mission there, to give up to Austria all Italy except Genoa and to make an equal division of Switzerland. If it be true, I should much fear that the bait will be found too tempting to be refused, and that all our negotiations will end only in our enabling Austria to make a better separate peace than she otherwise could. If we do no more than this, it is so far good, but we must not despair of doing better. The delay of this ratification has however an ugly aspect.

"Our latest accounts from the Royalists seem to leave little room to doubt that they must be forced to a pacification. If they can contrive to keep their arms either by express stipulation, or by contrivance and concealment, all may do well.

"If that cannot be, we must not hope much assistance from them in the course of the campaign, but we shall still, I trust, be able to strike some important stroke with our own force. It was contrary to our wishes and representations that they originally rose at this time. We wished to have kept them back to the spring.

"Pray let Lord Elgin occasionally know how things are going on in this world, for, by his dispatch which I have received to-day, all his ideas are two or three years behindhand." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

Private.

1800, February 8. Downing Street.—"With the strange uncer-

tainty of our communications with the Continent, it is possible that this may reach you before the messenger who will leave this place the beginning of next week. He will be the bearer to you of full powers to execute the ideas contained in your No. 52 and 53. We have also entirely adopted the opinions of the enclosure B. in 54; and think ourselves fortunate in the circumstances which render that line the most practicable which we are convinced is also the most eligible. You shall have the person as assistant whom you mentioned to me last year, the younger of the two brothers who were abroad.

"You neither do yourself or me justice when you conclude your despatches with apologies for doing us the most essential service we can receive, giving us your opinions fully and in detail on all the interesting objects which are in question. The value of your suggestions has been inestimable to me, and whatever be the result, I shall never forget the obligations I owe to you for them." *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 8. Dublin.—"I enclose my plan for the trial of controverted elections, which may be liable to many objections which I do not discern, but which, in my present view of it, might, I think, be adopted with good effect, even in England.

"Since I wrote last, the House of Lords met to receive the Lord Lieutenant's message. The Chancellor came down at four, and the moment prayers were over, not ten Lords being present, without a word of comment or observation, put the question that it should be taken into consideration on Monday; and none of the Opposition being there, it passed of course, and the House adjourned. I was very sorry for this, for by it an opportunity was lost of publicly declaring the resolution of Government to persevere, and their confidence in the numbers which divided for them in the House of Commons. Such declaration, I assure you, is necessary; for the high language of Opposition has impressed many, even of our best friends, with an idea that the Ministry are terrified. I am sure there is not, as yet, any reason to doubt of success. I looked over the list of the House of Commons with a person who is well informed, and we could make out but eight on the side of Government, about whose steadiness we entertained any doubt. We know that they are all standing out for terms, and therefore we think we may reckon upon retaining four, at least, of them; of the twenty-two members unaccounted for, eight are elected but not returned as friends to the measure. Upon one only of these we have some doubt, four we are morally certain will be absent, two are friends of Lord Downshire, not returned; so that there remain only eight, the greater part, if not all, of whom we think it probable will be with us. But if we divide them equally, there will still remain a majority of 40."

Enclosed :—

A new plan of trying cases of disputed election to the House of Commons of the United Kingdom.

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most private.

1800, February 10. Dublin Castle.—“A debate on the first British resolution, which contains the principle, is going on in the House of Lords. The Chancellor spoke for four hours historically and argumentatively, and, in great part, very forcibly, and with great effect.

“I thought he was rather too anti-Catholic. He said the Catholic question could only be debated without danger and with impartiality in an Imperial Parliament; but he stated, as his confirmed opinion, that a Popish ecclesiastic could not be an attached subject, from conviction, to a Protestant monarchy. He abused the consular Government, and their stock purse, and bribery, with great effect; and appealed to the consuls.

“Lord Charlemont got up, and merely said he had never offered a bribe.

“The Chancellor said the noble Lord had mistaken him; he had not asked whether his Lordship had given a bribe with his own hands, but whether his Lordship did not know of a consular exchequer, and whether he did not know the uses to which it was applied.

“Lord Charlemont said nothing. Lord Downshire, the first consul, followed. He was much agitated; he disavowed fully the stock purse, and all knowledge of it, and complained of being nicknamed. He then complained of the harsh manner in which he had been treated; but said he was happy to think his conduct was now coming into a course of trial. He talked much of loyalty, his attachment to his sovereign, and Mr. Pitt’s government. He made an attack on Lord Castlereagh, and read a string of instructions which Lord Castlereagh, when he first came into Parliament, said he would obey.

“On the subject of Union, Lord Downshire said he had been a friend to it before 1782. If it had been proposed at the time of the Regency, he would have supported it; if, hereafter, in a time of peace, when it could be coolly investigated, it should be proposed, he would give it his best assistance. But he thought the present time bad; that it was taking an improper advantage of Ireland when she was weak. He disclaimed faction and any idea of going beyond constitutional opposition.

“I think the numbers in the House may be 55 to 28, and proxies will make them 95 to 33. The numbers might have been greater, but there has not been so great an exertion as there would have been had there been less security.

“Opposition stick at nothing to bring down our majority; intimidation, direct bribery, promises of seats in future Parliament, and of places and employments; for they think themselves certain of driving away Lord Cornwallis.

“If we can maintain our majority (and the point is precarious) I fear not the country. It will remain quiet. The City will grow turbulent. We hope to increase our numbers by eight in the next division, which will be on Wednesday; but I have my fears.

“I see so much unsteadiness, so much rascality, that I cease to

be sanguine. The Speaker continues very hostile ; but pretends to be only personally hostile to the present administration. I think Lord Downshire's conduct has been pique. Parnell's has been timidity ; he is, I know, disgusted with opposition ; but so pledged he dare not retract."

ADMIRAL LORD KEITH to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, February 10. Palermo.—"I have the honour of sending you some heads of a letter which was read to me in confidence. It was believed to be genuine, and from high authority. It was impossible to obtain a copy by reason of the means used to procure a sight of it. The person who read the letter to me is well apprized that you are in possession of some parts of it, but was so extremely anxious that the subject should be impressed on your mind, that I was desired to repeat certain parts of it.

"It began by a general review of the state of Europe, and the interests (as the writer supposed) of the various states therein. It seemed to glance at a separate negotiation with France, either pending, or intended to be entered into. He mentioned Prussia in a doubtful state, and betrayed the strongest jealousy of Russia ; hoping however to divert that nation, by sacrificing part of the dominions of the Turks. Switzerland was spoken of as being essential to the interest of the Empire ; but if not possessed by the Empire, to be restored to its antient constitution, rather than to be allowed to remain in the hands of France. On the subject of Italy, it ran nearly thus.—' Your Majesty is in possession of Turin, Alexandria, Tortona, all of them strongholds, and it will be difficult to drive your forces from them. The King of Sardinia is too feeble to protect his own dominions against France, and he must not return there, whatever equivalent may be assigned to him elsewhere. The dominions of Genoa, when reduced, it may be difficult to dispose of ; but there must be no Genoese. The Duke of Modena has not behaved well in some cases. He must take the fate that is determined for him. The Grand Duke of Tuscany is here, and here he must remain ; but he is contented to do so. His towns are garrisoned by Austrian troops, which is a sufficient security against the discontents of the inhabitants. There must be a Pope, and he must be in possession of Rome, but by no means to possess Civita Vecchia, or any of the sea ports, and to pay 8,000 Austrian infantry and 2,000 cavalry to be employed on his frontiers. The only obstacle that presents itself to those regards seems to be the kingdom of Naples that has shaken off all its natural connections, and blindly thrown itself into the arms of England. The negotiation with that country must be gently managed, and its consent obtained if possible ; but at any rate, one stronghold must be acquired on the Apennines ; and one of its sea ports on the Adriatic, and one upon the Mediterranean, must be garrisoned by Austrian troops. Naples is too feeble to protect Rome, whatever the queen or general Acton may think, and it is from them that your Majesty will meet with the greatest opposition. The little state of Ragusa must either become Turk or Austrian, therefore it will serve to satisfy

some of the Powers who may think they have cause to complain. The English have no right to interfere in this arrangement; and if they do, they cannot prevent it.'

"This paper is supposed to have been a general advice from Monsieur T[hugut] to his master, the Emperor, and is dated the 13th December, 1799." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 11. Harley Street.—"Je suis surpris et fâché d'apprendre la confirmation du séjour de Dumourier à Petersbourg. Je m'empresse à présent d'écrire à l'Empereur pour le supplier de ne donner aucune croyance à cet aventurier.

"J'espère de pouvoir sortir dans deux jours, et je vous prie de me donner un quart d'heure après demain, jeudi.

"Si vous êtes dans le cas d'envoyer un courier à Petersbourg un de ces jours, je vous supplie de m'en avertir deux jours d'avance."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, February 11. Cleveland Row.—"I cannot so well put it into official language, but you will, I hope, understand the real meaning of my dispatch of this date to be this. We can appropriate a million to procure reinforcements for the Austrian army. You are on the spot, and best understand how to apply this in the most beneficial manner; to make the money go as far, and to derive as much benefit from it as possible. Do so according to the best of your judgment, and be persuaded that what you shall think best, and shall do accordingly, will be approved and adopted here. We are delighted at the signature of the Bavarian treaty, and, if one could feel quite secure that Austria would not bite at a hook baited with Italy, I should really think our success ensured, as far as human calculations can ensure it.

"The Landgrave of Hesse will, of course, not act till he sees Mayence either blocked or taken. But if that were done, and his dispositions continue the same as they were a few months ago, you may easily conclude with him in the manner I have mentioned; and the idea of his lending us the money was suggested by himself.

"I was sorry to hear you had been so ill; every thing now hangs on your activity and exertions; but do not overwork yourself, for, if you are forced to stop, the whole machine must stand still."
Copy.

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 11. Dublin.—"Our packet not sailing last night, I have the pleasure to say that the general principle was carried in the Lords this morning, by a majority of 49."

LOUIS PHILIPPE DE BOURBON, DUC D'ORLÉANS to MONSIEUR, (COMTE D'ARTOIS.)

1800, February 13. London.—"Mon premier soin en arrivant

dans le lieu où vous résidez, est d'avoir l'honneur de vous en faire part. Oserais-je, en m'acquittant de ce devoir, prier Monsieur de vouloir bien fixer le moment où il daignera permettre que j'aie lui présenter l'hommage de mon respect et celui de mes frères, ainsi que l'expression du profond regret qu'ils éprouvent de ne le pouvoir pas faire en personne. Ils sont retenus à Clifton par une incommodité assez grave survenue au Comte de Beaujolois, le qui a retardé de plusieurs jours mon arrivée ici, et a obligé le Duc de Montpensier à rester auprès de lui pour le soigner. J'ai lieu de croire, d'après le mieux marque qu'il éprouvait lorsque je l'ai quitté, que son rétablissement est prochain, et qu'il pourra incessamment se remettre en chemin. Je me joins à mes frères pour prier Monsieur de vouloir bien être convaincu de leur respectueux empressement à lui faire leur cour." *Copy.*

LOUIS PHILIPPE DE BOURBON, DUC D'ORLÉANS, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 13. 6 Sackville Street.—“ Je me proposais de passer chez vous, et je regrette infiniment de vous donner la peine que vous voulez bien prendre ; je resterai chez moi toute la matinée, et ne recevrai personne jusqu'à ce que j'aie eu l'honneur de vous voir.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, February 13. Cleveland Row.—“ It is no small satisfaction to me to reflect that I shall have no more to write, nor you to read, on the subject of the eternal dispute about the ratification. We are now to begin a new score with our Austrian friends and we must hope the best.

“ I am seriously alarmed at what is going on between Petersburg and Berlin. They are venting themselves to each other in mutual complaints against the ambition of Austria, and a very little more of Thugut's peevishness and obstinacy would be capable of turning Suwarrow's army against the Austrian dominions, either in menace, or even in actual hostility. You know how they would catch at any chance of this at Berlin, and I am sure they have begun to conceive some hopes of it.

“ It is a delicate subject to touch at Vienna ; for if they are not a little alarmed about it they will do nothing to prevent the mischief, and if they are too much alarmed it will distract their efforts against France.

“ Lord Elgin's dispatches, received to-day, give me fresh occasion to beg you to keep him a little *courant*, for he is playing exactly our adversary's game at Constantinople.

“ I have not explained to you in my dispatch my whole idea about the Netherlands. I thought things were not ripe for it, but you will judge better how to act in it by looking at the whole together.

“ I take it for granted that Austria will take one of the two last of the three modes I propose, and, in truth, the difficulties of the first are so numerous that I hardly think it worth struggling for :

especially as, in that case, whenever the seventeen provinces were connected with France, which would be as often as they had an incapable Stadtholder or a weak Government, we should, in case of war, be as much shut out from the continent as we now are. Whereas the existence of two separate governments, one in the Netherlands, the other in Holland, will always give us a double chance of keeping at least one communication open.

"In either of the other alterations the government will be that of a weak Prince, dependent more or less on Austria for his support ; but having an extensive military frontier to guard with comparatively small means of raising or recruiting an army.

"If we throw upon him by the treaty of peace the whole burden of the Austrian loans—of which we may perhaps never get any very satisfactory payment from Vienna—we shall compel him to have recourse to us for relief. Why should not this be granted on conditions something resembling those of the old barrier treaties ? Why should we not agree to accept as payment the maintenance of a considerable body of British troops to be stationed in time of peace as a garrison to the frontier of the Netherlands ? We should by these means correct one of the greatest difficulties which belongs to our situation in Europe, that of the great deficiency of our military force in war owing to the constant reduction of it at the first moment of peace to skeleton regiments, which train neither officers nor soldiers, and drive us on the breaking out of war to numberless expedients for sudden augmentations, which incur generally an enormous expense, and give a fresh blow to the composition of our army.

"Any constitutional question—if indeed times and circumstances have not changed the nature of such questions as applying to such an augmentation as I speak of—but, any constitutional question, if such there be, might easily be solved by stationing the regiments in the Netherlands according to some fixed rotation, and by absolutely prohibiting the bringing any of those troops into the King's dominions which should be voted for that service. It might even be enacted that neither the Mutiny Act nor the votes of payment should apply to them if so brought.

"In this manner we should maintain at all times the foundation of a solid military force, without any other expense than that of taking upon ourselves what is too likely otherwise to fall upon us. We should always retain a certain possession and hold of the Netherlands, which would at least prevent their being suddenly overrun by France. And the sovereign of those provinces would apply to their protection and defence those sums which he would otherwise be obliged to pay to us without any return whatever.

"This is my project, which innumerable accidents may defeat, but which I really think, if it could be executed, offers us the best solution of any that has yet occurred for this difficult question. You will easily see that it is not of a nature to be as yet fully opened to Thugut, but by keeping it in your mind, you may gradually prepare the way for it.

"You will have seen the account of the two debates in Ireland on the union. Our friends are disappointed at not having had a

larger majority the second day, but they seem pretty confident of final success." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, February 14. Cleveland Row.—“Je vous restitue la lettre du Directeur de la Poste en vous plaignant du malheur arrivé à vos lettres. Lord Minto me renouvelle l'assurance de la ratification *incessamment*, en disant même que l'Empereur l'a signé. D'ailleurs rien de nouveau—toutes nos mesures sont conditionnelles. Si cette éternelle ratification a été donné, Lord Minto pourra conclure des arrangements pour de nouveaux secours pécuniaires, Si non, il n'en sera rien, comme de raison. Bonaparte paroît n'avoir fait aucune ouverture à Vienne, et on nous répète que l'on n'en écouterait rien, jusqu'à ce que l'on a de nos nouvelles.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

1800, February 14. Cleveland Row.—“In the copy of your resolutions, as published in the papers, there is a verbal error which had been corrected here, but has probably been retained by some mistake of clerks in copying. Though a mere question of words, it is not without its importance in point of principle, and I trust, therefore, this will reach you in time for its being set right, unless there is some reason for the present form of which I am not aware.

“It is in article 4, in the first sentence, where the Irish commoners in the United Parliament are called *Representatives* of Ireland in the House of Commons. Instead of this, we had put *members to sit and vote* in the House of Commons, on the *part of Ireland*. This last is the phrase observed, I believe uniformly, in the Scotch Union, and the reason is obvious, because, though each Irish member is, in Parliamentary language, the representative of the county or borough for which he sits, yet the aggregate of all the Irish members will not be representatives of *Ireland*; but, in common with the British members, representatives of *the whole United Kingdom*.

“The phrase, *on the part of Ireland*, being used in every other part of this resolution, I conclude that the first is an error.

“A little lower down, *such Peers who have*, should be, *such Peers as have*.”

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most private.

1800, February 14. Dublin Castle.—“We had a good night in the House of Commons.

“On the motion to quit the chair for going into the consideration of the message relative to union, a debate commenced against the Speaker leaving the chair. All the minor poets of opposition vented themselves till twelve o'clock. Nothing could be more stupid or uninteresting. Mr. Balfour then said he had not received the union papers, and Mr. Ponsonby suddenly moved the question of adjournment. On a division for adjourning, 98 against 123.

Delay was again attempted, and it was moved to adjourn the debate till Monday. This was on a pretence that several members had not received the papers. On a division, at two o'clock, we divided against adjourning, 157 for 110. Our object was attained, which was to shew that our phalanx was firm and increasing. And as several members whom Lord Castlereagh wished to conciliate, and has hopes of making friends so soon as the main question is decided, prayed for delay, his Lordship agreed to a compromise, that he would agree to adjourn if it were clearly agreed to by Opposition that no further attempt shall be made to prevent the decision of the main question. This was accepted unanimously, and your Lordship may, I think, reasonably expect that we shall carry the main question on Monday by a majority of from 47 to 50. I am confident we shall increase in our numbers rather than diminish. If our debate had lasted till morning, we should have had 163 or 164.

"I own I was much alarmed on our last division. I thought an impression was made against us, a run commencing. Lord Cornwallis's decisive and prompt conduct against Lord Downshire, gave a turn in our favour. It marked the determination of Government, and gave our friends spirits. I lament Lord Downshire's imprudence, which, I dare say, was not meant; but, when he embarks in any measure, he is apt to be headstrong. His Lordship has been always kind to me, and, before he took his ultimate decision, he conversed with me. He promised moderation; but it is singular that I told him that he would commit himself, and be brought into a scrape, in five days. He is very much distressed. He considers my Lord Lieutenant's conduct as severe; but it was unavoidable. Had not his Excellency taken it up as he did, his administration might have been ruined. The measure of Petshining might have run through both militia and yeomanry, and it was considered as the trial of the pulse and nerves of Government.

"The decision in the Lords came next to our assistance. The Chancellor's and Lord Kilwarden's speeches were most impressive. The debate was entirely on our side; and the division, so respectable for numbers, ability, and property, has given a turn to sentiment.

"The City then addressed—Latouche, Sir W. Newcomen, and Mr. Neville. Their answers are decisive.

"We have prevented our friends from being seduced, and taken off two or three from the enemy.

"Last night gives us consistency and solidity. Opinion begins to attach to us.

"The terms are reckoned fair and liberal; and I think there is a disposition to submit, in parts of the opposition.

"They have had several meetings in order to plan future operations.

"They wanted to try a short money Bill, but they could not get unanimity.

"They have failed in the plan of defeating the measure by vexatious delays.

"They have failed in the plan of exciting popular resistance.

"I do not think that we shall have an insurrection in the city,

as my Lord Lieutenant has marked his determination to put down mob ; but I fear there may be attacks on individual members. And I shall think myself very lucky if I escape with whole bones. Some manufacturers have turned off their men ; and there are several desperate Committees.

“ One of the plans of Opposition has been to secede after the principle is carried, and to make a great protest, but that is not determined upon.

“ Lord Cornwallis is reconciled with Lord Enniskillen as to his personal quarrel relative to the court martial of which Lord Enniskillen was President. This will have good consequences.

“ If we could get the Coles, Wynne, Fortescue, the Kings, and others who are well disposed to break off, it will be of much consequence.

“ The Rowleys have written to Lord De Clifford to allow them to support the details.

“ I think we shall see more light before Monday.

“ I have been so harrassed with long nights, and looking after friends, that I have not been able to attend to business.

“ The delay which has taken place as to the delivery of the papers was owing to a paltry manœuvre of the Speaker. All the accounts were printed before Lord Castlereagh made his speech. I ordered them to be sent to the House. The Speaker privately sent for the printer, ordered him not to send out a single account, but to print a fresh set. Of this I was not acquainted. The resolutions were also sent to the House for delivery. They were kept in the Journal Office, and the Speaker would not let them go out with the votes. This was also concealed from me. What *petitesse* ?

“ I had much conversation with him some days ago. He acknowledged a union might be salutary, but not now, not under Lord Cornwallis. I know that it was once the great object to make a run at the Administration ; for he cannot bear that the union should be carried without him.

“ I should think he has done every thing in his power to distinguish between his opposition to the English, and the Irish administration.

“ We have difficulty on the article of calicoes. They have duties at present of 40 *per cent*. The reduction to 10 *per cent*. will be strongly opposed.

“ Compensation merely makes a clamour.

“ I write in spirits, and trust I shall not alter my tone, but the Irish climate is most uncertain.”

LORD GRENVILLE to VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

Private.

1800, February 14. London — “ As I do not accurately recollect whether I had an opportunity of saying any thing to you, before you left London, on the subject of the trial of controverted elections of members of the House of Commons on the part of Ireland in the united Parliament, and as it is a point on which I feel naturally

a particular anxiety, I take the liberty of troubling you with a few lines on the subject for your consideration

"The article, as it now stands, I hold to be clearly right, and that there would be the utmost danger in any attempt at any further specification on the subject, previous to the Union. The measure of union itself would, I think, be unnecessarily embarrassed by clogging it with any details on this question, which is, undoubtedly, one of some difficulty. And as the point is not one on which the wildest imagination can suppose that a majority of British members could have an interest in making any provisions injurious to the fair trial of Irish elections, it does not seem to be naturally an object of previous stipulation on the part of Ireland, but one which would more properly to be left to be regulated by the wisdom of the united Parliament. While, on the other hand, many inconveniences, and those of the most serious nature, would result from making these regulations any part of an irrevocable treaty. We have already seen occasion to introduce more than one alteration into the law on the subject here; and there is still more reason to think that this might hereafter become necessary as to the object now in question.

"Trusting, therefore, that you will be successful in resisting any attempt to make provision on this subject beforehand, otherwise than as it now stands in the resolution as opened to the Irish Parliament, I should think it unnecessary to break in upon you in the present moment with any discussion of future regulations upon the subject, if it were not that I feel much anxiety that, even in debate, no ideas should be held out, either of Committees to sit in Ireland, or (still less) of Committees to be wholly composed of Irish members. The former, as it seems to me, would be destructive of the principle of the Union, and totally inconsistent with any form or principle of Parliamentary proceeding. Nothing could be more dangerous than to have, during the recess of Parliament, bodies of that description sitting in Ireland, with no check over them to control any proceedings they might adopt; for, what other power could be allowed to interfere with the proceedings of a Committee of the House of Commons, acting as such, however unwarrantably or illegally? The other idea, that of composing Committees exclusively of Irish members, would be useless if they were not to sit in Ireland. It is therefore liable to all the objections which I have already stated, and it is, besides, inconsistent with the principle of the present Act, and calculated, in effect, to destroy all hope of impartiality in the trial, when the jury, instead of being chosen from among 558 or 658 members, would be confined to so small a number as 100, and those, too, the most influenced by local prejudices and connections.

"All that I can think necessary to be done on this subject, and I have thought much upon it, is that the United Parliament should give a power to the parties to examine witnesses, in presence of counsel on both sides, and liable therefore to cross-examination before some commission duly constituted for the purpose, and to produce that evidence, reduced to writing and properly certified, before the Committee here. Even in this case, I would not preclude

either party, if he chose to incur the expense, from the benefit of producing his oral testimony before the Committee; but I would simply make the written evidence, taken as above, *admissible*.

"This point may, however, I am aware, admit of some doubt, and I am far from taking upon myself to decide upon what may ultimately be found right on this subject; but, seeing much danger in any ideas founded on the principle of any greater change than this, I was anxious to submit to your consideration these thoughts upon it. I trust we shall have full opportunity to consider them in a moment of more leisure to yourself than this can be."

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1799 [1800?], February 15. Constantinople.—"I have been for some weeks past alike disabled either from replying to your Lordship's last letter officially, or what I have desired still more, to address you a few lines in private, till at length, after getting the use of my limbs by slow degrees, I am all at once called upon by a sudden opportunity to take my pen in hand, but under circumstances which will not admit of my getting through a quarter of all I have to say. Amongst other things my brother had charged me to make some confidential extracts, for your Lordship's sole eye, of his private correspondence, but all I can do is to get a copy made of a public letter he has sent a duplicate of through my hands to Lord Nelson, and get a dispatch (the annexed) intended for last post, but which could not be ready in time, copied for this conveyance, which is of a peculiar hurrying kind.

"Undoubted information has reached this place in a variety of ways of the successful termination of the negotiation on foot for the evacuation of Egypt. I am without a scrap from our Commodore since the 18th December, but I know him to have been *well employed* ever since. At length the Internuncio, in whose house I happen to have passed my tedious confinement for the sake of a little motherly care and nursing, has received such a positive proof of the advanced stage of the arrangement in question, that he is going to send off this night to his Court, and allows me, *sub sigillo*, a place in his packet for as much as I can get ready within such a limited time. The Porte has demanded of the Austrian mission a state of their shipping trade, in order to know how many sail can be chartered immediately to rendezvous to Alexandria to carry the French home, in consequence of the *signature* of their capitulation. Besides this, he has received an express from Cyprus by which I have had some letters of different dates, of which I have had some copied for the Levant company; but the last and most important I have reserved for your Lordship, and annex to this hasty scribble; for what with the agitation produced by such good news upon a convalescent constitution, which has lately sustained a long trial of vexation of various kinds, and what with the real fatigue of galloping through so much writing as if it were for a wager, I must confine myself to thus much, and reserve my brother's communications for another moment. As it is, they contain reflections and

explanations so far superceded by the present salutary tidings, that they become only necessary as an historical guide for your judgment on certain recent occurrences.

"With respect to myself, I meant to unbosom myself to your Lordship in a more becoming and respectful form, but I have no chance even of getting at you at all with the truth in time to keep pace with so much ingenuity as I have to cope with, that I venture to make your Lordship the unreserved confidence of a memorandum I made some time ago to refresh my memory (in the midst of such a heterogeneous succession of subjects as occupy one's mind in this situation) against I should be able to take up my pen in a leisurely way. I trust your Lordship will peruse such a crude text with the indulgence of a friend, and good will of a patron, as my object is limited to the getting my bread in the least offensive way to anybody. As I find it impossible to cultivate Lord Elgin's confidence by the most persevering trial, I neither wish to exist a constant object of jealousy, nor to deprive him of any of the honours, patronage, or emoluments he thinks ought to be concentrated in him only. And as it is impossible for me to maintain my ground upon the present equivocal footing, without more support than I can pretend to hope for, I trust your Lordship will allow me to revert to my official demand of a leave of absence which my health really needs, with the eventual contingency of returning here with credit, or else a change of situation to any southern station. I wish much to have an opportunity of preparing myself by a few weeks of the air of Naples for an English winter, and if I can combine my journey home with any object of public utility, I shall be proud of the honour of any of your Lordship's commands to execute by the way."

Two Enclosures.

Enclosure 1:—

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR LORD GRENVILLE.

"When Lord Elgin arrived he seemed to feel his dignity, and contenting himself with the general superiority reserved to him by the nature of his appointment as explained in your original notification, by declining any interference in the current affairs of the post which he referred to me as the acting magistrate; till, all at once, he manifested a spirit of encroachment and monopoly that no detail of business whatever could escape; and losing sight entirely of the grandeur of his situation, augmented if anything by having a minister to transact business under his direction, treated the solemnity of his representative mission quite as a secondary consideration, and attributing to himself the entire and *exclusive* management of all sorts of business, such a collision of necessity ensued between us as brought on an explanation, wherein his *verbal* definition and commentary upon his official character with reference to this residence differed so widely from every syllable of your Lordship's clear and explicit notification of the temporary change in my situation, and demarcation of our respective duties, than which nothing could be more easy than to adhere to, that

though I, of course, declined anything like resistance of his authority, or even the appearance of a difference between us before the public, yet I reserved to myself the right of appeal to the proper quarter, and to solicit those whom we both depend upon to make good their own meaning. Your Lordship condescended to tell me that, except the correspondence with your Office, (and political negotiations included) no change was to take place in my situation except the agreeable one of a step of promotion. His Lordship, on the other hand, has informed me in every possible form that his appointment has effaced every atom of my public character except that of corresponding with the Levant Company; for that, as to carrying on their affairs, *he found it impossible* to make the Porte understand that the king should preserve here any other accredited agent than himself, and still less to carry on the business of a corporation *of whose existence the Ministry was utterly ignorant!* and that for his own part he could not receive the explanation I gave of my situation as quoting your correspondence with me, nor wait for, nor abide by any other rule of conduct than his full power and instructions, which he has *more than once sent* me to read over in a significant way. Indeed I may say these two instruments form the *sum total*, the alpha and omega of *all* his communications either official or confidential to me of any one act or transaction of the embassy he informs me I am secretary to, when it becomes a point with him to obliterate my past character in the eyes of the world here. But when my services are, as they have been often, respectfully and earnestly tendered in that capacity, I am then tauntingly entitled the Levant Company's Minister; and am desired to confine myself to their correspondence. All my conduct under this treatment is comprised in endeavours to avoid collision or even the air of rivalry, and still less of schism, so as to furnish a topic of scandal for the society we live in. I seek to hide my diminished head as well as I can while this cloud is passing over it, trusting that the wisdom, equity, and delicacy of my superiors will not suffer any perversion of their intentions to exist unnoticed and uncorrected; and still less that an appointment meant as a reward to one servant of the country should operate as a punishment or penance to another."

Enclosure 2 :—

JOHN KEITH (Secretary of Sir Sidney Smith) to SPENCER SMITH.

Private for Lord Grenville.

1799, June 20. Beyrout. *Extract.*—"Here we have been for some days in order to get water, but finding the operation so very difficult and tardy, I believe we shall proceed this night to Cyprus to complete our stock, and if we meet the Ottoman fleet under the Patrona Bey, we shall in all probability tow them down to the scene of action. What a terrible thing it is to have to do with such dilatory wretches! They cut us up, and if Sir Sidney is not invested with a regular supremacy over them, they will ultimately swindle us out of all the important advantage to be reaped from the miraculous blow your brother, and him only, has struck against the astonished

enemy ; but if they again have time to fill their bellies, and heal their sores, we shall just find ourselves as far advanced as over your fire last January.

“Allow me therefore [to say], in your brother’s name, while he is resting his wearied limbs asleep by me, although mid-day, that we must *be fully* empowered, and that from all quarters, or you must hope for nothing from us analagous to our late herculean labours. It is of the utmost importance that what you can do in this way be done, and that speedily.

“Jezzar has informed Sir Sidney that he will not admit for the future but *British born* subjects as consuls within his pashalik. He says, all other mercenary foreign agents and deputies are a set of miserable intriguers, and all more or less partisans of an intriguing enemy. And that after a given time he shall clear the coast of any remaining persons of that description. (This comes in full consonance with all you have done to purge the Levant mission of such stains.) The pasha has expressed a wish that I should remain with him in that capacity in Egypt, and Sir Sidney says that I ought to postulate for such a situation when our present warfare be over. I certainly think I could make myself useful in that way, and that under Jezzar Pasha I could perhaps do better than another. I mention the matter now to have your sentiments upon it, and shall perhaps, hereafter, call upon you for your support.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 16. Stowe. *Extract*.—“I find from Dick that you are very sanguine on the subject of the union. I should personally think unfavourably of it from the last division, if every letter that I have got from Ireland did not assure me that Government may depend always on a majority of 50. I own that I do not understand Lord Cornwallis’s acquiescence in the writs of citizens Downshire Charlemont and Ponsonby for calling together all the counties of Ireland ; a measure with which, in my judgment, he ought to have grappled instantly, for it could obviously lead only to intimidation of county members, and to general outrage and violence. As little can I understand the wisdom of giving to the Irish colonels of militia the means of recruiting their numbers at a moment when, most fortunately, you were enabled to weaken that very disaffected force. Surely some *delay* can be found in the issue of this money.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 17. Dublin.—“I am very happy that our ideas tally so exactly upon the subject of the trial of controverted elections. Your plan of leaving it open to either party to bring the witness at his own expense, obviates a material objection to mine. The mode by Commissioners I certainly prefer to that by Assistant Barristers, as giving a better chance of impartiality [not only] from the quality of the judges, but from the greater solemnity, and

publicity, of the proceedings, which, considering the nature of Irish evidence, are very necessary checks. Lord Castlereagh suggests, as an improvement to my plan, that the Committee should be struck in the first instance, in order to preserve more entire the jurisdiction of the House. My reason for proposing it otherwise was merely that such a number of members, who might be wanted on other Committees, might not be kept idle while the evidence was taking in Ireland; but I do not think it at all material. I perfectly agree with you that this matter is not to be made an article of Union, and, indeed, it seems to be that from the very nature of it, it is impossible that it should; but, you will observe, it was much insisted upon by Ponsonby in the debate, and it is prudent to be prepared with some rational plan to remove the scruples and fears which many, even among our friends, entertain concerning it.

"I take for granted that the House of Commons will not divide before to-morrow evening, but I think I may safely assure you that you may be perfectly at ease as to the event. The majority will in my opinion be about 50. The Government expect more, but I have now no doubt of complete success, and believe the struggle will be over to-morrow, nor do I apprehend any serious tumult in any part of the country.

"Lord Downshire's folly happened most opportunely, and the decision with which Lord Cornwallis acted on that occasion, prevented the mischief that might have followed from false impressions, before the determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the measure could be authentically known. Your promptness in dismissing from regiment, governorship, and Privy Council, has had all the effects you could wish; and the reconciliation which has taken place between Lord Cornwallis and Lord Enniskillen will, I think, have an immediate tendency to dissolve the connexion of the Opposition; many of whom will absent themselves after the first question is voted, and many will not refuse their assistance to Government upon the details.

"The Chancellor made a most able speech when he moved the first Resolution in the House of Lords. Though great expectations were formed of the impression it might make upon the public, Messires Cooke and Company neglected to take effectual means to have the speeches of their friends reported, so that no full or authentic account of it has yet appeared. But, I believe, the Chancellor himself is preparing it for the press.

"I hope to get away in the course of next week. There will be no struggle upon the details in our House, and I think it cannot be necessary for me to stay merely to go up to the Castle with the address and resolutions. I think they will pass in a little more than a fortnight, and I shall return when the Bill is brought in."

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, February 17. Dublin Castle.—"I am to acknowledge the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 13th, with many thanks.

The observations contained in it, relative to the inexpediency of involving the treaty of Union with any regulations on the subject of controverted elections, are unanswerable, and your Lordship may rest assured that nothing shall be either said or done on that subject which shall commit either Governments, much less fetter the United Parliament on a point of such delicacy.

"I threw out an idea of Mr. Pitt's in debate on this question, but in such a way as to make it clearly understood that a regulation on this subject was not in contemplation as connected with the treaty; and I stated it, at the same time, to be merely one of many suggestions that had occurred for obviating an inconvenience which it was desirable, if possible, to diminish, but which, even were it to remain, no person who approved the Union on other grounds, could feel as an obstacle at all fundamental.

"The first resolution will this day be proposed in a Committee of the whole House. I hope to be enabled to send your Lordship a favourable report."

THOMAS LANGLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 17. Taplow.—"The flattering manner in which your Lordship did me the honour of answering my last letter demands my best thanks, and the encouragement your Lordship gave me induces to enter more fully into the subject of pluralities.

"The extent to which this abuse of church preferment was carried previous to the Reformation is well known, many of the reformed churches, particularly Scotland, corrected it. The Statute of 33 Henry VIII. was intended to curtail the privilege, but the poverty of the greater part of the parochial benefices were such as to offer no restrictions as to livings under £8 *per annum* other than those which existed in the Canon law, namely their becoming voidable but not absolutely void. Many livings of very considerable value were not returned in the *Valor* of Henry VIII. as producing any income; and the re-appropriation of tithes, inclosures, and other arrangements have rendered the *valor* wholly inconclusive, and, in consequence, dispensations for pluralities are founded upon the most irregular principles. In one instance a heavy charge is incurred to hold two small contiguous livings; in another, two very considerable livings at any distance may be held without any license. All other ecclesiastical preferment, whether prebendal or sinecure, may be held with any livings under charge, and even with one living above charge, without any dispensation. Your Lordship is of course in possession of the accounts of the present revenues of the faculty office. I have no data to form any correct idea of the amount, but there can be little doubt they might be improved very considerably and with great satisfaction to the country at large, and if pluralities are allowed to continue, there surely can be no objection to Government availing itself of the principle to extend the duties to all preferment so held. Were no person enabled to hold more than one benefice with cure of souls, I presume the Church of England would approximate to the primitive times, and yet the inequality of livings with the present establishment of prebendal

dignities would be a sufficient counterbalance to the very just objection of destroying the principle of emulation and laudable ambition. If this appears to your Lordship to be pressing the point farther than the age in which we live will allow, still the necessity of extending the obligation of dispensations may be attended to in a financial point of view. There can be no possible justice in subjecting a parish to the inconvenience of a non-resident rector when the revenues are sufficient, merely because the value in the *Valor* of Henry VIII. admits of some subterfuge. Even the present mode of granting dispensations by the Archbishop is founded upon positive falsehood. The pluralist gives a bond to the Archbishop that he will perform certain duties in his second parish, which I believe very rarely occurs, and the bond is never acted upon. I refer your Lordship to the statute of dispensations and the test of experience. I should trespass too much on your Lordship's valuable time if I were to enumerate the incredible subterfuges which this *Valor* and Statute of Henry VIII. occasion. Livings under charge, no charge, donatives, peculiar jurisdictions so interfere with the wholesome laws of residence, that the Curates Act will do little to remedy the evil. The experience of seven years convinces me how little the power of the substitute can avail in the regulation of a parish. He cannot feel the same responsibility, he cannot stifle the hopes of acquiring some permanency in his profession, and therefore his attentions are rather with immediate views of temporary assistance than with settled plans of solid arrangements for the benefit of his poorer parishioners. Your Lordship will observe that I am deviating into parochial concerns ; but my mind is at present so much engaged in the administering to the wants and combating the prejudices of my parishioners at this juncture, as to be diverted from my immediate subject. I may again presume to enter into further details of the present state of our church, from a firm conviction that the regulations proposed are consonant to her true interests, and in no degree calculated to cherish any enquiries which, from the woeful experience of the present day, are productive of dangerous schemes of unnecessary reforms. Your Lordship's superior judgment will act upon these *data* in that correct and comprehensive manner as cannot fail to distinguish your Lordship's administration as peculiarly beneficial to the true interests of religion."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 18, Dublin Castle.—"This day, after 18 hours debate, the principle of Union was carried in the Commons by 161 to 115. The question was that the Chairman should leave the chair. The main question then passed without a division.

"A great altercation took place, early in the debate, between Corry and Grattan. Nothing could be more abominably personal. Corry was forced to send him a message forthwith by General Cradock. They went out : fired a case of pistols each ; Corry was wounded in the arm, but not badly ; and the affair terminated in the usual manner.

"This altercation suspended attention to the debate for some hours. Sir John Parnell and the Speaker then entered fully into the whole detail of the measure, which they endeavoured to prove as ruinous. Lord Castlereagh was excellent in reply to both.

"The rest of the debate went off as usual ; nothing remarkable.

"I do not think there was any ill humour in the House after the division. No threat of appeal to the people, no wish for improper delay, but rather a contrary feeling.

"I think all looks promising.

"Parnell debated goodnaturedly ; the Speaker wickedly and ably.

"I am very much fatigued. I will write to-morrow if I find any turn in things.

"The objections are levelled chiefly against reducing the duty on cottons, the peerage regulations, and the compensation idea.

"Altogether it is a most important day. We had three or four members absent ; but you must consider how difficult it is to keep men together [when] the heart is not completely in the cause.

"We go on upon Friday."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 21. Stowe.—"I wished to turn over very fully in my mind for one day the proposition in contemplation for the Bishop of Chester, and I am most clear that neither his health nor his habits ought to permit him to accept it. The situation in question will doubtless be ameliorated by the Union ; but to be useful in the way that alone can give him satisfaction, or contribute to make him happy or respectable, he ought to be able to ensure longer life, and more vigorous habits than, at his age and under his state of health, he can hope for. I should therefore, if he asked my advice, dissuade him, but it is most fit that he should speak from himself only on such a question so deeply interesting to him. If you wish me to go over to Oxford to sound him, or to offer in your name this arrangement, I will do it ; but I see no advantage in such a step over the more obvious mode of a letter. As to Bangor, when I last saw him he was decided against it, as not worth the expense of a removal, and the fatigue of new arrangements from which he would still hope to be to move to Wells or Worcester ; but when I tell you this, I only mean to give you my impressions of what he may determine, not his resolution.

"I return you the letter to Lord Castlereagh, and join most cordially in your view of the impracticability of an Irish House of Commons committee, which I am satisfied must never be permitted to meet in Dublin, or even in London as a distinct body ; but I am not sure that your ideas go quite the length of mine as to the ' Court of Enquiry ' to whom I would refer the investigation of facts previous to the formation of the usual committee, to be formed in the usual manner at Westminster. This Court of Enquiry ought to be ballotted out of a body of twenty-four commoners to be named by the Crown, out of two lists of twelve from the English and twelve from the Irish bar, given in at each new Parliament by the two

chancellors, to be presided over by one of the three junior judges of the Irish courts, and to have nominees from the parties. The examinations and arguments all to be taken down and certified; together with a case for the appellant and for the sitting member signed by counsel, as in the case of appeals to the House of Lords; but to this I would add the signed opinion of the Court of Enquiry on the facts at issue, and on the result of the whole. From these opinions the House of Commons committee might differ if they saw grounds; but it is obvious that the parties would in most cases be much guided in their proceedings, and consequently much litigious discussion saved by a knowledge of those opinions. I am not clear that in *any case* would I allow a rehearing of witnesses at Westminster.

"I am delighted at hearing this morning from Tom the division on the resolutions, as I take it for granted that the *Bill* will be very short and very rapidly carried through. I am sorry for Corry's rencounter with Grattan; '*qui zonam perdidit*.' What is your next step of proceeding in this business? I trust that you do not mean to suffer the Irish Commons to cool by delay."

Postscript.—"So far from blaming what is done against Lord Downshire, I blame you very much for not going further. I understand that there is distinct proof of his sending to the head-quarters of his regiment resolutions, with *an order* to his adjutant to procure as many signatures as possible. You will remember that when this regiment was serving against the rebels in 1798, and in the field with Lord Cornwallis, the colonel never went over to Ireland."

LE DUC D'HARCOURT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, February 22. London].—"J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 20 pour m'informer que Sa Majesté a agréé que Monsieur ait l'honneur de lui présenter, au palais de la Reine, et de la même manière que Sa Majesté a vu Monsieur, les princes de la branche d'Orléans; et dès que vous aurez bien voulu m'instruire si ce sera mercredi ou jeudi, j'aurai soin de les en avertir.

"Monsieur m'a chargé d'avoir l'honneur de vous mander qu'il accepte avec empressement votre invitation pour samedi. Dès que Monsieur m'aura donné la liste que vous désirez avoir des Français qui partageront l'honneur de l'accompagner, j'aurai celui de vous la communiquer."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 22. Dublin Castle.—"The three first Resolutions, after some speeches upon the principle, were last night carried, about eleven o'clock, without a division." Some members being ill, and others absent, they did not like appearing with diminished force; not that I yet see any real separation in the party.

"Lord Corry, who is an *élève* of the Speaker, and has been put forth on former occasions to speak his sentiments, said he would not

interfere in the details, or mix in the responsibility of the measure ; he would, however, attend the Committee, and oppose the principle in every stage, and particularly when a Bill should be brought in upon the subject. He thought the British Ministry would never press a measure so much against the sense of the country. This last sentiment the Speaker has frequently expressed to me.

"G. Ponsonby gave notice that, on Thursday next, he would make a motion upon my Lord Lieutenant's message, which alludes to the signed Declarations, in order to ascertain the sense of the people.

"I think they seem to despair of impairing our majority by debate.

"They have no point in the articles but cottons, which I always knew would act unfavourably against us. The duties are now from 30 to 50 *per cent*. The reduction to 10, might make a revulsion in the trade.

"The scarcity of provisions, which in these last ten days has become sensible, is to our disadvantage.

"The politicians of the party are also endeavouring to make a handle of the alledged return of the Russians from the Rhine, and of a probability of a peace between France and Austria, and of the pacification of the Chouans. If any solid comforting intelligence could be transmitted to dissipate those stories it would be useful.

"I think there will be efforts at delay ; attacks against Government for using unfair means to carry the measure ; and unceasing attempts to stir up the people. Our adversaries are old political actors, and they know that any attempt to move Government, without a general cry of popular discontent, is folly.

"I do not see any decided break in Opposition ; perhaps their not dividing is through fear of it."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, February 23. Vienna.—"You will naturally believe that the interval since the date of my last private letter has been a very uneasy one to me. With a certain knowledge that this Court was in a state of communication with the enemy, and a refusal to acquaint me with the purport of it, I had nothing to diminish that anxiety but the knowledge that I should very soon be furnished with the means to bring this Cabinet to an explicit and unreserved declaration on this particular point ; as well, I hope, as to engagements that will prevent the future danger of reserved secrecy. I have nevertheless been very little diffident of the favourable result of all these proceedings, being satisfied, first, that Austria cannot get such good terms from France by a peace as she can force by the war ; and in the next place, that she cannot obtain the same security for her acquisitions by the guarantee of France in opposition to her present allies, as by the course we wish her to pursue. Being refused the regular and authentic information to which I was entitled on the subject of the overtures from France, I have had recourse to the private and irregular channels that are to be found here ; and I have received a great variety and quantity of that sort of intelligence concerning

secret negotiators who visit Baron Thugut privately and other occurrences of that nature ; but I confess I have little faith in this species of information ; and I already possessed internal evidence of the thing to be assured that a secret communication existed, which made me less anxious concerning the particular form it assumed. I am the less disposed to believe in these mysterious proceedings on such evidence, as I found my friend Monsieur de Kalitcheff doubting on similar grounds whether Baron Thugut had not come privately to my house at eleven o'clock at night, and stayed till one in the morning ; and I frequently find that the most improbable falsehoods concerning my correspondence or conversation are carried to Baron Thugut, who generally mentions them. On the whole I did not think this sort of matter deserved a place in my dispatch, and I should perhaps have done better to save your Lordship the trouble of reading it even in this form. At the same time I cannot positively assure your Lordship that no other communications concerning peace have passed than those ostensible, and, one may say, circular ones mentioned to me by Baron Thugut. I am however on the whole inclined to think that they have never arrived at a disclosure of *conditions* ; and I am certain that at least none have ever been intimated in any way, public or private, that have been thought either admissible, or likely to afford a basis of negotiation. My expectation certainly is that, on learning the acquiescence of His Majesty with the most essential propositions transmitted by me, Baron Thugut will enter into particular engagements for the campaign, and general ones for future connexion if it is thought proper. However, your Lordship knows the character I have to do with, and that certainties elsewhere are not more than probabilities here. Your Lordship's speech on the 28th January has made the greatest sensation at Vienna amongst all classes ; and I am happy to find a disposition to draw their opinions from such sources prevail amongst the Austrians, as well as the French and others more personally concerned in the accomplishment of the English system. It is most fortunate and providential that Buonaparte's proceeding should have furnished the opportunity to England to take the lead, and to settle the public mind of Europe on the complexion of the present critical period."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 23. Wimbledon.—"I shall certainly see Sir Watkin, and have for that purpose wrote to him to call upon me to-morrow ; at the same time I confess I feel little hopes of being of any use to him in what he very naturally is anxious about. It is only two days ago that Sir Charles Stuart communicated to me the enclosed copy of a letter he had received from the Duke of York. It is in answer to one he wrote to the Duke immediately on his return from the Mediterranean, arising from his own feeling of the real pretensions he had to it from his military skill and exertions. I never saw the sentiment so distinctly avowed before as that no circumstance of military merit or service could gain a man admission into the British army, unless he had got his first entrance

in the shape of an Ensign. If the rest of his Majesty's servants are of opinion, that in a free and commercial country, insular in its situation, and where of course every incentive to keep up its military spirit is of essential consequence, such a proposition is to be acquiesced in, I certainly shall not singly stand forth, but the proposition is a perfectly new one, and in my opinion not more new than pernicious.

"If I can dine any where next Tuesday, I am engaged with Nepean, and I take it for granted the Bank business in the House of Commons will at any rate prevent Mr. Pitt from being with you at dinner. I should wish you to put down on paper any suggestions that occur to you on the subject of Sir Charles Stuart's instructions, and we could talk over the subject on Wednesday morning. Sir Charles is anxious to get away and I am as anxious to send him."

Enclosure :—

FIELD MARSHAL FREDERICK DUKE OF YORK to LIEUTENANT
GENERAL SIR CHARLES STUART.

1799, August 30. Horse Guards.—"I do not delay acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, and assuring you that I have ever felt disposed to give Colonel Graham the greatest credit for his zeal and courage.

"I am however exceedingly sorry to be under the necessity of declining to recommend your recommendation in his favour for permanent rank in the army, which I have uniformly felt it my duty to resist upon the grounds of the utter destruction it would be to his Majesty's service, and the grievous hardship to meritorious officers who have devoted their lives to the army to allow that door ever to be opened again to persons who have not made the army their profession; particularly as, should this be granted, there are others whose pretensions are fully as great in my opinion as Colonel Graham's, and who would naturally expect, and with reason, to have the same mark of favour extended to them." *Copy.*

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1800], February 25. Constantinople.—"The state of my health not yet allowing of my frequenting Lord Elgin's society, I am unable to pick up what he may have received worthy of communication concerning the grand affair on foot in our neighbourhood, which occupies us all so much, but, as may be supposed, me more particularly, whether considered as the consummation of my own past labours in this country, or with reference to the arduous and critical share that has fallen to the lot of my brother. I therefore make no apology for trespassing upon your Lordship's attention a few moments, in order to lay before you another more circumstantial confirmation which has just come to hand of the advanced stage of what I alluded to in my last letter.

"Baron Herbert, my wife's father, has a confidential correspondent in the Vizier's camp, and in an advantageous situation for knowing *all* that passes. Baron Herbert, witness to the extreme

anxiety which my brother's long silence (since 18 December) occasioned me in an irritable state of health, has been good enough not only to administer the first remedy by the unreserved communication of the first positive authentic intelligence he has received from the quarter in question relative to pending affairs, upon a private footing, but moreover, with the sole restriction of not making any use of this secret intelligence here upon the spot to any soul breathing, to permit me to convey it home for the use of our family and friends. Your Lordship standing in some degree in the first relation, and having certainly proved your right to the latter title, in addition to the priority due to your place upon our official footing, I heartily avail myself of the Internuncio's permission to transcribe his *Argus's* letter, which being in Italian *pâtois* I annex a translation, and have omitted nothing but the signature, for obvious reasons; but I have seen the original, and the writer is known to me, and I place a good deal of dependence on all he says.

"The other four enclosures of this packet relate to my brother, whose subject I meant, as I mentioned to your Lordship in my last, to take up in rather historical detail; but not being able to execute that task, I simply send forward some papers I had from him to show Lord Elgin, and then to lay before your Lordship. You will find a copy of one of his letters to that *frondeur*, General Koehler, together with one from the General to myself, which Sir Sidney has sent back to me with marginal notes by himself, concerning which I have only to say that *eodem animo scripsit quô bellavit*. There is besides the translation of one of his Turkish dispatches to the Porte; and lastly I annex what may not prove uninteresting, namely a more distinct plan of the relative position of things at the commencement of the siege of Acre, taken from a very rough pen and ink sketch, by which Sir Sidney elucidated his first dispatches from thence, which I kept a traced copy of till I could have leisure to make it out fair."

Enclosure 3:—

BRIGADIER-GENERAL KOEHLER to SPENCER SMITH.

Note [by Sir Sidney Smith].—"Sir Sidney Smith made this communication to General Koehler as an incitement for him to come to the scene of action where, if on inspecting things on the spot he had seen any necessity of changing the mode of attack proposed, the matter could have been discussed much more to the purpose than by folios of correspondence, which those who are actually opposed to the enemy have not time for; and as General Koehler had it in his power to join us on the

1799, August 3. Bouyoukdere.—"Sir Sidney Smith having informed me by letter of the intention of a *corps* of land troops being employed against the enemy in Egypt, on a land operation; and having received a similar communication from Hadgi Ibrahim Effendi, the Turkish Minister at War, I think it my duty to report to you, what I have so frequently, formally, and verbally urged, both to yourself and the Turkish Government, the anxious and earnest desire of the whole, and

theatre of operations as easily as Major Faed, it was thought he would do so, although the Turkish Government might not chose to commit themselves by a requisition to that effect which might be construed into a promise to give additional emoluments to the detachment of artillery offered gratuitously to the Porte by his Majesty's Ministers-Plenipotentiary in conference with the Ottoman Ministers on the projected military operations of the campaign. These conferences being held before the arrival of General Koehler at Constantinople, he could not be present at them; and as to the combined forces opposed to the enemy, *proceeding in the execution* of what was then concerted according to the article of the treaty, without further 'consultation' or communication with Constantinople, it is presumed that it was their duty to defend a besieged place, and also to pursue a beaten flying enemy, and to precede his van if possible without the delay requisite for such consultation upon the obvious thing to be done. As to naval officers arranging and 'actually commanding military operations on shore' it is done daily, and to the great advantage of his Majesty's service, either in combination with his Majesty's land forces, and in that case subordinate to them according to their ranks, or as in the present case, where there is not *a single land officer* on the scene of action, and this in compliance with a positive article of war which subjects 'every person in the fleet' to the pain of death if he does not 'relieve and assist a known friend in view to the

every individual of the military mission, to be employed upon that, or some similar actual military operation against the enemy. I conceive it incumbent upon me to represent to you the impropriety of military officers, sent by his Majesty and Government to this country, for that purpose, being laid aside, totally unemployed and not even consulted, or the least communication made to them of land operations being in contemplation until after they are actually commenced; and of such operations being combined, arranged, and actually commanded by naval officers assuming to themselves the title of military rank, and conferring military promotion at a time when the military mission sent by his Majesty is totally unattended to. Such arrangements as these, so totally irregular and disrespectful to the commands and intention of his Majesty's Ministers, as well as the military officers themselves composing the mission itself, so unnatural and in every respect contrary to the established rules and customs of our service, I hope you will not refuse on this representation to rectify; and exert every influence you might be possessed of that the obvious intentions of his Majesty's Ministers in the destination of the military mission to this country might be accomplished; and by that means allow the naval department full liberty to act in the more important operations of their natural and appropriate service, in the prosecution of which the military mission by land will not fail to co-operate and contribute by every means in their power in

utmost of his power.' Now though it may not be in the power of a land officer to command a ship, it is in the power of a naval officer to command a battery or regiment on shore, since there is no part of that duty but which enters into his education as Lieutenant at Arms of a man of war, and this without any pretension to any knowledge beyond his naval duty as such. As to the idea of banishing his Majesty's naval forces into the ocean where their early successes have deprived them of the chance of meeting an enemy, they will not acquiesce under it readily; and however great the confidence they may have in the abilities of land officers, they have never yet failed to prove themselves emulous to perform their parts of all operations on the sea coast, whether *on shore* or afloat, and have repeatedly received the thanks of his Majesty's most distinguished general officers for their performance of those duties, which, it was acknowledged, their peculiar mechanical talents qualified them for, instead of being *censured*, as in the present case, for '*irregularity, disrespect, and acting unnaturally and contrary to the established rules and customs of the service.*' As to the conferring military rank, the indispensable necessity of a particular promotion in the *marine* service has been reported to the Admiral Commander in Chief of his Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean, for the information of the Lords of the Admiralty on whom the marine forces depend. The foreign auxiliary officers in the service of the Porte have proved their ability to fill the ranks they hold, and the right of the Porte to employ whom it pleases cannot be disputed. As

the most faithful and zealous manner.

"Zeal for his Majesty's service, and the honour and success of his arms, which I hope stimulate and equally influence us all, are the only motives for my making this representation and request; that whatever your better information might, upon the consideration it merits, think proper to urge, or recommend to the Porte or elsewhere, might be, in proper time, done." *Copy.*

to naval officers assuming to themselves the title of military ranks, there is no instance of it unless a Greek dragoman so applying the French term *général* may be so called."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 25. Dublin.—"The three first articles passed the Committee in the Lords last night with little debate; the division, 48 to 20.

"In the Commons, the 7th or contribution article was debated. The Speaker had left an impression that, if the Union had taken place before the war, we should have been, on the terms proposed, ten millions more in debt.

"Lord Castlereagh well exposed and refuted this fallacy, and forced the Speaker to give up his ground; and we had some interesting altercation in good parliamentary style.

"Corry made a good speech of detail; he is pretty well, but his arm is uneasy, and I fear his exertions last night have done him no good.

"Our debate soon grew desultory, and upon every point but the question. At 12, Colonel Barry moved that the Speaker should leave the chair; ayes 108, noes 150. We then went through the whole article without amendment.

"J. C. Beresford moved that the proportion should be two-twentieths, instead of two-seventeenths. On this, Plunket, in the name of Opposition, begged him to withdraw his amendment; that he and his friends opposed principle; that no terms could make it palatable; that they never would sanction terms by amending them."

"Beresford's motion was negatived, and the article passed.

"We go on, upon Wednesday, on commerce.

"I think Lord Castlereagh was clearly master in the debate. The numbers prove that no variation in party has taken place. We had several invalids, whom we left in bed; the Opposition had a few.

"It will be still very hard work to get through with an Opposition of 120, gross. I think their not fighting the detail a great advantage to us. It abridges delay.

"Lord Corry sent a proposal to Lord Castlereagh that, if he would postpone the Union measure to next session, Opposition would support the administration; and, if the people should then be for it, they would assist the measure.

"Lord Castlereagh gave the civillest dissent in his power.

"Their chance is to operate on the people and produce resistance.

"I cannot hear of any thing wrong in the country. The town is cross; but no tumult. I walk from the House every night."

LORD GRENVILLE TO R. LISTON.

Private.

1800, February 28. Cleveland Row.—“I have not been able as yet to form such a judgment on the different points in Mr. King’s paper, as to say any thing officially to you on the subject. But I perceive, at the first view, that it is subject to very great and serious difficulties: and my hopes of its leading to a satisfactory issue can be grounded only on the persuasion that his instructions must have been framed with a very considerable latitude of concession from these demands. I confess, however, that the whole system of the American Government seems to me to be tottering to its foundations; and, so far from being able to enforce upon the country good faith towards foreign powers, I much doubt their power of maintaining internal tranquility.

“In this state of things it may become very necessary for us to reconsider our system as with respect to that country, and I am therefore far from being averse to the wish which Mr. Hammond informs me you have expressed to him of returning home. I conclude you do not wish to undertake a voyage across the Atlantic with the prospect of going back again to America, nor is it desirable that you should. I deeply regret the course which affairs are taking there, as considering it highly injurious to our interests both there and in Europe; but where we cannot control events, we must, as well as we can, regulate our conduct according to them.

“I send you with this a provisional leave of absence. You will, however, exercise your own discretion with respect to its being made use of; and I am very confident you will not come away under any circumstances in which you think your doing so may tend to aggravate the evils which I apprehend.” *Copy.*

ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION WITH THE ROYALISTS OF FRANCE.

Memorandum by GENERAL COUNT DE VIOMENIL, Commanding the Russian Troops in Jersey and Guernsey.

1800, February 27.—“1. Comme on ignore quel sera le plan des opérations, et sur quel point elles se dirigeront, on ne peut établir de question que sur le genre de guerre que l’on sera dans le cas de faire, soit offensive ou défensive. Dans la première supposition, le corps de troupes Russes n’ayant point de cavalerie, il est probable que la Cour de Londres sera disposée à lui en donner, et que ce même corps aurait aussi une augmentation de forces en infanterie, soit de la Cour de Russie, soit de Sa Majesté Britannique. Il est important de savoir quel est le nombre de régiments de chaque arme dont le dit corps Russe devrait être composé, et quelle serait la quantité de pièces d’artillerie de position, ou appartenants aux régiments, qui lui serait affectés. On joint ici un état de celles que l’on croit nécessaires, et qui seraient augmentées en proportion de la force à laquelle cette armée serait portée. Il est sous-entendu, que les caissons, munitions de guerre, et les chevaux de service pour cette artillerie, seront également fournis par la Cour de Londres.

“A l’égard d’une guerre défensive, qui ne serait d’aucun avantage, on présume que toute question sur cet objet devient inutile.

2. "Le petit nombre de Cosaques et de huzards qui se trouve au corps russe, n'est point monté, parceque le capitaine Popham a exigé qu'on laissa leurs chevaux à Revel, promettant qu'on leur en donnerait en Hollande. Il est donc urgent de les monter le plus tôt possible, afin d'accoutumer les chevaux au service avant l'ouverture de la campagne.

3. "Y aura-t-il un corps de troupes Anglaises dont les opérations seront séparées, et indépendantes de celles du corps Russe ? Dans ce cas il faudrait en connaître la force, et que les commandants de ces deux corps fussent parfaitement d'accord sur l'exécution de leur plan de campagne, afin de s'entraider mutuellement, et en parfaits alliés lorsque besoin sera.

4. "La cour de Londres ne fournira-t-elle pas au corps Russe la quantité de pontons nécessaires pour jeter trois ponts sur les rivières que l'on aura à passer dans les provinces de France où se portera le théâtre de la guerre ? Il faudrait aussi une quantité de pelles, de pioches, de haches, et d'instruments suffisants pour les travaux des fortifications de campagnes, ainsi que les chariots et chevaux nécessaires pour les opérations de guerre. Tous ces objets manquent au corp Russe.

5. "La cour de Londres fournira-t-elle aussi les voitures, et les chevaux nécessaires au transport des hôpitaux, et des bagages des officiers et soldats ? Fournira-t-elle encore un hôpital ambulant, ainsi que les médecins, chirurgiens, et médicaments indispensables. Monsieur Beaujean, docteur en médecine, et excellent chirurgien, qui a déjà été employé par le gouvernement d'Angleterre, serait très capable de diriger en chef ces hôpitaux comme Inspecteur-général. Il pourrait aussi procurer quelques chirurgiens français pour compléter le nombre nécessaire qui sera fourni par la Cour de Londres. Si cette proposition était acceptée par le gouvernement Britannique, le Comte de Vioménil en serait fort aise, par la confiance qu'il a dans les talents du dit sieur Beaujean.

6. "La Cour de Londres donnera-t-elle un commissaire pour les vivres ? Les troupes Russes auront-elles leur nourriture habituelle, et aura-t-on des moyens assurés pour la subsistance des hommes, et des chevaux lorsqu'on pénétrera dans l'intérieur de la France ?

7. "Y aura-t-il un nombre suffisant d'officiers du corps du génie et de l'artillerie Russe ? On pourrait attacher au corps Russe quelques officiers Français de ces deux armes qui connussent parfaitement les côtes de France.

8. "La Cour de Londres fournira-t-elle des fonds pour les dépenses secrettes, ou grands services rendus par les habitants des provinces de France où l'on pénétrera. Dans cette supposition elle fournirait un commissaire pour cette administration.

9. "Dans le cas où quelques régiments républicains déserteraient de leur armée pour passer à l'armée alliée, serait-on autorisé à les recevoir, et quelle serait la capitulation qu'on pourrait leur promettre ?

10. "Les Royalistes agiront-ils avec le corps Russe, ou séparément ; et, comme my lord Grenville le fait entendre, y aura-t-il un prince Français débarqué en France ? Dans cette supposition quelle sera son existence ?

11. " Les troupes Anglaises qui sont en Portugal joindront-elles le corps Russe, et en quel nombre seront-elles en infanterie, et en cavallerie ?

12. " Doit-on compléter les régiments Russes qui ont fait la campagne d'Hollande. Ce corps recevra-t-il quelque augmentation ?

13. " La Cour de Londres fournira-t-elle les bâtimens de transport, et une escadre pour protéger le débarquement ?

14. " Si l'embarquement doit se faire, il est nécessaire que les officiers attachés à l'artillerie de position, ainsi que ceux qui seront employés à celle des régiments, procèdent à l'embarquement de cette artillerie, de leurs affûts, des caissons, et boulets, et munitions de guerre qui lui appartiendront, afin que le débarquement puisse se faire avec autant d'ordre que de célérité.

15. " La Cour de Londres fournira sans doute une quantité suffisante de fusils de remplacement, pour suppléer à ceux qui manqueraient.

16. " Il serait instant de donner le plus tôt possible des cartouches, et des balles de calibre aux troupes Russes qui sont à Jersey et Guernsey pour les exercices à poudre, et pour les exercer à tirer au blanc.

17. " Ya-t-il en Angleterre des officiers Français qui aient une connaissance parfaite de la partie des côtes de France où devra s'opérer le débarquement.

18. " Il serait essentiel que les royalistes pussent se rendre maîtres de quelque place qui put servir d'entrepôt pour les subsistances, et le dépôt des armes ou munitions de guerre, peu de temps avant l'instant où l'on pourra marcher à leur appui.

19. " La Cour de Londres donnera sans doute tout l'argent nécessaire pour fournir aux besoins urgents du corps Russe.

20. " Indépendamment des moyens indispensables demandés ci-dessus, et qui devront être proportionnés à la force armée qui sera employée, si l'on veut attaquer la France par la Bretagne, on croit que le Morbihan serait le point le plus favorable, mais l'on est persuadé que, pour assurer le succès de cette entreprise, il faudrait y porter 35 ou 40,000 hommes de troupes réglées ; 30,000 d'infanterie, et 8,000 de cavallerie ou troupes légères. Si cela est possible une telle armée inspirera de la confiance aux royalistes qui s'y réuniront, et les déterminera à faire les plus grands efforts. En entreprenant avec moins de forces, le moindre échec qu'éprouveraient les royalistes pourrait les décourager, et les décider à abandonner l'armée.

" Il est encore à observer que ces 35 ou 40,000 hommes de troupes réglées sont jugés nécessaires pour soumettre la Normandie, dont les fermiers ont acheté toutes les terres de leurs seigneurs ; et quoique la plupart soient de bons royalistes, il est vraisemblable qu'ils défendront autant qu'ils le pourront leurs propriétés. Ce n'est donc qu'avec une force imposante, et la plus exacte discipline, que l'on pourra espérer de pénétrer jusqu'à Paris, où doit se faire la contre-révolution de la France.

Résumé.

" Il faudrait faire toutes ses dispositions pour que l'armée qu

doit pénétrer par la Bretagne put commencer les opérations dans les premiers jours du mois de juin, époque à laquelle les forces des républicains seront occupées en Italie, et sur le Rhin. Il faudra beaucoup de biscuit, de riz, et de légumes secs pour les approvisionnements de la dite armée, dont la composition devrait être comme il suit—

" Infanterie, y compris	2,000.
" Chasseurs à pied	30,000.
" Cavallerie	6,000.
" Huzards ou Cosaques	2,000.
" Les canoniers nécessaires pour le service des pièces ci-après.				
" Artillerie ; pièces de position ou obusiers	24.
" Pièces de régiments ou artillerie de petit calibre	36.
" Il faudra que cette artillerie ait des grénades, des pétards, et des fusées, pour les employer lorsque besoin sera."				

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, February 29. Dublin Castle.—" I do not find that the disposition to contest the Union resolutions is yet materially relaxed ; and we are to have another fierce battle on the principle upon Friday. I hope, however, and expect that their number will experience some diminution.

" Opposition are making efforts to work upon the city, and to bring forward the mass of the people. I hope in vain.

" All is reasonably quiet hitherto. I am sorry to say that dearness of provisions begins to increase alarmingly.

" The Speaker still holds determined language, and says the measure cannot pass. His argument, on Monday, was well adapted to inflame ; and it happens unluckily that his authority is of great and universal influence.

" Lord Downshire is in low spirits, and quiet, and in no state of exertion.

" Grattan, in his own vindication from Corry's charges, made, I think, his situation worse than before. He said he never would condescend to defend himself against public accusation ; but, to any gentleman who requested in private an account of his conduct, he would prove that the truth of the evidence against him was physically impossible. He then read part of a letter from Nelson to him. This letter stated that Nelson considered his evidence before the Secret Committee to have been mis-stated, though it was signed by himself. He writes to Grattan that the Committee asked whether he had been with Mr. Grattan at Tenehinch ; he said yes ; whether he had sworn Mr. Grattan ; he said no ; what had passed between them ; he replied that he had asked Mr. Grattan to take a part and come forward, but Mr. Grattan refused, saying, he did not think it would contribute to the peace of the country.

" In replying to Corry's charge of flying from the country when the rebellion broke out, he stated, that he had not fled ; but the reason he did not come back was that he found, on one side, there were rebels in the camp, and, on the other, traitors in the Government.

"The duel and his wounding Corry will, in this duelling country, give him some éclat. Corry was well enough to come to the House to-day.

"Lord Castlereagh rises daily in reputation and talent."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 1. Munich.—"My wish to pay due respect to the memory of the poor Avoyer de Steiguer had nearly cost me dear. A cold that I caught at his funeral fell on my nerves in the shape of a slow fever, and has rendered me unfit for business of any kind. I never indeed knew what it was to be seriously ill before.

"I have contrived, however, at some intervals to get through all that was most important and pressing, but I might as well have thought of flying in the air as of writing a line to England. The quantity of subjects upon which I had to write, and the importance of many of them, quite overpowered and frightened me, and, whenever I attempted, it always brought on a return of my fever. I have now broke the ice, and in the course of a few days your Lordship will receive, besides several public despatches, the particulars of my journey to Vienna, which are not without curiosity and interest. I only write a line to-day to ask your Lordship's indulgence a few days longer. In my public despatches I have stated all that presses the most, the rest, which is more matter of curiosity, will probably reach England nearly as soon as this letter.

"I once again beg your Lordship to excuse me. You know my zeal, I hope, sufficiently to be persuaded that I should not defer writing now if I did not feel that forbearance in that respect was for a few days longer absolutely necessary."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 1. Dublin.—"After the Budget yesterday, which was not opposed, we went into the Union Committee. Altercations took place on the propositions of 1785, and the settlement of 1782, between Beresford, the Speaker, Grattan, and Lord Castlereagh, till $\frac{1}{2}$ past nine. We then examined cotton manufacturers till two in the morning. I enclose to your Lordship the Speaker's speech. The table at the end will disclose to your Lordship the line which is probably intended to be pursued, which is to examine men to every article the duty on which will determine, or be diminished. And, on such a question, it is absolutely impossible to resist examination. The object, I fear, is delay; so we may have more work on our hands than we imagined.

"I think Opposition very steady. Grattan's tones were loftier last night than before. A successful duel does wonders in Ireland.

"Your Lordship must not think us out of danger. 120 minority makes us liable to surprise."

LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

Private.

1800, March 4. Cleveland Row.—“We send out to you by this mail Colonel Clinton with the character of military assistant to your mission; and Mr. Booth, appointed by the Treasury Assistant Commissary of Accounts. Both are directed to follow your orders in all things. We are in so strange a state of ignorance respecting the Russian army that I know not how to instruct Mr. Booth otherwise than by putting him under your orders. You will set him, according as need may be, to overlook Russian, Swiss, Bavarian, Condé or Imperial accounts; and, if you see he wants aid, you must authorise him *provisionally* to employ it; for it has taken four months and more to get him named and sent off, and it would not take less to get him any assistance from hence.

“This frost is cruel. I am ignorant of all your operations, except as I collect them from the French papers, from which I learn that you are not idle. Whatever you have done I am confident I shall think it right, for so I have always found it hitherto.

“We know nothing whether we are to have more Russians here, or to lose those we have. Of course all our plans (or nearly all) are at a stand, except what relates to General Stuart, whom you will shortly see in person.

“I have, I think, settled that Proby shall be employed, in one way or another, with that army; probably as aide-de-camp to Simcoe who is likely to be named second in command. If he is at a distance from you, it would be a kindness if you would contrive for him the means of repairing to Minorca as soon as he can. But perhaps the best thing would be to talk with Stuart about it. I send a formal leave for him to quit his present situation.

“Every thing depends on the struggle of this year. I hope the example of the Vendée will not discourage in other quarters. The whole thing was ill contrived and worse conducted. We tried in vain to keep them back till the spring; but although it is certain they broke out some months too soon, yet they failed not so much from that cause as from their own divisions and jealousies.

“The submission and reconciliation of the Orleans Princes is, I think, useful, as it cuts off all hope of any other monarchy than that of the lawful King.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, March 4. Cleveland Row.—“I have just put your paper into Mr. Pitt’s hands. I am sorry that I cannot meet you at the time you mention, but if $\frac{1}{2}$ past 10 on Thursday will suit you equally well, we shall both be at your orders. Let me know whether here or at your Office will suit you best.

“In the mean time, as it would not be right that we should omit to return some answer to Viomenil’s paper, I have put down a note of a paper for that purpose which Mr. Pitt has seen, and which, if you approve of it and will return to me, I will get put into French to-morrow morning, so that we may give it to Viomenil when we

see him to-morrow. They would, I think both of them, be offended, if they have not some answer then, and I trust you will think this does not preclude any final decision we may take on the main question." *Copy.*

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 5. Dublin Castle.—"G. Ponsonby made his motion last night respecting the sense of the nation.

"He asserted that, in the message upon Union, the King had appealed to the sense of the people; that, from the petitions before the House, the sense of the people was against the measure; that it was the duty of the House to lay the sense of the people before their sovereign, as he had appealed to it.

"He moved an abstract principle as to the right of petitioning, intending to follow it with a declaration of fact as to the number of petitions before the House, and an address for laying them before the King.

"He did not make an impressive speech; but Lord Castlereagh made an admirable reply, which put our friends in complete spirits, and he moved the question of adjournment. Our debate lasted till $\frac{1}{2}$ past six this morning; 155 for adjourning, 107 against.

"I think the whole of the evening was favourable to us. It was the Opposition's great question, and they made no impression. The House was in ordinary force; our friends very steady. We had 166 members in town; nine ill, but I think we have no *malingerers*.

"If the public out of doors can be kept quiet, I think we may now do well.

"I hear the Consular exchequer is running dry.

"We had some bold doctrines last night by Saurin and Plunket on the competence of Parliament, but they were well exposed by Fox.

"I think our friends like arguing the general question.

"Lord De Clifford's members did not divide against us last night; nor did G. Knox.

"The Speaker will plague us upon cottons and other details.

"The Lords are growing discontented as to the power reserved to the Crown of creating new Irish peers after Union."

SIR W. SCOTT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 5. London.—"I received the honour of your Lordship's letter, and shall be very happy to attend your Lordship's summons and Mr. Pitt's to converse upon the subject of the proposed bill. I should, however, be glad to have the opportunity of looking at it again, as I have lost the recollection of several parts of it, having not taken any notes either of it or of the last letter which I troubled your Lordship with respecting it. The objection with respect to the fund is certainly removed by what is stated in your letter, and to which I do not recollect that any explanation was

printed in the draft of the bill itself. Neither do I see any objection to the management of the fund being vested in the trustees, but, if the application of it to the consolidation of livings is to be independent of the Bishops and even compulsory upon them (which I recollect was the expressed intention of the Act) I cannot but think, with great deference, that that will be an alteration of the law subject to great doubt as to its expediency.

"I beg your Lordship to believe that I feel most fully the propriety of making the attempt to correct the growing mischiefs which threaten the religious establishments of the country; and shall be glad to give my humble assistance to it in any way in which I can be instrumental to its success. Your Lordship will excuse my adding, by way of apology if I should happen to detain the draft of the bill for a day or two longer than might otherwise seem proper, that I am at present engaged in daily sittings upon some very long and laborious causes in the Admiralty."

ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION WITH THE ROYALISTS OF FRANCE.

LORD GRENVILLE TO GENERAL COUNT DE VIOMENIL.

Most Secret.

1800, March 6.—"The means of carrying on any successful operation in France must depend on a consideration of the state of the country at the time of the proposed expedition, and of the amount of force to be allotted to it, as well as of the general situation of the allies. At present therefore the whole question can be considered only provisionally, and the answers given on particular points must all be subject to the great question whether the enterprise itself shall be undertaken. And even the separate points may be liable to be in some degree varied at the precise moment of acting, from the same considerations by which the main question is to be governed. Subject to these remarks the separate articles in the memorandum may be answered as follows.

1. "The force of the army to be employed entirely depends on the result of the present negotiations at Petersburg. The inconvenience of acting with a combined army composed of the forces of two nations, whose troops, though equally brave and faithful to their respective sovereigns, have yet never been accustomed to co-operate together, and have in no respect the same rules or habits of service, has led to a persuasion that no plan resting on that basis can be adopted with a prospect of a satisfactory issue to either of the two Powers concerned. The mass of the army to serve under M. de Viomenil must therefore be Russian, and its operations must be calculated principally on the amount of Russian troops which the Emperor of Russia's zeal for the common cause may induce him to furnish for these operations, by treaty with His Majesty, in consequence of the negotiations now carrying on at Petersbourg. This principle, which applies irresistibly to any plan of acting on the same point by a combined force consisting of large bodies of the troops of each nation, with their respective general and staff officers, does not however, by any means, exclude the possibility of furnishing to a small amount, and as accessory only,

any particular description of force which it may be thought peculiarly necessary to add to the Russian army. The emigrant corps now in Portugal come under this description, because their services must be of particular value in any expedition undertaken for the support of the Royalists in France. They are, besides, represented to be perfectly well disciplined and in every respect fit for service. Their number may be put at 3 or 4,000 men. A small corps of foreign chasseurs now in Ireland may, in like manner, be added to the army. Whatever dismounted cavalry the Emperor may be induced to send here from Russia, measures might easily be taken for mounting them, without the smallest delay, immediately on their arrival; and this will probably be found the most satisfactory mode of providing for the service of such a body of cavalry as will unquestionably be required for any offensive operations on the coast of France. For it does not seem compatible with the principle above stated, nor is it a measure which in itself promises to be productive of solid advantage, to attach to such an army a body of British cavalry; who are accustomed only to act with their own infantry, and according to a system of service essentially different from that of the Russian cavalry; and who are besides, from many circumstances of local and national character, totally unfit to form the only cavalry of a foreign army, especially of one acting in France. The same remark might perhaps be less applicable to a corps of British artillery to do the service of such a park of British artillery as it may be necessary to attach to the Russian army, with a view to those operations, whatever they may be, which shall ultimately be determined on.

Article 2. "There will be no difficulty in mounting the Cossacks here mentioned, and M. de Viomenil is desired to send to Mr. Dundas an account of the number and description of horses required.

Article 3. "Before the expedition is finally resolved on a communication will be made to M. de Viomenil of such plan as shall ultimately be adopted here for the employment of His Majesty's troops in the next campaign. But the aid which the expedition now in question will derive from their exertions will, in all probability, be more in the way of diversion than of direct co-operation.

Article 4. "There will be every disposition to afford to the Russian troops to be employed on any such expedition as is here spoken of, all such supplies and succours as are mentioned under this and the following article, to the very utmost extent of our means. But this demand cannot be answered in detail unless a specification be made of the quantity and nature of each article required. For which purpose a statement should be made out, applying to the different amount of force of which, under different suppositions, the expedition may consist, it being impossible to settle this point with precision till after the receipt of the next despatches from St. Petersburg. The greatest embarrassment which we shall have to encounter will probably arise on the subject of horses; not from the difficulty of the supply, but from that of the means of transporting them. And all the operations which are in view would be greatly facilitated if, by understanding with the Royalists, or in any other manner, horses, to any considerable amount, would be found in the

country. And the comparative resources of different provinces in this respect should be considered as a very material article in the choice of the point of attack.

Article 5. "Same answer.

Article 6. "It being wished that the whole expense of every kind of the Russian troops should in future be defrayed by His Majesty, and that this arrangement should stand in lieu of all other engagements of subsidy, His Majesty could in that case name a Commissariat to serve with them, and the persons so employed would be instructed to furnish as nearly as possible the rations of food to which those troops have been accustomed, both as to quality and quantity. But if the army should advance into the country, the Government to be established there will naturally be expected to provide in a considerable degree for this object.

Article 7. "The measure of attaching to the Russian army a number of French engineer and artillery officers seems highly proper, and if M. de Viomenil will make choice of proper persons for that purpose, His Majesty will willingly agree to any reasonable arrangement to be proposed by M. de Viomenil for their pay and subsistence while so employed.

Article 8. "Provision will be made by His Majesty for the supply and management of a secret service fund under the direction of the general commanding the army, and with such mode of administration and account as may be most satisfactory to him.

Article 9. "This has already been in great degree provided for by the communications made through *Monsieur* to the Royalists; but all necessary latitude will be given on this subject to M. de Viomenil.

Article 10. "The presence of a French prince seems indispensably necessary to every hope of success from such an expedition. All the necessary arrangements respecting his situation, and also relative to the means of rendering the force to be raised in the country entirely subordinate to the same direction with that of the Russian army, would be settled with him and the general of the Russian troops previous to the expedition. This last point is deemed essential, and His Majesty's government sees no better way of its being accomplished than by M. de Viomenil receiving from *Monsieur* a commission to command the Royalists, with such reserves only as are due to the personal situation of any prince of the Royal Family of France, who may be serving with them.

Article 11. "Answered above.

Article 12. "Yes, if the Court of Petersburg consents to it.

Article 13. "Yes, but the assistance of the Russian ships now here may perhaps be wanted for the purpose of transporting the troops and articles necessary to accompany them. The continuance of a British squadron on the coast after the debarcation must depend on the place chosen for that purpose, and on other considerations by which all naval operations must be regulated.

Article 14. "Yes.

Article 15. "Ditto.

Article 16. "Will be attended to, and M. de Viomenil is desired to send to Mr. Dundas a note of the quantity required.

Article 17. "M. de Viomenil will exercise his own discretion and knowledge in this respect: he being well acquainted with the character of the different French officers of that description now here.

Article 18. "This must be concerted with *Monsieur* whenever the plan is determined on.

Article 19. "Answered above.

Article 20. "M. de Viomenil's calculation of the force necessary for the success of either of the two plans here mentioned, is not considered by His Majesty's Government as in any degree overrated. Perhaps even that number would be found incompetent to act with success in those provinces, unless assured of powerful co-operation on the part of the Royalists, whose dispositions, however, appear to be such (even after their late disasters) as to afford a strong ground of hope in this respect. If then the number mentioned by M. de Viomenil be taken as a basis for the adoption of either of those plans, the decision in that respect must depend on the possibility of collecting, transporting, and feeding so large a force as 40,000 men, with all the various articles of supply which are necessary to enable them to act. This still appears to be extremely uncertain, and it is hardly possible to form even a conjecture in this respect till the answers from Russia are received. If the force shall (as is perhaps more probable) not be carried so high as the amount here stated, or if, on a detailed examination of the transports, provisions, and supplies required, they should be found to exceed the disposable means which this government can command, even with its utmost exertions (taking into consideration the various and multiplied calls for other services equally pressing and important,) it will then remain to be considered in what other mode such Russian force as may be destined to act against the enemy on this side can be employed so as most to promote the benefit of the common cause, and the attainment of those ends which the two sovereigns have in view. And on this point M. de Viomenil's opinion would justly be considered entitled to the greatest weight and consideration." *Draft for translation into French.*

THE EARL OF CLARE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 6. Dublin.—"I send you a statement as correct as I have been enabled to furnish from a vile note sent to me of what fell from me on opening the subject of Union in the House of Lords. And have only to request you will be assured I do not insist upon your reading it. Will your Lordship have the goodness to excuse me for troubling you with a copy for my friend the Marquis of Buckingham."

DUTCH AFFAIRS.

Official Minute.

1800, March 6 Admiralty.—"Mr. Nepean has been desired by Lord Spencer (who has been obliged to go out upon some business) to acquaint Lord Grenville, that the step most adviseable to be

taken under all the existing circumstances will be to order the four Dutch frigates to proceed to Portsmouth and land their crews on the Isle of Wight, where sufficient accommodation can readily be provided for them, and where they may remain until they may be called upon to serve. Mr. Nepean understands that the four frigates are not at this moment in a condition for service, and if continued in commission, after they shall have been purchased from the captors, will occasion a very considerable expense to the public.

“The ships which surrendered with Admiral Story are all intended to be libelled, one of them indeed has already been libelled. The removal of the crews of the four frigates to new ships will therefore be attended with great inconvenience, as no regular establishments are at present, or can as they are now circumstanced, be sent on board them.

“Lord Spencer will be ready to meet Lord Grenville on the subject of these ships at any time his Lordship may be likely to be at leisure.”

Enclosure :—

The PRINCE OF ORANGE to [H. FAGEL].

1800, March 5. Hampton Court.—“Je vous envoie une lettre du Lieutenant Froent au Capitaine-Lieutenant Van Vos. Vous y verrez que l'on veut s'emparer des frégattes, le *Hector*, le *Heldin*, la *Venus* et la *Minerve*. Ceci n'a rien de commun avec les vaisseaux qui ont été commandés par l'Amiral Story. Il seroit à souhaiter que ceci n'eut pas eu lieu, car la prise de ces vaisseaux ne fera pas autant de bien aux capteurs que la nouvelle de la prise fera du tort au bon parti en Hollande, mais il s'agit de savoir que faire des équipages de ces frégattes si les Anglois en prennent possession. La chose presse ; pourroit-on obtenir un ordre de l'Amirauté pour que l'on diffèrât la prise de possession de quelque temps, ou que quelques-uns des vaisseaux de l'Amiral Story puissent venir à ma disposition pour y placer les équipages de ces quatre frégattes, en attendant que le sort de tous les vaisseaux soit décidé. Je vous prie de me faire savoir si vous vous portez mieux, et si vous pouviez recevoir demain dans la matinée MM. Van Vos et Grengler. Il y a encore un point sur lequel ils demandent des ordres, c'est au sujet d'une revolte qui a eu lieu à bord du *Heldin*. Ils demandent s'ils peuvent tenir conseil de guerre et les punir. Je ne puis rien dire sans savoir ce que l'on veut ici. Si vous vous portez mieux je serai charmé de vous voir demain ; mais, en attendant, je vous prie de me faire savoir si vous pouvez voir ces Messieurs demain matin, et ce que vous croyez que je devois faire en ceci.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 8. Harley Street.—“Ayant reçu votre billet avec la réponse en Anglois aux questions par écrit que le Général Comte de Vioménil vous a remises à la conférence qui a eu lieu entre vous, M. Pitt, M. Dundas, lui et moi, je l'ai fait traduire en François, et je l'ai tout de suite communiquée au dit général.

“ Nous n'avons pû être que très satisfaits de cette réponse, qui toute préliminaire et éventuelle qu'elle soit, puisqu'elle dépend de tant de circonstances futures et indépendantes de notre volonté, nous prouve certainement le zèle éclairé que le Ministère Britannique met dans une entreprise qui peut décider du sort de la France, et, par conséquent, du repos de l'Europe.

“ Il est mutuellement reconnu par vous et par nous que l'entreprise ne peut s'effectuer que par une force imposante, et telle que nous n'avons pas ici actuellement ; ainsi il faut attendre quelle sera la résolution de l'Empereur à cet égard. Il est également reconnu que si on aura cette force, il seroit bien imprudent de la hasarder avant que la guerre ne soit bien vivement allumée sur la frontière de la Provence, du Dauphiné, de la Franche Comté et de l'Alsace, où Bonaparte seroit forcé de porter ses armées, ce qui affaiblirait ses moyens de résistance en Bretagne et en Normandie ; et, par conséquent, l'époque de notre expédition ne peut être mieux fixée que vers la fin de Mai, ou au commencement de Juin, comme l'a très judicieusement marqué M. le Comte de Viomenil.

“ Il reste à répéter le besoin de quelque cavallerie qui nous manque, et sans laquelle on ne pourroit rien faire, si même l'Empereur envoyoit deux régimens d'huzards démontés, car pour cette espèce de troupes on pourroit trouver des chevaux en Bretagne ; mais pour des dragons on n'en trouvera pas, parceque, suivant M. le Comte de Viomenil qui connoit le pays, la race des chevaux y est d'une taille très petite. Nous espérons donc que le Gouvernement Britannique, accordant tous les autres points, ne refusera pas aussi de donner quatre régimens de cavallerie légère avec leurs montures.

“ Pour ce qui est de la réponse au 13^me article, je dois observer que les vaisseaux de guerre Russes, ainsi que des vaisseaux Anglois de la même espèce, ne peuvent servir pour le transport des troupes, parcequ'ils ne peuvent même aller aux isles pour prendre les troupes, vû que les ports de ces parages ne peuvent recevoir que de petits batimens et des frégattes. Nous n'avons pas des premiers, et fort peu des secondes. Il faut donc des batimens de transport qui seront protégés par les escadrons combinées ; et cette combinaison d'escadres est d'autant plus nécessaire que nos amiraux et capitaines ne connoissent pas les côtes de France, et qu'il faut, d'ailleurs, être en grande force pour ne courir aucun risque de la part des flottes combinées de France et d'Espagne à Brest, et qui peuvent sortir par les mêmes vents qui empêchent à vos escadres le blocus de ce port. Voici ce que j'ai crû devoir soumettre à votre considération, et à celle de M. Pitt et M. Dundas, auxquels je ne doute pas que vous ne communiquiez ces observations.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 9. Fort William.—“ Newspapers have reached me from England containing your speech on the 4th October upon

moving the vote of thanks to me. I read it with stronger emotions than I can describe, and not without many tears of joy, gratitude, and affection.

"By the same dispatch I learnt the state of affairs in Europe to the date of the new French revolution (with the exception of the effect of that event in England, my English intelligence not being later than the 25th October).

"Your difficulties are again increased, but I am certain your courage will not abate, and I still trust that you will be able to rally the allies. One effort more would accomplish the business.

"I have written to Dundas earnestly pressing to be allowed to return home in January, 1801; I shall then have been above three years absent from England, and above two and a half actually in India. It will be nearly six months, in all probability, from the time of my embarkation to that of my arrival in England. With regard to the public service, I really believe that I shall be more useful by representing to Dundas the true state of these countries, and urging proper measures, than I can be here; and with respect to fortune, if I am satisfied, who is to complain?

"The truth is that I cannot support a longer absence from my family and friends. In one of my letters to you I thought I had reconciled myself to my splendid exile; but with the sound of triumph and honor all around me, and with the affectation of satisfaction and happiness, this proud Governor General

Spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

"You cannot conceive the state of society here; how entirely devoid I am of all resource of conversation or relaxation of any kind; although the climate requires long intervals of repose from business, that repose is,

'A deathlike silence, and a dread repose.'

Many circumstances too have contributed to aggravate my melancholy; although my own health has not been touched, I have lost many valuable friends, and the best of my companions, poor Hunt Cooke, a very worthy officer, one of my aides-de-camp; others are returned to Europe; and at this hour, a most excellent and amiable young man, whom I brought from the coast with me, is in a state nearly approaching to desperate. In this country the cry of death is for ever in one's ears; and it is too shocking to stand long when it proceeds from friends and companions, and when no voice of comfort is to be heard.

"For God's sake release me; and let me embark, *emeritus*, in January 1801."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 10. Dublin.—"The Representation article passed this night after a short debate. As nothing about compensation was introduced, the Opposition reserved themselves.

"The Committee was thin when the division took place; the article passed by 81 to 62.

"G. Ponsonby gave notice that, on Thursday, he would take the sense of the House on the principle of compensation; and some

squibs on the subject were thrown out by Goold, Plunket, and H. Osborne.

"Lord Castlereagh will move, to-morrow, the Church and the last article ; on Friday, commerce.

"The Opposition still hope to inflame the country ; but they have not effected their purpose yet. The Speaker still maintains his language, that the measure cannot pass, and that England will not force it."

The BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 11. Buckden Palace.—"I return the heads of a plan with the few remarks written in the margin which have occurred to me upon a very careful and attentive perusal. I also take the liberty of enclosing some observations relative to the necessity of some bill upon this subject, which were written immediately after I had the honour of receiving your letter concerning the parishes in the neighbourhood of Dropmore, and before our meeting in Downing Street in the beginning of December.

"I cannot but hope that your conference with Sir W. Scott will end in making him favourable to the plan. I now begin to be anxious about time. It is but a month to the Easter recess. The heads are to be communicated to ten or twelve people, and then formally to the Bishops through the Archbishop ; and the Bill itself is to be drawn. It appears to me desirable that the heads should be given to the Archbishop next week, and that in the following week the Bishops should meet upon the subject. I am going into Suffolk upon the 17th and shall return hither on the 21st, after that I shall be ready to go to town every day, or even before if it should be necessary."

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 12. Constantinople.—"Having heard from Lord Minto of Mr. Paget's going to Naples, I have written to him by Donaldson (and for the information of the admirals) on every circumstance before me which could at all enter into consideration in regulating the destination of any squadron we may have to send into these seas, this summer. And I have done it on the belief that the appearance of an English fleet, under the command of a steady and respectable officer, will go a great way towards increasing our influence, and checking the superiority and unfair advantages which others find the means of assuming only because they are relativeley the strongest. Any commercial arrangements we may have in view would be more recommended by the mere sight of an English squadron, than by any argument that could be used ; and it is singular that no English squadron was ever in company with the Turks, or cruising in this neighbourhood. The differences, and (if my information be right) the scandalous proceedings of the Russian agents at Corfu, would thereby be suppressed, and, in general, a degree of harmony maintained which it undoubtedly was the intention in the alliance to establish."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 13. Somerset Place.—“A few days ago I received a copy of a letter from Lord Elgin to you on the subject of a land communication between this country and India by Constantinople. Do you mean that I should take measures for the execution of it through the means of the East India Company? I like the suggestion much, and I think so conducted the communication would be much improved. The Court of Directors have prejudices against communications between India and Great Britain by land, but they are perfectly unfounded, and cannot be regarded.”

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 13. Florence.—“I had prepared, and it was my intention to send to your Lordship a detailed letter upon a subject which has occupied my mind very much of late, but the treaty concluded under the auspices of Sir Sydney Smith having created so total a change in the affairs in that country, it appears to me almost superfluous to trouble your Lordship with it. I will however just state that my idea was to *gain General Kleber and his whole army, and to send them to co-operate with General Willot in the south of France.*

“Though I say to gain, I meant to be understood that I thought the business ought to be done with little or even without money, that is for the purpose of corruption; as from the information I have been able to obtain with regard to the character of General Kleber and the principal officers under him, such as Desaix, Menou, and upon a reference to Kleber’s letters in the last intercepted correspondence from Egypt, I was induced to believe that he and his whole army are so completely disgusted with their late and present rulers, that they would gladly enter into a league to overthrow the existing French Government.

“I had a person in my eye, and within reach, whom I had proposed to employ in this business. He was formerly intimately acquainted with Kleber, and also with some of his officers; he is to have a command in the south of France under General Willot. I should have wished him to have been accompanied by some English officer, that they should have landed on any part of the coast of Egypt, have proceeded to the French head-quarters, and then have made such favourable overtures to General Kleber for delivering France from its present tyrants, as I am induced to think he would have accepted.

“I will not conceal from your Lordship that I communicated this plan to Lord Keith, so that had things been in such a situation that it might have been approved by your Lordship, there would have been no time lost in making the necessary preparations by sea for the execution of it; for, I presume, no difficulty would then have been made to it by the King of France, or by the

Ottoman Porte to the evacuation of Egypt by the French on those terms.

"Such is the outline of the plan, and I think I could have answered for the complete success of it under the circumstances then existing. Whether there is sufficient merit in it to make it worth considering as to the practicability of executing it now, is what I most humbly submit to your Lordship.

"I am just returned from Leghorn, for which place I set off the day after my arrival here, in order to concert with Lord Keith about the return of the King of Naples to his capital; to-morrow morning I shall proceed without delay on my journey thither."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 14. Downing Street.—"In the box which I sent to you with the military memoir there were two papers as an appendix; one a letter from an officer on the expedition to Sir Ralph Abercrombey; the other a small Dutch map with some manuscript observations and intelligence respecting Walcheren. Mr. Pitt has returned the memoir but not the other papers, and he says they were not sent to him by you. I hope that is the case, for I have looked over his table carefully and cannot find them, and I should be sorry if the intelligence had gone astray."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 14. Dublin.—"We were in the House last night till near four. Ponsonby had been obliged to give up his motion as to the compensation to boroughs by the borough proprietors, and he feigned sickness. Sir J. Parnell took his place, and, by a manœuvre of the Speaker, got possession of the House. He moved an address to the King to dissolve Parliament; we divided, after a long debate, 150 to 104.

"Mr. Saurin, having broadly laid down the doctrine of resistance if a law were passed against the sense of the majority of the people, was warmly attacked by our friends. Since we have established our majority and shown its steadiness, the lawyers, in despair, have been bringing forward violent appeals to the people. Saurin, who is a man of real ability as a lawyer, and a smooth, artful, plausible speaker, with an excellent private character, takes the lead. It is insinuated that he would never utter what was not strictly constitutional.

"Lord Castlereagh thought it right to check these attempts; and he made, at the close of the debate, a most pointed and eloquent attack upon Saurin. He accused him, broadly, of acting the Jacobin game; of endeavouring to establish the position that the sense of the people was not to be found in Parliament; of preaching the doctrine of resistance on the ground that any Act passed against what any man chose to call the majority of the people was a nullity.

"He said these doctrines went to excite and justify rebellion.

He called on Saurin, if he did not mean rebellion, not to lead on the people to their destruction ; if he did, to come forward, avow himself, and place himself at their head.

"I think good effects will follow, for Saurin was not supported. Even Grattan declined his doctrines, and kept himself strictly constitutional.

"We hope to pass all the resolutions but commerce to-day. That is put off till Tuesday. I hear the different guilds of the city are going to petition to be heard against the Union by counsel, as their petitions go to the principle. I suppose they cannot be heard."

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 14. St. Petersburg.—"I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's private letter of the 18th November on the subject of the Russian maps, which you wish to procure from hence. I am much afraid I shall not be able to satisfy your Lordship's expectations, as I most ardently wish to do. I have myself all those which have been published here, but in the whole number there is not one set which can be called a good work. I will however select the best, and forward them by the first opportunity. The Emperor, it is true, has some very curious ones, but they are more so from the beautiful manner in which they are executed, *à la main*, than for their accuracy. They are regarded as curiosities, but never referred to. They have however never been published, neither is there any other copy than that in the possession of His Imperial Majesty. Your Lordship may however depend upon having the best which can be procured."

E. COOKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 15. Dublin Castle.—"We went through, yesterday, the article respecting the church, and the last article, almost without observation. The Opposition did not attend.

"I send your Lordship the evidence which has been given at the bar.

"The power to be retained of creating Irish peers after the Union is much disrelished by the Lords, and I [am] a little apprehensive on that subject ; and my Lords the Bishops seem to affect squeamishness as to voting upon that point."

Enclosing :—

A copy of the evidence taken by a Committee of the whole Irish House of Commons in regard to the injurious effects of the Articles of Union upon Irish trade.

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1800, March 17. Munich.—"Since my last I have been again confined to my room with this vexatious fever that has never ceased

to torment me more or less for more than two months, nor do I believe that I am yet cured, though infinitely better within these last five days.

"I promised your Lordship an account of some of my Vienna observations, and I will now be as good as my word ; only premising that I learnt nothing there of which your Lordship as well as myself had not very tolerable notions long before I undertook this journey.

"My first interview with Thugut lasted an hour and a half. Nothing could have been more awkward than the first half hour, after which he left off squinting, and looked me full in the face. The conversation became animated, a few ill-natured things were said on both sides, but we parted very good friends, with a very pressing invitation on his side to return again whenever I should find a moment of leisure.

"The Bavarian treaty made the principal subject of our conversation, but as it was a subject connected directly or indirectly with a great many others, I had an opportunity of hearing him descant on almost every topic on which I could have wished to have set him a-talking. Amidst some occasional sneers at the *disinterested* policy of England, expressed in a way that left me no doubt of this subject being the one that had made the deepest impression, he launched out against Russia, Marshal Suwarow, General Mack, Lord Nelson, and Sir Sidney Smith, particularly Marshal Suwarow, in a manner that marked more of passion than discretion ; and confirmed at once all the impressions I had received of him, particularly from the Avoyer de Steigner, that he was a man whose conduct was very much governed, even in the most important occasions, by the personal opinion he entertained of individuals with whom he was called on to act ; and that his opinion was very often formed on no other ground than the readiness or unwillingness of those individuals to act according to his own wishes and inclinations.

"He refused peremptorily (though very strongly pressed by Lord Minto) to give any account of what had passed between the Emperor and Buonaparte, until he should have the assurance that his Majesty would engage not to make a separate peace ; but was frequent and earnest in his declarations that, if the two Courts could come to an understanding, his Majesty should have every reason to be thoroughly satisfied with the conduct of the Emperor, particularly with the efforts that would be made by the armies both in Italy and Germany. I trust I should have been one of the last persons who would have become the dupe of such declarations unaccompanied by facts tending to make me believe that they were sincere ; but I own that I left his room thoroughly satisfied that his whole object, at this moment, was to retrieve, still more effectually than had been done by the victories in Italy, the disgrace which the Austrian arms had incurred before the treaty of Campo Formio, and that he saw no mode of arriving at this object but by the conquest of Germany and Switzerland, both of which I am persuaded that he considers as perfectly feasible. I am persuaded also that Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein are uppermost in his mind, and that he thinks that both the one and the other may be conquered on the

upper Rhine and in the Bishopric of Basle. I know at least that this is the military opinion of the very men whom he is about to employ in this campaign, though having a personal dislike to them all; I mean Schmidt, Weyrother, and Chasteler. The latter, your Lordship probably knows, was the author of Marshal Suwarow's proclamation to the Piedmontese, nor do I believe it possible for a man to have committed a greater fault in M. Thugut's opinion than to have written that paper; excepting it be Schmidt, who has expressed on every occasion a strong personal attachment to the Arch-Duke, whom M. Thugut hates most cordially.

"Your Lordship will probably observe that his conduct on this occasion is directly contrary to that which might have been expected from the character I have given of him but a little way back, and I admit that it is. But it is not at our time of life that we are to learn that these contradictions are as common in great men as in little ones; nor do I believe them less frequent on the banks of the Danube than on those of the Thames.

"Be that as it may, there escaped from him, and *that* in moments of warmth, enough to satisfy me that my information from Paris was correct, and that Bonaparté would make no sacrifices but such as M. Thugut now thinks that he can obtain without the consent of the Consul. I found in him too, when talking of the army, all that pride and conscious superiority which I have often told your Lordship that I had observed of late in the Austrian officers; which has always appeared to me, if rightly managed and directed, the safest and surest instrument for insuring the continuation of the war. It appears to me something like the sensation one feels on gaining two or three games at chess of a person who had been accustomed to beat you for three or four months before. Your Lordship knows very well, at least did know, that it is not in human nature to resist a fourth game if offered by the person you have beaten.

"I do not mean to say that if terms were offered such as would insure to the House of Austria a continuation of peace for five or six years, and *an increase of power such as would enable it to fall upon Prussia in the interval*, that they would not be readily accepted. But, short of this, I think in my conscience they would be rejected, provided Great Britain enters firmly and cordially into the alliance, is liberal in her pecuniary assistance, and does not interfere *too much* in political or military direction.

"I am besides persuaded that the M. Thugut of to-day is a very different man from the M. Thugut of the month of April, or even of the month of July last, when the decided superiority of the Austrian arms was still problematical; and that it is his opinion *now* that the chance of war may be risked without much danger, which was certainly not the case at either of the two periods I have last mentioned, when he was more afraid of M. de Suwarow's victories than of any defeat that could have befallen the Arch-Duke.

"In one point I do not think it possible for me to be mistaken, I mean his extreme and eager desire to succeed in obtaining assistance from England. Had I been ever with him alone, I should certainly have ventured to have applied the touchstone more closely than

Lord Minto has done ; as it was, I put him two or three times in a passion by contradicting him, purposely to put him off his guard and make him say ill-natured things, which nobody is more apt to do than this good minister ; and I regularly observed that he took great pains to check himself, and to avoid saying anything that might give offence. On the other hand whenever I talked of the power of England and Austria united, and of the days of Queen Anne and Maria Theresa, I observed his eyes brighten up in a way that could not have been assumed for the purpose of deceiving me, and he launched out immediately on the ambition of France under whatever form of government she existed, and the necessity of reducing her within proper bounds. If all this be trick, I own I am grievously deceived ; the more so as I have left Vienna with the impression that though M. Thugut is unquestionably a cunning, intriguing man, and one who will occasionally sacrifice his opinions and his prejudices to carry some great point, yet that his general character would be more correctly given if I were to call him an obstinate, self-willed old man, full of spleen and passion. Such at least is the opinion I have formed after four very long conversations with him, and it is upon that opinion that I should act if I had a point to carry with him, being persuaded that many parts of his conduct which had hitherto appeared to me inexplicable, may all be cleared up by referring them to the above principle.

"He was very clear and explicit on the subject of Switzerland, and his whole language and promises such as I could most have wished. But I thought his manner of explaining himself on the subject very clumsy, as he did not conceal his intention of having his conduct on this occasion considered by me as a personal favour to myself ; at which I should have laughed had it not been my principal object to keep him in good humour. Besides, it was something for me to know that he wished to keep well with me.

"We sat with him every night for near two hours, sometimes more, and he was always unwilling to let us go ; and, when we parted, he gave me a kiss on each cheek which I shall long remember. Had I been alone with him I should have learnt a great deal more, as I saw him once or twice disposed to enter into explanation on the subject of Dietrichstein's mission ; but he checked himself each time as if he were afraid of talking before Lord Minto, to whom he had told so many lies.

"His contempt and hatred for the French Princes and the Royalists in general is unshaken, and nothing but his conviction that *France* cannot be reduced but by their assistance, will ever engage him in any measure tending to give them support or consideration.

"In all matters of business with which he was acquainted I found him very clear and able, but rather slow in comprehending a new subject, or understanding any complicated fact.

"I believe upon the whole that my journey to Vienna has done good, as, whatever his real principles and views may be, his instructions to Kray and Lehrbach certainly are to communicate on *many subjects*, fairly and confidentially, with the British Minister. The latter would not have left Vienna but for the King's message

to the House, on the subject of the negotiations with the German powers, which has reached us through France. As soon as M. Thugut read it, he ordered M. Lehrbach away immediately, and told him (as the latter assures me) that he might now communicate with me *confidentially* on *all* subjects, as our interests were the same.

"After M. de Thugut, I saw all the other ministers at Vienna, after which I was the less astonished at the credit and influence which the former enjoys. Much as I had heard on the subject before, they were all very much below what I had expected to find them. It is really not possible for your Lordship to figure to yourself a more poor, contemptible set, or to form an idea of the thorough indifference and contempt with which Thugut treats them all.

"I found at Vienna a number of officers with whom I had been acquainted at the army. I saw, besides Bellegarde, Chasteler, Dietrichstein and many others who have been at times the favourites and the instruments of the Minister. I saw a great deal of the old Prince de Ligne, and of Gallo; in short I saw and heard, as much as possible, every body that was worth seeing and hearing. The human face divine was all that I allowed myself to run after, having seen literally nothing of what strangers go to Vienna to see; not even the palace, the arsenal, the opera, nor even the Prater. The sum of my observations is that Thugut stands unshaken, and irremovable; and that this Russian tempest has served no other purpose but to make his old roots strike into the earth ten times deeper than before.

"This was the only point in which both his friends and enemies agreed, and concerning which no possible doubt can now be entertained. This therefore is the only key to Vienna politics, and, rusty as it is, I am afraid your Lordship will be obliged to have recourse to it if you want to open any doors in that quarter.

"If this letter were not already extended to so very unreasonable a length, I would add something of what I conceive to be the real views of this extraordinary man; but I will reserve all this for another occasion, the more readily as I shall learn much from Lehrbach, in the course of a day or two, of the history of the Arch-Duke's retreat, the real test of Thugut's strength."

Postscript.—"I find that the poor Arch-Duke is loudly blamed for having communicated to Tolstoy the original letter he received from the Emperor by the hands of Dietrichstein, ordering him to withdraw his *whole* army from Switzerland. Your Lordship will recollect that M. Thugut always declared that the Arch-Duke had discretionary powers on that subject. It was Gallo, to whom this secret was disclosed at Petersburg, who communicated it only whilst I was at Vienna to Thugut.

"It does not appear that they know that his Royal Highness made a similar communication to me."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 17. Harley Street.—"Je vous avois promis de vous communiquer des renseignements sur le Comte Viomenil; je vous les envoie en toute confiance, en vous priant de ne pas en tirer de copie

de les lire vous seule, et de me les renvoyer. La première de ces deux pièces est un écrit qu'il m'a donné pour que je lui fasse des réponses. Vous verrez par la première question qu'il avoit des préjugés contre ce pays ; mais je dois lui rendre justice qu'il en est tout à fait revenu, et qu'ainsi, comme je vous l'ai assuré la dernière fois que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir, vous pouvez compter sur les bons principes et les talents de ce général. Je l'ai vue tous les jours pendant plus de trois semaines, et je puis vous assurer que c'est le Français le moins Français que j'ai vue de ma vie, et qu'il est parti pour les isles convaincu de la bonne foi du ministère Britannique.

"L'autre pièce est mon rapport à l'Empereur sur le plan du Général Comte de Viomenil, en conséquence de l'ordre que Sa Majesté Impériale m'avoit donné de revoir les plans du général, et de lui envoyer mon opinion.

"Est-il vrai que les négocians Holandais qui s'étoit chargés de faire venir de France des grains ont retractés leurs promesses ? "

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, March 18. Cleveland Row.—"Je vous renvoie les pièces que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer. J'y vois avec plaisir toutes les précautions que M. de Viomenil croit devoir prendre pour ne pas s'engager dans une entreprise hasardée. Son ignorance sur tout ce qui regarde ce pays-ci ne doit pas surprendre, puisqu'il n'y avoit presque pas de François sous l'ancien régime qui se donnoit la peine d'être mieux informé à cet égard.

"Je n'ai montré ces papiers à personne, ni n'en ai tiré aucune copie.

"Je n'ai rien appris de plus au sujet du blé que l'on avoit cru pouvoir exporter des ports François en droiture pour l'Angleterre, mais je doute toujours que cet entreprise réussisse ; et dans mon opinion particulière, nos besoins ici ont été bien exagérés par des spéculateurs qui se proposoient d'en profiter.

"La dernière des propositions pour l'Union a dû passer en Irlande aujourd'hui. Nous les aurons ici immédiatement après Pâques."
Copy.

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 18. Constantinople.—"I am really sorry to have been obliged to bring *Spüring's* elopement forward in a public letter, and particularly in so far as regarded Mr. Smith. But the transaction was, it seems, public before I had made any enquiries about it, and known to have been purposely concealed from me, owing both to Spüring's ill-placed confidence, and the stupidity of the people about him. My intercourse with Smith must now, of itself, draw to a close after these letters. I can and must say to your Lordship I never knew such a man in my life. But I trust, long e'er now, your Lordship will have found some other destination for him.

Postscript.—"I wish you to keep in mind the transaction of M.

Tomara, as mentioned in my No. 34. I believe he wished me to refuse him, in order to throw odium on me, and to curry favour. That I shall know."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 18. Munich.—"After waiting all night I have but this instant received the ratification of the treaty which I hope to be able to dispatch in the course of an hour. I need not point out to your Lordship all the difficulties I have had to encounter; you know enough of this Court to be satisfied that everything that Prussia says and does is attended to here in preference to whatever may come from any other quarter. I believe your Lordship is also informed that old Goertz, who is considered as the saviour of Bavaria, was sent here on purpose to dissuade the Elector from entering into any engagements with England after the Russian troops were withdrawn. I know that he told the Elector, and assigned as a reason for his not engaging in the coalition, that France would *necessarily* give the law to the south of Germany this campaign. On being asked, however, officially whether the King of Prussia would take Bavaria under his protection, he first gave a doubtful answer, then, on being more closely pressed, said that Bavaria being in the *south of Germany*, and on the way to Vienna, the King could not possibly in any case have it included within the neutrality which he had had the good fortune to obtain for the north.

"This answer fixed the Elector in his determination to conclude the treaty, but left him a prey to all manner of doubts and suspicions, and added to the dilatoriness of all his measures and resolutions.

"The only person whose conduct is quite inexplicable is Montgélès. That he was a leading man among the *Illuminés* is certain; that he has filled the offices with *Illuminés* is equally so; and it is no less true that he is not only Prussian but even French in his politics; and yet he is the man who has engaged the Elector to go on with, and finally to conclude the treaty. His animosity against the Austrians is implacable, as considering the Court of Vienna to have been the cause of his former disgrace and banishment, and he lives entirely with Prussians, *Friends of Humanity* and Anti-Austrians.

"There is no doubt but that the *first* project of this treaty was conceived in hatred to that House, and that the guaranty without the interference of Austria was the great object and inducement. That hope however being at an end, I am persuaded that there is *now* some project fermenting in the Minister's brain of making his sovereign master of the country and of the *States* by means of the army. In the meantime the army is paid and maintained by Great Britain, and the revenues appropriated to its maintenance by the States are applied to the wants of the Government, which are pressing beyond all example. At least this is the only explanation I can give of his conduct that has even the appearance of probability.

"Sooner or later Austria must have Bavaria, or dwindle herself into a power of the second order; but I do not think that she has any views of the kind at this moment; her present project being most evidently to provide by her acquisitions in Italy the means of conquering Germany under more favorable auspices.

"In the meantime by this treaty she acquires a formidable acquisition of power and strength which, do what we will, she must and will employ to her own purposes.

"I have endeavoured, and I believe not *quite* without effect, to make the Elector and the Minister feel how important it is for their own interests, as well as for those of the common cause, that they should be somewhat more circumspect, at least during the existence of this treaty, in their language on the subject of the Court of Vienna. But I fear they will be better only for a day or two, and then they will fall into their old habits again; such, at least, has been the tendency of their conduct during these last two days..

"I shall write to your Lordship in a day or two on the subject of France, where affairs have changed but little, as far at least as I have been able to observe, within these last two months."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800 [March 20]. Downing Street.—"A Cabinet has been summoned to-morrow, at the desire of several of our colleagues, to discuss further our military plans and prospects. It will be very desirable that you and Dundas and myself should have some previous conversation; particularly on the circumstance (which you perhaps have not heard) of Stuart's having relinquished his command, from dissatisfaction at his treatment at the Horse Guards. Dundas will be here at eleven if you can meet him."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 20. Downing Street.—"I understand that after I left the Duke of Portland's yesterday evening, the subject of the Mediterranean expedition was started with doubts of the propriety of it going on, and it ended in wishing for a meeting of Cabinet. I have accordingly summoned one for to-morrow at 12 o'clock. I hope it will be convenient for you to meet me at Mr. Pitt's at eleven, that I may have some serious conversation with you and him. I feel very unpleasant in the prospect of the next campaign so far as our force may be concerned, and my own situation is become more irksome than I can describe. Of this however no more at present. From some misunderstanding between the Duke of York and Sir Charles Stuart, the latter has resigned his command. If the operations are to go on there, others may, I don't see how he is to be replaced."

E. COOKE to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1800, March 21. Dublin.—"We last night went through the

Commercial Article, giving the existing duties to the cotton manufacturers *in quinquennium*: yet the cotton manufacturers are discontented.

"There was no resistance to the article after it was gone through. Grattan made a speech against Union *in toto*—not impressive; but he will of course print *editio auctior et emendatior*.

"After some debate the Speaker made an impressive and able speech *ad captandum*, and in the close of it, professing moderation, he introduced an historian giving an account of the transactions of the Union, and he turned his historian into a most virulent declaimer against the present administration. Lord Castlereagh thought his conduct so violent and mischievous that, at the close of a very able reply, he made a very severe attack on the Speaker. The Speaker answered in passion. Grattan supported him, and attacked Lord Castlereagh by reading some proceedings of a Northern Whig Club of which Lord Castlereagh had been member, but which he never but once attended when he came of age; which proceedings were, as stated by Grattan, very reprehensible. Ponsonby followed Grattan, and soon after Saurin, and, in the course of the night, Plunket made personal attacks on Lord Castlereagh.

"It seemed as if there had been a plan of general attack; but although there was a good deal of animated invective, no point was attempted to be made against Government; so that, although I think Opposition made a good rally, they shewed they had no real charge to bring forward, no real point to depend upon.

"The Prime Sergeant made a very good speech at the close of the debate.

"We divided on the question for the Chairman to report the Resolution to the House, 154 to 112.

"In the House we divided for going into the report on Friday, 154 to 107.

"Opposition made their best exertion, all their members present but 3. We had 16 absent, 7 in their beds.

"To-morrow we shall carry up the report to the Lords, or at least vote to do so.

"The debates are now made to produce popular effect."

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, March 22. Palermo.—"After the kind assurances your Lordship has been pleased to give me in your private letter of the 20th of December last, of the King's approbation of my long services, and that His Majesty had been graciously pleased to permit your Lordship to assure me of his favour on my retreat, I shall return home with much satisfaction, and with a thorough confidence in His Majesty's goodness, and relying on the continuance of your Lordship's friendship towards me. I only beg leave to remind your Lordship that it was not my retreat but a leave of absence for a short time to look after my private concerns that I begged of your Lordship to apply for me to His Majesty's goodness."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 22. Dublin.—“The Opposition did not choose to risk another division, as they conceived we should divide eleven more than had appeared on the last night, and they could not produce another vote. None of the leaders came down, their benches were thin, they announced their intentions through Sir L. Parsons. Five or six of the inferior speakers made their declamations, and we got through the Report by ten. To oblige the northern members and to satisfy the cotton manufacturers and obtain their good will, Lord Castlereagh consented to let the present cotton duties remain for 7 years instead of 5. It seems immaterial to England, and will, I hope, produce the best effects here. To-day the Resolutions have been carried up to the Lords, and I feel myself quite relieved.

“The Lords are debating the Representation article. They are sore on the subject of making peers after the Union, very sore; but I hope will acquiesce in the proposed modification.

“I hear the object of Opposition is to procure addresses to the King.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 23. Stowe.—“Sincerely do I congratulate you on the Irish prospects. The sketch of the Bill sent to me from Ireland for regulating the representation is strangely imperfect; for, as the clause now stands for the election of the first twenty-eight Lords temporal, all proxies and all bishops are excluded from voting, and the right of election is confined to the Lords temporal *actually present*; the consequence of which will be that the anti-Unionist Lords will, if they stick together, elect the twenty-eight Lords temporal, for they actually have the majority of Lords temporal *present*. Add to this the risk and unnecessary deviation from your general rule in assembling this body, *en corps*, after the Union, and you will, I am persuaded, lean with me to the idea of conducting this election in the same manner as you direct all the subsequent elections, namely by signed lists. No provision is made by this Bill for permitting Irish peers to sit in the House of Commons for British seats; and the clause which directs peers to qualify (for future elections) in the Irish Chancery or before an Irish Justice of Peace, will exclude all those who usually reside in England, even though they may have property in Ireland.

“I see in the foreign papers a Constantinople account of some French ships of war and twenty transports being seen off Candia. I hope that *Sa Majesté très Corse* has not been able to slip out his Toulon ships to the relief of Egypt, for I am very anxious that ‘Memphis shall cover them and Egypt shall bury them.’ As to the rest I really think that our prospects are better now than at any period of the war; but I sincerely hope that you will not find it necessary to wait for any further reinforcements of Russians before you strike some blow, as I cannot conceive that you can

get any troops from Revel or Riga sooner than the end of June. As to your Downs embarkation I think I see as far into that milestone as you do."

E. COOKE to [LORD GRENVILLE].

Private.

1800, March 24. Dublin.—"On Saturday the Representation Article was carried in the Lords. They divided on the numbers of temporal peers, 52 for, 17 against. My Lord Lieutenant had been obliged to make a compromise that the Crown should only retain the power of making one peer for every three extinct after the Union, until the number should be reduced to 100. This was necessary to prevent both a division of friends and a defeat on the point. Your Lordship cannot conceive how averse the peers were to any modification on the subject.

"Lord Yelverton made a most able speech on the general question, but he rather interlarded too much exculpation and praise of Grattan.

"He also denied that any propositions were ever made to him by the Duke of Portland in 1782 of any measures which had the tendency to a Union or were to be the substitutes for it. I understand however that the proposal on this subject was at his house, but that both his Lordship and Fitzpatrick were so drunk that they might well have forgotten what passed. This, at least, is the Bishop of Meath's account of the matter."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 24. Harley Street.—"Si vous voulez bien me permettre, je viendrai chez vous demain, mardi, à une heure avant dîner. En attendant cette entrevue, je vous envoie ce que j'ai reçu par vos couriers de Vienne et d'Augsbourg. *Primo*, une lettre du Comte Stakelberg, et comme sa main est peu lisible, je joins une copie que vous pourrez garder en me renvoyant l'original. *Secundo*, un *postscriptum* de Kalitchef, dans lequel il y a aussi des choses assez intéressantes, et auquel sont joints deux annexes, une sur le conclave, que je vous prie de me renvoyer avec l'écrit de Kalitchef; l'autre est un prétendu recueil d'anecdote sur Buonaparte, fait par M. D'Antrague à la réquisition de Mr. Drake, et qui doit être remis à Mr. Hammond; je vous prie de le remettre à son adresse.

"Si vous n'avez pas de meilleure nouvelle que celle que j'ai reçu de différents côtés, autant valoit-il ne pas recevoir les postes que nous attendions avec tant d'impatience. Je suis encore moins content de ce que j'ai reçu de mon pays, et c'est sur ce sujet que je voudrois vous voir demain."

Enclosure :—

M. DE KALITCHEFF to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, February 11. Vienna.—*Extract.* "La réponse de l'empereur des Romains a été très insignifiante. Il s'efforçoit de démontrer assez mal qu'on avait eu une nécessité absolue de faire

retirer l'Archiduc Charles de Zurich avant l'arrivée des Russes d'Italie, et finissait par des regrets de ce que le tout a mal tourné. Depuis, dans des réponses subséquentes, cette Cour n'a rien dit de satisfaisant à la nôtre, ni sur les prétentions et désirs qu'on a ici de dépouiller le Pape, de démembrer le Piémont, ni de faire rentrer le roi de Sardaigne dans ses états. Le B[aron] de Thugut a articulé quelque chose de vague à Lord Minto des modifications à l'égard du démembrement du Piémont, en disant qu'on pourrait indemniser le roi de Sardaigne en lui donnant une partie du territoire de Gènes, et en gardant le reste de ce territoire pour l'Autriche. Mais ce ministre ne s'est point encore engagé envers le plénipotentiaire Anglais que son maître l'Empereur ne ferait point de paix séparée ; et il ne veut pas le faire avant d'avoir la certitude que l'Angleterre lui garantira le nouveau emprunt de deux millions de livres sterlings que l'Autriche veut lever à Londres comme auparavant. Il exige aussi que l'Angleterre paye les intérêts de l'ancien pendant la guerre, et je crois toujours.

“ Le B[aron] de Thugut a nié jusqu'à hier que Bounaparte s'est adressé à cette Cour-ci, quoiqu'il n'y eut nulle doute que la même proposition ne soit arrivé ici comme elle a été faite deux fois à Londres. On dit même, et le bruit court depuis trois jours, qu'il se trouve ici un émissaire Français arrivé de Berlin, de la part de Bournonville, pour traiter de la paix ; que cet émissaire voit le B[aron] de Thugut dans sa propre maison au fauxbourg, et qu'il y va à onze heures du soir.

“ Quant au Pape, rien n'a été décidé. Le B[aron] de Thugut, qui veut faire Pape le Cardinal Mattei, a gâté lui-même cette election. Il le désire, parcequ'il a signé le traité de Tolentino, espérant qu'il sera plus facile à lui céder les trois légations. S'il ne réussit pas à le faire Pape, ce sera Valente ou Bellisorni. Voici un extrait de ce qui s'est passé au Conclave. C'est le prélat Albani qui me l'a donné sous le sceau du secret. Je supplie v[otre] E[xcellence], de me le renvoyer par occasion ; il me faut cet écrit pour l'archive, ayant envoyé l'original à Petersburg.

“ Mr. Drake a écrit au Comte d'Antraigues, neveu de St. Priest [qui] est pensionné par notre Cour, de faire un pamphlet sur Buonaparte. D'Antraigues vient d'en faire, et je vous l'envoie ci-joint. Il faut le rendre à M. Hammond, parceque M. Drake l'a demandé en son nom. J'ignore quel mérite a cet ouvrage. D'Antraigues est un homme d'esprit, connaît Bonaparte. Mais il exagère souvent. Quelques fois il a de bonnes notions, et m'a été utile, mais en d'autres temps inconséquent, et inconsideré, et peu sûr, comme tous les émigrés. Tout cela est entre nous, parceque cet homme m'est souvent utile, et il a des correspondants à Londres, et il brigue vos bontés et votre suffrage. J'ai vu Thugut ce matin ; il n'avoue pas qu'il eut une proposition, mais il ne le nie pas. Il ne répond rien à cela, mais il assure que sa Cour n'a jamais fait de proposition aux Français, comme on le débite, dit-il, à présent à Berlin.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, March 25. Cleveland Row.—“ His Majesty has been

pleased to destine Lord Carysfort to the mission at Berlin. I lose no time in apprizing you of the circumstance, in order that you may communicate it to M. Thugut, so as to obviate any suspicion which his jealousy on the subject of Prussia may excite in his mind of a disposition on the part of this Government to cultivate, at this precise moment, a closer connection with Berlin. We have certainly no such intention ; and the strongest proof you can give M. Thugut of this is that Lord Carysfort will not set out for Berlin till towards the end of June.”- *Copy.*

REPORT FROM PARIS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

1800, March 26.—“ L’on veut sans doute un tableau complet de la France sous ses rapports actuels avec l’Europe. On ne veut rien de ce qui est sù ou de ce qui peut aisément l’être. Le secret, rien que le secret, et autant que possible tout le secret de l’état. L’expérience prompte et facile sur plusieurs points donnera entière confiance et pour le présent et pour l’avenir. En peu de lignes sera tracé le tableau de tout ce qui s’est fait diplomatiquement depuis le gouvernement de Bonaparte. Nous finirons par quelques mots sur la situation intérieure. Nous suivrons pour plus de clarté l’ordre géographique, en commençant par les rapports de la France avec les puissances du nord.

“ On sait que Bonaparte a écrit en même temps à presque tous les Rois, entre autres au Roi de Suède, au Prince Royal de Danemarck ; il a chargé aussi ses agents de faire surtout entendre à ces deux gouvernements que s’ils ne préféraient pas l’alliance de la Russie, on leur rendrait justice sur le point dont elles se plaignaient avec le plus d’amertume, la prise de leurs vaisseaux. Quant au Danemark qui se trouvait à la même époque plus menacé par la Russie, et en même temps assez mécontent de la Prusse, sur laquelle il avait le plus compté, cela ne l’a pas empêché d’ordonner à son ministre à Paris, Monsieur de Dreyer, de quitter cette résidence.

[*] “ Il est même à observer que Monsieur de Dreyer qui a beaucoup de crédit à sa Cour, et qui a un désir extrême de rester en France, a fait les plus grands efforts pour obtenir cette permission de sa Cour.

[*] “ Avant hiér, dans l’audience donnée aux Ambassadeurs, le premier Consul a spécialement chargé le Secrétaire de la Légation Danoise d’écrire à sa Cour, que la restitution des prises et la satisfaction sur tous les points de mécontentement du Danemarck dépendait exclusivement du retour à Paris non seulement d’un ministre quelconque, mais de la personne même de Monsieur de Dreyer ; il a prié à la même audience le ministre de Prusse d’écrire à Berlin dans les mêmes termes.

“ Tout cela tient à ce que Bonaparte est convaincu que Monsieur de Dreyer, l’un des plus anciens diplomates de l’Europe, peut lui rendre les plus grands services pour les communications de toute espèce avec le reste de l’Europe. [*] Monsieur Dreyer a fini par être aussi extrêmement lié avec le ministre [*] Talleyrand ; ce vieux Danois, extrêmement attaché aux intérêts de son pays, a

* *Marginal note by Lord Grenville*—“ This is certainly true.”

été pendant 3 ans à Paris le ministre étranger le plus roide, le plus inflexible, le plus libre dans ses propos contre les hommes et les [*] choses de la révolution Française ; mais quand il a vu que la Russie voulait forcer la main à son pays et le faire sortir de la neutralité qu'il lui croit extrêmement salutaire, tout a changé ; il a devenu éminemment pacifique et presque Français.

“Quant à la Prusse, le ministère Britannique en sait probablement plus sur ses intentions secrètes que l'on n'en sait à Paris même ; mais voici les faits : Bournonville a été tout-à-fait capté par les recherches vraiment extraordinaires de politesses et d'attentions qui ont marqué son arrivée. Un homme plus fin que lui, et qui est avec lui, a cependant découvert assez promptement que tout cela avait pour but d'abord de se dispenser de rien faire de réel, et de payer la France en simagrées, et, de plus, de faire contraster par les succès du nouvel ambassadeur Français la solitude, la misanthropie de Syéyès, qu'on déteste cordialement en Prusse.

“Quant à l'Empire, plusieurs princes du second ordre, et même l'Électeur de Mayence, ont fait faire des ouvertures indirectes.

“L'Électeur de Bavière a envoyé plusieurs fois auprès du ministre Français à Francfort pour faire valoir son refus de terminer le traité des subsides avec l'Angleterre, et pour s'excuser du passé sur l'influence et la présence des Russes.

“Voici le point essentiel sur l'Empereur.

“Il est certain qu'il y a à peu près 2 mois, Bonaparte fit écrire à Monsieur de Thugut qui avait déjà répondu évasivement à la lettre de Bonaparte à l'Empereur lui-même. [*] À cette seconde époque Bonaparte proposait le traité de *Campo Formio*. Monsieur de Thugut répondit presque sur-le-champ que cela était trop vague, et que d'ailleurs les positions étaient changées ; c'est alors qu'on voulut aussi tenter du côté de la Prusse, et lui demander de se prononcer afin de régler d'après sa réponse les offres que l'on ferait à l'Empereur. La Prusse n'ayant rien répondu, on a fait en effet à la Prusse [Autriche] des propositions plus avantageuses ; en voici certainement le sens, presque les mêmes termes. On propose à l'Empereur de garantir à la France la barrière du Rhin, on lui offre en retour presque toute l'Italie à l'exception de quatre principales places fortes du Piémont, dans lesquelles la France veut au moins garder garnison jusqu'à une certaine époque ; et à l'exception aussi de la ville de Gênes, que la France veut garder ou pour elle-même ou sous sa main.

“On voit qu'il y a ici quelque louche dans ce qui concerne le Piémont ; c'est, qu'en effet, on fait à cet égard une proposition alternative en offrant plus à l'Empereur, si la France garde elle-même la ligne militaire du Piémont, et moins si ce pays est rendu au Roi de Sardaigne. Mais dans tous les cas on stipule la garde des places fortes jusqu'à la paix. On attend tous les jours la dernière réponse de Monsieur de Thugut, et il est possible qu'un *Postscriptum* vous l'apprenne. Quant à l'opinion du premier consul et de ses alentours, il disait encore avant hier qu'il parierait pour la paix quatre contre un. Tout en effet a l'air arrangé par lui dans cette opinion.

* Marginal note by Lord Grenville—“This is certainly true.”

“ Il ne faut pas oublier quelque chose d'assez important aujourd'hui sur ce qui concerne les négociations en général. L'opinion la plus récente de l'ambassadeur Français à Berlin (il s'agit de lettres arrivées hièr [*]) est que cette Cour est plus disposée à s'entendre avec la Russie et le Danemark contre les prétensions exagérées de l'Empereur ; il va même jusqu'à dire que le ministre Russe à Berlin a fait des insinuations à cet [*] égard en demandant toutefois qu'on restraignit ses prétensions du côté du Rhin.

“ Nous passons au midi de l'Europe. D'abord, quant à l'Italie, Bonaparte ne parle qu'avec mépris de la prétension de l'ancien Directoire qui a sacrifié la possibilité de la paix générale à la folie de maintenir des républiques ; il a l'air de les abandonner tout-à-fait ; aussi a l'on vu pour la première fois avant hièr au dîner diplomatique du mois, les trois seuls envoyés de Milan, de Gênes, et de Rome non invités.

“ Pour la Turquie, voici le peu qu'on n'a pu apprendre par la correspondance interceptée.

“ Il est bien vrai qu'on a fait semblant de négocier avec l'ambassadeur Turc, mais il n'avait pas de pouvoirs. L'envoyé à Constantinople, Descorches, est toujours à Toulon ; restent donc les seules instructions données à Klèber.

“ Nous arrivons à l'Espagne, qui est la puissance avec laquelle nos relations sont aujourd'hui plus intimes.

“ On sait que le rappel d'Azara, le retour de Talleyrand au ministère qu'Urquijo n'avait rien négligé pour [*] empêcher, les soupçons donnés à Bonaparte contre ce ministre, tout cela ensemble avait causé, il y a environ trois mois, un refroidissement assez sensible ; mais depuis Urquijo a senti qu'il fallait céder, il a multiplié [*] les complaisances, les promesses de dévouement, et on est absolument en rapports assez amicaux.

“ Le prétendu rappel de Musquitz et son remplacement par Massaredo n'était qu'une ruse de guerre, et une fausse nouvelle publiée par Bonaparte lui-même, afin de faire croire que Gravina se trouvant à Brest commandant en chef la flotte Espagnole, les escadres combinées allaient sortir.

“ On a fait à l'Espagne depuis quelque temps plusieurs demandes de piastres à concéder sur ses établissements de la rivière de la Plata et de Lima. C'était surtout destiné à alimenter des expéditions coloniales, mais en accordant ce qu'on voulait à Lima, elle a toujours refusé pour la Plata sous prétexte qu'elle n'était pas sûre qu'il s'y en trouvât, et, en effet, parcequ'elle les fait venir elle-même de là beaucoup plus facilement.

“ On vient aussi de lui faire une espèce d'injonction qu'elle paraît avoir éludée. On exigeait d'elle qu'elle fit déclarer au concave que sous des prétextes Catholiques, comme l'influence des puissances schismatiques ou hérétiques sur l'élection du nouveau Pape, elle ne le reconnaîtrait pas actuellement ; mais elle a répondu que ses instructions pour le Cardinal Lorenzelca étaient parties, et elles portent [*] la reconnaissance du Pape pourvu qu'on approuve

* Marginal note by Lord Grenville—“ This is certainly true.”

le nouveau décret royal qui donne aux évêques les dispenses dans beaucoup de cas réservés autrefois au Pape.

“ Un autre objet important, récemment demandé à l'Espagne, a été l'emploi de son influence sur la Cour de Lisbonne pour la forcer à la paix ; et des nouvelles arrivées extraordinairement, il y a trois jours, portent qu'en effet la Cour d'Espagne a déjà fait avancer plusieurs régiments d'infanterie et de cavalerie sur les frontières du Portugal, et menace la Cour de Lisbonne si elle n'entame pas les négociations.

“ Des maisons de commerce de Portugal avaient fait faire par des maisons de commerce de Paris quelques ouvertures indirectes, il y a à-peu-près deux mois, et alors on s'était hâté de Paris d'y faire répondre qu'on était tout prêt à partir de l'ancien traité. [*] Le fait est qu'on exigerait même une moins forte prestation d'argent, et aucune espèce de concession territoriale aux colonies Portugaises.

“ La France souhaiterait particulièrement que l'ancien négociateur Portugais d'Aranza fût chargé de la négociation, mais elle serait loin de tenir à lui, parcequ'on met beaucoup de prix à traiter pour donner ce déboire à l'Angleterre.

“ Nous avons oublié dans leurs places deux faits assez importants ; l'un est le système préféré aujourd'hui par Bonaparte, et auquel il tentera par tous les moyens d'amener l'Espagne et même l'Empereur, pour l'existence future d'un Pape, et qu'il ne soit plus à l'avenir que salarié par les puissances Catholiques en non-souverain.

“ L'ancien état du Pape serait destiné soit au Roi de Sardaigne, si la France garde une partie du Piémont, soit au Duc de Parme dont les intérêts futurs sont un grand moyen de tenir toujours en échec et en complaisance l'Espagne, et surtout la Reine d'Espagne.

“ L'autre point oublié est la situation actuelle de la France avec Hambourg. Bourgoïn, en passant par cette ville pour Copenhagen, y fera un séjour de cinq ou six semaines, et plus s'il est nécessaire ; il est chargé d'y négocier une sorte d'arrangement. On ne veut pas demander tout simplement de l'argent, mais bien un emprunt, en sauvant le plus possible l'honneur du demandeur.

“ Sur l'intérieur on sait presque tout. Il est sûr que le gouvernement de Bonaparte, très fort, très vigoureux, n'est ébranlé que par la guerre, et plusieurs revers dans la guerre ; il le sent, il sacrifiera tout à la paix.

“ La nouvelle s'était répandue, il y a trois jours, du départ de la flotte ; elle était destinée à débloquer Gênes, Malthe, et à rester dans la Méditerranée ; mais on a su hier par le télégraphe que la vue de 36 vaisseaux Anglais devant Brest l'avait empêché de sortir.

“ Bernadotte devait être fait commandant-général ; on voyait un grand accord entre les Jacobins, proprement dits, et le parti des anciens Directeurs, comme Treilhard et Merlin.

“ — indiquait le lieu où se préparaient les écrits qui devaient être publiés. Tout a été trouvé en effet. Deux pamphlets étaient même déjà imprimés ; l'un intitulé ‘ *Adresse aux Français* ’ ; l'autre, ‘ *Réflexions sur le 18 Brumaire* ’ ; on y criait à la tyrannie, à l'envahissement des droits du peuple, à la nécessité de lui rendre ses élections, sa majesté souveraine avec la constitution de '95.

* Marginal note by Lord Grenville.—“This is certainly true,”

“Comme on a vu que l'on était sûr de disposer du Général Lefèvre, homme borné et instrument docile, le premier Consul s'est hâté de le présenter au Sénat Conservateur, et il agit avec beaucoup de chaleur sur tous ceux qui lui sont dévoués dans ce corps, pour que la nomination ait lieu.

“Murat commandera à Paris à la place de Lefèvre, Berthier ira à Dijon, et à dater de la découverte dont nous parlons, Bonaparte a résolu de n'y point aller lui-même, et de ne sortir de Paris que pour un coup de main indispensable à une armée ; mais pardessus tout, comme nous venons de le dire, à ne rien négliger pour la paix.”

SUPPLEMENT AU RAPPORT PRÉCÉDENT.

1800, April 2.—“D'abord l'homme en qui le Gouverneur a plus de confiance que dans son ambassadeur à Berlin est un nommé Bignon, secrétaire de légation, qui est chargé de faire des dépêches contradictoires et particulières.

“On a sù hiér par un courier que l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Vienne a adressé à son collègue à Paris, que malgré les prétendues bonnes nouvelles d'Egypte publiées avec affectation dans les journaux, il y a quatre à cinq jours, Kléber avait été obligé de signer une capitulation, en vertu de laquelle il s'embarque avec à peu près 7,000 hommes, seuls restés de l'armée d'Egypte, qui doivent être conduits en France sur des vaisseaux Turcs.

“Le prétendu courier Espagnol que tous les journaux d'Allemagne ont fait arriver à Vienne, il y a quinze jours, n'était autre chose qu'un courier Turc auquel l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris avait donné un passeport. Il portait en même temps de nouveaux chiffres pour la légation d'Espagne à Vienne, qui lui permettront de communiquer aussi avec l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris, selon le voeu du gouvernement Français.

“La Cour d'Espagne a aussi consulté la France pour le choix, et pour le moment du départ, de son nouvel ambassadeur pour Constantinople.

“L'agent Français Descorches, qui va secrètement à Constantinople pour y déployer dans l'occasion le caractère de ministre Français, a écrit de la rade de Toulon une lettre reçue avant hiér, par laquelle il dit que le commandant d'armée ayant pu donner à sa corvette les matelots qui lui manquaient, il va mettre à la voile.

“On peut ajouter quelque chose à ce qui est dit sur le Portugal.

“Le Cabinet de Lisbonne paraissant très récalcitrant à la paix, l'Espagne vient de promettre de faire approcher de ses frontières jusqu'à 18,000 hommes. L'ambassadeur Français est chargé de faire entendre que c'est là le point capital qu'il faut obtenir de la Cour de Madrid, et d'exprimer même à la reine d'Espagne que la bienveillance de la France pour le Duc de Parme, à qui elle s'intéresse vivement, sera le prix de ce qu'on fera dans cette occasion pour déterminer le Cabinet de Lisbonne.

“Il y a à-peu-près trois jours qu'il y eut une discussion vive et contradictoire devant le premier Consul sur la question de savoir s'il importait beaucoup à la France d'avoir la barrière du Rhin.

* Marginal note by Lord Grenville.—“This is certainly true.”

C'est là le seul point auquel Bonaparte tient jusqu'ici opiniâtrement ; car, en lui laissant Gênes, il renoncerait *même aux places fortes du Piémont*.

“ Le fameux Carnot a été appelé pour dire son opinion, et il a prouvé avec beaucoup de chaleur que la barrière de la Meuse, meilleure militairement parlant, l'était aussi politiquement, en ce qu'elle abrégait les difficultés interminables qu'entraînerait toujours le morcellement des trois Électorats, et la nécessité des indemnités et des compensations. Bonaparte a dit avec humeur après cette discussion, que Carnot n'était pas un homme aussi distingué qu'on avait bien voulu le prétendre.

“ Voici l'anecdote importante et sûre qui a encore rabattu les prétensions de Bonaparte, et qui l'a décidé à répondre de nouveau à l'Empereur avec de nouvelles propositions plus avantageuses, si le courier qu'on attend à tous les moments apporte une réponse négative ou dilatoire.

“ Une lettre anonyme, mais qui portait des grands caractères de vérité, lui indiquait qu'un plan assez vaste et assez bien combiné devait être exécuté par le parti Jacobin le lendemain même du départ du premier Consul pour Dijon ; Lucien Bonaparte y jouait certainement un rôle, mais le premier Consul n'a point lu son nom aux personnes de confiance à qui il a lu tout le reste. Au reste Bournonville lui-même, il y a déjà plus de trois semaines, a écrit que du moment où il avait entamé les affaires sérieuses, et proposé indirectement l'alliance, on l'avait éconduit ; il écrivait même déjà *ab irato* qu'il n'y avait rien à tirer de la Prusse, et qu'il fallait traiter avec l'Allemagne.

“ Il est vrai, cependant, que, ne sortant jamais de son système d'obligeance insignifiante, le Cabinet de Berlin a consenti à faire faire à la Russie des espèces de propositions qui n'ont pas été accueillies. Il y a précisément un mois qu'on a fait partir pour Bournonville un courier avec des ordres de demander à la Prusse une réponse précise sur la part qu'elle voulait prendre à la pacification de l'Europe. Au bout de quatre jours Bournonville a renvoyé le courier en disant que le moment n'était pas favorable, et qu'il le saisirait s'il se présentait.

“ Depuis quinze jours le ministre de Prusse à Paris a donné à sa Cour beaucoup d'inquiétude par tout ce qu'il a écrit sur les soupçons que lui donnent les bruits à Paris d'une négociation très avancée avec Vienne ; tout cela a contribué à refroidir. Pour l'Angleterre, le Roi et *Monsieur* doivent savoir tout ; seulement ce qu'on peut ignorer, c'est que rien n'a irrité et mortifié Bonaparte comme le peu de succès de négociation, parcequ'il n'y avait rien à quoi il mit plus d'importance. La pensée actuelle du gouvernement Français est un vif regret du mode choisi pour cette négociation ; c'est la seule volonté de Bonaparte qui a prévalu à cet égard contre l'avis des ministres. Ils aimaient mieux un agent secret sans rien d'écrit, et l'on est encore convaincu que, si l'on avait pris cette voie, et si l'on n'avait pas exposé le cabinet d'Alexandre à l'éclat d'un refus, après lequel il est toujours difficile de revenir sur ses pas, on aurait aujourd'hui quelque chose d'entamé avec le cabinet de St. James.

“ On a discuté, il y a trois jours, si l'on permettrait tacitement à des maisons de commerce de la Belgique de faire des envois de grains en Angleterre, et on a fini par adopter la négative pour deux motives ; l'un présenté par des administrateurs habiles qui ont dit que la France, n'étant jamais sûre d'avoir trop de blés, on s'exposait dans l'année où il fallait le plus éviter les troubles, à de grands inconvénients, si, en effet, on en manquait. L'autre motif, qui certainement a été le plus déterminant, est la prétendue certitude que la disette en Angleterre est ou deviendra telle qu'elle influera sur les déterminations politiques, et l'amènera à traiter.

“ Quant à la Hollande, on est froid avec cette république. D'abord on est resté convaincu qu'à l'époque de la descente, le Gouvernement actuel n'avait jamais été très sincèrement effrayé de son succès. De plus, ils se sont toujours montrés moins complaisants pour les demandes de toute espèce du gouvernement Français depuis qu'ils ne craignent pas, comme sous le feu Directoire, d'être chassés, et révolutionnés pour le moindre refus.

“ Le gouvernement Hollandais a aussi un vif sujet de mécontentement dans la confiscation de ses vaisseaux injustement pris par nos corsaires, et d'un surtout qui est à Bordeaux depuis six mois, et dont on leur promet tous les jours la restitution. On leur a demandé la somme exorbitante de 25 millions pour le port de Flessingue ; ils ont dit alors qu'ils n'en voulaient pas à ce prix. Enfin on vient de leur expédier le [*] Conseiller Marmont, gendre du banquier Perrégaux, ami et confident de Bonaparte, pour demander, non pas précisément à la Hollande mais au commerce particulier d'Amsterdam, une somme de 13 millions à emprunter ; il propose pour garantie une partie des forêts de la Belgique et des diamants, entre autres le fameux diamant *Le Régent* que Marmont porte avec lui.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 26. Downing Street.—“ I forgot to ask you this morning what progress you have made in your ecclesiastical paper. The Bishop of Lincoln writes to me with some anxiety to know when he will be wanted in town ; and it is material to him, as he has a visitation and some other arrangements to settle. I imagine the next steps must be, our seeing the Archbishop, and his calling a meeting of Bishops. If you can let me know what time you think this will take, when we meet to-morrow morning, I can write by to-morrow's post.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 27. Stowe.—“ As far as a superficial observer can collect from newspapers, English and foreign, I certainly like our prospects ; for if the Austrians (including our subsidized troops) are stronger than the French everywhere save on the Rhine, I think it must be very much our fault and that of our friend Paul if we do not, by diversion or direct attack, find full employment for

* Marginal note by Lord Grenville.—“ This is certainly true.”

the French on the lower Rhine. The march of General Brune's force from Bretagne to oppose us in Holland, and the return of the same army to Bretagne to oppose the *Chouans*, is a decisive proof of the real weakness of France in that part of their line ; and I trust that we shall profit by our experience of last year so as to combine our attempts with a view to the operations of the interior of France. As to Sir Sidney, I am out of all patience with his insanity ; but I hope and trust that *no consideration* will induce Government or Lord Keith to ratify a convention so mad and so entirely beyond his powers and instructions. I hope that, long before this, Lord Keith has sent Captain Louis of the *Minotaur* or Captain Ball of the *Alexander*, who were both at Aboukir, and are both in the Mediterranean, and seniors to Sir Sidney, to supersede him and his convention. Troubridge is at Malta, and would be the best of all if he could be spared. I cannot help likewise mentioning to you that Sir James Saumarez, who was second in command to Nelson at Aboukir, is just come into Causand bay with the *Cæsar*, and if he was ordered to Alexandria with instructions, he might be there in twenty-five or thirty days at furthest, and would be in time to block the port, and to send Sir Sidney to explain his conduct to Lord Keith, and to receive his orders upon it. I see that this must be subsequent to the 10th of February (the day of the storm of El Arish) so that I think that Saumarez would be in time. You will I know excuse all this, but for God's sake give me the satisfaction of knowing that every thing will be tried to stop this cursed blunder. I am very happy to hear of the *Généreux* and her convoy in Lord Nelson's hands, for this was the identical squadron that *Sa Majesté très Corse* was fitting at Toulon, and which I feared might get to Egypt.

"I am sorry that you should still think it right that the Lords temporal should meet *en corps* for the election of their twenty-eight, for whatever may be the reasons good or bad for confining the election to Lords qualifying in Ireland, there can be no good reason for deviating from your wise principles of never suffering them to *assemble* after the Union. But if you should persist in this plan, for God's sake maintain your proxies or you will risk the election of your list. It has come to my knowledge that Ponsonby has been negotiating with great exertions for a large force in the United House of Commons by arranging for the first seat in the boroughs that will be to send one, and he has succeeded to secure *nine* members ; and I fear that, of your Irish one hundred, you must look to full two-thirds as voting with Opposition ; which at present is immaterial, but which eventually may be very unpleasant. There is no provision in your Bill for the overslaugh in your episcopal roster of duty when the turn comes to a bishop who may be a peer of Great Britain, as in the case of Lord Bristol, though there is for a bishop who may be one of twenty-eight peers of Ireland.

"You say nothing about your Irish primacy. I hope and trust that it will end in Euseby Cleaver. You know how anxious I am for a proper man in that station, and my full persuasion that there is not an Irish bishop fit for it except him ; nor do I believe that

you are better provided from the English bench, at least of those who will accept it.

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1800, March 27. Augsburg.—“I have little to add to my publick dispatches but the assurance of my firm belief that we have force enough to beat all that Buonaparte can bring against us. I cannot say how much I am pleased with Weyrother's promotion. Of all the staff officers I have yet seen with the Austrian army he is by far the most intelligent, and has the largest views. He is besides, if possible, more bold and enterprising than Chasteler, and, without at all despising his enemy, he is penetrated with the opinion that the French may be beaten even with inferior forces when skillfully attacked by troops *that will stand*. Your Lordship knows that he is the author of the plan of attack at Rivoli; acknowledged by Buonaparte himself to be a *chef d'œuvre* of military skill, and real talents *of the mind*. The Count le Lehrbach tells me that Buonaparte frequently spoke to him on the subject at Rastadt, advising him to preserve the man who had framed the plan of the battle of Rivoli as the most precious possession of the Austrian Empire. Between Schmidt, Chasteler, and Weyrother there is at this moment a re-union of talents at the Austrian head-quarters such as has never been assembled before. If all this is destined to be beaten, I can only say God's will be done, for in such a case (if ever) we may be allowed to say His hand was there, and that He has some great object in view beyond the reach of our faculties, of which the Consul is to be a leading instrument.

“I have no doubt but that all will do well in this part of the world, and I trust that your Lordship will be satisfied with the extent to which our levies will be carried, and with the promptitude with which they will be brought into the field. I am even not without hopes that the Austrians will, on this occasion at least, do us full justice.

“The contracts are most unquestionably made on most advantageous terms, and with people of undoubted responsibility. It is really scarcely possible, nor could I have believed it possible myself (till tired out with the imperfect manner in which my business was done by other people, and the unsatisfactory information I received, I determined to undertake the business myself, and to go through with it in its most minute details) that in the midst of the present scarcity of grain, with every article of life risen twenty-fold within these last three or four years, and in the very centre of such numerous armies regular and irregular, I could have contracted for the subsistence of cavalry at only two and twenty pence a horse per day, one with the other. Still less could I have believed, scarcely knowing the value of beef at market, that I could have done what is unquestionably the case, reduced the contracts of the whole Austrian army. I have said in my public dispatch that the reduction will be 7 per cent. only; but I am persuaded it will be still greater. The enclosed letter will show

your Lordship that the ration last year (and I am sure the prices have not diminished during the winter) was 1 florin 14½ k[reutzers]. This sum, mentioned in Count Colloredo's letter, was the real price paid by the Austrians themselves. There are sixty kreutzers in the florin; the florin is worth nearly 1s 10d English, as, at par, eleven florins make a pound sterling. The Austrian ration is throughout the army the same, namely 8 lbs. of oats and 10 lbs. of hay. The Bavarians have two different rations, one rather larger, the other smaller than that of the Austrians. The average according to the new contract is about a florin; the average under the Elector was about a florin, twenty kreutzers. In short I have thoroughly satisfied myself that there is, in every administration of every army, a great deal of indolence and inattention, or a great deal of roguery. Your Lordship will hardly believe that yesterday morning, before I concluded the contract, the Count de Lehrbach sent to me his confidential secretary to advise me to recede something from the terms I had insisted on, which I peremptorily refused to do, and the whole was concluded at ten o'clock.

"I say nothing about the Swiss levies, because at last, and upon the whole, all will do well; but I have sworn never to have anything to do with your military men again unless they will learn their own business better before they come abroad, or have a more moderate opinion of their own knowledge and suffer themselves to be instructed. Besides, it is not to be conceived (bravery and presence of mind in the field excepted) how very, very cheap we are holden upon the Continent.

"With all this I pass many pleasant hours with Ramsay; and I shall be truly happy to see Clinton, who will be well received at head-quarters, where I am sure that, in consideration of his real merit, we shall establish rather a better opinion of British military talents. But of the other gentleman caricatures are drawn when he goes to inspect a regiment.

"I have not given my note to the Archduke. Have I done right or wrong? If wrong, my fault is a greivous one. But I trust, under all the circumstances, that the lie direct already given to M. Thugut by Lord Minto will be thought sufficient."

LORD GRENVILLE to SPENCER SMITH.

Private.

1800, March 28. Cleveland Row.—"I have received your letter of the 15th of February with its inclosures. I very sincerely regret on your account what has passed since the arrival of Lord Elgin at Constantinople. I can answer for it that he went there with a desire to live well with you, and even that his first letters to me from thence expressed that hope. The failure of it I cannot with truth or justice impute to him, as far as I am able to judge from the papers which I have seen. And indeed I must fairly own that if I had no other information on the subject, the memorandum inclosed in your letter of the 15th of February would be sufficient to satisfy me upon it. It is extremely unfortunate that you have not had the opportunity, previous to your being engaged in the foreign line

in Turkey, to see the manner in which that business and his Majesty's service are carried on at other Courts. If you had, I am perfectly certain that the present misunderstanding could not have arisen. You would have seen that the relative situation of an Ambassador, and of the Secretary of Embassy at the same Court with the rank of Minister-Plenipotentiary, is a thing as well known, and as clearly defined as the respective subordination of rank and command of the king's military or naval officers. And so far from apprehending any degradation by finding yourself in the same situation in which men of your own standing in life and of the first families in this country are so frequently placed, by the appointment of Ambassadors or Ministers to those Courts where they have resided as Secretaries of Embassy or Legation with the rank of Minister, or without it, you would have seen in all the arrangements which I have made on the subject the same uniform desire of preserving to you the means of finding at Constantinople a permanent, secure, and honourable station, requiring only on your part diligence and temper, and that due subordination which belongs to every profession and line of life in which any man seeks advancement.

"I have on a former occasion written to you as my official duty required, to explain to you that, of which I am persuaded you were unapprised, but which you would at once have seen if the course of events had thrown you sooner into the foreign line, or given you any opportunity of observing it elsewhere than in Turkey. The present is a letter strictly private, in which I write to you with the openness of one who has sincerely endeavoured both from good wishes to you, and from regard to your brother, to promote your interests. The best and indeed the only advice I can give to you is that where you have been under a misapprehension and error, very naturally to be accounted for, you should apply yourself with cheerfulness to set it right. With respect to your request of leave of absence, I have before explained to you the motives which have led me not to lay it before the King; they are motives of kindness and good will to you. Coming away under the present circumstances, your return to Turkey, or your appointment to any other southern mission, are points which I neither could nor ought to recommend, for such a line of conduct on my part would be directly subversive of that subordination which it is my duty to require and enforce in this line of service; nor have I indeed, under any circumstances, ever held out to you the expectation of a removal to another Court, seeing no probability of my being able to gratify such expectations if I had raised them.

"It would have been far more agreeable to me not to have been under the necessity of writing to you at all on these subjects, but when that necessity existed I feel that I could not better prove my good wishes towards you, than by writing to you fully and without reserve." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, March 28th. Cleveland Row.—"You will easily suppose the impatience which we have felt while the ice has locked up all

communication with the Continent; especially as the French have been all the time spreading continual reports of negotiations with Austria, the death of the Emperor, and other fables.

"The thing which strikes me as the worst in the whole of our present situation is Thugut's obstinacy in removing, from private pique and jealousy, the Archduke Charles from his command. It is impossible to hope that Kray will create the same confidence in the army, or that he will dare to act with equal energy against the French, or against the factions in his own army. I conclude, however, that the step is now irrevocably taken, and we must make the best of it.

"The Egyptian capitulation is a most mortifying event, and may well put a less peevish man than Thugut extremely out of humour with his allies. I am almost as much grieved at the discredit which this affair throws on Sir S. Smith, as I am at the thing itself; for he had deserved so well of the country by his conduct at Acre, that it is a cruel thing to have to condemn and to disavow him. Thugut will, I doubt not, be very angry that we do not break the capitulation. I really think that, very *strictly* speaking, we have a right so to do; but I am sure you will agree with us that for such a country as this, the bringing the public faith even into any sort of question is a thing not to be done even for such an object as this would have been.

"What we are doing in the Mediterranean, as well as the powers which you and Wickham have received for pecuniary exertions in the Empire, must at least prove to Thugut that we are heartily bent on assisting his efforts. But I fear it will all end in a separate Austrian peace, whenever Bonaparte feels himself sufficiently pressed to think it worth his while to give the conditions, whatever they are, which Thugut means to require.

"We have received the account to-day that the Union resolutions have passed the House of Lords in Ireland. Nothing now remains but the address, which was expected to pass without a division. We shall have the whole here before Easter, and proceed upon it immediately after." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

Private.

1800, March 28. Cleveland Row.—"I am grieved at the account of your two illnesses. What you have done has been done in the same masterly style which distinguishes your work from that of all other artists in the same line. But do not forget how much more remains for you to do, and how much depends on you. Manage yourself therefore, and save your strength, for without you the whole will be at a stand. Your excuses and your assurances of zeal and exertion to the utmost of your strength were more than unnecessary after the experience of so many years.

"Our Union labours are drawing to their close. We expect the resolutions here before Easter, and shall proceed upon them immediately after. Little or no opposition is to be apprehended here. Speeches and declamations of course, but that artillery has lost its effect." *Copy.*

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 28. Dublin.—“The Union Resolutions and Address go over this night. I trust they will be found correct, and I have no doubt they will come back unaltered. It occurs to me that the best mode for inserting the countervailing duties will be to move a separate schedule, and resolve that it will be fit to propose that the said schedule should make part of the schedule No. 2 of the 6th Article of Union, and then Ireland will incorporate it.

“There was little opposition of consequence in the Lords, the majority for confirming the report was 50.

“We passed yesterday the amendments of the Lords and the address in the Commons with little opposition and remark. Opposition did not attend in force, the policy of which I cannot conceive. They rely solely upon their exertions in the country.

“There are some disturbances in Tipperary owing in a degree to tythe. The introduction of that question by Sir John Macartney was very insidious, and if Lord Castlereagh had not taken the decisive step of quieting the subject of agistment tythe by a bill, there is no calculating the mischief which might have ensued. I hope all is now right, and that we shall be able to prevent any general flame of opposition spreading through the kingdom.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 29. Wimbledon.—“Mr. Pitt seems to entertain the same idea you have as to the propriety of continuing the levy of the Albanian corps, and, in truth, my doubts were of so slender a nature it is not worth giving you the trouble of discussion upon it, and I shall therefore immediately write to direct the levy to be continued

“From your information on the views and politics of Russia you are much better qualified to combine the different informations respecting them than I am, and I think it right to send you the enclosed extract of a letter which William Broderick of the India Board has received from his brother Colonel Broderick. Considering the eagerness they seem to have for the sovereignty of Malta, I cannot comprehend how they should industriously withhold their force from giving any aid in the reduction of it. If it falls by our means alone, they are perfectly at our mercy whether we will allow them to put a garrison into it.”

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, March 29. Duke Street.—“I am not quite certain whether in mentioning to you this morning some of the circumstances of Baron Spaen's mission I did not omit one which is material. It is that both M. de Spaen himself and his family have always been and still are steady and zealous adherents of the House of Orange. Some family connexions with M. de Haersolte, one of the Directors, who is also of a noble family in Gelderland, have occasioned his taking this commission upon himself.”

STATE OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF GREAT BRITAIN, EXCLUSIVE
OF THAT ALLOTTED FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN.

1800, April 2.—Regiments of the Line in Ireland, after allotting
the 26th, 46th, and 82nd to the Mediterranean :—

15th Regiment.	1st Battalion	-	-	834
	2nd „	-	-	897
16th „	-	-	-	847
20th „	1st Battalion	-	-	742
	2nd „	-	-	723
62nd „	2nd „	-	-	800
56th „	-	-	-	792
				<hr/>
Two Brigades of Guards	-	-	-	5,635
				4,000
				<hr/>
				9,635

Regiments of the Line which will remain in England (after the
expedition to the Mediterranean, and after sending the 63th to the
Cape, and the 60th and 69th to the West Indies), first ready for
service :—

63rd Regiment	-	-	-	646
1st „	2nd Battalion	-	-	624
2nd „	-	-	-	568
23rd „	-	-	-	600
25th „	-	-	-	472
27th „	-	-	-	1,243
29th „	-	-	-	566
49th „	-	-	-	470
55th „	-	-	-	460
79th „	-	-	-	376
85th „	-	-	-	1,346
92nd „	-	-	-	706
				<hr/>
				8,077

Regiments come from Ireland, and which may be supposed ready
for service by the 1st June :—

1st Battalion.	Royals	-	-	883
13th Regiment	-	-	-	806
54th „	-	-	-	1,241
64th „	-	-	-	913
68th „	2 Battalions	-	-	2,013

5,856

To which may be added from the Irish Militia - 3,000

8,856

Expected in June and July from Gibraltar and North America :—

28th Regiment	-	-	-	660
24th „	-	-	-	639
26th „	-	-	-	616

1,915

These by recruiting may, it is supposed, be augmented on their arrival to 3,000.

Recruiting, or expected from the West Indies :—

21st Regiment	-	-	-	-	246
32nd	„	-	-	-	96
38th	„	-	-	-	373
43rd	„	-	-	-	251
71st?	„	-	-	-	219
72nd	„	-	-	-	173
Suth ^d	-	-	-	-	400

1,758

These regiments by recruiting may probably be brought to between 3 or 4,000 men and be fit for home service in the course of the summer.

The Guards it is supposed may be carried in an early part of the summer to their establishment, and may then furnish 3,000 men, in addition to the two brigades at present allotted to Ireland, which it is also hoped may then be withdrawn (leaving 5,600 of the Line in Ireland).

This will furnish an addition of - - 7,000

The result is, that there are in the first instance

left disposable for active service about - 8,000

By the 1st of June an addition of about - 9,000

In July, (or as soon after as the regiments from Gibraltar and North America are completed) - - - 3,000

When the Guards are completed and two Brigades recalled from Ireland - - 7,000

Making in the course of the year a force applicable to active Service - - - 27,000

And leaving in Great Britain about 2,000

Guards, and Six Regiments recruited to 3 or 4,000 men - - - 5,500

And in Ireland Regiments of the Line to about the same number - - - 5,500

11,000

Total, 38,000

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 4. Duke Street.—“As it will be necessary to give some account of your conversation of this morning with M. de Spaen to the Hereditary Prince, M. de Stamford, Mollerus, and others, I take the liberty to send to you the substance of what I mean to write, and shall be much obliged to you to send it back to me with such alterations as you may think proper, in order that I may be sure of saying nothing more than what you stated.”

Enclosure, endorsed by Lord Grenville :—Minute to be given to M. DE SPAEN by M. FAGEL.

1800, April 9, London.—“ Le Gouvernement Britannique voit très peu d'apparence que l'accord projeté puisse se réaliser d'une manière satisfaisante. N'ayant aucune connoissance des dispositions de la cour de Berlin à cet égard, il ne peut y en faire la proposition. Si les gouvernans actuels en Hollande désirent de donner quelque suite à cette affaire, c'est là qu'ils devraient s'adresser en premier lieu, pour que le ministère Prussien en parle au ministre du Roi à Berlin, et en s'expliquant clairement sur les sûretés que l'on pourroit donner en pareil cas pour les intérêts de l'Angleterre, et ceux du gouvernement légitime des Provinces-Unies.

“ Ce n'est que dans ce cas qu'il pourroit être utile que le ministre du Roi entrât dans la discussion d'un arrangement fondé sur les trois bases suivantes, c'est à dire.

1. “ Garantie expresse et positive du Roi de Prusse que, soit à la paix, soit auparavant, le gouvernement Stadthoudérien doive être rétabli dans la personne du Prince d'Orange.

2. “ Engagement également exprès et positif de maintenir vis-à-vis de la France la neutralité des Provinces-Unies pendant toute la guerre, et même de la soutenir en cas de besoin par les armes : et de s'entendre avec l'Angleterre sur les sûretés ultérieures que l'on pourra donner à cette dernière sur ce point essentiel.

3. “ Un arrangement propre à empêcher que la France ne profite du masque du commerce Hollandois pour rétablir pendant la guerre le sien, maintenant détruit par la supériorité de la marine Angloise,

“ Tout en donnant ces explications le gouvernement Britannique, jaloux d'éviter jusqu'à l'apparence la plus éloigné de mauvaise foi, croit devoir déclarer qu'il n'entend contracter par là aucune espèce d'obligation de s'abstenir, soit pendant le cours de la discussion qui pourra avoir lieu, soit, à plus forte raison, dans l'état actuel des choses, des mesures qu'il pourra juger avantageuses à l'Angleterre, et propres à assurer le succès de la présente campagne et à délivrer la Hollande du joug François.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 6. Wimbledon.—“ After a very fine ride of two hours, and the enjoyment of a very fine day, I can assure you I have no disposition to go to town sooner than Tuesday when I must go, and therefore I withdraw my summons ; but if I find a further conference necessary, you must lay your account with riding over to breakfast to Wimbledon, where I would summon Mr. Pitt to meet you. In truth it is not so pressing by a day or two, as Sir Charles Stuart, who meant to set out on Tuesday, will be detained a day or two by the death of his uncle Mr. Stuart Mackenzie.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 7. Stowe.—“ Many thanks to you for your Austrian detail, which is indeed very gratifying, if we did not know how

uncertain the result of Vienna operations always must be whether for war or peace. The whole of that system is so crooked that I shall dread very much the consequences of any escapade of your Russian ; and the impression on the public mind from any separation from him will be very discouraging. I trust therefore that, though he may snort and throw the bit out of his mouth for a moment, yet that you will ultimately bring him back to his curb. Most sincerely do I deplore your resolution to allow the return of Kleiber, and though I think I see your difficulties, yet I cannot conceive them of sufficient magnitude to induce such a decision. It was necessary that the example of the total loss of that execrable army should have been held out to all posterity as a signal and terrible warning ; and it did not require the pen of Bonaparte to tell you (as he does in his letter to Kleiber) that if he can get this army safe out of Egypt for the present he should think the reputation of the French arms saved. As far as I understand the Vienna account of this treaty, the ships (of which there are two Venetian 64's) remain to France, and are to be navigated under Turkish colours ; and if they are to embark within three months, they will arrive at Toulon about the beginning of June, exactly at the most critical moment of the campaign, with no tie of them save an engagement not to serve ; the breach of which promise your allies nor you never can detect, and at all events they can serve in the Vendée or any disturbed part of France. I sincerely wish that I could guide Paul's head, with the bridle between his teeth, to this object, and I should forgive much of any other escapade. I conclude (though you do not say it) that you expect Malta and Genoa to fall immediately. I am very uneasy that the first holds out, for I think it most material to every Mediterranean view (in peace) that this should be out of French hands as soon as possible. What a heart-breaking disaster is this of Lord Keith's ship and crew ! I have very little doubt but that the newspaper account of the cause of the accident is true ; and I have been often astonished that accidents have not more frequently arisen from the same cause, on which I have had so decided an opinion that I have a contrivance fixed to my guns to avoid this very accident of the sparks flying from the lighted match.

"I am very uneasy about your twenty-eight Irish peers, for I have already been written to in confidence to solicit my vote for one who is not to be one of the Government twenty-eight, though he votes with them. The number of Lords temporal voting with Government, including proxies, is only fifty-two ; consequently a combination of any twenty-eight (even if they should be unassisted by Opposition) would return the election against the Government list ; and *this idea has been in circulation*. All that can be done is to endeavour to secure the election by means of proxies ; and indeed there does not seem any reason for complimenting away the influence of Government (through proxies) in the first election, though you may be disposed to this sacrifice in the subsequent elections. If this cannot be, you must send over every Lord you can influence to assist in the election, or you will lose it ; and I do not fancy that you will much like the addition of twenty-eight

wrong-headed men in the House of Lords superadded to those who are already there.

"I am very glad that you are pursuing the idea of preventing the marriage of adulterers; but I wish you would consider the idea of punishing by imprisonment, as a misdemeanour, the seducer, by criminal prosecution; for the compromise of damages is now, I believe, *always* a preliminary proceeding; at least I can name to you three or four late cases in which I know that it has been done.

"As to your '*Heads of a Church Bill*,' they certainly do not come up to my expectations, for there is no sort of check or control upon the bishops; and I am persuaded that in very many cases the fault, from various causes of timidity, weakness, indolence, and job, is to be ascribed to the *custodes*; and I think it is obvious where you are to look for the *quis custodiat*. If you look to the present Bench you will see how few there are upon whom these various causes do not operate, even in instances where the law at present gives them full powers. Upon the same principles I cannot approve of repealing the statute for lay prosecutions for non-residence, because, though I agree with you as to the *animus* of the prosecutor, the defaulter whom the bishop will not punish is thereby brought to trial. But I very much [wish] you to consider the idea of suffragan bishops, for, upon comparing the numbers of these very essential commanding officers with the similar establishment in every other Christian Church, it is astonishing how very inadequate the number appears; and I am persuaded that even Chester (well as it was administered by bishop Cleaver) would have been assisted most usefully by a subordinate rank of bishop. Many things please me very much in your plan, but I doubt whether the present establishment of our universities is adequate to the immense supply that would be required, certainly not less than 8,000. You take no notice of my idea respecting the leases of the lands given in lieu of tithe to our parochial clergy."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 8. Hollwood.—"I enclose you a letter which I have received from Cooke with a draft of the proposed Act of Union, and also of that for settling the Irish elections, both of which it will be very useful if you have time to look over and to correct. Whenever you have done so have the goodness to send them me back."

Postscript.—"There is also a letter from the Bishop of Ferns, on the subject of the precedency of bishops. I think I ought to show it to the Archbishop, but I should like first to know what you think."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 8. Stowe.—"I see by the papers of this day that Stewart Mackenzie, Lord Privy Seal of Scotland, is dead. As this event may probably occasion a step in the Scotch ladder of promotion which may remove Silvester Douglas from the Treasury, I am sure I need not remind you of the very great kindness with

which, when I last saw you in town, you expressed your wishes to assist me in my future objects. I therefore do not lose a moment in sending a servant with this letter, and in putting this business entirely into your hands. If you think it necessary for me to come up to town, or if anything is to be done, I will beg of you to send back the servant immediately, as I can in that case be in town by to-morrow evening. The servant has directions in case you are out of town to leave this letter in Cleveland Row, to be forwarded to you by the messenger."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, April 9. Vienna.—"I shall dispatch a messenger to your Lordship to-morrow; but I will not omit the opportunity of a Turkish messenger passing through Vienna to say merely that, since the date of my last, I have had an interval of considerable anxiety, as the delay in acquainting you with the effect of your Lordship's late instructions may have led you to imagine; but that I am now happy in being able to assure your Lordship that the prospect is as good as ever. I have had recourse to strong language, and to considerable warmth, which appear to have operated; but a *little time* is an ingredient necessary in all measures whether of persuasion or coercion, and it was not till last night that I obtained the satisfaction which I wished. Colonel Ramsay is here. The *corps de Condé* begins its march this day, and I have apprized Lord Keith of its destination. I flatter myself every thing will be ready for its embarkation about the first week of June. I have also requested Lord Keith to communicate the same information to the commander in chief at Minorca."

Postscript—"Captain Proby is here with Colonel Ramsay and in good health. I acquainted him with Lord Carysfort's appointment. He is under great alarm on account of the *Danae*, as we have heard no particulars. I confess that I share his anxiety, having conceived a real regard and affection for Lord Proby.

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 9. Somerset Place.—"Agreeable to your permission I have stopped your despatches, and return them to you. Mr. Pitt came to Wimbledon on Tuesday forenoon and, however averse he was to relax from his former opinion, he was at last satisfied it was impossible to send any thing more of the force to the Mediterranean than that already embarked without hearing from Sir Charles Stuart after his interview with Mr. Wickham. I send you the note from Sir Charles Stuart which I mentioned to you in my note on Sunday, and I send you likewise the explanatory note which, upon my desiring it, he sent to Mr. Huskisson. Upon the perusal of these you will immediately perceive the impression they made upon me. It is shortly this; if the Emperor will give us upon payment for them the assistance in horses, waggons, provisions, which an army of 15,000 men or more will require, there is then

the possibility of being prepared to take advantage of circumstances, if favourable ones occur, to enable such an army to proceed within land; but, if the army is not furnished with these essential requisites, it never can be above a day or two at most from its ships, which in that case must answer the purpose of horses, waggons, magazines. Is there any thing in the conduct of Austria, in the despatches recently received, or in your own conviction as to justify us in the belief that these essential requisites will be supplied by Austria? We have no reason to suppose any such thing, and, under a state of such absolute uncertainty, it would really be madness to put the best part of the force of the country so totally out of the way of being at all employed. This matter will be cleared up by Sir Charles Stuart proceeding to head-quarters and learning what the dispositions are. If the supply is to be forwarded, the additional troops may be sent. If it is not, Sir Charles must content himself with having a moveable force and squadron to make as material diversions as he can. For this purpose the force already in the Mediterranean, or going there, is perfectly sufficient. And in the meantime, till we hear from Sir Charles, the transports and troops most ready may be without delay employed in the attempt on Belleisle, which certainly, in every view, would be the preferable object at this precise moment."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 10. Downing Street.—"I certainly would give you the trouble of coming to Wimbledon if I thought any good would arise from it, but I do not think there would. I have had another full conversation with Sir Charles Stuart, and I am perfectly positive that unless he feels from his conversation with Mr. Wickham that the Austrians are sincere and zealous to the full amount of the service on which he is sent, it must end ultimately in his disgrace and consequently in that of his country. He seemed astonished and staggered at my recital of your doubts that the Austrians would give him any cavalry, of which they have more than they can have any use for. He is clear as to impropriety of bringing the cavalry from Portugal without knowing a precise point to which they can be brought. There is neither accommodation nor food to keep them at Minorca. I send you back the despatch for Mr. Wickham in the manner I think, under the present circumstances, it can go; you will see however that I go upon the supposition of your likewise writing to Lord Minto, and, if he makes any communication to Mr. Wickham, which he should be authorised to do, I don't think the loss of time will be longer than, at all events, those necessary measures would create. I had almost forgot to mention that General Stuart hopes you will give no encouragement to the idea of having a number of new-raised Piedmontese put under his command in the Mediterranean."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Private.

1800, April 11. Dropmore.—"This letter and the accom-

panying dispatch are sent by a Russian messenger. It is probable that he will very soon be followed by one whom I have it in contemplation to send. By this occasion, therefore, I shall only mention to you that your leave of absence is sent in consequence of a desire conveyed to me through Count W[oronzow] that there might be a new minister appointed to the Court of Petersburg.

"I reserve all details on this subject, and on those which relate to your own situation here, and will only assure you of my sincere and invariable regard, founded, as you know, not in personal acquaintance, but in a long course of upright and meritorious public service." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, April 15. Louisburg.—"I should be quite spoiled by the three or four last private letters which I have received from your Lordship if I had not been so long accustomed to your kindness and indulgence. As long as I shall continue to receive the same approbation of my labours your Lordship may be assured that I shall think myself more than sufficiently rewarded.

"Your Lordship had given me the devil of a mission here; between the violence of the one and the mildness of the other I thought I should inevitably have gotten into some awkward scrape. I feared at first indeed that I should at least have been hanged, drawn and quartered. But it was soon perceived that I was not to be taken in that way, and milder methods were attempted; to which I answered immediately with all possible fairness and openness, but in a firm and decided manner, to the effect stated in my public note A; and from that moment I cannot say too much in praise of the manner in which the whole business has been conducted. Notwithstanding that a distinction, and I trust a proper one, has been made between Ludwisburg and Munich, yet your Lordship will not fail to observe that I am still greatly within the discretionary powers granted to me, and that we are a long way within the Cassel treaty of 1793. Mayence and Wurtzburg, as still more deserving, must be treated in the same manner, and we must, in fact though not in words, allow to each of them to carry a small portion of their contingents to the account of the subsidiary troops, otherwise the treaty will really bear too hard on them, and they will be obliged, from absolute necessity, to do their utmost to cheat us. Upon the Bavarians I would have no mercy, for, God knows, they deserve none from anybody.

"I hope your Lordship will not be too much alarmed at Lord Minto's No. 16, of which I have this instant received a copy. Were it not for the great political example so very necessary to give to the world at this moment, I should say that you are all wrong about Piedmont, and that the most desirable thing that could happen for us would be the delivering the guard of the French frontiers into the hands of the House of Austria. This has been uniformly my opinion, and is not the consequence of any new hopes created by the present prospect of renewing the Austrian

alliance. If you could obtain the Milanese for the King of Sardinia, with Parma and Genoa, I should then think otherwise. Short of that he will ever remain *the little King that lives on the road from Venice to Paris*.

"Thugut's ill-humour arises principally from bills coming in upon him faster than he can pay them ; and indeed, when I witness the enormous expenses incurred for the support of this army here, it is matter of astonishment to me how they can possibly go on as they do with their finances in so very disordered a state. I verily believe they have not advanced less than £450,000 this winter to the different States of the Empire who have been in want of assistance to enable them to keep up their troops, and to the different levies of militia and armed peasants that have been made between Basle and Mayence.

"Surely Lord Minto was authorized to pay the first £200,000 forthwith. I fear that this delay and the history of the Legations will cause a material delay in the opening of the campaign. Their hopes on the side of Italy have been grievously disappointed. Bad administration and unwise political conduct have prevented their drawing from that country the half of the resources which it would otherwise have furnished. In one word, money you must give them ; for, without money, they cannot possibly go on, and without them we can do nothing.

"Proby is gone with Ramsay to Lintz. On his return I will execute your Lordship's commission which will give him the greatest pleasure and satisfaction. I shall myself be sincerely sorry to lose him. He is a very good and a very clever lad, but he passed here a life of idleness. He liked Ramsay very much as a pleasant companion, and a gentlemanlike man, but he had a very mean opinion of his military talents, and therefore the sooner he is taken away from him the better.

"I wait General Stuart's arrival with great impatience. I wish he were already in the Mediterranean, as our operations here must be guided and determined by those of Italy.

"I do not much like the state of things in the interior at this particular moment. In spite of everything, many people are fools enough to believe that Buonaparte means to restore the royal family."

Postscript.—"I am obliged, though sorry for it on many accounts, to *suffer* the Baron de Roll to go away. He is so terribly anti-Austrian and so impenitently French, that he does serious mischief without intending it. I wish much however that your Lordship would give him to understand that I see him go away with regret. He had been foolish enough to imagine that I should give him the command of the Swiss corps for which he is totally unfit, and because that cannot be, and because I cannot, with every wish in favour of such a measure, displace Bachman, he says he cannot remain here any longer with honour.

"I hear to-day that Lord Carysfort is going to Berlin. Without knowing much of his Lordship's means or talents, I am heartily glad of this appointment, as the Minister will act under your Lordship's immediate and confidential direction.

"This point becomes every day more and more important, as the French are doing everything in their power to get at Petersburg through Berlin, the mischievous consequences of which attempt, should it succeed, are beyond calculation. And they have now so many points of contact with all manner of countries and all manner of persons in Europe, that the utmost vigilance of the ablest and most quick-sighted Minister that ever was employed on a foreign mission would not be sufficient to discover half their secret intrigues and negotiations.

"I think, as I have had occasion to say before, and my opinion is the result of much observation and reflection, that the *disinterested* proclamation offered by M. Thugut is better than a *royalist* one, and will be more serviceable to the Royalists themselves.

"Clinton and Booth are arrived. I will acknowledge their arrival by the first occasion.

"I shall be very glad to know that I have got into no scrape *at home* by my conduct here, and shall be truly thankful to your Lordship for a line to tell me the real truth on that subject.

"From everything I can observe and collect, the Duchess appears to be satisfied and happy here. The Duke is certainly full of attentions to her, which those who live constantly in the family (and I have among them a very old friend and acquaintance) assure me are not assumed on this occasion."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret.

1800, April 15. Hollwood.—"You will probably have learned by this time from Dundas, that he abandons the idea of hanging up the Mediterranean plan for the issue of Stuart's mission, and wishes to decide at once on sending no more than 5,000 men thither, and keeping the rest of our force in a state to avail itself of openings nearer home, in a way very conformable to what you seem to have in view. This remaining disposable force he counts upon only as 25,000 infantry in the first instance, but it certainly in the course of the year will furnish not less than from 34 to 37,000, and may, I think, give great means (if well applied) of harassing and distracting the enemy, and perhaps (under very favourable circumstances) of striking some important blow. On the whole I think we have nothing better now in our power.

"I had at last on Saturday a very long conversation with the Archbishop, who enters warmly into our plan as far as relates to the augmentation of livings, and the summary power of suspension to enforce residence; but he seems to think the line of residence too strictly drawn, and is full of apprehensions as to the system of inspection and report. I fear we cannot proceed further, till I have an opportunity of talking over with you all he stated."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 17. Downing Street.—"Two on Saturday will suit perfectly for me, and I will be ready for you at half-past one. I

am ashamed of having forgot the Condé army, on which I had only to say that I quite agree with you in the obvious necessity of countermanding their march to Leghorn, and that I now see no use to be made of them so good as joining them to Wickham's Swiss, to act under the best conditions he can make for them with the Austrians.

"I have unluckily a slight bilious attack which has obliged me to defer our business in the House till Monday."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 19.—"Il y a bien longtems que je n'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir. Je n'ai rien eu de ma cour si ce n'est la nouvelle de l'arrivée du courier retenu si longtems à Yarmouth. Je voulais vous demander si vous aviez reçu quelqu' information ; et comme M. Frere m'avait averti qu'on expédioit un courier ce soir, je craignais que vous n'eussiez peut-être quelque communication à me faire, et que le tems ne vous le permit pas. Vous savez que Thugut me soit mauvais gré quand vos couriers ne lui apportent point de renseignements de ma part.

"Savez vous que notre ambassadeur en Espagne est mort. Comme l'esprit de vilainie d'argent dirige toujours ma cour dans ses dispositions vis-à-vis de ses employés, pourquoi ne reformeroit on pas l'ambassade d'Espagne pour l'établir ici ? Que dites vous de cette idée ? Elle me paroît digne de nos deux cours et de leur intimité actuelle. Si vous l'approuviez, je crois qu'il seroit à propos que vous vous hâtiez d'en donner *le hint* ; ce seroit bien le moment ou jamais."

LORD LOUGHBOROUGH to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1800, April 20.—"Mr. Erskine states that, upon his last arrival at Lisbon, a rumour prevailed there of the intended hostility of the Court of Spain. Mr. Walpole had told him that Pinto appeared to be very much alarmed at the last dispatches received from Madrid. This led Mr. Erskine to make such inquiry as his former connections at Lisbon enabled him to do. The Portuguese Commissary of War informed him that there was not the least movement on the side of Spain which indicated a preparation for war ; and, from the scarcity in Portugal as well as in Spain, it was not possible on either side to collect any respectable force before the month of June ; and from that time to September, the want of water on all the frontier to the south of the Tagus renders the approach of a Spanish army almost impracticable. The northern part of Portugal continues to be in a very good state of defence owing to the activity of a General Calder, who has commanded there for a considerable time, and the zeal of the Archbishop of Braga. By their united efforts, the country to the northward of Oporto is armed and in a condition to repel any attack which the force that Spain could collect in that quarter might attempt. The Portuguese Commissary had received no directions to form any magazines, but said he should be provided much sooner than the Spaniards could

be; which, Mr. Erskine observes, is not a vain boast as the Portuguese paper is only 16 per cent. below par, and the Spanish 46. He adds that Pinto is always disposed to exaggerate every alarm, as the great object of his own alarm is the Duke de la Foens, who at present has excluded him entirely from the military department, which would necessarily revert to him if there was such an appearance of danger as should bring a British army into Portugal, for no British general could act with the Duke de la Foens.

"Though this statement does not affect the measure proposed yesterday in any respect, I thought you would not dislike to receive it."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 20. Wimbledon.—"I have this morning been furnished with the drafts of instructions to Sir Charles Stuart, together with your notes, all of which I shall attend to; only I think it right to mention to you that it is never the practice to send orders about the civil government till we hear of the surrender and the conditions under which it is made. From the particular circumstances of this case it was necessary to take care that nothing in the first instance shall be done to interfere with the ultimate arrangement that may take place, and accordingly Sir Charles Stuart is particularly instructed on that point. I have not the treaty with Russia by me as to Malta, but, if my recollection is right, neither the Grand Master of the Order of Malta or his deputy, *as such*, under the agreement have any thing to do with it, until the island is restored to the Order *at a general peace, or at such earlier period as may be agreed upon by mutual consent*. So that I am sure we are acting accurately within both the words and the spirit of the treaty. I hope in God you will be able to make such an arrangement with Russia as may secure to us, *as a naval power*, all the advantages which the island of Malta possesses. I send you the perusal of a few sheets extracted from a French publication. They are of course wrote with the view of colouring highly the importance of the new acquisition, but, in truth, the exaggeration is very small. To France its value is incalculable."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, April 22. Louisburg.—"I am much hurried to-day by pressing messages from General Kray to hasten the equipment, march, and arrival of the Bavarian and Wurtemberg troops. I am therefore obliged to write less both of public and private letters than I could have wished.

"I will not however omit this opportunity of strongly recommending to your Lordship, in case I should be able to send you some very good accounts from hence, to procure some honourable testimony of satisfaction and favour either directly or indirectly from the King. I should much wish also, in case I should have it in my power to speak handsomely of the services of any of the

subsidiary troops, that they may be acknowledged to their respective Courts. These are instruments that in times like these ought not to be neglected, though I should be as sorry as any one to see them used with prodigality.

"Another thing I wish to mention is, though I believe I should also do it openly, that the Elector of Bavaria and the Duke of Wurtemberg have given each of them a very handsome watch to Major de Varicourt, the Swiss staff officer whom I have employed to regulate with persons respectively appointed by the Elector and the Duke for that purpose; namely the Baron des Deux Ponts on the part of the Elector, and Colonel Varenbuhler on the part of the Duke."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, April 23. Cleveland Row.—"I return to you the paper you sent me about Malta. I received long ago the French pamphlet from which it is extracted, and which, to say the truth, never appeared to me to be entitled to the least attention.

"It is unquestionably true that, in the hands of France, Malta might prove a naval station of some, but I conceive not of very great, importance in time of war; though it is little likely that a naval war will ever hereafter, as it has now happened, be carried on between Great Britain and France in the seas of the Levant.

"In time of peace it is, I think, demonstrable that Malta could be of no use to us or France, for we have both of us direct access to all the ports and countries of the Mediterranean and want no emporium; and, if we did want any, Minorca is for that purpose as well situated, and is, for a naval station, much better situated than Malta.

"As for arrangements with Russia, I own that I despair, and when you read the despatches you will probably do so likewise, of being able to conclude any thing with that Court just now; but especially on the very point on which the Emperor is most sore.

"My opinion therefore clearly is to leave the thing as it is; to satisfy ourselves with the advantage of having Malta rather in the hands of Russia than of France; and not to attempt to open any fresh negotiation at Petersburg on the subject." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF DARNLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 23. Berkeley Square.—"I feel it my duty to submit to your consideration the following observations on the 4th article of the Union with Ireland before the discussion of this most important subject is again renewed in the House of Peers on Friday next. In conformity to what appeared to be the general sense of the House when we went into the committee and voted the 3 first articles, I forebore to express in the strongest and most decided terms my general approbation of the measure as I had intended, and, at the same time, to take the opportunity of suggesting to Government before the discussion itself took place, the objections which strike my mind very forcibly to one particular point, I mean the

continuance of a limited prerogative of creating Irish peers. It appears to me that of the 3 choices which presented themselves, the Irish Parliament have chosen the worst. If the prerogative is to remain, does it not afford a dangerous precedent to limit and circumscribe it, and is it not an innovation in this part of the Constitution which nothing short of absolute necessity can sufficiently justify? In this case nothing like necessity appears. The precedent of Scotland points out the natural and obvious course to be followed. Ireland by the Union is to be extinguished as a distinct and separate kingdom, and, therefore, plain constitutional analogy prescribes (if I mistake not) that distinct and separate peerages for that kingdom should cease to be created. After the Union the king himself will cease to be king of Ireland as a separate kingdom, and therefore might with equal propriety create peers of Scotland or Wales as of that kingdom which will merge, as the others have done, in the British empire. Peers of the British empire are the only constitutional peers of whom I can have any idea after the Union shall have taken place.

“If there be any weight in what I have advanced, I do not think the reasons which have been given for this deviation from former precedent will be sufficient to counterbalance it. It is true that the circumstance of many of the Scottish peerages descending to heirs general, while the Irish are all limited to heirs male, makes the probable extinction of the latter much more rapid and certain than of the former. Considering however the present numbers of the Irish peerage, it is not probable that they will be reduced very low before the Union shall have taken the full effect reasonably to be expected from it in identifying the two countries; and then, whether peers are sent from Ireland or not will, as it appears to me, be of little or no consequence, or rather it will be better that they should not, and that every trace of separation or distinctness should, even in this comparatively immaterial instance, be obliterated. In a word, why should we introduce a great constitutional innovation without necessity or (as I conceive) even expediency to justify it? If any such can be proved to exist, and you will take the trouble to point it out to me, I shall be most happy to acquiesce in this part also, as I do most cordially in every other of this great and important arrangement. If not, I shall be obliged in this particular point to withhold the approbation I am so anxious to give to this measure; and trust you will agree with me in thinking that, by making this previous communication of my ideas on the subject, I act the most fair and friendly part to you and the other members of Administration.”

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 23. Harley Street.—“Après que nous nous sommes séparé hier, j’ai vue le Général George [Georges Cadoudal] et son compagnon. Il n’a cessé parler de l’effet que le séjour des Russes aux isles faisoit dans l’intérieur de la France, et même sur Bonaparte, et que l’attente de leurs débarquement étoit incomode au Consul, et que s’il s’effectuait, pouvoit être très décisif. Comme ni

vous ni moi nous ne pouvons rien faire sur ce sujet, j'ai cru devoir conseiller au Comte d'Artois d'envoyer ces deux personnes à Mittau auprès du Roi, en priant sa majesté de les expédier à l'Empereur pour lui donner tous les détails de l'état des choses en France. Qui sait si cela ne réveillera pas le zèle de l'Empereur, n'exitera de nouveau son entousiasme d'être un des principaux instruments pour le rétablissement de la monarchie en France ; et comme nos troupes ne peuvent être habillées que vers la moitié de juin, et par conséquent ne peuvent pas partir avant on auroit le tems d'avoir la réponse, je suis sûr que *Monsieur* vous consultera. Ne découragez pas, je vous supplie, cette idée, en cas que ce prince l'approuve. Faites moi l'amitié de me dire votre opinion sur ce sujet, et renvoyez-moi, je vous supplie, une de mes boîtes."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800 April 23. Cleveland Row.—"Je vous envoie les deux lettres que je viens de recevoir de Petersbourg. Elles m'annoncent rien que de mauvais, et je vous avouerai que, quelque attaché que j'ai toujours été à l'alliance de la Russie, je ne pense pas qu'il nous convienne de jouer le rôle du Comte Cobenzl et de sa cour, en n'opposant que des bassesses à toutes les humiliations qu'on lui a fait éprouver.

"C'est là ce qui me fait douter de l'envoi des deux François, puisqu'il sera censé venir de notre part quoiqu'au nom de *Monsieur*. Il faudra que je consulte mes collègues là-dessus.

"Je suis bien éloigné de vouloir desservir la grande cause que nous soutenons par des mouvemens d'humeur, quelque provoqués qu'ils soient, mais, de l'autre côté, l'honneur et la dignité d'une nation sont ce qu'elle doit avoir de plus cher." *Copy.*

RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, April 24. Great Cumberland Place.—"I take the liberty to send your Lordship an extract of the report of our last conference that I have sent to Colonel Pickering, in order that I might be enabled to correct any misconception, that I may have fallen into, of what passed on that occasion."

Enclosure :—

RUFUS KING to TIMOTHY PICKERING.

1800, April 22.—"The written answer of Lord Grenville having intimated a disposition to accede to certain regulations which it was supposed might facilitate the execution of the treaty, I yesterday asked a conference with his Lordship for the purpose of obtaining a precise idea of the nature and extent of these regulations. This was immediately granted, and afforded an opportunity for a free conversation upon the general topic, as well as respecting the particular subject that brought us together. Many things were

said on both sides which it would be useless to repeat ; these therefore are omitted in this report.

“ His Lordship observed that the object of the delay that took place at London was to allow time for the Court of Appeal to decide the several prize cases before their examination by the Commissioners, and that a like arrangement might be made in respect to the cases before the Commissioners at Philadelphia. With regard to the questions of impediment, solvency, insolvency, and some others of equal importance, Lord Grenville said their decision must be left to the provisions of the treaty, to the particular circumstances of each case, and to the sound discretion of the Commissioners ; adding that, upon a full investigation of the subject, he was convinced that no new and general rule upon these points could be made without affecting cases and claims that ought not to be affected ; and that even with respect to an agreement to delay the cases before the Commissioners at Philadelphia, in order that the claimants should have an opportunity first to obtain the decision of our Courts, it would be difficult, not to say impossible, for him to form any satisfactory idea of what would be a convenient time, unless he had a more adequate knowledge of our judiciary proceedings, and a particular instead of a general acquaintance with the claims. Upon this point, as on most others, there seemed to be wanting a discretionary power always present, and ready to act as occasions arose, and according to the nature and circumstances of the particular question ; that the persons whom he had thought of as two of the Commissioners to be appointed by the King, were men of prudence and discretion, and with whom, he thought, we should be satisfied ; that Mr. Liston having repeatedly asked and lately received leave of absence on account of his health, might not be at Philadelphia ; and he saw no preferable course, in case we acceded to the suggestion, to that of sending these two persons to Philadelphia, to concert with us such analogous regulations, in respect to the commission there, as were agreed to with regard to the commission here. We should by this means have an opportunity of knowing the character and disposition of the persons sent to prepare and agree to these regulations, and who would afterwards be appointed to assist in the execution of the treaty.

“ Lord Grenville asked me in what time I supposed the Courts would be able to go through the whole of the cases. I answered that this must chiefly depend upon the diligence of the creditors, and that I could not form any satisfactory estimate of the time that might be necessary. On the one hand it should not be so short as, with a disposition in the Courts to avoid delay, would defeat the object of the regulation ; and on the other it should not be so long as to afford any ground from the delay to infer that there was a denial of justice. No precise time was settled here, and perhaps none should be at Philadelphia.

“ His Lordship asked if there could be no means found to accelerate the trials. I repeated the observation that more would depend on the diligence of the creditors than upon the Courts, of whose disposition to give the greatest dispatch there could be no doubt : that a law requiring extraordinary sessions of the Courts, or pre-

scribing a more summary proceeding would not only interfere with the established course of our judiciary, but give birth to other and still more difficult questions which it would be unwise to agitate.

"His Lordship asked whether the cases before the Board are any of them in a state for the new Commissioners to take up; suggesting that it would be desirable that the new Board should, at their commencement, have something to do. I replied that though I could not then answer the question with any degree of accuracy, I was inclined to believe that many cases were in a situation that, without recourse to the Courts, might soon be prepared for the Commissioners to decide, and that the progress of the trials would be constantly furnishing additional cases.

"Lord Grenville expressed his opinion that the new Board ought to proceed in a different manner from their predecessors, by deciding cases singly one after another, instead of attempting to decide them by general resolves, and in classes.

"I observed that it was possible that new difficulties might arise in the course of future proceedings; and should Mr. Liston be absent, there would be no one with whom we could confer for the purpose of removing them. Lord Grenville replied that, in this case, he must endeavour to find out a proper character to supply Mr. Liston's place.

"I then asked Lord Grenville if he had formed any idea of the gross sum on the payment of which they would engage to compensate the claims of the British creditors. His Lordship replied that he had not; adding that he thought the creditors had not been wise in swelling, as they had done, their claim to four or five millions sterling; though it might have no influence upon our Government, it would be likely to have some upon the people; that he himself did not like the idea of the payment of a gross sum, and that he had mentioned it to me in compliance with the opinion of his colleagues; but that, on the supposition that the debt due to British creditors did not exceed two millions, that they might be willing to accept a gross sum of between one and two millions." *Extract.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO RUFUS KING.

1800, April 24. Cleveland Row.—"Your report seems perfectly accurate. One question is however omitted, the discussion of which seems to me likely to be material. It is whether there may not be means of classing the cases, so as to give to the creditors the benefit not only of applying to the Commissioners for redress when the existence of an impediment actually applying to their class shall be ascertained by trial in one case; but also the benefit of speedy and effectual redress from the Courts where, by the decision of one cause, any question affecting a class shall be decided. If this is not done, debtors who profit by delay may oblige the creditors to try each disputed question over again, as often as it occurs through the whole class of cases to which it applies.

"You must also allow me to remark on the last point mentioned

in your letter, that, though I permit myself to speak with freedom to you of my personal opinions, I should be unwilling that any expression of doubt, however slight on my part, respecting the opinions of those with whom I am so happy as to act in all business, should get into an official correspondence." *Copy.*

The EARL OF DARNLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 24. Berkeley Square.—“I cannot help troubling you again to thank you for your very obliging and detailed answer to the hasty and undigested communication which I took the liberty of making to you, and to observe that, on one great point, namely, that the arrangement of the Irish peerage as it stands at present in the 4th Article of the Union is by no means the best in principle or policy that could have been devised, we appear perfectly agreed. That we should differ on this subject in the smallest degree I sincerely lament, and am really diffident of my own opinion; but I should not act with that fairness and candour which your letter demands, if I did not confess that I cannot bring my mind to assent entirely to some of the conclusions which you have drawn.

“The election of the Irish peers for life is undoubtedly a considerable improvement on the plan of the Scotch Union, and obviates in a great degree the probability of intrigue and cabal; but I really do not understand why in either case the reduction of the number so low as to admit of no election at all, and still less why the total extinction of the separate peerages of either country should be likely to produce the smallest inconvenience. In their progress and near approach to the first of these points some inconvenience might indeed be felt, but it must necessarily be in its nature temporary. Whenever election ceases there is an end of intrigue or cabal; and the constitution of the whole peerage of the empire would then rest upon its only true basis of hereditary succession. As it appears to me, the sooner such an event takes place the better, and the more complete the Union will be. In the first instance the constitutional anomaly of a separate and elective peerage is (I agree with you) indispensable in any plan of Union; but why should not the gradual and certain hand of time be suffered to take its course in producing the natural remedy of the evil?

“In my view of the subject therefore the best arrangement would have been the extinction of the prerogative of creating Irish peers altogether; but, if it is to remain, I agree with you in thinking that for various reasons it had better have been unlimited. But this also is liable to the objection you have stated of the probable diminution of the value of the peerages themselves. On the other hand the present arrangement seems calculated not only to form, but to perpetuate also, the sort of close corporation you have described. In short, I see many objections to a continuance of the prerogative of creating Irish peers after the Union, whether limited or unlimited, but none to the total extinction of it.

“Having thus stated to you my opinion with freedom and candour I shall forbear to urge in my place in the House of Lords anything which might be construed into hostility to any part of this measure,

for the final accomplishment of which no one can be more anxious than I am. At the same time, however, when the subject shall come regularly before the House, it will be my duty to offer the same suggestions in public which I have taken the liberty of thus communicating to you in private, and your's to treat them as you may think they deserve. At all events, I shall acquiesce in your decision whatever it may be."

The MARQUIS DE CIRCELLO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 25. 1 Mansfield Street.—"Le Duc de St. Teodoro, ministre du roi mon maître à Madrid, m'écrit une lettre, que je crois pouvoir mériter votre attention ; c'est pourquoi j'ai l'honneur de vous en soumettre une copie, et, en rappelant à votre souvenir ce dont dans le temps passé vous m'avez chargé de représenter à ma cour au sujet de celle d'Espagne, et les réponses que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous communiquer, j'attends vos instructions pour régler d'après elles ma réponse à mon collègue. Vous connaissez les intentions du roi mon maître ainsi qu'il est superflu de vous dire qu'il ne négligera rien de ce qui peut contribuer au bien général, et à la satisfaction particulière de son allié la Grande Bretagne.

"Permettez que je vous réitère mes instances au sujet des espérances que Lord Keith a donné à ma cour de la possibilité que la Grande Bretagne accorde un secours en troupes et officiers, dont elle a un besoin positif. Vous m'avez fait espérer que vous en parleriez à Monsieur Dundas. Veuillez me mettre à même de pouvoir donner à ma cour une réponse sur un objet aussi intéressant pour elle."

Enclosure :—

The DUKE OF ST. TEODORO to the MARQUIS DE CIRCELLO.

"Questa monarchia non può non considerarsi come strettamente legata alla nostra per rapporto ai vincoli del sangue dei due Sovrani. E vero che ci ha indegnamente e vilmente abbandonati, ed offesi ; che si è condotta infamemente : ma tuttavia converrebbe salvar la se si potesse. L'interesse generale lo domanda, tanto più se vi fosse modo di persuaderla a tenere altra condotta.

"Questa Corte, mediante la corruzione che esiste in Parigi malgrado il governo di Bonaparte, ha avuto il mezzo di procurarsi la copia delle segrete istruzioni date al nuovo ambasciatore Alquier, ed ha conosciuto quanto poco deve contare sulla buona fede della potenza alleata, per la quale ha fatto e fa tanti sacrifici.

"Alquier deve riunirsi segretamente al Principe della Pace, e procurare di far cadere Urquijo. Questa scoperta ha molto nociuto al Principe della Pace, e ha dato maggior credito ad Urquijo. Non comprendo perchè i Francesi non vogliano Urquijo, il quale si è sempre mostrato propenso per essi.

"Alquier deve far comprendere che la Francia, non più soggetta al governo rivoluzionario, va a prendere una forma stabile e forte : che l'idea di rimettere i Borboni sul trono è inesequibile, poichè la nazione tutta non li vuole : che l'Inghilterra non ha altro in mira

che la distruzione della Francia, e di tutte le altre potenze marittime ; che la casa d'Austria mira al suo ingrandimento : che la Russia delusa si ritira ; sicchè la Spagna deve restare unita alla Francia, e per suo particolare interesse, e per la bilancia.

“Alquier deve far capire che qualunque passo darà la Spagna per separare la sua flotta dalla francese, sarà riguardato come *une atteinte* all' alleanza. Deve insinuare alla Spagna d'indurre il Portogallo alla pace, ed in caso di rifiuto (come è stato fatto per il canale stesso della Spagna) accordare il passaggio ai Francesi. Deve finalmente far comprendere che dagli sforzi che farà la Spagna in questa campagna decisiva, dipenderà il grado d'interesse che la Francia metterà in favore della sua alleata nella negoziazione di pace : che la Francia videndosi costretta a negoziare svantaggiosamente coll'Inghilterra per la restituzione del capo di Buona Speranza, proporrà in cambio le Manille che li Spagnuoli non hanno ancora perdute. Ecco la buona fede di Buonaparte, e dell' attuale Governo ! Cosa se ne deve inferire verso le potenze nemiche, quando pensa a sacrificare l'alleata ?

“Queste istruzioni hanno allarmato qui sono in timore, e sono stanchi : ma non possono, nè osano. Tuttavia Urquijo ha avuto il coraggio di dare qualche rifiuto. La Francia desiderava che la Spagna non avesse riconosciuto il futuro Pontefice, qui si è risposto negativamente. Forse se la Coalizione agisse in un modo più chiaro, qui penserebbero a separarsi : ma temono di rimanere esposti.

“Qui poi si teme che gli Anglo-Russi non vengano a sbarcare in Portogallo, per attaccare la Francia traversando la Spagna.

“Mi è stato detto, che costà vi sia un negoziatore segreto di questa Corte.

“Vi ho detto tutto per vostra intelligenza e governo. Aspetto poi da voi qualche lume. Vi prevengo che ho su di questo delle intrusioni da farne ; uso secondo le circostanze.” *Deciphered copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, April 25. Somerset Place.—“I have this morning received my answer from Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and I send you a copy of it in case the Portuguese minister should be as importunate with you as he was with me yesterday at St. James's.

“Sir Charles Stuart has resigned his command in the Mediterranean. I sincerely regret the loss of so valuable an officer, but it is impossible for me to call upon him again without departing from every principle of subordination. I am perfectly ready to listen to all military remarks, and to remove all professional inconveniences, but when he writes to me that he cannot obey his instructions in so far as they go to the restoration of the Order of Malta, or putting the island under the despotism of Russia although the King is bound by treaty to do so, there is no longer any opening for my interposing to smooth difficulties. I certainly regret as deeply as he or any person can the final disposal of Malta, but if our officers, who are to execute, are permitted to controvert our councils, there is an end of all government. If there should be

any serious movements against Portugal, it will be in that view so far fortunate as that, by giving the command of the Mediterranean force to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and sending Sir James Pultney with him, Sir Ralph, remaining in Portugal, can send Sir James to the Mediterranean, or bring the troops from the Mediterranean to Portugal as he shall think best for the public service according to what he may observe in Portugal. Sir Ralph's seniority of rank makes this highly proper in every view of military etiquette, but, as General Fox now at Minorca is senior to Sir James Pultney, there might have been an awkwardness in sending him to Minorca to dispose of the troops there as he pleased ; but there is no such awkwardness when he goes in detachment under the orders of Sir Ralph, who is senior both to Fox and to him. I doubt if Sir Charles Stuart would have been disposed to go to the Mediterranean the moment he knew that he might at any time be called upon by Sir Ralph Abercrombie to send his force to Portugal if necessary. This, to a certain extent, consoles me for the loss of Sir Charles Stuart's services, which I am really sorry to part with if I could have retained them."

Enclosure :—

Copy of a letter from Sir Ralph Abercromby accepting a mission to Portugal to report on the military resources of that kingdom and the condition of its army.

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, April 27. Harley Street.—“ En me parlant de l'affaire du passeport refusé, vous m'avez dit, avec votre amitié ordinaire pour moi, et dont je sens tout le prix, que vous ne voulez pas me donner des embarras, et que vous ferez porter vos plaintes et vos réclamations par Mr. Casamajor, et que je pourai seulement dire que vous m'en avez parlé. Après avoir réfléchi sur ce sujet, je pense que telle est la pusilanimité de ceux qui entourent l'Empereur, qu'ils n'oseront pas même lui communiquer les plaintes que votre chargé d'affaire présentera officiellement ; et comme il est d'une nécessité absolue que quelqu'un lui ouvre les yeux, et lui fasse voir le mauvais effet que doit produire partout ses violations du droit des gens, j'ai pris sur moi de lui écrire avant hier en chifre la dépêche que je vous envoie, et que je vous supplie de me renvoyer dès que vous l'aurez lue. Il n'a qu'à se fâcher ; mais il est important qu'il sache que ce qu'il fait n'a été pratiqué nulle part, à moins que ce ne soit à moi—.

“ Je vous avoue que je commence à être las de servir une Cour qui se conduit d'une manière aussi étrange. Je ne puis la blâmer publiquement, mais je n'aurai jamais la bassesse de la justifier, ou en faire l'apologie.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, April 29. Cleveland Row.—“ I have not time to write at length by the opportunity of Lord William Bentinck, who sets off

to-night for Italy. The prospect opened to us in your dispatches which we received yesterday is highly favourable ; but still doubt and uncertainty hang on the horizon at Vienna ; and I know not what ground of confidence we can have that the campaign will open in good earnest, or, opening, will continue longer than till Buonaparte finds himself obliged to offer that, whatever it is, which Austria requires in Italy.

“ Our speculations about Piedmont are not at all different from yours, but you see the reason of what we are doing on that subject.

“ The project of acting on any large scale in the Mediterranean was renounced as soon as it was clearly ascertained that no Russian co-operation was to be had, either there or on this side of France. Stuart has resigned that command in one of those strange humours which belong to his character, and which nearly destroy all the advantage that might be made of his excellent talents and military skill.

“ Sir James Pulteney will have there about 8,000 troops, of which not more than 5,000 will be disposeable for active service. These may occasionally co-operate in particular operations on the sea coast, or they may reduce Malta, or annoy the Spaniards if despair should drive Buonaparte into compelling the latter to attack Portugal ; but I do not expect anything more from them.

“ Here we may do better things if opportunity serves, but not otherwise. In this state of things Proby must remain with you for the present, and I will endeavour to do what I can to forward what I understand to be (and I think rightly) his object, that of service with British troops.

Postscript.—You will of course expect a messenger as soon as we hear the result of Lord Minto’s negotiation.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 1. Fort William.—“ I cannot allow this overland dispatch to depart without a few words of thanks to you for all your kind letters received by the *Mornington* and other ships arrived in the course of last month. I shall answer you fully by the return of the *Mornington* in a few weeks. In the mean while believe that I am most cordially sensible of your affectionate remembrance of me, and that I shall always retain my sincere friendship for you in full ardour.

Quæ me cunque vocent terre.

Pitt, Dundas, and Bernard will tell you how I have been distressed by my Irish honors, and what their effect is likely to be here ; they will tell you that I must come home, if I am to continue an Irish Lord, and to receive no higher marks of the King’s sense of my services. But I shall return in perfect good humour with myself and my friends, and exactly in a disposition to become a Buckinghamshire or Berkshire freeholder, and to remain a country gentleman to the end of my days, talking over Indian politics with Major Massacre, and Mrs. Hastings, and the Major Majorum, not forgetting Major Aprorum, Rennell ; and with your speech, and the votes of both Houses, framed over my parlour chimney.

"With respect to grants of money; I cannot accept any grant which shall be, or shall appear to be a deduction from the prize money of the army. Dundas has been most kind in the pains he has taken on this subject.

"I am tolerably well, but in bad spirits, and annoyed by feelings of mortification and disappointment which I shall soon forget, when I shall have shuffled off this mortal coil, and arrived on English, not *Breetish*, nor *Irish* ground.

"Dispatch the overland express; and for God's sake bring me home, home, home; home first, home last, home midst. . . .

"No official letter has reached me respecting my *new brogues*; and it would not be correct to put them on *before I get them, by Jasus*.

"I forgot to thank you for your picture, with which I am delighted; the likeness is admirable, exact to a point, and perfectly alive. I never saw a better portrait; who is the painter? You cannot imagine what a satisfaction this picture affords to me in this dreary solitude.

"I send you a box of seeds. I hope my good-natured, old, silly aide-de-camp Major Davis brought my Lady's birds in safety to her hand."

Equidem, haud dissimulo, me tuas, Cornwallisi, laudes non assequi solum velle, sed (bonâ veniâ tuâ dixerim) si possim, etiam exuperare. Illud nec tibi in me, nec mihi in minores natu animi sit, ut nolimus quanquam nostri similem evadere civem. Id enim non eorum modo quibus inviderimus, sed Repub: et penè omnis generis humani detrimentum sit.

Recommended to Mr. Pitt's attention by a poor *Irish* scholar.

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, May 2. Vienna.—"I have received your dispatches of the 19th April, by the return of one of my servants who arrived while I was preparing my dispatches of this day. I am under the necessity of postponing what relates to them to the next messenger. In the mean while I am sorry to say that I foresee the greatest embarrassments from the change in the destination of the *corps de Condé*. I have always been assured that the Emperor would not suffer them either in his armies or his dominions, and I know not how we shall dispose of them on one hand, and satisfy or fly from the clamour of this Court on the other for their departure. However, it will be time enough to fatigue your Lordship with these distresses when they arise.

"If you should approve of the conditions respecting Piedmont, it seems to be Baron Thugut's wish that your Lordship should immediately open the matter to Monsieur de Front, as an arrangement which, we have reason to know, might be obtained from Austria; and to intimate that our support must be withdrawn if he should oppose so reasonable a settlement. I should also be authorised to communicate it to the Sardinian minister here. I have not yet acquainted Mr. Jackson with any part of this negotiation, which I feel to be unpleasant, but it seemed impossible to do otherwise without great inconvenience."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1800, May 2. Vienna.—“However delicate the subject certainly is, I feel it to be a duty that I ought not to decline to say a word or two, in the strictest confidence, concerning the choice of a person to administer the government of Piedmont. The intention being to establish something like harmony between the Imperial army and the Piedmontese government, without throwing the country into the hands of the Austrians, which would create jealousy and alarm of various sorts, I have reason to know that this Court would think the measure entirely frustrated if any person were named whose habits had attached him strongly and peculiarly to the Court of the King of Sardinia. In this view Mr. Trevor, however respectable in every other view, would not give satisfaction here; and I fear I am under the necessity of adding that Mr. Jackson could have no share in that system without exciting the greatest jealousy at Vienna, instead of inspiring the confidence which this measure is intended to produce. Some new man connected and in habits neither with Austria nor Piedmont, and not distinguished for anti-Austrian feelings, would be, in those respects, best qualified for that situation. In other respects it will require many very rare and eminent qualifications; for to mediate between two parties; and to exact from Piedmont, on one hand, all the sacrifices and exertions which the war requires, and, on the other, to resist with temperate and discreet firmness and impartiality the exactions that may be expected from the Austrians, will demand a strong judgment, and a strong character. The person employed should also have the habits of business, and a competent acquaintance with the science of finance, and all that belongs to what the French call administration.

“I fear your Lordship will think this letter written like many others for the sake of the postscript, when I confess that there is a person in my mind whom I think made on purpose for such an employment; I mean Sylvester Douglas. Your Lordship may not have thought of him in that view; but all his talents, his acquirements, and his first habits point to foreign life and occupations; and he has, besides, acquired all the knowledge of other sorts that would be wanted. He is a master of French, Italian, and German, and indeed most other languages. I know he wishes for some foreign occasional employment. I feel that I am taking a great liberty, but I will endeavour to diminish my fault in some degree by assuring you, upon my honour, that I take this step entirely without his knowledge, and that he shall never know it except in the case of his nomination.

“I think it still my indispensable duty to return, at all events, to the principles of exclusion mentioned in the beginning of this letter.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 6. Harley Street.—“Il m'est arrivé un courier hier; son expédition datte du vingt-huit mars, vieux style, et je sais

qu'elle étoit faite dix jours avant d'être expédié. Elle contient un tas énorme de paperasses, dont une partie est en Russe qu'il faut que je fasse traduire pour vous les communiquer ; la plus part régardent les affaires d'Égypte, que je vois être le principal motif de l'humeur qu'on a chez nous. Les copies et les traductions ne pourront être prête qu'après demain, jeudi, matin, et je vous prie de me donner une heure de votre tems entre deux et quatre heures de jeudi après demain.

"Je vous rend mille grâces pour le warrant, et pour la bonne nouvelle de la défaite de Massena. Je vous prie de me renvoyer quelqu' une de mes cassetes ; il en est resté quatre chez vous."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, May 8. Vienna.—"I am so strongly urged by Mr. Tooke not to lose a single moment in forwarding the dispatches to the India House which this messenger carries, that I have had barely time, while his horses are ordering, to write the accompanying dispatch, and I must for the present content myself with adding in this form that, after conversing fully with Baron Thugut, and satisfying myself concerning the determination of this Court respecting the *corps de Condé*, I see that it cannot be employed with any of the Austrian armies. If it were, differences and mutual criminalations *must* arise, in which we should find ourselves parties on account of the connexion we now have with the *corps de Condé*. But independent of all other reasons, the French principles of this Court are too little *prononcés* to admit of their placing a corps purely royalist, with the French king's uniform, cockade, and colours, in the front of their operations against France. On the whole, the only thing I could think of for the present, till your further instructions arrive, is to let them proceed to Italy, and to station them in the Pope's territories, as at Civita Vecchia, and perhaps Rome, to wait His Majesty's orders. If General Willot succeeds, and the southern provinces offer a fair prospect, the *corps de Condé* may be transported there from Civita Vecchia with little delay or inconvenience. If you should still wish to carry them to Minorca, they are equally at hand ; or if you take them to Portugal or to England they are still in a convenient situation for embarking. I have, in the meanwhile, written these ideas to Mr. Wickham, and till his answer arrives they will halt where they are, already within the Italian provinces ; and Baron Thugut has promised to make an arrangement for provisions which will enable them to do so for a fortnight. I should have wished for a little more leisure to throw out to your Lordship an idea that appears to me extremely worthy of attention concerning this corps. Nothing can be more noble, or in my opinion more becoming the liberal policy of our Government than the principle on which the *corps de Condé* is established. But the more that principle is to be commended in the liberal and generous view of the subject, the less favourable it is to a principle merely military. There are 7,000 mouths, and between 2,000 and 3,000 effective fighting men. If the liberal part were separated from the

military, some thousand individuals would enjoy the same relief which is intended for them, without the fatigues and changes of marches and voyages ; and all the extraordinary expenses of transporting them from country to country would be saved to Government ; while those really capable of service might then be usefully employed against the enemy. At present the train is so great that no army on actual service can conveniently accept of such a reinforcement. This reform might be executed while they are in the Roman territory, if your Lordship and His Majesty's ministers approve of it.

"Baron Thugut has begged a few days more for the *projet* of the treaty, but every thing continues secure and steady.

"General Melas was going in person, by the last accounts of the 24th April, against Suchet to the westward, and had begun to intrench his army round Masséna. They are bringing siege artillery against Genoa."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most confidential.

1800, May 8.—"Let me very earnestly recommend to your Lordship's consideration what I have only hinted at in my public dispatch, the necessity of strong reinforcements in the Mediterranean. I am pretty confident that we shall not be beaten here, but, if we are, we must do as the Romans did with Carthage, carry the war to her very gates. Believe me that nothing else will save us. I write to this effect strongly to Vienna. The loss of the Austrian magazines is a most grievous calamity. I am persuaded that not less than five hundred thousand pounds will be necessary to enable Count Lehrbach to replace them.

"My opinions on subjects of that kind are, I know, rather odd, but I should strongly advise, if I durst, that the King should take this opportunity of saying and doing a handsome thing personally to the Emperor, and begging to bear a part of the loss. If he would give a hundred thousand pounds, I would engage to save them out of what you have assigned to me. But if you do the thing at all do it handsomely, and in a noble king-like way.

"We have conquered M. Thugut I verily believe. We must conquer also the good will of the army and of the nobility, which a generous action of this kind will surely do.

"Do not think me mad for suggesting such strange things. I now know the people well enough with whom we have to deal, and I am sure they have only been lost for want of sufficient attention being given to study their real characters. Proud as they are they are not above a bribe ; do not even dislike such a thing ; and would even willingly take one, provided it were given under any other form.

"The poor regiment of Roverea is almost destroyed. It is a sad history of which I will send your Lordship the detail another time. They have been sent into the field without the means of transporting their provisions or carrying away their wounded ; though I had received from Ramsay the most solemn assurances before he went

to the Condé army that they were actually provided with everything. But I cannot too often repeat it. Our officers, particularly those that call themselves staff officers, are totally unfit for anything of the kind; and it is only since I have meddled with military arrangements myself, in consequence of their evident incapacity, that I have been able to judge of the extent to which that incapacity is carried. Judge how heart-breaking a thing it is for me to have received personal reproaches on this subject from General Kray and the Archduke Ferdinand. Pray let me be authorized to give the King's thanks to the remains of the regiment."

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL SPENCER.

1800, May 9. London.—"I have, as I expected, received from Woronzow a heavy complaint against Sir Sydney Smith for his conduct in the negotiation of Kleber's capitulation.

"May I give him to understand in my answer that Sir Sydney will by this time have been withdrawn from that station? If this has been done, it will be a better proof of disavowal than all the assurances I could give." *Copy.*

LORD SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 9. Admiralty.—"Whether Sir S. Smith will actually by this time have been withdrawn from the Levant station I know not; but when we received the account of the capitulation, I wrote to Lord Keith suggesting to him the expediency of employing Sir Sidney elsewhere; and I think it most probable he may act on that suggestion. However, I will take an immediate opportunity which now offers, of repeating it."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, May 9. Cleveland Row.—"Mon premier soin ce matin a été de lire attentivement tous les papiers que vous m'avez laissés hier. J'aurai le plaisir de vous recevoir ce soir, mais je crois vous épargner quelque travail en vous envoyant une minute, faite à la hâte, de ce que j'aurai à vous dire sur les deux points principaux.

"Je vous ai exprimé hier que très faiblement l'étonnement et la douleur avec laquelle j'ai reçu l'autre nouvelle que vous m'avez communiqué. Vous rendez certainement trop de justice à mes sentimens pour ne pas être persuadé de ce que j'éprouve, tant pour la chose publique que pour moi personnellement, en voyant l'injustice inouïe que l'on fait à un homme dont on avoit paru apprécier le mérite et les qualités qui le distinguent d'une manière si éclatante. Ne croyez pas que je veuille vous flatter—c'est le vrai sentiment de mon âme. Je n'ai jamais connu personne plus fait pour inspirer tous les sentimens d'estime, d'amitié, et d'affection. Je vous ai voué ces sentimens depuis longtems, et plus je vous ai connu, plus j'ai eu à vous admirer et vous respecter.

"Recevez avec bonté ces assurances que la circonstance me met dans l'impossibilité de retenir, et croyez à l'amitié inaltérable de celui qui vous est dévoué pour toujours." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, May 10. Budvitz.—“I set out from Vienna the night before last in order to meet Lady Minto and my family; I met them last night twelve posts from Vienna, and am now on my return, hoping to arrive to-morrow night. I received to-day by *estafette* the enclosed letter which may possibly contain the earliest accounts your Lordship may receive of the recommencement of hostilities in Egypt. Mr. Straton, in a subsequent letter written also yesterday, adds that Baron Thugut had informed him it was surmised—but merely surmised—that General Kleber had recommenced hostilities in consequence of orders from Buonaparte, and assurances of speedy succours from France.

“By a letter from Mr. Tooke, accompanying the dispatches to the India House which this messenger carries, I learn that Lord Elgin had dispatched a messenger from Constantinople on the 22nd April with the Egyptian news. Mr. Tooke’s letter is dated the 25th, and on this account he says that he does not think it necessary to mention those accounts. Possibly Mr. Tooke may have written what he has heard on that subject to Mr. Ramsay, secretary to the East India Company, with the packet which I am now dispatching. Lord Elgin’s messenger may be expected every day.

“Baron Thugut having desired to postpone our conferences on the treaty to Monday or Tuesday, I trust your Lordship will not think I hazarded any prejudice to His Majesty’s affairs by this short absence on an occasion so interesting to me.”

Enclosure :—

ALEXANDER STRATON to LORD MINTO.

1800, May 9. Vienna.—“In the answer to a note which I wrote last night to Baron Thugut for the purpose of learning where General Kray’s head quarters were, he mentioned the resumption of hostilities in Egypt as a fact with which you were probably acquainted. This not being the case, I called upon the Austrian minister this morning, and I think it right to send on an *estafette* with the result of the intelligence he gave me on this important subject. He told me that Kleber, on hearing of the renewal of the blockade of Alexandria, and of the difficulties made in England respecting the convention, had announced to the Grand Vizer that the armistice was at an end, and that he would immediately recommence hostilities. The Grand Vizer wished to send to Constantinople. But Kleber would not consent to the delay which this step would occasion; and attacked and completely routed the Grand Vizer’s army. On the other hand, one of his, the Grand Vizer’s, lieutenants, who was in the neighbourhood of Cairo, fell upon a body of French that was there, put it to the sword, entered the city and massacred all the French of every denomination that were in it. Some of the Beys had joined the Grand Vizer’s lieutenant. Baron Thugut did not exactly recollect, but he thought that the armistice had been broken on the 17th or 18th of March.

He also informed me that his letters, which came by *estafette* by the way of Belgrade, mentioned Lord Elgin's having dispatched a messenger by the way of Bucharest, who may be hourly expected and who will, of course, bring a detailed account of what has happened in Egypt. Upon the whole Thugut seemed satisfied with the news."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 10. Harley Street.—"J'ai reçu hier tard les papiers que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer. J'étois occupé de l'expédition de mon courier que j'ai fini à trois heures de ce matin. Je n'ai pu donc les lire qu'aujourd'hui; je les ai renvoyé à Monsieur Hammond, et en vous remerciant de cette communication confidentielle, je vous prie d'ordonner qu'on fasse de ces papiers l'extrait que vous avez promis pour que je puisse l'envoyer à ma cour.

"J'ai écrit à l'Empereur pour avoir mon congé du service, et pour pouvoir rester ici en particulier loin de Londrès, désirent de m'établir dans le sud-west de ce pays où le climat est plus doux pour un homme dont la santé est aussi délabrée que la mienne. Je lui parle de cette santé et de celle de ma fille, qui sont tels que c'est autant que de nous condamner à la mort que de nous obliger d'aller vivre en Russie.

"Je ne vous ennuierois pas de ces détails, si je ne connoissois votre amitié pour moi.

"Je vous envoie la copie de ma lettre officielle ou réponse sur les affaires de l'Égypte, et le mésentendue au sujet des subssides. J'ai tâché tant que j'ai pu d'adoucir l'aigreur qui comence de chez nous sans aucune raison.

"L'article qui me régarder perssonnellement est fait pour ôter tout soupçon qu'on pouroit avoir que je cherche à me rendre nécessaire, et garder mon poste; et, en vérité, je régarder comme un bonheur de le quitter quand je vois que tout vat à la renversse chez nous, et qu'il n'y a que honte et humiliation à récueillir en servent une cour qui, définitivement, otte toute espérance de se conduire plus sagement."

Enclosure :—

COUNT WORONZOW TO COUNT PANIN.

1800, May 11. London.—"J'ai communiqué hier à Milord Grenville les deux lettres que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser par le sous-lieutenant des chasseurs Neüman, arrivé ici depuis cinq jours; l'une desquelles contenoit des annexes sur l'étrange capitulation que cet extravagant Sidney Smith a fait faire au vizir; et l'autre qui traite des difficultés survenues au sujet des comptes pour les subsides. Toutes ces communications étant très volumineuses, et Milord Grenville étant pressé d'aller à la Chambre haute, me pria de les lui laisser et qu'il me reverroit le lendemain (aujourd' lui). Ce matin il m'envoya le papier ci-joint que j'ai l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence, et en me l'envoyant, il m'a prié de passer chez lui. Il m'a dit que personne ne pouvoit

être plus blamable que ce fou de Sidney Smith, qu'il a été hautement désapprouvé ; et à cette occasion il m'a lu l'ordre qu'il a écrit aux Lords de l'Amirauté par ordre du Roi le vingt-huit mars, où il leur est adjoint de témoigner à l'amiral qui commande en chef dans la Méditerranée d'exprimer au capitaine chevalier Smith l'extrême désapprobation du Roi, d'avoir osé négocier ou se mêler des négociations pour les quelles il n'avoit autorisation ou pouvoirs quelconques ; et d'avoir pu compromettre son souverain envers ses alliés. Il m'a ajouté que Smith est rappelé de sa station où il étoit commodore, et aura l'humiliation de servir comme simple capitaine dans une flotte où plusieurs de ses camarades sont plus anciens que lui, et où il sera souvent sous leurs ordres. Que quoique sa conduite est très répréhensive, le vizir n'en est pas moins coupable à son tour, car le commodore Anglais n'avoit aucune force ou moyen de le contraindre ou de l'intimider à faire cette convention, qu'il a signé seul ; car Smith n'y a pas mis son nom et ne le pouvoit pas. Qu'après la prise d'Alarish, où le découragement et l'insubordination des troupes françaises étoient si visibles, qu'il auroit pu, en trainant la guerre en longueur sans écouter les folles représentations de Smith, détruire l'armée de Kleber, mais c'est qu'il étoit pressé d'éloigner les Français de l'Égypte pour jouir des richesses du pays, et de ne pas donner le tems aux Beys de se reconnoître, et de s'unir entre eux pour reprendre leur autorité passée. C'est pourquoi il souscrivit à tout, et pour se disculper vis-à-vis de la Porte et de la Russie, il jetta tout le blame sur le commodore Anglais, qui certainement avoit fait des démarches extravagantes, mais auxquelles le vizir ne devoit pas se conformer. Que quant à l'idée de détruire les Français en violation d'une capitulation accordée librement, c'est une perfidie qui ne peut venir que dans une tête turque, que cela doit répugner à l'âme élevée de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, et que le Roi son fidel allié a le même horreur pour une perfidie pareille. Que pour ce qui regarde la Sicile, le royaume de Naples, et les isles jadis Vénitiennes, les flottes Anglaise et Russe sont plus que suffisantes pour les protéger. Qu'enfin pour me prouver plus complètement que l'extravagance de Smith n'a jamais été autorisée d'ici, il fera faire un extrait de tous les ordres qui ont été donné à Milord Elgin, qu'il me donnera après son retour de la campagne, où il va pour quelques jours, et que je pourrai l'envoyer à Petersbourg.

“ Nous sommes venu après à parler des mésentendus survenues sur le sujet du paiement des subsides, au sujet des quelles il m'a répondu aussi par l'écrit ci-joint ; il n'a fait que répéter la même chose en me disant qu'aussitôt qu'il reviendra en ville qu'il quitte aujourd'hui, il tâchera de voir Monsieur Pitt, sans lequel il ne peut rien faire en matière d'argent, qui est du ressort de la Trésorerie.

“ Il auroit fallu que je fus bien sot et un fat des plus impertinens, si je ne vous faisais observer, que ce que Milord Grenville dit dans son écrit qu'il sera charmé de traiter cette affaire avec moi de préférence, n'est qu'un pûr compliment, et que si nous n'étions pas même liés d'amitié, il n'auroit pas pu se servir d'autres termes sans manquer à cette politesse qui doit régner entre des personnes bien nées. Je supplie votre Excellence de croire que Monsieur le conseiller d'état actuel Lizakevitz traitera cette affaire aussi bien et

mieux que moi, et que ma présence ici pour suivre et discuter cette affaire est tout à fait inutile.

“ Je puis aussi assurer positivement que qui que ce soit qui sera envoyé ici pour me remplacer trouvera toutes les facilités possibles ; car toute personne employée par Sa Majesté Impériale sera traitée avec estime, égard, et confiance, puisque le Roi et le ministère restent toujours inébranlables dans le système de l'étroite union entre la Russie et la Grande Bretagne. Le rapprochement actuel entre ce pays et l'Autriche est une mesure forcée par les circonstances. L'Angleterre ayant refusé solennellement deux fois de suite de traiter avec l'usurpateur Bonaparte, et ayant déclaré qu'elle ne négociera jamais qu'avec le concours de ses alliés, elle se trouve obligée d'aider la Cour de Vienne tant pour faire voir à la nation qu'elle a des alliés qui la soutiennent, que pour donner des moyens à celui qui fait une diversion si puissante en faveur de ce pays contre l'ennemi commun de tous les trônes. Cela n'est pas un garant certain de la fidélité du Baron de Thugut, mais il y a des circonstances impérieuses qui obligent à se servir de tous les moyens et à risquer bien de choses.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May 10. London].—“ The enclosed letter from Garlike is worth your reading, because I think it probable with him that your expressions to Jacobi may have been mis-represented, and that, at any rate, you will think they ought to learn at Berlin to distinguish their application for Napper Tandy, from our application not to furnish contributions to our enemy to enable them to make war upon us.

“ By some conversation that I have had with Windham, I find him informed that ‘ *without* the reserve of the house ’ the treasurer-ship is destined to Ryder, and he has written to Pitt to claim for himself the option of that which was offered to him, if it be unclogged with the reserve of the house. I tell you this only for your own information, because you will easily be sensible for myself that I can have no intention of looking for a claim of six years to the leavings of Ryder, Steele, and Canning. When I mention the word claim, I could easily enough establish it beyond any doubt or question, but that it is not in my temper to intrude any pretensions of mine where they are in any degree reluctantly admitted. I write this instead of saying it to you, because I have been all morning at St. James's with my good little niece, and I doubt whether I should be able to find you this evening.”

Enclosure :—

B. GARLIKE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1800, April 28. Berlin.—“ If the wind should have served well, a Russian courier will have arrived a day or two before you receive this letter, and I hope that he takes with him (to be communicated to Lord Grenville) a copy of a project sent to Baron Krudener for the renewal of the Russian treaty of defensive alliance with this country which was concluded in 1792, and will expire in July. As far as I

can recollect from once looking over the project it is the same treaty with some slight alterations, making Ievern among the places to be guaranteed to the Emperor by Prussia, and stipulating a treaty of commerce ; but I know not what separate or secret articles there may be. Count Lusi will take the project with him to Petersburg where the treaty will be concluded.

"I scarcely know why I should have started on hearing of this measure, unless it were from the suddenness of its appearance here. It is a plain and ready way of shewing the two Courts to be on a friendly footing, and leaves the ground-work of future co-operation. If neither of them will fight against France, it may be that they incline to each other without France ; but as to a system of active war, which we want, and want now, I fear that this very treaty shews that Russia means to retire from it and to fall into Prussian neutrality. It is remarkable that Baron Rosenkrantz (the Dane) is ordered from hence to Petersburg on a temporary mission. The circumstance is perhaps unconnected with the present crisis at Petersburg, but as these things happen in that crisis, it is possible that there may be some notion between Russia, Prussia, and Denmark, and perhaps Sweden, of a scheme of neutrality for the north of Europe, to be extended as circumstances may require it ; but I have no facts for the supposition except those I have mentioned, and one I mentioned some time ago, stated by Count Haugwiz from *Baron Krudener*, that Russia was adopting the Prussian system. There is, I believe, but little doubt of Baron Krudener's having been anxious on the measure of the renewal of the treaty ever since December, but he never mentioned it to me, nor have I ever seen an allusion to it.

"It does not appear that M. Bourgoing has ventured to ask the senate of Hamburg for money. Count Haugwiz happened the other day to renew this subject and to mention the instructions which had been sent to M. Schultz and which I had before noticed to the Office. I thanked him and said that if the demand was made by the French minister, I feared I should trouble him (Haugwiz) with a note on the subject. This was in a sort of unofficial whisper in company, when he recollected himself and took me aside to say, '*qu'à ce sujet là, il avait quelque chose à me conter préalablement : qu'à l'occasion de l'emploi des bons offices du Roi en suite des instances de la Cour d'Espagne, en faveur de Napper Tandy, Lord Grenville avait répondu à M. de Jacobi que premièrement la demande qu'il venait de faire au nom de Sa. Majesté Prussienne ne pouvait pas être portée à le connaissance du Roi d'Angleterre. Et, en second lieu, qu'une pareille demande montrait un désir de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures du pays.*'

"I appealed to Count Haugwiz's knowledge and experience of Lord Grenville's mode of doing business against such an answer, and asked if the words were in his recollection. He said, '*oui et le Roi en a été fort surpris.*' I said it could not belong to me to give explanations of what Lord Grenville has said to Baron Jacobi, and asked if no explanation had occurred to him that there was an easy distinction to be made ; that Lord Grenville might have said '*que l'effet d'une pareille interposition serait nécessairement de toucher*

aux affaires de l'intérieur, et que, pour cette raison, il ne pouvait pas en exposer la demande au Roi ; but not that '*c'était montrer le désir de s'y immiscer.*'

"I should have thought it right not to notice this conversation to you but for the following reason. Count Haugwiz added that he had again written to M. de Jacobi on the subject, and that the subject would be renewed.

"I was afterwards near concluding that Count Haugwiz meant to say that if I applied for Prussian interference in favour of Hamburg, the answer would take a colour from M. Jacobi's report.

"I really do not believe he meant to couple the two things in that sense ; but while I justify him on that score, I must attack his awkwardness, for to that alone do I impute his mentioning in that manner to me a report of Baron Jacobi's, which may have been twisted by Lombard in his *précis* reading to the King."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 11.—"Having occasion to write to the Duke of Portland yesterday, I told him that in conversation with you I had quoted the Duke of Portland for having announced, in express terms to me, that in 1794, upon his naming to Mr. Pitt the names of Mr. Pelham and myself for Privy Council offices, Mr. Pitt had said he could have no difficulty upon that subject, Lord Mornington being the only person who had any such claim upon him.

"I only added in my letter to the Duke that I did not think it fair to quote his words without apprising him that I had done so, and without wishing to know from him whether I had been accurate in my statement.

"I enclose to you his answer which confirms every word that I have said ; and Lord Spencer, to whom I named it yesterday, said that not only the Duke had told him so in 1794, but that in conversation the Duke had again repeated the same words ten days ago.

"I was anxious to shew you by this variety of evidence that I had made no mistake, and that our principal friends had all precisely the same impression as that which I had received of an engagement from Mr. Pitt upon this subject.

"You will not wonder at my solicitude to clear up this point, as it was not fit that it should stand alone upon my assertion.

"The Dutch ship is a 54, claiming to be a cartel, but improperly stored and laden, and therefore brought in. Lord St. Vincent has just written to say that he has ascertained that nothing has stirred from Brest, and that he hopes to keep them on the alert.

"Be so good as to return the Duke's letter. Pitt has told Windham that the report which he had heard is not correct, so that at present there is no question but that of Treasurership of the Navy, which is certainly of equal rank and distinction as to business with that of Secretary at War."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 11. Stowe.—"Many thanks for your communication

of the Irish documents which do you so much credit both in the precision and in the extent of the measure, which I really think is better worded than the precedent on which it is founded. The only objection I have to it is that Ireland is too well treated ; but as I well know that she will not from various causes profit by one-tenth of the advantages you have given her, my fears for cotton and wool will not break my rest. I trust that you are well aware of the cabal now going on for securing to Opposition in Ireland the greater number of the returns both of Lords and Commons into our limited Parliament. What the object can be of such an exertion I cannot imagine ; for all real hopes of forming an efficient Opposition against Government at Westminster must have vanished from the moment that Mr. Fox, after his speech at the beginning of winter, again seceded. But I should be sorry that Irish Government should be careless on this subject, and I wish you to take care that they are properly warned upon it. I repeat that I know of such a cabal for directing the elections in the House of Lords ; and unless proxies are allowed *for the first election*, that cabal will name the twenty-eight Lords. In the House of Commons I know of two instances where friends of Government holding places are to receive money to waive their seats to opposition members. As I find Lord Carysfort does not return to Ireland, I send you a blank proxy which you will send to Cooke, requesting him that, if it is wanted, he will give it either to Lord Clare or to Lord Carleton, for I am very anxious that Government should not lose their *House list*.

“So then Genoa is not taken, and Massena is not killed. Will you promise me that the Austrian will not sign a convention on the plan of Sir Sydney’s *chef d’œuvre*, for enabling this army to return to France ? or will you promise that the inflexible Cabinet of Vienna will not be bought by French offers to an immediate peace arising out of this Italian success ? You will certainly promise no such thing, and I own that I very much dread such an event, particularly if the advantage gained by the French in Swabia is not immediately repelled. But as you allow me to be a *Frondeur*, my great complaint now (and most violently am I indignant) is at the reappointment of Sir R. Abercrombie, of whom I was in hopes that you had all seen and known enough from dear experience to have secured the country against the employment of such a man. I fear likewise that this expedition to the Mediterranean will have clipped your wings for the only object where you can really strike to advantage ; I mean the coast of Normandy ; for I have no faith that the force *now ordered to encamp* ever will embark for France, and a defensive campaign is now ten times more than ever ruinous to us. Have you any hopes of your angry Paul ? I fear that he is irrecoverably gone, and I wish his Russians were well gone out of our islands.

“Many congratulations on the *Guillaume Tell*. I have long looked for her to complete the set of the Aboukir volumes, and I hope that her capture will be followed by that of Malta, and of the little Aboukir duodecimos now in that harbour (the *Diane* and *Justice*) which will entirely account for *every French ship* that sailed out of Toulon on Bonaparte’s expedition.

“Can nothing arise for our dear Tom out of Dundas’s vacancy ?

Dick would, I am sure, forego every view for such an object, and I should be sorry to see poor Tom put by for such animals as Steele and Rider and Canning. His labours of every sort (beginning with labours private as well as public in 1794) for Government do give him pretensions, which I have sometimes thought Mr. Pitt disinclined to admit as fully as you and I feel them. Pray think this over. I did not say one word upon the subject till I found from report that no other use was likely to be made of such an opening than to give it to Rider or Steele, and to move Canning; and I have not named it to Tom. Let me know if you see light on this subject."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

Private.

1800, May 12. Dropmore.—"Being anxious not to delay this messenger, I am obliged to postpone replying in detail to your private letters; but I will not fail to do so by the next messenger, whom I must of course dispatch whenever I receive the long expected dispatches from Lord Minto. Be assured that I feel in all respects satisfied with everything that you have done, and that I trust you will be so likewise with my answers to your different questions.

"It is just now a very anxious moment with us here in the expectation of your next dispatches, especially as the Paris accounts give room for much uneasiness. We must however hope the best, and the affairs of Genoa seem to promise a speedy conclusion, such as may set free at least a part of Melas's army to act in aid of Kray's operations, whether of offence or defence.

"I defer, for obvious reasons, till the receipt of your next letters, writing anything to you as to our plans in this quarter. I trust they will not be without their effect even on the state of affairs with you." *Copy.*

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 12. Dublin.—"I am sorry Lord Farnham has opened upon your Lordship; he is a most indefatigable correspondent; your Lordship's answer ought to satisfy him.

"The Resolutions were presented this day, and the consideration of your amendments appointed for to-morrow without much opposition. The introduction of the Election Act was resisted as premature, and a division suddenly took place at 7 o'clock, 135 to 80, many absent on both sides. I believe Opposition will muster within 2 or 3 of their former numbers. I like, upon the whole, the complexion of the House."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 12. Dublin.—"All the necessary documents arrived to-day. Messages were sent to both Houses. In the Commons Lord Castlereagh moved for the message to be considered to-morrow and for a committee of comparison, which were agreed to upon question. He then moved for leave to bring in the Representation

Bill, which was opposed by O'Donnell, Sir J. Parnell, Colonel Barry, Mr. G. Ponsonby, and Mr. Moore, on account of the precipitation, of such a step. Ponsonby called for a division, and we divided 135 to 80; this happened before six o'clock.

"Lord Castlereagh then presented his Bill, moved to have it printed, and that it should be read a second time on Wednesday. These motions were carried. Delay and opposition were threatened, but I do not think that real delay and effective opposition are determined on. All is tranquil; the effect of the assizes and of the management in England has been great.

"In two or three days, it is probable a judgment may be formed on the line Opposition may take.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May 12]. Downing Street.—"From what Long has just told me, I am not sure whether you are aware that the man who fired the pistol last night, is actually committed by warrant of the Secretary of State on a direct *charge of high treason* in compassing the King's death. This fact intimated to the House by yourself, or the Duke of Portland who committed, added to the notoriety of the pistol having been fired is surely sufficient ground for all your proceeding, without calling for any statement from the Lords attending the King, which would be less precise, and (if not wanting) ought to be avoided on a subject which must be tried in a court of justice. The evidence of firing *at the King's person* will turn out quite direct; and I conclude therefore you will not describe the act in your address as any thing short of a horrid and treasonable attempt against his Majesty's sacred person. The description will not be the less true, even if the plea of insanity should (as it probably will) be hereafter established; and therefore all reference to that point seems as well avoided.

Postscript.—I have this instant seen Dundas, from whom I imagine your ideas already correspond with those I have here stated, but I may as well send them."

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1800, May 13. Palermo.—"Although I arrived here in the beginning of the second week in April, it was not in my power to present my credential letters to their Sicilian Majesties till the 21st of the same month. It is painful to me to state the reason of this to your Lordship, but I feel it my duty to do so. It seems that Sir William Hamilton was *worked upon* to consider his recall, and my almost immediate appearance after it at Palermo, as extremely abrupt; my first wish therefore was to place the matter in such a point of view as would be most agreeable to Sir William's feelings, which I am confident I should have succeeded in had I not been counteracted. Finding at the end of two or three days that he said nothing about presenting his re-credential letters, I mentioned the subject to him, and said that my only motive for doing so was

(which I did in the most delicate way in my power) that I might be enabled to proceed upon the business with which I was charged. Sir William then said that he should keep his letters in his possession, till it was convenient to him to present them ; that he could not be guided by what I said *en l'air* ; that he did not wish to remain here as a private individual after so many years service ; and that, without I shewed him my instructions and that they contained anything which obliged him to present his letters of recall immediately, it was his intention not to do so till the day before his departure, for which he was only waiting for the *Foudroyant* from Malta which was to convey him there. As to shewing Sir William my instructions, it was a thing which I decided at once within myself not to do, for he certainly would have been obliged to communicate them to Lady Hamilton, who would have conveyed them the next moment to the Queen. I therefore without taking any further notice of the business, remained quietly till the arrival of the *Foudroyant* and the departure of Sir William, which was about ten days afterwards. But I must acquaint your Lordship that General Acton, with the utmost readiness and civility, received me as Minister during the whole of the interval from the day Sir William presented me to him, which was about six days after my arrival at Palermo.

“Your Lordship did me the honor to talk so confidentially both about persons and things previous to my departure, and allowed me to do the same, that I feel it incumbent upon me to act in the same way now.

“It is not to be told the pains that were taken by Lady Hamilton to set the King and Queen and the whole Court against me, even before I arrived. I was represented as a Jacobin, a coxcomb, a person sent to *bully* and to carry them *bon gré, mal gré*, back to Naples ; and it is enough to know the character of people here to be sure that all this jargon had its effect. I must indeed except General Acton *in toto*. But her Ladyship’s language in general has been extremely indiscreet, representing Sir William as an illused man. She has however persuaded herself and others that I am only sent here for an interval, and that Sir William will resume his situation at Naples next winter. On the other hand Sir William says that nothing shall induce him to accept it again unless a sort of second Minister is sent under him to do the business and represent. I am sorry to say that Lord Nelson has given more or less into all this nonsense. His Lordship’s health is, I fear, sadly impaired, and I am assured that his fortune is fallen into the same state in consequence of great losses which both his Lordship and Lady Hamilton have sustained at Faro and other games of hazard. They are expected back from Malta every day, and are then, I understand, to proceed by sea to England.

“I really believe that there is no other object in the Queen’s journey to Vienna than that which I have stated in the dispatch. She will not venture to act contrary to General Acton’s wishes, and I am almost sure that he will not consent to her doing anything that would not be perfectly agreeable to England.

“I have heard a good deal lately about General Acton’s retiring to England ; at length he told me confidentially the other day that

such was his intention. I immediately took upon me to endeavour to dissuade him from it, I told him that, under the present difficult circumstances of the country, I was sure that it was wished in England that he should, at least for the present, remain where he is. I could not get him to promise me that he would do so, but I think I may venture to say that he will not go away so soon as he says. There is one person who knows him very intimately, and who assures me that he has no such intention, and that it is to answer his own purposes with the King and Queen that he declares this to be his resolution ; but still, he talked of it in such a way to me, that I ought hardly to doubt of the truth of what he said. He appears to me to be thoroughly disgusted with his situation. The state of this country is in fact melancholy, and though I do not think that much improvement will be made in it under him, yet, on the other hand, I am convinced that bad would become worse if it were governed by any man or set of men that I know of here at present. I therefore really think that his remaining here is a most desirable object. He is very much attached to England, and has more means of doing good, with a better disposition to act according to those means, than anybody I know in this country. Although we quarrel a little now and then, we are nevertheless upon the best terms possible, and I know from facts that I enjoy his confidence in some measure ; for these reasons I should be disposed to do anything in my power to prevail upon him to remain here, and, in so doing, I hope that I shall meet with your Lordship's approbation. I know that his idea is, in case of going to England, to have credential letters with him, but as there appears to me to be a great degree of analogy between General Acton's and Count Rumford's situations, I should feel it my duty not to allow the former to leave this country with the idea of appearing in England in a public character from this Court.

"They are certainly very uneasy here about the Court of Vienna. It seems that the Austrians have entered the principality of Piombino, which is a detached state, but belonging to the Crown of Naples, a circumstance which does not fail to increase their alarms. It seems also that an Austrian General (whose name is I think Mercanti) arrived at Naples a short time since under another name, and in a sort of disguise, and upon being recognised the said General disappeared. It is likewise supposed that there are two Austrian officers in disguise here, after whom the strictest search is making ; these circumstances give rise to unpleasant surmises here. I do all in my power to quiet them.

"Your Lordship will, no doubt, remark that I have dwelt a great deal upon the wretched state of this country. I, of course, include the Neapolitan dominions particularly. The more information I gain upon the subject, and the more I reflect upon it, the more despondent I feel. I really do not know whether any good is to be done with the present generation, so corrupt and so insensible to all principles of honor and morality do I think it. A total reformation upon the largest and most comprehensive scale ought to take place. The code of laws, which is not in itself a bad one, but which from perversion is become execrable, ought to be revised ;

but there is not a man in the kingdom who combines sufficient honesty and talents to be equal to the undertaking. Seminaries of all sorts ought to be instituted, but the same obstacles present themselves. The military, to whom in these times and in these countries the security of the whole in great measure depends, is in a deplorable state. As to religion, I do not pretend to a competency of giving an opinion upon the nature of the changes necessary to correct this most essential of all Christian establishments, but it must strike the observation of the most common understanding, that this branch of society in this country calls for reform.

“Leaving therefore this latter subject to itself as a delicate subject for a Protestant to touch upon, I am, with respect to the former, of opinion that nothing useful or good can be effected but by the introduction or direct interference of foreigners; but I will not trouble your Lordship more upon this, till it is in my power to enter more in detail upon the business.

“I forward by this opportunity a letter to Mr. Dundas from General Graham, by which everything interesting from Malta will of course be learnt. The general, in his letters to me, seems to expect a sortie, but I cannot imagine that the French will make a sortie now, when at a time the garrison was much stronger and when our works were only manned by Maltese peasants they never attempted one. I have, however, obtained H[is] S[icilian] Majesty’s consent to send the three companies of British now at Messina to Malta, which will be an acceptable reinforcement.

“I wish I could say more exactly when we were to return to Naples; I scarcely think before July. I can assure your Lordship that this has been a very difficult matter to manage, and it will still give a good deal of trouble, and require constant attention. Nothing, I find, but fair language will do. I must mention rather a singular thing to your Lordship. I was conversing upon the subject the day before yesterday with General Acton; I remarked to him the disastrous situation in which the King of Naples would find himself if the French should succeed in landing eight or ten thousand men in Sicily, four [thousand] for instance here, and four thousand at Syracuse, which would absolutely cut off retreat. This, of course, was admitted. But it is rather singular that an English officer (Colonel Callander) who arrived here yesterday, having left Lord Keith off Genoa the 4th instant, submitted word for word the same remark to me. I learnt from him also that there are from ten to fifteen thousand Italian malcontents on the coasts of France ready to be employed on this service, if it should be determined upon. If, therefore, upon examination and further inquiry this fact turned out to be authentic, your Lordship would hear of the King being at Naples within the shortest possible space of time.

“I fear that your Lordship will think the interval from the time of my writing to the Office from Naples to the present extremely long; but I have, for some time past, been in daily expectation of having it in my power to send off a servant with what I have now the honor of communicating; and, in not having done so sooner, I have been entirely guided by circumstances. Nothing can be more irregular and uncertain than the arrival and conveyance of the post

from this place, for which reason it is extremely discouraging to send anything at all interesting by it. I shall be extremely anxious for your Lordship's answer."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, May 14. Donawerth.—"I can add little or nothing to my public dispatches but the intelligence, which has just been received for the third time, of the capture of Genoa. For this time I am inclined to give credit to the report.

"The accounts from the army are good. Kray is regaining the affection and esteem of the troops at Ulm, and I trust that all will go on well. I cannot imagine what the French are about; either they are sickened by the resistance made by the Austrians, or they are really detaching a large force to Italy unknown to Kray. I wish this may be the case, as, if they weaken themselves here, Kray cannot well fail to beat them. I trust he will be able to resume offensive operations the day after to-morrow.

"The conduct of the Bavarians has excited general admiration in the Austrian army, where no one would believe till they saw them in the field that a Bavarian soldier would ever have appeared. By the next messenger I will send some of the correspondence I have had on the occasion, from which some slight opinion may be formed of the difficulties I have had in bringing them up. But now that they are once engaged, all the resources of the country are at our disposal. I trust that his Majesty will take due notice of their conduct either through me to the army or by Count Haslang to the Elector.

"If Genoa be taken, things cannot fail to go on well here; and this check, severe as it is, will only serve to make the turn of affairs be more sensibly felt in France.

"There has certainly been mismanagement, but I only desire that the man who would have acted better than Kray, *in every point*, under similar difficulties, may be the one who shall throw the first stone. The Prince of Lorraine merits the severest punishment. Prince Reuss is not without blame, but he is a brave soldier and a gentleman, and the fault is thrown entirely on his staff, who ought to have had better intelligence of the motions of the army which was opposed to him. I think in my conscience that Kray was justified in supposing Stockach safe with 10,000 men under the Prince of Lorraine in and about the place, and 25,000 under Prince Reuss in the enemy's rear.

"It is impossible to give too much or even sufficient credit to the French for the manner in which this able manœuvre was conceived and executed; but they have only succeeded by risking the safety of their whole army; whilst Kray is censured and has been beaten for risking his, because his plan did not succeed."

ROYALIST INSURRECTION IN BRITTANY.—MEMORANDUM BY LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May.—(1) On tiendra prête une armée de 25,000 hommes.

avec les transports nécessaires, pour opérer un débarquement en France.

(2) Trois ou quatre mille hommes seront rassemblés à Douvres pour pouvoir prendre possession du Calais, dès l'instant que l'on en recevra l'invitation ; ce qui devrait avoir lieu le plutôt possible après le 20 Mai.

(3) Après l'occupation de Calais, et vers le milieu du mois de Juin, l'armée de débarquement profitera du premier vent pour se porter sur les côtes de France. On aura déjà pris des mesures pour l'occupation de l'isle de Houat pour servir de point de communication avec les Royalistes.

(4) Arrivé sur les côtes, le général commandant l'armée jugera d'après les communications qu'il ouvrira avec les Royalistes, et d'après les notions qu'il pourra recevoir de la disposition des forces républicaines, si l'état des choses lui permettra d'opérer le débarquement, avec la certitude de pouvoir se rembarquer en cas de nécessité avant que des renforts, envoyés soit de Poitiers soit de Dijon, puissent mettre les Républicains en état de lui opposer des forces supérieures.

(5) Si même, par l'effet de quelques circonstances imprévues, il jugerait ne devoir pas débarquer son armée, il aurait l'ordre de fournir aux Royalistes toute sorte de secours dont ils auraient besoin en armes et argent ; de protéger, s'il était nécessaire, le débarquement d'un prince, et, dans ce dernier cas, de faire sur toute l'étendue des côtes de France les démonstrations les plus menaçantes afin d'opérer une diversion efficace.

(6) Il paraît que dans tous les cas le mouvement à Paris ne devrait s'effectuer qu'après que l'on y ait reçu des notices, de la part de Général Georges, de l'arrivée actuelle des Anglais sur la côte, et de la détermination que l'on prendra alors, soit d'y agir avec l'armée Anglaise, soit d'y protéger le débarquement d'un prince de la manière ci-dessus mentionnée.

LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF CIRCELLO.

1800, May. London.—“ M. de St. Teodoro aura pu se convaincre combien on est d'accord avec lui sur les points principaux de son mémoire. On a ménagé l'Espagne dans la guerre actuelle parcequ'on a cru que rien ne serait plus contraire aux intérêts de ce pays-ci que de voir la Revolution s'étendre jusqu'en Espagne, ou dans ses possessions Americaines. On se prêteroit volontiers à tel arrangement qui mettrait la cour de Madrid en état de se défendre efficacement contre le danger imminent dont elle est menacée.

“ Le Prince de la Paix est, sans doute, celui qui par son influence et ses moyens pourrait déterminer le Roi à prendre le seul parti qui lui reste pour la conservation de sa couronne, et même pour sa sûreté personnelle. On donnerait pour cet effet toutes les garanties qui seraient désirées, et on se prêterait aux arrangements nécessaires pour amener, et pour consolider cet ouvrage.

“ M. de St. Teodoro rendrait à la cause commune le plus grand service si, en présentant à l'esprit du Prince de la Paix ces con-

sidérations dans leur vrai point de vue, il pourrait le décider à se charger de cette entreprise.

“ Dans ce cas-là il serait très facile de traiter dès à présent avec le Prince, pour un arrangement éventuel que l'on conclurait en secret, et qui n'aurait son effet qu'au moment où les succès des alliés sur la frontière, ou de grands mouvements dans l'intérieur, décideraient le Prince à se mettre en avant. Les détails d'un pariat traité pourraient être négociés avec plus de facilité et de sûreté en Angleterre qu'à Madrid. En y envoyant une personne sûre le Prince de la Paix ne serait exposé à aucun risque, puisqu'il ne dépendrait que du Gouvernement Anglais de tenir parfaitement secret l'arrivée d'une pareille personne, et, bien plus encore, l'objet de son voyage. Pendant que l'arrivée d'un négociateur Anglais à Madrid attirerait toute l'attention et d'Alquier, et d'Urquijo, et pourrait entraîner les conséquences les plus funestes.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 15. Harley Street.—“ La part que vous prenez avec tant d'amitié à ma malheureuse circonstance me touche infiniment. J'aurais bien voulu suivre votre conseil ; il épargneroit bien de fatigue et de souffrance à moi, et à ma pauvre fille surtout. Mais cela est impossible. Despote est soupçonneux à l'exès, il ne verroit en moi qu'un rebel qui, malgré son ordre, s'obstine à rester en Angleterre. Je sais que depuis quelque tems il s'est mit dans la tête que j'aime mieux rester ici qu'autre part, parcequ'il croit que je suis tout dévoué à l'Angleterre aux dépens de mon propre pays. Son caractère soupçonneux est tel que quand même une calomnie qu'on lui fait contre quelqu'un ne fait pas d'effet, et qu'il la repousse pour le moment, il le ressouvient après, et au premier mécontentement, quelque léger qu'il soit, contre la personne qu'on vouloit perdre, il croit alors à la calomnie qu'il avoit repoussé auparavant. Je le sens à mes dépens, et je sais que quoiqu'il n'avoit pas cru dans le moment qu'il lisoit la lettre du Comte Starhemberg à Cobenzel dans laquelle il disoit de moi que je suis soufflé par vous, que je suis tout-à-fait Anglais, et que par là mon souverain est très mal servi, à présent il le croit.

“ Si mon collègue auroit écrit que je ne suis pas admirateur de la probité de Thugut il n'auroit dit que la pure vérité ; mais me faire passer pour un sujet infidel dans l'esprit de mon souverain, qui est despote et connu pour soupçonneux à l'exès, c'est une trahison abominable. Mais elle a été suivie par une suite de bassesses inouïs, car je possède plus de vingt billets de la main du calomniateur, écrits postérieurement à la calomnie, dans lesquels il ne cesse de me répéter l'attachement le plus tendre ; et ce qu'il y a de particulier c'est que le billet par lequel il me prioit d'envoyer sa lettre où il me dénonçoit à Cobenzel, et que devoit être lue par l'Empereur avant que de parvenir à celui à qui elle étoit adressée, étoit le billet le plus tendre.

“ Si je reste ici sous prétexte d'attendre sa réponse à ma lettre je suis perdu ; ainssi je suis résolu de partire, coûte qui coûte. Si je n'avois pas deux enfants qui me sont chers, j'aurais pris

autrement mon parti ; mais c'est pour ne pas les voir victimes innocentes du ressentiment qu'on auroit contre moi que je me soumet à tout ce que voudrât de moi mon malheureux sort. Recevez mes remerciements et ma profonde reconnaissance pour l'amitié dont vous m'honorez. Je la sens plus énergiquement que je ne puis l'exprimer, et je vous serai attaché tant que durera mon existence. Excusez ce grifonage ; je ne sais si vous pourrez le déchiffrer. Ce soir je vous enverrai ma lettre officielle pour vous demander à vous présenter M. de Lyzakewitz demain. En vous nomment ce dernier je serois injuste envers lui, je n'agiroit pas en ami envers vous, si je ne vous assuroit que c'est un parfaitement honnête homme ; qu'il aime ce pays où il est depuis trente-six ans ; et que, sur le système politique de l'union entre nos deux patries, il pense comme vous et moi."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 17. Dublin.—"Yesterday and this evening the Representation Bill went through the committee of the House of Commons with little opposition. The enclosed paper will shew the grounds on which Lord Castlereagh supported his selection. His speech was very clear and gave general satisfaction.

"We are threatened with a debate on the Report, but I believe it will not be serious.

"In the Representation Bill a slight alteration is made with respect to the Clerk of the Crown returning the 28 peers who shall be elected, so as to obviate the case of 28 peers being not *completely* elected by reason of an equality of votes ; and a provision is added to the Bill that a copy of the writs and returns of election shall be kept in the Crown Office of Ireland, attested by the Chancellor ; which copy, in case the original writ and return should be lost, is to be deemed evidence.

"The Speaker asked me what had the Chancellor to do with it ? I said the writ was a Chancery writ and that the Clerk of the Crown was ministerial. He said the Clerk of the Crown was a servant of the House, and had a seat in the House, and that the House of Commons would not recognise the Clerk of the Crown as an officer of the Chancellor.

"I said, the Chancery was the Office of Writs ; that though the House of Commons made their order on the Clerk of the Crown he was still the ministerial officer of the Chancellor, and that the writs were in the custody of the Chancery. He then said, cook it your own way, I have nothing to do with it ! I believe I am right.

"I think the Speaker is growing more reconciled. He told me he was against delay and he is in tolerable good humour.

"There was some cross conversation to-day respecting the difficulties of framing a Bill to try Irish controverted elections.

"On Monday we hope to get through the countervailing duties. I asked, to-day, one of our most active opposition merchants what he thought of them and he said he approved the arrangements.

"The Union Bill will be moved for on Wednesday, and it is understood Opposition will on that day make their effort."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 18. Stowe.—“I do not know anything that could have shocked me more sensibly than the account you gave me of the danger from which Providence has saved us by the King's almost miraculous escape. I feel in common with every good subject, the deep and anxious stake which we all hold in this invaluable life; but my sensations of private personal affection and respect are paramount to every thing that I can feel as a public man. I sincerely hope and trust that the nature of this offence will be fully considered; and I feel that my mind is not sanguinary nor impetuous on this subject, when I urge you to consider what I have so often said to you in discussing the former attempts upon him; namely the legal and political propriety of admitting the plea of lunacy in such cases. And you will recollect how much my ideas on this matter are strengthened by Lord Mansfield's argument on this plea tendered by one unfortunately too clearly entitled to the benefit of it, I mean Laurence Lord Ferrers. By that argument it seems clear that a jury are bound to consider, not the general habit and repute of lunacy, but the precise and actual state of the culprit's mind at the precise and actual moment of the treason; and to enquire whether he was then *capax doli*, that is whether he knew the nature of his offence, and the consequence of it. And if the facts stated in the papers were stated on oath to me as a jurymen, namely, that he said ‘he meant to kill the King because he was tired of his life, and would not destroy himself, but expected to be torn to pieces by the people, or to be hanged for it,’ I should convict him of the treason, without the slightest consideration of his prior or of any subsequent lunacy. In truth I have some doubt whether a man so left at large on his usual and constant occupations is not fully answerable for all his acts, unless he can prove the hand of Providence afflicting him in the precise moment of the act for which he is arraigned; and the extent of that affliction should be examined very fully, unless you are prepared to say, on a less interesting matter, that Lord Ferrers was foully murdered by the judgment of his peers. I urge all this, not because I doubt your inclination to do all that can be stated to be your duty, but because I think the practice of our courts, in the cases of the former attempts, has encouraged mischievous frenzy to take this course; and will, I fear, inevitably encourage Jacobinical treason to avail itself of a means so obvious as this which is put into their hands. Pray give every attention to this matter, and if any thing can be done upon it in Parliament, I will, lame as I am, attend, and urge on my one leg all that can assist you in any step that can be taken to avert a calamity so heart-breaking. I must likewise beg you, in justice to my feelings towards the King, to tell him that I should have put myself into my chaise immediately to have taken the first opportunity of paying my duty to him (duties God knows founded on the truest affection and respect) if it were possible for me to support myself at his levée; but being still tied to my stick, and my wheeling chair, and unable even to get on my horse, I beg he will give me credit for all I feel on this occasion.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 19. Hollwood.—“It is not from idleness, but because another morning here will be of great use to me, that I much wish not to return to town till dinner to-morrow. That wish would however give way, if I saw any material purpose to be gained by my coming sooner. With respect to the Mediterranean, I do not see how we can send any more force from hence, without giving up all prospect of acting (if events should be ever so favourable) on this side France; and without departing from our provisional engagement with *Monsieur*. At all events no useful discussion could take place at a Cabinet on this part of the subject, without previously arranging it with Dundas; and I should have no chance of seeing him in time for to-morrow. The two other points (the Condé army and the free gift to Austria) do not seem to me to require a formal Cabinet, especially as you will probably see most of our colleagues at the Queen’s House to night. With respect to the first of the two, what you propose is the only thing left to do. For the second I am persuaded that, on so strong an authority as we all hold Wickham to be, no one will hesitate to risk another 150,000*l.* for an additional chance of turning to account all the rest which we have given or are to give. I conclude however your generosity will be so far conditional as to depend on your instruction finding Lord Minto still relying on the disposition of Vienna to act fairly.

“I wrote about Leveson, and find Lord Stafford is to be in town to-morrow, which I hope will enable him to decide.

“There can surely be no objection in trusting Wickham with a discretion to give such a gratuity to the unfortunate regiment as he thinks adapted to the case.”

LORD GRENVILLE to ARTHUR PAGET.

Private.

1800, May 19. Cleveland Row.—“I have received your private letter of the 13th March, and by this conveyance can only say that the plan there mentioned would, under the circumstances that then existed, have been highly useful. Subsequent events have probably rendered it much less practicable, but if you should see any opening for it, its execution might still be highly advantageous to the common cause; and Lord Keith would, I doubt not, readily co-operate in it.”

Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, May 20. Cleveland Row.—“I received yesterday your dispatches of the 8th, with your private letter. I have immediately complied with your suggestions, which I think excellent, as I am always very apt to think your suggestions are. To-morrow night a messenger sets out for Vienna with orders to Lord Minto to make the Emperor a present, in his Majesty’s name, of £150,000 extra beyond the loan; and as a mark only of the share which the King takes in the events of the campaign on the Continent, and of his disposition to consider its mischances as well as its successes, matters

of common concern. All this is necessarily subordinate to this condition, that, at the arrival of my dispatch, Lord Minto shall be as well pleased with Thugut as he is by his last letters. You are therefore fully authorized to make such confidential use of the circumstances as your discretion shall point out, and as you may think useful for obtaining confidence and good will at head-quarters.

"I have long seen reason to judge as you do of the capacity of our officers. Something may be allowed for want of opportunity to learn; but if, when that is thrown into their way, they will not learn, they are incurable.

"I do not wish to turn you into an accuser, but I must say to you fairly that I shall not think you do your duty if, charged with the whole superintendence of that business, you do not find some way of letting the neglect you mention to me in your private letter come officially before me. And if it does, I shall not do mine if I leave the individual in question there one hour afterwards.

"I have been on the point of sending you one or more military assistants, but I have hesitated from the fear of burthening you with inefficient and sometimes troublesome instruments. I heartily wish you had pointed out to me some others, as you did H. Clinton, whom you wished to have. I would have sent them immediately.

"Shall you want more now? The Condé army is going far wide of you, and you have always at hand Swiss and Austrians whose services you can command. I should be glad to give some of our officers such an opportunity of learning; but if they profit by it no better, what good does it do?

"If Ramsay is recalled, who do you wish to replace him?

"Abercrombie and his convoy are as usual blown back. If I were a seaman, with half the superstition which belongs to them, I should certainly throw him overboard as a second Jonas. If ever he gets to the Mediterranean he will have ten or twelve thousand men under his orders, of whom, after garrisoning Minorca as much as it can require to be garrisoned against the Spaniards, and after providing something for Malta, he may still have six or eight thousand disposeable troops. Were he there now, such a body would most certainly be of great value, when aided by our decided naval superiority in that sea. But I much fear before he arrives all chance of his being of use will be over, unless Willot (of whom neither you nor Lord Minto have lately written to me) has carved out some work for him. He is ordered, if possible, to correspond with you on that subject, and to pay the greatest attention to your suggestions. I guess that the Dutch business does not sit very easy upon him, and that he would not be sorry to do something brilliant; but I doubt whether his character is naturally enterprising enough to give fair chance to royalist plans.

"As to the Brest fleet, do not let that disturb your dreams whether sleeping or waking. We shall find full employment for them here, and in the meantime, they have brought seventeen of their line of battle ships back into the inner harbour, and have landed and marched away the troops who had been embarked. This is said to be because of the sickness which prevailed on board. And how can it be otherwise. Whoever heard of a fleet continuing healthy

while lying at anchor in its own roads. Your plan of beating Moreau in Savoy, Dauphiné, and Provence, is excellent, but I have no expectation that it will ever be understood much less approved of at Vienna.

"You mention to me the watches given to M. de Varicourt, but not the supposed value. If you will let me know it, I will send corresponding presents of rather more value for the Baron de Deux Ponts and Colonel Varenbuhler, unless you can procure them where you are, and give them, which would save time and trouble.

"I have in my dispatches done what you recommend about compliments to the Bavarians and to the poor Swiss. But I felt the latter demanded something more, and I have done accordingly. Whatever you propose, with much more *connoissance de cause* than we have, will, I undertake for it, be immediately done.

"I am, besides, about ordering a medal, silver for the officers and copper for the men, for the remains of the regiment Roverea. If any particular idea strikes you on the subject, or any inscription better than another, let me know it. My present idea is the King's head on one side; reverse, Valour, or Fame, or better, Britannia inscribing a shield with the words *Möskirk Maii 5° 1800*. Legend, *Virtuti militari Helvetiorum*, and round the rim "*Régiment de Roverea*. This is but a just distinction to these poor men, and is an example useful in all armies. Would it be too much to put round the king's head, instead of his names and titles, '*Vindex Europæ*' or '*Europæ libertatis Assertor*.'

"Your purchase of plate was abundantly justified by the occasion, and I shall not feel the smallest difficulty in recommending to you an allowance on that head.

"I have sometimes spoken occasionally on your situation to the Duke of Portland. I have never perceived in him the smallest disposition to be impatient for any new arrangement. At the same time I fairly own to you that my mind has carved out work for you where you are, such as will not soon be finished. But I think the whole had best remain as it is just now. Your services are such that I trust you can entertain no uneasiness as to your future situation."

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, May 20. St. Petersburg.—"I should perhaps apologize to your Lordship for having in my dispatch of this date alluded to the private letter with which your Lordship was pleased to honour me of the 11th ultimo; but I could not forbear expressing the strong sense I entertain of your Lordship's goodness, and my gratitude for the consolation which you so generously afford me. I beg leave to bespeak a continuance of the same favourable disposition when I shall have the honour of making myself personally known to your Lordship; my respect and my attachment to your Lordship's person shall best prove how anxious I am to deserve it.

"May I venture to hope that your Lordship will so far enter into the difficulties of my situation here as to become my advocate with

his Majesty, and to obtain his gracious pardon for the liberty I have taken in trespassing upon the confidence reposed in me. I have done it only on the strength of the solemn engagement to refund should my claim be deemed unreasonable. But I give your Lordship my word of honour that, without such assistance, I should not have been able to maintain the character which I deem it under the present circumstances more essential than ever to preserve; and that every shilling of the debt which I must otherwise have left behind me, has been contracted on the public account, in which I include those extraordinary expenses necessary to keep up the dignity of His Majesty's mission, and my own personal independence. I trust that on this ground your Lordship will not refuse to plead in my behalf.

"I do not see any probability of my being under the necessity of remaining here longer than I have mentioned in my dispatch. But if things should take an unexpected turn, and nothing of that nature is impossible with the Emperor, I shall, notwithstanding His Majesty's permission and my own inclinations, think it incumbent upon me to remain at least until I shall be able to ascertain what advantage is likely to be drawn from such a change."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May. Downing Street].—"When I desired to dine with you to-day, I had quite forgot an engagement which I cannot well put off. Dundas will meet us here at twelve to-morrow. Perhaps you could call so as to walk for half an hour first, as there are one or two points I wish much to talk over with you before we see him."

Postscript.—"I saw my brother, and wrote to Westmorland, and I rather hope nothing awkward will happen to-day, but I see we shall have much difficulty and vexation."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 20. Wotton.—"Upon my arrival at Aylesbury, where I met my uncle Tom, he informed me that he had heard it stated very generally about town that Mr. Ryder was to be the Treasurer of the Navy, that Canning was to succeed Ryder, Mr. Wallace to succeed Canning, and *that I was to have the seat at the Admiralty vacated by Wallace.* When he stated this he distinctly said that he had had no conversation with you on the subject, but he also stated to me the authority from which he heard the story, which appeared to me—as it did to him—sufficiently good to induce me to pay some attention to it. I wrote in consequence to my father a simple state of the story as I heard it; I received from him the enclosed answer. Deeply hurt as he seems to be by the slight which he conceives to have been put upon my uncle Tom, and by the implied breach of engagement to me by this arrangement, I shall add nothing to his letter, neither shall I make any comment upon it. My feelings are naturally as strong on both the points mentioned as his can be; at the same time, knowing how reports get about

and how erroneous those reports sometimes are, I reserve the expressing those feelings till I distinctly find the facts assumed by my father are confirmed. I know your affection for me too well not to be convinced that every thing you can do you will do. Thank God I am not influenced in this business by any indecent or improper haste for office. My only object in proposing myself as a candidate for it at all is a very earnest desire on my part to try my fortune in the line in which so many of my family have distinguished themselves so much, and in which I hope I shall not disgrace either myself or them.

"As Lady Temple is not well, I should feel loth to leave her to go up to town unless it be absolutely necessary. If, however, there are any points which you wish to discuss with me, I will certainly come up; or I will, if you will give me leave, call at Dropmore if you are there in the course of the week; on this subject however I hope to receive your orders at Aylesbury."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 20. Downing Street.—"I return your letters, and Wickham's private one certainly proves that things are in a critical situation in more places than one. There has certainly been great military errors in the arrangement of the Austrian army, and Moreau has taken the advantage of it. It seems perfectly right both to reform the Condé corps, and to send them to Civita Vecchia, but may it not be a question for further consideration, especially under the pressure of the late letters from Wickham, if the corps, reformed as it will be, might not be sent to Minorca in place of being brought round to B[elle Isle] in the event of our success in that quarter. It would not be improper to write to Sir Ralph Abercrombie on that subject, more especially as I am sorry to say there are too ready means at present of communicating with him, for, by a letter I have from him this morning, his convoy seems to be dispersed, and the *Seahorse*, in which he is, has been blown back to Torbay. He writes *urgently* to have other two battalions sent to the Mediterranean, if we expect him to be able to do what he wishes, and what is expected of him. I think the two battalions ought to be sent as soon as we can. Beyond that I am sure it is impossible to send more till the business of Belle Isle is decided one way or other. This return of the fleet to Torbay is very unfortunate in that respect. I don't think our friend Wickham always recollects that it is not so easy to move an army as it is to write a dispatch. It is not a month since distracting the enemy on this side of France, with a view of keeping them weak on the Rhine, was the favourite object; and, with that view, our ideas with regard to Belle Isle have been regulated; but it is altogether impossible, supposing every other difficulty removed, to have an army such as he points at in the Mediterranean without abandoning our ideas as to Belle Isle, and all the consequences resulting from the possession of it.

"I had proceeded so far when Huskisson put into my hands the proposed dispatch to Lord Minto. You'll observe what I have stated above contains no idea incompatible with that dispatch. Although

the Condé army, from the feelings of the Austrians, could not be employed in any operations with them, still, by strengthening the force at Minorca or Malta, it would liberate and render disposable more of the army under Sir Ralph Abercrombie in the Mediterranean. Have you any objection to send a copy to Sir Ralph Abercrombie of your dispatch, and I would direct him to communicate it to Lord Keith."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, May 21. Cleveland Row.—"When Stuart resigned the command of the Mediterranean expedition, and there appeared a probability that little if any active operation would be undertaken in that quarter, I wrote to Captain Proby to remain where he was. But as these circumstances are in great measure again changed by Sir Ralph Abercrombie's appointment and by the plans which are in agitation, I should esteem it a very great advantage to Captain Proby if I could place him for this campaign under Sir Ralph Abercrombie's protection and attach him to his family.

"I am perfectly aware that Sir Ralph Abercrombie must, long before this, have provided himself with his regular *aides de camp*, and that I cannot therefore reasonably expect that he should place Captain Proby in that situation; but, if he would allow me to write to him to join the army at Minorca, and if he would then consider him in the light in which Sir Charles Stuart had promised to receive him as a supernumerary attached to him, and employ him in any manner that would give him the opportunity of learning his profession, and particularly becoming acquainted with the practice of the service of his own country (he having hitherto seen nothing but the Austrian service, to which he has been attached through almost the whole war) all my wishes and that of his friends would be fully answered; their object being not pecuniary advantage for him but military instruction, which certainly they cannot better obtain than by placing him under Sir Ralph Abercrombie's orders.

"If you think I might venture to presume upon Sir Ralph Abercrombie's acquiescence in this request, I would, by the messenger who goes to-day to Wickham, order Captain Proby to make the best of his way to Minorca. If not, we must wait till the next messenger goes." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 21. Downing Street.—"I have no hesitation in advising you to take the first moment of writing to Captain Proby to proceed to Minorca. Your request seems a very reasonable one, and, if it was less so, the accommodating disposition of Sir Ralph Abercrombie would induce him to embrace any recommendation coming from either of us."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 21. Stowe.—"I was prevented yesterday by unexpected business from answering your letter. In the first place I

am to thank you most warmly for your intimation of giving me a few days at Stowe, for you can give me nothing I prize more ; and in the next place I must desire you to leave orders to receive within your doors a guest that I have negotiated for your cellar, namely, a hogsheaf of golden pippin cider from Somerset, now ordered to march from Taunton to Cleveland Row.

"I fear that Wickham's friend Kray will have been forced to fall farther back, and I do not quite understand how it happened that, with such a force as you sent me a list of, he has been obliged to fight with such inferiority. The moment is very anxious, and the Vienna account of Melas *entrenching* before Genoa does not appear to promise any immediate termination of that contest, so as to enable him to help Kray by the obvious move into Switzerland and into Lower Provence, where I had hoped to have heard of them before now."

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 22. Dublin.—"I received your Lordship's note with Lord Buckingham's proxy enclosed, which I have delivered to the Chancellor. Opposition made their effort last night when Lord Castlereagh moved for leave to bring in the Union Bill. The leaders did not debate. The debate came from the dregs of Opposition : much abuse and more nonsense. The House was sometimes disgusted, sometimes in roars of laughter, never serious. We divided at eleven, 160 to 100. Every effort was made by Opposition to collect their forces.

"I hardly think we shall have any serious debate hereafter. Many of our opponents are on the wing. There is no sensation on the subject in town or country, and, unless affairs take a new and unforeseen turn, I shall not think of troubling your Lordship any further with my scrawl upon this subject.

"I consider the question really carried."

CHARLES PHILIPPE, COUNT D'ARTOIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 23. Welbeck Street.—"Je m'empresse de vous instruire qu'en revenant de chez le Roi j'ai reçu des nouvelles de Paris, sur le contenu desquelles je désirerais beaucoup conférer avec vous le plus promptement possible. J'ai aussi à vous communiquer des idées que je considère comme très essentielles.

"Soyez donc assez aimable, je vous en prie, pour me faire dire si je puis vous voir demain, ou dimanche au plus tard, soit à Cleveland Row, soit à Welbeck Street, comme vous le préférerez."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May 24. Wimbledon.—"I herewith send you, as I promised, the correspondence which has passed between the Governor General of India and the Captain General of Goa relative to the propriety of admitting a British garrison into that important station. The garrison for the present has been admitted, and the expense of it is referred home to be settled here by the two Govern-

ments. The security of Goa from falling into the hands of any European enemy is certainly an important object, but it will be a great additional expense to our military establishments, already very expensive, if we are to be at the expense of maintaining so large a garrison. I wish they would give it up and confine themselves to as many factories as they please. It is of no use to them, and they are not able to defend it.

“The other claims they set up are very idle.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, May 26]. Downing Street.—“Smyth declines quitting the Treasury for the India Board, and as Wallace is therefore to go thither, my only vacancy will be at the Admiralty. I imagine from what passed before, Lord Temple will wish to succeed to it. Pray let me know. I would have come to you if it were not too hot to move. To-morrow I can be at leisure any time you please after one, if you are staying in town, which I can hardly suppose.”

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL TEMPLE.

1800, May 28. Dropmore.—“I had hoped in consequence of the arrangements I had made for a visit to Stowe this week to have seen you at Aylesbury or Wotton. This is put out of the question by a severe cold, which will not let me think of the journey to Stowe. Next week I hope to be more fortunate, if the union arrangements should not, as I think they will not, be sufficiently advanced to require my attendance in the House of Lords. I am however unwilling any longer to postpone communicating to you what has passed on the subject of official arrangements, and the state in which that matter now stands, which is shortly this.

“When the arrangements were finally settled respecting the Treasurership of the Navy and joint-Paymastership, the first thing that was done was to endeavour to make that arrangement conducive to your wishes, by offering the vacancy at the India Board to Smyth of Heath, whose acceptance would have opened the Treasury to you. After some consideration he declined this offer, principally, as I believe, on account of the inconvenience of a re-election. Douglas is already at the India Board, and there are obvious reasons to prevent the bringing Townshend or Pybus there, which, in the case of one of them, would also have been still more liable to the same difficulty of re-election.

“It remained therefore only to bring one of the Lords of the Admiralty to the India Board, and this has accordingly been done by the nomination of Wallace.

“About the same time an intimation was received from Lord Granville Leveson—the person whose name was last year mentioned to my brother as having a promise of being brought forward into the line of office—that the difficulty respecting his re-election no longer existed, and that Lord Stafford saw no danger in his vacating the county at this time, if he was appointed to the present vacancy.

“He was answered that I had already been empowered to offer

Wallace's seat at the Admiralty to your acceptance, and that the matter must therefore wait your decision.

"In this situation therefore it stands. If you think, on a consideration of all the circumstances, that it is best to let the Admiralty pass you, it will be given to Lord G. Leveson, and the effect of this vacancy will have been to remove out of your way a prior engagement, and one which it is the more desirable to remove since the difficulty respecting his re-election is no longer found to exist. And you will then stand first for the first vacancy to arise at the Treasury. If, on the other hand, you prefer accepting the Admiralty now, you place yourself at once in the line of office, and under the particular circumstances of the case, the engagement to Lord G. Leveson, though prior in point of date, will be postponed in order to make good the offer which I was empowered to make to you.

"I do not add any thing of advice respecting your decision, because I think it must in great degree depend on your own feelings; but if it would be at all more agreeable to you to talk the subject over with me before you finally decide upon it, I trust we shall next week have an opportunity of meeting." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, May 28. Vienna.—"It was my intention to have written pretty fully to-day, but an unusual press of business and the arrival of dispatches from India, which it is necessary to expedite, oblige me to request that your Lordship will excuse me till the next opportunity.

"I confess I am disappointed to find that the construction put by Lord Elgin on the last orders (for allowing the capitulation) is likely still to send the Egyptian army to reinforce the enemy in Europe. I had imagined they were intended to take effect only in the event of the capitulation being, at the time of their arrival, in vigour, and in a state of actual performance.

"Baron Thugut continues staunch."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, [May 31].—"I enclose to you a letter I have just received from my father. On the question of the *Admiralty* I must confess I retain the same opinions I did before. On *another point* discussed in my father's letter, I must confess I feel as warmly as he does, as I really think Mr. Pitt has hardly done fairly by me in offering to me the very lowest situation in office when, in Lord Hawkesbury's case, he had established a precedent for offering me a higher; particularly too when by chance the very situation to which he had before placed Lord Hawkesbury was become vacant. All this does not affect the question of Admiralty, but it does very much the main question of whether, under these circumstances, I can pursue my plan of office. Every thing must depend upon Mr. Pitt's conversation with you. I must again repeat, what I am

afraid I have troubled you with much too often, that my wishes are for a public life, and that to follow that object I am ready to sacrifice as much as my situation will allow me ; at the same time I cannot reconcile to my feelings the coming into office in a situation beneath that in which other young men of my own rank have been placed. These considerations, perfectly distinct from any we have discussed together, I must confess press upon me very much. What turn they may take entirely depends upon Mr. Pitt's language to you, and I preferred the expressing them to you by letter to the taking up your time by an interview. I cannot however conclude my letter without assuring you that, whatever may be the event of this business, my feelings of gratitude to you for the very affectionate attention you have paid to my objects, will remain always the same."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, May.—" Permettez-moi de me plaindre pour la première fois de ma vie de vous-même à vous-même. J'apprends que cette éternelle convention pour laquelle j'ai écrit quatre-vingt sept dépêches, et cent deux lettres particulières, vient d'être ratifiée, et vous ne m'en dites rien. Comme mon courier n'est pas arrivé, et qu'on ne me le mande pas non plus, j'en doute encore. De grâce rassurés-moi, vous savez combien cela m'intéresse. Qui plus que moi vous a donné plus de preuves de mon attachement à l'alliance et à la persévérance dans les principes de l'honneur et de la probité. D'ailleurs je suis le seul ministre étranger qui puisse se glorifier d'être Anglais en même tems, et je vous assure que j'en suis bien fier. Quand vous me le permettez, je viendrai vous faire ma cour, et vous féliciter ainsi que moi-même de notre *re-réunion*. Il faut qu'elle soit éternelle."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 1. Stowe.—" Upon a closer examination of Garlike's letter, I find that Krudener understands from Count Woronzow that no English Minister will for the present be named to Petersburg, and Garlike very justly quotes this as an additional reason against any such change as might add to the strength of this impression at Petersburg ; surely however Woronzow had better not promote this belief among his brother ministers, as it can only tend to make bad worse."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 1. Stowe.—" Your letter to Tom of yesterday announces the capture of Nice ; but Lord Keith's promise of starving Genoa by the 20th is liable to so many accidents, that I fear the blockade by land will necessarily be abandoned, to enable Melas to meet Bonaparte or rather Berthier. It is however great consolation to reflect that the Egyptian army will be otherwise employed than in landing at Marseilles, precisely in the moment in which France would most want them. I fear however that Abercrombie

(even if he was all that I do not think he is) will be too late to save the Austrians in that quarter, if the fortune of the war should be against them. On the chapter of Swabia I am more at ease, for the *repose* given to French army after the battle of the 11th, is a clear proof that they cannot gather strength in proportion to the accession that must have joined Kray."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 1. Bromley Hill.—"You will have heard the account received this morning of the sailing of part of the French fleet (probably for the Mediterranean). This combined with the state of things by the last accounts from Italy, brings me back to the idea, that we may still do more by sending eight, ten, or twelve thousand additional troops to the Mediterranean, than by any other application of our force. I am the more confirmed in it from finding this morning at Wimbledon, that the state of our preparations with a view to any enterprise on a large scale on this side of France, is so wretchedly backward, and the exertions for pushing them so languid, as to leave (in my judgment) little chance of our doing any thing in that way that can influence the fate of the campaign. We may *yet* be in time to send to Italy what may render success decisive, or retrieve disasters that might otherwise be irreparable. I think you are very likely to have anticipated the same opinion. At all events I am sure you will think the point well deserving immediate consideration.

"I have written to Dundas to tell him what has struck me since I left him this morning, and to beg him to meet me in town at twelve to-morrow. Lord Spencer is in town, and I wish much that you would if possible meet us at that time, or as soon after as suits you.

"If any thing is to be done, time will press in all respects; but particularly because the Bellisle scheme, must, on this idea be suspended for the present, and if so, we have not many hours to lose."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 2. Downing Street.—"On coming to town I found that the squadron from Brest has returned to port, and that the blow at Bellisle is probably on the point of being struck. It must of course be followed up, and the only question now remaining, will be whether the part of our disposable force not necessary for this enterprise shall be sent (as we can get shipping) to the Mediterranean, or employed in expeditions or demonstrations here. I rather incline still to the former, to a certain extent, but it does not now press as I supposed it would, and I therefore see no reason to put off returning to the country for to-morrow.

"I conclude you did not mean to go back before the birthday."

Postscript.—"I trust we have gained some thing since yesterday, in advancing preparations equally requisite for either service."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, June 3. Cleveland Row.—"You are too well used to the

business of Parliament to be at all surprised at our extreme impatience under all my friend Thugat's delays. For my own part I really know not what we shall say or do if the *projet* does not arrive in the next week or ten days ; for, without it, we can hardly propose to Parliament to vote near three millions of foreign subsidies, the whole policy of which depends upon the engagements taken or to be taken with the Court of Vienna. Nor does my imagination supply me with any reasonable answer to the obvious question why our treaty has not been made weeks—I might say months—ago.

“We had a considerable alarm here one day in the idea that the Brest fleet had availed themselves of Lord St. Vincent's absence to put to sea. They did actually attempt it, but the appearance of our fleet drove them back again immediately to their hiding place. If they had got a couple of days start of us, and run at once for Genoa, eight and forty hours might have done irreparable mischief. I trust, however, that Genoa is by this time in Melas's hands, and Lord St. Vincent, now that the French have shown the desire of getting out, will of course be doubly watchful to prevent it.

“I think it is by no means to be regretted that Kleber has broken the capitulation. One cannot but be sorry for the Turks who have fallen victims to their own indiscipline, and the ignorance of their leaders ; but Kleber and his army can annoy us much less where they are than in almost any other possible situation. It is not yet finally decided what orders shall be sent to Lord Keith on this subject, and the question is indeed a very difficult one. In the meantime, the delay will prevent any mischief from that army being employed against the Austrians in this campaign at least.

“I trust Melas will give a good account of the great Consul and his army of reserve, but its force will evidently be very different from the 10 or 15,000 men they talk of at Vienna. I should think it likely that a part of Moreau's army will be marched to support it, and, in that case, I trust Kray will be ordered to move forward again.

“We are doing, and shall continue to do, every thing in our power to create diversions in their favour on this side.” *Copy.*

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 6. Duke Street.—“I lose no time in transmitting to you a letter which I received yesterday, after I left you, from M. Mollerus. It fully confirms what I remember you mentioned to me some time since, with respect to an offer of 20 millions which had been made by the Batavian Government to the French. It also contains some other curious particulars, as for instance that of the ex-ambassador Brantsen (the same whom you may perhaps recollect to have been sent to Paris in the beginning of 1795, soon before the French invasion, to negotiate peace, and who, I think, is otherwise sufficiently known to you) being employed to collect information respecting a landing in Holland.

“When you have perused this letter, I shall be much obliged to you to return it to me. I have already written to M. Mollerus that in consequence of the turn which this whole business has taken no

hopes can be entertained of bringing it to any advantageous issue.

"Enclosed you will also find an extract from one of the last letters of the Hereditary Prince of Orange."

Enclosure :—

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1800, May 27. Berlin, *en chiffre*.—"Le chiffre du 9 Mai avec la copie de la lettre de Mollerus au Greffier m'est très-bien parvenue, et je puis assurer que nous allons bride en main, et ne ferons aucune démarche qui puisse compromettre. Haugwitz a recommandé que les Bataves fissent une démarche en France, et il a autorisé Sandoz Rollin à y sonder le terrain, ou faire une ouverture d'après les circonstances pour appuyer ou faire témoigner que le Roi désire la neutralité, et qu'il est prêt à se charger de la négociation et avec l'Angleterre et avec la France pour la procurer à la Hollande. C'est du 5, au 10 qu'il attend réponse ; jusque-là on ne fera rien. Je verrai Haugwitz encore avant mon départ, mais, du reste, les choses resteront *in statu quo* jusqu'à la réponse de Paris." *Extract.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, June 1-7. York Farm.]—"J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-joint une lettre assez intéressante et très détaillée d'un seigneur Flamand, l'ami de mon enfance, et autrefois attaché à l'Archiduc. C'est le Comte de Moldegghem, le seul de la noblesse qui se soit toujours bien conduit, depuis qu'il a pu sortir des Pays-bas. Il est allé respirer à Munster où il se trouve actuellement. Vous serez content de l'ensemble des notions que vous trouverez dans sa lettre. Agréez mon hommage. Quand aurons nous donc quelque chose de positif de Vienne ? Ce Thugut est terrible avec *sa singularité dissimulée*. Je serois plus expéditif à sa place, et sûrement, aussi bien pensant."

Enclosure :—

COUNT DE MOLDEGHEM to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, May 23. Munster.—"Avant mon départ, qui n'aura lieu que le dix-huit de Juin, j'ai voulu vous assurer la reception de votre lettre du neuf mai, mais il est assez simple que vous ne soyez point informé de l'arrangement des bureaux de poste de cette partie d'Allemagne. Les lettres mise à la poste à Hambourg, au poste correspondant avec le conseiller Dûesberg de Munster, *qui est le tenant de l'Electeur,—cela est sure* quand l'on a la précaution à Hambourg de remettre les lettres à son bureau ; mais le poste qui est le bureau du Prince de Latour, qui a le sien à Hambourg, tous les secrétaires du nommé Hamm d'ici qui en est le Directeur, homme très riche et insouciant, laisse faire la besogne à des subalternes, qui sont absolument vendus aux Prussiens, qui sont très avides des nouvelles qui arrivent de Paris à Hambourg, de là plus loin, et le retour de votre ville par les

arrangements pris avec la France. Cette poste pour les intérêts des négociants va très vite, mais il y a de l'obscurité des Prussiens, ainsi qu'un parti de la noblesse qui croit que le séjour de l'Electeur à Vienne pourroit leur donner un coadjuteur, ils travaillent tous les esprits contre, et ne néglige rien des relations extérieurs; à cette poste pour intérêts, actuellement vous voilà au courant.

“La campagne a été brillante en Italie, mais l'idée de secourir Gènes, passant par le Valais, est effrayante, sur tous avec la rapidité de ce qui est parti de Dijon, pour chercher à occuper le Simplon et prendre le Piémont à dos. Tant que Gènes ne sera pas pris, je ne serai pas tranquille sur la sécurité de l'Italie. Vous conviendrez que si l'on avoit laissé M. De Melas opérer devant Gènes, et Kray observer le Piémont, et le St. Bernard, les armées avoient des chefs qui avoient leur confiance, l'Archiduc en Souabe, qui auroit été forcé, également, de se retirer au Danube, peut-être sans autant de pertes, mais qui auroit repris l'offensive après la reddition de Gènes, car il étoit impossible de tenir, à moins d'être plus en force, contre les six attaques venant des villes forestières et le front du Rhin; plusieurs officiers blessés, qui sont ici chez leurs parents, m'ont démontré la chose.

“Dans la Belgique l'on presse la rentrée des contributions de tous les genres, ainsi que la réquisition, qui va très mal, malgré les soins des conseillers de la municipalité *Dursel, Lannoï, et Arconaty* l'on est honteux de voir des gens d'un tel état ne cesser de se déshonorer. Quand aux contributions l'on peut en ralentir la rentrée en occupant les troupes destinées aux exécutions pour les percevoir, inquiétant les côtes, des tems autres les menacer, cela m'est [met] les commandants des côtes en peine. Ils font rassembler, aller, venir les troupes, mais il faut que cela soit fait avec intelligence et adresse, car il faut laisser l'embouchure de l'Escaut occidentale tranquille, pour ne pas troubler les fraudeurs, qui vous apporte des grains de divers espèces; mais si l'on venoit à faire un entreprise sur la Zelande, vous avez à Flessingue un homme dont l'on pourroit venir à bout, qui s'appelle D'Hoost, fils d'un cabaretier de Menin, homme sans esprit en moyens militaires que l'audace de la témérité, ivrogne et crapuleux. Toutes les radiations venues de Paris, non encore compris aucuns Belges, tous porte sur des Français constitutionnelles. Si je n'ai pas obtenu la levée de mon séquestre avant la fin de Juin, puisque je ne suis pas émigré, et que j'ai l'ennui d'habiter la république, je veux au moins en tirer parti pour vendre. Je chercherai à avoir audience de cet infâme Bonaparte.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 8. Bromley Hill.—“The chapter of peers from Ireland is certainly full of difficulty. I rather think that if Lord Cornwallis presses Lord Ormond (who is I understand related to him) as a personal favour, it would not be unreasonable to state it to Lord Carysfort in the same light as Lord Londonderry. Lord Drogheda must certainly be rejected or Lord Carysfort included. I really believe the King would scarcely be brought to consent to

the whole, and it could not be agreed to without much inconvenience here. I state to you just what occurs to me now, but I hope to see you before the *levée* on Wednesday.

"With respect to Tuesday's business, I begin to feel less anxiety. I thought it best to write to the King last night on the subject. I enclose you his answer, which you will be so good to give me back, when we meet. I returned his draft immediately which was as proper as it is possible to conceive, and will, I think, produce its effect. From a conversation I had with my brother after our meeting yesterday, I think he will endeavour, in earnest, to prevent any mischief.

"I do not however see any reason for your excepting Lord Poulett and Lord Macclesfield from the list to which you write. They ought on such an occasion to act with the Government, rather than with one individual member of it; and the distinction might be a troublesome precedent.

Enclosure :—

GEORGE III. to W. PITT.

1800, June 8. Windsor.—"I have this instant received Mr. Pitt's note on the intended complaint of the Earl of Carlisle in the House of Lords against the printer of a newspaper, but in reality levelled against Lord Kenyon for his charge in a late action on account of adultery, when his language is supposed to have been aimed against certain expressions of that Earl and other objectors to the Bill lately debated in the House of Lords for extending the punishment on that crime against every religious, moral and social tie of society.

"It is certainly a duty of Administration to resist this attack, and Mr. Pitt does me but justice in supposing that my respect for the character of Lord Kenyon, as well as of decency, must make me feel the propriety of this line of conduct. I will therefore most willingly write to each of my three sons on this occasion, and though I have cautiously avoided pressing them on matters of politics, I feel this so much one regarding public decorum, that I cannot have any difficulty in pressing them to absent themselves on Tuesday, as a conduct that will gain them credit with the sager persons of this nation; but least I should not exactly express myself as Mr. Pitt would wish, I have made a draft of what I propose writing to them, which I desire he will, if he [it] does not fully answer his ideas, correct it, and on receiving his answer I will instantly send a fair copy to them."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 8. Wimbledon.—"I have wrote to Lord Aboyne to desire to see him. The Duke of York is in the country, but I have wrote to him to inform him that a reinforcement for the Mediterranean, not less than four thousand effective and good men, will be immediately wanted, and I have named the regiments which I think most suited to the purpose. I told him that there is another topic on which Mr. Pitt and I would desire to converse with him.

It is one in which I considered the stability of his Majesty's government and the honour of the royal family to be equally involved. He would perhaps anticipate (I have said) that I alluded to the appearance of the Princes of the Blood in the House of Lords on Friday, when notice was given of a proceeding intended to affect the credit and honour of the persons whom his Majesty had placed at the head of the Court of King's Bench ; and, if his Majesty's servants were unable to protect a person of that description, they were unfit for the trust which his Majesty had reposed in them."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800 [June, 10. Wimbledon].—"I think it material that I should have some conversation without delay with Mr. Pitt and you, and I have intimated to Mr. Pitt that I expect to meet you and him in Downing Street to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

"Mr. Pitt has mentioned to me yesterday your wish of Lord Temple being at the India Board. I would wish to say a few words to you upon the subject when we meet. You can have no doubt of my disposition to acquiesce in any proposition that will be agreeable to Lord Buckingham and you ; at the same time you will feel that I owe it to myself, and to the public service, and also to the parties immediately connected with the proposition, that I should speak to you upon it without reserve.

"I send you a letter I have received from Governor Pownall, on which I must likewise have a little conversation with you and Mr. Pitt."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 12. St. Veit.—"Though for many reasons I think it right and expedient not to send your Lordship any dispatch or letter from hence, yet I cannot refuse myself the pleasure of writing a single line merely to say that I have found all right and steady here, and that I am persuaded the Emperor will not be terrified by anything less than the *destruction* of one of his armies.

"I do not think, myself, the state of things by any means so bad as it is represented or supposed to be. But assistance from your side is very much wanted, and indeed may become absolutely necessary. Whatever success Buonaparte may have, short of complete victory, he cannot now detach a man from Italy or Germany, and I am persuaded that so fair an opportunity for an attempt from your side never yet offered itself.

"I ought not to disguise from your Lordship that complaints of the want of co-operation are not wanting either here or at the army ; as it is generally understood that the army of reserve is almost entirely composed of detachments from the coasts of Brittany and Normandy. In general, however, I have found most people, and particularly M. de Thugut, more fair and moderate on that subject than I should have expected under their present severe reverses, and with the apprehension of much greater and more serious ones immediately before their eyes.

"Lord Minto transmits your Lordship accounts to-day of the capture of Genoa, which appear to me deserving of the highest credit though not yet official."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, June, 14].—"I have received a letter from my father approving of the new arrangement in terms more expressive of happiness than you can possibly conceive. I am going this morning out of town in order to settle Lady Temple in the country, and I will beg of you to send me a line to Avington to let me know when you will want me for Lord Camelford's affair, and for the completion of the arrangement, which I will certainly obey immediately."

Postscript.—"I cannot do better than to enclose to you my father's letter which expresses most fully what I feel on the subject."

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ISLAND OF MALTA communicated to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 16. Malta.—"I came to this island in the beginning of last autumn, and I have remained almost constantly until now. During this time I have often reflected on the advantages which may be derived from the possession of this island, and I now communicate my reflections to you. It is not necessary to mention to you the advantageous situation of this island for the commerce of the two Sicilies, the Adriatic, Morea, Archipelago, and the coasts of Syria, Egypt, and Barbary; and the excellency of its harbours and lazaretto. Whoever possesses Malta will have a decided superiority in this extensive commerce. If England retain possession of it, English merchants will establish themselves in La Valette, and have magazines of woollens, cottons, hardware. Merchants from the several countries I have mentioned will come to purchase these goods in barter for their own productions. English ships will have shorter voyages outward and homeward bound. In the excellent warehouses of La Valette they will find all the Levant goods ready to be put on board. They will sail immediately with clean bills of health, avoid the delays and expense of the present mode of performing quarantine in England, and deprive the Dutch of the advantage which they always derived from a different management, by coming to our market with Levant goods earlier than our own merchants. On this subject I refer you to Eton's book on the Quarantine Laws.

"The States of Barbary are now certainly hostile to the French. The Bashaw of Tripoli has promised a reward of 500 dollars to the first who brings him news of the taking of La Valette, and the merchants of Tunis send now corn, bullocks, dates, and other produce to this island. If England were in possession of Malta I am persuaded that these states would desist in time from their piratical practices and find their own advantage in becoming industrious and mercantile. They would come to this island with their own productions, and exchange them for the goods they would find in English magazines.

"The late Knights of Malta were perfect Sybarites; they had lost the spirit of their predecessors; they lived luxuriously on the revenues they derived from the possessions of their Order in other countries, and paid no attention to the cultivation and commerce of Malta. Without asking a question, when I ride over the island I can discover the lands which are the property of the Order and those which belong to individuals by a difference of cultivation. But the lands of the Order, if they were properly cultivated, and their revenues from gardens, houses, and warehouses in La Valette, and from the duties of customs and excise, estimating them only at the amount paid to the Grand Master, would defray the expense of civil government, and likewise of the military establishment necessary for the defence of the island, by any power to whom the natives are attached as much as they are to the English.

"Besides, all these branches of revenue may be improved to an amount much more considerable, and this island by proper management would in a few years produce a surplus of revenue to any power who can protect its commerce and encourage its cultivation. The principal article of its produce is cotton. The exportation of cotton wool is prohibited; the natives manufacture it into coarse cloth for their own consumption only, but they export annually to Spain cotton thread to the amount of more than half a million sterling, and their exportations of oranges, lemons, and figs, anise and cumin seed, are very considerable. The sugar-cane, the anil, and the pepper tree grow in Malta; but they gain more by the cultivation of cotton and of various fruits than they could gain by making sugar, indigo, or pepper. They make no wine, though their grapes appear to be of an excellent quality; and they might make wine, at least for their own consumption, without interfering with any other article which they now cultivate. They export salt to the Adriatic. It is both very cheap and very fine, nay the very stones of Malta for paving, houses, and terraces, and for making conduits for water, are a considerable article of exportation.

"The Maltese under the government of the Knights were constantly at war with the Turks, and with the States of Barbary; they seldom carried their own productions to market, but they are good seamen, and in time of war would furnish excellent sailors for our fleet."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 18. Downing Street.—"I have just received your note on my coming to town. I left Mr. Pitt in bed this morning at Wimbledon. I shall see him the moment he comes to town, and it is my intention to fix us three meeting to-morrow at eleven, and the Cabinet precisely at 12. He stated to me last night that the business you mention would probably prevent our meeting to-day and, previous to your note, I had resolved to return to town for the purpose of a Cabinet in consequence of the accompanying note from the King. I am very strong in my opinion for sending the force to the Mediterranean as I proposed. Certainly I will not think of sending the force there which is now at Quiberon till we

hear again from Maitland. Perhaps you have not seen his despatches, either those received on Sunday or those received yesterday. I send them all to you, wishing you to return them as soon as you can. If you cannot read them before you go to the Cockpit, probably Dr. Lawrence's preamble may give you time enough to do it."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 19. Downing Street.—“On referring to Sir Ralph Abercrombie's instructions, they are strong enough to prevent him allowing the Russians to take possession of any of the strong forts of Malta. You know my sentiments on that subject; but I have thought it best to desire Huskisson to call upon you to take your directions how much more strict you would agree to make them.”

Private.

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 19. Vienna.—“As I am to transmit the treaty so soon, I shall not trouble your Lordship with more on that subject at present.

“I am apprehensive that there is some mistake concerning the very generous present which His Majesty has made to the Emperor. Your Lordship's dispatch authorised me to say that 150,000*l.* should be sent to Hamburg. But Messieurs Vries at Vienna have only heard of 100,000*l.* from their correspondent at Hamburg. As I made the communication according to your dispatch, that sum is now expected, and it would be ungracious to make an alteration in a matter of this sort. May I beg your Lordship to order some enquiry to be made, and the mistake to be rectified as soon as possible at Hamburg, if there should prove to be one. It is very much the wish of Baron Thugut to receive the money in specie at Hamburg, and for that purpose it would be necessary that I should draw on Hamburg, payable to Baron Thugut's order, or to some one that he may point out, and give him the bills. There will certainly be a great economy in that method, for there can be no doubt of Vries charging very high for specie. I must therefore beg that your Lordship would be so good as to direct the house at Hamburg to honour my bills if I should find it necessary to draw.

“Baron Thugut has made no use of the bills on the Treasury for 200,000*l.*, which I gave him some time ago, but I shall have occasion to write to your Lordship officially by next messenger on the mode of remittance.

“Baron Thugut does not speak so confidently as I should wish about Italy; and Melas seems to have expressed a good deal of embarrassment in his last letters of the 8th. He is distressed for provisions, many of his magazines being in the hands of the enemy. Yet Buonaparte's situation must be infinitely worse.

“The Pope, who embarked at Venice on board an Imperial frigate, has been forced into a port in Istria by stress of weather. He is to land at a small port near Ancona, not choosing to go to the latter place.

“An alteration is making in the provisional government of Tuscany; the senate having given universal dissatisfaction. The regency is now to be composed of three Florentine members and the Marquis de Sommariva, the Austrian commandant, who is to preside.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private, in cipher.

1800, June 20. Cleveland Row.—“The mails from Germany having lately arrived, to our great disappointment, without bringing, any dispatches from Vienna, I cannot help mentioning to you that even in the absence of any interesting intelligence, it has been always customary for the ministers resident at the great Courts to write by the opportunity of every post, if it were only to apprise us that nothing new has occurred. I can readily allow for your being much occupied, but you must, on the other hand, consider what our impatience is. The union will pass the House of Lords next week; and Parliament will then be kept sitting in June solely from the necessity of laying before them something from Vienna before the session can close.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF FARNHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 20. Dublin.—“I had the honour of your Lordship’s letter, and shall once more intrude upon your time, for the purpose only of giving you information concerning the real state of the pecuniary circumstances of this country, in which be assured that I shall not in any particular misrepresent it. The reading this letter is the only trouble I wish to give you, as I do not desire that you should be at that of acknowledging it.

“The mode of ascertaining the relative abilities of the two countries by the comparative value of the imports and exports, and of the consumption of the enumerated articles, must be considered, and has been acknowledged, as extremely uncertain and inconclusive. Their respective balances of trade form the best criterion of their abilities, arising from *commerce*. Mr. Rose states that of Great Britain at 14,800,000*l.*; and, from the returns laid before us, the average balance of trade in favour of Ireland for three years ending 25 March, 1799, amounts to no more than 500,000*l.* This small balance has in 1799 declined to 200,000*l.* I do not know of any influx of money into Ireland save this small balance. Her annual remittances to Great Britain in discharge of the interest of her loan is £724,000, and Mr. Pitt states her remittances to her absentees at a million. From the best information I have received they *really* amount to two millions. Though Ireland borrowed in the last year 3 millions from Great Britain, the course of exchange was from three to five per cent. above par. You will observe that the interest of the late loan of two millions is not included in the said sum of 724,000*l.* At present her credit is supported upon paper wings, and every guinea which can be laid hold of is carried away out of this kingdom. This constant balance

of efflux must necessarily diminish her capital, and the produce of the taxes which arise from her trade. Compare her revenue with her expenses in 1799. Her then revenue was but about two millions Irish, out of which she paid 1,400,000*l.* in discharge of the *then* interest of her debt, and had a residue of about 600,000*l.* *towards* the support of her establishments. She has since greatly added to her debt, and has laid on additional taxes of about 600,000*l.* to discharge their interest. These are principally raised by internal taxation, as it was apprehended that additional taxes upon the imports would be not productive. According to Lord Castlereagh's computation, he states that Ireland is to contribute 4,400,000*l.* in time of war, as her proportion. I cannot understand how this is practicable. An experiment has been lately made in this kingdom to raise only one million and a half, and the undertakers have been obliged to forfeit their deposits. The aforesaid proportion considerably exceeds the expense that Ireland was put to, either in the year of rebellion, or the average of the last three years, of which an account has been laid before Parliament. This proves his assertion *that Ireland would be gainer by the apportionment*, to have been erroneous. In respect of the peace establishment of Great Britain, which in 1789 was about 6 millions, and which he states has to rise when peace shall return to 7,500,000*l.*, I shall observe that the increase of the pay of the army and navy, which in 1790 amounted to 4,666,000*l.*, would be found to produce more than that increase of expense. And here I shall state the numbers of which the army of the empire then consisted, the navy, and the expense of both. The whole army consisted of 48,000, of which 17,000 remained in Great Britain, about 12,000 in the East and West Indies, near 4,000 at Gibraltar, all which, amounting to about 32,800 men, were paid by Great Britain. The remaining 15,200 were paid by Ireland. The navy consisted of 20,000, so that Ireland paid 15,200 of the whole force of 68,000 men, that is nearly 2/9th. The whole expense of the navy and army paid by Great Britain was 4,666,000*l.*, and Ireland paid 579,000*l.*, being about 1/9th of the whole expense. This shews that Ireland, paying a fair proportion of the *whole* expense of the defence of the empire, was from her contribution justly entitled to the protection of the navy. Ireland was at that time well able to pay such contribution. The interest of her debt amounted but to 142,000*l.* The whole of her establishment was 1,153,710*l.*, and her revenue amounted to 1,190,684*l.* There must, in my opinion, be a great increase to the expense of the British peace establishment, and I cannot suppose that it will not be found necessary, to keep up an army in Great Britain of double the number of the former peace establishment. There is one criterion to judge of the respective abilities of the two nations which to me appears better suited to that purpose than either of those which have been resorted to; a comparison of the produce of their respective *permanent* taxes. That of Great Britain for the year ending the 5th of January, 1799, was upwards of 26 millions, and that of Ireland but two millions. In proportion as about 13 to 1. The balance of trade about 29 to 1. To me it appears impossible for Ireland to pay that sum which she takes

upon herself of 2/17th. The danger arising from such a failure must strike your Lordship. I wished that the United Parliament should be invested with a power of revision of the apportionment, and for that purpose proposed an amendment. Administration disapproved of it, and therefore I did not press it. I still think that as the adjustment of the proportion of contribution stands upon very doubtful data, that it would be prudent to put it in their power, if it should appear to them necessary, to alter that proportion without infringing upon one of the most material articles of the Union. Although my opinion is strong against this measure as injurious to both nations, I wish that, if it does take place, it may be permanent. I wish to guard against such discontent as may finally be productive of separation. I shall not apologise for the trouble I give your Lordship of reading this letter, as my object sufficiently justifies it."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, June 21. Horse Guards.—"I saw Lord Macartney this forenoon. If you want his services at Verona send for him. If you do not, let him know as soon as you can, for he means otherwise to go immediately to Ireland. The conversation led to resume a little the last conversation I had with him. My opinion is that, if you wanted him for the American station he would not stand on the rank of ambassador. In short he does not like to be idle, and would certainly accept of employment in the public service in any creditable way.

"Be so good as order somebody in your Office to send me every day in my absence a bulletin of what intelligence arrives at your Office. Huskisson has mentioned to me that he finds a great shyness in Burgess and Aust to give him any communications. Put that to rights in any way you please, but don't let them know that he has made to me any complaint on the subject."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 25. Harley Street.—"Trop malade pour pouvoir aller à Windsor, j'avois chargé le Marquis de Circello de vous prier, de ma part, d'avoir la bonté d'obtenir du Roi pour que je puisse avoir l'honneur de prendre congé de leurs Majestés dans le palais de la Reine demain, jeudi, avant que leurs Majestés aillent au cercle à St. Jammes; je vous supplie de nouveau de m'obtenir cette grâce.

"Je ne puis vous exprimer à quel point je suis affligé des malheureuses nouvelles d'Italie qui doivent influer sur le malheureux sort de toute l'Europe, et consoliderent l'usurpation du trop heureux Corsse, quoique la disperssion (tout à fait inutile pour le bien de la bonne cause) de plus de trente milles hommes dans les garnisons de Ferare, Bologne, Ancone, Urbino, Ravene, Orvietto et jusqu'aux portes de Rome, faisoit prévoir que les Français trouveroient des facilités à pénétrer par la Suisse dans le Milanois,

et ne trouveroient que des petits corps qui ne pouvoient les empêcher de déboucher par les Alpes, pour aller couper la communication de Méllas avec le Milanois, le Mantuan, et le Vénitien. Ceux qui connaissent le pays savent que Bonaparte pouvoit se maintenir dans cette prétendue plaine qui n'existe que sur la carte, car c'est le pays le plus coupé de l'univers par les rivières, les canaux, et les haies vines [vignes] dont tous les champs sont entourés ; mais je n'aurois jamais cru que Mellas, venant du territoire Génois, et faisoient venir après lui de Gennes même le corp du Général Otto, fut aussi imbecil que de ne pas se joindre à ce Général pour aller ensemble et en forces attaquer l'ennemi ; au lieu de cela il laisse battre Otto, et après se laisse battre lui-même. Où est donc le génie de ce prétendu excellent état-major de l'armée Autrichienne qui, d'après Thugut, faisoit toutes les dispositions de Souvorow, que Thugut proclamait ignorant, ivrogne, et sans courage.

“ Ce poltron n'a pourtant jamais été attaqué de sa vie ; il a toujours prévenu l'attaque en attaquant lui-même, et n'a jamais cessé de harceler l'ennemi, jusqu'à ce qu'il ne l'ai détruit. Thugut a perdu l'Italie, et peut-être l'Europe.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 25. Harley Street.—“ J'aurois été inconsolable de partir de ce pays sans avoir le bonheur de faire ma cour à leurs Majestés, et les remercier pour les bontés dont elles ont daigné de m'honorer, si je n'avois l'espérance de revenir ici dans peu de tems. Je vous supplie pourtant de me faire la grâce de me mettre aux pieds de leurs Majestés, et d'ajouter celle de leurs exprimer que quoiqu'elles sont justement adorées par leurs bienheureux sujets, il n'y a aucun parmi ceux-ci qui leurs soit plus attaché que moi. Après cette grâce que je vous demande, je vous supplie de m'accorder une autre que je voulois vous demander depuis longtems ; c'est celle de me donner votre portrait.

“ Honnoré de votre amitié, ayant mérité votre confiance dont vous m'avez donné des preuves bien flatteuses, il me sera bien doux (que je sois ou ne sois plus dans les affaires) de posséder le portrait d'un ami aussi estimable, d'un ministre aussi éclairé que vertueux, et avec lequel j'ai eu le bonheur pendant près de huit ans de traiter les affaires avec une franchise et une confiance réciproque peu ou point usité autre part. J'ose me flater que vous ne me refuserez cette faveur qui m'est précieuse. Si vous pouvez me recevoir chez vous aujourd'hui, ou demain entre deux ou trois heures après midi, je serois bien aise d'avoir encor la satisfaction de passer un quart d'heure avec vous.”

LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, June 26. Stockholm.—“ Upon leaving Petersburg on Sunday, the 8th instant, I was in hopes soon after this to have paid my personal respects to your Lordship. My journey to Abo, and my passage from thence across the gulph of Finland were un-

commonly fortunate ; but not being able to procure a vessel at Abo sufficiently spacious, we were obliged to divide, and that on which my servants and carriages were embarked is still prevented reaching this port by a contrary wind which has prevailed since the first day of my arrival.

“ I need not say with what impatience I suffer this delay. My anxiety to reach England may be easily conceived, and will be a sure pledge of the expedition I shall use as soon as I am released from hence, which I am every moment expecting.”

“ I have taken upon myself to augment your Lordship’s collection of maps by some which have lately been published of part of this country, and which are well executed ; and I have requested the publisher, a Swedish gentleman of considerable fortune, the greatest part of which he devotes to the most patriotic purposes, to forward me the remainder as soon as the collection is complete.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, June 26. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis très reconnaissant pour l’amitié que vous avez de me promettre de me donner votre portrait, et de ce que vous désirez d’avoir le mien. Je désire depuis longtems de posséder le vôtre, c’est pourquoi je vous l’ai demandé ; quand au mien je me ferai un devoir de vous le donner, dès que je me trouverai dans des circonstances un peu plus tranquilles.

“ J’aurai la satisfaction de vous voir demain entre deux et trois heures après midi.

“ L’intérêt que je prens, et que je ne cesserai de prendre pour ce pays m’encourage à vous communiquer quelque réflexions sur l’état actuel des affaires. Il est probable que l’Autriche fera sa paix et que Bonaparte la lui accordera sur les bases de celle de Campoformio ; mais la paix du Continent ne restorera pas l’état de la France, et n’accompli pas la paix générale que le Premier Consul lui a promis, et qu’il doit lui procurer pour le meintient de sa propre puissance. Sans paix avec la Grande Brétagne la France, dans l’état actuel, restera toujours misérable, sans comerce et sans communication avec les colonies. Rouen, Nante, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Marsseille languissent et languiront dans le désespoir de la misère. Il n’y a pas de doute par conséquent que Bonaparte sera obligé de vous faire des nouvelles avances, et elles seront d’autant plus pressentes que vous aurez la dignité, dont je ne doute pas, de ne pas être les premiers à demander la paix. Vous traiterez alors avec autant de dignité que d’avantage : mais pour cela il est d’une nécessité indispensable de proroger au plus tôt possible le Parlement, et d’écarter avec soin, en attendant, toute motion que pourra et voudra faire certainement l’Oposition pour entamer une négociation avec la France ; car pour peu qu’on parle de paix dans l’une ou dans l’autre Chambre, Bonaparte ne fera plus d’avance, prendra tout un autre ton, la négociation un tout autre caractère, et vous perdrez en dignité et en avantage.

“ Avez-vous quelques nouvelles de ma malheureuse patrie ? Lord Whiteworth a-t-il quitté Petersbourg ? Casamajor a-t-il reçu votre mémoire sur les passeports des couriers, et l’a-t-il présenté ? ”

7 p.m.—“Connaissent l'amitié que vous avez pour moi, je m'empresse à vous annoncer mon bonheur. Je reçois dans ce moment par estafette tout ce que je pouvois désirer de plus heureux pour moi. J'ai mon congé absolu du service, et permission de vivre où je veux avec mes enfans.

“Je suis maintenant sûre de laisser mes oss dans ce bienheureux pays.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private and Secret.

1800, June 27. Cleveland Row.—“Having explained to you in my last letter the embarrassment in which we were even then placed by the unaccountable delay of the Austrian treaty, I need not use many words to enable you, who know so well the nature and course of Parliamentary business, to conceive how much those embarrassments are augmented by the late misfortunes in Italy. This letter will arrive too late to produce any effect; because if next week does not bring us the treaty which has been so often promised from three days to three days, it would I fear be much too sanguine for us to entertain any hope of receiving it after the account of the defeat and capitulation of Melas shall have reached Vienna. But it will doubtless operate as an additional motive to induce you, and as a fresh argument in your hands to enable you to persuade Thugut that, if he does not mean to play the game of France in this country, he must be contented to adopt a little more plain dealing towards us. We have had some discussion on the subject in the House of Lords to-day, and shall probably have more on Monday, and a considerable debate will probably take place in the House of Commons to-night.

“The people of this country have fortitude and public spirit to enable them to bear up even against such reverses as we have now experienced. But then they must see that they are treated with attention and confidence by those to whose aid they are called upon to contribute so largely.

“I hardly dare allow myself to hope that the Court of Vienna will feel what ought, most certainly, to be the conduct of a great country in such a crisis. If they negotiate, it is certainly an object for us, and it is perhaps still more an object for them, that they should do so with dignity and good faith; and should invite us to concur in the negotiation. If they do make such an invitation we cannot, most unquestionably, do any thing but accept it; but we should be very much embarrassed if the invitation were accompanied by a demand from France that we should, in the interval, join in the armistice, for that cannot turn to our advantage whatever the negotiation may do.” *Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800], June 27. Stowe.—“*Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*; but of all the possible dementations, surely none was ever more out of the ordinary course of things, than that of surrendering

without a stroke every point on which the Court of Vienna might be to lean, in case she did not agree to such terms as Bonaparte might wish to impose. This makes me imagine that the peace is in reality made; and that Mantua and Peschiera will be to form the new boundary to the Emperor; and yet it is difficult to imagine that Melas could be furnished with any discretionary powers applicable to so unlooked for an event. But if this story is true (and there seems no reason to doubt it) our peace must inevitably follow, and will (to my ideas) as inevitably sacrifice sooner or later the safety of this country, unless the internal state of France hereafter should break their power.

"If, in the mean time, it could be possible (by risking our last man, and by sacrificing largely in the attempt) to take or destroy Brest, I am persuaded that you will think it your duty to hazard, under these circumstances, what you would not ten days ago. No Frenchman will assist you to such an object, even if he clearly saw that it would replace Louis 18 on the throne; but I look to it as an *English* object; and if any personal sacrifice of mine could assist you, I am ready with one leg to add to the numbers of invaders, or I would lend myself to any other feasible exertion that could assist such an object. Including guards and dismounted dragoons, you ought to have a force applicable to such a move, from England and Ireland and included those gone to Bellisle, of above 40,000 men; and I know that those who have well considered the question think that such a force would *take* Brest, but certainly might *destroy* it. I write to you explicitly on this idea, because you have little time left to decide; and because I am clear that you will be obliged to make a peace which will eventually be ruinous, unless the hand of Providence that has smote us, interferes to save us."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, June 28. Vienna.—"I shall only add to a very long dispatch that the early ratification of the treaty may come to be important; and that, events having thrown the execution of the secret articles to a great distance, your Lordship will probably incline to withhold them altogether from the King of Sardinia, as well as every other power. Monsieur de Vallaise has told me that the King of Sardinia, observing the precarious state of those countries which are the subject of the proposals submitted to him, had thought there was nothing so pressing as to preclude him from submitting his objections to His Majesty. The thing will stand very well so, for the present.

"The Pope has landed at Pesaro and was on his journey to Rome. The Queen of Naples will be somewhat retarded by the late events; she must probably embark at Ancona for Trieste.

"On the grand question of the present moment, peace or war, I am afraid to give you any thing like a positive opinion, having in fact no solid ground on which to form my own. If I were to say what seems most probable it would be that nothing precipitate and disgraceful will be done, as in the case of Campo Formio; but

that, before the natural end of the campaign, an armistice may be made, during which negotiations may be set on foot that may terminate in an Austrian peace, in concert however with His Majesty. This I say seems at present perhaps the most *probable* issue, but I by no means *despair* of keeping them up to the war; and if Baron Thugut were sure of his *own ground*, I should have little doubt. The colour of the next event may probably decide the question."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, June 28. Ratisbonne.—"I am so very unwell, and so worn down by fatigue and vexation of different kinds, that I trust to your Lordship's goodness for making and receiving my excuses if I send the enclosed dispatches from Colonel Clinton and Mr. Frere without anything of my own. I only beg leave to make one single observation on the late unfortunate events and their consequences.

"The real strength of the House of Austria remaining untouched, it is impossible that any permanent or sincere peace can be made on this occasion between that power and France.

"I wish only to add that, as it seems impossible to deny that the Emperor, however he may have been mistaken in the manner of employing his force, had made preparations for this campaign, and incurred expences of such a nature as to leave no doubt of the sincerity of his intention to carry on the war with vigour, it seems of the greatest importance that as little as possible of dissatisfaction should be expressed, should the late unfortunate events oblige him to adopt measures which it will not be in his power strictly to justify."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800 [June]. Downing Street.—"The accompanying papers will show to you the unpleasant correspondence in which I have been involved, which, although ultimately His Majesty has given way, has lost already near a week. I don't mean to communicate them to the Cabinet, and I have sent for the Duke of York, that there may[be] no further tergiversation. I expect him from Swinley at two o'clock."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1800, July 1. Vienna.—"I trouble your Lordship with a line in this form because, I believe, the subject I am to mention cannot with propriety be treated in a dispatch.

"Baron Thugut, amongst the means by which the Emperor might derive assistance from His Majesty, has mentioned of late with some anxiety a more friendly conduct on the part of Hanover. He quoted the other day a proceeding of Baron d'Ompeda, Hanoverian minister at Ratisbonne, as an instance of the hostile

disposition of the Regency. He gave in an official proposal that, as the country did not seem secure from an attack, every thing might be removed from Ratisbonne that could draw the enemy thither. The Austrian magazines were the object he aimed at. Baron Thugut considers Baron d'Ompéda as personally ill-affected to the cause, and thinks his removal would be useful.

"But he has also suggested another service that might be rendered to the cause. It seems possible that a question may be put to the empire on the expediency of peace. It would be extremely the wish of the Emperor that Hanover should vote against peace; and that the influence of His Majesty should be exerted to the utmost to obstruct any proceedings favourable to a peace on such conditions as would leave to France her acquisitions on the empire. A more direct and active part in the war would no doubt be still more acceptable; but a friendly neutrality at least, and the particular service which I have just mentioned, would be extremely agreeable and encouraging to His Imperial Majesty."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 2. Harley Street.—"Je vous envoie sous le seau du secret, ce que j'ai reçu dans ce moment de Russie, par un homme qui vient d'arriver de Petersbourg, qu'il a quitté le vingt-neuf mai, vieux stil. Renvoyez-moi dès que vous aurez lu toutes ces pièces, et je vous conjure d'embrasser l'idée du Comte Panin, pour ne pas entretenir les deux pays dans une rupture inévitable en usant de représaille. On ne doit pas se fâcher contre des enfans, ou des gens en délire. Méprisez tout ceci, comme cela doit l'être, pour épargner aux deux nations des ambaras incalculables."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1800, July 2.—"J'allois vous écrire sur cette nouvelle extravagance quand j'ai reçu votre lettre avec ses incluses. Je ne vous les renvoie pas, désirant d'avoir votre permission de les montrer à M. Pitt, ce que je ne ferai qu'avec cette permission.

"Sans doute s'il est possible de trouver quelque moyen d'éviter les représailles, on doit y songer. Ce seroit trop absurde que de mettre plus de vingt millions d'hommes en guerre pour une pareille folie. Mais je crains bien que les mêmes impressions qui ont produit cette extravagance n'en mènent bientôt à de nouvelles et de moins supportables." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 2. Harley Street.—"Sûrement vous pouvez montrer à M. Pitt ce que je vous ai communiqué sous le seau du secret, car je vous regarde tous les deux comme identifié dans un même corps et âme; mais je vous prie de ne pas lui laisser les papiers, car il ne pourroit pas lui-même les retrouver un jour après, vu l'immensité de papiers qui lui arrivent de tout côté et encombre toute ses tables et bureaux. Je suis enchanté que vous jugiez comme le Comte

du Panin et moi sur cette affaire ; il seroit vraiment absurde si pour un *puntiglio* avec un extravagant vous alliez compromettre les intérêts de quatorze millions de vos compatriotes et de trente-deux des miens. Soyez persuader que quoique vous ferez vous serez blâmés. Si vous ferez ce que vous êtes obligé par votre bon sens de faire, c'est-à-dire de ne pas faire attention à notre extravagance, l'Oposition vous attaquera ; et si vous chassez, ou interdirez la cour à M. Lyzakewitz, toutes les villes manufacturières et de comerce se joindront à l'Oposition pour vous blamer, et vous citeront l'exemple de la Cour de Vienne et de Berlin, qui ont laissé, l'une à Vienne le chargé d'affaire de Russie quoique celui d'Autriche fut renvoyé de Petersbourg, et l'autre ne rapella pas de Russie Gruben son ministre, qui y est mort huit mois après que le Comte du Panin et toute sa mission quitterent Berlin. Si après cela on fait d'autres extravagances chez nous, vous serez complètement justifiés devant votre pays et le monde entier. Si vous avez du tems à me donner quand ce ne seroit que pour dix minute demain, jeudi, au soir, à quelque heures que ce soit je serai charmé de vous voir, et causer un peu sur toutes ces extravagances."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 3. Stowe.—"Indeed you could not have made me so happy by any communication as by that of the arrangement made for our dear Tom. I know how much he must have owed on this occasion to your kindness, and to the activity of your attentions in not losing a moment ; but I feel likewise (and I am glad to feel) the kindness and grace with which Mr. Pitt has lent himself to an arrangement so interesting to us all, and I wish you to tell him how sensible I am to it, and how much I thank him. I hope and trust (as you do) that it is intended that the grant shall stand on the same footing as it has done almost invariably ; for undoubtedly the essential part of this grace is the security to our dear Tom of his comforts and independence.

"I am sorry to be obliged to feel satisfied by your letter that Brest is out of the question. I am sure you would not abandon the idea if there was a chance of success with 60,000 men, for I think that number might be collected. I fear that the Austrian peace is too certain, for I hardly see the means to the Emperor of pursuing the war under such a check, even if his operations in Germany had been more fortunate. At the same time I should be anxious to send more force to the Mediterranean (if you give up all idea of operating in Normandy) for it is impossible not to recollect how much we lost of every sort from the want of 10,000 disposable troops in that quarter. How unlucky it was that Genoa had not been garrisoned by an English garrison ; and that Lord Keith, instead of quarrelling for 25,000*l.* ransom for the ships, had not found some adequate ground for blowing up the mole, and destroying (at least for maritime operations) a port which always has been used against us, and must, almost under any circumstances, be always hostile to us."

LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

1800, July 3. Cleveland Row.—“I take the liberty of troubling you with two letters which I have lately received, the one from an old college acquaintance whom I formerly recommended to the favour of Lord Buckingham, and afterwards of Lord Camden; and the other, in support of it, from General Nugent.

“I am well aware how much you must be in all probability hampered with engagements in the line of ecclesiastical patronage as in every other, after the struggle which you have so happily for both countries brought to a successful issue; but I could not decline troubling you with these few lines in Mr. Bisset’s favour, and adding that I should be truly gratified by his success in any reasonable and proper request.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

1800, July 3. Cleveland Row.—“Having within these few days received the enclosed, I can of course take no other step upon it than to send it to you, and to request to know what answer the Lord Lieutenant and you wish I should give to it. I guess from its contents that the Duke of Leinster supposes he shall lose the county if he attempts to contest it against a Government candidate, and has fallen upon this expedient to secure his family interest.

“The prospect of a general election being somewhat remote, it may, I conclude, be best to refer the decision of the line to be taken by Government on this subject to a period rather nearer to the event in question; but as there may be some circumstances of which I am unapprized, that might make a more specific answer desirable, I have judged it best to trouble you with this letter on the subject. I cannot conclude it without most heartily congratulating you on the final success of your labours, and on the great honour which is universally felt to result to you from them.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 3. Hollwood.—“I return you Woronzow’s letters and papers and am quite satisfied that we ought not, either in wisdom or dignity, to retaliate this act of extravagance, but that we should suffer the Russian *Chargé d’affaires* to remain here, without taking any formal notice of what has passed. I collected however from Hammond, that the true ground of what has given this offence was that Hailes, coming away without taking leave of the Court, of course made no visit of ceremony. If this be so, and the etiquette is correct or he supposed it to be so, might it not be worth while that this should be explained privately through Woronzow to Panin or Rastopsin, that they may turn it to account in any cooler moment, if such should ever come?”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, July 4th. Dropmore.—“We are still without any news of the *projet*, and by the last mail I have no letters from you.

"It now seems probable that Thugut, having accomplished his object of hanging up our negotiation till the result of the campaign could be judged of, will enable us to make some communication to Parliament which is at this moment sitting in July for no other purpose whatever. At all events I trust that it is impossible but that we must hear from you decidedly what we have to trust to, as soon as the news of the armistice shall arrive at Vienna. Till then I can write nothing to you in addition to my last letters, but for God's sake let him see clearly that we can be trifled with no longer.

"He may not understand enough of our Government to conceive it, but the fact is that the effect of these delays has been, and is at this moment, more, much more, prejudicial to the interests of Austria in this country than all their defeats and losses, were they twice as great as they have been.

"Certainly no man of ability ever played his game so ill as Thugut has done since the moment of their first successes last year." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 4. Downing Street.—"The treaty you see is come *all but signed*, and if the bad news has not ruined every thing in the 48 hours which were to follow, we may expect it *actually* signed by Sunday or Monday. Should that be the case, I think we must immediately send a message announcing the public articles, and asking the subsidy. Luckily our debate is put off till Wednesday. I wish much to see you as soon as possible to settle provisionally what is to be done, and particularly how we are to manage as to the secret articles, which are certainly most of them become of little consequence.

"Can you come to Wimbledon either to-morrow an hour before dinner, or any time in the course of Sunday? If you can, be so good to let me know at Hollwood by breakfast time to-morrow, and I will meet you. Dundas will have no company, and we shall have time for a quiet discussion in an evening walk.

Postscript.—"I assure you I feel on every account the most sincere pleasure in the arrangement proposed for your brother. I wish I could relieve you by the proposal about the Treasury, but I will explain to you what makes it at present impossible."

LORD GRENVILLE to ARTHUR PAGET.

Private.

1800, July 4. Dropmore.—"In addition to my public dispatches I have to thank you for your private letter of the 13th May. I much regret that Sir W. Hamilton should have been induced to create any delay in your official reception. You certainly judged quite right, under the peculiar circumstances, especially of the persons by whom he is surrounded, in not communicating to him your instructions, which he indeed ought to have known was a proposal wholly irregular and unjustifiable.

"Sir W[illiam] is not yet arrived here, but when he does come

I shall explain to him without reserve the utter impossibility of his going back to Naples in any public situation.

"From a letter of General Acton's which Circello lately shewed me, I guess that he has no real intention of retiring, but only means to hold that out as a threat in order to counteract the intrigues which are employed against him. I have no doubt from the picture you draw of the state of affairs there, that it is our interest he should remain.

"Long before this reaches you the result of the campaign in Italy will have been known at Palermo; and will, I doubt not, have been considered there as a reason perfectly decisive against the return to Naples before the actual signature of peace. It is lamentable to see how the avidity of the House of Austria on the one hand, and the jealousy of the Italian Courts on the other, have thrown the whole of Italy once more at the mercy of France, and have brought Europe almost back again to the state in which it was during the disgraceful negotiation at Rastadt." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 6. Harley Street.—"Je vous demande pardon de vous importuner sur nos affaires au quelles, quoique je ne puis plus prendre aucune part officielle, je ne puis pourtant ne pas prendre un intérêt très vif. Ne croyez-vous pas qu'après avoir reçu de Mylord Whiteworth la note étrange que le Comte Panin fu forcé de lui remettre, il est convenable que vous en doniez aussi une à M. de Lyzakewitz qui servi de réponse, et par laquelle, tout en consservent cette dignité qui convient à votre cour et à votre propre élévation d'âme qui vous distingue dans toutes les occasions, vous fassiez voir avec des expretions amicales combien on a été surpris et affligé de l'interprétation qu'on a donné chez nous à une chose tout à fait simple; que le Baron de Budberg devoit savoir que Mr. Heeles [Hailes] quitant Stokholm sans prendre congé de la Cour, ne devoit prendre congé et faire des visites de cérémonie à qui que ce soit, à moin que ce ne soit une visite particulière à quelqu'ami intime.

"Que jamais on ne s'est mêlé ici de prescrire aux ministres d'etiquette qu'ils doivent savoir, encor moins est on capable de prescrire à faire des inpolitesse, et que sans la note qu'on vient de recevoir, on n'auroit jamais connu cette affaire. Que Sa Majesté le Roi, ami constant et allié sincère de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, lui a donné assez de preuve de la noblesse de ses sentimens pour s'imaginer pour que Sa Majesté Impériale puisse croire qu'il a pu donner un ordre directe ou par son ministère à Mr. Heils, afin qu'il manque d'égard envers un ambassadeur d'un souverain pour lequel Sa Majesté a, et aura toujours, le sentiments d'amitié, et de confiance les plus sincères.

"Si vous sentez autant que moi la propriété de donner une note (car ne pas la donner du tout seroit la plus grande marque de mépris possible) vous l'arengerez mieux que moi, et vous saurez, suivent votre contume, la faire dans des termes francs, amicals, et acompagné de dignité."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 7-8.]—"J'ai passé au bureau pour essayer vous trouver. On m'a dit que vous ne veniez pas en ville aujourd'hui ; permettez que je vous demande un *appointment* pour le jour où vous y serez. Je suis content de ce que j'ai reçu de ma cour par le courier qui m'est arrivé, on y est inébranlable et bien décidé ; les revers affligent sans décourager. J'aurai à cette occasion plusieurs demandes officielles à vous faire, que vous trouverez trop justes pour n'y pas consentir. Au reste, M. Thugut me témoigne amitié et confiance sans bornes. On m'envoie les dernières instructions pour l'emprunt, et ordre de signer quand cela sera convenable. M. Müller, ci-devant secrétaire aux Pays-Bas, vient ici pour la partie financière ; il m'est recommandé, et subordonné. Cet homme est sage et sensé ; je suis bien aise d'être débarrassé des détails toujours crasseux chez nous, en affaire d'argent ; je l'avois demandé. Quand il sera convenu de ses prix, cette partie rentrera dans la convention pour l'emprunt, que je suis autorisé de signer d'abord, *sub spe rati*, et pour les conditions politiques, duquel j'ai eu toutes les informations requises."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 8. Stowe.—"If I have abused your confidence by enclosing your letter to Tom, as one that could not but add the greatest weight to the earnestness with which I urged him not to put by this opportunity of putting himself forward, I will balance it by a similar treachery towards him by enclosing to you his answer ; because it is possible that he may have explained himself more fully by letter than in personal communication to you, from that delicacy which he has always felt on points personal to himself ; and because this letter puts the proposition correctly on its proper footing, namely, the real wishes of Mr. Pitt, which, without any question of personal good-will, may, from many circumstances, be more or less disposed to an idea that, in all events, he will (naturally) be less anxious to promote than you are. There are various points of view in which I should imagine that Mr. Pitt might see great advantage from Tom's active and efficient co-operation ; and many events and contingencies in which he might want the talents and the means which Tom might hereafter bring with him into efficient office ; and I do not see that the confidential intercourse necessary for him in the immediate object of assisting Government in Parliament, will necessarily give umbrage to any thing of sufficient calibre to distress Mr. Pitt, or even to give him an uneasy thought. I cannot therefore but wish that whatever explanation (not of future views but of present wishes) may be necessary, may pass without loss of time through your hands between them. You who are individually to profit by any assistance that can be given to Government, super-added to the affection towards him that we share in common, cannot be more anxious that this moment should be the epoch of his public career than I am.

"Have you heard from Vienna since the book of Marengo has been opened to them ? Though I know not why I ask the question ;

for I am perfectly persuaded that, whatever they may feel, or whatever they may say either to England or to others, there will be peace; not because they ought to make one, but because that military system which we are endeavouring to teach to our army, exactly at the moment when the inefficiency of it has been shown to all Europe, must hang as a dead weight on all their councils. But unless the French newspapers are more grossly liars than usual, the Austrians seem as much pressed under Kräy as they have been under Melas; and if so, the peace will advance *au pas de charge*, as Berthier calls it, instead of the more phlegmatic Austrian step. Shall *we* too have peace? You have no secret yet to keep on that question, and therefore I put it to you; and say before hand, yes, for Bonaparte will find it his interest to offer such terms as you will not dare refuse, though you will be convinced (as I am) that it can only be an armed truce, ruinous to us in its consequences, unless Providence saves us by the internal quarrels of France two years hence, when she will calculate for her blow.

"I am very anxious that this session should not close, or rather that the new one should not open, without some permanent system for our militia and our yeomanry; both of them require much consideration. Have you turned your thoughts to it? Our internal tranquility must hereafter depend upon them, for our army is as little applicable to our civil, as they are to our military purposes.

"Our Bishop of Lincoln comes here this evening, and I shall endeavour to urge him to make his *concio ad clerum* to-morrow rather more peremptory upon points on which you and I agree rather more than we do with his Lordship. I am persuaded that much might be done with the existing powers, if the Right Reverend Bench were of a different composition; and your bill is, to my ideas, very defective in trusting too much to their Lordships' exertions, which you know before-hand they will not make."

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, July 10. Dublin.—"The answer suggested by your Lordship, namely postponing all decision till a period nearer to the general election, appears both to the Lord Lieutenant and me the most adviseable to be given to Lord Robert's letter under all the circumstances. There could not be a more desirable candidate than Lord Robert, unconnected with the stipulation which the Duke seems to connect with his support; but there is an additional difficulty in deciding at present what line Government ought to take, as Colonel Keatinge, one of the present members, has claims for attention, having given his assistance on the Union, in opposition to both parties in the county, and it is impossible at this distance of time to decide in what way the principles of duty and policy can best be combined.

"I beg your Lordship will accept my sincere thanks for the obliging manner in which you express yourself relative to the result of our political campaign. I hope it will prove as advantageous to the

empire as it must distinguish your Lordship and the Administration who conceived the measure, and gave it in charge to the Government of Ireland."

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, July 11. Phoenix Park.—"You judge perfectly right in supposing me to be deeply engaged in every department in this country, and I think I am rather more embarrassed in the ecclesiastical line than in any other.

"Mr. Bisset however has been a zealous and useful friend in our late arduous contest, and has claims to the attention of this Government, exclusive of the weight of your Lordship's interference in his favour. There has been very little patronage in the Church since I have been in Ireland, and there are some specific agreements which must take place of everything; but I hope that I shall have an opportunity, before I leave this country, of shewing my good disposition to Mr. Bisset, and my regard for your Lordship's recommendation."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 12. London.]—"The forest arrangements by your assistance appear to be in a very prosperous state, and the question respecting the salary seems to be in the fittest shape by being left entirely to Mr. Pitt's uninfluenced determination; all that I can wish upon the subject is that he should be informed upon the matter, but more than that would neither become you nor me, and I am too much gratified by all the circumstances which have attended the arrangement to look with any degree of anxiety into the *plus* or *minus* of it. I will willingly go with you to Dropmore to-morrow, and by sending on my curricule to Cranford Bridge we can go in your phaeton thither, and escape a dusty and hot road-ride, but I have no saddle-horse, as mine is in physick; if you have a spare one perhaps you can lend him me, or if not, I can hire one for my coachman to follow us at Cranford Bridge. Tell me at what time you dine and set out to-morrow, that I may take my measures accordingly.

"I shall have opportunities to talk to you of Fisher. My own mind would not hesitate a moment to take him for myself in a similar situation; you will easily understand that if I am to recommend him to you I may naturally feel more scrupulous towards you than I should to myself; yet in my conscience I believe that you cannot do better than to take him."

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, July 12. Constantinople.—"I do assure your Lordship I never undertook so painful a task as writing my letters No. 65 and 67. In regard to Sir S. Smith, besides long habits of private

friendship, lately increased by family connection, I know him to be as good-natured a man as breathes ; and amply equal in ability to the duties of his situation. But his vanity is so insatiable, that no consideration stands before it. Private letters and private conversation are ever exposed to misrepresentation. And any story however fabulous is admitted, when to serve a purpose. He is at this moment fighting the battle of the builder Spurring ; and, even to me, writes that the only reason for my wishing him at Constantinople was to fit out a pleasure boat for my own use, when he knows that Spurring was the occasion of my getting that vessel, though of no earthly use to me, in order that he might have an opportunity of shewing his work, at a time when the Porte would not employ him. Mr. Carlyle, who has been long on board the *Tigre*, speaks with infinite regret of Sir S. Smith, whose errors he sincerely laments. Sir Sydney's principal folly is his attachment to Frenchmen. French is the only language in use in his cabin, and his commissions whether to me, to the Turks, or to the French, are for the most part entrusted to Frenchmen ; a system highly uncomfortable to myself and to his countrymen, injurious to our general influence in Turkey, and attended with much mischief in regard to the enemy. For while these confidants do undoubtedly endeavour to make private friends amongst the enemy, the Republicans are highly indignant at seeing emigrants thus employed against them.

"I am sorry to see his naval conduct disapproved, for it appears that, since the commencement of the negotiation, and Buonaparte's quitting Egypt, Sir Sydney has not been six weeks in all off the enemy's ports. The Porte is, accordingly, angry at the loss not only of many transports, but also of four sloops of war, which his absence occasioned going into Alexandria after the renewal of hostilities. And I am afraid some very lucrative commercial speculations have been permitted with Alexandria, and much criticised on board the *Tigre*, as well as here. A Frenchman in particular of the name of *Lioron*, who is established at Neuchatel, is now here, having taken a very rich cargo of wine from Spain to Alexandria ; and, afterwards, brought a cargo from thence to Smyrna in virtue of a passport from Sir S. Smith.

"Mr. Smith, on the other hand, has entirely disappointed the hopes I had entertained from his professions to me on the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 7th of March. From that period I have been preparing the way for comfortable intercourse with him, in the way that I thought prudent, under the experience I had of him in business. And I had flattered myself that some progress was made. But still it was impossible for him to keep clear of intrigue ; going away privately to meet persons from Sir S. Smith ; concealing arrangements taken by him in public matters ; and encouraging absurdities in the factory, in order to make them appear independent, and inimical to me. I never did meet with an old politician to whom intrigue was equally habitual ; nor any one who managed it with so little regard to personal feelings. Mr. B. Pisani is at this moment really ill, owing to Mr. Smith's persecutions of him.

"I conclude with giving your Lordship my positive conviction that Mr. Smith is totally unfit for any situation where discretionary power is to be exercised; and that it is totally impossible for me to do justice to His Majesty's service while he remains here."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 13. Hollwood.—"If it were clear that next mail would either bring the simple ratification or the annulling the treaty, perhaps it might be as well to defer laying it before Parliament; though even on the latter supposition I should be sorry to have lost the opportunity of shewing that we remained as ready as ever to fulfil our part of the engagement. But it seems a very possible case that we may receive by next mail some new proposal for modifying the terms of the treaty, combining it with negotiation for peace, or adding to the subsidy; and we should then find it more difficult to lay the treaty than now, and yet there would be great embarrassment in suspending it. If you think I am right, you will probably be so good to order the copies to be made of the treaty; and it may save time, as you are so much nearer, if you prepare the messages and send them to the King. Most of our colleagues (whom I saw yesterday) seemed to agree to this opinion. If you have any doubt, it seems material that you should come to town. Perhaps to-morrow evening would give you an excuse for Frogmore. Dundas and I return from hence to-morrow."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 13. Downing Street.]—"I have just found your note, and can only say at once that room for doubt there is none in my mind, and that the line we have taken is the only one, in the main point, which I either could approve or even acquiesce in. I wish there were any refuge elsewhere for the person who differs from us. There is not, but although that makes obstinacy on our part more unpleasant, we must be obstinate (if necessary) where both his real interest and our own public duty are at stake. All the nasty words of the moment are of no consequence. I will take the first opportunity I can of letting him know in a proper manner what I think on this whole subject."

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, July 14. Hollwood.—"I cannot refrain from writing to you to say how much I feel all the kindness and delicacy of your conduct respecting Frere. What I heard yesterday from Pitt is, I am afraid, sufficient to shew that there can be but one remedy for the inconveniences and anxieties of which you complain. I will endeavour to prepare Frere for it; but I think I shall be able to do so with less shock to his mind, and with better hope of either deceiving him (which I should almost think fair) or persuading him to deceive himself as to the real origin of the proposals to be made

to him, if I defer saying anything till I see him, than if I were to risk writing upon such a subject. I shall be in town, probably on Friday, but certainly before the beginning of next week. I hope the delay will not be embarrassing to you in any way. I should like also, before I speak to him, to have had an opportunity of knowing from you a little more precisely the nature of the Denmark mission, and the comparative merits of it and Lisbon, which latter (were it possible that anything like the same colour, of *temporary employment*, could be given to it) would, I should think, be the more tempting of the two.

"I am confident, in whatever light the proposal strikes him, and whatever his decision may be upon it, he will feel precisely as I do the kind consideration which you have shewn for him throughout."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1800, July 15. Amberg.—"I am afraid your Lordship will find my dispatches very jejune and uninteresting, but I begin to find myself literally worn down with fatigue, and I have the seeds of fever hanging about me to a degree which makes me fear that, sooner or later, I must undergo a new ordeal. In this situation I tremble every hour lest I should be taken ill with a load of public business on my mind, and immense arrears of correspondence of every sort to settle. I know not to what your Lordship looks when you say, in one of your late and very kind private letters, that 'your mind has carved out for me work enough where I am, for some time to come.' But, if there is an intention to employ me in any negotiations that may take place here in consequence of the late events, I must again renew my earnest request that Flint may be appointed to assist me. Where much time must necessarily be employed in giving and receiving entertainments, and where still more must and ought to be spent in conversation and apparent amusements, some one on whom the mind can repose with thorough confidence should always be left at home to keep things right and steady, and to prevent an accumulation of business which always distracts the attention, and is injurious to the public service. An arrangement of this kind will be the more necessary for me as my present mission alone will, in its nature, furnish a continuation of business, and a large portion of arrears for many months to come, supposing, what I cannot bring myself to believe, that we should arrive speedily at a *tolerable* peace; and nothing short of that will, I trust, ever be accepted.

"These, and particularly the real state of my health, will, I trust, be found sufficient reasons to render my demand fair and reasonable, and such as may be holden out to anyone. But there are two other points of view in which I wish to present the thing to your Lordship alone. First, I have really need of somebody on whom I can rely with that confidence with which I trust your Lordship can now rely on me, and which can only be the case where there are, at the same time, sentiments of gratitude, of affection, and of respect, all

of which I have received the most convincing proof that this young man entertains for me, as I do most sincerely for your Lordship. I have need of such a person because, being naturally over-anxious in public business, I can trust no one who does not think and feel exactly as myself; and, if business is not done quickly and to my mind and in my own way by those who are under me, I am apt to be impatient and express myself too warmly. I am sorry to say that I observe this growing upon me, though, on the other hand, as I trust your Lordship will have done me the justice to have observed, no one is more patient or more forbearing when he has only enemies or reputed enemies to deal with. *Secondly*; to speak out fairly and with as much modesty as truth will permit, you really want a somebody to supply my place should anything happen to me. Now I will engage, if you will give me Flint, to make him *your Lordship's own man*, that is, that in the course of four or five years he shall be thoroughly fit for any business with which you may think proper to intrust him; and I will add that whatever he does he will do without noise or bustle. Remember that our *old* foreign Ministers are either really growing old, or are too far advanced to be employed in any but missions of the highest *rank*; and among the younger ones will your Lordship, with your hand upon your heart, say that there are more than two or three *at most* to whom any business of real delicacy and importance, or any real state-secret can be intrusted with safety? If it were not so, it is clear that I should not now be here.

"I feel but two objections to what I propose. The first, that he is really useful to the public where he is; the second, that it would be no easy matter to give him a situation really equal to that which he now enjoys. For I cannot think, all things considered, the place of *Chargé d'Affaires* or a foreign mission (the best he could possibly have) at all adequate to the sort of home-employment which he now holds, as long as he fills it with real credit. I could only therefore advise him to go abroad on the certainty that he would make his way in a line that is really open.

"Should your Lordship enter into my ideas on the subject, I have opened a way for you to give them effect without the thing's exciting too much attention in the first instance. I have written to the Duke of Portland to ask leave for Flint to accompany my son (who is coming out to me) and to remain with me about three or four weeks to put my papers in order, as well as my accounts, a favour which I am sure, in consideration of the state of my health, the Duke will readily grant. I shall mention by this post my real views to Flint, who has expressed the strongest wish to come to me since he knew of my illness last winter, and, if your Lordship should think proper, you may inform him of your intentions, or you may permit him to come out and afterwards write to me yourself on the subject, as your Lordship may judge most expedient.

"I will only add that my own ability to serve your Lordship with the same zeal and activity I have hitherto done may really depend on the attention I pay to my health, and the care I take of myself for these next six months to come. I assure your Lordship that I am just now in such a state that I send for my son for no

other reason but because I feel that it is a duty in me to look out for objects that will interest me enough to divert my mind from public business at my meals, and other hours of leisure.

"I shall soon write about the regiment of Roverea. In the meantime, unless the thing be gone too far, I think the medal will be too much, and may be reserved for another occasion. The loss has turned out less than was supposed by the return of several officers and men who had been supposed killed, and is reduced to three officers killed and about fourteen wounded. The proportion of killed and wounded is greater among the private men, as many of them fell into the hands of the enemy from fatigue and inanition.

"It is too late to say anything about R[amsay]. He has, besides, felt his neglect, and I am averse to letting him go for the reason that the old woman of Corinth prayed for the life of Dionysius. He has, besides, many good qualities with all his faults, and is now doing the Condé business exceedingly well.

"To shew your Lordship however how perfectly unmanageable these officers are (even Clinton has slipped through my fingers) I refer your Lordship to a dispatch from R[amsay] inclosing a printed copy of the Swiss Regulations which you will have received by Mr. Frendenrich. Your Lordship will scarcely believe that he has published them, using the King's name from one end to the other, notwithstanding the clear and positive injunctions he received from your Lordship to the contrary; though I told him distinctly that he ought not to do so, that by so doing he would really incur the King's displeasure, and did actually sign the manuscript as follows—*approuvé au nom de Sa Majesté Britannique*.—W. W., which he declined to publish.

"As the fact of the publication of the King's name appears in the book itself, transmitted by himself, it seems a fair opportunity for your Lordship to give a hint that these things ought not to be.

"Thugut will certainly play us some trick or other, and yet I am persuaded that we have nothing to do but to stand firmly by him. If we let go our hold, the whole machine falls to the ground, and the conquests of France are secured to her for ever. I presume you are now discussing the great question of negotiation or no negotiation; how you feel on that ground at home I of course can form no opinion; but, as far as continental reasons and the prospect of success in the campaign are to have their weight, I think I may safely say that all ought to depend on this one question, *shall we have the Archduke or no?* If we have him, we shall drive the enemy headlong over the Rhine in a week. If not, all the Emperors and Empresses in the world will make nothing of this army but what, I believe, our army in Ireland really was, though it was not very prudent in Sir Ralph Abercromby to say so, formidable only to its friends.

"Whatever Thugut may say, he is working at this moment at Bavaria with all his skill and cunning. I have a bad opinion of Montgélais in many points, but he has shewn himself throughout the whole of this business clear-sighted, firm, and steady. His game is a difficult one to play, and I think, upon the whole, that he manages it well. France can give nothing, and Austria wants

to take all that is left. He clings therefore to G[reat] B[ritain] to get what France cannot give, and to Prussia to prevent Austria taking what is left, but his views on Prussia go no further. He is bent on the exchange, but has not dared to mention it to Prussia. He gave Drake to-day one of the neatest reprimands I ever heard. I had long since obtained from him a secret promise that he would prevent the Elector from taking refuge at Anspach, by which he faithfully abides in spite of every opposition and temptation. D[rake] (who will be meddling, and to whom I had given an assurance, without stating my reasons, that the Elector would not go out of the Palatinate) though only presented the day before yesterday, began to lecture them all round, and, in particular, gave a long chapter on that subject to Montg  las, who, turning on his heel, said very coolly, *Monsieur, nous avons d'autres puissances    consulter    ce sujet, et d'autres int  r  ts    m  nager que ceux de la maison d'Autriche.*

"Remember what I say, that they will quarrel before the month is over, and that M[ontg  las] will lead the other into some scrape. I shall however give everything over into Drake's hands, as it would be neither fair nor practicable for me to correspond with the Minister but through him. I am only afraid of some mischief happening with the Court of Vienna, which has but at present a weak, and is about to have an artful Minister here. M[ontg  las] will not suffer our friend to do any harm to the connection between London and Munich; but is very likely either to set him by the ears with the Austrian Minister, or to give him false notions of things, and false impressions, with the intention of exposing his credulity afterwards."

Postscript.—"Your Lordship will see by the Swiss Regulations that the non-com[missioned] officers and privates who behave well are entitled to a medal, but, as in all other services, even in Russia, the medal must be of silver; this is an objection to giving medals to a whole regiment.

"I have written volumes to Lord Minto on the subject of the Arch-Duke, hitherto without effect, as his Lordship has not dared (and I think upon the whole he has been right, or rather I cannot say he has been wrong) as yet to bring the subject fairly forward. I have tried the thing with Lehrbach and Dietrichstein, but in vain."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 20. Wimbledon.—"I have this instant received a note from you dated the 16th. I suspect it has been travelling about in the circulation box. Sontag's papers were only intended for your and Lord Spencer's perusal, and I don't know how they got further. I had no other intention but that you might know all that I know.

"It is impossible to decide any thing relative to the disposal of our force without coming to a positive decision how far your operations are in any respect to be connected with or subservient to the operations on the Continent or of the Royalists. But the more immediate difficulty arises from the very contradictory opinions

entertained respecting Belle-Isle. Sir Edward Pellew and Colonel Maitland have never made a doubt either of landing or succeeding, and have never mentioned more than 10,000 men as requisite. Every person here and there who were at the last attack of that island insist that it would be madness to make the attempt with less than 20 or 25,000 men; and that we must lay our account with a very considerable loss of men and a long siege. Amidst this contradiction I thought it best to send for Maitland to come home and explain the grounds of his opinion; for, if it is to take a very large force, and to succeed only at a late season after any considerable loss of men, it alters the whole complexion of the business. I have formed my opinion as to other objects, but it is unnecessary to trouble you with details till this great preliminary is decided.

"I send you the perusal of the answer I sent to Lord Wellesley. I cannot think it possible he will come away abruptly; if he does I will never forgive myself for not carrying my own intentions into immediate execution.

"By the accounts received this morning from Duvergne at Jersey, it would appear that the French fleet will be obliged from absolute hunger to come out and fight. They have put their fleet on short allowance, and have nothing of any kind in their victualling stores."

Postscript.—"I was just going to seal this letter, when a messenger has arrived to inform me that Colonel Maitland is arrived a few hours ago. I shall of course see him early to-morrow morning. Every thing is completely ready for any operation."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 21. Stowe.—"A letter which I have received from Ireland tells me that the new peers are to be created *immediately*, and that chapter closed. In the first place I take it for granted that no Irish duke is to be created, for you was so kind as to say that you would apprise me of such an intention if it came within your knowledge; and I equally take it for granted that the King would be adverse from the idea of giving me an Irish dukedom; and therefore having asked the question, I am perfectly satisfied on that subject. But having fully considered the many points connected with the question of a creation of an Irish barony to my second son, I am very anxious to receive that favour, being able to make such arrangements of my property there as will enable him to support his situation, independent of an eventual succession to which this creation may lead. Under these circumstances I hope that the King may be induced to give me this object, which, as you know, was within my reach when Lord Nugent pressed it upon me in 1788; and which, in consequence of the Union, is now more eligible than it could have been then; and if the thing could be arranged, I wish that the title of Baroness Nugent of Carlanston (Co. Westmeath) should be given to my wife, with reversion to her second and every other younger son and their issue male, and further reversion to the second and every other younger son of Lord Temple. Be so good as to let me know (after seeing Mr. Pitt)

whether any difficulty occurs on this matter ; and if not, in what way application is to be made to the King for it ; as I really cannot go to Court, or stand five minutes together for a much more important object. If however (as I expected) no batch is to be baked till December 31st, or a few days before the Union-day, I should wish that nothing should be *yet* said about it.

"I do not make any apology for troubling you on this subject, for I know that you feel for me and mine all that I could wish, and that you will freely say all that could occur to your mind upon it, if you have any doubts upon it.

"I am most happy in the prospect of our week at Wotton. How seldom could I have looked to the hopes of uniting four of us under that loved roof, and at a moment when our dear Tom is, by your care, so independent and happy!"

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July.] Brighton.—"Mr. Frère a eu la bonté de me mander qu'enfin ce si longtems *wished-for* projet étoit arrivé de Vienne. Recevez-en mes complimens les plus sincères, et je me fais déjà à moi-même les vôtres par anticipations. Ce n'est pas le lendemain d'un arrangement semblable qu'on abandonne ses amis, d'ailleurs le ravitaillement de Mantoue et de Peschiera prouve qu'on s'attendoit à la possibilité d'un grand révers. On peut donc avoir été étonné, mais on n'a pas été surpris, et, selon toute apparence, nous tiendrons bon. Cela n'est que juste, il est d'ailleurs toujours de l'intérêt d'une grande puissance de montrer de la probité et de l'énergie. Je viendrai mardi à Londrès, d'où la santé de Madame de Starhemberg (toujours inquiétante) m'avait encore rappelé ici, et je tâcherai de vous trouver pour me réjouir avec vous de la certitude encore mieux fondée que nous aurons vraisemblablement alors de notre persévérance."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 23]. York Farm.—"J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer une lettre assez intéressante que j'ai reçu des Pays-Bas, et que vous serez bien aise de parcourir. De grâce, mandez moi si vous avez quelque nouvelle de Vienne. Férons-nous la guerre ou la paix?"

Enclosure :—

COUNT DE MOLDEGHEM to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, July 17. Brussels.—"Me voici de nouveau dans la galère par une suite de la prétendue modération du moment. Je viens d'obtenir la restitution de mon bien, séquestré depuis trois ans sur une délation. J'arrive de la frontière de l'ancienne France. C'est en courant les chemins, et en passant dans les villes fortes, que j'ai appris de nos propres officiers prisonniers, les malheurs de l'Italie à Marengo et ceux du Danube. J'en ai été consterné et affligé à un point extrême ; les malheurs actuels pourrais peut-être amener

à des dispositions pacifiques, le hasard m'a procuré la pièce secrète *ici jointe, que je vous garantis authentique*. Il seroit trop long et ennuyeux de vous dire comment je l'ai eût. Vous y verrez l'esprit de cette diabolique nation, comme sûrement votre esprit et vos talents, joins à votre état, vous metteroient sûrement dans le cas d'être consulté. Si il étoit question d'une paix, veuillé être favorable aux Belges, et soutenir les militaires et autres encore au service; et si la clause du traité de Campo Formio venois à être renouvelé qui donnerois trois ans à tous les Belges pour vendre et aliéner leurs biens, il faudroit nécessairement prévenir les taxes arbitraires, et autres déjà établis, que metteroient la nation envers ceux qui s'annonceroit pour quitter le pays. C'est pour cela, permetté moi de vous le dire, que si l'on exprimoit d'une manière claire que tous Belges, militaires, civiles, et autres, qui s'annonceroit en vertu de l'article du traité de paix pour quitter la République et vendre ses biens, partout où il seroit situé sur le territoire Français, ne seroit sujets à aucun droits de timbre et d'enregistrements actuellement établi, et ceux qui pourroit survenir dans l'espace de trois ans; que la simple annonce d'un Belge, vendant ses biens partout où ils pourroit s'en trouver sur le territoire de la République, vendant à un habitant français, ou à un étranger, ne seroit sujet à aucun droits d'enregistrements de transcriptions, et que les dites ventes auroit leurs effets sans être inquiété, une nombre de propriétaires, capitalistes, et n'aimant point le régime actuel, n'attendent que la paix pour transporter leurs fortunes dans les états de l'Empereur. Cela peut avoir des avantages pour un pays qui a souffert comme les pays héréditaires de voir arriver des individus et du numéraire, et de conserver des officiers moyennés à une puissance tout à fait militaire. Je ne sais si toutes ses réflexions vous paroîtront justes, mais il m'a parut, qu'en cas de paix, il est util de connoître d'avance les dispositions de son ennemi. Si cela est, en vous écrivant ceci, j'aurai rempli mon objet. Veuillé assurer la réception de cette lettre à la femme du dit Alexandre, actuellement de retour de Vienne à Munster."

Postscript.—"A exprimer aussi que les mêmes individus qui quitteroit la République, resteroit toujours dans leurs droits pour les biens qui pourroit leurs tomber, par succession ou autres événements."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, July 25. Dropmore.—"I did not fail to lay before His Majesty your Lordship's letter respecting the conduct of his Hanoverian government in the empire. It does not perhaps belong to me to give an opinion upon the subject, but I do not think any impartial man would advise the Elector of Hanover, at this moment, to throw away the protection of Prussia, in the hopes of support from Austria. It is a thing to be lamented that such should be the local circumstances of the King's German dominions; but I do not see how his British ministry can hold out to him either means of security, or hope of indemnity, to Hanover, if that country should provoke the hostility of France

by following the course of British politics. Nor do I think we should much consult our own British interests, by exposing so large a part of the north of Germany to inevitable plunder and anarchy.

"I cannot persuade myself that M. Thugut will, as he has thrown out to you, send the Emperor to the army and go himself to Italy. At all events we could have nothing to gain by precipitating our measures. We do not expect that Austria should do any thing to make the terms of our peace better; we may be well content if the mode of joint negotiation, which on other accounts we prefer, does not, in this respect, operate to our disadvantage. I see therefore no inconvenience in suffering Thugut to do whatever he wishes to do by such a journey, if he does undertake it; reserving only to ourselves the means and the right of concurring in the more formal and public negotiation, or of beating out our own terms of peace, in our own way. The appearance and name of treating jointly is much more than the real aid we can derive in negotiation from our ally." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, July 25. Alt-Oettingen.—"I have nothing to add to my public dispatches but the repetition of my persuasion that you cannot commit this army at present without risking its utter destruction; and, on the other hand that, with a proper choice of generals, and a Commander-in-Chief enjoying its confidence, it would beat the French army to pieces, even with Buonaparte at its head, and the ghost of Desaix to boot to direct and encourage it in battle.

"I am inclined to believe that the quantity of tobacco used by the Austrian officers, which is really enormous, has, at the last, an effect upon the understanding. This at least is certain, that all their old officers are stupid, and become so some years before old age alone would have that effect upon them.

"A young Swiss officer who was engaged for the first time at Möeskirch, being asked what he saw as he went into action, said that he remembered nothing but four of the fattest gentlemen he ever saw together in his life, and that somebody told him they were Austrian Generals; but, as they were keeping out of the reach of the fire, smoking their pipes and looking on whilst the soldiers went forward to be shot, that he was persuaded they were *bourgeois* of Möeskirch who came to see the action.

"This is so true a description of some of those fat-headed gentry, that I could not give your Lordship a better if I were to write a page.

"Lord Minto, M. Thugut, and Count Dietrichstein are all pressing me to go and reside for some time at least at Munich. I should say Amberg, but your Lordship, who knows Drake, will, I am sure, agree with me that the thing is not possible. I do not like anybody to meddle with my business, because I never meet with anybody that does it exactly in my way. Drake's fingers are always itching to be writing, and his tongue to be talking, and, as it will be often

impossible for me to make him understand exactly what I would be at, I am sure that, nine times in ten, he would undo the very thing that I was doing, as was the case when I was at Amberg on more than one occasion; and then, as I was very near doing on those occasions, I shall grow angry, and shall say something unpleasant, and then God knows what will happen. The truth is that I am very apt to be out of temper with my own friends, though no one is more patient when he has to deal with the King's enemies. I shall therefore content myself with corresponding with Montg  las constantly, and going there only on any emergency when my presence may be really necessary.

"I am really persuaded that the Elector has a personal confidence in me, as well as his Minister; and it is equally important for me to preserve that confidence, and to avoid giving any offence to Drake, which I must inevitably do, if I did my duty.

"By the bye, there is poor Walrond, who has really done his duty extremely well in these latter times, left quite to himself, though obliged to remain here to collect and give up the papers, part of which are gone to Vienna with my effects, the rest are at Munich. His salary ceases, and I believe he has not a penny of his own. If that cannot be continued a little time longer, it would be a great act of kindness in your Lordship to give him a line of approbation of his past conduct, through Frere. Such a testimony would really be a treasure to him, would be only what is due, and would cost nothing to anybody. I think he has been now eleven years in the service, and is very much liked and esteemed by everybody at Munich, though the strongest prejudices existed against him at first on account of his having been attached to Paget.

"The accounts from Vienna received to-night are warlike. It will not do, believe me, it will not do without a total change, and you will only witness a renewal of the scenes of Alvinzi and of Wurmser.

"I shall write all about Cond  ans, Swiss Subsidiary Corps, and the rest before I leave this place.

"I do not think the Elector would resist a letter written in Buonaparte's own hand, and presented by Prussia, but, fortunately, the Consul seems to be violently angry with his Electoral Highness.

"I am persuaded that you must come to secularization at last; though I would fight against it to the last drop of blood if I could procure safe instruments to fight with. Something tells me, however, that we shall have no serious negotiations; and I am for the first time really afraid of continental war."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 25. Downing Street.—"I was just stepping into my carriage this morning at six o'clock to go to Swinley to settle with the Duke of York the detail of our plan, but I was stopped by the note from the King, of which the enclosed is a copy. Most of you being of opinion that we ought not to send any force out of Europe (the reverse of which is my decided opinion), and the King and those in whose councils he confides being of opinion that our force is to

go nowhere (which is the plain English of all this), my situation is become too ridiculous to be longer submitted to. I have wrote to the King that, upon the receipt of his note, I had come to town to lay it before His Majesty's servants, but, as I could not collect them together, I must postpone it to a future opportunity."

Enclosure :—

GEORGE III. to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, July 25. Windsor.—“ On returning from Swinley I have found Mr. Secretary Dundas's note, forwarding a minute of Cabinet; not having before heard of an expedition against Ferrol, nor on what grounds of supposed success it is to be undertaken, nor what force will remain in this country after sending so large a force out of it, I cannot give any answer till I have received the data on which to form an opinion.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, July 25. Altona.—“ We arrived here on Wednesday night, and are obliged to remain to recruit Elizabeth's strength. I trust we shall be able to set forward on Sunday, and I expect that we shall reach Berlin on the fourth day. My official correspondence will not begin till then, but I must inform you that I met here *Garret Byrne of Ballymanus in the county of Wicklow*, one of the most guilty, most mischievous, and most powerful of the Irish rebels. He claimed acquaintance with me as his neighbour, and I find he is extremely desirous of being allowed immediately to return to England. The pretence is private business, but his Irish estate may be managed as well by directions from Hamburgh as from England, and if what I heard at Yarmouth is true, that important papers have been seized there upon an agent of the Irish rebels endeavouring to get to France, it may be advisable to put the Duke of Portland's Office upon its guard against the application which will certainly be made for Mr. Byrne for a passport. The part of the country where his property and influence lies was by the last account in a state of great fermentation, and there is a gang of deserters and other rebels in arms there who have been under the command of Dwyer, a man belonging to Byrne.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 25. Downing Street.]—“ Pray see if you can apply the necessary corrections to the Lord Lieutenant's speech. It certainly wants many, but none occur to me that I am satisfied with.

“ I will try to-morrow to send you a draft for our own, unless you have already been at work upon it.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, July 26.] Hollwood.—“ I have endeavoured to put down a draft for the speech; and have told Carthew to send you a copy immediately. Have the goodness to return it with your corrections

to-morrow if possible, that I may send it to the King and have it circulated in the course of Sunday and Monday."

Postscript.—"By a note from Dundas, I find the King chooses to hesitate about the expedition now proposed. He cannot mean to persist, but it is really provoking to find a disposition equally to object to all means of making peace or making war."

MEMOIR ON THE STATE OF RUSSIA, BY LORD WHITWORTH.

1800, July.—"After the example of some of my predecessors, who, in times less important than the present, have felt it their duty at the expiration of their missions to collect under one point of view whatever might throw light on the events which have taken place in the country where they have resided, or on the characters of those who may be supposed to have an influence on public affairs, I venture to submit the following observations which, however deficient they may be in point of composition, are founded on experience impartially stated, and may at least answer the purpose of affording some insight into the character of the present Sovereign of Russia.

"In order to do this it may be necessary to look back to the latter period of the life of the late Empress, who, though she finished her reign without giving effect to the salutary measures which she had in contemplation, cannot be supposed to have differed in opinion with her contemporaries on those important points which have within these last few years convulsed the whole system of European politics.

"In justification of her backwardness to take a part in the war, it must be remembered that she had many serious domestic considerations which demanded her most anxious attention. Her accurate knowledge of the character of her immediate successor would certainly have made her desirous of interrupting the regular course of inheritance, had not the times in which she lived, when so large a body of men, and some perhaps even of her own subjects, were tinctured with revolutionary doctrines, deterred her from taking those steps which, under other circumstances, she possibly would have pursued; she felt that the moment was too dangerous to risk the dispute of a title to an absolute monarchy; and it is more than probable that the state of the newly acquired provinces in Poland was a point which had a considerable influence on her political conduct. The effects resulting from an apprehension of the uncertain tenure of those conquests have been felt to a very fatal degree by the combined Powers who, in the early period of the Revolution, were so nearly re-establishing the regular government in France. The same dread of revolt in Poland which divided the attention of those Powers, and hastened their retreat from the French frontier, deterred likewise the Empress of Russia from stepping forward, until a combination of circumstances rendered the progress of the French arms a more dangerous evil than any which possibly could result to the Russian empire from active operations.

"The death of the Empress suspended however for a considerable time the bringing into effect the resolution which was adopted, and

for the execution of which the necessary measures had been taken. The critical moment and sudden nature of her death occasioned an awful interruption to the new scene of politics on which Russia had so lately determined to enter, and called forth the present Sovereign of that country from almost exile and confinement to absolute power, and from his frivolous and favourite pursuit of drilling a garrison to wield the sceptre of this gigantic empire.

"In attempting to form a judgment of the character of this Sovereign, and to obtain a correct opinion of his actions, it is but just to call to mind the character of the father from whom he is descended, and to conclude that he inherited naturally many of those weaknesses which obscure his reign. If many defects were inherent in his nature, his education had but little tendency to correct them. Regarded by his mother with the jealous eye of an usurper, many of the most essential avenues which lead to judgment and experience were to him most circumspectly closed; and more pains were taken to encourage weaknesses, which by captivating his mind might at least tranquilise his indignation, than to sow those seeds which should blossom in the august character of a Sovereign.

"The sudden reverse of fortune which raised him to the throne took place in a moment when he was totally unprepared to meet the elevation which awaited him. If any apprehension existed lest the intentions of his mother (which her past conduct had given ample reason to suspect), should be brought into execution, the events of a few days were sufficient to appease every anxiety. The most perfect submission prevailed throughout every department of the Government, and those who attentively considered the effects of the change which had taken place, calculated certainly with very great precaution on the future events of the new reign, but regarded the regular succession which had taken place so quietly and the probability of the continuance of internal tranquility as likely to consolidate the general strength of the empire.

"A sentiment of indignation against the usurpation of his mother, cloaked under the mask of respect to the memory of an injured father, was displayed in the very first moments that the Emperor felt his power. The same scrupulous devotion to the minutia of military detail, and the same attachment to the Prussian dress, and to the Prussian discipline which had prevailed throughout the short and insignificant reign of Peter the Third, soon betrayed itself in the character of his son. The first idea that occurred to the monarch on whom the vast concerns of the Russian empire had devolved, was to change the dress of the military, and to reduce it to the standard of the old Holstein uniform. These little and inconsistent peculiarities were soon found to be united with a great degree of superstition and enthusiasm. An idea occurred to him, and was actually put in execution, not less extraordinary to the eye of an indifferent spectator than repugnant to the ancient practice and fundamental law of the empire. The body of Peter the Third, whose coronation had never taken place, was ordered to be removed a considerable distance, and deposited in the chapel destined only for those sovereigns of Russia who have actually

worn the Imperial crown. To obviate the impression so extraordinary a proceeding was likely to produce on the public mind, and which at that moment was an object too serious to be disregarded, the Emperor conceived the romantic idea of crowning the coffin; thus betraying the first symptoms of a character which has since proved the source of infinite public inconvenience as well as of domestic misfortunes.

"The love of military parade in the meantime displayed itself to an excess, the effects of which are scarcely to be credited.

"The town of St. Petersburg, situated at a very great distance from any frontier, inaccessible to surprise either by sea or land, was at once converted into a garrison town, piquets were planted in every street, the whole circumference of the city enclosed by pallisades, and the gates guarded to prevent any communication from without, with as much rigour as if an enemy had been at hand. The military establishment became in a very short time from one of the easiest, the most severe in Europe; the strictest conformity was required to frivolous and scarcely intelligible orders, and officers of the highest rank and most distinguished merit were either dismissed the service with infamy for the most accidental omission, or subjected to the direction of officers whom, in time of actual danger, they would with reluctance have commanded. The civil departments of government were exposed to the same irregularities; so much inconsistency prevailed in every transaction, so little respect was paid to past merit or solid worth, that terror and disgust universally prevailed, and even the individuals who had been elevated in a moment of favour, could neither contemplate with composure the proceedings of their Sovereign, or divest themselves of the apprehension of a sudden reverse.

"There were however considerations which, if the various details of the Emperor's conduct had not given too much reason to suspect his sincerity, might in some degree have reconciled a thinking mind to the violent and absolute system he had adopted.

"It must be remembered that Russia is an absolute monarchy, and that the will of the sovereign constitutes the law of the land. It is necessary therefore that the throne should be entrenched with all the pomp of power, and all the terror of authority. The late Empress had, it must be allowed, betrayed in the early part of her reign too mild a disposition, too anxious a desire to extend to her subjects privileges which at present they are only capable of abusing. The error was soon detected by Catherine, nor were its effects at that time much felt. However, within the last few years of her life (such was the natural lenity and benevolence of that sovereign) she relaxed much from that distant conduct which the secure possession of her throne now rendered unnecessary. She suffered her subjects to approach her without restraint, and formed for herself a society where the dignity of the sovereign was absorbed in the kindness of the friend. The effect resulting from this condescension was certainly a diminution of that terror with which the Russian has been accustomed to venerate the seat of power. Catherine it is true lost nothing, but the throne of Russia was rendered less formidable.

“ It was but natural that the well-wishers to regular Government should cherish such ideas as might serve in any degree to justify or palliate the conduct of the Emperor. His conversation, although strongly tinged by singularity, gave evident proofs that, notwithstanding much reason existed to doubt solidity of judgment, this monarch was not deficient in a certain line of talent, of which quickness of conception or imagination formed the principal feature. His political conduct augmented this gleam of hope. Although the troops promised by the late Empress were, in the first moments of his reign, withheld, yet many considerations presented themselves which might seem to justify in some degree the necessity of such a determination. It was easy to conceive that a monarch scarcely seated on a throne, the accession to which had long been regarded as doubtful, would not at once engage in a laborious foreign contest, against principles which at such a time it might be extremely dangerous to agitate, or venture to deprive the empire of any part of its natural strength while it might be necessary for the maintenance of its internal tranquility. Every attention was however paid to the supporters of the good cause, although no immediate efforts were made in its behalf. The closest connection was cultivated with Great Britain, the strongest attachment demonstrated to its interests; and these demonstrations were accompanied by the renewal of a treaty of commerce on terms highly advantageous to the British nation, as well as by an augmentation of the auxiliary fleet; and the most confidential intercourse between the two Governments continued to exist.

“ A distant prospect of the empire of Russia might give, during the continuance of this period, a view sufficiently favourable of the principles and political conduct of that Government; and the hearty co-operation of the Emperor in expressing just indignation against the bad faith of the House of Austria was calculated to strengthen every hope. The expectations which must have been excited in the eyes of Europe by the measures hitherto pursued were still more fully confirmed by the accession of the Emperor to the general coalition, and the engagements entered into to undertake active operations in the campaign of 1799. It was certainly the interest of every foreign power, and the first duty of every Minister devoted to the service of the good cause, to profit by these favourable dispositions, and take advantage of the zeal which seemed to animate this Cabinet. But it was impossible for those who were anywise conversant with the details of administration, to avoid lamenting the inconsistency, the violence, and the ungovernable precipitation which, prevailing in many essential points of the Government, but too strongly marked the rash imbecility of the supreme power in Russia.

“ In this state of affairs a serious loss accrued to the Russian empire and to the good cause from the death of Prince Besborodko. His long experience, his solidity, and vast capacity for business rendered him almost of indispensable utility, and enabled him to retain a great influence over the department of affairs entrusted to his care. His opinion was ever listened to with respect, and he possessed an authority sufficient on many occasions to counteract

the violent inconsistencies which, originating in the petulance of the Sovereign, but too often threatened the derangement of the whole political machine. Useful to the State, because in a certain degree respected by the Monarch, the weight of his influence gave a solidity to the councils of the Emperor, which since the unfortunate loss of that statesman they have never been able to regain.

"If however the general conduct of the Emperor had hitherto been consistent with the views of the combined Powers, and the strict observance of the principles of morality had rendered him venerable in the eyes of his subjects, a sudden infringement of them now almost extinguished the last rays of respectability which glimmered round the throne. An attachment to a lady who had attracted his attention during his coronation at Moscow was openly avowed; and although platonic affection was asserted to be the basis of this partiality, still the Court of Petersburg had been too long accustomed to scenes of licentiousness to consider such eccentric principles as likely to limit the progress of the Emperor's attachment. Connected with the same romantic system a circumstance occurred which exposed the weakness of this monarch but too publicly to the eyes of Europe. His wild and inconstant spirit at length burst forth, and proclaimed itself aloud in the enthusiastic protection he extended to the Institution of the Order of Malta. The insignia of this Order were received by the Sovereign of Russia with a degree of childish admiration; affairs of the utmost importance were suspended to give time for the arrangement of the most puerile ceremonies; and not only the great system of politics, but the dearest and most immediate concerns of this empire dwindled into objects of small importance when in competition with the empty concerns connected with the barren rock of Malta.

"The capture of this island by the French gave rise to a new system of measures still more deeply tainted with enthusiasm and inconsistency. The Bailli de Litta whose influence and mission at the Court of Petersburg were thus threatened with dissolution, made no scruple for the promotion of his personal interests and particular views to take an unjustifiable advantage of the weakness which the Emperor of Russia betrayed, by a fatal insinuation of measures likely to flatter his vanity; in the first instance by proclaiming himself sovereign of an island which, if it ever became him to possess, was now in the actual possession of his enemies; and in the next instance to sanction by his consent to the marriage of the Bailli de Litta, a violation of the fundamental laws of that very institution which he stood pledged to protect.

"A part of the Crown lands of Russia were now disposed in Commanderies and distributed amongst those who shared the favour of the Sovereign without regard to any of the qualifications, either of birth, or service, or even of celibacy which the Order requires. The light in which such an usurpation of dominion might be regarded by the different States of Europe, received not a moment's attention, and in spite of every political connection which unites Russia to the great system of European politics, three instances were exhibited to the astonishment of every one accustomed to consider the political intercourse of nations, of

foreign ministers being banished the country, under every accumulated circumstance of inconvenience and disgrace, because their Courts had ventured to express the sentiments of surprise which such novel measures had excited, and their reluctance to acknowledge a sovereignty in so unprecedented and unjustifiable a manner assumed.

“The same weakness and violence which mark every detail of this transaction have unfortunately since betrayed themselves in every point of the administration of this empire. Not even the sacred claim of personal misfortune has been so far respected by the Sovereign as to give consistency to his actions. Neither the unfortunate monarch who, bereft of his own dominions, was compelled to end his days in the capital of his oppressor, or the prince whose high birth and active services, demanding every consideration, had entered into the service of Russia, have been exempted from the most cruel and unprovoked insults. And if the legal sovereign of France has escaped many an open provocation, more perhaps is owing to his fortunate or prudent absence from the Imperial residence, than to any sense of feeling for his melancholy fate.

“The trade of the country has been subjected to the most sudden and violent interruption, urged in many instances by those who, having access to the Sovereign, have taken advantage of his precipitation and incapacity to forward their private interests, and oppressed individuals unfortunately have not the possibility of appealing to an impartial and competent judge. Thus whole towns and provinces are ruined, their magistrates and governors perpetually changed, the regular channels of commerce interrupted, and confidence hourly diminishes. The discontents which these violent proceedings, both in the military and civil departments, have given rise to, cannot but have reached the ears of those whose power depends on the existence of the Sovereign; and they by alarming his mind, while they close every avenue through which more wholesome influences might enter, have annihilated almost every shadow of personal security. Timid, through a dread of those violent excesses, in which every sentiment but that of vengeance against the object of wrath is extinguished, they serve but to encourage the fatal inconsistencies which it is their most solemn duty to counteract. Thus the metropolis has in the most cruel manner been emptied of many of its most valuable inhabitants, every society where mere ordinary comforts could be found is scattered into banishment, and the common enjoyments of a civilised people are become matters of suspicion and indignation. A dread (fundamentally indeed but too justifiable) of Jacobinical principles has lately led to a prohibition of every source of information to be derived from foreign publications; and perhaps the best illustration of the present state of Russia, is a reference to the state of France while under the tyranny of Robespierre. Blood it is true has not yet streamed in this empire, but personal property, upon the most unwarrantable pretext has been seized, every other act of tyranny has been witnessed, and even the most sacred rights violated.

“If these circumstances collectively prove the little reliance to be

placed on a Sovereign thus deficient in every quality that can inspire confidence, and surrounded by a weak and timid administration, there are other considerations which make disgust against the monarch subside into pity for the man. It is impossible to witness the absurd and fanciful regulations which are daily enforced, to observe the particular forms of dress, the shape of a hat, become objects of Imperial edicts; to contemplate the various whims which in the course of a morning's ride become the subject of orders from the monarch, and without adding to the security of the throne, efface its dignity, and destroy all personal comfort, without concluding that it has pleased Providence to confer the sceptre of power on one incapable of the lowest office in which the exertion of sound reason is required. The public voice confirms this necessary conclusion, and those who approach nearest to the sources of information, feel most sensibly the painful conviction.

"Such is, upon a fair consideration, the opinion that must be formed of the present Sovereign of Russia. The confidential servant actually at the head of affairs, without abilities or knowledge to inspire confidence in himself, is the humble instrument of the caprice of his Sovereign, and if he be not distinguished by any enmity to those who are the firmest supporters of the good cause, he is characterized by no remarkable trait. He is enabled to retain his influence chiefly by cultivating the friendship and protection of a man who has raised himself from the capacity of a menial servant to one of the highest offices of state, and who by a long acquaintance with the weakness of the monarch has learnt to acquire that kind of influence over him to which beings thus unfortunate are ever found to be subject.

"Amidst all the regret which these afflicting truths excite, it is however a sincere consolation to every friend to the cause of Europe and humanity to find at least one man who, high in office and in dignity, has maintained so firm an adherence to the good cause, and exhibited, under circumstances of the utmost personal danger, such friendship to its faithful supporters, as no terms can express, nor any length of time efface from the memory. Although influence and even confidence is at present denied him, his efforts to render service are incessant, and although Providence has seen fit for a time to shake the foundation on which the true interest of Russia must rest, yet every hope may be entertained that, supported by such a statesman, the fabric may yet be preserved from crumbling into ruin.

"When these considerations are impressed upon the mind, the nature of the late secession from the Coalition, and of the incalculable indignities offered to the Government of Great Britain, can alone be fairly estimated. To violate the sacred law of nations, the rights of hospitality, and the most solemn ties which can make public transactions matter of public confidence, is perhaps more than a mere national insult; it is an injury to the general welfare of society, and considered under this point of view, a nation great and just as Great Britain must rear her head with indignation. But the ties which bind the British nation to the Russian empire are formed by nature and inviolable. England has reason to regret with

Russia that the Imperial sceptre should be thus inconsistently wielded, but it is the *Sovereign* of Russia alone who divides the empires.

"In every class of people oppression has at length excited disgust; the neglect with which Souvorow has been treated, who, whatever may have been his intrinsic merit, was deservedly a popular character, and the insult offered to his memory by almost denying him military honours, has tended greatly to increase it; whilst a numerous and harmless body of men, to the amount of several hundred, has been roused to indignation by an order for their indiscriminate expulsion from the metropolis, in the course of a few hours.

"The final issue it is almost impossible to calculate. Constant suspicion has excited such vigilance throughout every department of the police, that any combination of parties to produce a change in the government is almost to be considered as impossible. The eyes of all are fixed with inexpressible anxiety on the immediate successor to the throne, from whose general character of liberality and benignity the most sanguine hopes are justly entertained.

"But these sources of public approbation have drawn upon all his actions the most scrupulous suspicion, and as far as human foresight can at this moment penetrate, the despair of an enraged individual seems the most probable means to terminate the present scene of oppression, than any more systematic combination of measures to restore the throne of Russia to its dignity and importance."

RUPTURE OF THE ALLIANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA.

MEMORANDA BY LORD WHITWORTH.

1800 [July]. No. 1.—"On the 26th of May Count Panin gave me the most positive assurances that in the confection or rather the renewal of the treaty between this Court and that of Berlin, and which waited only the arrival of the new Prussian Minister for signature, there was nothing in the smallest degree inimical to the interests of Great Britain either individually or as connected with the cause. That the measures of precaution taken against the House of Austria are not of a nature to cramp its efforts against France, and are not to take effect till after the conclusion of the war. That the object in view is to keep the House of Austria within bounds, but not to refuse it a fair compensation for the losses it has, or may sustain.

"The idea is that Austria may, at the general winding up, be in the same relative state of power as she was before the breaking out of the war. For the rest Count Panin assured me that he could not take upon himself the exclusive merit of this forbearance, although the business had been chiefly entrusted to him, since the Court of Berlin had of itself suggested the importance of avoiding every measure which could at this moment divert the attention of Austria from the prosecution of the war."

No. 2.—"According to the best information I have been able to procure, the Emperor's present animosity is to be ascribed: first, to the failure of the expedition against Holland, and to the mis-

representations of those who have availed themselves of that circumstance to excite his jealousy and mistrust.

"Secondly : To the idea of our good understanding with the Court of Vienna, at a moment when he conceives himself insulted by it ; and to an exaggerated apprehension of our giving in to all its views of ambition and aggrandisement.

"Thirdly : To the refusal of his Orders of Knighthood.

"Fourthly : To a latent jealousy of our successes by sea ; and this with all the other pretexts inflamed by the insinuations of French emissaries, and by the intrigues and constant lamentations of the Swedes and Danes, but more especially of the former.

"Fifthly : To the new policy of Count Rastopsin, totally in the hands of a party in Russia who style themselves economists, and whose great object is to separate Russia from the Coalition, not perhaps from any partiality towards France, but from a dislike to the war. In order to this, he has availed himself of his access to the Emperor, and rendered all those suspicious who on former occasions may have influenced his opinion. This he has, as I have reason to believe, succeeded in doing by the most unjustifiable means. He is Chief Director of the Post, and the organ of all communication from thence to the Emperor. Opportunities therefore cannot have been wanting, and it is well known that if they had, he would not have scrupled to supply the defect.

"And lastly : To a natural versatility of character, which bids defiance to every kind of calculation, and which, if it is in the present instance unfavourable to our interests, may, when we least expect it, bring the Emperor round to his former opinions, and to a sincere, though tardy desire to repair the mischief of which he may have been made the instrument."

LORD SPENCER. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 1. Admiralty.—"We have ordered some bomb-vessels and gun-boats to accompany the Baltic squadron ; and it had before occurred to me that it would be desirable to employ Popham. I have therefore appointed him to the command of one of the fifty-gun ships, which fortunately I had the means of doing.

"I wish to suggest for your consideration whether it might not be as well to give some secret hint to our cruisers not to be very particular in looking out for neutral convoys for the present ; this may be done without compromising our principle, and it may be as well to run as little chance as we can of involving ourselves more deeply in this imbroglio at least for this year."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 2. Wycombe.—"I shall go from hence to my brother's quarters near Bagshot, and could come to you on Wednesday to dinner, and go to town with you on Thursday. If I hear nothing from you to alter this plan in the interval, you may expect me in good time on Wednesday. Meanwhile, I return you the Admiralty letters, and quite agree with you that things should be

left as much as possible in *statu quo*, avoiding to say decidedly whether they are prisoners of war or not, while the negotiation is pending. But if any circumstance of health or convenience requires either officers or men being put on shore, the latter might, I imagine, be put in some place of proper custody, and the latter [former ?] allowed to land on *parole* of delivering themselves up when called upon, to await our decision.

"I think the power you have given to Whitworth highly advisable, and more likely than any thing else to avoid present extremities, and by gaining time, in substance to carry our point. I doubt about the other power you propose, which, in fact, would give our demand that summary and peremptory form which, in the result of our discussion on the subject, we inclined to think it wiser to avoid. This however, I suppose, may wait till we meet. I rather understand that you are gone either to Stowe or Wotton; I have therefore ordered the messenger to call at Dropmore and take his directions from thence."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 8. Harley Street.—"Mon ami Monsieur Lyzakewitz, qui craint de vous incomoder, et qui d'ailleurs a ordre (entre nous) de demander le payement des subsside qui sont due à la Russie sans entrer dans aucune discution, mais de répondre au plus vite si c'est oui ou non qu'il recevra ici pour réponce, m'a prié de le tirer d'ambaras, car la maison Hop [Hope] le tourmente pour savoir s'ils auront ou non cet argent, parce qu'on leurs a assigné cette somme pour le payement des intérêts de notre dette d'état. Je vous conjure de prier Monsieur Pitt de faire donner une réponce claire et prompte à M. de Lyzakewitz sur cette affaire, car il craint que cela ne lui attire des désagréments perssonel, et que cela ne servit de motif pour brouiller encor plus les deux pays.

"Excusez, je vous supplie, cette importunité en faveure du motif qui m'engage à vous incomoder."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD.

1800, August 11. Dropmore.—"I have to acknowledge two letters from you, the one of the 23rd July, and the other of the 2nd of this month, enclosing a letter from the Duke of Richmond to you. They relate principally to the Lisbon mission, to which I should have had sincere pleasure in recommending you, if there were not particular circumstances which, as I thought, made it necessary for me to propose to his Majesty the different arrangement which is now on the point of taking place.

"If I could, in this instance, have complied with your wishes I can with truth assure you that the doing so would have been a sincere gratification to me; and that pleasure would certainly have been increased by my knowledge of the anxious interest which the Duke of Richmond has always expressed to me, in what relates to your advancement in the foreign line.

"It would be quite unnecessary that he should trouble himself

to make a formal application on the subject. I well know his wishes respecting it, and it certainly would always be a pleasure to me to comply with them." *Copy.*

AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.

J. EDWARDS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 12. Pall Mall.—“ Having, through your protection, obtained His Majesty’s licence to go to France to enquire after goods belonging to me which have been laying there before the war, I conceive it my duty to relate to your Lordship the situation and disposition which I had an opportunity of observing in that country, as well as the conversations I had with several political characters in it.

“ The whole country through which I passed from Calais to Paris is in the highest state of culture, and the crops most abundant. The population appeared to me equal to what I had formerly seen it. The manners of the people peaceable and obliging ; the reverse of a disgusting pertness which I witnessed when I was last in France about 1791.

“ At every place where I stopped, an anxious enquiry for peace ; not the least expression of reproach to England or its Government anywhere, except that in all the Public Offices there is a printed paper ‘ *Guerre au Gouvernement Anglais ;* ’ and at a post-house near Amiens, a number of women sitting together in the street, one of them cried out, ‘ *Ah, Monsieur Anglais, vous nous avez donné assez de misère. Donnez-nous la paix.* ’

“ The posts are exactly as before the war, and the roads nearly as good. I saw no marks of republicanism or revolution at any town through which we passed except the demolition of churches, and the destruction of Chantilly ; nor any military except what might be expected to support civil order in times of peace.

“ At Paris instead of the devastation, disorder, and misery which I expected, the houses and streets in every quarter are in a most perfect state of decency and order. I saw very few private carriages, but they numbered more than 2,000 hackney coaches and cabriolets for hire. Though some of the monuments of art have been destroyed, *all the best* have been preserved, from St. Denis, the Sorbonne, the Mazarine, and every other public building, so as to make a school of French art in sculpture from its infancy ; all classed under their different ages, and placed with great taste in the college and gardens of the *Petits Augustins*. I saw them and have got an octavo volume of their description.

“ They have not been less careful of the monuments of art plundered from Italy, Germany, and other countries. The statues of the Apollo, Laocoon, and every other I saw have arrived as perfect as I saw them at Rome, except Michael Angelo’s part of the Laocoon which was not applied. The pictures of the Italian, French, Dutch, and Flemish Schools are about half placed in the uppermost story of the Louvre. The whole length of the room is 1,400 feet ; only half of it is yet filled, but I saw piles of pictures

for the rest (chiefly of the Italian school) not yet hung. Numbers of artists were employed in cleaning and repairing them. Those which are hung up seem to have arrived in perfect condition.

"The *Bibliothèque Royale* is preparing to be enlarged more than double, and the piles of books from foreign countries, as well as their own, ready to fill it.

"It is remarkable that the late Queen's Library is preserved entire, and kept separate from all the rest.

"Every one of the *royal palaces* have been preserved, and in higher condition of repair than formerly. The Thuilleries is ornamented in front with fine Roman statues of senators and a number of modern statues of heroes are ordered at £1,000 sterling each—among which is our Duke of Marlborough.

"No gold coin has been struck during the whole Revolution, and the *louis d'ors* as well as *écus* of the ancient monarchy always permitted. At the few places where I saw the cap of liberty, it seems to have been ironically formed as a fool's cap. The trees of liberty are almost everywhere suffered to decay, or purposely destroyed. The great statue of Liberty at the Champs Elysées was pulled down a few days after I arrived at Paris.

"About 16 days ago an order was issued that the *Décadé* was only binding to the Offices of State, that others were at liberty to use it on Sunday as their day of rest. The Sunday following I saw more than half of the shops shut, and the people going in parties to the country as formerly. I went into *Sainte Sulpice* on 2 or 3 Sundays, and saw mass performed as usual, but only attended by the lowest people. When I was in society where religion was mentioned, the infidelity of Voltaire seemed to have pervaded everywhere, so as to have made all but the lowest class a nation of Deists. Bonaparte appears to wish to restore Christianity. He ordered *Te Deum* to be performed in Notre Dame for the victory of Marengo, and has permitted the emigrant priests to return on condition they would live under the laws of the French Government. In the music at the *église des Invalides*, July 14, were passages addressed to the Supreme Being expressed as decently as anything of its kind. The country people in general are attached to the Christian sabbath, and have always observed it as much as they durst during the Revolution.

"The National cockade is still worn by the men, but diminished to the size of a half-crown, and even that but half exposed above the hat-band. I did not choose to wear it, and was never interrupted for the want of it except once in passing a *corps de garde*, *faubourg St. Germain*. The soldier stopped me and took me into the guard room for not having it. I asked to see the officer, and told him I did not conceive myself entitled to wear it, being an Englishman. He said '*Oh, c'est différent*,' and very politely showed me to the door. I was never addressed as *citoyen* but by the lowest people, and seldom heard it among the natives; in good company it is *Monsieur* as formerly.

"In various companies I have spoken of the return of monarchy in the restoration of some branch of the family, and never found any repugnance from Frenchmen to the admission of it as the only

hope of stability. I saw nothing of democracy anywhere among Frenchmen, nor heard the word mentioned by them but with horror. On expressing my surprise at this change to some who had been most violent formerly, they seemed ashamed and lamented their error; they said it was impossible for an Englishman to conceive what they had suffered, and how they had been made to expiate their folly; that till Bonaparte had taken the reins of government, they had been in the hands of villains who knew nothing of regular government; that everything was disorganised and trusted to the effects of chance; that they even sought to increase the disorder to fill their own pockets more securely; that every fibre of government was relaxed and no confidence in anyone. All classes speak of Bonaparte with enthusiasm for having given them for 6 months past such security and calm as they have never before had since the change of government. They seem convinced that he only seeks their happiness. He appears to shun every kind of popular applause and ostentation, he is secret and decisive in all his operations, he consults but never argues, and nothing can be more absolute. He is a strong fatalist, and has inspired the nation with the idea that he is to give them peace; though he has preserved most of the old officers of government he has almost universally checked them by rivalry or jealousy.

"Fouchet[Fouché] (Minister of the Police at Paris) and Talleyrand are said to hate each other; indeed I had an instance of it in the refusal of the former to countersign Talleyrand's passport to me. Again the *prefet* of the police at Boulogne is the friend of Talleyrand and enemy of Fouchet; on this account Fouchet has placed Mengaud, one of his friends, as Commissary of Police at Calais.

"Bonaparte has made a disposition for a succession in case of his death by means of the Conservatory Senate; 'tis supposed Carnot would supply his place, and Barthélemy one of the other Consuls, but this was considered by the people I conversed with as provisionary till complete order could be restored.

"I breakfasted twice with Monsieur Le Blond, the intimate friend of Sièyes. I asked him if it was possible Bonaparte could have an idea of establishing himself in the supreme authority. He treated the question with ridicule; that it was impossible any other than *some one of the ancient family* could be placed at the head. He said '*Vous Anglais nous méprisez assez hautement, mais vous ne nous méprisez pas la dixième de ce que nous méritons.*' He said this when three others besides myself were at his table. In one of his apartments was hung up a very fine picture of the *Queen*, and on the other side a portrait of Mary of Médicis by Rubens.

"I was three times with Monsieur Talleyrand; he hoped I had found Paris in a different state from what it was represented with us, and begged that I would report it so.

"I was introduced to the Consul Le Brun, who is a very amiable man and good scholar; he was the principal instrument of the Chancellor Maupeou, and was placed by the late King in the Finance. At the time of terror he retired to his estates which are considerable, and was recalled from that situation by Bonaparte to fill the place

of 3rd Consul. He hoped I had a pleasant journey and found France in a different state from what it was represented in England. I told him I had come over in a merchant's ship laden with coffee, cotton and sugar; that I was happy to find the Governments on each side winked at an indirect commerce; that I hoped it was the prelude to more regular communications and peace; that we wanted their corn as much as our colonial produce was sought for by them. He said it has not been owing to France but your own Government that corn has not been supplied to England. We have twice been on the point of permitting a free exportation, but it has been prevented by the discovery of intrigues which do no honour to your Government. I answered it was very likely that the persons to whom he alluded gave themselves out as employed by Government, but without the least title to it; that I was totally unconnected with Government, but in such a situation as to communicate with every class; that knowing the character of my country I was persuaded they had nothing to do with anything dishonourable; that England was too powerful a nation to stoop to such means, and indeed the few English I had seen were more likely to be such as had quitted their country from discontent, and expressed with little regard to truth whatever related to England; that we might have agents for information, but I could not believe the extravagancies imputed to them. He said he did not allude to Englishmen but to Swiss. Blond asked him if the armistice with the Emperor was confirmed. He said it was, and now they had only to employ their strength against England *if she persisted in continuing the war*. This being directed to me, I said England had made ample provision for the war however long it was necessary, but desired peace, and was ready to make it whenever it could be done upon grounds of security and liberality. He asked me what I meant. I told him as an individual unconnected with any party I spoke the sentiments of the nation in saying England never could make peace with France but when it was separated from Belgium; that we were a nation so deeply engaged in commerce it was thought of importance by every individual that our trade should not be so endangered at the breaking out of a future war as by having such an extent of coast in their possession; that no Ministry could make a peace otherwise; that England did not demand for itself, but that it should belong to some power capable of supporting it against France, and would be ready to give its full equivalent in the surrender of some part of those possessions we had taken from them; that having lost nothing we had nothing to ask for ourselves, we were in the fullest exercise of commerce and protection but lamented the miseries of war, and were too just to treat for peace but upon the most honourable terms. He said if we insisted upon Belgium it was in fact to say we would have war; that we showed it both by spurning the offers of Bonaparte, and by the invectives we were continually throwing out against him. I begged leave to observe that at the time Bonaparte sent his message he had but just overturned in the most violent manner what had before been the Government; that he must allow it was *then* as natural to suppose Bonaparte might be as suddenly overturned; that as to the

invectives he complained of, they were as abundantly employed by Opposition to Ministers and Ministers to Opposition, and had no other personal meaning than as applied to the subject in debate; that it was impossible for men of great abilities not to respect each other in reality, whatever language policy might dictate to influence the people; that in the answer of our Government they looked forward to a moment when they could treat with France securely; that they did not pretend to dictate a government, but to advise what seemed most likely to bring about stability. Here he did not appear to wish I should go on, but said with great cordiality, '*Vous êtes un véritable Anglais; dites à votre Gouvernement ce que vous voyez de l'ordre, de la régularité, de la bienséance partout.*'

"I was several times with Monsieur Caillard, *Garde des Archives* (formerly minister at the Hague and at Berlin). I said as much to him on the subject of Belgium which he did not seem surprised at. He desired me to present his compliments to Lord Malmesbury and Lord St. Helens.

"I saw Barthélemy several times, and once dined with him. He expressed his disappointment at the reception he met with in England, but without bitterness; and said he had met with such kindness formerly as must always endear England to him. He wished to know the sentiments of the country for war or peace. I explained to him the readiness with which every loan was raised, the immense resource for the continuance of the war by the produce of the income tax, and the strongest proof of our prosperity by the gradual rise of the funds for the last two years; but that we all wished for peace when it could be had without danger. He wished me to explain what I conceived that to be. I said the restoration of Flanders, and a regularity of succession at the head of government. He made no observations upon it.

"I was introduced to the Chevalier Flicurieux of the Marine. He showed me a fine maritime atlas of the Baltic which was nearly ready, and, he said, would be of great use to English sailors. I told him we should receive it with great pleasure. He said though the nations were at war individuals were made to respect each other. I forget whether it was he or Monsieur Lescallier who told me they were meditating an increase of their navy by a ship from every department. I made a bow and answered that they were very generous. *Comment?* I said by saving us the trouble of building, unless they could build British sailors also. He exclaimed *diable!* and dropped the subject."

LORD GRENVILLE TO J. H. FRERE.

"1800, August 13. Cleveland Row.—"As I am not quite sure whether I have in our conversations on the subject explained to you as fully and satisfactorily as I should wish the grounds on which I have proposed to you to undertake the mission to Portugal; and as, at all events, I am desirous of doing this in a more precise and distinct manner than in a conversation which, where it relates to personal arrangements, is always more or less delicate and embarrassing, I have determined to state the circumstances to you in this form.

"You have indeed yourself seen from the dispatches received from Lisbon since Mr. Walpole's departure, how pressing and urgent it is that a person should be sent there, not only entitled generally as the King's representative to respect and attention from that Court, but one who from his station here may evidently have been chosen as being in the full and intimate confidence of Government, and able, on every occasion that may arise, to speak with perfect knowledge of our sentiments, and to impress the Portuguese Government with the persuasion that he does so speak.

"There certainly never was a more interesting crisis than that to which matters are now brought at Lisbon, nor could there be a fairer field for the exercise of your talents, not merely in carrying on the intercourse between the two Courts, for that will be the least of your functions, but in giving to them that energy and vigour which can be derived only from the presence and the exertions of a British minister, and of one known to be in the entire confidence of his Court.

"Your delicacy about Mr. Arbuthnot could not stand in the way of such important objects. It ought not to do so even if there were more foundation for it. But there are many circumstances which would have made it impossible that he could succeed from the situation of Consul General to that of minister at Lisbon, even if the occasion had not been such as to call for the nomination of a person connected, as you have been, with the interior councils of this Government.

"I entertain no doubt that your success in this mission will answer the expectations and warmest wishes of your friends, among whom I trust you will do me the justice to reckon me." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 14. Vienna.—"I am sorry to acquaint you that Captain Proby has been taken prisoner carrying dispatches to Lord Keith. He sailed from Venice on the 18th July in a small vessel for Ancona; and was forced by stress of weather into Casenatico. Mr. Consul Watson writes that the municipality sent by express for a party of French troops stationed at some little distance, who took him. It does not appear whether he had an opportunity of destroying his dispatches or not. Captain Proby, in a letter to Lord W. Bentinck, does not mention the circumstance of the municipality's sending for the French; but he says he had stipulated with the vessel on which he embarked that it should on no account put into any port except Ancona; and that the sailors took advantage of his being asleep to run into Casenatico. He was carried to Milan, from whence he writes on the 1st August that he was well treated, and that he was to go in a few days into the interior of France."

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, August 14. Vienna.—"I must beg your indulgence if I delay for a few days more the account which I promised of some

of the particulars attending the negotiation of the treaty which I have signed. I wish also by next opportunity to say a few words on the treaty of Amberg signed by Mr. Wickham, especially as the tone of Baron Thugut is now much softened on that subject ; "and I can already say that he withdraws all opposition to the measure, reserving only the Emperor's protest against *territorial indemnity* and *secularization*, and claiming the support of His Majesty in opposing those measures, when any occasion arises.

"I hope Baron Thugut will say no more concerning Hanover, and that it will not be necessary to give him any answer on that subject. He did not at all look to the Elector of Hanover's taking part in the war against France, or renouncing the support of Prussia ; but he expressed a wish that Hanover should act as friendly a part towards the Emperor and the cause as is consistent with the neutrality prescribed by Prussia. However, as Baron Thugut has himself changed his mind since he desired me to transmit his wishes on this subject, it is probable that we shall hear no more of it.

"I cannot help apprehending that when your Lordship wrote your dispatch No. 32, you was not entirely without suspicion that, in proposing to follow Baron Thugut to Italy, I might have some view of obtruding myself into the negotiation of the peace. If I am mistaken, which is extremely possible, in this apprehension, I must throw myself on your indulgence if a strong feeling on that particular point induces me to give you the trouble of reading a few lines more, and makes me perhaps more alive to a suspicion of that subject than I ought, or than I should be on many others. In the first place I am not conscious, in the whole course of my public life, of having taken or advised a measure with a personal view. When I have views which I think reasonable, and justified by what I consider as my fair pretensions, I take the liberty of stating them openly and clearly ; as it is natural to do while I am acting with a candid and friendly principal and Government. Your lordship will think that I have given a tolerably clear evidence of this practice in another letter which this messenger carries. Your Lordship may remember that I followed the same course on this very subject of peace, when I took the liberty of expressing the satisfaction I should have in being employed in the pacification of France and of Europe, if the events of the war should enable us to transact that business with the King of France. But I added that I had no ambition to treat with the Republican government of France. I continue very firmly in the same sentiments ; and even if the presence of Baron Thugut at the congress, and the habits of transacting business with him, had happened to suggest me to your Lordship's mind as a natural colleague to any minister whom His Majesty may happen to name, the repugnance which I feel to any avowal of this destructive and insolent government, and to the men who administer it, now as much as ever must have induced me to decline a service for which I feel myself, on these accounts, extremely unfit. To say the truth, I have felt an inclination to say as much ever since the battle of Marengo opened the prospect of negotiations. But I was restrained by the fear of incurring the ridicule of refusing what was not offered ; and by the

certainly that your Lordship was already apprized of these sentiments. Your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse me if I have seized, or as you may think, sought or imagined this opportunity for doing so. At the same time, I profess no opinion adverse to the measure of peace, relying on the wisdom and spirit of government in which I place an unfeigned confidence on this question ; and I feel nothing which should render the part allotted to me at Vienna irksome to me ; especially if, as I still cherish the hope, we may yet weather the peace, or only pass quickly through it to a more vigorous and more successful exertion in the same cause."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1800, August 15. Crems-Munster, near Wells, Upper Austria.—
"I had determined for the sake of tranquility to have taken no public notice of my two colonels, but Clinton's application to your Lordship and Ramsay's official declaration left me no choice.

"I am not surprised at Clinton's demand, nor am I by any means without blame with respect to him, as I certainly have scolded him in terms to which he was not accustomed, and which I had better not have used, nor should I have used to anyone whose real good I had not most sincerely at heart ; though, after all, my language on the occasion was by no means so strong as what the gentleman really deserved.

"The truth is, for there are secret histories everywhere, that he was foolish enough to bring out with him his new married wife, *a daughter of Lord Elcho's*, and still more foolish to hope and believe that she would remain quiet wherever he placed her. Instead of which she was always wanting to be running nearer and nearer to head-quarters ; writing to her husband every day ; expecting answers as regularly ; miserable if she did not receive them ; tormenting all the Austrian commissaries and commanders of depôts to death for news and for opportunities to write to her husband, till she became their laughing stock ; and spreading the alarm in the rear of the army by communicating the intelligence she received from the colonel, which was always authentic, always bad, and often exaggerated in the hope of engaging her to remain further from the reach of danger.

"I am persuaded with all this, that she is really a very good sort of woman, but I was foolish enough and boyish enough to attempt to give counsels to the husband respecting the wife, which he, with equal lack of wisdom, disclosed to the lady. *Hinc illæ iræ*, and thus it is that I have brought the whole old house of Charteris on my back.

"I will leave your Lordship to judge how much Clinton must be altered from the Clinton of last year when I tell you that he was absent from the army and with his wife on three of the most important events of the campaign, the battle of the 5th June, the battle of Neuburg, and the armistice ; and that his letter giving an account of the affairs of Memmingen and Biberach, though dated from Ulm, was written from his wife's chamber at Donauwerth.

"I had one other serious quarrel with Clinton, namely his writing

long detailed accounts of everything to Lord Mulgrave and to the Horse Guards, whilst to your Lordship and to me he scarcely gave a line. On this subject, after having remonstrated with him as a friend, I left him written instructions when I went to Vienna which he has frequently and openly disobeyed. To conclude, having now had my full lesson, and bought my experience very dear, and having no one to blame but myself, I hope I shall be wiser in future and keep out of all such scrapes, and that, by the time I shall have attained the age of forty, your Lordship will find me to be really a safe and steady servant of the public.

"To turn to another and more important subject, I am confident there is something more than has been disclosed now going forward between Berlin and Vienna, and that a general partition scheme is on the *tapis*; though I think, in the present state of things, that Berlin will be brought with difficulty to accede to it, and that fear of France and perhaps of Russia, and mistrust of M. Thugut, will prevent its being carried forward. But should I be mistaken in this latter conjecture, then *gare à nous*, for I am persuaded that the great Continental Powers will then look to nothing so much as the engaging England and France in a maritime war *ad internecionem*. I am confident that this is one of the projects now revolving in M. Thugut's brains, though I do not think it by any means the favourite one.

"This however we may be assured of, that he is deserving of no confidence on our parts but *there* where we see evidently that his interests, his political views and speculations, or his passions and resentments lead him. And if his projects on France and on Italy fail, he will no doubt turn quickly somewhere else; and where else can he look with any hope but to a system of partition, at which if we are suffered to look at all before the thing be done, it will only be in the hope of preventing us from joining with France to oppose it.

"Your Lordship will perhaps wonder at my even starting such an idea as this last; but, such is the present state of things, that I consider an alliance between England and France as much within possibility now as it was in the year 1708, when appearances were to the full as strong against it.

"If your Lordship has a mind to know in a few words my whole present system of politics fairly and sincerely avowed, it is *this*, and I am persuaded it will not be very far from your own.

"*First, and far above all.* Continuation of the continental war, if it can be continued with a fair hope of only balanced success.

Secondly. Joint negotiation, and a partition scheme carried on during the negotiation in full and fair communication with Great Britain, provided it be of a nature to engage Prussia and Russia in the war, or at least to enable Austria to resume hostilities with increased power and means, and with Prussia and Russia really interested in her success.

"*Thirdly.* Separate peace for England, and France engaged in a continental war to prevent partition.

"*Fourthly.* Separate peace for the Continent, and a maritime war between Great Britain and France.

"*Last and worse of all.* A general peace, leaving France in possession of her conquests, and of her supremacy upon the Continent, and the rest of the Continental Powers where they now are.

"I should place the third system in the second place (being convinced that it is attainable) were it not too perilous to be hazarded but in a case of great necessity and immediate danger; for, every partition scheme is so decidedly hostile to our manufactures and to the sale of our colonial productions, as well as to our free communication with the Continent and our influence there, that it is never to be resorted to but as the lesser of two evils; and, in this case, as the only mode of preventing France from remaining without a Continental enemy, and perhaps with the means in her hands of shaking to the foundation our manufactures and colonies themselves.

"If, however, the Continental Powers should attempt to play us foul in any such scheme, I would most unquestionably resort to the third plan, for I cannot help considering the keeping France engaged in a Continental war as the only *certain* means of safety for us, and as a measure to be brought about by us almost *per fas et nefas*, if the pushing another from the plank to save oneself from drowning can in any case be called nefarious.

"I am not without due confidence in the result of a maritime war, yet, it must be remembered that any real failure at sea, or any important blow struck against our colonies, might now have such serious consequences as to force an ignominious peace, which must necessarily be followed by the ruin of our dear country, and of its dearer government and constitution.

"Still, however, I think this chance to be risked rather than the evils of a general peace with France, leaving her in possession of all her conquests and domineering over the Continent, and the continental powers confined to their present means of resistance. And I think a peace with France on the third system more feasible and more likely to be formed after a few months of maritime war and continental peace than before. For, partitions and other schemes of aggrandizement will certainly enter into the heads of Continental Powers, of a nature to give jealousy to France, and to make a maritime peace desirable for her; and to leave the option to England whether she will take part with the Continent or no according to the views, means, and intermediate conduct of the Continental Powers. These are all the glimpses I have been able to catch through the thick gloom which surrounds us. And I communicate them to your Lordship, not in the presumption of their throwing any new light on your Lordship's speculations but, as mere *reveries*, to which however I have given as much of attention and consideration as became a mere speculator.

"If there is anything in what is said of Russia having shewn symptoms of hostility to Austria, we may rely on Thugut himself being the first to make separate peace on any terms, far from opposing such a system in others. I have good reason to hope that Drake will agree much better with Montg  las than I had at first believed. If so, everything will do well in that quarter."

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, August 16. Palermo.—“I am infinitely obliged by your Lordship’s obliging private letter of the 4th July. I have already acquainted your Lordship of the particular aversion which the Queen of Naples took to me, and of the means she has employed of shewing her resentment. Under these circumstances I am unwilling to say anything in a public dispatch which may appear prejudicial to Her Sicilian Majesty.

“You cannot conceive the dissatisfaction which the whole of her conduct since her departure has occasioned here, nor has the circumstance of conducting Lady Hamilton with her to Vienna tended to lessen it; but I will forbear saying anything more about that woman, who has done more harm, not to the Queen in particular, but in general in this country than it can well be imagined.

“Long ere this reaches your Lordship, Prince Castelcicala will have probably arrived in England. It is now too late, but I perceive that General Acton is awake to all I said upon the subject previous to, and in time to delay the appointment. Prince Castelcicala is so thoroughly execrated at Naples that the Queen, for the security of the person of one of her favourites, insisted upon his appointment as Minister to England, more to get him out of the country than for any other reason. General Acton acquiesced at the expence of his friend the Marquis di Circello, which, I believe, he now thoroughly repents of.

“I cannot conceal from your Lordship the sufferings of my mind when I reflect upon your Lordship’s most friendly and flattering recommendation of me to His Majesty for this mission, and upon the very small portion I have fulfilled of the object for which I was particularly sent out. Indeed I hardly know whether I have rendered the smallest service whatever. I am become extremely intimate with General Acton (who certainly governs this country, if it can be called governing) and I really believe that I possess his full confidence. There are however certain subjects which even the General does not dare to press beyond a certain length upon the King, and his return to Naples is one of them. If we were once there, I am at moments sanguine enough to think that some good might be done; certain I am that the longer the Court remain at Palermo, the more disgraceful and desperate their situation becomes.

“I am most intimately connected with the Russian Minister, the Chevalier d’Italinsky, whom I took the liberty of mentioning in my last private letter to your Lordship. He has resided seventeen years at this Court, and from having one of the best understandings I ever met with, may be supposed to have acquired a tolerably accurate knowledge of these countries. I consider him also as one of the most just and honorable men I ever became acquainted with. He long ago told me, ‘you must not expect to get the King back to Naples as soon as you wish; you must not expect to do all the good in this country which you wish, for no good is to be done with the present generation of men.’ And I have every day the melancholy proof of the truth of these observations, which, however, do not spare me daily anxiety and grief. There is neither army,

navy, justice, religion, nor even roads ; and this was the state of the country when the Government was in full enjoyment of all its finances. The prospect therefore is at present truly gloomy.

“ I trust that your Lordship will do me the justice to believe that, notwithstanding the despair I am in at thinking it out of my power to render the services in this country which are expected of me, I shall not spare fewer pains in endeavouring to fulfill the object of your Lordship’s instructions to me.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, August 19. Dropmore.—“ There is one subject on which I wish to say a few words to you, and which comes more properly within the contents of a private letter than a public dispatch. It is what relates to the employment of our troops and ships in the Mediterranean. Our extreme and habitual indulgence to our allies naturally leads them to think that they have a claim to appropriate to their own objects, even to the most inconsiderable, the use of those efforts which we make with so much difficulty and expense, and to do this without even the usual returns of cordiality and confidence.

“ If, in the beginning of the present year, M. Thugut could have brought his mind to treat with us as allies, and to say distinctly that he might want our assistance in Italy, Sir R. Abercrombie and his army—at its present amount—might have arrived before Genoa as soon as the Austrian operations began there, and would unquestionably have saved Italy.

“ This Thugut would not do, and the troops were consequently not sent till the period which suited our plans, and this without any further reference to those of Austria than such a state of things seemed to require. Yet no sooner do they arrive than Thugut proposes, while Austria has signed an armistice which locks up her own force as useless, to allot our force to the protection of some Austrian interests, which their own general has overlooked in the conclusion of that dishonourable convention.

“ This cannot be. It is not reasonable or fitting for us ; it is not even useful for Austria. While the armistice continues we must, for our own safety, make the best use we can of our force to distract the operations of the enemy, whom a sudden treaty may, at any moment, leave at liberty to turn his whole power against us.

“ But although we must of necessity act in this manner, yet no resolution is yet taken for the employment of our force in any manner that shall prevent our being at liberty to appropriate it to bear our share in any concert for active operations that shall be proposed to us in the event of the renewal of hostilities. Nor do I think it probable that any such resolution will be taken, unless the accounts from Vienna should be such as to satisfy our minds that further active operations are not to be looked for from thence.

“ I may be too suspicious, but it is our experience of the Austrian councils that has made me so, when I add that the delay of three days from the 2nd to the 5th to give the Emperor time to sign the ratification, after he is said to have determined to ratify, looks

extremely like the three days—which were not less than six weeks—during which Thugut fed us with continual promises of receiving the *projet* of this same convention; being, in fact, all that time watching the course of events to see if he could not do without any convention at all. I am persuaded that the Emperor's signature will still depend on the answer M. de St. Julien brings. If Bonaparte's terms are judged acceptable, they will be accepted, and the convention not ratified. But if he asks too much, we shall then be desired to bear our part in the resistance to them.

"The misfortune is that against this crooked policy we have no defence but that—which would be ten times worse—of playing the same game against our allies, and alarming them by the fear of our making our own peace without them.

"We must therefore go on as we are; but all this is a reason for incessant observation and vigilance; and I cannot help adding that it is an additional ground for our impatience to receive from you constant and regular accounts of what is passing. I mentioned to you in a former letter the old Office rule of hearing from the great Courts by every post; and I cannot help referring to it again, because if we were only to learn that matters remain in the same state, *that*, so far from being uninteresting, would frequently be the most important intelligence we could receive.

"If affairs should take the turn of a congress or joint negotiation in any place on or near the French frontier, it may be useful that you should be enabled to apprise M. Thugut in confidence that His Majesty has destined Mr. Grenville to that mission. A more painful service cannot be allotted to any man, but his sense of duty would certainly lead him, in that case, to obey the King's orders; and although I should have hesitated long before I had submitted his name to the King for this purpose, yet the same reasons which actuate my brother on this occasion must also influence my conduct respecting it.

"A great facility to him in the execution of such a task will result from the means of constant and confidential communication with you." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 19. Cheltenham.—"Your not hearing from me on the subject of the Portugal command proceeds not from inattention on my part. I employed Mr. Nepean as the best *private* channel I could think of to learn whether Sir Charles Grey relished the command, before I should mention it to the Duke of York. I stated to you my reasons for this precaution. Sir Charles, I know, is in Northumberland, but I did expect before this time to have received Nepean's answer, but I have not. I have wrote to Mr. Nepean this day desiring him to communicate what the answer is, as soon as he receives it. It must not however, if he does accept, be stated as a thing fixed till I am enabled to write to the Duke of York.

"We have got remarkable fine weather here, and I am making as much use of it as I can. You need not feel any backwardness in writing to me on any subject of business, for I have time enough to do anything essential to be attended to."

CHARLES ARBUTHNOT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, August 22. Lisbon.—“I am under the necessity of sending in a private letter the enclosed paper of intelligence from Madrid, as the Swedish Minister, who supplies me with information from that quarter, has made me promise solemnly that his present communication shall not be left in the Office with my public dispatches.

This caution indeed has on this occasion been so unusually great that, although the whole sense of the despatch which was written from Madrid to the King of Sweden, is given correctly to your Lordship, yet in one instance it has, to a trifling degree, been altered with a view to conceal the name of the person from whom the chief part of the information was received. In the original, which was read to me as soon as it had been deciphered, it appeared that Monsieur Urquijo himself stated to the writer of the despatch the inability of Spain even to commence a war; and it was he also that talked of the cession of Biscay as an alternative far preferable to the passage of a French army through the Spanish territories.

“I certainly don’t mean to enhance the merit of the intelligence that I am now communicating, but having reason to be convinced that there is literally no person in Portugal who is so well informed of what is going on in Spain as the Swedish Minister, I trust there is no impropriety in my having promised in your Lordship’s name that secrecy which is so earnestly demanded. Since the sailing of the last packet, I have seen several letters from Madrid of a prior date to the extract I am now sending, but none of them appeared sufficiently interesting to be transmitted to your Lordship. I must only observe that in every one of them the dismissal of Monsieur Urquijo was mentioned as an event nearly certain, and this also has of late been written from various quarters; but it begins, I must confess, to appear very doubtful whether such a change in the administration as was pointed out is likely to be effected.”

Post Scriptum.—“This letter having been detained, I have an opportunity of sending to your Lordship some more intelligence from Spain which is contained in the enclosure marked No. 2.”

Enclosure (No. 1):—

1800, August 12. Madrid.—“Je vous conjure de me garder le plus profond secret sur l’extrait suivant de ma dépêche au Roi, car, sans cela, je risque d’être compromis, et de tarir mes meilleures sources.

“Quoique toutes les lettres de Lisbonne en date du premier de ce mois annoncent la détermination de la cour de Portugal de ne point admettre les conditions que la France lui avait fait faire par le canal de l’Espagne, Monsieur Urquijo persiste cependant à ne pas regarder cette résolution de Portugal comme un refus formel, et il paraît encore espérer que cette dernière puissance se rendra finalement aux désirs de sa Majesté Catholique. Ce ministre d’état prétend même qu’il n’a jamais été question de fermer les ports aux Anglais, et qu’au lieu de trente millions, la France n’en a exigé

que sept ; sacrifice, auquel la cour de Lisbonne n'avait pas d'abord voulu se prêter ; mais qu'il croyait cependant qu'elle se déterminerait enfin à faire.

“ Quelque soit le degré de franchise qu'on puisse accorder à ce langage de Monsieur Urquijo, il est au moins permis de soupçonner que ce ministre, dont l'amour-propre doit se trouver blessé en voyant toutes ses démarches infructueuses, aimera à dissimuler le motif de son chagrin, aussi longtemps qu'il conserve encore quelque espérance de faire revenir le Prince du Brazil ; et j'ai lieu de croire que les instances redoublées du Duc de Frias (ambassadeur d'Espagne en Portugal) pour cet objet, sont bien vivement soutenues par l'ambassadeur du Portugal à cette Cour, qui, tout-à-fait d'accord avec le ministère espagnol, ne cesse dans ses rapports de représenter l'accommodement de sa Cour avec la République comme d'une nécessité impérieuse, si l'on veut éviter une attaque immédiate des forces espagnoles et françaises réunies. Une autre raison bien naturelle, qui aura pû dicter le langage que tient le ministère espagnol quant aux affaires du Portugal, se présente dans l'embarras extrême où il doit se trouver de réaliser les menaces dont la transmission des offres de Bonaparte avaient été accompagnés ; menaces qu'une complaisance aveugle aux volontés du premier Consul lui avait fait hazarder sans avoir consulté la possibilité de les soutenir. Connaissant le foible de la reine pour la maison de Parme, le Gouvernement français en a su profiter dans cette occasion, et l'aggrandissement des états du duc par la réunion du Modénois devait être le prix des démarches vigoureuses que l'Espagne avait promis de faire vis-à-vis de la Cour de Portugal, pour la déterminer à la paix. Le temps fera voir si, effectivement, la France a les moyens et la volonté d'accomplir cette promesse ; mais, en attendant, quelque soit la nature des engagements contractés par cette Cour envers la France, relativement au Portugal, je puis assurer votre majesté que l'Espagne est absolument hors d'état de les remplir dans le moment présent. Déjà depuis longtemps on vit ici du jour à la journée, et c'est miraculeux et vraiment inexplicable comment on a pû jusqu'à présent subvenir aux frais ordinaires de l'état, qui montent environ à quatre millions de réaux par jour.

“ Si des moyens extraordinaires, tels que des emprunts forcés, des négociations ruineuses, et la saisie de presque toutes les caisses, ont pû faire aller la machine, tant bien que mal, jusqu'à ce jour, et que ces mêmes réponses, qui commencent cependant à tarir, pussent encore possiblement retarder pour quelque temps la chute des finances de cette monarchie, du moins seraient-elles insuffisantes pour les frais énormes qu'une nouvelle guerre entraînerait nécessairement. L'Espagne n'est certainement pas en état de mobiliser six mille hommes dans ce moment. J'ai vu le rapport d'un officier, chargé dernièrement de l'inspection des différents arsenaux ; il a fait un tableau effrayant de l'état où il les a trouvés réduits : l'attirail de campagne, perdu presque en totalité pendant la dernière guerre avec la France, n'a pas été remplacé depuis : l'armée est sans tentes et sans utensiles : les magasins à poudre sont vides : peu de munitions de toute espèce ; il ne manque pas de canons, mais la

plupart n'ont point d'affats : point de chevaux de transport pour l'artillerie et les bagages de l'armée : [*il n'existe pas un seul magasin, et le trésor n'est rien moins qu'en état d'en former, ni de faire l'achat des différents objets préliminaires qu'il faudroit pour pouvoir entrer en campagne : et, quant aux troupes auxiliaires de la République, votre majesté peut être bien persuadée, que cette Cour sent si vivement le danger de leur accorder le passage, que dans l'alternatif de devoir ou sacrifier la *Biscaye*, ou de voir une armée française traverser le royaume, elle se déterminerait sans balancer pour le premier parti.] C'est donc bien à tort que le Portugal a pris l'alarme, n'ayant absolument rien à craindre de ce côté-ici : d'ailleurs les menaces employés par déférence pour le Gouvernement français, ont si peu rempli les désirs du premier Consul, que l'ambassadeur de la République s'est encore plaint l'autre jour à Monsieur Urquijo de l'extrême mollesse que l'Espagne montrait dans ses démarches contre le Portugal.' ”

NOUVELLES COURANTES DE LA MÊME DATE.

“Le Comte de Saint Julien est parti de Paris le 30 juillet. Comme il n'avait ni pleins pouvoirs ni ordres de commencer une négociation pour la paix, il fut invité par le premier Consul de s'en retourner à Vienne, accompagné par l'aide-de-camp Duroc. Celui-ci porte avec lui *l'ultimatum* de Bonaparte ; il a l'ordre de demander une réponse catégorique en cinq jours, pour la porter sans délai à Paris. On ne connaît pas encore les conditions proposées ; seulement que les avantages du Duc de Parme ne sont point oubliés, et que Bonaparte ne veut point comprendre les alliés de l'Empereur dans la signature des préliminaires ; mais qu'aussitôt après il était prêt à négocier avec l'Angleterre. Les dernières nouvelles de Paris annoncent, que loin d'évacuer l'Égypte, il est actuellement question de renforcer Kléber. En conséquence il doit avoir reçu l'ordre de se maintenir en attendant ses renforts. Ceci ne paraît pas annoncer beaucoup de modération, ni beaucoup de désir pour la paix. Le froid entre la Prusse et le premier Consul va en augmentant depuis que celui-ci a commencé à se rapprocher de l'Autriche.”

Enclosure (No. 2) :—

1800, August 15. St. Ildefonse.—“Vous saviez sans doute déjà par la voie du courier de l'ambassadeur de Portugal, dépêché d'ici hier, que la Cour d'Espagne est instruite de l'arrivée du Général Berthier à Madrid, qui aura lieu dans quelques jours. Le ministère n'est cependant pas informé de l'objet de sa mission, mais on craint que ce soit pour demander le passage d'une armée française pour attaquer le Portugal. Cette espèce de certitude a jété la Cour dans une consternation qu'on ne sauroit rendre. Soyez sûr que l'on fera ici l'impossible pour éviter la présence d'une armée

* Note by Mr. Arbuthnot.—“I have placed crotchets to mark the part which in the original despatch contained a speech of M. Urquijo's on the situation of his country, but for the reason mentioned in my private letter it is here delivered as if it were the writer's own opinion.”

française, qui, pour bouleverser le Portugal, commencerait par l'Espagne. On fera, soyez en persuadé, de nouvelles tentatives à Lisbonne ; on menacera ; on promettra de nouveau : on essayera après à obtenir de se charger seul de l'exécution de cette expédition, quoiqu'on ne soit nullement en état de le faire, au moins que faiblement. Mais si toutes ces tentatives ne réussiront pas, soyez également sûr qu'on n'a ici ni le courage ni la force de s'opposer aux désirs du premier Consul, quoiqu'on tâchera de les éviter aussi longtemps que possible. On est ici très mécontent du Duc de Frias (l'ambassadeur d'Espagne en Portugal)."

1800, August 19. St. Ildefonse.—"Le courrier attendu depuis si longtemps de Lisbonne est enfin arrivé. Les dépêches qu'il apporte n'ont aucunement rempli l'attente de cette Cour, qui a vu avec un déplaisir extrême que le Portugal cherche toujours à gagner du temps, et qu'il ne veut se décider ni à accepter ni à rejeter pleinement les propositions du gouvernement Français. Monsieur de Pinto exprime ses désirs de voir les affaires s'arranger à l'aimable ; à cet effet il demande des éclaircissements sur différents points, qui étant préliminairement décidés, il assure que sa Cour s'empressera à entâmer des négociations, soit directement avec la France, soit sous la médiation de l'Espagne ; et il demande en conséquence l'avis de Monsieur Urquijo s'il croyait que le choix de Don Alexander de Souza pour se rendre ici, et même à Paris si les circonstances l'exigeaient par la suite, pourrait être agréable au gouvernement Espagnol et Français.

"Le choix d'une personne que sa majesté Catholique a déjà refusée plusieurs fois à sa cour, en qualité d'ambassadeur, a confirmé le ministère dans sa persuasion que celui de Portugal n'a d'autre but que de temporiser jusqu'à voir l'issue des négociations pour la paix continentale, qui déterminera vraisemblablement les moyens que la France aura disponibles pour réaliser ses menaces. Outrée de cette conduite, et en même temps attirée par la crainte que les Français n'aient déjà commencé à rassembler des forces dans les provinces méridionales de la République, destinées à agir contre le Portugal, ainsi qu'on l'a fait entendre ici, la cour d'Espagne, malgré l'extrême détresse où elle se trouve réduite, et malgré le manque total de ce qu'il faut pour commencer une guerre, vient cependant de donner les ordres de mobiliser une partie de l'armée, et de la tenir prête à entrer en campagne. Je vous ai fait un tableau de l'état des finances et des arséniaux de ce pays ; il ne présente certainement aucune probabilité de succès en cas qu'une rupture devenait inévitable.

"Je crois même qu'on en est convaincu ici ; mais cette mesure, quelque couteuse qu'elle soit, quelque difficile que soit son exécution, quelque peu qu'on prévoit d'avance qu'elle remplira le but, elle est cependant devenue indispensable lorsqu'on se trouve dans l'alternative accablante de devoir ou faire l'expédition soi-même, ou bien à souffrir que les Français la fissent. Il a donc été décidé de ne pas provoquer l'arrivée d'une armée française en restant ici dans une inactivité parfaite, et on s'est empressé de prendre ces arrangements avant l'arrivée du Général Berthier, attendu d'un moment à l'autre.

"C'est à Monsieur d'Urutia qu'on destine le commandement de l'armée qui, une fois réunie, pourra monter à près de 45 ou 50 mille hommes. Mais l'ordre de quitter les cantonnements n'est pas encore expédié, et il faudra d'ailleurs du temps pour former des magasins qui manquent encore de tout, excepté quelques dépôts de grains à Badajos et à Merida.

"Avant que les préparatifs indispensables puissent se faire, la saison sera déjà passée; les fortes pluies qui commencent en Septembre empêcheront toute opération, et il est bien probable, qu'à moins de quelques menaces fulminantes de la part de la France, l'année se passera en simples démonstrations de part et d'autre.

"Le Général Berthier est attendu à chaque instant. On se perd à deviner l'objet de son voyage. Quelque soit la part qui a le Portugal, il y a apparence que son voyage a encore un autre but, et on croit qu'il veut demander les vaisseaux qui restent encore aux Espagnols, pour mener des renforts en Egypte." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1800, August 22. Dropmore.—"I trust that what I have written to you and to Wickham is sufficient to put you in possession of our general ideas about mediation, which you had indeed already anticipated. I expect from Vienna the most decided opposition to any idea of Prussian interposition; and I think the apprehension of this more likely than anything else to drive them into concluding a sudden and separate peace.

"It is however possible that they may be captivated by the hope of getting Bavaria for the Netherlands, and may be induced for the sake of this project, which they can never hope to effectuate in opposition to Prussia, to try to reconcile the Court of Berlin to it by acceding to some extensive plans of secularization. It is not our business to make ourselves the instruments of such a negociation, but, if it should succeed, I should think a great point was gained for our interests; and I might, in that case alone, think we ought to give up a part of our conquests in compensation of whatever security we obtain on the side of Holland, and of the Netherlands.

"They have always affected at Berlin to feel with us an interest in these two points, but I have very little hope of their doing anything effectual to assist us in them. These are however, as I believe, the best topics to urge them.

"Paul was certainly coming round, and an able English Minister might have done much there at this moment in concert with Panin. But I am afraid as things now are, Denmark will succeed in creating there some interest in her favour, though in fact we are only doing now what he was urging us to do all last year.

"Pray remember, if ever we get upon good terms with Haugwitz, to let it be understood that all Balan's principles and conduct here are so hostile to Government that I can never treat or converse confidentially with him. I think it much the most likely thing that this foolish business about Prussian prisoners originates in some reports of his. I have always considered him as a complete Jacobin." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 23. Harley Street.—“ Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour la bonté et l'amitié avec lesquelles vous vous êtes intéressé auprès de Monsieur Pitt au sujet de la sœur de Mademoiselle Jardine. Je vous supplie de témoigner ma reconnaissance à Monsieur Pitt.

“ Tous vos procédés à mon égard depuis que j'ai eu le bonheur de me lier avec vous, sont ceux d'un vrai ami. Je serais bien heureux si jamais j'ai le bonheur d'avoir une occasion de vous prouver tout ce que je sens dans l'âme, et combien je vous suis attaché.

“ Quand à l'*office* que mon ami Lyzakewitz a eut ordre de vous présenter, je suis mortifié de vous dire que je ne partage pas l'espoir que vous paraissiez avoir du rétablissement de l'amitié si chaude que l'Empereur avoit pour ce pays ; car j'ai la certitude malheureuse que tout se fait chez nous par humeur, par caprice, sans aucune suite de principes, et que la Suède a une grande influence dans ce moment chez nous. C'est le comble de honte pour la Russie que cette influence d'une Cour si méprisable et notre ennemie, jurée et naturelle. C'est elle qui a travaillé sous mains, mais avec assiduité, à nous brouiller, et qui continue à nous laisser dans cet état.

“ Il n'y a rien à espérer de solide et de raisonnable pendant ce règne, qui ne sera qu'une suite de contradiction et d'incartades ; aussi je regarderai comme un vrai malheur pour moi si je devois être pressé de nouveau, comme matlot sur un vaisseau, toujours prêt à échouer par l'ignorance et les caprices du capitaine qui s'amuse, en attendant, à maltraiter son équipage.

“ Il n'y a ni plaisir, ni honneur, ni gloire à être employé à présent. On ne peut faire aucun bien, on ne peut pas même empêcher aucun mal, et on n'a que des reproches et des réprimandes sans cesse, sans rime et raison.

“ Il y longtemps que ma passivité étoit épuisée ; j'ai eu enfin le bonheur de quitter ce travail pénible, et ayant obtenu de rester dans le seul pays au monde où l'homme est dans toute sa dignité, je vivrai tranquille, bien heureux d'être oublié dans mon pays natal par celui qui le gouverne actuellement. Si on voudra m'employer ici dans un autre règne, j'en serai bien aise ; mais je suis trop vieux pour voir ce nouveau règne.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 26. Taplow.—“ I found that the master of Billingbear was gone for three or four days to Brighthelmstone, and therefore I have taken up my quarters here ; I write only one line to say that I will certainly come to Dropmore on Thursday to learn the explanation of your foreign suggestions. Having passed the last fortnight in pleasuring I neither guess at the present state of your negotiations, nor at the chance which shall lead them to Luneville, or which shall have made that preferable to Strasburg or any spot more really frontier : but be the spot where it may, if there is any spot in which it is thought that I can be useful, I shall not be backward in following that course whenever I understand the means which are to be employed for that purpose. You find me however

stripped of the few accessories which remained to me of my Berlin mission ; and if I am suddenly called upon, I scarce know how to supply satisfactorily the loss of Fisher. If I understand rightly his last letter, he seems to think Frere's departure not likely to be very immediate ; in that case it might be possible that if you actually named him in order to secure his appointment as under secretary, he might without inconvenience be able to go with me for two or three months ; but I would not propose this to him unless I knew, first that you would not object to it, and secondly, that you could actually name him under-secretary before he went with me. Tell me what you think about this, and do not name it to him, because if he suspected that I wished it, he would not hesitate to put by his own interests to follow my wishes ; and yet you will easily believe that I would not consent to take him unless I saw that his situation was in every respect as completely secured to him as if he remained in England, which can only be done by his being named in your Office before there was any question of his going with me.

"I have heard nothing from Lord B[uckingham] as to the visions of Wotton ; and therefore I continue to be quite abroad as to my domestic arrangements ; I apprehend that my brother wishes to know the result of the Treasury arrangements in order that he may judge of the means which may be in question for settling any new Wotton destination before he takes any steps in changing the present state of things ; in this view it would be very desirable for me to ascertain as soon as might be what is likely to be the decision at the Treasury. If therefore any opportunity presents itself to you by which this matter may be brought to any certain issue, I believe it would enable me to know with better certainty what future plans I should be able to invite Charlotte to look to with me. I should not have intruded this domestic enquiry with the Luneville dispatch if I had not thought it possible that, while you are in the neighbourhood of Downing Street, you might have better facilities for mentioning the matter, than in the more formal shape of a letter from Dropmore. But although I shew to you very undisguisedly the ground of my impatience, I do not in the least wish you to take any step in it that does not occur to you easily, naturally, and without effort or constraint.

"If you see no difficulty as to Fisher, either on his account or your own, it would perhaps be useful that I should write for his assistance as to preparations of departure ; but if either your convenience or his interests could suffer in the least degree by this proposition, I will not entertain it for a moment."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, August 27. Cleveland Row.—"I have carefully kept the secret of the transaction of M. de St. Julien at Paris, and have not even explained it to Count Starhemberg, as I found him ignorant of it. This must therefore be our justification if he complains of a want of confidence on my part, as I think he seems disposed to do.

"I have however made one exception. Bonaparte is pressing the Court of Lisbon, through Madrid, to conclude a separate peace with him, paying him a large sum of money for it. They have really hitherto shown a great degree of firmness at Lisbon on this subject, but the course of the late events may well have its operation on stronger nerves than theirs.

"The great argument that Spain uses is the certainty that Austria will make a separate peace, and that France will then turn all her armies against Portugal, to wound us through them, since she cannot do it directly.

"In order to enforce this argument the Spanish ambassador at Paris wrote to his Court that Bonaparte himself had notified to him the arrival of General St. Julien charged with powers to conclude a separate peace; and even this news had produced a great impression at Lisbon.

"You will easily judge what it will be when they learn through the same channel the signature of St. Julien's preliminaries, which it appears, was notified to the Batavian minister, and certainly therefore to the Spanish ambassador.

"In order to counteract this, if it be yet time enough, I felt it absolutely necessary to state the truth of the case to M. d'Almeida, whom I know by experience to be capable of keeping a secret; and I desired him not to communicate it to his Government but under the strongest injunctions of secrecy.

"You will judge whether it be necessary to mention these particulars to M. Thugut. If you do, I am confident he is too reasonable not to perceive the absolute necessity of doing what I have done, for the sake of an interest very important to us, and which cannot be indifferent to Austria; since the conclusion of such a peace in the midst of our negotiations would both raise the pretensions and augment the resources of the enemy." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO B. GARLIKE.

1800, August 29. Cleveland Row.—"In proposing to Mr. Grenville to undertake the mission with which he is about to be charged at Luneville, it became necessary to consider of the assistance which he was to receive from the persons to be attached to that mission. I felt that I could make no better arrangement in that respect than by proposing to you to accompany, or rather to follow him there, to act as the King's Secretary of Legation to that mission.

"In the persuasion that you will not decline a situation of such high trust and confidence, and in which your talents will be so advantageously employed for the public service, it is my intention, whenever I receive from Mr. Otto the passports for Mr. Grenville, to desire that one may be transmitted directly from Paris to Berlin to enable you to proceed without delay from the latter place to Luneville, where it is probable that Mr. Grenville will by that time be actually arrived.

"I trust you will see in this proposition a proof of the very favourable opinion which I entertain, in common with my brother,

of your talents, character, and conduct; and it would afford me great satisfaction to learn that the arrangement was agreeable to you.

"If any person is sent to Berlin to supply your place, such appointment will only be temporary, in order that your present situation may at all events be kept open for you at your return from France, should none offer more acceptable to you.

"I authorize Lord Carysfort by this messenger to advance to you £300 to perform the journey, and to provide such articles as may be necessary for that purpose." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, August 31. Bromley Hill.—"In thinking over your proposal of writing to Count Panin, it has occurred to me that perhaps the measure might be rendered much more effectual if you could, at the same time, send privately some discreet person to Petersburg; who might appear to come there only as a traveller; but who might be furnished with dormant credentials, and be authorised to produce them in the event of the Emperor's authorising Count Panin to express a wish for the renewal of the usual intercourse between the two Courts. I am aware that there may be some objection to allowing a person to appear with a public character there while there is no Russian minister here; but it is so important to save time, and to avail ourselves of the first moment of any returning favourable disposition in the Emperor, that I hardly think this consideration alone ought to stand in the way. Perhaps the point of etiquette would be sufficiently satisfied by an assurance that the Emperor would immediately appoint a new Minister here, or (what would be much better, and would perhaps not be unlikely if there is any disposition to good humour) would send fresh credentials to Woronzow. In the latter mode, every thing would be put at once into its proper course. Pray consider this and see whether you cannot make something of it."

Postscript.—"If you think the thing itself desirable, would it not both save time and avoid observation here if you were to direct Garlike to proceed from Berlin. The only difficulty that strikes me is how to send him without the appearance, in the first instance, of a public character."

LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, August. London.]—"It is only this instant that I received your Lordship's obliging note proposing to me Mr. Williams as Secretary during my excursion to Copenhagen. I need not say with how much pleasure I accept your Lordship's offer; and you may be perfectly assured that he shall experience from me every mark of friendship and of confidence which my desire to prove my gratitude to your Lordship, and my respect and regard for his family, so justly call for.

"I am to go by appointment to Mr. Hammond to-morrow

morning for the purpose of reading the instructions of which your Lordship has already given me the heads; and I shall be ready to set out as soon as I am required to do so."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, September 2nd. Dropmore.—"It was really without any such idea as you mention that I wrote the dispatch to which you allude in your private letter of the 14th of August. What I have seen of your conduct since we have been engaged in business together has confirmed the opinion I always entertained of your character, which was and is totally opposite to any such suspicion.

"I can perfectly understand the motives which would have induced you, if the occasion had occurred, to accept M. de Thugut's invitation and to accompany him to Italy; and I really believe that I should myself, acting on the spot, have done the same.

"But we judged here that it might be the policy of Austria in such a negotiation to make that sort of use of your presence there which would very much have committed us without at all forwarding the interests of this country; and that, if such a scheme really existed, the distance of our communications with any part of Italy would give more facility to the execution of that project than it was our duty to allow.

"The task of treating for peace with the present governor of France is certainly not to be envied, either as to those who are to direct or those who are to carry on such a negotiation; and I am sure I can answer both for myself and my brother that no other feeling than that of duty could lead me to undertake it, or induce me to look with any satisfaction to its probable termination.

"But if the continental powers themselves, through folly or real inability, are content to sacrifice to France the most essential interests of the Continent, what can remain for us but to look to the maintenance of our own maritime strength, by consolidating our foreign possessions and securing our commerce.

"Lord Carysfort's sons are very unfortunate, but I trust that Captain Proby will not remain long a prisoner. We have now less than 200 British prisoners in France, and between 20 and 30,000 French prisoners here." *Copy.*

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 2. Althorp.—"That I may not forget it, as I did when we last met, I trouble you with a line to say that I received letters from Sir Thomas Trowbridge and Captain Hallawell informing me that they had been apprized by Lord Nelson that the King of Naples had conferred on them the Order of Saint Ferdinand, and requesting me to tell them whether his Majesty would approve of their accepting it. I told them in answer that, I apprehended, the regular way of obtaining such permission was for the Minister of the Court bestowing the Order to acquaint you officially with it, desiring, in his Sovereign's name, that the King would permit them to accept the distinction. I, however, undertook to inform myself more accurately on the subject; and I wish much to know

your sentiments on it. Lord Nelson has himself been created (as I see by the papers, and by a letter he wrote upon it officially to the Admiralty) the first Knight of this order, and is coming home decorated also with various other Orders from the Porte and the King of Naples. Some other of the officers who have been employed in the protection of Naples and Sicily have also had it, as I understand ; therefore it will be necessary to come to some determination upon it."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 2. Cheltenham.—"The present state of Portugal and the danger to which our connexion with it is exposed, either by a war against it under the conduct of France, or by a peace dictated by France, naturally brought to my recollection the subject of the Portuguese settlements in the East Indies, two of which are certainly most essential to our interests, and, in the possession of a hostile or rival nation, might ultimately be used much to our annoyance. You'll anticipate me when I mention Goa as the first ; but I doubt, under all its circumstances of local situation and otherwise, if Diu, adjacent to the Guzerat which commands the Indies, is of less consequence if we look, as we ought to do, to an intimate connexion being sooner or later formed between France, the Marattas, and Zemaun Shaw. I have sent for the collection of papers on that subject and, having carefully perused them, I send them to you. Much of them is not material for your perusal, but I cannot separate them ; and, upon running them over cursorily, you will easily perceive what is worthy of your attention. D'Almeida has full powers, and the sooner you conclude with them the better. In a short conversation we once had on the subject, you hinted at our object being gained by their admitting a garrison of ours, and I was hopeful that expedient might have answered ; but on considering the state and viciousness of the Portuguese government of Goa and its dependancies, which is confirmed to me from various other quarters, I am afraid that expedient will not answer, and nothing will truly answer but their naming the highest revenue they ever drew from it after paying for their establishments, and that sum we ought to pay to them. Unless this plan is adopted, the country will remain in a state of poverty and oppression equally unproductive to both nations, and the necessary military establishment to be stationed there will be a large and very inconvenient burden on our finances, which, with a debt of not less than fourteen millions, and a large proportionate sum of interest, they are at present ill able to bear ; and must continue so, till by some salutary plan we can provide for a speedy reduction of the debt, which has been necessarily contracted at a high interest, from the pressure of the war, and the large investments which have been sent to Europe. If, on the other hand, the country comes totally into our hands, and we apply the same salutary principles of administration and government which we practise with regard to our own Indian territories, we may fairly hope that, ere long, the people will be rendered happy and prosperous, and the country produce at least adequate to its own defence.

Whatever arrangements are ultimately agreed, they will stipulate for some security to their religious establishments, which, of course, must be granted to them. If an arrangement takes place on the basis I have stated, it puts them in a situation infinitely better than they ever were before. They will have a pecuniary tribute paid to them which will serve as a provision for an investment to one or two ships which they may wish to send out to India annually ; they will have the free use not only of their own present settlements in India, for the purpose of commerce, but they may have the same privileges extended to ours ; and all their commercial interests and property will, of course, be under our immediate protection. Whatever arrangement is made, let it be by a treaty between the two Sovereigns, and there will be no difficulty afterwards in arranging every thing with our East India Company ; but there are several particulars which would create some trouble to arrange if the stipulation took place as between Portugal and the East India Company. If every thing to be given up by them is ceded to the King, it is always in our power to give up to the Company whatever it is proper they should hold.

"It does not occur to me that I have any more to trouble you with ; and as I have no copy of this letter, you'll be so good as cause one to be sent to me, or else sent to Mr. Budge at my Office, and desire him to take a copy and keep it for me till I return. I have only further to recommend to you to conclude the business as soon as convenient. Mr. Wellesley is with me, and I have explained to him, for the information of his brother, the principles on which I hope this business will be arranged.

"The weather has been remarkably good since I came here, and, although it is soon to decide, Sir Walter Farquhar has almost persuaded me that the waters have done me good. I certainly feel more comfortable, but I am not sure if regular exercise and less labour and confinement have not their full share of merit in any change that has taken place."

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 3. Putney Hill.—"You may remember my taking the liberty to mention to you what I thought I knew to be Lord Malmesbury's feelings about his own situation, and his (supposed) claim to be employed in any new negotiation with France. I assure you upon my honour, that I have not let him know (nor have any thoughts of confessing to him) that I have ever said a word to you upon this subject. The occasion of my troubling you upon it again is a letter which I received from him two days ago, of which I cannot forbear sending you an extract. I hope you will not consider me as guilty of an impertinent interference in what is certainly no business of mine. But as I really apprehend that his disappointment (for as such he is prepared to feel it) will weigh very heavily upon his mind, and upon his health, I think you will forgive my wish to put you in possession of what he has disclosed to me of his anxiety and uneasiness, purely for

the purpose of enabling you to take whatever method may seem best to you, for softening the matter to him and reconciling him to himself. The passage is as follows. 'I have been long meditating to write to you, under a strong desire to advise and consult with you as my private friend. I can speak to no one so freely as to yourself. . . . T. Grenville is of all men the man I should like best as a colleague ; but if he is to be sent *alone*, and I am to be entirely passed by, I should consider myself as having the strongest grounds for complaint. Is it to be so ? Be assured whatever you write or say shall be sacred.' And then he goes on to talk of coming soon to town.

"This whole communication is so like what it *would have been* if Lord Malmesbury had written to me to *sound* you, and if I had made a confidence to you of his expectations in order to report to him what you might say, that I feel it necessary again to repeat the solemn assurance that this is *not* the case ; that he neither knows nor has the smallest reason to believe that I have had, or shall have, any communication with you about him."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to the EARL OF MINTO.

1800, September 5. Crems-Munster.—*Extract.* "I think it right to mention to your Lordship that I have the most unquestionable proof not only that the Count de Lehrbach is the declared enemy of the Count de Dietrichstein, but that he is seeking underhand to do him all the mischief in his power. He has been so pointedly loud in his censures of the armistice during his late journey, that it has been inferred from thence that the Count de Dietrichstein is really out of favour with M. de Thugut ; but, independent of open language, *I know* that he has taken some indirect means to send unfavourable reports to Vienna.

"I shall soon have occasion to write at length on the subject of the Count de Lehrbach, as it is now evident that he is to be employed in the negotiation.

"I have had many and full opportunities of observing him, and *I think* I know his character to the bottom ; and *thinking* so, *I think* him one of the worst men that could be employed for our interests. In a word his merits are great activity and industry, strong attachment to the interests of the House of Austria, an obedience to M. de Thugut, as long, that is, as he shall think his power unshaken. His demerits are, excess in political profligacy, falsehood and low trick in conversation, though by no means so in ~~writing~~ because all that he puts to paper in French passes through the hands of his Secretary Hoppé ; ignorance of the French language ; overbearing insolence, accompanied, as is always the case, with meanness towards those who contrive to gain an ascendancy over him ; and a disposition to listen to flattery that scarcely knows any bounds. I am, besides, not quite without suspicion as to his venality.

"I have ever agreed with him, and have in no one instance to complain of him ; but all this has cost me much pains and not a little flattery."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 1-7.] Coleshill.—“I send you in your red box all the papers which I have relating to Otto, and all Lord Minto’s correspondence, except the *précis* book of last year, and the first 20 dispatches of *this* year, which are locked up in the drawer of my bureau at Dropmore. In case you should likewise want them, I send you the key of the drawer, but if you send for them you must get Lady Grenville to put them in a box, as they are not sealed up or enclosed. I think your time so uncertain, and mine so much more likely to be wanted in London than to be useful here, that I mean to come to town to-morrow, and you may expect me at dinner with Lord Malmesbury’s Paris correspondence in my hand ; that of Lisle I do not possess.

“I am sorry for the pressure upon the subject of armistice, yet I know not how you can risk the consequences of refusing it, more especially as Thugut in his letter to Tallyrand of 2nd May, 1800, refuses the armistice to France upon a long reasoned argument, in which he proves the inconsistency, disadvantage, and division of interests which would be found if Austria gave an armistice to France in which Great Britain did not equally join.

“Surely, however, if you give the armistice to France, you will insist that their troops shall no more levy contributions during the armistice ; and as they acknowledge they demand it as a benefit, you have a good right to arrange the terms of that benefit, so as to extend some protection to Austria through the medium of it.”

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 6. Putney Hill.—“I certainly will undertake to mention to Lord Malmesbury as much of what you have furnished me with, as I may find necessary for setting his mind at rest. And I shall have an opportunity of doing this to-day, as he has fixed upon to-day for coming here to talk with me upon the subject of his last letter.

“I am not without hopes that the reasons of a public nature, which your letter enables me to state to him, will go a good way towards calming the inquietude which he now feels ; and which proceeds (I have no doubt) in a great degree from the apprehension of being passed by *without any assigned reason*. As to the choice which you have made, I am perfectly certain that there is no man who can be more warm in his approbation of it than Lord Malmesbury himself, or can more cordially agree in the general sentiment of the public, that it is the most natural and most unexceptionable choice which you could have made.

“I will let you know how far I think I succeed, and I will endeavour to succeed so far as that you shall have no further trouble in the business. If, however, Lord Malmesbury should still have any wish to see you, which (be it only for the purpose of waiving his pretensions) I think it not improbable, you will perhaps have no objection to affording him this satisfaction.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to the EARL OF MINTO.

1800, September 7. Crems-Munster.—*Extract.* “I find that Count Lehrbach is with the Emperor. I had rather myself that it were another, because he is more than unpopular in the army, as well as for other important reasons.

“At all events, I trust your Lordship will, as from yourself, desire M. de Thugut to give him a hint that he ought to use the same fair, open, and manly conduct in his communications with the British minister at the army, that has done so much honour to M. de Thugut himself at Vienna.

“He is full of trick, and low cunning, and foolish affected mystery ; of all of which I am prodigiously afraid *in a friend*, as producing unfriendly sensations in my own mind which I have a difficulty to conquer.

“Once again, *recommend* to M. de Thugut to *recommend* that there be nothing of low trick or unnecessary closeness at headquarters.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 10. Charles Street.—“Detained in town to-day, I have been prevented from going to Dropmore, and take for granted by what I read in the foreign papers that the armistice is at an end, and that Bonaparte means to cram the treaty of Campo Formio down the throat of the Austrians something nearer to Vienna than in the house of King Stanislaus at Luneville.

“As I have determined in my own mind that you will hear this to-morrow or next day, and that you will come up to town to do nothing or something in Cabinet, Mr. Fisher and I propose to set forth peaceably to-morrow to Coleshill to let this feverish storm of going and coming pass over Mrs. Cowell’s fir trees, instead of passing backwards and forwards along with it to and from the empty city of London.

“In the mean time I have a request to make to you in favour of an old friend of mine and of the fine arts. Mrs. Damer is going to pass three weeks or a month at Paris, and is very anxious to be allowed to pass over from Dover to Calais in a cartel boat with Edwards and his returning French bookseller. As she is a very good aristocrat and no politician, I have promised her that I will do what I can to obtain this indulgence for her, and I know no other way than that of applying to you upon the subject.

“If she can obtain this permission, she has no doubt of getting through Perrégaux a French passport for the three weeks of October which she means to pass there ; she would take only a friend and their two maids to Calais, and from thence take a travelling servant at the recommendation of the banker there. Pray help her in this if you can, and write me a line to say what you can do in it.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 11. Hollwood.—“I return you the Irish papers for further consideration. The more I consider the question of tithes, the more difficulty I see in it.

"We shall probably have occasion to meet in town within a day or two, and as Dundas will be returned, we may then talk over the military arrangements. I agree very much in your idea, supposing hostilities to be renewed and continued on the Continent, but though I rather expect their renewal, I think their continuance very unlikely, as Austria will, I think, soon be driven to submit to a separate peace. In that case it would be unfortunate to have sent our troops as far as Leghorn.

"Lord Malmsbury has desired to see me, when I come to town, for the purpose of asking some mark of favour (I suppose a step in the peerage) to show that his not being made our negotiator does not proceed from disapprobation. Pray let me know what ostensible ground you have stated to him for not employing him."

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 13. Palermo.—"I do not think it right to delay the departure of my servant any longer, particularly as, if anything new occurs, I shall probably have another opportunity in the course of a day or two of writing to your Lordship. It would appear from the nature of the orders given by Sir R. Abercrombie to General Pigot, that his instructions about Malta differ widely from mine, which I cannot help lamenting that I did not know sooner. In conversing some time ago with General Acton upon this particular subject, he told me confidentially that if his Sicilian Majesty could suppose that it was our intention to hoist English colours exclusively at Malta, he should immediately withdraw his troops from thence.

"I wish I could give your Lordship any hopes of our going soon to Naples, but I do not see the smallest probability of it, for the reasons I have so often had the ungracious task of detailing."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 14. Berlin.—"I have this moment received yours of the 2nd. I need not say how much I feel your kindness to John. As to Lord Holland, he is extremely anxious to avoid any misconstruction, and made quite unhappy by the paragraphs which have appeared in the papers. His affairs require, as I know, his presence in England in the beginning of October, and his son is really in such very bad health (as well as his wife) that it is a matter of great consequence to them; and therefore as it is clearly impossible for any answer to be received from you in time, I have ventured to tell him he may go; but I have, at the same time, said that I take it upon myself, and rely on his passing by the shortest route, with the utmost expedition, and having no communication direct or indirect, consequential or not, with any person employed or connected with the Government except what is absolutely necessary to his passage.

"Since I closed my despatch, I have seen the person mentioned in my separate and secret despatch, but he only told me he should take an opportunity when he could be unobserved by his colleague

here to speak to me. From the colleague however, who has habits of most confidential intercourse with Krudener, I have received full satisfaction as to Haugwitz's interpretation of the Russian measures and representations being wholly wide of the truth; and I am persuaded that, either in the case of hostilities being continued, or a negotiation for general peace, you may derive great support from Russia.

"I have written to Lord Minto in the following terms. I trust if he should give into this idea, and I should not have heard from you, you will not be afraid that I shall do anything that will commit you; but if you wish to renew intercourse with Russia, it will at this critical juncture be a great thing to save a little time. If not, or if you should already have resorted to any other means, there will have been no harm done.

"As we have a letter from Mr. Casamajor mentioning that it is likely he shall set out immediately, I presume you have not abandoned all hope of a successful negotiation. For my part I have none at present."

Extract :—

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to the EARL OF MINTO.

1800, September 14.—"I am strongly of opinion that if the war with France continues, as I am persuaded it will, Russia may be brought to co-operate with England and Austria.

"It is very possible that the tone she will assume toward the latter will be harsh and unconciliating, but it will be worth the while of Austria to dissemble a little in order to obtain such powerful assistance.

"The approach of the Russian army will facilitate any attempt of working upon Prussia through Saxony and Hesse. In this situation of affairs it seems of the highest consequence to lay the foundation of a confidential intercourse between our Government and the Emperor of Russia. And I will mention to your lordship an idea which has occurred to me, and which you may perhaps think might be worked upon. Mr. Harris, I understand, is with you at Vienna, and if he was to go as a traveller to Petersburg, he might by passing through this place be furnished with such communications from me as, without committing the dignity of Great Britain, might be the beginning of an immediate intercourse. M. de Krudener in his present temper would, I think, assist it, and Mr. Harris might bring me such instructions from your lordship as should not only prevent the possibility of any misconception on the part of Austria, but even help to give such a turn as would be most consonant to her wishes.

"As what passed in London with Otto is at length in the Ham-
burgh papers, and as I presumed it could not interfere with the view of your last despatch, I communicated in great confidence to Krudener the disposition the King had manifested to treat for a general peace; and the curious proposition on the part of the French that Great Britain should, without even an insinuation that any return would be made, give up more than the enemy

could gain by a long course of successful war. He was immediately struck with the date of the answer to Otto, and the notice given in Bavaria, and said he should transmit to his Court this new instance of the perfidy of France. He seemed fully sensible of the extravagance of the proposition of a naval armistice."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 15.]—"J'étois venu quoique sans *appointement* de vous à tout hasard, *primo*, pour vous féliciter sur la bonne nouvelle de Malte, et, *secundo*, pour vous demander des explications sur la retraite de Thugut. Elle lui fait honneur si c'est lui qui l'a demandée.

"When vice prevails and impious bear sway
The post of honour is a private station."

"Cependant je crois que ce *Crispin* en politique reparoitra sur la scène. Mes lettres de Vienne ne vont que jusqu'au vingt-deux et ne m'en disent rien. On m'avoit dit ici que vous veniez de bonne heure, ce qui m'a engagé à vous attendre, mais je suis forcé à m'en aller à présent. De grâce voyez-moi demain un instant."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Extract:—

1800, September 17. Stowe.—"I have thought over Irish tithe repeatedly and most anxiously, because I am sure that so long as it exists, the peasantry will be most discontented for very many reasons. The objections you have started are not the only difficulties that appear to me insuperable; for you have not taken into your consideration the prejudices of three-fourths of your Irish people, who, either as Catholics or Dissenters, easily reconcile or mix their religious opinions with their various reasons for defrauding the parson. And the worthy followers of the religion as by law established have a conscience on tithe cases very different from yours and mine. After the fullest view of all these difficulties, and of that monument of violence and injustice which the Irish House of Commons was pleased again to build last year and to make permanent, I see no possible means of equalizing the tithe where it exists, or of giving compensation (which ultimately is the same thing) where it has been forced from the clergy, as in the case of agistment, potatoe garden, bleach-green, and a variety of other Irish tithe law or practice. Do not startle then, if with my eyes open to the question of English tithe, which stands on ground differing *in toto* from that of Ireland, I propose to you the entire change of that part of the establishment of the Church of Ireland. You will observe that the tithe establishment there is a system differing from the enormous disproportion of the religions; differing, from the quality and situation of the tithe holders, who in Ireland are almost exclusively clergy, and of them a very large proportion Bishops, Deans, and dignified clergy paid by livings (on which they do no duty) annexed to their situations; differing, likewise from the want in Ireland of that principle which is always alive in England to correct the discouragement to agriculture arising from tithe, I mean the principle of commutation in its various shapes,

under the various bills that pass every sessions. I am persuaded under all these impressions, that it will be more easy to provide for the Protestant clergy by a full equivalent of some other description, than to attempt to satisfy your own opinions, and those of so many other descriptions on this subject. Of this provision or commutation there are several modes, but I should earnestly deprecate the principle of attaching this commutation locally on lands, because any such particular provision would still be considered as tithe, and would in the folly or madness of an Irish landholder, or occupant, be considered of a grievance. My idea therefore would be to give to all Bishops, Deans, and Dignitaries, corn-stipends in lieu of tithes, and to all parochial ministers commutation in corn-rents or stipends; to be paid quarterly, and with accommodations easily arranged out of a consolidated fund applicable to this purpose only, with the addition of the Dissenting establishments now paid from Government, and of the new Catholic establishments which must be paid from the same stock; to be levied in the same manner, and in the same proportions as the county presentments are now levied. This would throw the whole ecclesiastical establishment of Ireland on the land and houses of the country; and the stipend would fluctuate with the price of corn; fixing in the first instance by Commissioners the average value of each tithe for the last 7 years, and the number of bushels (or barrels in Ireland) of wheat which that tithe has given or bought at the wheat price of the last seven years.

"You will observe that this is not to interfere with any arrangements for the augmenting small livings, or for the disuniting the profligate unions of livings, or with any other ecclesiastical objects of glebes, houses, *et cetera*; but that it is meant as a general commutation of tithe upon the principles recognised and acted upon in Great Britain in all our enclosure Acts.

"I could state to you many other parts of this project, if you encourage me, but I take it for granted that you will be so much startled at the first blush of this measure, that you will endeavour to patch up the old system; and if so, be assured that you will neither please yourself, nor others.

"For once Tom has been more discreet than you on his views France-ward, for I have not heard one word from him for the last three weeks. My motto is still, *nulla salus pace!* but that does not in the least change my conviction, which I stated to you long since, that you will be obliged to negotiate, and probably to make a very bad and dangerous peace; for John Bull tells you very loudly that *tel est notre bon plaisir*; and he will be equally ready to hang Tom and you for signing it, as soon as the certain consequences of it press upon him."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 17. Coleshill.—"It was so plain to see in the French proposal of English armistice an intention of their renewing hostilities in order to drive Austria to a separate peace, that we have not much to boast of our sagacity in foreseeing the answer

which I learn from you to be arrived. It is doubtless a very necessary precaution on your part to keep in the terms of the correspondence the best ground which can be taken with the public, but it is impossible not to see that their judgment upon this last communication will more be governed by the ultimate events of the Austrian campaign, than by a more close and logical reasoning upon the matter; if the Austrians can make head against the French in the renewal of hostilities, you will all of you be approved for having refused the naval armistice. If the Austrians are beat into a separate peace, you will then be attacked for not having prevented that event by negotiation; this is not good logic but nevertheless it is John Bull's reasoning. I should myself be much disposed to think that it would be advisable for government to lose no time in making their statement of this last communication public, and to take the highest possible tone in speaking of the proposition for naval armistice, because I think they would in every respect have much advantage by appearing to challenge that discussion, rather than by waiting for it when it shall be blended with other circumstances which may work unreasonably upon the prejudices of the public.

"I know not that I can excuse myself to Lord Carrington for to-morrow unless he sends to put me off, but I can come to you on Friday at all events to Dropmore. I find from Lord Ossory and from Lady Spencer that the best Northamptonshire drainer is an old man of the name of Harte living at Northampton; the Spencers recommended him 2 years ago to Pointz of Cowdrey, who was highly satisfied both with the success of his work and the reasonable charges of it. By a line from you to Lord Spencer you may probably have him whenever you please, if you think him worth trying. Lord Spencer has a constant gang of his own drainers, and therefore does not himself employ Harte."

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 18. Vienna.—"Lyell and Wiffen arrived together, and I had a long conference in the afternoon in which I communicated to Baron Thugut all that related to Captain Georges' conferences with M. Otto, and every other point according to your instructions. I hoped to dispatch my messenger this forenoon, but Baron Thugut sent for me again in order to talk over once more several parts of our extensive subject before my dispatches should be closed. I cannot therefore send off the messenger (Ruffe) till to-morrow. In the mean while a packet from India, which I have this moment received, requires that I should dispatch a messenger with it, without a moment's delay; and I avail myself of that opportunity merely to express the lively and grateful sense I have of the kindness and indulgence which run through the dispatches I had the honour to receive yesterday. On every point of business I refrain not only from want of time, but because, in truth, the whole matter is so nice and requires so much certainty of conveying correctly the shades as well as the substance, that I begged Baron Thugut would allow me to see him *after* I had thrown the subject

on paper, and before I should dispatch it to your Lordship ; which he seemed desirous also that I should do. You must allow me however to indulge myself in expressing the real and cordial pleasure I already feel in the prospect of corresponding once more with Mr. Grenville, and the entire and unqualified confidence I derive from his nomination. I understand that there will be a free communication between Mr. Grenville and me by messenger, independent of the Austrian couriers. This will be very necessary, for Mr. Grenville's reports will be rather more to be depended on than Monsieur Lehrbach's. I need not attempt to conceal from your Lordship that very strong anti-Austrian leanings have long been attributed at this Court to Mr. Grenville, and that some indications of apprehension on that account escaped on my first naming him and Garlike. I feel too much zeal however when I speak on this subject not to hope for success ; I mean, not to hope that I shall very soon see those apprehensions converted into confidence and satisfaction. I am sure your Lordship and Mr. Grenville will be inclined to feel sufficient indulgence for these prejudices, and to think it of sufficient importance that they should be removed, to second me on this point by such language as, without sacrificing principles of any sort, may convey an impression of favour and friendship towards Austria, and towards the system of connexion with that power."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 18th. Berlin.—"My separate and secret despatch will have informed you of the commission with which the Chevalier de Bray was entrusted by M. de Montg  las and Mr. Drake. The Princess of Tour and Taxis has undertaken the part assigned to her with a readiness and zeal which ought to be remembered to her praise. With how little prospect of success the Chevalier de Bray will tell you. It would be superfluous to repeat what you are so well acquainted with already. The King of Prussia is surrounded by persons of the worst description, whom there is no visible mode of counteracting. What passed with the Princess makes it but too certain that he has imbibed all the notions which have been propagated and received with so much avidity upon the Continent, of the ambition and intrigues of England, and the moderation and fair intentions of Bonaparte. The note I have received from Count Haugwitz, which I transmit with my despatch, seems to confirm this, if any farther evidence were necessary.

"The Princess of Tour and Taxis is represented to me as a woman of great prudence and good sense, and she has hopes she may get the Queen to interest herself so far as to resist the impressions which may be made on the King's mind against England ; and it must be considered as an advantage if we can obtain early and good information of the particular points on which he may be prepossessed. This is all that can be expected from this attempt. I do not see that any hazard can be incurred by it, and therefore did not prevent the Chevalier de Bray from acting in it.

"As to my note ; as to what I told you I communicated to Krudener, but not as having any official knowledge of it, and as

to my suggestion to Lord Minto about making use of Mr. Harris to save time at a most urgent and important crisis ; I hope no hazard can arise from any of these steps, but of my appearing foolish or officious. You, I am sure, will not attribute to presumption what really proceeded from zeal. I am not however without real and great apprehensions of having erred in judgement, but you will not scruple to censure me according to the degree of my error.

“The Chevalier de Horta, many years resident at Petersburg as Minister of Portugal, is a good sort of man and an old friend of mine. If you have an opportunity of taking any little notice of him pray let him think I have a share in it. He is just arrived here, and proceeds on his journey to London on Saturday. He may give you some interesting account of the country he has left. He is to tell me what he knows to-morrow.”

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1800,] September 18. Ampton near Bury.—“In compliance with your suggestions, I have endeavoured to trace out the practicability of a proportional commutation between tithe and rent, and have examined a little farther the difficulties of tithe arbitrations ; (it is impossible to answer for the feelings of the Church, but otherwise) think we were at first rather inclined to overrate them. Property in tithes may be as easily surveyed and valued as any other description of property, and it would be as objectionable in practice to settle what proportion short of a full 10th the clergyman should in all places receive, as to attempt to negociate what proportion of the profits of land should go to the landlord, and what to the farmer. The landowner who cannot farm his own land and the rector who cannot collect his own tithe in kind (which in Ireland from the extent of the parishes is physically impossible) must each be contented with reserving as great a proportion of the profits, as by contract he can obtain. The proportion will be regulated so much by the habits of the country, that any attempt to equalize it would be to disturb the relations and in fact the value of property.

“I wish I could prevail on your Lordship to digest something on the two questions of most detail, namely tithes and the arrangement for the dissenting clergy. I am aware of the difficulty at present of any Cabinet decision being taken upon these measures, but it would afford great satisfaction to my mind, before I returned, to see them reduced into *some shape*.

“I shall return to town either on Saturday evening or Sunday morning and shall be happy to receive your Lordship’s further commands.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 20.] York House.—“J’ai remis à Mr. Hammond deux lettres que le Colonel Herries m’avoit prié de vous communiquer. L’une est de son frère et l’autre est sa réponse. Vous jugéz bien que la *spéculation de Cocheville* veut dire la négocia-

tion de paix. Au cas que vous soyez content de la réponse du Colonel, il voudrait bien que vous donniez ordre qu'on l'envoie. Il veut être net, et sa conduite lui fait honneur.

“Voilà donc la guerre prête à recommencer. J'en suis bien aise au fond, car mes principes ne varieront jamais ; cependant, tout en admirant la noble détermination de l'Empereur, qui ne peut manquer d'électrifier l'armée, je ne vous cacherai pas que je suis fâché que M. de Thugut ne l'accompagne pas. Je craindrais presque, si effectivement ce ministre reste à Vienne, comme on me le mande, que la présence de l'Empereur à son armée ne produira un effet contraire à celui que nous en attendons. Il est possible que ses vieux généraux timides, et d'autres êtres pacifiques, tâchent de lui persuader que *les Français sont invincibles, qu'il faut faire à tout prix la paix avec eux*. On nous dira ensuite que *Sa Majesté s'est convaincu de cette vérité* par elle-même, et si l'Archiduc accompagne son frère, mes craintes redoubleront. Ce jeune Prince, rempli de grandes qualités, a le tort de pencher pour la paix. Que tout ceci soit de vous à moi, vous n'ignorez pas le motif qui m'anime. Je connois la faiblesse du chef, et les sentimens de ceux qui l'environnent. Prévenez en Lord Minto et M. Wickham ; le premier, surtout, ne peut pas être comme moi au fait de toutes les embûches et pièges qu'on va tendre. Il ne connoit à Vienne que *Thugut*, c'est le seul auquel il est à faire, et il doit en être content. Il faut tâcher que ce gouverneur n'abandonne pas son élève. Vous savez que je n'adore pas Thugut ; mais il est, avec ses trente-six mille défauts, et cent mille singularités, nécessaire dans la circonstance. Son entêtement bien dirigé lui donne tous les avantages d'un grand caractère. Adieu, cette lettre vous prouve bien ma confiance et mon amitié. J'ai cru devoir ces réflexions confidentielles à la personne d'un ami que je chéris, et au ministre que je révère.”

FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 20. Amberg.—“I take the liberty of laying before your Lordship an extract of a letter which I wrote some time ago to the Earl of Carysfort, hoping that your Lordship will not disapprove the scheme which is the subject of it. I have long had the honour of being acquainted with the Princess of Taxis, and I am persuaded that, if the project should fail of success, the failure will not be attributable to any want of zeal, dexterity, or address on her part. It were to be wished that her Prussian Majesty's talents were equally well adapted to the management of a scheme of this delicate nature. This latter circumstance, her Majesty's timidity, and the singularity of the King of Prussia's character, are not calculated to inspire any very sanguine hopes of success ; but (as I have already mentioned to Lord Carysfort) the scheme seems worth the trial, and it does not appear that any inconvenience can result from a failure of it. Lord Carysfort will probably inform your Lordship of the progress and issue of this business.

“It was my intention to have paid a visit to the Princess previous

to her departure for Potsdam, but my occupations here would not admit of my absenting myself. I therefore proposed the commission to the Chevalier de Bray whom I knew to be extremely intimate with the Princess; and he readily consented to undertake it, Baron Montgélas having previously given him permission so to do, upon the express condition, however, that the *real* object of his journey to Berlin should never in any case be made known except to your Lordship and to Lord Carysfort."

Postscript.—"I have already had the honour of observing, in one of my public letters to your Lordship that, whatever the Chevalier de Bray's former conduct may have been, he has recently given strong proofs that his present opinions are such as we could wish them to be."

Enclosure :—

FRANCIS DRAKE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, September 4. Amberg.—"This letter will be delivered to your Lordship by the Chevalier de Bray, who sets out from hence to-morrow morning for London, where he is to reside as the Elector Bavaro-Palatin's minister to his Majesty. He goes by the way of Berlin for the express purpose of seeing the Hereditary Princess of Tour and Taxis (with whom he is very intimately acquainted) and of endeavouring through her means, and through the influence of her sister the Queen, to work upon the King's mind, and to impress him with sentiments more congenial to the views and wishes of the allies. The task is a difficult one, but even a partial success would be attended with the most beneficial consequences; and as no possible inconvenience can result from a failure, it appears to me at least worth a trial. I fully intended to have paid the Princess a visit at her country house near Anspach for this same purpose, but my avocations here have not permitted me to absent myself. I therefore suggested to the Bavarian minister my wishes that the Chevalier should take Berlin in his way, and I made choice of him because I know that he possesses a considerable degree of influence with the Princess. Baron Montgélas requests that the *real* object of his mission should be kept a profound secret both at Berlin and in London as it is here, the Elector himself not being acquainted with it.

"The Chevalier will explain himself very fully to your Lordship, and he will follow such advice as your Lordship may think expedient to give him. If his first overtures should be attended with any degree of success, he will leave the further prosecution of the business in your Lordship's hands, to be carried on either by a secret correspondence with the Princess, or by any other means which your Lordship may think proper to advise. I must add that the talents of the Princess, as well as those of the Chevalier de Bray, are peculiarly well adapted to an enterprise of this nature; but my acquaintance with the latter is of a fresh date, and therefore I cannot take upon myself to recommend to your Lordship to give him more of your confidence than just so much as may be barely necessary to give his first overtures a proper direction.

"I need not apprise your Lordship of the expediency of not touching upon this subject (*in claro*) in any letters which your Lordship may hereafter do me the honour to write to me, as every precaution must be taken to prevent this attempt from ever coming to the knowledge of his Prussian Majesty. I doubt much if the attempt will succeed, but, as I have already said, it is certainly worth a trial, and no bad consequences can result from a failure of it. The Chevalier will repeat to your Lordship my conversations with him on the subject. I should have wished to have entered into further details upon it in this letter, but I have various occupations on my hands which require my immediate and incessant attention, in consequence of the arrival of a messenger who is just come in from Mr. Wickham." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 20. [Crems-Munster.]—"I have been so full about Lehrbach that his brother negotiator at Luneville, if you send one, may know something of his real character, which is flimsily disguised under an appearance of great openness and warmth. I have thought it also right to reserve a subject for *complaint* and *justification* under any circumstances that may happen.

"We are worn off our legs. I have besides horses lame and servants who are leaving me, and am removed three leagues from the scene of action, to which I must gallop hard if Lehrbach does not return in half an hour, and hostilities really begin, which I cannot bring myself to believe.

"If there were more officers and fewer boys in the army I should have great confidence in our exertions, but, as it is, I am not at ease. At the same time if I was the Emperor, I would rather go back fighting to Vienna than give up the fortresses.

"I have always treated Lehrbach like a demi-god at least, so that I believe him without any suspicion as to the opinion I really entertain of him. He must however be either very stupid himself, or have an extraordinary opinion of the extent of my own stupidity if he thinks (as I believe is the case) that I have not seen through any of his tricks of any kind.

"I reserve Flint and all other subjects for another opportunity with your Lordship's kind permission.

"6 p.m.

"My public dispatch will speak for itself. I have nothing to add to it but the assurance that I will do nothing that shall commit myself or others either way.

"I have not the smallest doubt but that the enemy would have been completely surprised and beaten had we acted only this morning."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 20. Downing Street.—"You will suppose that the subject of our last Cabinet has occupied most of my attention since we parted. While the subject was fresh in my memory

I put the result of my further reflexion into the shape of a detailed minute. I send it for your perusal.

"I have had a very satisfactory conversation with General Stuart and Sir Home Popham, and Mr. David Scott, this morning on the subject of the Red Sea, and I have now no doubts what it is proper for me to order in that quarter. I have summoned the Cabinet to meet on Tuesday at eleven o'clock. Gibraltar is a very bad situation for the shipping and transports, and we have already lost too much time in sending our orders to Sir Ralph Abercrombie."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 20. Curzon Street.—"I called to-day in Cleveland Row but was informed of your being in the country. I am returned within these few days from my tour, which has been in every respect extremely pleasant and interesting.

"I shall be happy to see you, whenever it may be convenient; and I flatter myself this may be soon, if you should come to town in the course of next week. Give me leave to send you the enclosed letter from the Hereditary Prince of Orange, which I suppose to be intended for such a communication.

"Permit me also to enquire whether any resolution has been taken during my absence on the subject of the poor Pensionary Van de Spiegel's family. Before I left town in the beginning of July, you gave me hopes that something would be done for them, and as I know their situation to be very far from comfortable, I should be extremely happy to have it in my power to give some satisfactory intelligence to the son, who is anxiously waiting for an answer from me."

Enclosure :—

THE HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE to H. FAGEL.

1800, September 17. Newport.—"Votre prochain retour à Londres m'a engagé de remettre de quelques jours à vous répondre à le votre du 2, et à vous renvoyer la lettre de Mr. Garlike qui y étoit incluse. Je le fait maintenant par ces lignes, vous supposant de retour de votre voyage, du quel je me flatte pour vous que la fin aura été aussi agréable que vous paroissiez content du commencement. Permettez que je saisisse cette occasion pour avoir recour à votre complaisance ordinaire, et de laquelle je craindrois d'abuser si je ne connoissois parfaitement son étendue, en vous priant d'entretenir My Lord Grenville à mon égard. Vous vous appellerez que c'est d'après le désir énoncé par ce Ministre, que je me suis empressé de revenir en Angleterre, n'ayant fait le printems dernier qu'une course rapide en Allemagne, et que j'ai passé ici cet été afin d'être à la main dans le cas que l'on jugeroit convenable de faire usage de ma personne. J'ai consacré tout le tems dans ce pais au bien-être du corps de troupes Hollandoises, et travaillant celui-ci jusqu'à présent, j'ai taché de le rendre tout-à-fait capable pour être employé à ce que le service du Roi exigeroit; en quoi je me suis vu aidé du zèle et de l'attention du corps d'officiers, ainsi que de la bonne volonté du soldat, dont l'esprit excellent m'assure de son

utilité s'il est employé convenablement. Mais maintenant le corps de troupes Hollandoises est séparé, un régiment étant déjà pour Guernsey, tandis qu'un autre va être embarqué pour Jersey, de sorte que mon activité auprès de celui-ci est paralysé, et d'ailleurs l'approche de l'automne rendra en peu de tems tout-à-fait impossible de continuer à dresser les troupes dans cette isle. De plus, la saison avancée paroît permettre d'établir l'opinion qu'il n'y aura plus d'emploi actif pour nous cette année, et que, par conséquent, ma présence ultérieure dans ce pais est tout-à-fait superflue. Ma prière est donc que vous vouliez bien vous informer auprès de Mylord Grenville, s'il juge encore nécessaire que je prolonge mon séjour ici, ou bien s'il consent que je parte jusqu'au printems prochain, en donnant l'assurance que je serai toujours prêt à revenir, du moment qu'il sera jugé nécessaire de me faire appeller. J'ose avec d'autant plus de fondement espérer que Lord Grenville ne s'opposera pas à mon départ s'il veut considérer que, pendant cet hiver, je ne suis nullement à même d'être de quelque utilité au corps de troupes Hollandoises restant en Angleterre, tandis que, par ma présence en Allemagne, je puis beaucoup en favoriser le recrutement ultérieur, comme mon séjour du printems dernier en fait preuve, ayant obtenu de la Prusse un libre passage pour les Hollandois que voudroient nous joindre. Cet objet devient d'un objet doublement majeur, si la reprise des hostilités en Allemagne faisoit donner quelque attention aux offres que j'ai été à même de faire il y a quelques mois, d'augmenter par les relations que nous avons en Allemagne de quelques bataillons le corps de nos troupes, en faisant usage des propositions que divers Princes et Comtes d'Empire m'ont fait à cet égard. Enfin, ma position et mes relations personnelles sont pour moi un motif pressant pour désirer de rejoindre pour quelque tems ma famille. Du moment qu'une occasion s'est présentée de pouvoir être de quelque utilité à ma patrie, à mes compatriotes, ou la cause générale, j'ai toujours scu sacrifier tout ce que me concerne personnellement pour ces objets, et je me flatte que vous voudrez me rendre cette justice, mais je me crois aussi obligé, par contre, à me vouer pour quelque tems du moins, pour vaquer aux soins de mes affaires particulières, ainsi que de veiller à l'éducation de mes enfans ; du moins tant que des affaires majeures n'y mettent pas une impossibilité réelle. Ce dernier point est d'une importance d'autant plus majeure pour moi que, lorsqu'il fut question l'année dernière de l'expédition d'Hollande, je fus obligé de quitter très promptement Berlin, et que je dus abandonner mes affaires sans pouvoir y mettre ordre ; que de depuis je n'ai pu passer que six semaines à Berlin, durant les quelles je n'ai pu faire que quelques arrangemens momentannés, ayant de donner mon tems aux affaires concernant le corps de nos troupes ; et que devant me préparer à revenir l'année prochaine en Angleterre, je désirerois avoir le tems tout fixe, de manière à pouvoir sans inconvénient m'absenter quelque tems." *Extract.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 21. Hollwood.—“ Before I received your box with the papers respecting Portugal, I had a *mémoire* from Dundas

respecting Egypt, and a summons for a Cabinet on Tuesday, which will probably have reached you. Both questions must come under consideration at the same time. I mean therefore to be in town on Tuesday, and have written to Lord Spencer."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 22.]—"Mille grâces de votre communication amicale. J'espère que M. de Thugut restera en place, mais je sais que l'Archiduc travaille à le perdre. J'aime mieux le général civil, puisqu'il est impossible de les avoir tous deux."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1800, September 23. Whitehall.—"I send you Otto's answer to our last note, which is certainly well drawn. I have since seen Las Heras and Front. The former is just come from Paris, and the latter had seen a Danish Consul, who is also just come from there. Both agree in saying that in France the whole cry is for peace with England, that what they feel there the most is the interruption and ruin of their trade, and that they are very indifferent to continental peace in comparison with the other object. This information which accident has thrown in our way at this interesting moment may certainly enable us both to raise our demands as to terms, and to insist strictly on the conditions of our project of armistice.

"Many of the inconveniences of such a measure will be avoided by such a notice as we talked of to-day, but we should be careful so to time it as not to allow the Spanish treasures to come in unless our terms are acceded to. Las Heras told me to-day such particulars on that subject as are really astonishing. He spoke with great freedom, and expressed his persuasion that the French object is to revolutionize Spain. Did it never occur to you that our army in Portugal might in that case be a resource for Spain itself?

"I send you a curious letter from Gregory."

Postscript.—"We may so give our notice as to save the fourteen days, and to reckon the re-commencement of hostilities from the very day which we may think it right to limit, and which must, for the reason I have mentioned, be rather less than more than three months." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 23. Wimbledon.—"I return the note without loss of time, thinking you may want it early in the morning. It is certainly dexterously drawn with a view of effect if the negotiation should fail, and may perhaps be intended only for that purpose. Coupled with the rest of your information, it seems to me only to furnish a reason for executing what seemed to be the resolution of this morning firmly in substance, but in the most conciliatory mode the nature of the thing admits of. The more I think of the limitation of the armistice (as you proposed) the better I like it. But I quite agree with you that it ought to be terminated before the time which would admit the Spanish galleons; and that very

circumstance will afford hereafter a convincing reason for the precise limitation which we may fix."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 24. Crems-Munster.—"I know not yet what to make of Thugut in all this business, or whether Lehrbach is playing his cards or no. I have grounds for thinking that this is really the case, and pretty strong evidence of the contrary. The leaning of my mind is in T[hugut's] favour. I think however this march upon the Traun a very long one, and it will not escape observation at Berlin that we are in the high road to Bohemia."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 24. Coleshill.—"Many thanks for your note; if I judged only from my own speculations, I should still consider Otto's proposal rather as addressed to influence the opinion of the public here, than really to facilitate the means of negotiation and peace; but your opinion being founded upon better documents is I suppose more just; at all events I am glad that Hammond sees him to-day, because that circumstance will give no additional advantage in discussing these overtures if they shall fail of producing any real negotiation; and you will, I presume, have charged Hammond to learn explicitly what the *present* state of things is before you agree to any *future* arrangements. If the French have really prolonged the armistice, as they have nothing to gain by delay, I shall begin to think them in earnest, but I can never believe that Otto would have expressed himself so loosely and obscurely if he had felt himself enabled to say distinctly that Bonaparte had prolonged the continental armistice to favour the discussions with England, and the chance of general peace.

"Both the weather and the business of to-day will keep you in town till to-morrow; be so good as to send me a line, as you will naturally suppose me to be anxious to know what turn this is likely to take. My general intentions were to pass Sunday with you, to meet Pitt and Dundas at Lord Carrington's on Monday and Tuesday, and then go to Coleshill for four days of embodying at Aylesbury, namely till the 7th of October. My brother writes me word that Lord Temple (as I expected and thought most natural) expresses a determination rather to abandon Avington than Wotton, if that alternative should become necessary to his income. Though I should have had great delight in residing there, I cannot but be gratified in a decision which must be so much more agreeable to my dear brother, and which secures so important a protection to the good old place in future."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1800, September 26. Cleveland Row.—"I see on looking at our correspondence that I have to answer your private letters

3, 4, 5 and 6. You will not wonder that during the last fortnight my time has been very fully occupied.

"There certainly can result nothing but good from the steps you have taken about Russia, but I doubt whether anything will result from them. If the information I have received this morning from Harward of an embargo laid on our ships at Petersburg be true, the question is already decided. But his intelligence is never entitled to much credit.

"I own however, in my opinion, you overrate the importance of Russia in the present moment. I should rather say that of the Emperor of Russia; for with a steady and consistent conduct, there is nothing that the Court of Petersburg might not have achieved, circumstanced as the Courts of Vienna and Berlin are. But whatever declarations the Emperor Paul might now make, or whatever part he might take for the moment, no power in Europe would place the smallest reliance on it. With respect to his troops, the secret of their indiscipline and insufficiency for any other than a war on Tartar principles is now well known. And if he were disposed to enter into all our measures now as heartily as he did last year, I know not any more embarrassing question to decide than that of the mode in which he could give us any assistance.

"Lord Minto and Wickham can tell you that both Austria and the Empire had ten thousand times rather make almost any peace with France than be again defended by a Russian army. The same thing is true with respect to operations on the coast of France. Wherever the fault may lie, it is plain that British and Russian troops could not act together; and indeed to send Russians into the Royalist provinces would be to alienate them from our cause for ever. They might indeed at first be a little better received in Italy by the smaller powers, who look to them for protection against Austria; but that very circumstance would, by disunion, defeat all hopes of united efforts in that quarter.

"With all this I am entirely of opinion that it is better to have the name of being well with Russia, and that, though the Emperor's friendship can do us little good, his enmity might decidedly disable our allies from acting.

"I trust however Lord Minto will not have taken your hint about Harris. I could give you many reasons why he is perfectly improper to be employed on any such commission. If there was in my opinion the smallest probability of our soon wanting a *Chargé d'Affaires* there, I should have fixed upon Garlike preferably to any other person, and in the case of his being otherwise employed I have another choice in view. I am however inclined to think with Whitworth that the Emperor has been spoiled by too much courting, and that some appearance of reserve is not less suited to our interests in that quarter than to our own dignity.

"Your official note seems to me very ably drawn, and likely to make as much impression on the King of Prussia's mind as anything of the sort can do.

"I had already settled with Casamajor to go to Berlin if Garlike leaves you even for a time. He has been in the office here and bears a very high character for talents.

"Lisahevitz is ordered to Denmark and leaves no *Chargé d'Affaires* here, so that all future communications with Petersburg must be through you and Krudener.

"All our communications with Otto are, as you will observe, drawn with a view to their being made public if the thing should break off. There is so much want of peace in France that I sometimes think Bonaparte will be compelled to take any terms on which we and Austria steadily insist. But how to produce that steadiness at Vienna is the great difficulty just now; though, to do Lord Minto justice, more has been done in that respect than I ever hoped to see after the battle of Marengo.

"There is some awkwardness in the state of the business respecting Lord Holland. The Duke of Portland, through whose Office the licence must go, delayed it on account of his having hitherto refused all such applications (or nearly all). By the 'Traitorous-correspondence Bill' no permission is valid for this purpose except under the King's sign manual. You have therefore no power to grant him leave to that effect, nor I to authorize you to do so.

"Our discussions with Otto are, as you will see by my public despatch, brought very near to their point. Most unquestionably we shall not allow them to send troops and arms to Egypt, and if they insist on that, the whole will of course be at an end. But they have conceded so much that I rather look to the chance of their conceding this also. At any rate our negotiation will have given to Austria the interval of a full month which, if she knows how to improve it, is invaluable." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1800, September 26. Cleveland Row.—"There is no one circumstance which ever happened to me that I have looked at with more satisfaction than I do at the fortunate (I may say providential) concurrence of events, which have placed you at this moment at the Austrian head-quarters. To have had no minister at all there, when every step that we are to take from day to day depends on what is passing there, would have been mortifying beyond all endurance, but it would have been no less so to have had at this moment to look out for some person to send there, and to have made at last a choice with which I should have had so much less reason to be satisfied than with the course which the thing has now taken of itself.

"I heartily wish that we could this day have asked you by telegraph whether the Austrians can be trusted to maintain themselves for a month or six weeks longer if hostilities should really recommence in consequence of our refusal to accede to M. Otto's terms of armistice.

"With respect to any question in which this country alone were to be concerned, there can be no doubt that we have already offered too much. We have done so simply and plainly in the sole view of preventing France from suddenly renewing hostilities in Germany. You will not fail to represent this sacrifice in its true light, and I hope your endeavours will have contributed to make them turn to

good advantage the respite we have procured them. If we can, by these or any other means, arrive at the time when it will be too late to act in Germany, and particularly in the Tyrol, all may yet be well. Austria may assume such a tone of negotiation as becomes her. His Majesty may treat on the grounds which belong to his situation, and we may make France feel that she has more need of peace than the allies.

"But all this depends on our being able to ward off any great reverses for the next six weeks. I reckon that, even if France breaks off on the present ground, it must be the beginning of October before she can recommence hostilities, and the middle of November is, I imagine, late for operations in the countries where they will be to act.

"If we are to treat, we shall be very much embarrassed for the want of some chart to steer by. We are still perfectly ignorant of the views which Austria entertains in this new state of her affairs. I could make fifty projects more or less agreeable to my fancy, but without some foundation in the dispositions of Austria they would be purely castles in the air. You could not do me a greater service than by finding out from Lehrbach what views his Court entertains of terms in the present state of affairs.

"To restore the House of Orange to Holland under any decent and plausible shape of constitution not purely democratical; to give the Netherlands to the Elector Palatine in exchange for Bavaria; and Bavaria to Austria in compensation for the Milanese, or in addition to it, would be my favourite project. But then what to do for France to induce her to give up the Netherlands, and to let Austria have Bavaria? What we have to give back of French Colonies is not much in exchange for such objects, and we have besides Egypt to buy out.

"All these are speculations in the air till Austria speaks out to us as to her own views; and, so far from being jealous of them, all our fear would be lest she should not strengthen herself against France.

"I own that, knowing not much about the matter, I am very much of Weyrother's opinion as to the projected attack of the 11th. I rejoice in seeing all the old women and intriguers sent to the right about, and heartily wish that some other armies that I know could be *jubileert* and *pensioneert* in the same manner. But it was surely too early to try the effect of such arrangements before they could have time to operate, and the effect of defeat must evidently have been irretrievable.

"How does Thugut dare to trust the Emperor away from him? Is he sure enough of his influence with him, or does he count with confidence on Lehrbach's co-operating with him in all his views?"
Copy.

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, September 27. Twickenham.—"Je suis sensible comme je le dois à votre attention amicale. Je ne savais pas encore officiellement le renouvellement de l'armistice, sur lequel je pense bien

comme vous. La poste d'hier m'a apporté des dépêches de M. de Thugut qui m'annonçoient la rupture de l'armistice, les raisons qui l'avoient amenée, et celles qui avoient déterminée Sa Majesté Impériale à prendre le commandement en personne. On m'a mandé en gros le changement arrivé à l'armée, et j'en augure favorablement. *Expurgate vetus fermentum* dit l'Évangile. Avez-vous lu, à propos d'Évangile, les plaisanteries que le *Morning Chronicle* d'hier se permet au sujet d'un acte de religion de l'Empereur, avant son départ pour l'armée. Cela est infâme en vérité. Oserois-je vous demander s'il est vrai que le Comte de Dietrichstein soit mis à la pension ? On ne me la mande point de Vienne, mais je l'ai lu dans les gazettes. J'en serois étonné, et même fâché, car, quoique, de vous à moi, ce soit un pauvre sujet, il est honnête et bien pensant. Je suis lié avec lui, et il est un créature de Thugut. Des avis particuliers de Vienne me disent aussi que ce ministre ira à l'armée. Cela est-il vrai ? Dieu en soit loué *if so*. Vous n'avez pas d'idée de la faiblesse de notre noblesse. Je rougis et je pleurs en vous confiant que mon père me dit dans sa dernière lettre, *hélas ! mon ami, où en serons-nous quand vous recevrez la présente ?* Ne croyez pas que son fils lui ressemble. *War then, open war*, (dit Milton) *for who could think submission ?* "

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, September 29. Twickenham.]—"Mille pardons de vous importuner au milieu des occupations sérieuses et de toutes espèces que vous devez avoir, mais vous connoissez trop bien ma manière de penser pour ne pas juger de l'abattement dans lequel m'a jetté la nouvelle que je viens de lire dans les gazettes Anglaises à l'article de Paris. Est-il possible que nous ayons acheté un armistice au prix honteux de Philipsbourg, Ulm, et Ingolstadt ? Je ne puis le croire, peut on s'abaisser et se trainer ainsi dans la boue ? Ça s'appelle se déshabiller successivement devant le bourreau. De grâce, un mot de *comfort* si vous pouvez me le donner, je suis honteux et désolé, hélas ! hélas ! "

Postscript.—"De grâce ne me cachez rien et prononcez hardiment que *nous sommes* ce que *nous sommes*, si *nous le sommes*. Se peut-il qu'un souverain soit si faible, des ministres aussi pervers, un peuple aussi sot, et des généraux aussi lâches ! Je me fais gloire hautement de n'être pour rien dans toutes ces infamies ou lâchetés au moins."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, September 30. Berlin.—"You may think perhaps that I have, in my despatch of the 27th, given an exaggerated picture of the prejudice prevailing on the Continent against Great Britain, but I am convinced I have not. Of the foreign Ministers there is not one, except the Portuguese, by whom it has not been strongly imbibed.

"It passes as current truth from one to another without examination, and no argument by which it is controverted will receive a patient and candid hearing. It is therefore very difficult to counteract it ; nor does it occur to me that it can be done, unless recourse

is again had to what has more than once been employed already with the best effect, some public declaration of the sentiments and principles of the British Government. No pamphlet or paragraph or essay in a newspaper will be read. A state-paper certainly will. The present conjuncture seems particularly favourable for such a measure; as what has been passing between Vienna and France is very imperfectly known, and what share Great Britain may have had in the business is utterly unknown. The opinions of the public begin therefore again to fluctuate a little, and their judgment is suspended. All eyes are turned towards Great Britain, and expectation is universally roused.

"You may think me perhaps prejudiced by my own situation when I say it is of great importance at this moment to make a show of putting some confidence in the King of Prussia, and to impress him with favourable notions as to the moderation as well as firmness of the King's councils. Much assistance cannot, I think, be derived from him in any case, but to keep up and improve the disposition he undoubtedly has to be upon terms of personal friendship and confidence with the King, and the ideas, not yet eradicated from his mind, of the importance of the maritime power of Great Britain to the general security, may prevent his being made the instrument of mischief. It is certain, besides, (as far as my opinion goes) that he has all along resisted the idea of the Northern League, and deserves some compliment upon that account, as well as to induce him to discourage the resumption of that scheme in future.

"What has passed in Germany will irritate the Emperor of Russia against Austria. The fears of the Elector of Bavaria as to the designs of that power are again excited. The conduct of Austria is considered by him, and so represented to the Court of Petersburg, as perfidious in the extreme. The suggestions and opinions contained in this letter I would not hazard in a despatch, though I could not help communicating them to you." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, September 30. Cleveland Row.—"J'étois engagé hier quand j'ai reçu votre note, de manière à ne pouvoir écrire dans le moment. J'avois déjà chargé Hammond de vous prévenir de la nouvelle étonnante que les papiers François nous avoient apportés.

"Tout bon Anti-Jacobin dans toute l'Europe doit se trouver humilié de voir que l'Empereur d'Allemagne ne prend le commandement de ses armées que pour en flétrir la gloire par les conditions les plus honteuses. Mes dernières lettres ne me donnoient le moindre raison de m'attendre à une pareille démarche." *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, October 3.]—"On vient de me dire que les papiers de Paris rapportent que les François se sont emparé de Livourne. Si cela est vrai, voilà une bonne raison de recommencer. Il faut se défendre au moins.

"L'auteur du grand homme a l'honneur de vous en envoyer quelques exemplaires. Je serai bien aise que le *grand homme Pitt*

le lut. Vous rémarquerez que j'ai un peu divagué dans le sens p'un émigré pour mieux donner le change.

"De grâce, ne mandez pas à Lord Minto que je vous ai laissé la dépêche de Cobentzl. Il est si ridicule et si minucieux, et Thugut aussi, qu'ils ne me le pardonneroient jamais, et je veux me ménager la confiance de ces—pour servir la cause, votre cour, et la mienne. Ma conduite et mes principes ne varieront jamais."

"Mon courrier est venu avec un passeport du Général Clarke, daté de Luneville du vingt-cinq, et qui sert pour aller et revenir. Cobentzl a envie que le courier le trouve à Paris ; dans tous les cas il y passera, et aura à cet effet son passeport contresigné par le Général Ferrand qui commande à Calais. Je l'expédierai demain au soir si vous êtes prêt.

"J'écirai à Thugut par votre courier d'aujourd'hui dans le sens dont nous sommes convenus. Si vous avez quelqu'ordre à me donner, ou que vous désiriez que j'ajoute quelques mots encore, mandez-le-moi, ou faites-moi venir ; je ne bougerai pas de chez moi."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 4. Downing Street.—"After we parted yesterday I prepared in the evening the instructions for Sir James Pultney. Consistently with the opinions I hold, I must of course think that the force proposed to be sent to Portugal is more than sufficient for the purpose of demonstration and effectual defence of that country if Spain is the only enemy they are to contend with ; and that, if they are to be involved in a contest with both France and Spain, it is impossible for us to protect them against such a combination. I trust however that I have been successful in preparing the instructions for Sir James Pultney, agreeable to the opinion of others, without any reference to my own. I am sure it was my intention to do so ; but, that I may be sure I have succeeded, I send the proposed instructions to you in case you should wish to make any alterations upon them. You'll observe that every question of command is kept quite out of sight, and left open for your future consideration."

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, October 4. Fort William.—"Although I do not consider the present conveyance to be either very safe, or to promise much expedition, I must hazard a few lines to your address for the purpose of expressing the cordial satisfaction which I have received from your several kind and affectionate letters ; they have sustained my declining spirit throughout a long and tedious season of sickness and of vexation. Much of both have I suffered since the month of April ; and as this climate had been favourable to my health until that period of time, as the first effects of this climate are always the most formidable, and as it is well known that distress of mind in this climate never fails to attack the health, I attribute all my sufferings to the disgust and indignation with which I received the first intelligence of the King's acceptance of my services, and to the agonizing humiliation with which I have since learnt the effect of my Irish honors in every quarter of India. Never was so lofty a

pride so abased ; never was reward so effectually perverted to the purposes of degradation and dishonor. I will venture to assert that there does not exist a man in India who has not formed a more mean opinion of me in consequence of the honors which have been inflicted. If I had been left untouched, my fame would have remained uninjured on its own plain simple basis ; but these false ornaments, composed of vile, despicable materials, have added nothing of splendour and destroyed all simplicity and proportion. I would give half my fortune now that my patent could be annulled. These feelings, operating on an eager temper, have very nearly brought me to my grave. I am however now much better in health ; and notwithstanding the wreck of my spirits and the deep pangs of my heart, I have accomplished many public points of great importance, as you will soon learn ; particularly a great territorial cession from the Nizam in place of his subsidy. This measure will be highly grateful to Dundas. But I have no longer any alacrity in any part of my service. On the other hand I have lost all pleasure in the prospect of returning to Europe, depreciated and disgraced as I feel myself to be, and with the odious marks of my Sovereign's contempt fixed upon my name. It is indifferent to me where my career is now to be terminated, provided it be not terminated by any act of weakness, passion, or dishonor on my part. I shall therefore remain here, and I think, and perhaps hope, end my days here, endeavouring to struggle against the sufferings of my mind and body, and to shame the injustice of my country by additional service. I understand I have been sacrificed to Lord Cornwallis's reputation, or rather to the weak jealousy of his friends. This is atrocious injustice both to him and to me. Thank God the sentiments of my mind on this delicate subject have not been so contracted ; and I have not thought that any tribute to his fame could injure my own ; nor can I conceive how *his* could have been injured by any act of justice, by any fair proportion of reward to service, which the King might have been advised to manifest in my instance. Do not suppose that I mean to direct these complaints against your friendship, or indeed to express a sentiment of animosity against any of my friends in the Cabinet. I can safely declare that my heart beats with as much force and warmth for all of them, as when I left Europe. But their strange mistake has destroyed my personal consideration, and extinguished every spark of happiness connected with public honor in my mind. *O improvidi amici, melius et amantius ille qui gladium obtulisset !*

“I mean to write to you very fully in answer to all your exhilarating letters (which revived the memory of old and better times) by the *Mornington* packet, which I shall dispatch express in the next month, and which may perhaps reach Europe before this ship, as she must touch at the Cape.”

Enclosure :—

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to HENRY DUNDAS.

Most secret.

1800, October 4. Fort William.—“There is one subject on which I am very anxious that you, and all my friends likely to have any

influence in naming my successor, should be fully and seasonably apprized of my sentiments.

"I understand that Lord Hobart is using every effort to secure the succession to me in this Government, and has declared his determination never to be satisfied until he shall have recovered his station in India and been appointed Governor General.

"I must enter my protest against his appointment to succeed to me, and I ground my objections on reasons both of public expediency and of private justice. Lord Hobart's temper, prejudices, and reputation in Bengal disqualify him for this Government. He will overturn the whole system of this establishment, and he never will be respected here. As far as he is capable of forming any regular plan, he appears to have formed one diametrically contradictory to mine in every respect. He will therefore overthrow all my institutions and frustrate all my plans. He will be the more inclined to this violence from his natural temper, as displayed at Madras, and from his personal resentment against me, and his jealousy of my reputation. All the best men here dread the appointment of Lord Hobart; a few of the worst would rejoice in it. He now corresponds with the famous Mr. Bristow, and with others whom I know to be adverse to me.

"On private grounds, inseparably connected with those of a public nature, I think I may claim from the justice and merited gratitude of my country that my most bitter and implacable enemy, whose hatred is derived from the consciousness of his own base ingratitude and flagrant injustice towards me, should not be my immediate successor. Either I am unfit for my office, or he cannot wreak his revenge on my memory without injury to the public service. If Lord Clive should not succeed me (of whose integrity, honour, and correct principles of Indian Government I entertain the highest opinion) I make it my earnest request to all my friends, as they tender the public interests, and my honour, not to suffer Lord Hobart to be introduced into my place. I sincerely wish him success wherever he can be employed without hazard to the public. Whether my career in India should terminate by my return to Europe, or by my death, I rely on the justice and affection of my friends to keep this request in remembrance."

Extract.

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 5. Coleshill.—"I did not know of your exercising on Saturday, and therefore made a fruitless ride to Dropmore. The chief object of it was to ask you whether any or what steps are taken to give to Lord Wellesley the option of Burke's at Beaconsfield. My reason for that question is because I think, if it is not sold, that it may be very well worth my immediate attention. My brother is selling Eastbury, and meaning to realise in Bucks; he is kind enough to say that he will purchase land wherever there is a house that I should like; he destines about £15,000 to this arrangement, and with the Florida money, I think one could engage altogether in a purchase of £20,000 which I take to be about the

price of Burke's. I think it very enjoyable, and its near neighbourhood to you will with me stand in lieu of very many recommendations.

"Pray tell me what you know of this and what you think of it, and if you are only thinking of it for Mornington, do not decide anything until we have talked this over. In leaving Dropmore yesterday I rode all about it, and am quite satisfied that I shall like it if it be found practicable.

"I write, because as I hear you go to town on Tuesday, I shall not see you till your return, and I am afraid of any time being lost which may be material.

"I return here on Wednesday to dinner; if you do not want Henry in town pray send him to talk Danish with me on Wednesday.

"I suppose you will escape your naval armistice, but nevertheless if the Emperor treats, and if bread continues dear, you will all of you then be obliged to treat also.

"What a fine thing to be within 3 miles of you in Burke's summer house."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1800, October 6. Dropmore.—Proposing an adequate provision, by means of a pension and employments under the Crown, for the widow and family of Van de Spiegel, late Grand Pensionary of Holland, who had been reduced to poverty by the Dutch revolution of 1795.

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 6. Wimbledon.—"I received your letter of yesterday, and have made all the alterations you suggest without the least hesitation. Indeed the despatch is improved by them, and I have no indisposition to consider with perfect openness to conviction every thing you wish to state with regard to Portugal, more especially as I suspect you have not formed an accurate conception of the line I think it right at present to pursue with regard to that country. I am afraid I cannot see many things respecting it to the extent of either danger or importance which you do, but I am very far from having made up my mind that an *immediate* invitation to peace is an expedient measure with regard to Portugal. If we had refused her the aid she expected, that would have been a necessary and just measure, but sending fifteen thousand men there makes a material variation on the state of that question.

"When I say I have adopted all your suggestions as to the Portugal despatch I should have excepted one. I mean the giving more immediate hopes of the other two regiments of cavalry than I have done in the words I have used. You are mistaken if you suppose I have any backwardness on that part of the aid we have agreed to give them, but I am sure you are not aware (nor indeed can anybody who is not in the daily detail of such business) of the impossibility of giving hopes as speedily as your alteration as to those two regiments of cavalry would imply. To convey these two regiments will require 20,000 ton of transports, which must all be

fitted up with stalls, and that is not done in a short time, especially at this season, when work is to be done afloat and liable to daily interruption. But this is not the only or the chief difficulty. To take twenty thousand ton of shipping out of the general freight of the country cannot, in the present state of its trade, be done without great difficulty and a most expensive advance of freight. But even this is not the chief difficulty; for cavalry ships you are confined almost exclusively to the coal trade, and to take from that trade so great a proportion of its tonnage at any moment, and particularly at this season of the year, and in the agitated feelings of the country, is an experiment that cannot be tried without the most pressing necessity. I wish you to recollect the effect upon that trade which the measure of taking transports for cavalry to Holland last year produced, and although that happened and every exertion was made, we never had it in our power to transmit even for that passage more than one regiment at a time; I really believe not so much. How much then is the difficulty increased when you are to carry them to Lisbon. If you ask me why I must confine myself to the coal trade, it is because the Baltic, the West India, and all the other great branches of trade are carried on in two decked ships, on board of which it would be impossible to carry horses to Lisbon. Indeed, carry them in the best mode you possibly can, you must lay your account that at this season at least one horse in four will be lost in the passage, and that all the remainder will be a very considerable time before they are fit to take the field. This last consideration leads me to suggest to you the propriety of informing yourself how far it is possible for the Portuguese, by drafting the horses from their own cavalry, or by purchasing for us 1,500 of the best horses the country produces, to mount our men on the spot. It would be worth our while to give any price, when I tell you it will take about 200,000*l.* to carry over these two regiments of cavalry, independent of the delay and other inconveniences I have stated. If they could accommodate us in this respect, we could give them the two regiments of dismounted cavalry as soon as you please, for you deceive yourself if you suppose there is any affected delay on my part. I have no such feeling. On the contrary, I wish every thing that goes to go as quickly and as perfect as possible, and, on that principle, I have much satisfaction by informing you that by the report of the Duke of York, who has been reviewing them, the Dutch troops (in fact most of them are Germans) are in the very highest order. That is the report received this very morning, in addition to that of Colonel Sontag, whose authority I quoted to you formerly, and there can be none better.

"I have only to mention to you one idea more which has occurred to me in the course of last night on the subject of Portugal. With every kind disposition to Sir James Pultney and a high respect for his military talents, I feel what you do, and I know others do the same, as to his getting that command. An idea has occurred that Sir Charles Grey would perhaps be the very best man, *if he could be induced to go*. I have reasons for this doubt which I shall mention to you to-morrow in confidence, but, if any body can induce him, I think it is myself, and I am sure both at home and every where else

it would totally alter the whole complexion of the business if he was to have the chief command of both our and the Portuguese troops."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 6. Wimbledon.—"I thank you for your suggestion with respect to cavalry for Egypt. Sir Ralph has already 150 which he will carry there with him, and I will add considerably to it, 150 more at least. This will answer for orderlies, vedettes, attending the outposts to bring intelligence and prevent surprise. As to all the rest we must trust to the Turkish cavalry if we are to act in squadrons. I have always understood that they are by much the [best] part of their army, and in reality very efficient. By the copy of Sir Ralph Abercrombie's instructions which I have ordered to be sent to you, you will see what I wish you to write to Lord Elgin and General Kœhler. Indeed I wish you to send to Lord Elgin the extract from the instructions which I have desired to be made and sent to you for that purpose. It will further be desirable that you should direct Lord Elgin to provide three or four hundred horses to mount our detachment of cavalry. I imagine he will have no difficulty in getting them for us either from the Turkish cavalry in Suna or elsewhere, or by directing them to be purchased for us at Candia or Cyprus. I have wrote a private letter to Sir Ralph Abercrombie to inform him of this arrangement, and I have made use of the same means to convey to him, that if he has no particular reason against it, he would send Generals Coote and Craddock to Portugal. My reason is that I know them to be favourite officers of Sir Charles Grey, in case he should go there. I am sure Sir Charles would rather have Prince William of Gloucester as [than ?] otherwise, and in every other point of view it is very eligible that he should go as much as possible on service. He certainly did well in Holland."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 7.—"I send you the inclosed papers, as there was no opportunity the other day of reading them through.

"If you concur in general in their contents, I will proceed in the business without delay, sending the plan to Wickham by the officer who will set off to join Ramsay, and be employed in the accounts, on Friday.

"I am more disturbed by our decision of last week in the part which relates to Portugal than in that which regards Egypt. From the latter good may possibly come. I by no means pretend to say that the attempt may not succeed, and even easily. In fact if it succeeds at all, it is likely to be easily. I only think that the risk is not compensated by the hope, and then the trial might be made in a more advantageous manner.

"In the case of Portugal it is a question of good faith and of reputation with respect to our allies, in which the evil is certain and never to be repaired. *Laesa pudicitia est, deperit illa semel.* It is one of the fatal circumstances of the time that all who look for effectual protection will learn to fly to the French Republic,

who will at least defend them from all hostility but its own. A facility of giving up allies is not a character calculated to assist us, either in recovering our importance in Europe, or in maintaining ourselves. Even independent of this consideration, I should think it very bad policy to accelerate the period which is to deprive us of Portugal. But this is a subject which it is idle for me to dwell upon. I wish only to mark, in some way, my dissent from this part of the measure as one had an opportunity of doing with respect to the other; to which in fact my objection is less strong and less decisive than it is to the course of policy which is determined upon with respect to Portugal. If no other occasion should occur, I will beg you to take the trouble of keeping this as a memorandum of my opinion."

Postscript.—"I congratulate you about Malta, which will be no small help to the present plan respecting Egypt; though I know not whether it does not tell more as an argument for deferring it."

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, October 7. Dropmore.—"I send you a private letter from Lord Elgin relating to a matter we discussed the other day at the Cabinet. I have too much regard for Sir S. Smith to let this letter go into circulation or get into the Office, nor do I think it fit it should do so without giving both to him and to his brother an opportunity to reply to it. But as it may be material just now that you should have seen it, I send it you in confidence." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, October 9. Crems-Munster.—"I send your Lordship, enclosed, extracts of two letters of mine to Lord Minto on the subject of Lehrbach which will sufficiently shew that I had the same apprehensions as your Lordship on the subject of the Emperor's departure from Vienna, where trusted to such hands. It was the dread of the Queen of Naples, as much as the habit of passing eighteen hours a day in what Suwarow called the *antre infernale*, that induced Thugut to take this fatal step. Lord Minto assures me, what I really believe to be the case, that Thugut knew him thoroughly, and that his only answer on the subject of representations as to [Lehrbach's] known character was that he had no one else to send. Dietrichstein has redeemed many of his sins (besides making a full confession of them) by his conduct on this occasion. He has besides thrown himself entirely into our hands, and he is an instrument of which great use may be made, so that I shall venture to recommend with respect to this gentleman (who after all is but a poor creature) that we should forget all old causes of quarrel, and that he should be received again with favour. I had him here for a week before the renewal of hostilities; fed him well, and coaxed him, so that I really believe he had not a secret of any kind from me. I know, from undoubted proof, that before he left me, he gave his decided opinion to Thugut that nothing but the recall of the Archduke could

save the army. I made him friends also with Fasbinder on the ground of their mutual jealousy and hatred of Count Lehrbach, and I have indeed little doubt but that the driving away of this wretch will lead to the recall of His Royal Highness, the only *real* object at which I have aimed ; for, whether it was Lehrbach or any other diplomatic knave and coward at H[ead] Q[uarters] did not much signify. It may seem a strange thing to say, but from the moment I knew of L[ehrbach's] appointment, I began to entertain hopes that either he would get himself or we should lead him into such a scrape as must somehow or other bring the Archduke back to us ; *quod Divum promittere . . . fecit* Lehrbach.

"I have only one word to add. Should the Archduke come, never mind forms or prejudices or opinions of his past conduct in certain respects. Let the King write him a *good* line of congratulation on the occasion. I know your Lordship will frame such a one as that it shall be flattering to himself without giving jealousy to the Emperor, and such a measure cannot fail of doing *good* to us, *good* to Austria, and *good* to Europe. May I add that, if any notice is taken of your Lordship's humble servant in the letter, it should be, directly or indirectly, as of a person who has sent flattering and favourable reports of His Royal Highness ; who is an enthusiastic admirer of His Royal Highness ; and whose opinion has ever been most marked and pronounced on the subject of the command of the army being placed in His Royal Highness's hands, whenever it should please God to allow of such an event taking place by restoring His Royal Highness's health. I ask, as in duty bound, a thousand pardons for recurring again to this subject, but it is nearest my heart from the conviction only of its utility."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 9. Coleshill.—"I returned here yesterday from a campaign something shorter but much more successful than that of the Imperial army. By what you tell me of Otto's last communication the Consul appears to have had a very unnecessary apprehension of the possibility of your closing with the terms of the proposed armistice, and therefore he has hurried as fast as he can to the proposition of a separate peace from his confidence that you will reject what you have already rejected, and leave him alone to settle with the Emperor how much or rather how little of his Imperial Crown shall be left to him to wear : for I presume there can be no doubt that these arrangements will now be concluded by a separate treaty for the Court of Vienna. It has long been my opinion that, putting by other considerations upon the mere question of terms of peace, we should treat with great advantage by treating for ourselves alone, and therefore, in this view, I do not see for my part much to regret in the Luneville peace of Austria and France ; but it is impossible at the same time not to see that the apparent dereliction of us by all our allies will have the future mischief of indisposing the country more than ever to foreign connections, and will be an immediate and strong motive with the public for urging our government upon the subject of peace. By what I

can collect, I should not guess that Pitt had expressed much confidence in his materials for another war-budget, as besides the diminution of the income tax, I hear that he is forced to abandon the resource which he had hoped from porter, on account of the very high price of barley; but be this as it may, the scarcity of bread and the consequent distress of the poor, if it continues, will I believe, force you whether you will or no to make your peace with France. God grant that I may be mistaken in my opinion; at least I am sure that opinion does not grow out of my desire and impatience to meddle in that arrangement; to do so may become a duty but cannot be suspected to be an object of ambition or of personal gratification.

"Upon this dreadful evil of the distress of the poor I am really quite sore with all that I hear and see of it, and am strongly inclined to think that there is neither justice, humanity, or policy in not enforcing the power which the magistrates have of proportioning in some degree the price of labour to the actual price of bread, whatever be the cause of that price. In a village which I stopped in the day before yesterday, 3 miles from Aylesbury, I found the established price of labour there in the present moment is *seven shillings per week*, and the farmer who told me so thought I ought to be satisfied with his observing that this low price was made high enough by the increase of the poor's rates; so that according to that doctrine every industrious and hard-working labourer in the country is told that if he labours all day he cannot escape from becoming a recorded pauper, or live by his spade without receiving the alms and charity of the parish in which he works. These thoughts and reflections do really quite sicken my mind. I had hoped that my brother would have attended the Quarter Sessions, and would have waited there to have urged him to have taken the lead in proposing to the magistrates to exercise their authority upon this point. It would, I think, have become his character and situation to have been the first in the country to propose this measure, however strong may be the prejudices against it; unfortunately, as I think it, he remains at Gosfield till November. You must not be surprised at my wandering from foreign politics into this question, for I am very much persuaded that, in the result, the two questions will be found to be very nearly and closely connected.

"My mention to you of Beaconsfield was in the very first passage of that idea across my mind, but I never was in the house, and I have not any guess whatever as to the value of the estate, the size of it, or the sum which is asked for it. As I suppose from your letter that your friend Bernard has been discussing this point, I think I cannot in any way get so good information as by begging you to write to him directly to send you all the particulars whatever which he knows respecting either the house or the land, the purchase money which is asked, and the supposed value which it really bears. I am sorry to worry you who have business enough upon your hands, but I know that you will not grudge your trouble to help to place us within four miles of one another for the evening of the days that remain to us."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1800, October 9. Cleveland Row.—“I have just received your letter, No. 7, from the Chevalier de Bray. I am to see him to-morrow, but it is probable that my despatches to Vienna will too fully occupy my time to allow of my writing to you after I have seen him.

“You will see that I think you inclined to go too far in overtures to Russia; not that the object is less valuable in my eyes than in your’s if I saw the least hope of keeping him steady to our system by attentions and flattery. I believe the contrary to be the case, and that with his character, indifference and even affected neglect, is more likely to work than any system of coaxing.

“His present hostility to us goes much farther than you seem to be aware of. I shall send you by to-morrow’s mail, for your information only, the copy of his representation at Berlin for the purpose of forming a new neutral league against us. To remark upon the extravagance of this paper would be useless; but what is worthy of attention in it is the desire to do mischief.

“Haugwitz’s answer, and the language he may have held to you about it, will afford no bad test of the sincerity of his declarations of wishing us well, of which I believe not one syllable.

“But if he has not spoken to you about it, do not question him upon it. We ought not to betray too much anxiety about a thing that may create some temporary inconvenience, but cannot, in our present situation, do us any serious harm. I do not think any good is to be done at Berlin just now by putting ourselves forward.

“But above all we must be careful not to do anything that can solicit, or even facilitate their intervention in any negotiations of ours with France. They have too great a longing to play the part of mediators, not to watch every opportunity for that purpose. We have nothing to gain by their interference. To our views of maritime strength and power they are, as you yourself say, decidedly hostile. With respect to Austria, such is their blindness that they had rather see France the absolute mistress of Germany than lose the opportunity of lowering Austria.

“I will own to you that I wish you had not gone so far as to give them any insight into our views about Bavaria and the Netherlands. We are bound by treaty with Austria not to mix Prussia in our negotiations respecting Continental peace without the Emperor’s express consent. That subject above all others is one which, if our views could have been acted upon, would have required the utmost dexterity of Austrian management in order to reconcile Prussia and the other states of Germany to the seeing Vienna acquire so great an accession of power. In general I think it much safer for us, in the present state of Prussian politics, to rest upon our oars, and *voir venir*, than to hazard confidences which are only used as so many weapons against ourselves.

“I trust it is unnecessary for me to caution you not to let Krudener draw you into any conversation about Malta, and above all, not to allow him to make you the channel of any thing like official

communications or representations from Petersburg on this delicate subject.

"It is one advantage which we derive (in common with many inconveniences) from the Emperor's absurd measure of breaking off all official intercourse with us, that he will not know how to communicate with us on this subject without treading back some of his steps.

"I write to you, as you desire, quite freely both as to what is passed, and as to the line which seems to me to be the best for the future. Our situation is no doubt a critical one, and the folly of these Continental powers in directing their jealousies and resentments against their only defenders may create to us much trouble. But long experience has proved to me that this madness is not cured by coaxing and lenitives, and that the only mode to obtain their friendship is to convince them that we do not want it. Their present partiality to France is a species of love which is more than half compounded of fear. By steady councils and the protection of Providence, I have no doubt we shall weather these difficulties, as we have weathered others of a much more fearful aspect than these.

"Before you receive this letter you will probably know with certainty whether Austria decides to treat without us or not. Lord Minto, in his last despatch, seems still to think they will not.

"All our papers about the armistice will immediately be published. It may be very useful for you to try if Gentz can be persuaded to write a commentary upon them, to place in its true light Bonaparte's perfidy and double dealing, which I have endeavoured strongly to mark in all the notes of this Government." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

Private.

1800, October 10. Cleveland Row.—"I share with you all the grief and indignation which the despicable weakness of the Emperor's councils has excited in your mind. The step is, I fear, irretrievable, even if from this moment other principles and sentiments could prevail. But what hope is there of this from an Emperor of Germany who has publicly proclaimed his cowardice in the face of Europe, and delivered himself up, bound hand and foot, to his enemies, *qui lora restrictis lacertis sensit iners, timuitque mortem.*

"Yet with all this we have adhered to our system, not in the hope of much further co-operation from such an ally, but because we will not give the example to Europe of abandoning, even under such circumstances, those to whom we are bound by treaty.

"If, *par impossible*, it were yet a question who should go to Luneville to treat jointly with Mr. Grenville, we should have a right to require that it should not be Lehrbach. But it seems more likely that he will go there and patch up a separate peace, and then we must do the same; for in their present humour, Russia and Prussia would be much more likely to interfere against our objects than for them. Send us therefore the earliest notice you can, that we may take our measures accordingly." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 10. Wimbledon.—“I yesterday received yours enclosing the private letter from Lord Elgin. I suspect by the date of it, *Dropmore*, 7 October, it should have come to me sooner. I am very sorry for the contents of it. I have some time thought that the French had of late flattered Sir S. Smith into a better opinion of them than he used to have, but I cannot lay aside the partiality I have for his many gallant and honourable traits of conduct. Is there not however a danger in the delay your proposed enquiry will lead to? Either Lord Elgin or the Smiths should come away, for the public service never can go on with any effect or even safety in the hands of such jarring and discordant instruments, and the smallest appearance of it at Constantinople must break down the whole credit of our Government there. I daresay you will do what is best in the business, but you have an embarrassing part to act.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 10. Wimbledon.—“I have sent for Mr. Nepean to sound Sir Charles Grey before I mention the subject to the Duke of York, as I would not wish to have any battle upon it, and then Sir Charles decline it. When I learn Sir Charles’s determination I will then write to the Duke of York in a way to remove any objection to it. The Duke thinks that it would be improper for Prince William of Gloucester to go with only Sir James Pultney there, as, in the event of any thing befalling Sir James, the command would devolve on Prince William. Sir James Pultney and Prince William are the two youngest Lieutenant-Generals on the list. If Sir Charles Grey accepts I think it would remove all objections, as, in that case, with both Sir James Pultney and Sir Charles Grey, I can see no good objection to Prince William, or still less to the Hereditary Prince of Orange on this subject; therefore I will do no more till I hear from Sir Charles Grey.

“I go to Cheltenham on Monday. As Parliament is to meet so soon, I am really very averse to going, and nothing would make me agree to it except the hope of Mr. Pitt following me, which he has promised to do. Sir Walter thinks if he was once at Cheltenham, he would come there himself and entice him to Bath, which is only forty miles from it. Our plan about Goa may wait till I return. I am afraid the early meeting of Parliament may interfere with the plan of Mr. Pitt going to Bath, but, if there is a prospect on a short trial of its agreeing with him, he might go for a month after our short session.”

CHARLES DE THUISY, Knight of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem,
to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 12. Richmond, Surrey.—“Fidèle aux sentimens que je vous dois, j’ai eu l’honneur de vous communiquer à différentes époques des notes relatives à Malte. Celle que je crois devoir transmettre aujourd’hui à votre Excellence m’a été fournie par le commandeur de Thuisy, mon frère, qui étoit à Malte lors des

horribles événemens du 10 Juin 1798, qui l'y est conduit d'une manière malheureusement si inutile, et qui n'est arrivé ici que depuis quelques semaines."

Enclosure :—

NOTE SUR LE PRODUIT DE MALTE, ET LES DÉPENSES QUE L'ORDRE
FAISAIT DANS CETTE ILE.

" En 1530, quand Charles Quint donna Malte à l'Ordre de St. Jean de Jerusalem, cette ile n'était qu'un rocher presque inculte, et qui nourrissait à peine 12,000 habitants.

" Aujourd'hui la population des iles de Malte et du Goze est.

" pour la citée la Valette	-	-	de	25,000
" pour la ville qui est à gauche du port	-	-	de	14,000
" pour la citée vielle	-	-	de	4,000
" et pour les campagnes	-	-	de	62,000

Total, 105,000 ames

" Non comprises les troupes de la religion, les membres de l'Ordre, et les Maltais émigrés en Sicile et en Espagne.

" Un bon tiers de l'île n'étant encore que rocher, n'a pas encore été cultivé, mais ces rochers n'auraient su résister à l'inconcevable activité du bon peuple de Malte, le plus laborieux comme le plus heureux qui fût au monde, jusqu' à ce que Ferdinand Hompech l'abandonnat aux Français. Il ne payait presque pas d'impôts. Toutes les dépenses, toutes les richesses de l'Ordre tournaient à son avantage, son commerce était protégé ; des écoles gratuites, des hôpitaux commodes et magnifiques lui étaient ouverts.

" Le sol des iles de Malte et du Goze suffisait, peut-être, à une partie de la subsistance de ses habitants, si le désir d'un plus grand bénéfice ne les portait à préférer, à la culture du bled, celle des cotons. Ainsi dans la supposition très positive que les récoltes en grain fournissent pour trois ou quatre mois, la consommation du surplus tiré de la Sicile et du Levant est estimée de 55 à 60,000 salmes (la salme pèse 240 rottes, et la rotte équivaut à 30 onces).

" Pour avoir une idée exacte du commerce des iles de Malte et du Goze, on a calculé par année décimale l'exportation des cotons filés, ainsi que le produit de ceux qui se fabriquent et se consomment dans le pays.

" On a estimé l'exportation des premiers à 10,430 quintaux de rottes qui, évalués à 120 écus Maltais ou scudi le quintal (le scudi vaut 48 sols Tournois) rendraient 1,251,600 scudis.

" On a de même estimé à 600,000 scudi le travail des manufactures et métiers ; ce qui porterait l'évaluation du produit

" total des cotons à	-	-	-	1,851,600 scudi
" ou	-	-	-	4,443,840 tournois

" On cultive deux espèces de coton, l'indigène qui est blanc, et celui de Siam qui est jaune.

" Les seuls droits, les seuls impôts qui se perceussent au nom du Grand Maître étaient

" 1°. Celui sur toute espèce de denrées étrangères, les grains et les comestibles

exceptés. Ce droit pour le Maltais était de $3\frac{1}{2}$ pour cent. sur toutes marchandises entrant et sortant des ports, et pour les étrangers de $6\frac{1}{2}$ pour cent. Le simple transit ne payait qu'un pour cent.

Ce droit de douane rendait	-	95,000	scudis
" 2°. Celui d'assise ou droit sur le vin	-	53,000	"
" 3°. Le nouvel impôt créé par le Grand maitre Cotoner en 16—	-	4,000	"
" 4°. Celui sur les meubles vendus, de 3 écus 4 tarins pour cent (le tarin vaut 4 scudi tournois)	- - - -	8,000	"
Total,		160,000	"

" Les maisons et fonds de terre ne payaient rien. Point de capitation. Le Grand Maitre avait des domaines dans l'île de Malte et principalement du Goze.

" La dépense que l'Ordre faisait et dont le profit tout entier était pour le peuple de Malte, cette dépense calculée ainsi par année décimale était

" 1° le Grand Hopital	- - -	100,476	scudi
" 2° l'hôpital des femmes	- - -	18,676	"
" 3° les enfans trouvés	- - -	6,146	"
" 4° les pensions (<i>Bene meriti</i>)	- - -	1,070	"
" 5° le Piazza Morte	- - -	2,326	"
" 6° le Monastère de St. Ursule	- - -	520	"
" 7° Les aumones annuelles aux convents et autres, en pain	- - -	17,309	"
" 8° La Castillanie (Tribunal)	- - -	223	"
" 9° Les fontaines publiques	- - -	2,920	"
" 10° Le collège	- - -	1,848	"
" <i>Nota.</i> —Le Grand Maitre doublait cette dernière somme.			
" 11° Les magasins, arséniaux, corderies	- - -	18,264	"
" 12° La Marine	- - -	474,942	"
" 13° Les troupes de terre	- - -	173,038	"
" 14° Les fabriques, môles, rues, &c.	- - -	31,626	"
" 15° Les gardes du Grand Maitre	- - -	20,000	"
" 16° Les aumones du Grand Maitre en grain et argent	- - -	1,006	"

" Total - - - 870,390 scudis

" On pourrait ajouter à ce calcul les revenus du Grand Maitre consommés dans l'île ; enfin l'Ordre consommait à Malte plus de 3 millions d'écus, dont la plus grande partie était au bénéfice de ces malheureux habitants, aux quels les Français sont venus apporter tous les genres de calamité. Les Maltais sont religieux jusqu'à la superstition, ils étaient très attachés à l'Ordre, et ce qu'on doit appeler le peuple était resté très étranger aux infernales machinations qui ont ouvert les ports de Malte à Buonaparté." *Copy.*

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 12. Dawlish.—“I some time ago wrote by my father’s desire to Mr. Pitt relative to my old tutor, Mr. Holt, and I have since spoken to him on the subject, but, from the multiplicity of church applications he must receive, and church engagements he must be under, I can hardly flatter myself with any reasonable hope of success. The fact is that poor Holt, to whom I feel every thing I ought to feel for a man for whom I bear a very sincere affection, and who deserves every thing I can do for him, is turned adrift with a small living and a large family, and my father, having church jobs of his own upon his hands quite sufficient, has turned over the providing for Holt to me. I know the difficulty which attends a business of this sort, but, at the same time, I feel so very anxious to serve him, that I am induced to do what in any other case I would not do, and ask your advice in what way I can best set about to arrange my object; and if you could give me any assistance in it I should really feel grateful.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, October 12. Crems-Munster. — Soliciting from the British Government a suitable provision for the widow and family of the Swiss Advoyer de Steiguer, whose recent death had reduced them to poverty. “With the poor Advoyer I look upon Switzerland as irretrievably gone; and I think the manner in which it must be disposed of at the general peace one of the most knotty, delicate, and at the same time important points that you will have to settle. On this subject I fairly own that I cannot see my way at all. And it is one upon which I have heard nothing but rank nonsense from others. I had some talk with Thugut upon the subject when I was at Vienna in June last, but I found him more in the dark than ever, and as unwilling to receive as incapable of comprehending any notions whatever about the necessity of fixing an impenetrable barrier to France on that side, in some shape or other. I need not say that any neutrality but an armed one would be a mere bugbear in the way of armed France; and yet how to arm such a neutrality, or how and with what precautions to trust arms into its hands, or how to obtain anything better than a neutrality, are questions that I find equally difficult to solve. Were it not that such a measure would be at least as dangerous as it would in some respects be advantageous to both parties, I should think that the whole would terminate in a partition; and, in my mind, anything would be better for Austria than an unarmed and inefficient neutrality.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1800, October 12. Crems-Munster.—“I have said nothing hitherto to your Lordship of my situation with respect to Drake, or of the powers I had found it necessary to give him, because I was sure that your Lordship would immediately guess the whole

truth. The fact is that he fairly drove me away from the left bank, of the Danube, horse, foot and dragoons. I was disposed at first, foolishly enough, to be rather angry, but, upon better consideration, I could not help laughing myself at the adventure, and I thought I should act much more wisely in endeavouring to turn his zeal and talents to the public service, even though I were to make myself, which I saw I must do, his very humble servant. I have since had no reason to repent of what I have done, though it has cost me some alarms and not a few *estafettes* to prevent his going too precipitately to work, both of which I had avoided before by concluding nothing myself, nor letting anybody else conclude anything for want of powers. I think it nothing more than my duty to add that he has done his business, as far as I am a judge, well and ably and with temper; and though I could have dispensed altogether with his interference and assistance, yet now that he is there I shall give him every support, assistance and countenance in my power, direct and *indirect*. I have already marked my entire *confidence* in him in private letters both to Montgelas and to Dietrichstein, who have both dealt with him accordingly. Somehow or other, however, the former gentleman has made him believe that he was above taking a bribe, which I can only attribute to his belief that I should give him a better. My sending Colonel Hope there was a matter of necessity, not of choice, in consequence of the 6th article of the Amberg Convention, which rendered the residence of a British *Umpire* with the corps absolutely necessary; and there was no one else to be found, the Elector having peremptorily refused P—— as such. I thought Hope objectionable in some points; but he has so entirely gained the good opinion of both Austrians and Bavarians, and they have each of them expressed to me such a confidence in his impartiality as well as in his military knowledge, that I am now really anxious that he should remain there permanently. His having the commission of Austrian colonel gives him a weight with the Austrians that no other man could possibly acquire, and he is much attended to in consequence of the personal favour and kindness shewn him by the Emperor. The fact is that the Emperor had given him the commission of colonel gratuitously, and had written through Lehrbach to Thugut to say that he should be happy to have him about his own person as aide-de-camp, when Lehrbach, who had already his project ready cut and dried, interfered, and said positively that he could not have the rank unless he were employed with some of the subsidiary corps, as upon enquiry, it had been found that it was contrary to established rule and etiquette that a foreigner should be placed about the Emperor.

“Before Hope went to the Bav[arian] corps I had a full explanation with him about our respective situations; which, of course, was such in its termination as you might have expected from a man who knew the world, and who was born north of the Tweed.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 16. Berlin.—“As Lord Minto has sent me a box of despatches, with directions to forward them with all possible

expedition, and as there is barely time for the courier to reach Cuxhaven before the packet sails, I have only to say that I have nothing material to add to my last despatch. Lucchesini sets out to-morrow. Our conversation was interrupted almost as soon as it began, but he took me aside to say, in case he should have no opportunity of renewing it, that he was fully informed of, and should pay the greatest attention to all the points of contest between the two countries, *dont les vues et les intérêts ne se croisent en rien, et sont, à bien d'égards, précisément les mêmes, particulièrement pour ce qui regarde la Hollande, et le nord de l'Allemagne.* The Hanoverian Minister, however, seems to be under some alarm as to the intentions of Prussia with regard to the Electorate. His apprehensions originated in something said to him by the Duke of Brunswick at Potsdam, which I mentioned in a despatch. I do not however partake his fears, and think what Count Haugwitz said to me at that time, together with the general tenor of his conversation since, sufficient to show the Prussian Government have, at this moment, no intention hostile to his Majesty's interest there. The Turk assures me he has sent no messenger, but that the report originated from his having applied for a passport for one of his people who is returning home. As it appears however by Lord Elgin's letter that there has been some sort of negotiation carried on through the Turk detained at Paris and the agents of this Court to procure the reception of a Spanish minister at Constantinople, I do not think implicit reliance is to be placed on this account, and am glad I have given notice to Lord Elgin. How deplorable is the state of the Austrian Government, when no person of better character and talents than Cobenzl can be found to be ostensible Minister, and to conduct a negotiation of such importance as that at Luneville, if it ever takes place, must be.

"I have just learned, from an English merchant arrived from Petersburg, the strange story of the sending back of Sharpe, which seems to put an end to all my speculations of good from that quarter."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, October 10-20]. Coleshill.—"Here are authorities enough for *Britannia* :

"Scaliger in his notes upon Catullus says : '*solenne Romanorum provincias numero plurali enunciare*' and accordingly we find

"*Hunc Gallie timent, timent Britannia* Catullus, Ep. 30

"*Mavult quam Syrias Britanniasque* Catullus, Ep. 46.

"*Die alias iterum naviget Illyrias* Propert, 2 Ep. 16.

but what is decisive authority with me is that Pliny in speaking of the British islands and Ireland says thus, '*ex adverso hujus situs Britannia insula—Albion ipsi nomen fuit, cum Britannia vocarentur omnes ; de quibus mox paulo dicemus ;* and then he enumerates Hybernia, the Orcades, Mona. This passage is in Hist. Nat. L. 4, cap. 16 ; and afterwards in Lib. 33 of the same work, speaking of the fashion of wearing rings on different fingers he says :

"*Gallia* (that is the different people of Gaul as he has himself

described them, L. 4, c. 17) *Britanniæque* (i.e., all those islands) *in medio dicuntur usæ* (annuls). I think these passages ample authority.

"Would not Lucretius furnish a motto for the union, if one were wanted.

"*Vis conjuncta atque uniter apta*," Lucretius, L. 5, 559.

"I hope to stay here till towards Saturday or Sunday; if before that you hear anything which it imports me to know, pray send me a line."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 17. Curzon Street.—"I was particularly desired by the Hereditary Prince of Orange to endeavour to speak to your Lordship to-day, in order to give you an account of the conversation His Serene Highness had yesterday morning with His Royal Highness the Duke of York. In consequence I wrote to you this morning to know whether and when it would be convenient to you to receive me, but hearing that you have left town I am forced to trouble you with these few lines.

"It will not be possible for me now to enter into the detail of the Duke of York's conversation with the Hereditary Prince, which I should have done if I had had the pleasure of seeing you. I must be contented to inform you at present that the Duke desired the Prince to explain to him in writing what his wishes were, and what had passed on the subject. In consequence the Hereditary Prince desired me to put upon paper what I had mentioned to him in your Lordship's name and the substance of his answer. From my minute and from the Prince's alterations and additions has resulted the enclosed note, which His Serene Highness wishes to deliver as soon as possible to the Duke of York, in compliance with His Royal Highness's request, but which step he would not take before your Lordship had seen the paper. I therefore beg you will return it to me when you have perused it, and acquaint me with any observations you may have made upon its contents."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, October 18. Dropmore.—"You have sent me no answer about the command in Portugal. I am sorry to break in upon you, but I am obliged to do it, because I am afraid the Duke of York is already hurt at having heard first from the Hereditary Prince upon the subject, and these two Princes seem to me to be getting into a discussion upon the subject such as is not likely to lead to good. If the thing were over, settled either way, it might easily be put in a proper light as to them both. I am much pressed for a final answer, and should be obliged to you to let me know how it is settled.

"My communication with the Hereditary Prince now rests on this footing, that he is not to be considered as having finally accepted till he knows what officers are to be employed in that army, and what relative rank he is to hold with regard to them." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to H. FAGEL.

1800, October 18. Dropmore.—"I regret very much that I missed seeing you yesterday. I have some verbal remarks to

make on the paper you sent to me which I cannot so well do by letter.

"I would propose to you to come here if it suited you, but I am myself going away for a day or two, and must therefore defer conversing with you on the subject till Tuesday morning, when I shall be in town." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL TEMPLE.

1800, October 19. Dropmore.—"I received a few days ago your letter of the 12th. I heartily wish that it was in my power to be of the least service to you in respect to your wishes for Mr. Holt, but the foreign department offers no means of ecclesiastical patronage. Not even an Ambassador's chaplain is named here, or provided by the Government, so that it has more than once happened that, in some of the most considerable capitals of Europe, the King's subjects residing there have not had the possibility of attending the worship of the church to which they belong; a scandal with which, I believe, no other nation in Europe can be reproached.

"You have taken, I believe, the only possible means of putting Mr. Holt *sur les rangs* for a prebend, and all that can be done more is that you should occasionally refresh Mr. Pitt's memory by fresh applications on the subject.

"But I know by experience that there is no other line of preference in which the things to be given bear so small a proportion to the persons who ask; their being no friend of Government of any consideration in either House who has not a tutor of his own or his son's, whom he wishes to make a prebendary." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 21. Berlin.—"Nothing but the full persuasion that you will continue without scruple or reserve to give me your opinion of the past, and your advice for the future, can give me any confidence in myself or reconcile me to my situation. But you may rely upon it I have not said a word to court the Emperor of Russia beyond what you have already expressly approved. Still less have I given Haugwitz any insight into your views respecting Bavaria and the Netherlands, nor do I believe that he in the least suspects them. You would not have had this fear if I had not, to save Garlike trouble, omitted almost all the share I had in my last conversation with Haugwitz. As to Bavaria, I really have done no more than to ask Haugwitz if, in case of Austria making an immediate and separate peace, the King of Prussia, notwithstanding his professions of friendship, and the Elector's earnest entreaties (at that moment the common talk of Berlin) could leave him to the mercy of the French. And as to the Netherlands, I have only set forth the common interest of the two countries to rescue them out of the hands of France, and expressed my private belief that, for such a consideration, Great Britain would perhaps sacrifice a part of those conquests she was certainly fully equal to retain. In any view of the subject it could not but be of use, if possible, to have some ground to conjecture what specific interest

Prussia might take on those subjects. And I have always answered Haugwitz's invitations by reminding him of His Majesty's engagements to Austria. So that though you have been naturally alarmed by the sort of fidget I show when I am writing to you on subjects which interest me so strongly, I trust no harm has been done. Garlike has just read to me a private letter of his to you in October, 1898, respecting a conversation between the Duke of Brunswick and Count Panin, which I think you should read with my despatch of this date. From the two it should seem that Prussia might be bribed to consent to some considerable acquisitions for Austria, and Russia might consent to considerable changes for that purpose in the Empire, and, therefore, that it is not absolutely impossible to bring about some concert of those powers; but I must own I think, though it would be a delicate business, Great Britain must move the matter if it is meant it should succeed.

"Krudener will, I dare say, not return to the charge about Malta. He must have done it of his own head, and I trust I have not steered much wide of the line you wished. Was it my private letter, No. 7, that led you to mistake my meaning as to the disposition of this Court to support our maritime power? Haugwitz has uniformly declared himself and his master convinced that it is the great bulwark of Europe, and desirous of seeing it extended; nor do I believe he has countenanced, or means to countenance, the resumption of the armed neutrality. I alluded in that letter only to the notion prevalent here, that our success in the war makes us indifferent to peace; and that France, since Bonaparte has been sovereign, has really desired it. This delusion is beginning to pass away. But it had seized the King very strongly, and I daresay he will be one of the last undeceived. I have no hopes of the steadiness of Austria. The Emperor's pusillanimity has been too conspicuous, and the language still held by the Court is not at all calculated to rouse the spirit of the army and the people.

"Gentz undertakes the commentary with joy. It will be executed *con amore*; but, to be of use, it must appear speedily, and we want Otto's communication of the 23rd of September, which, from the answer to it, must be curious and likely to make impression on the Continent." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Original written in secret ink.

1800, October 21. Berlin.—"As we do not differ in opinion as to the important use which might be made of Russia, if that country was directed by a wise and steady administration, I trust you will not think it unreasonable if I say that, in spite of the personal character of the sovereign, no means should be omitted to establish a good understanding and some degree of concert with him. The late conduct of the Court of Vienna, the cession of the three fortresses, and above all, if it should be confirmed, the retreat of Thugut, opens a view of affairs almost entirely new, and certainly does not diminish the importance of Russia. I agree in a great measure with Lord Whitworth that Paul's natural perverseness

may be increased by too much flattery. I always thought we did harm by talking so much of his magnanimity ; and as to his troops, you may remember I declared, as soon as I knew they were to be employed, pretty nearly the same opinion you now do. But we must look not only to the character of the Russian monarch but the views and conduct of other powers, and first as to those of Prussia, which seem bent upon bringing about a peace between France and all the belligerent powers by separate treaties, if it cannot be done by a general arrangement. For what purpose ? That Prussia may form a defensive alliance in which her first object would be a connection with Russia, and the next with Great Britain.

“ It is very difficult to form any sure conjecture upon the views of a Court absorbed in such narrow politics and under the guidance of such Ministers ; but some grounds for this may be found in my despatches, and Mr. Garlike’s will have informed you that France has long since proposed to ally herself with Russia and the Court of Berlin. If France could find means to induce the Emperor to connect himself with her, Prussia would undoubtedly follow. At this moment then—when Russia, if she cannot do good, may, as you observe, do much mischief, France must not be assisted to work upon the foible of the Emperor and gain him by flattery to her side. Every step he removes from Great Britain is an approach to France, and a moment of irritation against us might be the means of losing an important opportunity.

“ But I see strong reason to think some reliance may yet be placed upon the councils of that country. Those who know Count Panin best seem confident that he must, from the superiority of his talents and address, acquire at last a decisive influence ; and that, in the mean time, his management will give a bias to the measures of the Government. It is not to be forgot that he has missed no opportunity of telling us that he was doing all he could, and that we must not despair. Let us now see what he has done. If he has not roused this Court to action, he has at least made it pledge itself to some concert with Russia for setting bounds to the ambition of France at a peace, and to make that principle in a great measure the basis of its connection with Russia. He has induced the Emperor actually to prepare for active war. He has taught the Emperor to bend to circumstances, as is manifest from his consenting at all to treat with the present Government of France, and from his having proposed modifications of the terms of general peace to which he might consent, according to the views which might be entertained by the several powers. As far therefore as can be, consistently with the King’s dignity, I think we should court the Emperor to assist the good intentions of his minister ; and this may the more easily be done, as the views the Emperor avows are very much analogous to those repeatedly declared by the British Government.

“ I am sometimes tempted to think it might be useful to enter with this Court even into such an insignificant stipulation of concert as I have mentioned in my last despatch to have been proposed as the subject of a secret convention to be added to the renewal of the treaty of 1792 with Russia, in order to preoccupy the ground,

and prevent the French from getting any footing here ; for, supposing peace concluded, France having, as seems probable, dictated separate terms to Austria, a defensive alliance with Russia and Prussia might possibly be the best thing we could look to.

"All the intelligence ciphered in my despatch of this date comes, whatever it may be worth, from authority not to be doubted." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1800, October 22.—"I send you a statement delivered by the Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Duke of York respecting his serving in Portugal. As soon as you have fixed anything about that command let me know it. I do not think he can have the command, nor does he wish it. If therefore the officer chosen is a Lieutenant-General, he must be content with that rank. I wish for the reasons we both feel that a fit person could be sent *from hence* for that service.

"We are not fortunate in our Spanish enterprizes." *Copy.*

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, October 22. Phœnix Park.—"As you have more easy and expeditious means than myself of communicating at present with Lord Carysfort, I shall be much obliged to you if you will ask what title he means to take for his British peerage."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 23. Woodley.—"Your reason for substituting the Lord Steward is conclusive, and the Speaker agrees with me in thinking the letter you propose right. We must, of course, have address, mover, and seconder as usual.

"I have not seen the account of Cobenzel's nomination, and do not understand your inference from it. If any material despatches are arrived, pray order them to be sent to me as soon as they can be spared. I will return them immediately. I send you a letter which I have just received from your brother, because it refers to something he has heard from you which I think he must have misunderstood. We certainly never had an idea of not bringing forward whatever measures we think can safely be adopted to alleviate the present difficulty, and prevent its recurrence, though the best channel for some of them may be through a committee. Our last plan respecting tythe would, I think, answer every purpose Lord B. proposes, and you remember we talked of other measures of permanent encouragement to tillage. I cannot persuade myself yet that raising wages is the true remedy (at least by itself) for the present temporary distress. I even doubt if fixing them by law or by magistrates can be made practicable. We all agree that some extraordinary provision must be made to enable the labouring class to support their families. Our importations, I am persuaded, will be considerable if a good plan of conditional bounty can be framed to satisfy the importer ; and I do not agree with Lord B. that we shall have any difficulty in paying for whatever we can get. In

addition to this, however, every degree of substitute should be called in, and I will write about his pilchards. If the high price continues, may it not be right (as the crops of barley are abundant and excellent) to prohibit for a time grinding any wheat without mixing a given proportion (suppose $\frac{1}{4}$) of barley? I am certainly better within these few days."

THOMAS MACDONALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 24. Great George Street.—"The public attention and flattering notice with which your Lordship honoured me on a late occasion induce me to believe that you will take in good part the communication of some few of those many remarks which I might submit respecting the present state of opinion with regard to this country, and the means of increasing our influence in *America*, which may be useful at this moment, and cannot be inconvenient, as I mean to state them very shortly.

"The *leading* fact to be mentioned is that the *true* situation and character of *this* country are less known in *America* than almost anywhere else, and that incredible industry is practised to keep the people in the dark respecting us. Exclusive of foreign exertions for that purpose, supported, either openly or in secret, by every Frenchman of every description in the country, your Lordship may easily conceive the impression which is made on the mass of the people by the discontented and seditious from Great Britain and Ireland; not to mention a set of very complaisant *British* merchants and agents, many of whom are now also American citizens and known coverers of enemies' property, who smile assent to all the calumnies against their native country, and give a currency and credit to every injurious report. Four-fifths of the people there in good earnest believe that we are, *politically* if not morally, a most tyrannical and unprincipled nation; and with respect to *them* restrained only by *fear* from attempting to bring them again under our yoke.

"*Fear*, as with respect to them, they do ascribe to us in a manner which would be amusing, were it not that the error encourages them to act towards us in a way which proves seriously inconvenient. The most extraordinary instances of this belief I have seen in men holding high characters and situations in the country.

"The best of them, of course, imagine that our statesmen are more occupied in watching *them* than in any other national business. Speeches are *on purpose* made in Congress, full of open threats or hostile insinuations, which they think will have the effect to sound an alarm throughout the whole British dominions, such as no Minister would find it possible to resist.

"On this subject they flatter themselves beyond imagination, and therefore never fail to mistake the motive of any *extraordinary* degree of indulgence or suavity of manner. They are a people who must be managed by means of great *reserve* and *grave* civility. In order to be *at all* respected, one must in some degree be feared; for to be what is commonly called *beloved* is, I suspect, to be disregarded. They are not a people to be influenced by personal

affection, but it is not certainly necessary or expedient to be personally disliked.

"Conceive to yourself a set of grown boys, broke loose from school, and playing the various parts of men ; if you add, what is not in general the accompaniment of forward boys, namely, *dishonesty*, or the cheating habits of Jews, you will have, in my opinion, a just impression of the American *community*. I say the community ; for I have known individual exceptions, but those exceptions I have generally found in a certain degree of *retirement* ; and any degree of retirement from business or speculation is a rare situation in America.

"I should add to the above description of grown boys playing men, that most of them may be supposed to have been for some time *sharply* schooled in an attorney's office.

"The application will, I presume, not only support my idea that they are to be managed by means of a civil and courteous *reserve* ; and that they cannot bear familiarity or indulgence ; but will shew the great expediency of counteracting the industry which is successfully practised on a superficial people, to give false and injurious ideas of *our* situation and conduct as a nation.

"The business of *printing* is much followed in America, and yet half a dozen of books are not certainly published in any one year throughout the whole Union. The printers are employed in the universal business of newspapers, and little pamphlets for the people. An American knows all that a newspaper can teach, and retails it off with considerable address. Indeed his conversation bears a strong resemblance to that cobweb collection of surmises, conjectures, wise discoveries, conceited positions, and sharp superficial sayings which form the columns of most newspapers in every country.

"The consequence is that the opinions of all classes arise entirely from what they read in their newspapers ; so that *by newspapers the country is governed*.

"But '*Britain*' (for they studiously avoid in general saying *Great Britain*) makes a very poor figure in the greater part of the American newspapers ; for which there are two reasons. The papers which abuse or slight us most, sell best. And the American ship-masters always bring over the worst *Opposition* papers from England ; the false colourings and degrading details of which are greedily adopted, even by the Government papers in America. The people really believe that the account given in those papers of our ruined circumstances, our disgraces, our profligate political principles, and our extravagant public folly, is the true state of the matter. But they are not contented with copying only from our worst *Opposition* papers. They mutilate and suppress on many occasions, so as entirely to reverse the fact, if it is favourable to the courage or conduct of England. For example, in stating the convention at the *Helder*, they printed the articles at first insisted on by the French general, leaving out entirely the steady answers and refusal of the Duke of York ; so that the idea of our being subjected to the most complete humiliation on that occasion is *at this moment* very general in America ; for, although the suppression of the truth

was taken notice of in one paper, the poison is not accompanied with the antidote in one instance out of a hundred. The mutiny of our fleet, and the horrible affair of the *Hermione* frigate were subjects of exultation with many persons of all descriptions ; and it was said with satisfaction that probably those and similar events were to be ascribed to the *brave* efforts of impressed American seamen, whose *right* to mutiny, and even murder British officers, was *asserted* and maintained in elaborate arguments, even in Congress ; a circumstance which leads me to say that the number of our ablest seamen in the American service or employment is incredible. And yet, however difficult the subject, I think it is an evil susceptible of a certain degree of remedy.

“The prevention or correction of those errors which are thus infused throughout America respecting this country, I must therefore beg leave to state, as a more important object of our care ; and I think it may, in a great measure, be accomplished by contriving to have true and authentic details of such matters as may give adequate impressions of our *good faith*, our *power*, and our friendly dispositions, but *steady determination* of conduct, published in *plain* and *moderate* language, as *promptly* and diligently as those which are propagated against us. A little expence to support or encourage a central establishment for that purpose, with a correspondence throughout the States, would be wisely bestowed. At any rate the best papers on the side of Government in this country ought, by all possible occasions, to be sent to the different sea ports of America. My wish however is that they know useful *facts*. Declamation or boasting would defeat itself, or be met in the same manner ; for America is the land of flimsy and inflated declamation.

“But I have already gone far beyond my intended plan of troubling your Lordship only with a few words ; and therefore I will only add, and I think it candid to do so, that I believe my excellent friend Mr. Liston, whose good sense and great worth I shall ever take all opportunities to acknowledge, entertains impressions of the people I have described, in some respects different from mine. But the great favour in which he is *personally* held in that country, and the great attentions he has bestowed, joined with what has happened, confirm the leading point of the opinion I have expressed.

“I hope your Lordship will receive this communication (perhaps a very unimportant one) as a mark of my respect, and not consider it as intrusive ; nor apply to me, what I have said of the Americans, that they cannot bear too much encouragement.”

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 25. Cheltenham.—“I yesterday received your letter with its enclosure. I have one on the same subject from the Duke of York. Upon looking to the Army List and comparing it with the date of the rank held by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, you will see that, consistent with his ideas, there is no person in our service except the Duke of York under whom he could serve. I don't mean to insinuate by this observation that there is any thing unreasonable in his statement, but, unless he was to have

the supreme command, which you say he does not wish, it seems necessary that he should for the present separate himself from his corps, and follow the other avocations which require his presence abroad. I regret that he should separate himself from them. Huskisson, who is with me, and is returned from visiting his father-in-law at Portsmouth, reports to me that they are almost the finest troops he ever saw, and exceedingly correct and exemplary in their behaviour. The Duke of York, who you mentioned to me not to be too partial to the Prince of Orange, made the same report of them and gave the credit of it solely to the Hereditary Prince. The Duke of York sends me a memorandum, put into his hands by the Prince of Orange, suggesting several additions and alterations to the corps. These suggestions will add a little to the expense, but they will add so much more comparatively to their efficiency and utility, that I have no hesitation in writing this day to the Duke of York to authorise the improvements suggested by the Hereditary Prince. The weather is very fine, and it would be unjust to Cheltenham not to admit that I am very well."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 25. Cheltenham.—"I omitted to say in my other letter that I really know not how to make any suggestion for placing the command of the British force in Portugal in any other hands at present than those of Sir James Pultney, unless you should think it essential to push the question of Sir Charles Stuart, a question, I need not tell you, [which] is neither a palatable [one], in England nor in Portugal. The other resource is Lord Moira, and I don't know enough of him or of the *carte de pays* with regard to him as to be certain how such an appointment would be relished by you and others. I know you think me too sanguine, but I cannot lay aside my hopes of Egypt being over so rapidly as to enable Sir Ralph Abercrombie to be in Portugal, if necessary, by the month of April or May next."

LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1800, October 25. Dropmore.—"I have received from a Mr. Soren, with whose case you are acquainted, a printed statement of his business, which I presume he will also have communicated to you. Having more than once interposed in his favour, in a matter which from the beginning had no relation to the official business of the Foreign Department, and of the final issue of which I was ignorant till I read his pamphlet, I cannot but be hurt at the insinuations which it seems to me to contain, particularly in page twenty-five, of inattention on my part to his sufferings or claims. I have directed a reference to be made to the dates of the correspondence on the subject, by which it appears that Mr. Soren's letter, dated September 19, was by me referred to the King's Advocate by a special letter of reference on the 21st of the same month; and that finding from his opinion that all means of legal redress were shut against Mr Soren, I wrote myself to Mr. Dundas to recommend

the case to his attention, as one which might receive some redress by orders from his Department; though from the Foreign Office it could not. This letter was dated the 27th September, 1798.

"I trouble you with this detail, because it was at your desire that I first interested myself in a business which (if I had not been desirous of contributing my endeavours to procure to Mr. Soren some redress for the injury he has suffered) I might in the first instance have returned to you, as not coming within the line of my official duty.

"The sort of feeling which sometimes urges a complainant to attack those who have most endeavoured to serve him is not uncommon; and I have had too much experience of the circumstances of a public situation to be much surprised at it. Certainly it will not lessen my wishes to be still of some use to a person who seems to me to have been hardly used." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 25. Berlin.—"I have received a letter from the Princess of Tour and Taxis (I cannot conceive why she has chosen to make use of my intervention) desiring me to apply through you to the King in favour of the M. de Bombelles who is now serving as a major-general, I believe, in the corps of Condé. His merits, whatever they may be, are, I presume, fully known to you. His present distress arises from the loss of his wife, by which seven children are left without care or protection in his absence. The additional expense which must be incurred by this event, the Princess says, he cannot supply, and indeed I suppose he has little or no means of subsistence but his pay. To be short, his request made through the Princess is this. I give it in her own words, because I do not understand them. '*Son humble prière porte à obtenir la solde entière en les rations qu'on accorde aux généraux.*' As she adds '*D'après le nouvel ordre, cette demande pourroit trouver quelques difficultés,*' I presume there will be objections to this. I have told her therefore that I am perfectly ignorant of the *ordre* old and new, and can only assure her of the dispositions both of you and myself to obey her commands. That I have communicated them to you, and shall write to her again when I know more, and particularly whether, as it is a military matter, it would not be necessary to apply to the Duke of York; which she would probably choose to do herself. I have only to add that the Princess seems to take a most eager interest in this business, and that I shall be sincerely rejoiced to hear her wish can be obtained, not only because I shall be glad to recommend myself to her, but that she has taught me to share her feelings for this unfortunate family. The Princess has left this country.

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that Portugal is about making terms with France. As I do not									
250	1422	2976	822	2749	452	1427	749	2752	
believe C . . . die himself knows what his Court is doing I pay									

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“Lord Holland and his companions, by my ignorance and his own precipitation, have, I fear, got into an ugly scrape, in which I come in for [a] share. But it cannot now be helped.”

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1800, October 20-25.—“I lose no time in transmitting to your Lordship the Hereditary Prince’s note with those changes which I suggested in consequence of my conversation with you this morning, and which the Prince willingly adopted. I beg you would have the goodness to return me this paper as soon as possible, and to inform me whether you approve of it in its present shape, or whether you have any further remarks upon it. I have endeavoured to render it as conformable as possible to your ideas as you stated them to me this morning, and as little liable as possible to those objections you hinted at. I have every reason to be well pleased with the conversation I had with the Hereditary Prince after I left your Lordship, and to hope that his final determination will be satisfactory, if any thing can be done to meet him half-way. I should be much obliged to you if you could let me have this paper again early to-morrow morning, as I have promised to send it to the Prince in time to enable him to deliver it to the Duke of York, which he can not well defer much longer.”

Enclosure :—

OFFICIAL NOTE.

“Lord Grenville a fait communiquer au Prince Héréditaire d’Orange par Monsieur Fagel que le Gouvernement, voulant employer le corps de troupes Hollandoises qui se trouve à la solde de l’Angleterre, avoit resolu de l’envoyer en Portugal pour servir à la défense de ce royaume, menacé d’une prochaine attaque; qu’avant de faire à S’Altesse Sérénissime cette communication d’une manière officielle, on avoit préalablement voulu l’en informer, et qu’on seroit charmé d’apprendre si s’altesse seroit disposée à accompagner elle-même le corps de troupes; qu’on verroit assurément avec plaisir qu’elle se mette à leur tête, et qu’on étoit persuadé de l’utilité

que sa présence pourroit avoir, et des services qu'elle seroit dans le cas de rendre ; mais, que comme on comprenoit en même tems que le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange pourroit être retenu par différentes considerations de nature à l'empêcher de prendre ce parti, on avoit crû qu'il lui seroit plus agréable d'être mis à même, par cette communication préalable, de s'expliquer avec une entière liberté sur cette matière.

“ Le Prince Héréditaire charge Monsieur Fagel de repondre à cette ouverture en substance ; que depuis le moment que le corps de troupes Hollandoises avoit passé au service de Sa Majesté Britannique, il avoit fait tout ses efforts pour le dresser complètement, et le rendre aussi utile qu'il avoit été en son pouvoir ; que l'objet qu'il avoit, comme de raison, principalement en vue, et que devoit naturellement lui tenir le plus au cœur étoit de voir un jour ce corps, composé principalement de ses compatriotes, servir à la délivrance de sa malheureuses patrie ; que s'il avoit été question, soit de cette délivrance, soit de la défense de la grande Brétagne, le Prince Héréditaire n'auroit pas hésité un instant à se dévouer tout entier à cet objet, et à passer par-dessus toutes considerations qui auroient pû y être étrangères ; mais que dans ce cas-ci l'objet au-quel il paroissoit que le corps alloit être employé étoit pour s'altesse Sérénissime d'un intérêt moins direct, et que plusieurs motifs personels et majeurs relatifs à sa famille et à ses affaires particulières le rappellent d'une manière instante en Allemagne, où il étoit déjà depuis quelque tems attendu ; que cependant, si le gouvernement Britannique attachoit quelque prix à ses services, si l'on croyoit que sa présence en Portugal pût y être véritablement utile, le Prince étoit encore prêt dans ce moment à faire à la cause publique et au service de Sa Majesté Britannique le sacrifice de toute espèce de considerations personnelles ; mais que, dans ce cas, s'altesse devoit représenter, qu'ayant commandé en chef l'armée de la République des Provinces Unies durant les campagnes de 1793 et 1794, pendant lesquelles cette armée s'étoit trouvée ré-unie avec celle de l'Angleterre et de l'Autriche, elle souhaitoit qu'on put prendre, relativement à son rang, des arrangemens qui ne la missent pas dans le cas de servir sous les ordres d'officiers, au mérite desquels elle rendroit pleinement justice, mais qu'elle avoit connu, il y a quelques années, dans des grades de beaucoup inférieurs à celui qu'elle remplissoit alors, et même à ceux que ces mêmes officiers remplissent aujourd'hui ; que si cette difficulté pouvoit être levée en donnant au Prince Héréditaire un rang supérieur (tel que celui de général d'infanterie, le quel il a eu depuis 1790 au service de Leurs Hautes Puissances et le quel rang pourroit être local pour le continent d'Europe, au cas qu'il y eut de la difficulté de le donner différemment) son altesse se détermineroit se rendre elle-même en Portugal avec sa brigade ; mais que, jusqu'à ce que ce point fut réglé, le Gouvernement trouveroit sans doute naturel qu'elle suspendit sa réponse finale ; que s'altesse se persuadoit au reste que, dans le cas où elle se verroit mise à même d'accompagner le corps de troupes Hollandoises en Portugal, le Gouvernement sentiroit lui-même l'avantage qu'il y auroit à faire avec elle des arrangemens pour améliorer l'organisation de ce corps, et même

pour l'augmenter ; mais, surtout, que le gouvernement appercevrait la nécessité d'en faire en tout cas pour tenir ce corps au complet, vu que ce dernier objet demanderoit plus de soins et de dépense que par le passé, à cause de la différence qu'il y a entre la destination principale et primitive pour laquelle les individus formant ce corps se sont jusqu'à présent engagés, et celle qu'ils vont avoir maintenant.

"Monsieur Fagel ayant rendu compte de cette réponse préalable du Prince Héréditaire à Lord Grenville, ce ministre l'autorisa à donner à connaître au Prince que lui-même et les autres Ministres du Roi ses collègues, ne pouvoient qu'applaudir au zèle et à la bonne volonté que s'altesse manifestoit en cette occasion ; qu'il recevoit sa réponse comme provisoire, et qu'avant de lui faire une communication officielle ultérieure d'après laquelle le Prince put prendre une détermination finale, on lui communiqueroit la liste des officiers généraux qui seroient employés dans cette expédition, aussitôt que la nomination en seroit faite." *Copy.*

THOMAS MACDONALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 29. Great George Street.—"I see from my notes that it was Mr. Marshal, the present American Secretary of State, a Virginia lawyer of considerable abilities, who in Congress maintained the argument which I mentioned in the letter I lately took the liberty of writing to your Lordship, namely, that *American* seamen had a *right* to do what had been done on board the *Hermione* frigate, to mutiny and murder British officers. He had spoken with effect in vindication of the President's conduct in giving up one of the mutineer's agreeably to the treaty, on the ground that he was in truth an Irishman, and a British subject ; but he took occasion at the same time to proclaim and enlarge upon the very humane and liberal principle I have stated.

"Being Secretary of State, and a favourite with the President, who appointed him in place of *Pickering*, as being supposed to be less favourable to the politics of England, I have thought that it might not be improper in me to mention this trait of his opinions. He was the framer too of the address of the House of Representatives in answer to the President's speech, in which they justify, in terms calculated clearly to make an impression on his Majesty's Government, the secession of the American Commissioners ; and had all along, as counsel against British creditors, been accustomed to oppose the plain and obvious construction of the 4th article of the treaty of peace.

"I may further mention what from good information I know of the character of Mr. *Ellsworth*, lately arrived from France. From all I have heard in America I am bound to speak of him very favourably. I take him to be uncommonly honest ; and from a feature which his countrymen ascribe to him, 'timidity, or shyness of nature,' (words which some acquaintance with the American language enables me to interpret according to the meaning *there* conveyed by them) I conceive him to be possessed of a certain delicacy of sentiment and conduct which must give him a cast of singularity. I

understand he is ignorant of the world, but not assuming ; another uncommon combination in America.

“ And now I request of you to peruse a very few words respecting myself. Your Lordship’s correct knowledge of the duty I endeavoured to discharge in America, the reception you gave me on my return, the great kindness of that praise with which you honoured me in your conversation with his Majesty at the *levée* (for which I shall never cease to be grateful) and your being happily at the head of the Department under which I have acted, all these circumstances induced me to gratify myself, as with much deference I do, with the flattering belief that I might safely *in silence* rely (as far as became me) on *your Lordship’s* favour. This confidence the Lord Chancellor confirmed by informing me last week that you had expressed to him a wish to be of use to me ; in consequence of which, after some preliminary conversation, he desired I would fully and freely state to him my private situation (which indeed he partly knew) and the precise expectations I entertained, for the purpose of his communicating them to your Lordship. I have done so accordingly, in a letter which may be considered as addressed to your Lordship ; and to which I must entreat your *indulgent* attention ; for whoever writes of himself stands in need of indulgence. My solicitude in this respect is in proportion to the high value I put on the good opinion your Lordship has so kindly expressed of me ; an opinion which it is my favourite hope you will never have occasion to alter.”

CHARLES ARBUTHNOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, October 30. Lisbon.—“ As I happened to learn from very good authority that General Goltze had chosen to say publicly that this Government was extremely averse to the arrival of British troops, I thought myself called upon to make M. Pinto acquainted with this very extraordinary circumstance. I mentioned it therefore in my conference of this evening, and I, at the same time, informed him that this language made a greater impression on me as it had been accompanied by strong declarations that it was very well known to your Lordship that the troops were not wanted here, but that the British Government had its own reasons for wishing that Sir Ralph Abercromby’s army might be allowed to winter in Portugal.

“ M. Pinto was much vexed and hurt at what I said to him. He owned that General Goltze had had the imprudence to express himself in a manner very similar to what I had stated ; but, whatever might be the private opinion of that officer with regard to the measures which this Government ought or wished to take, he had not been authorized by the Prince to talk as he feared he had done, for His Royal Highness still asked for succours with unabated earnestness, and had even very seriously lamented that the whole number of troops which had been applied for were not likely to be granted.

“ Having made this declaration M. Pinto then said that, as a

proof of the good faith with which he was speaking, he would own to me confidentially that he had this very morning written to General Goltze, by the express order of the Prince, to desire he would abstain in future from interfering in politics ; for the language he had held was not only in direct opposition to the views and wishes of this Government, but it might have the serious bad effect of throwing an appearance of inconsistency on that line of conduct which His Royal Highness, after the maturest deliberation, had determined to pursue. For this latter reason he entreated me very earnestly not to acquaint my Government with this part of our conversation. I could not venture to comply entirely with his request, but I have so far agreed to it as to convey only in a private letter that information with which I feel it to be my duty to acquaint your Lordship.

“As connected in some measure with this subject, I must now beg leave to take notice of another circumstance which has been lately made known to me, and for the existence of which I can safely answer.

“M. d’Almeida has written to a friend of his in this town that he finds himself at present in a very unpleasant and awkward situation. He says that every packet brings him assurances from M. Pinto that the country is in the greatest danger, and that succours of all kinds must be applied for. But then, in opposition to this, it is still more positively asserted to him from various other quarters that the state of affairs here is by no means critical, and that an additional number of British troops, instead of being serviceable, would be the cause of much embarrassment. He, of course, obeys the directions which he receives from M. Pinto, but in the private letter from him to which I have alluded, he expresses much uneasiness at the being obliged on all occasions to say more than your Lordship can well credit ; and he even adds that, having found the British Government ever ready to listen to his requests, he wishes he could be spared the ungrateful task of attempting to deceive it.

“Neither the language which has been held by General Goltze, nor what has been written by Monsieur d’Almeida, require my comments, for, on former occasions, I have given so very much in detail my opinion respecting the want of troops, that I am only apprehensive lest in so doing I should have gone beyond the exact line of duty. In this place, therefore, I shall content myself with stating as a matter of fact that, either for the reasons which I have ventured to impute to him, or at least from some more worthy but apparently mistaken motive, M. Pinto is at this moment of time the only person in the country who even affects to represent Portugal as being in such a perilous situation as to render foreign aid necessary. Should the Emperor’s negotiation lead to his own separate peace, this Government would then (as it has stipulated to do) have recourse to the mediation of the Spanish Court, and, should its attempts to get out of the war still be ineffectual, the late crisis may again return ; but, as things now are, there is neither the reality nor even the belief of danger.

“As I find it is said that a body of 8,000 Spaniards were entrenched in the neighbourhood of Cadiz when Sir R. Abercromby

proposed to land his troops, I must beg leave to observe that this large force of the enemy was not brought down to the coast till Sir J. Pulteney's expedition, after failing at Ferrol, had gone up to Gibraltar. I wish to mention this, as otherwise it might appear that our generals had been led into error by the inaccuracy of my information.

"By the last packet I had the honour of writing a private letter to your Lordship, in which I enclosed two papers of intelligence from Madrid. Lest they should have miscarried, I take the liberty of now sending duplicates of them, and I regret that an excursion which my friend has made into the country prevents my forwarding, by this conveyance, any further intelligence of a like nature."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 30. Woodley.—"Many thanks for your abstract of the despatches from Vienna. They certainly do not seem to furnish grounds for any new Cabinet deliberation as yet, and upon the whole they promise rather favourably. But the time is approaching very fast when we must settle the tone to be taken with regard to our Austrian connection, and it is not without its difficulty. If they break the armistice before the end of autumn on the ground of refusing to treat without us, we can (I hope) renew the subsidy. Perhaps we may be able to do so if they even obtain a prolongation of the armistice to the spring, without any new disgrace. But if Cobenzel once goes on to Luneville I have no great expectation that either of these will be the result. We shall then probably see either a separate peace or an armistice bought by concessions sufficient to transfer the prospect of success on the opening of the next campaign from the Austrians to the French.

"With respect to the payment of the second instalment of the subsidy I conclude you will adhere to the determination of declining payment till the armistice shall have been broken, or till we see grounds from unequivocal acts of exertion to justify fixing on any other period."

H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 30.—"I have received the enclosed letter from the Prince of Orange, which I have the honor to send to you, together with the paper which accompanies it.

"The Hereditary Prince is extremely anxious to know whether any determination has been taken on the subject of his journey to Portugal. As the season is advancing so fast, he grows every day more impatient to be relieved from the state of suspense and uncertainty in which he still is. I have no doubt but your Lordship will find this wish natural, and if you could enable me to say something to him on the subject, you would confer an obligation both on the Prince and on myself."

Enclosure :—

The PRINCE OF ORANGE to H. FAGEL.

1800, October 30. London.—"J'ai reçu par la poste de Hambourg du 17, de la part du Général Stamford, la copie ci-jointe d'une lettre

de M. le Comte de Goertz au Roi de Prusse en date du 25 September. Il m'a fait prier de la faire passer à Mylord Grenville au plustot. Il ne m'a pas écrit, n'en ayant pas la force, et devant partir de Brunswic le 14. Je vous envoie en original la copie qu'il m'a envoyée ; il y a des phrases et surtout la dernière que je crois n'avoir pas été bien copiée, car elle ne présente aucun sens. Je n'ai pas voulu y changer la moindre chose ; et quoique je croye que le Gouvernement a des informations directes sur les sentiments de la Cour de Vienne, et de son Ministre, j'ai cru ne devoir pas supprimer la lettre que M. de Stamford m'a envoyée, et que je vous prie de communiquer à Mylord Grenville.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October 31. Woodley.—“ I have no doubt that the answer you propose to send to Cobenzell is exactly what it ought to be, and that we can take no other line under these strange circumstances. With respect to the transaction itself, I hardly [know] how to interpret the conduct either of Austria or of France, and have no great faith in the probability of the first adhering to its engagements with us (if pressed to a point) or of the latter agreeing to joint negotiation. The whole is inexplicable, but what you propose will fairly try the experiment. Paris, and still more any other place on this side of France, would certainly be better for us than Luneville, if there should be a joint treaty.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1800, October 31. Cleveland Row.—“ You will see by my despatch and its inclosure the first effect of all M. de Cobenzl's promises. I much fear that his real intention is to outwit Thugut by framing and concluding a treaty *quelconque*, and establishing on that basis his ministerial existence ; and that Thugut's weight, even if well-employed, will hardly be sufficient to counteract this plan when peace is presented in one hand, and in the other the renewal of the war.

“ Is it possible that Cobenzl should go to Paris without ever asking the question whether an English minister was to come or not ? Nobody can believe it. And therefore I have no other expectation than that at Paris he will try to patch up the best peace he can ; and failing in this, but not otherwise, will make a great parade of adherence to the treaties with Great Britain.

“ If there was a grain of spirit in the Austrian councils this single event of the capture of Leghorn ought to rouse it to action, and the evacuation of that place ought to be made a *sine qua non* preliminary of all negotiation ; but such measures are, as Mr. Fox calls it, ‘ too strong for the present day.’

“ Surely it cannot be wise that Berlin should, just in this moment, be left without an Austrian minister. The greatest talents that ever fell to the lot of any negotiator would not be too great for the duties which an Austrian minister has in this moment to perform at Berlin. With all their affected indifference, they cannot really be blind to the interest they have in what is passing.

“As for Russia, you see that we are all but at war with that near and natural ally of this country; and that when Thugut has succeeded in making his own peace at Petersburg, he must next make our's, whose only offence was till now the having adhered to Austria when Paul quarrelled with her. Denmark and Malta have now added two other grievances which will not, I imagine, be easily got over; though it is not difficult to prove to any cooler head that in neither instance could we act otherwise than we have.”

Postscript.—“In my answer to Cobenzel I shall tell him that, if we are to treat, we had rather treat at Paris than at Luneville. Pray try to make Thugut of the same opinion.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, October —.Wimbledon.—“I send you two letters for your perusal which were put into my hands two days ago at the London Tavern, I do not know by whom. Return them to me in case they are asked for. They contain nothing new to you, but I am afraid contain only additional proofs how awkward that business becomes more and more every day. The Americans are egregiously in the wrong, but they are so much in debt to this country that we scarcely dare to quarrel with them; an additional proof how important it is for a great commercial country to have its markets as much distributed as possible.”

Enclosing two letters, dated respectively August 6 and September 2, 1799, from W. Parker, Philadelphia, to John Lane, London, complaining of the dishonest practices of the American Commissioners appointed under a recent treaty to consider the claims of British merchants upon the Government of the United States.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 1. Berlin.—“What I have said in my despatch of this date stands upon the authority there stated. My private opinion is that nothing can be expected from hence in any conjuncture. A few nonsensical words from France, or the mere mention of the journey of a Louis Bonaparte, who orders post-horses every week but never arrives, is sufficient to keep every thing here in suspense. And notwithstanding what has passed with General Stamford, I know that Haugwitz, so late as the day before yesterday, told a person with whom he is in the habit of conversing freely on all subjects, that he had received a letter in the Emperor's own hand approving in the fullest manner the Prussian neutral system, and that he had shown the letter to the King, who being now assured of the concurrence of Russia, was more than ever confirmed in it. Since my despatch was ciphered, Krudener told me what you see in the postscript. He then talked of Lord St. Helens and others for a mission to Petersburg, and added his conjecture that M. de Kottchoubey had orders to go to London. If that is the case you will have heard it before. Some Englishmen from Petersburg have given me such accounts of the violence of the Emperor during the suspense of the Danish business that I do

well see how you can pass it over. It seems as if all the British merchants were withdrawing from the trade, and indeed I think the declaration delivered to the neutral Ministers of Petersburg amounts almost to a standing declaration of war. As to Malta, I have not seen your convention, but I think it would be a most serious misfortune to all Europe that that place should become a Russian possession, which it will be in effect, if it is given up to the Order of which the Emperor is Grand Master. We are all on tiptoe for news from Vienna. For my part I expect nothing but separate peace. My old acquaintance Cobentzl is not made to be an instrument of good." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, November 1. Cleveland Row.—“The last private letter I have to acknowledge from you is No. 10, but I am too much hurried to-day to enter into its contents. I will send you next mail the papers which were wanting in the suite of Otto's communications.

“We shall probably now not let them be published till Parliament meets, as that is so near.

“We heard yesterday that Cobentzl is arrived at Paris, where he has renewed his declaration of not treating but conjointly with England. Will he adhere to it? That is the question which a few days will now solve, and which must decide all our measures. By all means cultivate any disposition at Berlin to be better with us. I will write to you more fully on this point if possible by Tuesday's mail.

“Do not let our papers appear till they are published here, which will probably not be till Parliament meets, if then.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, November 1.—“Je vous envoie la minute des deux questions.

“Tâchez, je vous supplie, de nous mettre à même d'y répondre positivement le plutôt possible.

1. La France a-t-elle consenti à traiter avec les alliés conjointement, et pour une paix générale, et cela sans armistice naval?

“2. Sur son refus, M. de Cobentzl a-t-il rompu sa négociation, ou (ce que je crois impossible) s'est-il déterminé à traiter séparément?

“Vous qui connoissez le pays, sentirez facilement combien il nous est important d'avoir, le plutôt possible, l'oui ou le non direct à ces questions, et de pouvoir y préparer l'esprit public.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 2. Woodley.—“I confess to you I cannot quite satisfy myself with the manner in which either of the two delicate points, corn and foreign politics, are treated in the draft of the speech which I received last night. With respect to corn I certainly think it highly necessary to discourage the dangerous notions which have been too much propagated of late; but I am

persuaded that it is necessary to sooth rather than to irritate, and that the effect is more likely to be produced by calm discussion and patient investigation than by a dry and peremptory tone for which I am sure men's minds are ill prepared. I am convinced that it is right and essential to shew a disposition to enquire whether there are any undue practices which it may be safe and useful to prevent, and which it may be possible to distinguish from the fair course of ordinary trade, on which I think it as essential as you do not to break in. It also seems to me very desirable to point the public expectation to some relief from importation, which I am persuaded will be realized to a considerable extent, and may effect some abatement of price, still however leaving it high enough to check the consumption and to afford much more than a sufficient profit to the farmer. To withhold all hope of relief will excite a despair which the circumstances do not justify, and is nearly as dangerous as the opposite extreme which asserts that there is no deficiency.

"With respect to foreign politics, I am clearly for communicating the papers to Parliament, and am not at all shaken in this respect by Canning's arguments; but I so far agree with him as to think that it is better not to make this subject too prominent a feature in the Speech, and particularly neither to pledge ourselves, nor to attempt to pledge others too deeply on the subject of our connection with Austria. It seems much safer to maintain only that both good faith and policy required our refusing separate negotiation as we have done; but to leave the question for the future of renewing our engagements, as one in which Government must exercise its discretion according to events. I have made an altered version of the speech with a view to these modifications, which I have directed to be copied and sent to you, and heartily wish you may not see much to disapprove."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800], November 6th. Downing Street.—"I send you a fair copy of the speech. In writing out the amendments I have thought it best to put what refers to the encouragement of agriculture in the early part of the speech, and not to blend the foreign with the domestic trade in provisions, as what is said about the latter will not apply to the former. I have made the paragraph about combinations and practices, in the material part, exactly conformable to what we sketched last night. But I own I think the words *injurious to the community* too vague to answer the purpose. And on the other hand the form of the sentence as it now stands seems more directly to countenance the opinion that injurious practices are prevalent, that [than ?] it did in the hypothetical way, in which I had stated it. I have therefore put on a separate paper an amended version of this paragraph, and which, qualified as it is by the reference to unfavourable seasons, I hope you will not think liable to much objection.

"I also send you on another paper an alteration in the part relating to the disposition to peace, which I think would make

that passage more satisfactory, and which consists chiefly in introducing a part of a paragraph in your draft, which I had inadvertently omitted in mine. I would not insert either of these alterations in the copy sent you, because you may like better to show the speech to your mover in its present form as an outline, and these corrections can easily be made afterwards, if on discussion there is no strong reason against them. I would have called on you if the day had been more tolerable."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800], November 7. Downing Street.—"I have desired King to send you copy of a hand-bill which has been circulated to call a meeting to-morrow at Kennington Common, and an account of the steps intended to be taken respecting it, which I imagine you will approve. It is unlucky that, by some unaccountable negligence, the Bill passed in 1795 respecting meetings has been suffered to expire. If any thing different occurs to you as fit to be done you will of course send word, or if you are at leisure to call here you will find me any time in the evening. Indeed there are one or two other topics on which I should be glad to speak to you, though they do not press."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, November 7. Cleveland Row.—"I number this letter 8, considering my last of the 1st instant as No. 7. I have four letters of yours to answer; those from the 11th to the 21st October.

"With respect to Russia, Shairp's story is conclusive as to any hopes of good from that quarter till the moon changes. The business of Malta will serve to exasperate the Emperor still more, and if he does us no harm, he certainly will not try to do us any good. Your answer to Krudener on that subject was exactly what we wished, but it may be useful that you should know for the sake of conversation with others that the convention to which he alluded was never signed; if it had been signed and ten times ratified, the Emperor's conduct has released us from it; but signed it never was.

"My alarm about your communications respecting Bavaria arose from my misunderstanding a passage in one of your despatches. What you did say could do no harm; but it is singular that the answer you received of total indifference on the subject should be so different from the language held to the Elector.

"It would be very useful if you could collect some idea of the conditions for general peace which Paul proposed at Berlin, because I have great reason to believe that these are not considered there as wholly laid aside. It is however very difficult to believe that either of those two Courts, governed as they are, will be able to acquire much weight in the negotiations between Austria and France. The latter will, of course, be desirous to bring into play the hostile dispositions of the Northern powers respecting our maritime strength. I wish I may be mistaken in including Prussia in that description, notwithstanding all that Haugwitz may say to the contrary. His

silence to you about the Russia paper is but a bad omen in this respect.

"It is however very well to keep in good terms with them, and I trust my despatch of this day will assist that object.

"I examined the case about Courvoisier, who was not to blame. But I have prohibited the messengers from going through Hamburg, and if you find they have been there, I will beg you to notice it to them and to the Office.

"I will enquire about the case of M. de Bombelles.

"We lay the papers on Tuesday before both Houses, and Gentz may publish as soon as he pleases after you get the printed copies, but not before." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, November 7. Cleveland Row.—"I have received by this mail an indistinct account from Hamburg respecting the capture of a Prussian vessel in the Ems, and its being brought into Cuxhaven. I wish you would say to Count Haugwitz that I had already directed an enquiry to be made into a complaint respecting some prior transactions of this nature, and that I wait only to receive the detail in order to direct an amicable communication to be made through you on the subject, which, among others, will also comprise this case. Do not wait till he speaks to you about it, but mention it first.

"What you will have to say will relate both to the captures made by us there and to the captures of our ships there by the (*soi-disant*) French from Delfzyl." *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 12. Berlin.—"I take the opportunity of two gentlemen going to England to send you two papers from Gentz, in which you will see the scope of the publication he proposes. The sum of what he asks (though in the state in which you receive the papers it may not clearly appear) is, that if the produce in London should not amount to two thousand dollars, the difference should be made up to him by the public. I think it would be to be regretted if his journal was to drop, as I believe it to be the only publication in support of the good cause which circulates on the Continent; and its reputation is so well established that it commands attention. He has proposed to Herbert Marsh to be his translator, and I have told him I think he should engage him also to manage the details of the publication. *Au reste*, he would employ nobody who had not the confidence of Government, either as editor or printer, and would consign his papers to any one named by you. The two thousand dollars would amount at par to about 300 guineas, and if what I have heard of the subscription for Mallet du Pan's work be true, I think there can be little doubt but that he would get subscribers enough to make up the sum.

"I rejoice much in what you tell me of Count Cobenzl in Mr. Fisher's letter, though even the few I talk with here who wish

well to the cause seem to despair of the means of Austria ; but I entertain less apprehension from the personal character of Cobenzl than I did, as it seems clear that Thugut is still the real minister. The Emperor of Russia's madness seems so evident that I trust it will prevent the League which has been forming in the North. I cannot persuade myself that it is yet in any forwardness, though I must own I find many well meaning persons persuaded of the contrary."

Enclosure 1 :—

MÉMOIRE, by GENTZ.

" Le principe dominant de la politique de l'Europe, et le principe dominant de tous les raisonneurs et écrivains politiques est dans le moment actuel—*la jalousie de la puissance Britannique.*

" Il ne faut plus se le dissimuler : l'enthousiasme que les principes de la Révolution Françoise avoient inspiré à tous les peuples de l'Europe, s'éteint de plus en plus : la terreur que les forfaits et les armes de cette Révolution avoient imprimée partout s'est dissipée de même. Ceux qui aimoient le système révolutionnaire avec passion, quoiqu' ils ne cesseront jamais de l'aimer, l'aiment avec froideur ; ceux qui le combattoient avec énergie, ne le combattent plus qu'avec indifférence. L'usurpation qui a couronné cette Révolution, est consommée. Chacun cherche aujourd'hui l'attitude qu'il doit prendre, dans le nouvel état de choses que cette usurpation a amené. On verra peut-être avec plaisir tomber l'usurpateur ; mais on le voit régner paisiblement. Le sentiment du juste et de l'injuste, l'horreur du crime, le besoin d'une vengeance légitime, le respect pour ce qui a été longtems sacré parmi les hommes, la loyauté, la pudeur, toutes les nobles émotions du coeur humain sont disparues. Il n'y a pas, jusqu' à l'ardeur révolutionnaire elle-même, qui n'ait été engloutie dans le tombeau de toutes les passions fortes de tous les mouvemens prononcés. L'enthousiasme avoit créé la Révolution ; c'est la lâcheté et l'égoïsme qui l'ont consacré et perpétuée.

" Il ne reste donc plus aux grandes puissances que le soin de s'affermir sur leurs bases, en calculant et capitulant avec ce bouleversement désormais irréparable, et se prémunir de longue main contre les germes de nouveaux déchiremens et de nouveaux malheurs, qui les menacent. L'Angleterre est la dernière ressource de l'Europe ; et c'est précisément contre l'Angleterre que se tourne à présent le torrent dévastateur d'une opinion publique, fruit de l'aveuglement des uns, et de la méchancheté inépuisable des autres.

" La haine contre l'Angleterre découle principalement de deux sources.

1. " Des absurdes préjugés en matière d'économie publique, qui font croire au public de *tous les pays sans exception*, que la grandeur d'un pays doit nécessairement être la faiblesse et la perte des autres, que ce qui constitue la richesse de l'Angleterre constitue la pauvreté du reste de l'Europe, que la prépondérance aussi *juste qu' inévitable* que donnent à une nation son industrie, son caractère, et la sagesse de son gouvernement, est un monopole odieux par lequel elle

opprime toutes les autres nations ; enfin ce qui est le comble du délire, mais en même tems une conséquence naturelle des erreurs fondamentales, que la décadence et même la destruction de l'Angleterre seroit l'événement le plus heureux qui pourroit arriver au reste du monde.

" Cette haine découle, 2. De la part à jamais honorable que l'Angleterre a prise dans la guerre contre la Révolution, et de la noble et salutaire énergie qu'elle a déployée dans cette crise terrible. C'est un crime irrémissible, que les nombreux partisans de système révolutionnaire ne lui pardonneront jamais.

" Par ces deux causes réunies nous en sommes enfin parvenus au point, que le gouvernement Anglois—il faut le dire avec vérité et même avec force—n'a presque plus d'amis hors le sein de son pays. Ceux qui se sont plus ou moins déclaré pour la Révolution sont les ennemis nés de ce gouvernement ; et ceux même qui n'aiment pas la Révolution voient dans l'Angleterre le fléau de la prospérité publique de l'Europe. Que l'on consulte l'esprit public d'une extrémité du Continent à l'autre : on retrouvera par-tout les mêmes dispositions.

" Il est vrai qu'un gouvernement fort de sa justice et de sa sagesse peut se mettre longtems au-dessus des vaines clameurs de l'ignorance et des intrigues infatigables de la perfidie. Mais il arrive un moment ou, sous peine de sacrifier les intérêts les plus sacrés, on ne peut, et on ne doit plus rester indifférent à cette réunion de haines sincères et de haines artificielles ; et ce moment paroît être arrivé pour l'Angleterre.

" Car (1) l'opinion publique, quelque pervertie, quelque détestable que puisse être sa direction, n'est jamais une chose indifférente. Elle pourroit l'être encore pour un gouvernement fondé exclusivement sur la violence et la terreur, auquel tous les moyens paroissent également bons et permis, et dont la maxime suprême seroit, *oderint dum metuant*. Mais un état dont la constitution même exclut l'abus de la force, qui ne veut et qui ne peut se permettre que ce qui est juste et bon en soi, qui règne par la loyauté et non par l'oppression, doit nécessairement compter avec l'opinion publique, la diriger si elle est pervertie, la combattre si elle s'arme contre lui.

2. " Cette opinion publique devient plus grave lorsqu'elle entraîne dans ses torrents non seulement la multitude aveugle, et les écrivains factieux, mais même les hommes d'état les plus influens par leur position et par leur pouvoir. Or il est indubitable que ce qui a donné si véritable force au système politique du moment, ce qui a entraîné tant de souverains dans les idées d'opposition systématique, de mesures concertées, de ligue générale contre l'Angleterre, ce qui a été la base de tout ce qui se prépare et se trame maintenant contre cette puissance, c'est l'aveuglement de la plupart des hommes d'état, ministres dirigeans, envoyés des Cours, publicistes d'un ordre supérieur, enfin de la plupart de ceux qui dominent l'opinion elle-même ; aveuglement dont les progrès sont plus grands et plus terribles que ne sauroient jamais le croire et le concevoir ceux qui n'ont pas eu l'occasion d'observer de près ce qui se passe sur le Continent.

“ On peut en appeler hardiment à tous les ministres instruits et attentifs de l'Angleterre dans les diverses parties de l'Europe, si l'exagération et la terreur panique ont la moindre part à ce tableau affligeant, si ce n'est pas là l'état réel des choses, s'il n'y a pas de grands pàys et des villes qui passent pour être en possession de toutes les lumières, où il seroit difficile de trouver *dix*, je dis, *dix* véritables et sincères amis du gouvernement Anglois, ou seulement dix personnes qui sentissent quel coup mortel l'affaiblissement de l'Angleterre porteroit à la prospérité et à l'existence même de l'Europe.

“ Je sais tres-bien que les efforts de quelques écrivains n'arrêteront pas tout-à-coup ce torrent dévastateur ; mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'au delà de ses propres moyens de conservation (qui sont certainement infiniment respectables, et qui, si la Providence ne nous a pas absolument voués à la destruction générale, nous soutiendront longtems, en dépit de nos propres fureurs) il ne reste plus au Gouvernement Anglois pour ramener peu-à-peu l'opinion à des principes plus sains, que la résolution de mettre à profit tout ce qu'il y a encore en Europe de lumières et de talens, et tout ce que la corruption effrénée du siècle a encore laissé intact de ces lumières et de ces talens, pour l'employer, pour le concentrer dans sa cause. Le public, tout gangrené qu'il soit, n'est pas devenu entièrement sourd à la voix de la vérité lorsqu'elle se présente avec force, avec courage, et avec éclat. *Le Mercure Britannique* de M. Mallet Dupan a été une digue plus salutaire que ne l'imaginent peut-être les ministres éclairés eux-mêmes qui lui avoient accordé leur protection ; et le rédacteur du présent mémoire, éloigné autant qu'on peut l'être de toute présomption ridicule, habitué même à se défier continuellement de ses foibles moyens, ne sauroit cependant se dissimuler que par les morceaux qu'il a publiés de tems en tems, il n'ait influé plus ou moins sur l'opinion du public, sur-tout dans les classes supérieures, pour lesquelles le danger de la séduction est malheureusement aussi grand aujourd'hui qu'il l'étoit naguères pour les classes moyennes de la société. Son ouvrage sur les finances de l'Angleterre, quelque imparfait qu'il soit, en a été une preuve remarquable. On l'a maltraité, insulté de toutes les manières ; mais il n'en est pas moins avéré et incontestable que cet ouvrage a fait en France même une très-forte impression, et qu'il a forcé à respecter l'Angleterre ceux même qui étoient les plus éloignés de l'aimer.

“ Quand on ne peut pas maitriser l'opinion, c'est déjà beaucoup que de l'entraver et de la battre sans relâche. L'abandonner à elle-même seroit la plus grave de toutes les fautes. Dans ce moment-ci ce n'est plus l'absurde fanatisme de la Révolution seul, c'est encore la haine intensée contre le Gouvernement Anglois qu'il faut attaquer de toutes les forces qui nous restent. Heureux ceux qui, en se chargeant de cette tâche noble et nécessaire, pourront se dire qu'ils ont contribué à maintenir ce qu'il y avoit de plus grand et de plus respectable parmi les hommes, et à détourner de l'Europe des calamités qui feroient presque oublier celles dont nous avons été les témoins et les victimes.”

Enclosuré 2 :—

MÉMOIRE PARTICULIER, by GENTZ.

“ Vous m’avez permis de vous présenter quelques idées sur la nécessité urgente d’agir sur la direction de l’opinion publique. Vous m’avez permis encore d’y ajouter quelques mots sur la manière dont je pourrais concourir moi-même à ce but salulaire. J’ai fait l’un dans le mémoire joint à cette lettre, mémoire qui ne contient rien que vous ne confirmeriez vous-même d’après tout ce que vous avez vu et entendu autour de vous. Je ferai l’autre par l’exposition sincère que vous allez lire ici.

“ J’ai commencé mon journal sous les auspices du seul homme qui parmi vous avoit parfaitement vû et senti l’esprit malheureux qui dirige les conseils de ce pàys. Vous comprendrez donc sans peine qu’une entreprise de ce genre devoit trouver mille obstacles au lieu d’un seul encouragement. La conjuration de la faire avorter a été générale et terrible. Le Comte Schulemburg m’a seul soutenu. Heureusement qu’alors son crédit étoit encore assez grand pour balancer tout ce qu’on avoit fait pour empêcher le roi de me protéger. Heureusement que les moyens de me protéger efficacement étoient tous entre ses mains.

“ L’état de notre librairie, et l’indolence et le mauvais esprit du public de l’Allemagne auroit rendu cette entreprise impossible à un homme qui ne s’en seroit jamais chargé sans être sûr de remplir sa tâche avec un certain degré de succès. Les travaux qu’un ouvrage de cette nature exige, les frais très-considérables de livres, brochures, gazettes, qu’il suppose, ne pouvoient absolument être soutenus que par le concours généreux de la part du Gouvernement. Le Comte Schulemburg, aux instances particulières duquel mon journal a du son existence, en a fait les honneurs sous tous les rapports. Il a déterminé le roi, 1. à me dispenser de la plus grande partie des travaux attachés aux fonctions de ma place ; 2, à consacrer une somme annuelle de 2,000 écus à la rédaction de mon journal. La moitié de cette somme m’a été payée comme gratification pour mon travail, l’autre moitié à titre de dédommagement pour les dépenses que ce travail entraînoit ; et je puis vous assurer sur mon honneur que bien plus que cette moitié, que les trois-quarts au moins de toute la somme ont été absorbés par ces dépenses.

“ Ce payement m’a été continué régulièrement, quartier par quartier, pendant les deux années 1799 et 1800. Je savois depuis longtems qu’il cesseroit à la fin de celle-ci. Le Comte Schulemburg avoit déjà fait l’impossible. L’influence et le crédit du parti opposé avoit tellement augmenté, que la discrétion m’engageoit moi-même à prier ce ministre de ne plus se sacrifier pour cette entreprise.

“ Comme je vous dois à présent toute la vérité, j’aurai l’honneur de vous dire qu’elle alloit cesser entièrement, si vous ne m’aviez pas ouvert une nouvelle perspective. La promesse de lui donner une autre forme, et de continuer le journal comme ouvrage périodique paroissant par quartier, n’étoit qu’un prétexte pour masquer au public le changement qui s’étoit fait dans ma position. Le Comte Schulemburg, qui m’avoit du moins procuré pour l’année prochaine la continuation de ma dispensation du travail de département, désiroit lui-même que je ne me retirasse pas brusquement, et que

j'en imposasse, pour ainsi dire, au public, qui n'a jamais été dans le véritable secret de l'entreprise. Je prévoyois et je prévois encore qu'il m'est impossible de la soutenir par mes forces.

"Cependant, comme vous croyez vous-même que la continuation de mes travaux ne seroit pas sans intérêt pour l'Angleterre, comme vous connoissez assez l'état des choses pour savoir que même la publication non-interrompue de mes écrits *en Allemagne* ne seroit pas un objet entièrement indifférent à votre pays, et qu'ensuite une traduction régulière dans votre langue pourroit faire quelque bien en Angleterre, je vous présenterai mon plan, en vous laissant le soin d'en disposer de la manière que vous jugerez la plus convenable.

"La seule condition que je fais pour moi doit nécessairement être celle de rester du moins dans l'état où je me suis trouvé jusqu'ici. Je suis persuadé qu'il ne s'agiroit que d'ouvrir une souscription en Angleterre ; et comme les cahiers qui forment une année peuvent très bien, d'après leur volume, être vendus à 2 guinées d'abonnement (ce qui étoit le prix de l'ouvrage de Mallet Dupan) je crois que le Gouvernement couvrirait aisément cette dépense. Mais, comme il me seroit impossible de traiter directement avec un libraire de Londrès, et qu'en général les tracasseries pécuniaires ne s'accordent pas avec le travail soutenu qu'exige un ouvrage de ce genre, je demanderois comme condition préliminaire, ou comme grace particulière, de n'entrer pour rien dans les détails de cet arrangement, mais d'être simplement assuré de percevoir, quartier par quartier, la somme en question, sans m'inquiéter de toute autre affaire relative à l'argent.

"Si cet objet peut se régler, je vous promets de vous fournir régulièrement ce qu'il faudra pour publier en Anglois les morceaux qui je composerois en Allemand. J'ai pris la liberté de vous désigner un homme à Londrès qui réunit toutes les qualités que cette traduction exige. Si on insiste à ce que l'ouvrage soit publié *par mois*, je m'arrangerai en conséquence. Cependant je vous répète encore ce que je vous ai déjà observé, c'est que, comme je m'abstiendrai presque toujours de traiter les nouvelles du moment, comme tout mon plan est basé sur des morceaux d'une très grande étendue, comme il me seroit infiniment plus favorable de donner à ces morceaux tout le tems et toute la suite que leur perfection demanderoit, et comme, d'ailleurs, la communication avec l'Angleterre est sujette à trop de difficultés pour pouvoir s'engager à y envoyer chaque mois les matériaux d'un cahier, je préférerois infiniment, et pour moi-même, et pour l'avantage du public et de la chose, de ne faire paroître que tous les deux ou trois mois un petit volume. Je vous prie de proposer cette idée aux personnes auxquelles vous ferez part de ma proposition, et je serois bien charmé si elles la regardoient du même point-de-vue.

"Si mon plan est accepté, je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que je m'attacherai principalement à traiter les objets qui peuvent avoir un intérêt particulier pour l'Angleterre, et pour ses intérêts sur le Continent. Je vous présenterai ici quelques-uns de ces objets qui m'occuperoient sur-tout dans le travail de l'année prochaine.

1. "Développement des principes qui tendroient à convaincre

l'Europe que son intérêt *bien-entendu* ne sauroit jamais être séparé de l'intérêt de la Grande Bretagne, de la conservation de sa précieuse industrie, de son commerce ; et à détruire toutes les fausses idées qu'on s'est faites de ce qu'on appelle si mal-à-propos son monopole.

2. " Analyse de la doctrine de la souveraineté du peuple, dans laquelle je remonterois à l'origine de ce faux principe, dans laquelle je montrerois quel mal il a fait à l'Angleterre depuis le siècle passé ; comment il a été propagé dans toute l'Europe, comment il a engendré la révolution de France (que les badauds regardent comme fondée sur des principes *inconnus* jusqu'à nos jours) ; et comment il a fait que même sous la meilleure des constitutions, il a toujours subsisté un levain révolutionnaire, seule cause de la conduite plus qu'étrange qu'un certain parti a tenu parmi vous, et dont il scandalise encore aujourd'hui la majorité éclairée de votre nation, et le petit nombre d'hommes—*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*—qui sont encore dignes d'entendre la vérité dans les autres pays de l'Europe.

3. " Recherches sur les véritables causes de la guerre actuelle et sur celles de sa durée, dans lesquelles je m'attacherois sur-tout à laver une fois pour toutes votre gouvernement de tous les reproches absurdes dont on l'accable. Je suis pour l'objet de cet article en possession de faits précieux et d'excellens documens, dont je ne pourrois pas faire *chez nous* tout l'usage que je désirerois, vu notre manière de penser, et les principes de ce gouvernement-ci.

" Au reste vous connoissez assez ma manière d'écrire et sur-tout ma façon de penser, pour que j'aie besoin de vous entretenir longtems sur l'esprit dans lequel tous ces morceaux seroient rédigés. Vous savez que je ne suis pas fait pour écrire jamais contre ma conscience, que tout l'or du monde ne m'y engageroit pas, que tout ce que je dis part de la conviction la plus intime, et que par un véritable zèle pour la bonne cause, j'ai consacré ma vie aux objets qui devroient occuper exclusivement dans ce terrible moment les pensées de tous les hommes d'état, et de toutes les bonnes têtes qui n'ont pas oublié que nous sommes encore loin, très-loin, de la fin des malheurs publics.

" Je n'ajoute plus qu'un mot. La fin de cette année approche à grande pas, et vous sentez combien je dois désirer de savoir, le plutôt possible, le résultat de cette démarche. Je vous prie donc instamment de vouloir bien engager ceux avec lesquels vous traiterez cette affaire de me faire parvenir, *sans le moindre délai*, leur intentions et les assurances que je vous ai demandées. Je m'en remets pour tout le reste à votre bonté pour moi, et à votre zèle éclairé."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, November 13. London.—" I am to see the Duke of York early this morning, which makes me wish for an immediate answer to this question. Have you any objection to our dismounting one or both of the regiments of cavalry at Portugal and sending them to Sir Ralph Abercrombie? He has wrote home excessively anxious upon the subject of some more force of that description ; and, considering the perturbed state of this country, and the great call for cavalry, I don't see it practicable to gratify Sir Ralph to the

full of what I would wish without having recourse to what I have suggested respecting Portugal. I am afraid indeed, from the scarcity of fodder at Portugal, the cavalry may be dismounted in another more fatal way, I mean by the death of the horses."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 15. Berlin.—"The moon is certainly not near the change in Russia. I hear every day some new instance of extravagance. My friend Krudener has to-day communicated to me Rastopchin's letter to you, by which I find he has complained of me to the Emperor. The power of doing mischief will, from what I hear, be very much reduced by the want of money, and I cannot but hope that other powers will think it dangerous to engage in any measures upon the faith of his support. Major Keir, together with your despatch of November 7th, brought me letters from Messrs. Glennie and Harward acquainting me that the Prussian vessel was restored; and I have another letter from the former to-night, by which I find the Prussian Minister Schultz has expressed his satisfaction, and sent to stop the march of the troops. This will probably be notified to me by Haugwitz to-morrow, and I rejoice to think that the general alarm which has been excited, particularly in Denmark, will have made this Court, and even that of Petersburg, entirely miss their aim; for I am well convinced that the occupation of Cuxhaven was premeditated, and is connected with the plan of the Neutral Maritime League. What I have said in my despatch concerning Sweden is founded upon some advances made by Engeström to Garlike the night before last, in consequence of which I called upon him. We were interrupted, and I am to see him again; but the Swede is, I believe, either alarmed at the encroaching spirit manifested by the present Protectors of the North or desirous from some other cause of drawing nearer to Great Britain. If it were possible, without departing from the principles necessary to the preservation of our maritime power, to give some new security to these people for their fair trade, it would completely, and at once, *dérouter* all the plans of Paul and Haugwitz.

"I wish you had said a word touching General Stamford's communications. Lord Minto's letter will have shown you what is thought of them at Vienna, but, notwithstanding the letter I have had from him, of which he has sent you a copy, neither General Stamford nor I thought it advisable to take any step till we knew something of your sentiments. Haugwitz shows such an eagerness upon the hint which has been given of a disposition in Austria to concert fairly and fully with this Court through the medium of Great Britain, that, if he has any influence at all, it must, I think, give some check to the progress of the schemes against us. This Court is mortified to the greatest degree at the neglect Lucchesini has experienced at Paris. When his last despatches came away he had not had a single interview with the First Consul, nor any mark of confidence or communication from the Government. If the war is resumed he will return immediately. Some people think Lucchesini is at work to supplant Haugwitz; but, I believe, they judge a little

too hastily, though sooner or later he will attempt it. We do not know here how to account for Cobenzl's remaining at Paris after the notice given of the cessation of the armistice. Count Haugwitz, I believe, reckons without his host, when he says he is sure of the concurrence of Russia in the plans he may arrange with Austria for the Empire.

"How mortifying are the accounts we receive from the army under Abercrombie. Surely such a force might, at least, have made some attempt. I do not know where the fault lies, but I am sure it has a very bad effect on our affairs."

H. ELLIOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 14. Dresden.—"I have acquainted your Lordship by another opportunity that a considerable number of the principal families usually residing at Petersburg had assembled at Dresden. Lord Minto, thinking it possible from this circumstance that I may obtain some interesting intelligence with respect to Russia, assures me that I may venture to transmit to your Lordship whatever I can collect upon this subject, as all direct communication between Petersburg and London is now become very precarious.

"The Russians residing at Dresden are divided into different parties who have little connection with each other. Those who have enjoyed employments during this reign, still entertain hopes of being restored to their country and to their former situations in it, by that fickleness of disposition of the Emperor which daily fills the gazettes with lists of the disgrace and subsequent promotion of his civil and military servants. They continue therefore to cultivate by every means in their power an intimate correspondence with those individuals at Petersburg, who are supposed still to retain some degree of influence with the Emperor, and to approach his person. It is therefore principally from them that authentic information is to be derived. For as to several other Russians of distinction here, who were either favourites in the late reign or who participated in the secret transactions of Catherine, they are debarred from much connection with the rest of their countrymen. Although I am persuaded they expect that the day will come when the most *daring* conspirators against the present Emperor will be the most *successful*, yet they are a description of men from whom little knowledge of the existing Government can be acquired, as they are only bent upon its total overthrow, and conceive that their wishes may be accomplished soon, should the Emperor's conduct continue to create such general disgust as it now does.

"In a late letter from Princess Gagarin to an intimate friend, she says: 'The Emperor has had such repeated fits of rage, accompanied with shrieks and convulsions, that his attendants thought his life in danger, and it was in agitation to endeavour to persuade him to seek for medical advice from some able English physician.'

"In another letter from Petersburg, written in the month of October, and from a person who has opportunities of being well informed, the same circumstances are repeated, with the addition, that during the Emperor's indisposition, the only persons who had

been allowed to approach him, excepting his menial servants, were Count Rastopschin, Princess Gagarin, Kutusow, and the Governor of Petersburg.

"There are several Russian gentlemen here with whom Count Rastopschin corresponds. In some of his late letters he laments exceedingly the present state of affairs, and expresses his wish that a good understanding may be soon restored between Russia, Great Britain, and Austria.

"Should your Lordship judge the above circumstances to be worthy of your attention, or direct me in future to collect further information relative to Russia, I am to entreat that no communication whatever may be made to Count Woronzow of what I write to your Lordship. That gentleman has his own correspondents at Dresden, and would certainly put them upon their guard against me, not indeed from any degree of ill-will towards the British Government, to which he is on the contrary well disposed, but from other motives, which it is not necessary to detail by the present opportunity. I am above all solicitous that the name of Princess Gagarin may not be mentioned as having written to any person concerning the Emperor's health. The publicity of such a circumstance might be fatal to her.

"I have taken the liberty of making this a *private* letter, as I conceive the subject of it to be entirely distinct from the official business of my mission here.

"Monsieur de Kotschubey writes frequently to Count Woronzow, and is one of those who also receives letters from Count Rastopschin. I perceive that he still entertains hopes of being again employed either at home or in some important mission."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, November 15.] Twickenham, 11 o'clock p.m.—"Plus j'y pense et plus il me semble que ce que j'ai imaginé est le plus convenable à la circonstance. Il me paroit impossible que vous fassiez une nouvelle démarche directe vis-à-vis les François, mais il est tout simple que l'on sache s'ils veulent recevoir un ministre anglois à Luneville ou non. En le demandant à Otto, il faudra bien que le gouvernement françois ou envoie des passeports, ou prononce un refus qui terminera enfin toutes ces lenteurs. Vous me direz lundi si vous voulez que je parle à Otto. Je vous joins ici un *post scriptum* de la dépêche du Comte de Cobentzl que je vous prierai de me rendre sans en faire mention. La dépêche même est allemande et dit à peu près ce qu'il vous marque dans sa lettre. Il m'y parle encore de son désir de voir arriver M. Grenville à Luneville, et me donne quelques détails sur son séjour à Paris. Adieu, mes sentimens pour la cause, l'union de nos païs, et pour vous-même, vous sont connus."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 15. Downing Street.—"I have received this afternoon the correspondence from Copenhagen. The subject is an important and pressing one, but it would be scarce possible

for me to attend the Cabinet on Monday, having fixed that day with our Committee for discussing what is still more pressing, and which I cannot put off without retarding all our proceedings, and producing a good deal of inconvenience. Any time you choose on Tuesday will suit me perfectly.

"If you receive anything from Cobenzel by a reasonable hour, pray order it to be sent to me before the packet is made up for the King.

Postscript.—"I have just received the box with Cobenzel's letter. It is a little suspicious that he should affect not to know that nothing but the refusal of the French to treat jointly or to give passports prevents our Minister being at Luneville. Perhaps the Cabinet to-morrow might dispose of the Danish business also, or at least shorten the future discussion."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 19. Berlin.—"There is on foot not only a plot for renewing the armed neutrality against us, but also a league of the northern powers, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Prussia, for a mediation of a general peace. It may be this to which the answer Krudener is promised will relate, or there may be an intention of combining the two. Russia however proposes to invite to the League of Mediation the accession of Saxony and Hesse Cassel, but expressly to exclude Hanover. As I have hopes of full information on this head, I do not make a despatch of it. I am by no means satisfied in my own mind that the occupation of Cuxhaven will not be persisted in, and I conjecture the ultimate decision will be reserved till it is known whether Austria makes her peace. In that case the possession of Cuxhaven will be kept. In case of negotiation, or renewed war, the execution of the plan will be suspended.

"The Danish *Chargé d'Affaires* sees this attempt with the greatest alarm.

"I know from authority which I think good that Sprengporten has been detained here, not waiting for the determination of Great Britain about Malta, but for want of money. He and his suite have been trying their private credit to the utmost. Some of them set forward to-day. Some runners of the Government have said that the order for occupying Cuxhaven will certainly be revoked, but that delays will be contrived so as to let the troops arrive, in which case the charge of their march will be thrown on the town of Hamburgh." *Copy. Original written with invisible ink.*

P. ABBOTT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 20, Piccadilly.—"On the news of the surrender of Malta to his Majesty's arms it occurred to me that some observations I had had occasion to make at different periods might be of useful information, and I set about to collect from them the annexed notes.

"I have until now hesitated in what manner they could with most propriety be introduced to notice,

"Being convinced from reflection of the propriety that your Lordship ought to have the first notice of them, and that your Lordship's candour would, without reference to any other consideration, estimate their utility, and the public motive that alone has induced me to apply myself to the subject, I think it my duty to withhold them no longer.

"And I esteem this direct mode of communicating them as the highest proof I can offer of my integrity for the common good, and of my veneration for your Lordship's character.

"Upon this score I claim your Lordship's indulgence for the imperfections of the form, style, and diction of these notes.

"I have also the honour to annex copy of some notes proposing to import corn from Turkey, which my friends encouraged me to offer to Government, and which I presented on the 15th instant to my Lord Hawkesbury; from the station your Lordship holds, and as Governor of the Turkey Company, it had perhaps been right to have addressed them to your Lordship in the first instance.

"I much wish that this proposal may meet with consideration, as I have many reasons to flatter myself that the adoption of it would contribute to the speedy relief and future benefit of this country."

Enclosure :—

"NOTE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING MALTA.

"It would be difficult to point out any event that has happened in the course of the present war that promises more amply to reward the persevering energy of Great Britain than the conquest of Malta.

"The advantages which strike our first view from the possession of this island are in themselves of great importance.

"With a moderate naval force, which may be safely and conveniently stationed, supplied, and refitted in her port, England will keep in awe every rival power on the Mediterranean Seas.

"Sicily and Egypt may thence be more easily protected against the future attempts of the French.

"And the trade of the Levant will be under the control of Great Britain.

"Such are the general outlines of the advantages which we discover on the immediate contemplation of this object.

"And with the certainty that this valuable prize would remain to us at the termination of the war, it would be perhaps unnecessary, at this juncture, to offer any further considerations on the subject; and we might without uneasiness wait the natural course of events to realize all the minuter advantages, and develope such as are of higher political importance which must arise from our secure possession of this conquest.

"But as the resolutions of Cabinets are beyond our power of divination, and as they are ever subject to miscalculations, under the anxiety that every Englishman ought to feel on subjects that relate to the welfare of his country, I deem it my duty to endeavour to point out some consequences of great injury to our interest,

which may be apprehended, should we ever relinquish this possession.

“As what I shall offer is the result of observations I have been able to make under particular circumstances, it is likely they may not have fallen under notice of his Majesty’s Ministers ; but if they have, the personal knowledge and experience with which I speak must give additional weight to the necessity of preserving Malta above almost every consideration.

“When Egypt shall be delivered from its present invaders, the next duty of our Government will of course be to adopt measures for placing that country in a proper state of defence. The rivals and enemies of England are aware how vulnerable we are through this Channel ; and we are as fully aware that France will on every favourable occasion endeavour to establish permanent footing in Egypt for the ultimate purpose of attacking our colonies in India. But this fact with all its magnitude, from its notoriety, is less to us than the enormous ambition and insidious policy of another power.

“The Cabinet of St. Petersburg, during a great part of the late Catherine’s reign, pursued, with serious and persevering attention, every means to gain footing in Egypt ; and often exulted in sanguine expectation of severing that province from the Ottoman dominion. During the last war with Turkey, particularly, a project was formed, which, had it been seconded with the means that were solicited, would not have failed of the most complete success.

“As Russia possessed no proper harbour in the Levant seas, and having failed in her attempts to draw Venice into an alliance against the Turks, consequently no longer hoping to procure a station for her squadrons in the port of Corfu, another expedient was resorted to. Every intrigue was employed to persuade the Maltese to join league against the Turks for the purpose of invading Syria, Palestine, and Egypt.

“Relying on the religious constitution of the Maltese government, and confident of the powerful and tempting arguments that he had the means of offering, Prince Potemkin, the great mover of the Russian government, did, not without reason, expect to succeed in these overtures, and it has been declared that persons in authority in Malta were warm in promoting his views.

“The immediate step that was to have followed this coalition, had it taken place, was that a Russian fleet with a considerable body of men should (in spite of every opposition from the Turks, and in defiance of the menaces of this country) sail from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus, and after battering and sacking Constantinople, and destroying the arsenal and shipping at their leisure, with the same winds which are periodically to be depended on, they should proceed through the Dardanells to pour their arms and spoils into Malta ; then, collecting the partisans which were forming in the Morea and other parts of Greece in immense numbers, Egypt and Syria would have fallen an easy prey to them, and with such means, easily maintained against all the efforts of the Turks and their allies to dispossess them.

“But the Maltese Government, as jealous of their political in-

dependence as of their religious professions, were alarmed at these proposals, and not only rejected them *in toto*, but we have observed that the squadrons, and even the cruisers of Malta, ever afterwards avoided joining or acting with the Russian flag against an enemy avowedly common to them both.

"It was easily conceived by the wary brotherhood, nor could those amongst them who had been gained to Catherine's interest even palliate that such a Russian squadron with troops be admitted into Malta under whatsoever pretext; the very existence of the Order would become dependent on the arbitrary will of Russia; and from the boundless ambition of a power, whose religion is almost as intolerant of the rites of the Romish Church as it is inimical to the faith of Islam, what but a speedy annihilation of their political existence could be expected on such a tempting opportunity being offered.

"Thus the well-founded fears of the Maltese frustrated the accomplishment of a project ever to be deprecated by every power in Europe, but most of all by Great Britain.

"The failure of this object at that time, however, so far from discouraging the Russian Cabinet, seems to have enhanced its value in their estimation; and they have pursued in ardent contemplation the opportunity of acquiring a naval station in Malta.

"And the petulant ardour of the Emperor Paul, no longer allowing him discretion to keep his own counsel, has proclaimed aloud what his predecessor intended to be held secret, by the most extravagant acts and declarations; creating himself and usurping the functions of Grand Master of a religious Order, whose religion not only he cannot profess but would not even dare openly to tolerate, consistent with the oaths by which he holds the sceptre of Russia.

"By the conquest of Egypt the views of Russia were by no means confined to the acquisition of a valuable territory, and the consequent weakness and distress of her natural enemy.

"Long had Catherine and her Ministers eyed with jaundiced hatred the progressive prosperity and greatness of England, and urged by the double motive of jealousy of our greatness and resentment for our thwarting her ambition, she meditated severe vengeance against this nation.

"There were not wanting at her Court men of abilities and enterprise to point out that our vulnerable side lay on our Indian possessions, and that Egypt was the channel through which the blow might the most easily and effectually be struck at the root of our wealth and grandeur; at the same time the advantages that would redound to Russia by turning the channel of the commerce of India with Europe were fully shown.

"Potempkin was surrounded by hosts of adventuring sycophants from every country, who were constantly forming plans and offering proposals calculated to flatter the ambition and vanity of that prince and his Imperial mistress, among which were some of a nature particularly alarming to this country.

"One was presented by a Livonian gentleman of uncommon abilities and experience, who had resided in our settlements in the East Indies. It proposed to establish similar settlements in the

name of the Empress of Russia on the coasts of Malabar, Coromandel and in Bengal. This plan comprised many objects of great political as well as commercial importance, such as enabling Russia to give law to Persia (then beginning to be distracted with inward commotions) to crush at her will the power of the Turks by the destruction of her Arabian provinces, and creating her arbitress of the fate of Great Britain in the East. The whole was planned and digested in India, and the gentleman charged with obtaining the execution of it being able to give ample explanations and illustrations upon it, was received with flattering caresses by Potempkin, who was seriously preparing measures for the enterprise when the late war with Turkey broke out. The agent of this project was, however, honourably retained by the Prince, and still continually promised with the success of his mission; he became very sanguine and urgent, when about the third year of the war, the Prince expressly sent for him from a distant province, and commanded him not to utter another whisper on the subject until he should be called upon by himself, which at the same time he allowed him to hope might be soon. He was then charged with active employments which occupied him until Potempkin's death, soon after which a period was put to that war.

"It did not require all the sagacity that the Livonian possessed to guess that Potempkin's motive for the sudden and mysterious injunctions he gave him on the subject was to avoid further provoking the jealousy of this country, at a time when the Court of Petersburg was endeavouring by every means to avert the hostilities with which Mr. Pitt threatened Russia.

"Since that project was laid aside a native of this country came from India in 1794 with a similar one, and immediately repaired to Petersburg; but this soon failed, partly through the want of temper and address in the negotiation, and partly from the weak influence and energy of the persons through whom the proposals were offered.

"Having, through a peculiarity of circumstances, got knowledge of these transactions, some of them at a very early period of my life, I resolved to trace the sentiments of the Russian Court on these subjects during my visit to Petersburg in part of 1795 and 1796, and being nearly connected by blood and intimacy with a person through whose department every circumstance relative to these projects was transmitted, I was enabled to inform myself of the leading objects, of the views which had been formed on them, and also of many other projects equally important and dangerous to the interests of this country, but not so immediately relevant of the object of these pages. And from other observations I was able to make, I became fully convinced that it has been the uniform and constant policy of the Russian Cabinet to wait the period when they shall conceive this country, and other powers of Europe, sufficiently weakened by the contest that has so long been straining their resources, to adopt enterprises formed on these projects that ought to be watched with all the vigilance, and opposed by all the energy of Great Britain.

"I am satisfied that such was the policy at least of Catherine

and her ministers, and I have no reason to think that the Russian Cabinet ever sincerely adopted a different system, notwithstanding they have seemed to give way to the gust of passion that Paul showed in favour of the coalized powers against the French. But what we have lately experienced from him clearly shows us that the old system of politics has again openly prevailed, having at the same time fairly warned us what degree of dependence we ought to place on the faith and integrity of his council.

"I hope that what has been said above will have sufficiently shown the danger of allowing Malta ever to fall in the power of either France or Russia; and it will, I trust, be unnecessary to point out the great probability that, should we ever relinquish that conquest in favour of its ancient government, every endeavour that we and all the adjacent powers could make to support her in her former independency would prove vain, and that either the intrigues and force of France, but most probably those of Russia, would soon prevail to place Malta under absolute control and in possession of one of these powers to the utter shame and great danger of the interest of Great Britain and her allies.

"It can surely never be expected that a state so completely overthrown and shattered as that of Malta is by the powers and principles of revolution can ever again be held together by its original bonds and interests.

"It would be superfluous to attempt to point out the innumerable advantages that the possession of Malta would ensure to the relative interests of England and Turkey, but I cannot at this moment help urging one object to the consideration of government.

"As a member of the Levant Company I have long been aware of the necessity of giving every facility to enable us to get speedy returns of our freights from the Turkish ports, and I am informed of the acts that lately passed and of the measures that have been adopted to allow foul ships to perform quarantine in this country. But I most seriously dread the possible consequences of suffering ships to approach the coasts of this kingdom with infection.

"The wisest and severest laws that can possibly be enacted will never sufficiently secure us against the secret and subtile infection of the plague, as long as there is a single smuggler on our extensive coasts. This a point of most awful consideration, and calls for the immediate deliberation of the Legislature.

"Malta already possesses one of the best lazaretto's for performing plague quarantine in Europe; and by substituting that for the one established in the hulks in the mouth of our most frequented river, with proper regulations for that dispatch and economy which are so necessary for the benefit of our mercantile intercourse with Turkey, every advantage that can be expected from the late adopted plan might be insured without the danger that the country must be in constant dread of from unlading infected cargoes and crews upon our own shores; and we might ensure greater security by this measure than even from the former quarantine regulations.

"This advantage alone sets Malta at a high estimation to this country."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 20. Berlin.—“My despatch gives you the result of the steps I have taken on the affair of Cuxhaven. The information received by Redern, which is official, of the countermanding the march of the troops is very curious, for it seems plain from thence that they cannot now be at Cuxhaven, so that the note of the *Ministre d'Etat et de Cabinet* contains a palpable lie. I must incline to think this measure is taken at the instigation of Russia. I heard some time ago a rumour, but not sufficiently authenticated, that the Emperor had solicited this Court to take possession of Hamburg, and Krudener has appeared very eager about this affair.

“The Swede's further conversation with me was only to tell me the reasons he had to know that the King of Sweden's displeasure was personal to Mr. Hailes, and founded upon a persuasion that he had been misrepresented to his Majesty, as unfriendly to Great Britain and favourable to France, by that gentleman. And to this cause he attributes the seizure of the convoy. The account current here is certainly not favourable to Mr. Hailes, and he is considered as having designedly put the Court into a situation in which they could not receive Mr. Talbot without a letter from you. But that is a matter of little consequence. You will judge from better information than I can give whether the existing circumstances make a closer and more constant intercourse with Sweden desirable. I understand from Engestroöm that Sweden means to send a mission to England forthwith.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 23. Crems-Munster.—“I can give you no assistance whatever in your speculations on the army of Condé. My public letter says all that I have to say on the subject, which in truth amounts to nothing more nor less than this, that you must send instantly to the depot all that is not strictly military, and make the princes feel that it is as much for their own honour as for their real interest to act the private gentlemen and not the presumptive heirs to the throne.

“But for Windham's letter I would have done it myself at once ; and I had placed Plunket there as a steady fellow, but, at the same time, a man of honour and high birth, to have carried the thing through for me. I think it an unfortunate thing for the country as well as for the army itself that I was prevented from realizing my plan in all its parts. I would have reduced the expense to £200,000 a year, and got about 2,500 or 3,000 good soldiers instead of from 1,500 to 1,800. The difference is lost by the immense number of orderly officers, and soldiers who are obliged to wait on, and take care of the horses of, such an extraordinary number of officers.

“I have but one word more on the subject, and that I give to your Lordship in the most strict and unbounded confidence. No earthly consideration should ever induce me to have anything to

do with the details of either the Swiss or Condé corps, as long as they are in their present channel.

"Were they a part of the regular War Office department, I should of course be happy to act under War Office orders; but, in the bureau where it appears that they now are, I know there to be so much prodigality as well as of ignorance of business, that I will take care never to have my name coupled with anything that comes out of or goes into it.

"I am thankful beyond measure for the indulgence your Lordship has given me, of which I have made full use, and am now as well and as ready for business as ever I was in my life. But I had been really overworked, as your Lordship very kindly observed, and some relaxation from business was absolutely necessary to me. I set out to-morrow with a light heart, though very uncertain as to the event, and unable even to form a conjecture from ignorance of the plans as well as of the force of the enemy.

"I am anxious to hear that you have not disapproved what I did at Hohenlinden, and still more to know what measures you have taken to provide against the evil of which such unpleasant accounts are sent us from England. I can form some opinion of the hurry you must all have been thrown into by this untimely meeting of Parliament whilst the carpenters are still employed in making seats for my old Irish friends.

"I hope to establish a correspondence through France, though it will not be without difficulty that I shall succeed unless we advance further.

"I wish I durst have concluded the Bavarian treaty sooner. It would have been better for us all. But when anything is said to me on the subject I always answer *Hohenlinden*.

"In the arrangement of the Swiss corps I hope your Lordship will not forget that the great affair, should we go on, though now of little consequence, will be the patronage, and I hope that you will take measures not to let it go out of its present channel. For the rest, I really think in my conscience that it cannot be better than in Ramsay's hands, whose faults are more than counter-balanced by his good qualities.

"Hope is the *only* man of business I have seen among our military men, but Ramsay is really becoming one, and I think at last he will succeed.

"This winter campaign will cost us a prodigious deal of money in wear and tear and in horse flesh, even should we be successful. Should we be beat we shall be ruined, as I doubt whether it will be possible to bring away a single Bavarian cannon."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 23. Berlin.—"I cannot but think the violent measures of the Emperor of Russia will check the scheme of the Armed Neutrality, and I must also hope that what I have been authorized to say of the dispositions of his Majesty to order his Minister to communicate with M. de Lucchesini, joined with Lord Minto's assurances of the inclination of the Court of Vienna, will

have come in good time to counteract the impressions endeavoured to be given by the French Government to Count Cobenzel and Lucchesini of the reciprocal bad intentions of their respective Courts. The letters I have just received from Lord Minto and Mr. Wickham make me almost regret that I have not proceeded farther in consequence of Lord Minto's letter to me of the 7th. You will believe, I am sure, that it is not from the fear of taking any responsibility upon myself where it might promote the public service, but considering how immediately his Majesty's German dominions are concerned, I thought I could not have with propriety ventured to say anything precise enough to draw any declaration from Haugwitz. In consequence of the eagerness Lord Minto manifests (he probably knows more than I can of the inclinations of our Government) I shall venture to go a step farther and acquaint Haugwitz that Lord Minto knows the Duke of Brunswick's ideas, and that it is with a view to them that he has sounded the Court of Vienna. I have always told Haugwitz I did not enter into the details of the Duke's plan, which I concluded would be varied *ad libitum*, but conceived the substance of it to be that Austria and Prussia should consent [concert?] together, conjointly with Great Britain, a final arrangement for Germany in which the limits of influence of each should be ascertained and acknowledged, taking for a general outline what had been virtually effected by the treaty of Basle.

"The plan proposed by Lord Minto of employing General Stamford would not be relished here, and both the General and I are of opinion that at present his journey to Vienna would draw so much observation as to defeat the object of it.

"The messenger, Mason, I shall, I believe, detain here, and send another person on to London who will not return. Mason says he is wanted by Mr. Wickham, and to send him to Cuxhaven in order to return immediately would be more expense to Government than the mode I mean to adopt. I send a German pamphlet by Haller of Switzerland, which General Stamford thinks it would be useful to have translated into English. I have heard that some body at Hamburgh has undertaken it. I shall be impatient to know whether you think I have done too much or too little in the affair of Cuxhaven. It is a satisfaction to observe that a very great and general anxiety has been excited on that subject. The Dane in particular seems greatly agitated, and not less uneasy at the apparent hostile spirit of the Emperor of Russia. I hope you may be able to make some use of this."

FRANCE UNDER THE CONSULATE.

BARON DE GILLIERS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November.—"Chacun voit dans un succès militaire sa fortune et son élévation. Je crains la défaite Autrichienne, s'ils font seuls la guerre. Bonaparte qui craint de rendre ses généraux trop puissans, voudrait la paix ; mais il ne sait comment s'y prendre.

"Vous n'avez sûrement pas oublié que dans ma conversation, je vous ai parlé des obstacles que Bonaparte rencontre dans l'espèce

d'indépendance dont déjà jouissent les généraux. C'est Moreau, dit-on, qui de son autorité privée a ordonné la démolition des trois forteresses. C'est Brune qui, sans pouvoirs, est entré en Toscane. Je crois pouvoir répondre que Bonaparte allait nommer un conseil-de-guerre pour juger les généraux Dupont, et Brune, lorsqu'à la suite de la conférence avec M. de Cobentzel, voyant que la paix ne pouvait pas résulter de cette négociation, il avoua la démarche. Moreau s'était plaint précédemment de la prolongation de l'armistice. Mais je vous le répète, le premier Consul veut la paix ; et si M. Pitt la désire, je pense qu'il serait des moyens secrets de rapprochement, et de traiter confidentiellement pour établir *une paix générale*, même d'après les vues raisonnables de l'Angleterre. Le point le plus important serait de détruire la méfiance. J'ai lieu de croire de plus, qu'avec des précautions, et des mesures discrètes, on pouvait parvenir à recevoir ici un agent secret, chargé de mettre sous les yeux du Ministre, par les moyens d'une personne confidentielle, quelques bases de négociations pour *la paix générale*.

"J'ai jetté rapidement sur le papier ce que j'ai sçu, et vû. Je vous prierai de suppléer à ce qui manque ici, d'après la conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 27. Avington.—"By the papers I see Sylvester Douglas is promoted. As this will make a move in the India Board I trust I shall not be left out. By you I am sure I shall not be forgotten, and if any proper arrangement can be made, I am sure you will do every thing to forward it. The *obvious move* is that from an *unpaid* situation at the Board to one with salary, the other would I suppose be to the Privy Council. As the first is not so much an object to me, would make no real difference in my official situation, and would vacate the county so short a time previous to the general election, perhaps, if the other step could be obtained, I should prefer it. However, I put myself into your hands, convinced that I shall be in the hands of one who will advise me for the best, and use his best efforts to assist me in any plan he may recommend."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 28.—"I am not less sensible than you to all the inconveniences which must arise from the embargo at Riga, more especially because at this time of the season I presume that no new measure can give us the fruits of our Baltic trade before the open weather of the next spring, and I take for granted that the Emperor Paul in laying on this embargo has felt this only security against the danger of our going to Riga to take it off again ; I consider therefore that chapter as closed for the next five months, and I cannot help strongly suspecting that before that time shall have expired we shall, in one way or other, have made either partial or general peace, enough to allow us to look this Northern comet in the face as we ought to do. But neither for this object nor for that

of French peace do I entertain any great expectations on the part of Prussia. They are too much afraid of Russia to help us even by the slightest demonstration on that side, supposing that they were inclined to do so, and the same apprehensions will lead them rather to employ the arms of Russia in a dispute with us than to take any step to divert that storm. With respect to the assistance of Berlin upon the subject of French peace, I have no doubt that they will be very liberal to us in professions of their desire to assist it, and that they would be so far sincere in that desire as they would see their own German views promoted by it ; but while those German views are all views of hostility to Austria and to the interests of the Emperor, we should be daily called upon to the necessity of sacrificing either Vienna to Berlin or Berlin to Vienna ; their fears and jealousies of Austria have thrown them upon France, and I think they now scarcely disown it ; and before they abandon that hold of the negotiation they would require from us to see that we were ready to give up in great degree the interests of Austria as opposed to theirs. If this is in any respect true at Berlin, consider only what effect my going to Berlin now would have at Vienna, and at Luneville with Cobenzel. I do not think it exaggeration to say that I should conceive it must produce almost immediately a separate peace between Austria and France. You will say I am more full of difficulties than suggestions ; I do not deny it ; yet I do not conceal from you that I think a more promising measure, or at least a more effectual measure, would be that we should propose to Austria that Austria and Great Britain should both enter at once into separate treaties with France ; because I think there are many points of view in which this would be advantageous to us, and among others that we could then, as far as we thought proper, avail ourselves of communication and negotiation at the same time with Prussia. I could not help saying these few general words.

“With respect to my going to Berlin, I should not without a good deal of reluctance look at a course of things which could not but be mortifying to Lord Carysfort and lowering to his situation there ; for it is impossible not to see that my arriving at Berlin would annul his business while I staid there, and this consideration I should feel strongly.

“As for my health, you know that I hold it in great contempt, so do not let us think or talk about it. I will come to dine with you if you are quite alone, and will send to put off the Duke of Portland, to whom I was engaged.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1800, November 29. Cleveland Row.—“I have read Gentz’s two papers. I think it much better instead of entering into a paltry bargain that we should allow him 150*l.* or 200*l.* per annum for continuing his journal in Germany. I have great doubts of his success in England, and think Marsh might be better employed than in translating what so few here would read.

“The plan of publishing from three months to three months is

very bad, for the political avidity of the present day wants daily food ; and before three months are gone by, half the events that happen are forgotten and leave no traces behind them.

"Say all this to him so as best to manage his *amour propre*, which no authors are without, and journalists least of all ; and settle to pay him either 150*l.* or, if you please, 200*l.* per annum sterling money for his services abroad." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, November 29. Berlin.—"As the papers concerning the armistice appeared in the newspapers, and a copy has been sent here to Mr. Garlike, I presume Gentz may publish forthwith, and I have told him so. The printing is already far advanced. I am happy in hearing that the number of our seamen detained in Russia is very small, the ships having been chiefly manned with neutrals. The conduct of the Emperor is universally and loudly reprobated, and I hope for the best effects from it upon the other Courts. The Dane is frightened out of his wits, and called upon me yesterday to ask whether I knew of anything treating at London or Copenhagen which might save his country from the danger. Glennie writes word that Denmark has made an application to this Court on the occupation of Cuxhaven. The *Chargé d'Affaires* knows nothing of it.

"I told you in a former despatch that General Stamford was to talk with Count Haugwitz on the possibility of some concert with Austria, and I have since seen Haugwitz on the same subject. You may depend upon it nothing has passed either from Stamford or me but in the way of conversation, and the last time I saw him I kept as much reserve as possible. To me however he said he thought the difficulties as to Austria might be removed, but to General Stamford that he apprehended the opposition of the King ; for though the King of Prussia would never invade the property or privileges of the Elector of Hanover, the military authority, and the possession of ports which must be allowed to the King of Prussia to make him for any useful purpose head of the North of Germany, must be objects of jealousy and uneasiness. But General Stamford's principal object, as well as mine, was to discover and influence the intentions and conduct of this Court concerning the Armed Neutrality. And the General was convinced that Haugwitz is alarmed at what has already passed, and will do all he can to prevent its going to any dangerous lengths. I hope I shall not find I have been mistaken in holding the language I have stated in my despatch. I really believe it is the best way to keep on good terms ; and so far I may augur well, as it produced an high eulogium upon me to General Stamford, and an invitation to dinner, with many apologies for its having been delayed so long. The Swedish minister too has taken great pains (certainly by Haugwitz's desire) to convince me that this Court has been doing, and will do, all in their power to prevent and soften any measure which might be offensive to Great Britain. I long to see your answer to Rastopchin. The Russians rely much on a correspondence between their Minister at Palermo

and Mr. Paget on the affair of Malta, the end of last June. Might it not be possible to keep a check over this Court by some insinuation of the possibility of breaking their favourite system for the neutrality of the North of Germany by the Elector of Hanover's thinking himself equal to the defence of his own dominions? Great Britain is now thought to have a large disposable force on foot, and to be desirous of finding employment for it. The bare idea of the probability of Prussia being involved by Russia in a dispute with Great Britain has produced an effect here which I could not have expected, and a change in the language of all those I talk with.

"If you turn to Lord Elgin's correspondence in the year 1797, numbers 70, 80, 91, and 113; and in the year 1798, '*Private*,' January 24th, '*Secret and Confidential*,' February 10th, you will see the proofs of a long continued negotiation between Panin and Caillard at that period; and the probability that the scheme unfolded in the paper transmitted to you by Mr. Wickham was then opened to Count Panin. It is too much in conformity with Russian policy and views not to have made a lasting impression." (*Invisible ink ends.*)

"I have taken steps for ascertaining the question about the sovereignty of the Ems. You will see by the first of my notes on Cuxhaven that I was already aware of the expedience of not admitting any claims founded on arrangements to which his Majesty was not a party." *Copy.*

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, November 30. Constantinople.—"Your letter of seventh March, serving as appendix to the dispatch bearing same date, reached me duly upon the 8th May. While I lost no time in the manifestation of my entire obedience to your directions by my official answers of 10th and 13th May, I was led to delay my farther acknowledgment of what your Lordship condescended to explain to me as a token of friendship, till I should have had opportunity of witnessing some of the fruits of my acquiescence, either with a view to the King's service or to my individual position. Although I am to lament that my expectations have not been realised, either with reference to the distribution of the public business in this mission, or to a more flattering treatment of my services by my immediate official superior, yet I do not mean hereby to return to the charge with the renewal of an application which, having been deemed inexpedient by your Lordship, would be now indiscreet. I take up my pen purely for the sake of a becoming demonstration towards a person I am proud to consider as my patron, and to submit some ideas on what is going on around us that I am forbid to hope could ever reach your Lordship in a genuine satisfactory form through any other channel, when I am even deprived of the use of a cipher to shelter my correspondence in case of need. If my local experience and means of information are depreciated by some, and my opinions concerning a country I have so long inhabited be either disdained or misapplied by those to whom they would always be cordially offered for the service of my country, I see no reason to

put my candle under a bushel, and refuse myself the honest gratification of imparting salutary views to others in the rectitude of whose judgment I can confide ; and I therefore offer the following reflections to your Lordship as a mark of my share of the gratitude the Government your Lordship forms a part of is entitled to from every good subject, and that I owe to your office and person in particular.

“ The means and extraordinary activity of the French not having operated the extirpation of the Mamlouks, it can hardly be supposed that the dwindling power of the Ottoman Porte will ever attain that object.

“ This soldiery has proved itself the most formidable *irregular* army in the world ; their education and study are devoted to military exercises ; and so expert are they in their peculiar style of warfare, that 2,000 of them resisted and finally defeated 30,000 Turkish troops sent against them in 1785-6. To this the Beys of the Saïd are resolved to supply the advantage of *regular infantry* and *light artillery* which the French have exhibited to them ; and this disposition is so well known and appreciated by the enemy, that many adventurous individuals mean to avail themselves of the circumstance to maintain their footing in the country should the French colony be annihilated by superior force. This plan was kept in check by the influence of the British name during the time that Sir Sidney Smith could cultivate a confidential intercourse with *Mourad Bey*, but the face of affairs must have changed since the late mission of his secretary to Cairo, Mr. Keith, to whose good will, uncommon vigilance, and intelligent zeal I am indebted for the soundest notions upon these matters. His observations amongst others have convinced me that Mourad and his party will never bow their necks to the Ottoman yoke. Far less will they allow themselves to be supplanted by the rapacious, merciless ministry of the camp, whose character of bad faith is so established that nothing can eradicate from minds of the Mamlouk leaders that it entered into the plans of the Vizer's counsellors to send them in bonds to Constantinople, had the evacuation taken place in conformity to the capitulation of *El Arish*.

“ Therefore my humble opinion is that we *cannot* succeed in restoring the Turkish dominion in Egypt to its primitive form ; but, if I err, and that, contrary to my expectations, we *should*, I then think it is as improbable that they can retain it a twelve month after the departure of our succours. For, independent of their degenerate nullity, the nickname of Yankeedoodle could not be more grating in America than the epithet of *Osmanli* in Egypt ; so that, after all, the Sultan will only be the nominal liege lord, and the province will still be exposed to a *coup de main*. Is it not then time for us to take our measures ? And does not our national interest seem to require that the government of Egypt should be rendered sufficiently stable and powerful to protect itself ? And that we should be sufficiently well with that vassal government in proportion as the tie by which it is held to our ally here may be so slender as to afford bad security to Great Britain for the commercial advantages to which we are entitled by existing treaty.

"I should be glad to answer the query that I see upon your lips by allusion to a dispatch of Mr. Liston's, that I recollect to have copied about the winter of 1794; but not having the same access to the records under the Embassy Extraordinary, I cannot quote the arguments I feel that work of my old master's would furnish to the case in point. I therefore content myself with reminding your Lordship of its existence in Downing Street.

"The soil and climate are comparatively so fine that the ruling Beys are not tempted to push their conquests, nor extend their commerce eastward beyond an old routine traffic with Arabia by the interchange principally of grain, coffee, and Indian manufactures; which latter article might be furnished to a limited extent by the English East India Company, as is the case in the Persian Gulf, not so much for the sake of trade itself as for keeping this branch from profane hands; to which end I think the Company might avail of the present conjuncture by seeking for leave to establish a permanent factory on the western coast of the Red Sea.

"When Sir Sidney learnt that Lieutenant-Colonel Murray's force was unequal to maintain possession of Suez, he suggested to that officer to get hold of *Coffeir*, the place at which Mr. Eyles Irwin landed from Yambo: see his travels. There the French have constructed a redoubt that commands the only well of drinkable water thereabouts; and it is by means of this post that the French have counteracted all the influence that I could prevail upon the late *Reis Effendi* to advise the Sultan to employ in his quality of *Khalif*, with the *Sherif* of Mecca; because, as the corn trade of Egypt passes by that *débouché*, he became more or less dependent on them for bread. I understand the French works to be superior to insult; but if we could once get hold of the place by a proper force, which we alone can employ on that side, we should find from three to five hundred men a sufficient garrison. From thence the communication with the Nile is only forty hours' march to Kumeh; and such an establishment, while it would render our intercourse perfect with the Beys, would also give us commanding influence in *Yemen*. Your Lordship will please to observe that I am not here forming a military plan of campaign against Egypt; my speculation is purely political. I have little doubt but that *Mourad* Bey, notwithstanding his ostensible pacification with *Abdallah-Menou*, would not refuse us the *grant* of a factory at Cosseir, on condition of our furnishing him with the means of preserving his pre-eminence in Upper Egypt, provided the overture is opportunely and dextrously made before his *Anglomani*a be extinguished.

"Having a foot on shore, we might in a few years draw thither the caravans from the interior of Africa; and an establishment of this kind would not give much umbrage here, where the grossest ignorance prevails relative to every thing beyond the quiet possession of Cairo, Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta. While a little management and deference for the Mecca pontiff would secure his good graces, and pave the way to quash any scruples of *Islamism*.

"It is impossible to pass the time I have done at Constantinople and not perceive that the destructive policy of the Turks will deprive them of Europe, perhaps even in our time. Your lordship cannot

be ignorant which of the European powers speculate the deepest upon the gradual corrosion of this territory, and I therefore presume your lordship will agree with me in the expediency of England acquiring a *previous* and decided ascendancy in the quarter whereon we can fix our eyes with the fewest chances of attracting the notice and increasing the jealousy of our neighbours.

"I have the best information that, about the year 1788, it was proposed to a mercantile house of Ostend to fit out under its firm two ships to sail under Imperial or Danish colours, loaded with warlike stores and hard dollars for the *Red Sea*. One of the two super-cargoes was then in particular connection with the late Admiral *Greig*, and the other was afterwards attached to the *Russian* legation at Copenhagen. The expedition was rejected by the house of Ostend : but there hardly remains a doubt that it was intended to light up a flame on that side, in case the Baltic fleet had entered the Mediterranean ; and that measure, though deferred, thanks to the late King of Sweden, is nevertheless susceptible of renewal in the event of a fresh change of system. That change I look upon as being nearer at hand than is generally supposed by superficial observers ; but from keeping a sharp look out both professionally and from principle on the conduct of certain agents of high and low degree, I have discovered too much underhand work and too many abusive practices not to be uneasy. In alluding to which I think it proper to make use of a memorandum which seems to emit a ray of truth upon a combined system pursued latterly between the agents I have in my eye, to goad these poor people on to certain destruction, and at the same time try to make them fail by starvation. *Garnier*, the deponent named in the annexed paper, is a *Marseillois* of very notorious character here, but reputed able amongst the *pelotes de l'Archipel* ; and as he persisted to remain at Rhodes, notwithstanding my brother's reiterated warnings during good part of a month to proceed to Jaffa, to distribute his cargo to the Vizir's famished followers, it gave rise to sinister suspicions.

"If I were not really ashamed of the prolixity of this epistle I could have wished to have claimed a few moments more of your indulgent attention for a line or two upon my personal situation and prospects ; but, instead of giving your lordship the trouble of any more reading, I prefer to charge my near relation and confidential friend, General Smith, with the rendering my wishes verbally. I beg leave therefore, once for all, to accredit my uncle with your Lordship as my representative, as well as my brother's and some other of our fellow labourers, and to solicit your kind reception of him upon that footing, as well as your confidence in whatever he shall impart to your lordship on our behalf."

Enclosure :—

Report from Commodore Sir W. Sidney Smith in regard to the suspicious movements of Philippe Garnier, Captain of a Russian vessel which had been chartered by the Turkish Government.
French. Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, December 2. Cleveland Row.—“My last private letter will in great measure have anticipated the contents of my despatches by this messenger. Your *note verbale* seems to me to be perfect, but you must allow me to say to you freely that the second note is taken on too low a tone, particularly where you speak of the satisfaction the King of Prussia has received.

“There was not the least pretence for asking any. The ship was laden with such articles as we have always considered, and always shall consider, as contraband, and it was captured off the Texel. We have a clear right to carry such prizes into a neutral port, and the King of Prussia has no more right to interfere with us there than at Lisbon or Leghorn. It may not always be necessary to put all these principles forward, where (as in the present case) the matter in dispute is otherwise arranged; but there can never be any advantage in doing or saying anything that shall appear to abandon them.

“Depend upon it that when you have known these people as long as, for my sins, I have known them, you will be persuaded with me that they consider all confession not as moderation but as weakness, and that, just in proportion as they crouch to France because she bullies them, they will attempt to bully us if they think us afraid of them.

“Our means are ample; the country is in good heart; the distress for provisions is the only real difficulty with which we have to contend, and that these people can neither add to nor diminish. The value of all Haugwitz’s good words and fine promises about the interest of the King of Prussia takes in our naval pre-eminence is sufficiently apparent from the confidence he has already made you, and still more from what he has not confided. I am every day more and more convinced that nothing will operate on the foolish prejudices of these people but the conviction that they have as much to lose by our shutting them out from the sea as we can lose by their excluding us from the land. If we give way to them we may as well disarm our navy at once, and determine to cede without further contest all that we have taken as a counterbalance to the continental acquisitions of France, for such you may rely upon it will be the tendency of their plan of peace. The conduct of Russia has (in this respect) fortunately enabled us to shut the door to all such discussions, and to tell Prussia that any confederacy with Petersburg now is a confederacy with our enemy, and cannot therefore be the ground of any friendly mediation. From this ground it is important not to let them drive us.

“You will have seen that our Austrian friends have done better than you were disposed to think they would. But I shall still very much fear the impression which any considerable defeat might produce on the feeble character of the Emperor.

“We sent you *Castle Rackrent* last week. Are you not delighted with it? Or do you think the picture overcharged? *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to ARTHUR PAGET.

Private.

1800, December 2. Cleveland Row.—“I send this letter to Lord

Minto to be forwarded to you by any opportunity that may offer itself. Before you receive it I think it probable that the fate of Italy may again have been put to the hazard of a battle, and though I am not so sanguine as to hope that a victory over the French would regain all that was thrown away at Marengo, yet much may still be done by courage and perseverance and exertion. I was much concerned to learn that your health had suffered by your residence at Palermo. If you find any necessity for a temporary absence on that account I am sure the King would approve of your availing yourself of any interval from the business for that purpose, and you might depend on my representing it in a proper light to His Majesty.

"I am sorry to hear that something like ill-humour has been shewn on the subject of Malta. What has since happened at Petersburg has abundantly proved that we could do no otherwise than we did ; and certainly the King has given too many proofs of friendship to the Court where you reside, to leave the smallest ground to doubt of his desire to do everything that may tend to promote their interests." *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 4. Downing Street.—"I send for your *own* perusal, to be immediately returned to me, the accompanying despatches, and among the rest the private one from Maitland to Huskisson. What is past cannot be helped, and talking of it can do no good but much mischief by creating bad blood between the two services. I wish I could bring myself to think that there was no room for inauspicious forebodings as to the future from the same cause."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 5. Berlin.—"The unexpected arrival of Mr. Moberly from Petersburg enabled me to write to you with less trouble and a day sooner than I otherwise could. I believe if you could have entertained a moment's doubt of the falsehood of the Berlin report of my conduct about Malta, Count Rastopchin's letter, which you must by this time have received, must have convinced you that it was without foundation. I told you at the time all that passed. I make no doubt that Krudener, whose temper is almost as violent as his master's, has frequently and loudly complained of me as the cause of all the mischief ; and from Moberly's conversation I presume I am so represented at Petersburg. I am doubtful whether you may enter enough into my views of politics here to approve of anything I have done since the affair of Cuxhaven, but I will nevertheless venture to tell you what I think and what I wish. I had no authentic information as to facts wh[en] I first saw Haugwitz, and little more when I delivered my first note. My objects were first to suspend the public opinion as to the hostile intentions of Prussia towards Great Britain ; and secondly, if I could not check or prevent the measure, to keep the ground open for you to act in any manner you might think fit. I have always been per-

suated that the only motives which act upon this Court are a jealous hatred of Austria, a longing for extending its influence in the north of Germany, but principally fear, the object of which has hitherto been either France or Russia. The violent temper of the Emperor, and the continual teasing of his Minister here, led them to countenance farther than they wished his scheme of armed neutrality, and was the immediate cause of the occupation of Cuxhaven. The first they hoped with the help of Sweden and Denmark, but particularly the latter, to make perfectly harmless, and such as should neither give offence nor alarm to Great Britain. At any rate they knew everything must be at rest till the spring, and in the interval they thought some means would present themselves to keep them out of the scrape. Of the Cuxhaven business they thought to make use to gain a little credit with the Emperor, at the same time they should quiet by their assurances our apprehensions. In this affair the assertion of authority in the north of Germany has really, I believe, no small share. Such being the estimate I had formed of the policy of Berlin, when I found that their Cabinet had really entered upon the business of the armed neutrality, but that it was not concluded, and that they were endeavouring to soften it, I determined to oppose intimidation to intimidation; and for this purpose, under the pretext of showing him what direction he should give to the endeavours he always boasts of making towards reconciling us and the northern maritime powers, I talked to Haugwitz in such a strain of the consequences to those powers of renewing the old armed neutrality, or engaging in anything at all like it, that he understood it, and did, I know, speak of it the same evening to persons who are intimate with him, as a plain declaration that we would make war upon Prussia herself if she should go to that length. I have every reason to think that the effect has been what I wished. You have now my state of the matter, and my wish is to be authorised to pursue the same course, that in leaving him a way to retreat by dissembling in some degree my knowledge of what he has already done, to convince him that if Great Britain is pushed beyond the line she has fixed herself, she will not hesitate to strike at Prussia as well as at the other powers. What I said was from myself, and could not commit you.

“As to Lucchesini’s mission, I believe he had no instruction whatever, but generally to watch Cobenzl, and if possible to prevent the separate peace of Austria, in the hope that, some how or other, Prussia might creep into a general negotiation. The universal consternation here when it was known that Cobenzl had the start could not have been exceeded if the whole French army had passed the line of demarcation; and the particular friends of Lucchesini poured a torrent of abuse upon Haugwitz, who could not interrupt his course of pleasure to despatch him in time. The expressions in Lucchesini’s letters of mortification and disappointment are cited over the whole town, and this, among others, *qu’il falloit bien du tems pour relever tant soit peu un Gouvernement si entièrement dé-cré-dité*. You will naturally ask on what foundation all this stands. What is said publicly is universally believed. Gentz is in correspondence with Lucchesini himself, and not a day passes in which

he does not see Madame Lucchesini, who employs and consults him continually. Gentz has also old habits with Lombard, is frequently at his house, and sees continually all the people who frequent him most. His accounts tally very much with the reports I hear from other quarters, particularly those who have most access to the French and Russian Ministers. Nobody here seems to have the least idea that Lucchesini is negotiating for any specific object; and striking off as much as possible from what I hear, because of the chance that the sources from whence it is derived are not to be entirely depended upon, I must be of the same opinion.

"Gentz tells me he has had a letter from Lucchesini to-day, dated on the 27th, and that he (Lucchesini) thinks the war will certainly continue. Gentz and General Stamford are of a different opinion; and the Danish *Chargé d'Affaires* has just communicated to me, in great confidence, intelligence which, he says, comes to him not through the French mission, but directly from Paris, that Bonaparte has offered peace to the Emperor with not only the cession of the Venetian territory, but Ancona and two of the Legations, and *encore une grande incision dans cette partie de l'Italie*; the immediate and complete restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the restoration of the King of Sardinia, the guarantee of the dominions of the King of Naples, security to Bavaria and Wurtemberg. The Emperor in return to guarantee the German territories on the left of the Rhine and the Netherlands to France. This is stated to be made as much to produce an effect upon the Emperor of Russia as at Vienna; but, it is added that it has been made known at Vienna, and some modifications have been suggested there, which being acceded to, and it was supposed they would, Austria would make a separate peace. If there is anything of truth in this you will probably have heard it from Lord Minto; and indeed the course of events will have declared it before this reaches you. I think it all calculated for an impression on Russia.

"As to Mr. Moberly, I do not know whether you will be able to make much out of his mission. You will of course be solicitous for the fate of our wretched countrymen whom the barbarian has within his gripe. I must own I have hopes of Sweden from the general complexion of his notes on the Barcelona business, and the natural repugnance he must have to Russia, if he can get any good leaning elsewhere. I fear you have but little chance of supplies of corn from the North. This country has no superfluity, and if the disorder among the horned cattle should spread, provisions will be very scarce. The ports of Russia cannot be open till the summer, and then it is very doubtful whether you will be allowed to export. If you direct anything to be said here, I hope you will make me do it in writing, to give the better chance of the King's being made acquainted with it.

"*Castle Rack Rent* is very comical. I think Elizabeth is pretty stout. The children quite flourishing. I have threatenings of gout, and of course am not comfortable.

"A paragraph copied out of the *Times*, and circulated in the *Spectateur du Nord* and other papers, has been a good deal talked of here. When I went to Haugwitz upon his note about the

Barcelona business, conscious that I had very substantial ground of complaint, he determined to complain too, and was prepared with this paper in his pocket. It is of the date of the 23rd or 25th of July, if you choose to take any notice of it.

"There is certain news here of the advance of the Austrian army and of the corps of General Klenau having passed Ratisbon, which the French had evacuated, and marched upon Ingoldstadt. The Arch-Duke Charles had left Prague, and was advancing with the Bohemian insurrection. I must own the memorial you have received from Wickham about the project of an alliance between the French and Russians strikes me more and more as deserving serious reflection. It is calculated to make a great impression upon Russia.

"I enclose the plan of Gentz's performance, which I hope will be useful. I have engaged him to publish separately and immediately what relates to the last negotiation. He says it will be out in six or eight days at farthest, and that the rest will immediately follow."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1800, December 9. Cleveland Row.—"I am delighted to see by your last letters how perfectly we agree as to the language which it is necessary to hold at Berlin. The fact which I mention in my despatch is unquestionable, and I much fear that the King of Prussia is already a party to the convention. All this they do in the foolish belief that we shall be intimidated, and yield the points in question. If we did, it is not very easy to see what Prussia would get by them, but it is very important to convince them that they will have a hard struggle before they succeed, and that we shall never yield on this subject but in the very last extremity, such as I trust and am confident we shall never see. Your language cannot be too strong on this head so long as it is, what I know it will be, calm and temperate; but we must show them that we are in earnest. If in answer to these communications they persist in occupying Cuxhaven, the first step we shall take will be to remove our packets to Bremerlee. And I shall endeavour to obtain such orders on that subject to the Hanoverian Regency as may give Prussia uneasiness on that quarter. The idea of Bremerlee may be a good one for us to suffer to get abroad, without your expressly saying it to Count Haugwitz.

"I am more and more confirmed in my opinion of the impropriety of our making ourselves the pandars of their inordinate ambition. The success of such a plan would be highly injurious, as I think, to our interests, and indeed the present transaction affords us a pretty good earnest of what we must expect if the whole north of Germany were in the hands of Prussia.

"What do you think of the Emperor of Russia, who accuses us of breaking a convention which was never signed? The instrument to which he alludes is a project delivered by his order to Whitworth, and drawn by himself, which Whitworth sent over here, but which appeared even then so unreasonable that no answer was returned to it for many weeks, and then only one stating that I should send

further instructions upon it. And this he calls a treaty between the two Courts. Paget has certainly gone further than he needed at Palermo, but that only proves the sincerity of the King's conduct towards Paul, till the latter withdrew from the concert, and made a secret and separate agreement with the enemy on this very point.

"Did I mention to you that at the same time that Bonaparte offered Malta to Paul, he sent us a proposal through Spain that he would evacuate it provided we would join in a guarantee that Paul should never have it? This fact and that about the convention should be known.

"I now send you my answer to Rastopsin. I expect that it will put the Emperor in a towering passion. He has not been used to hear so many truths, but I am confident this is the true way of dealing with him.

"I do not imagine that the whole of the seizure in Russia will exceed a million and a half, and against this we are to set £300,000 which we were to pay him at the peace, in part of subsidy. The loss is a considerable one to the persons concerned, but nothing as a national object. It rather seems to me likely that we shall meet here before long. It is a troublesome business, but a little firmness joined to the feeling that one is doing one's duty will carry one through greater trials than this. If it were not for the difficulty about the price of corn, I should hardly have an uneasy sensation on the subject." *Copy.*

H. ELLIOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret.

1800, December 11. Dresden.—"I cannot detain Coxe one instant to write to your Lordship with any detail concerning Monsieur de Kalitschew's appointment as Vice-Chancellor in the place of Count Panin. He is to see me privately before he leaves Dresden, and I shall not fail to communicate the substance of his conversation by the first proper opportunity. Count Rostopschin's jealousy of Count Panin's superior abilities has been one of the principal causes of that gentleman's former unfavourable conduct towards the Allied Powers, as he was suspicious of an intimate and secret good understanding having subsisted between Count Panin, Count Woronzow, and the British Government, for the purpose of transplanting him and of placing Count Panin at the head of the Russian administration. Lord Whitworth's last adventures at Petersburg must also in some measure be ascribed to this cause, as Count Rostopschin thought his Lordship peculiarly ill inclined towards him.

"Monsieur de Kalitschew is very unfavourable to the Court of Berlin, and I consider Baron Krudener's future influence as likely to be much diminished, if it can be so, by Monsieur de Kalitschew's sincere desire to restore a degree of cordiality between us and his sovereign.

"He looks upon Baron Krudener's entire devotion to the Prussian ministry as having considerably contributed to injure the interests both of Great Britain and of Austria at Petersburg."

Postscript.—"Your Lordship will be pleased to observe that it is

very essential Count Woronzow should not be made acquainted with Monsieur de Kalitschew's private communications with me."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 11. Downing Street.—"If an assize could be fixed, as the Duke of Montrose suggests, on any *one* sort of the bread to be introduced, his scheme has much to recommend it; but, from what passed last year, we are convinced it will be impossible to agree to any table of assize before the end of the session. It would be too hazardous, during the present high price, to abolish all assize; and therefore we feel it on the whole impossible to prohibit the bread now in use, and think it best to leave it to be sold under the present assize, and only to provide that all coarser or mixed bread may be sold without any assize.

"We regret the less giving up all compulsion as mixtures are certainly in many parts grown into use, and, as in the wheaten bread, it appears that the high price tempts the miller to mix up almost as much of pollard as would be made into bread on the other plan."

Postscript.—"The recommendation to use mixed bread cannot but be right."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 11. Downing Street.—"Lord Nelson put into my hands some days ago, some letters which have passed between him and the Emperor Paul; and which I think it is material you should see. Our admiral has perhaps gone unnecessarily out of his way, and out of his element, but I do not think he has given any grounds that can be fairly used against us. Pray give me back the letters to-morrow."

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 15. Constantinople.—"On Friday I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter to me of the 7 November, mentioning the subject of a conversation which the principal members of the Levant Company had held with your Lordship respecting the present state of the mission at the Porte; as likewise the suggestions which had occurred to you, in the view of obviating in future the continuance of the inconveniencies complained of. Your Lordship further does me the honour of desiring that I would consider of the course to be pursued in this occurrence, and write to you fully and explicitly upon the subject.

"I need hardly assure your Lordship how highly gratifying to me this flattering instance of your confidence must at any time have been. But, when my communications by Courvoisier reach your Lordship you will better judge of the infinite satisfaction I at this particular moment derive from perceiving that you have already recommended to the Levant Company the adoption of the very measure which I had presumed to suggest to your Lordship, in my private letter of the 21 November, as the only mode I could devise

for securing the interests of the state and of the company at the Porte; for correcting the unfavourable impressions which have already been conveyed here to the prejudice of the King's representation; and for superseding the necessity of any discussion whatever on the rights of the Levant Company.

"To those communications by Courvoisier I beg leave to refer your Lordship as containing a full, explicit, and also a confidential statement of my sentiments on the circumstances of this mission, and on the remedy which your Lordship proposes. You will also know from them that your letter of the 7th ultimo has found matters in this mission involved in difficulties far greater, and very different, from what existed at the period of the company's application to your Lordship. As long as I had no means of preventing this mischief except by an act of my own authority I submitted, from deference to a chartered company, to the extreme inconveniencies to which His Majesty's affairs were subjected by the application which their agent had given to an order issued by them. But, as these inconveniencies were increasing upon me daily, and now appear evidently not to have been in the contemplation of the company, it became my duty to lose no time in stopping them, since your Lordship had furnished me with the means of doing it. I have accordingly put your Lordship's intention in execution by a communication to Mr. Smith, of which I enclose a copy; and I have resumed into the service of the embassy the dragomen and others who had been withdrawn from it.

"I have also the honor of enclosing a letter to the Levant Company, which your Lordship will deliver or not as you may think proper.

"As to the period of my continuance at the Porte, your Lordship will recollect that upon this, as upon every circumstance of my mission, I referred myself wholly to your decision. The idea, however, I believe, was that my embassy should last till peace was concluded, not only on account of the general interests to be regulated by that transaction, but particularly in a view to our commercial advantages and our political influence in this country, which will ultimately depend upon the impression that can be conveyed to the Porte of our conduct during her contest with France. I cannot say that any other term has yet occurred to my mind."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1800, December 16. Cleveland Row.—"It is a matter of infinite satisfaction to me to see how perfectly we agree in our views of Berlin politics, and how completely your conversations have anticipated our instructions. I think the communication of the line we have taken towards Denmark may be very useful as a lesson at Berlin, but it is important not to let them know it time enough to enable them to give Bernstorff any advice as to the answer he is to make to our categorical demand. I have for this reason directed Drummond positively to send back the messenger with the answer, or with the account that he has received none, on the fourth morning

after his conference with Count Bernstorff, and to apprise the Dane that such are his orders.

"You will therefore have the goodness to calculate time so as to prevent any previous communication on the subject. Indeed it will, as I compute, do itself.

"I feel very confident that this line will answer our purpose and maintain peace; but, if it does not, it is very evident that no better result would follow from taking a lower tone, and we should only disgrace ourselves in the eyes of Europe. I grieve for the English captains and sailors, but as for Mr. Moberley's mission, it goes no further than to say that if, after the insult we have received, we will do what we refused to do before, we may be allowed to pocket the affront and say no more about it till next time.

"I really believe if they drive us to extremities, and we are on the point of considering ourselves as so driven with respect to them all, though some temporary inconvenience and alarm will arise as to our commerce, we shall give more animation to the feelings of the country, and go on, upon the whole, quite as easily as we should without it. In the meantime it is for Prussia and the other states in the north of Germany to consider what they will do with the whole foreign commerce blocked up, and the sea at least as effectually shut against them as they can shut the land against us; with the difference that our sea has other shores, and their land has no sea, so that they must go round to Venice or Trieste for all the articles which they now purchase from us, not certainly in order to encourage our manufacturers, but in order to supply their own consumption.

"I was very soon satisfied that Haugwitz's account of your answer to Krudener about Malta had about as much truth as his other assertions usually have. I hope you will approve the answer given to Rastopsin.

"We do not mean to let the Cuxhaven business fall to the ground. I have a long letter on the subject from the Senate of Hamburg, which, in due time, you will be instructed to communicate at Berlin, with a formal demand for the evacuation of Cuxhaven, and a declaration that, till this takes place, the King can place no reliance on the assurances of friendship he receives from Berlin.

"It is very difficult to account for Bonaparte's policy, in his marked coolness to Lucchesini; possibly it may have been only caprice, to which, like other despotic sovereigns, he seems a little subject.

"I am confident that the offer of peace on the terms you describe was not made to Cobenzl; it is evidently nothing more than a fabrication calculated for the atmosphere of Gatchina. My Austrians have really done very fairly this time, and their defeat is no bad proof of it. We have as yet only Moreau's account of it, from which as usual we make some deductions; but I fear there will be still enough to stagger the Emperor's resolutions.

"I see no appearance in Ehrenswerd's conversation of a better disposition on the part of Sweden. We have as yet had only one unofficial conversation, but he is presented to-morrow, and in our first ministerial conference I am to make the same categorical

demand as we now make to Denmark for an explanation of their negotiations or engagements on the subject of armed neutrality, and to tell him plainly that till we are satisfied on that head we will discuss nothing else.

"I have not seen the paragraph in the *Times* of which you speak, but you may say, whenever it can be useful, that the *Times* is a paper which, under cover of a pretended support of Government, is in decided hostility to it. I should not be sorry for an opportunity to trounce him if he would give it us, but I think if the paragraph went that length I should have remarked it.

"Gentz's performance will, I doubt not, be very useful.

"I am very sorry to hear that you are threatened with gout. It comes at a most unlucky moment, but you have only to shake your crutch at them as Lord Chatham used.

"I confess I think you will do well not to appear very credulous as to future assurances of friendship after the business at Cuxhaven, and the Prussian note about the Barcelona business. I should like to ask Haugwitz for the copy of that which he *doubtless must have sent* to Stockholm when the French made a forcible use of Swedish ships in order to invade the dominions of the Porte, *the ally of Prussia!*" *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to H. ELLIOT.

1800, December 16. Cleveland Row.—"I was very much obliged to you for your first private letter, and for the intelligence it contained respecting Petersburg. The other I answer by an official letter. You may rely on it that the names you mention shall remain perfectly secret. I am too sensible of the danger to which they would be exposed by any indiscretion to suffer any risk or hazard to be incurred in that respect. I trust therefore you will continue to write freely all you hear.

"Woronzow is retired to Southampton, and I never hear from him, and hardly ever of him. I know nothing therefore of the intelligence he receives.

"I should think the thing must be drawing to its crisis. I cannot conceive how so manifest a madman can be permitted to go on even so long as he has." *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, December 16. Twickenham.]—"Je ne m'attendais pas quand j'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir hier à la cruelle nouvelle que les papiers françois viennent de nous apprendre. Il y a sûrement de l'exagération, on ne prend pas dix mille hommes ainsi. L'Archiduc n'y étoit pas encore, je crois; on l'auroit nommé sans doute; il faut espérer que l'effet de sa présence opérera sur l'armée, et que l'on réparera sur-le-champ le passé. L'essentiel est de ne pas perdre courage, tout est perdu si l'on fléchit. Je voudrais que M. de Cobentzl n'ait point été à Luneville au moment de cette affaire, car je craindrais qu'il n'y restât après. Adieu, si vous avez des paroles de *comfort* à me donner, de grâce envoyez-les-moi. Je ne me soucie

pas de sortir de ma tanière dans cette cruelle circonstance, à moins que vous n'ayez des ordres à me donner, et dans ce cas je suis à vous—nuit et jour. Vous connoissez mon dévouement à votre païs, et à notre système. Je suis prêt à y tout sacrifier, même pour caver, au plus fort, la répugnance invincible que j'aurois à traiter avec ces scélérats, si je croyois que ma présence puisse vous être utile.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1800, December 16.] Twickenham. 2 o'clock.—“ Je venois de faire partir le billet que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire ce matin quand j'ai reçu le vôtre avec la gazette qui y étoit jointe. Un moment après est arrivé le courier que j'avois envoyé au Comte de Cobentzl. Comme ce qu'il m'apporte est en chiffres, j'en aurai pour toute la journée, et je ne pourrai venir vous faire ma cour que demain. J'ai l'honneur de vous joindre ici la lettre particulière, non chiffrée, ou plutôt les quatre mots qu'il m'a écrit. Vous verrez par son début que ma manière franche et ferme de parler a affligé notre homme, il n'y a pas de mal à cela. Si vous parlez à mon courier qui aura l'honneur de vous remettre la présente, son rapport vous consolera un peu sur cette malheureuse affaire. On la savoit à Luneville quand il est parti ; il a parlé à l'officier qui en étoit le porteur. Les François ne se vantent pas d'avoir été battus les deux jours précédens.”

Enclosure :—

COUNT DE COBENTZEL to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1800, December 6. Luneville.—“ Le courier Moritz arrivé ensemble avec Mayntz, m'a apporté la lettre de Lord Grenville du dix-sept Novembre, et celles que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le dix-huit. Si j'ai différé plusieurs jours à répondre à votre Excellence, c'étoit dans l'espérance de pouvoir lui mander quelque chose de positif sur les déterminations des François relativement à l'admission du plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique aux conférences pour la paix. D'après l'autorisation de Lord Grenville j'ai déclaré à Joseph Bonaparte que le collègue, avant l'arrivée duquel je ne pouvois absolument pas traiter, n'attendait que le passeport du gouvernement françois pour venir me rejoindre. J'ai insisté avec d'autant plus de force sur la décision du Gouvernement françois à cet égard en me refusant à toutes les tentatives qui ont été faites pour entamer du moins la négociation. Cette demande, et celle de l'évacuation instantannée de la Toscane, ont été les seuls objets discutés dans les différentes notes échangées entre moi et Joseph Bonaparte. Je ne les envoie pas à votre Excellence parce-qu'elles auront sans doute été communiquées à Vienne à Lord Minto. Sans être intimidé des menaces des François, j'ai laissé venir les choses jusqu'à la rupture effective de l'armistice, et à la reprise des hostilités. Il paroît que le premier Consul ne s'attendoit pas à cette fermeté, et qu'il a toujours voulu se flatter que nous céderions au dernier moment ; au moins plusieurs indices

semblent-ils annoncer qu'il ne seroit pas impossible d'en venir encore à un renouvellement pur et simple de l'armistice en reprenant l'ancienne position, bien entendu que nous ne pourrions y consentir sans l'évacuation de la Toscane. Ce n'est que la solution de cette question qui m'arrête encore ici. Il seroit sans doute de quelqu'avantage de pouvoir épargner à l'armée les pertes qui résultent toujours d'une campagne d'hyver. Dans très peu de jours je saurai à quoi m'en tenir, et si le Gouvernement françois ne se résout pas à une négociation commune avec les deux alliés, je quitte sur le champ Luneville, en informant aussitôt votre excellence. Entretiens je n'ai pas voulu la laisser si longtems sans aucune nouvelle de ma part. Je n'écris pas aujourd'hui moi-même à Lord Grenville parceque, dans le circonstance actuelle, je suis obligé de me servir du chiffre ; mais votre excellence voudra bien lui faire part du contenu de cette dépêche. Je crois très apparent que le parti que je serai dans le cas de prendre sera de m'éloigner du lieu des négociations. En tout cas Sa Majesté aura prouvé à ses peuples et à l'Europe entière qu'aucun des moyens combinables avec les engagemens qui l'unissent au Roi d'Angleterre n'a été négligé pour faire cesser le fléau de la guerre, et que c'est l'obstination seule du Gouvernement françois de vouloir à tout prix séparer les deux cours alliés qui est cause de la reprise des hostilités." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 21. Berlin.—“ Lord Minto's messenger is just arrived here since I finished my despatch. His letter and another from Mr. Elliott contain the same apprehensions as to the hostile disposition of Prussia, evinced by the conduct of its agents, which you have entertained at London, and of which the note delivered at Stockholm is, I think, the strongest and least equivocal mark. At any other Court I should have thought half of what has passed evidence of actual hostile intentions, but I cannot be of that opinion here. I believe the whole to have been only an effect of the temporizing system which has so long prevailed, and hope that we shall soon see a great change in the language and conduct of all the Prussian Ministers. As long as Haugwitz continues to profess friendship I shall continue, unless I have contrary orders from you, to treat him in some degree as if I thought he might be sincere. He is conscious I have good reason to doubt him, but, in speaking of other powers, I can say everything I wish him to feel in the strongest manner. I have done it to-day, with a scarcely indirect application to Prussia, in observations I made on the Swedish answer to his own note. That answer is excellent. Surely the King of Sweden is well inclined. I hope you will be able to draw some important good from that quarter. If the temptation of drawing from Great Britain the subsidy that crown used to have from France would attach him, would it not be worth while, and the best way of defeating the armed neutrality ?

“Hudelist whispered me to-day that he did not think matters were going on smoothly between Russia and France. He has

watched them as close as he could, and will tell me more another time.

“I have opened this letter again in consequence of what has since passed with Haugwitz. I told him plainly what I had just heard of the opinion universally entertained of the hostile disposition of Prussia towards Great Britain, which was an inference from the measures of the Court of Berlin and from the language of its agents. He seemed very much struck, and asserted the contrary in the most earnest manner and the strongest terms. I now see, said he, that the accidental concurrence in point of time of measures taken by the King with the most innocent intention, with the violent measures of the Emperor of Russia, has led to the belief that they have been concerted, which I solemnly declare they have not, and that they are totally unconnected. You may rely, he added, upon the personal character of the King. Whatever doubt may have been entertained of intentions hostile to England, a very little time will clear up. It could only spring from seeing *le détestable tripot qui l'entoure*. A strong and remarkable expression from a person in Haugwitz's situation, *et qui donne à penser*.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret ink.

1800, December 21. Berlin.—“I certainly did not intend in either of my notes to admit that the King of Prussia had received, or had a right to any satisfaction from us. But I am the less anxious to defend myself, and the less vexed at not having in this instance held exactly the language you would have wished, because, on a review of all that has passed, I have the satisfaction to find that I have really anticipated in effect all that you have now said to me; and when I have told Count Haugwitz that what he has heard from me respecting the armed neutrality, and the unalterable determination of Great Britain to maintain her maritime code is fully approved by his Majesty, nothing stronger can be conveyed by words. You will see by the reports in the foreign papers of my language and declaration that people have been set a-talking, and have received a proper impression. I did indeed say that I spoke from myself, that you might have disavowed me if you had found it necessary or convenient. But I told Haugwitz it was important he should understand that, though I had not yet orders to make a declaration on this particular occasion, my only doubt was whether the language I had held would be thought sufficiently strong.

“I am entirely of opinion with you, as you will have seen by former letters, that the only way of dealing with these Northern powers is threatening them. The fear of England must be opposed to the fear of France, and I trust will be found the strongest. Sweden, perhaps, wishes to be detached from Prussia. Denmark, it is true, is in a hobble, but as the British fleet can always pass the Baltic many weeks before a Russian force can put to sea, it seems as if even there the balance might be turned in our favour. I am glad you feel so bold, notwithstanding the scarcity. I had great

fears it might have obliged you to take a lower tone. (*Secret ink ends.*)

"I hope you will think the Prussian answer about the corn satisfactory. I am sure Alvensleben, who is a good-natured fellow, meant it should be so. Pray remember you promised to enquire about M. de Bombelles for the Princess of Tour and Taxis.

"It might have been of use to me, in following up the business of the Northern League, to have had accounts now and then of what was passing at Copenhagen, but I do not even know whether we have any body there since Lord Whitworth left it.

"I think *Castle Rack-rent* excellent. I am acquainted only with the polished Irish, but can readily believe that it is no caricature of the rest." *Copy.*

LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 22. Somerset Street.—"I consider Count Panin's dismissal or resignation, which ever it may be, as a plain indication of the Emperor's perseverance in his system of aggravation against us and of his understanding with the French. At all events it is a release from daily mortification. His successor, M. de Kalitchew, is a tool of Rastopsin's, ignorant and conceited, and I think I can venture to say from the knowledge I have of him, that no act of folly or of violence will provoke the smallest representation from *him*. I wish it were in my power to speak more favourably of this new Vice-Chancellor."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 23. Stowe.—"I had some hopes on the chapter of the Austrians in Bavaria, but they are vanished; for the accounts by Bremen seem as discouraging as Bonaparte could wish for us. Nor do the Austrians appear inclined to act on the *offensive* in Italy. A *defensive* either there or in Germany is certain ruin; and Cobentzel will very soon find himself released from all difficulty of negotiation by the necessity of signing whatever Bonaparte thinks proper to put on his paper. Add to this the armed neutrality, and it really seems as if our cup was full. But be it what it may, we must abide it; and I sincerely hope and trust that Government will not be staggered by the tremendous difficulty of the contest. You have sent 3,000 men to the West Indies, and you have done right, for you must attack the Dane and Swede *there* immediately, and at Tranquebar; but the real struggle must be at Elsineur and a little *petite pièce* at Gottenburgh. As to Russia, I see little chance of *great success* in the Black Sea, and incalculable difficulties both for us and for the Turk, whether friend or foe. The Baltic offers objects, but I fear that the long delay before the ice allows you to attack there, operates in Paul's favour. I have writ to Pitt to state my opinion of the necessity of again increasing your militia, to enable you to avail yourself of the disposable infantry still in this kingdom. The whole is only 14,000 men, of whom you cannot send more than 10,000. You may get 3,500 in exchange for your Dutchmen from

Ireland, and Sir James Pulteney brings you back 3,000 ; but England will then be left to 36,000 Guards and militia, which is too small a number. I have offered to lend myself to any arrangements he may wish ; but our militia ballots for any augmentation will require at least three months, so that you have no time to lose. My idea would be to allow us to recruit by bounty."

Postscript.—"I am made very happy by your *one bread* bill ; it is the only device that is sure to give real relief, and general satisfaction."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 24. Berlin.—"Garlike has seen the Dane this morning, and he tells me he finds him talking more confidently in regard to the armed neutrality. I suspect this language may have been put into his mouth by Krudener. He says some proposals will certainly be made, but of a nature which cannot be considered as hostile by England. You must have better information from Copenhagen than I can get here. I have not yet received your answer to Rastopsin, but mean to keep aloof from the Russians. It is to be wished that Sweden and Denmark at least should consider our quarrel with the Emperor not likely to be soon made up."

Nota Bene.—"The Dane only speaks of what he thinks is in agitation. He does not believe anything to be yet concluded. If they find you dare to make war upon Russia, I still think it will fall to the ground." *Original written with secret ink. Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 25. Bromley Hill.—"I enclose a letter which I have received this morning from Lord Auckland, though I hardly think the vague communication from Perrégaux deserves much attention. If you have leisure I wish you would put down your idea of a speech to end the session, and send it me."

Enclosure :—

LORD AUCKLAND to W. PITT.

Private.

1800, December 24. Palace Yard.—"I have received from M. Perrégaux at Paris a letter, brought by some private hand, purporting to relate to publications, and also to arrears of, *rentes viagères* belonging to Lady Auckland, one-third of which he says is now forthcoming in ready money. In the midst of those businesses there is the following remarkable paragraph introduced '*à propos de rien.*' I transcribe it *verbatim*.

"The world in general and humanity call for peace. We wish it here most earnestly. But on your side the same wishes do not seem to exist. The longer war exists, the more deeply the evils resulting from it must affect the countries which labour under that calamity. It is a pity every one does not give a little way to put an end to it.'

"It is possible that the above may mean nothing ; but I incline to think from various circumstances that it means a great deal. And I have heretofore remarked to you that perhaps the best mode of arriving at a good pacification would be by a mere personal communication, carried on by you or by Lord Grenville with Buonaparte, and not avowed till finally concluded ; and I think that much might be urged in support of that notion.

"As to the incident now in question, would you wish to have it mentioned to Lord Grenville ? or would you mention it ? or would it be better to disregard it ? "

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1800, December 26. Dropmore.—"I own I think that it would be best not wholly to reject Perrégaux's overture, which I rather incline to think was meant as such. The reason I took no step about G. was that just at the same time G. Ellis's friend wrote to him to propose to come over here for the same purpose. I authorized him to give an encouraging answer, but last week he received, at the interval of a month, a reply that he had been on the point of setting out, but that the publication of the correspondence here had shewn that there was no disposition here to come to any real understanding, and therefore that his journey had been deferred *sine die*. These are not the words, but their meaning.

"Ellis sent me a draft of an answer which I perfectly approved and which I sent. This expressed that they must know very little of this country if they really so understood a step which was unavoidable ; and that it would be a pity that a misapprehension of this nature should delay a measure which might produce much good. I have the copies of all these, and will shew them to you when we meet in town. While this was going on, I thought we should only embarrass our business by opening another channel.

"I have written the enclosed to Lord Auckland that he may send it if he pleases, and you think it right, or only extract it. If you agree in its being right, forward it to him. I will endeavour to send you a King's Speech to-morrow, but I am a little puzzled how much should or should not be in it."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1800, December 27. Berlin.—"You will easily believe with what satisfaction I learn that you so fully approve of what I have been doing.

"I think the line I have followed will show you that I have not been disposed to place implicit reliance upon Haugwitz's plausible professions, but you have a very full relation of facts, which I sometimes think best to give without any comment. I really believe we should do, if Haugwitz had prevailing influence ; but it is very doubtful whether any full and true representation ever reaches the King. I think this Cabinet has not, at present, any

hostile intentions towards us, but I really hope they are not so far engaged with Russia as to make a rupture probable at present, but their system has led from the first, and they must every day come nearer to a situation in which France and Russia may compel them to follow whatever impulse they may give. My hopes therefore are never sanguine or extend far, nor can I be perfectly confident even of the answer I am now to receive. I own I think that if you can break this intended league, and it can be plain you act from a generous motive, not from fear, you will do well to think of some favour, if any can be given safely to neutral powers. One grievance, arising perhaps from the extent of the war, and possibly without any remedy, is the long time which elapses before judgment can be obtained. Perhaps in the inferior courts it might be accelerated by multiplying the courts, but there must be one Court of Appeal.

"I enclose the copy of a passage in a letter received by a very respectable friend of mine from his correspondent at Brunswick. It shows the impressions which the Hungarian prayer is likely to make upon the public; and indeed the prayer itself, though it does not contain expressions so very offensive as are stated in this extract, is such as it is impossible not to disapprove.

"The letter to Rastopsin is excellent. Of the effect it may produce I think great doubts may be entertained; for the Emperor may not only have begun to repent of the violence committed, but may be struck with the delicacy with which you have, by pointing out the means of re-establishing good harmony by taking the first steps leading to the reciprocal appointment of ministers of each party resident at a friendly Court, saved him half the mortification of treading back his steps. At the same time the letter breathes the most determined resolution." *Copy.*

SPENCER SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1800, December 31. Constantinople.—"The new arrangement of my official situation here, according to a notification I received from the Ambassador on the 12th instant, a copy whereof is annexed, completing the measure of my disappointment of the hopes your Lordship's dispatch of the 7th of March raised in me of rendering my services still useful at Constantinople, I venture to plead this change of circumstances, besides the recent occurrence in my family of the greatest domestic calamity that could befall me, as the justification of an appearance of importunity in thus renewing my former request for the King's leave to undertake a journey home upon my private affairs.

"In every event of this application which forms the most earnest object of my wishes, I am under the necessity of recurring to your Lordship's interference for my relief from certain inconvenient restrictions which a desire I lately expressed to the Ambassador has unexpectedly laid me under. Concerning which I shall say no more than to refer your Lordship, for an explanation, to the perusal of two notes that passed between his Excellency and me upon the occasion.

"Having now seldom opportunity to offer myself to your recollection, I request permission to remind your Lordship in this place of the unfruitful issue to me as yet of His Majesty's gracious intentions to extend his bounty to me in alleviation of my loss by fire on 13th March, 1799, as your Lordship had the goodness to make me acquainted with so long ago.

"And, being once upon subjects of this personal nature, not to trouble your Lordship with another letter on purpose, I take this occasion humbly to solicit your protection of the interest I have in my commission as Secretary of *embassy* bearing the most ancient date consistent with the rules of office; and that if not as early as that of your first dispatch of notification, my appointment may be at least coeval with that of the ambassador."

Enclosure 1:—

The EARL OF ELGIN to SPENCER SMITH.

1800, December 12. Constantinople.—"I have the honour of communicating to you the substance of instructions which I have this morning received, by express, from Lord Grenville, dated the 7th of November.

"His lordship informs me that a meeting of the Deputy Governor and principal members of the Levant Company had been held by appointment at his^hhouse for the purpose of a discussion upon the present state of the mission at the Porte, and that, in consequence of what then passed, I am to accept from the company the character of their ambassador, in the same manner as has been done in former instances, retaining my present situation as the King's representative. His lordship further confirms his dispatch to me of the 7th of March, an extract of which was at the time officially addressed to you, intimating that the situation of secretary of the embassy, with the rank of minister plenipotentiary, must be considered in the same light at Constantinople as in every other Court; and that all the transactions of the mission must, without exception, be considered as placed under the direction and control of the King's ambassador.

"Being called upon to make this notification to you at a time when concerns of the most important and pressing nature to the interests of Great Britain are entrusted to my management, it is my indispensable duty to direct that you will, without the smallest delay, intimate in an official manner to the officers of the Levant Company at Constantinople that the regulations which, I understand, you delivered to them for their respective occupations, at a meeting you convened on Sunday, the 16th November, are entirely suspended, and that I am henceforward authorised to exercise exclusively the control over these persons."

Enclosure 2:—

SPENCER SMITH to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1800, December 26. Pera.—"I beg leave to make your lordship acquainted with a wish I have long entertained to visit the Troad

and other classical spots within an easy distance of Constantinople, and with the desire I have to avail myself of this very first interval of leisure since my employment here to effectuate that purpose.

"It is my intention, with your lordship's approbation, to set out soon as Mrs. Smith's health be sufficiently re-established to admit of our separation without uneasiness. To which end I have to request your assistance towards procuring the needful travelling *firman* from the Porte, for my going to and from the Dardanelles either by Rodosto or Brussa, and with sufficient latitude to permit my eventually extending my tour even to Ephesus, with six attendants, all Franks; to which I solicit the additional favour of your lordship's own passport of a similar tenour." *Copy.*

Enclosure 3 :—

THE EARL OF ELGIN to SPENCER SMITH.

1800, December 26. Constantinople.—"Since the receipt of your note this morning, I have examined Lord Grenville's letters to me, in the view of ascertaining whether my compliance with your request would be reconcilable with his instructions. But I am sorry to find Lord Grenville has so explicitly stated to me the reasons upon which he denied you leave of absence from hence, that your quitting Constantinople, by any authority except his own, would be equally in contradiction with his orders and his wishes."

H. ELLIOTT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret.

1800, January 1. Dresden.—"I have received your Lordship's most secret despatch N 2, 16 December, 1800, together with the enclosures.

"As Monsieur de Kalitschew was already gone to Petersburg, I have sent a private letter to him by Madame de Kalitschew, who followed her husband upon the 30th December. In the enclosed copy of that letter I am to solicit your Lordship's attention to the paragraph underlined. I trust it will be thought entirely consonant to the instructions you was pleased to convey to me upon the subject of my communications with Monsieur de Kalitschew.

"The rest of my letter is drawn up with the view of giving it the appearance of a letter of private friendship, and unconnected with public business. I shall not, however, regret if my letter should be laid before the Emperor, as from an early knowledge of certain mystical habits to which he was once addicted, I have contrived to insert two expressions, which will attract his notice, as being connected with a system which still prevails among some of the northern princes.

"I can assure your Lordship that such is the weakness of many, with whom I have been acquainted, that their conduct in private and public life continues to be guided by motives too puerile to be credited by those who have not had an opportunity of bearing witness to their absurdity."

Enclosure :—

H. ELLIOT to M. DE KALITCHEFF.

1800, December 29. Dresden.—“ Lord Minto ayant ignoré le départ de votre excellence de Dresde à la date de sa dernière lettre, m'avait chargé de vous faire sincèrement ses félicitations sur la prouve éclatante de sa confiance et de son approbation dont l'Empéreur Paul vient de vous honorer. Il se réunit à moi pour vous souhaiter tout le bonheur imaginable dans la nouvelle carrière que vous allez entreprendre. Puisse le rétablissement d'une bonne et solide amitié entre la Russie et l'Angleterre en signaler le début.

“ Je viens de recevoir de Milord Grenville la communication *confidentielle* de la copie d'une lettre du Comte Rostopschin à Milord Grenville en date du 23 Octobre 1800, de même que la copie d'une lettre du Lord Grenville au Comte Rostopschin en date du 5 Décembre 1800.

“ *Comme la lettre de Sa Seigneurie explique sans réserve les sentiments de ma Cour sur les événements dont il y est question, je dois me borner à exprimer mes vœux pour le renouvellement de la bonne intelligence entre nos deux augustes souverains.*

“ Je ne vous fais pas les compliments de la saison en vous souhaitant le retour de beaucoup de *nouveaux siècles*, je crois que vous serez de mon avis, et que vous n'enviez pas le sort du vieux *Methusalem* dans ce méchant monde. Vous souhaiter de la santé et du bonheur pour les années que Dieu vous destine sur ce globe, prouvera assez le vrai intérêt que je ne cesserai de prendre à vous. À Dresde nous continuons à nous ennuyer tout doucement et assez agréablement. Pour ma personne j'y serais parfaitement heureux au sein de ma nombreuse famille si le triomphe indécent des coquins et de Jacobins de tout poël, avoués ou cachés, ne me faisait beaucoup de mauvais sang. Les querelles entre les honnêtes gens sont les plus beaux étrennes que l'on pouvait présenter à leur malveillance pour le commencement du dix-neuvième siècle. *Divide et impera* sera sûrement le mot de guet de *tous les démons* qui dirigeront la marche future des révolutions encore à faire. Nous sommes tous bien maladroits de nous laisser mener de la sorte. Dieu donne que la concorde et l'unanimité renaissent entre les grandes puissances, qui ont un intérêt si commun à agir de concert.” *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1801, January 3. Vienna.—“ My public dispatches are so very full on the interesting but calamitous subject of the day that I have little to add to your Lordship in the shape of a private letter. I send Flint back, as well because I have now no *absolute* want of him, as because I think he may be more useful at home, particularly in receiving and communicating to your lordship my Paris correspondence, which may now become very interesting. He will communicate to your Lordship, if you shall think it right to question him, some few Austrian anecdotes which I

have thought it wiser not to commit to paper, and will throw still further light on the present situation of Thugut and Lehrbach.

"I have been anxious to have it understood that my opinion of the Arch-duke is not founded upon light grounds, because if it could be supposed that I was mistaken, the prospect here would be nothing less than misery and total ruin. I admit and admire the better parts of Thugut's character, but I know to the full as well all his faults and weaknesses, and have too often felt the mischievous effects of his ungovernable obstinacy not to know that he will go on from one false step to another till we shall all be undone together, unless the military sceptre be taken out of his hands. Fortunately, at this moment, it is an instrument which he finds himself unequal to wield, and I am inclined to think, though he will not say so distinctly, that he is desirous himself of resigning it to another.

"The truth is that he is thoroughly sick of all his advisers, even of Bellegarde, whose defensive system would have proved the loss of Italy if we had not lost it for him upon the Danube.

"The Baron has seen Fasbinder twice, and desired to see him daily. He has waited twice on the Arch-duke, and the Arch-duke has been as often in what Suvarow called the infernal cavern. Everything in that respect is taking the very turn that is most to be wished and desired, and at which, though not quite within my sphere, I have been labouring incessantly, though slowly and secretly, for these last nine months. Thugut is coming round slowly and sulkily; but he is certainly coming round; and I am confident that the Arch-duke will abide by his promise unless the old man should show himself wayward and foolish to a degree of which, under the present circumstances, I do not believe him capable. I have, besides, prepared the Arch-duke for finding him obstinate and wrong-headed at the dozen first interviews at least. In the meantime his visit to the old man has made a strong sensation, and has been felt as a death-blow to Lehrbach.

"If the Arch-duke be left to himself, it is my own opinion that he will have an army in one year, though I doubt whether he will go to war in two. But he is susceptible of impulsion, and if you keep the hold upon him which is now acquired by some measure of the sort I lately recommended, *I mean directly* from the King, I shall think nothing impossible or improbable.

"Circumstances and persons are certainly very different, yet I would wish to recommend here, as far as any similitude can be found between the two cases, a conduct as similar as possible to that which was followed when I left Switzerland; the consequence of which was the throwing the whole odium of the Swiss invasion on France instead of England, and the whole was gained at the price of a little civility, with a moderate portion of temper and moderation. The same sort of thing will happen here if we play our cards well, and part good friends with the hope of meeting again. And I shall not be at all surprised, in that case, to see an English alliance eagerly sought after by the popular cry before two years are expired.

"I shall write again by Lord Minto's first messenger. In the meantime I thank your Lordship for your private letter of the

8th November, and, with best wishes of the season, I most earnestly recommend the holy island of Malta to your special care and protection, and to your most close and safe custody."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 3. Berlin.—"I must confess I have been and am a good deal puzzled how to execute your last orders; for though I am, notwithstanding some unfavourable appearances, very much persuaded that Prussia is not yet in such a situation as to be under any necessity of taking part against Great Britain, and I am sure nothing can be further from her inclination and intentions, yet, without using much stronger language even than what you have employed towards Denmark, I despair of any answer not in some degree evasive. I conceive your object to be twofold; 1st to convince them that Great Britain is not only very angry, but very fully determined upon vigorous war, if her neighbours do not find the means to remove her suspicions; and 2nd, to learn their real intentions. Upon the first of these I trust I shall have succeeded completely, not without giving offence, but without offending sufficiently to excite active resentment. And as to the second, I hope also to succeed. This Court is so wedded to the system of doing nothing that they are afraid of being too positive if they say so much. I trust however that, even if the answer they give at last should not appear quite full, I shall be able to lay before you pretty good circumstantial proof of their intentions. I will send you by the next opportunity copies of what I have laid before Count Haugwitz, and a more detailed account of all that has passed with him, that you may judge as much as possible for yourself, and not upon my report."

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, January 5. Vienna.—"The unfortunate course which events have lately taken seems to point out a natural remedy for the difficulties in my personal situation which have been the subject of some of my former private letters. There seems to be no longer any reason to doubt an approaching peace between France and Austria; and I conceive that this object must be actually accomplished before anything precise or certain can be settled respecting the future system of this government in its relations with England. What I should propose myself, if your Lordship sees no material objection to it, would be to remain here till the peace is made; and till, after that event, the delicate and important questions which must be treated between Great Britain and Austria are brought to a conclusion. It is difficult to foresee exactly the length to which these matters may run, but at present there is no reason to think that every thing material that is likely to arise out of the new turn of events may not be terminated in the course of the summer; possibly sooner.

"A few months, however, would not be of moment either to

Government or me. When things are brought to this state, it appears highly probable that the business of this Court might cease to be sufficiently urgent to render my return to England on a leave of absence in any degree prejudicial to the King's affairs. If this should appear to be the case when the time comes, I flatter myself your Lordship will not refuse me that favour. It will be the most eligible mode in every respect for my return, and is that which I very much prefer myself. It will undoubtedly relieve Government from some expense by furnishing a fund for my indemnification proportioned to the extent of my leave of absence. It would likewise leave the situation open for me, if future events should seem to render my return to Vienna desirable. On the other hand, if at the period I have mentioned the situation of affairs should render it inexpedient to leave this Court even for a short interval without a minister on the spot, the question of my return may then be settled according to the circumstances of the time."

J. H. FRERE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 6. [Lisbon].—"I should naturally write to your Lordship in this form if it were merely for the sake of preserving the privilege with which you have indulged me; but there is one point which I am particularly anxious to suggest, at least if there is any intention of preserving Portugal in hostility with France, or indeed of providing for her security in case of a peace with that power. The effect of the Chevalier D'Almeida's continuance in England is to remove one of the only men capable of doing good here, and to withdraw from the English minister a great share of the consideration which ought to attach to his situation. If I had him here, with the perfect good understanding between us, and his favour with the Prince, and the assistance of Don Rodrigo de Sousa, I should think that anything might be effected of which the country in its present state is capable.

"There is at this moment a vacancy in the finance department by the death of the Marquis Ponte de Lima, and I should think that some means might be found out of the present state of things between the countries to send him back with some special communication, and to keep the Marquis Pombeira accredited in his stead. He would then be able to see his way, and might return at any rate if he could not establish himself to his satisfaction here. The views of the Government are, I believe, sincerely to use as much delay as their fears will allow them, and to avoid, if possible, the residence of a French minister. I have not, however, made any enquiries or expressed any curiosity about the terms lest they should be interpreted into approbation. If a French minister is once established here, I should look upon the Court as irretrievably gone. There is nothing like police, and the capital is the common resort of all that is villainous and infamous in the country. It would really require a volume to convey an idea of the total absence of all government, or to repeat one-half of the facts which have been related to me in illustration of it; and when one considers the apathy of the Government, and the literal encouragement which is

given to crimes, it is only astonishing that things are not worse ; and one wonders where it is that the security for life and property still exists, and why it is that people are not murdered and houses broken open in mid-day. I have heard instances of the Duke Dalafoens encouraging assassination, just as Mr. Windham would encourage boxing, as a point of honour among the common people. A street robber fees the guard and makes his escape unmolested. A murderer threatens his judge with assassination, and the judge obtains the continuance of his confinement by going to the minister and declaring that he will murder the prisoner the instant he is discharged. Such is the country which is in expectation of receiving a diplomatic propagandist as soon as the French Government shall think fit to accept the terms which they may have to offer. Mr. Pinto professes himself perfectly aware of the danger ; and if he had behaved more fairly in his communications with me, and were less influenced by his Spanish connections, I should be inclined to give him credit for having fled to this alternative as a refuge from the more formidable evils of war. But, unfortunately, the statement of the discussion between us will not admit so candid an interpretation. I think I have not left any thing undone, unless I had engaged for an army of 10,000 to be here in March ; but having said every thing to provoke some demand of assistance, and having noticed to the minister his silence, it struck me as unbecoming and undignified to obtrude such a proposal, especially as I did not feel entirely confident in the facility of its execution. If, however, there should be any considerable disposable force which it was thought proper to allot to the defence of Portugal, I should hope, and indeed feel confident, that its arrival would put an end to negotiation. With a view to this possibility I shall certainly give M. Pinto to understand that any preliminary excluding British auxiliaries would be considered as an act of hostility. I am afraid that my bad hand, which is made still worse by an accident which has befallen it, will have already fatigued your Lordship's eyes."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 6. Berlin.—"The natural inference, perhaps, from all that has passed would be that the Prussian Cabinet has been led on farther than it meant to go, but not so far as to leave no retreat, and that it means to get out of the scrape and to keep friends with us. But what inference can be drawn with confidence when we know that the Minister never boggles at a lie, that he has no real influence, that the King never sees with his own eyes, that those who approach him deceive him, and keep him in the dark, and are playing a game against us. I still think, however, that they all, king, ministers, and favourites, shrink from the very thought of war. The only questions are whether the moment is arrived when they have no choice left but to obey the mandate of France and Russia ; whether those powers are yet sufficiently connected to act for one end ; and whether both would at this moment think it politic to engage Prussia in open hostilities against us. These are no questions of easy solution, and till it is known

what terms will be imposed by France upon Austria, they must perhaps remain unanswered. I have doubts whether France will give peace upon any terms, and if they do, no part of Italy will probably be allowed to retain more than a nominal independence.

"Haugwitz repeatedly said that a war between Great Britain and Russia must, of course, put an end to all concert between neutral powers and the latter, and the Danes and Swedes certainly are very anxious that our quarrel with the Emperor may be made up. This is probably only dictated by the hope of gaining time to carry their own schemes into effect ; which, I trust, will be effectually defeated by your vigorous measures against Denmark at least, before she can receive any assistance. I have sometimes thought that if the King himself was to remonstrate by letter with the King of Prussia it might produce good effect.

"I am very glad to see by the last papers that the price of corn begins to fall.

"Baron Reden, the Hanoverian, is the good authority I quoted towards the end of my despatch. He lives with all the people who may be called the runners of Government here, and may possibly have been specially desired to tell me this, as he knew of my having been with Count Haugwitz in the morning, and called me out from dinner to make this communication. Lutzow, the Minister from Mecklenburg Swerin, was the reporter of the conversation of the Russians."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 6. Wilderness.—"I am vexed that I forgot to speak to you last week about the address. I found from my brother that the Duke of Rutland does not mean to be in town till March, and that from that and other circumstances there was no chance of his being induced to move. We therefore agreed it was not worth while to make the trial. I hope you will still have time to place it in proper hands. Our moving it ourselves is, I think, too much out of the common line, and not desirable."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, January 13. Cleveland Row.—"I know not that I can add anything to my despatches. I have there explained to you the past, the present, and future. But I fear the result will be that we shall meet much sooner than we foresaw when you left this country. It is in vain to reason with such fools and madmen, but really their want of all common sense does provoke one beyond all patience.

"If you can persuade them that they have not agreed to act against us, and that they can do no better than sit still and enrich themselves by the profits of that neutrality of which Denmark has made so abundant an harvest, you will do a fine thing. But I have no very great hopes that they will have even as much sense as this."

Copy.

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 13. Berlin.—“I have not materials to make a despatch, but I would not let the post go without saying a word to you. I still think this Court will get out of the scrape if it can. Haugwitz persists in saying nothing is concluded, and that, if there is war between us and Russia, the neutral league falls to the ground of course. I know not whether the bad news from Austria will oblige you to lower your tone; I rather expect it will have a contrary effect, and I am sure if we temporize now, this armed neutrality will come upon us in the summer with double force. What I principally write for now is to say that you ought to contradict the Emperor's assertion that England entered into a treaty about Malta, as publicly as he made it. It is in vain for me to state the truth wherever I go. Every public paper and every individual says, after the Emperor has declared by a note delivered in his name to all the Ministers at his Court that such a treaty exists, England would deny it openly if she could or if she dared.

“Jacobi's letters would probably be read by the King.

“Every body here, and private accounts from Petersburg confirm it, is of opinion that whoever will give a subsidy will have the Swede. The Dane, I trust, you will make sure of by other means. I am told here, and upon such authority as I can, I think, rely upon, that Baron Jacobi has a very right way of thinking, and would readily be of use if he could. As Prussia can have no real interest in the war, nor we in destroying her little trade, I persuade myself always she may be kept out of it; and his reports might, at this moment, be of more weight than anything I can say.”
Copy.

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 14. Stowe.—“Even in the midst of the tremendous difficulties of our French contest, I rejoice that the question avowed by the northern coalition comes so distinctly to issue; for I am confident that the spirit of the country bears you out in the resolution to grapple with it *usque ad mortem*. All depends on a vigorous Baltic blow, and I trust that you will not wait for the thaw before you strike where the ice certainly does not impede you. Denmark will pay the piper; but I wish I could see the prospect of shaking the *Bear* by the *beard*. You have not encouraged me to think about *men*; but I have a device for assisting the marine service from the militia; and, at all events, I think you must augment us, for you have no troops in the eastern district, and it is open to insult from Sweden and Denmark.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1801, January 16. Cleveland Row.—“In the event of our obtaining Prussian neutrality we shall have some overtures to make to them respecting the neutrality of the Elbe. By the possession of Altona, Denmark may obstruct our navigation to and from Hamburgh. But by so doing she will interrupt the neutrality of

that river, the whole of which is comprised within the Prussian line of demarcation. And we should thereby acquire, by just reciprocity, the right to station our ships of war just below Altona, and to intercept all trade to and from that town. This we shall be willing, under Prussian neutrality, to compromise, and to admit the line of demarcation as so far in force as to prevent all hostilities on either side in the limits included within that line.

"But we think it best not to make this proposal till we are a little more assured of the conduct which Prussia means to hold. I therefore only state the idea now to you for your information, and would not wish you to bring it forward even as a proposal from yourself till you learn further from us. But if you can lead Haugwitz to make it as a proposal of his, it will be very useful to do so.

"You must, however, always remember that we will not suffer that line of demarcation to be extended, either by land or sea, a single yard beyond what is now marked on the maps officially communicated to us; particularly not to the effect of driving us farther out to sea at the mouth of the Elbe.

"We are very impatient to learn the impression which our measures will have produced at Berlin. The Swede was, I believe, a little prepared for it, but not the Dane. The great haul will not however be in Europe, but in the East Indies, and coming from thence.

"Did not Paul, when he laid on the second embargo, make some declaration or publication in his *gazette* about armed neutrality, as well as about Malta? If you have such a paper pray send it me." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 17. Berlin.—"As Proby's part in the Wicklow election must long since have ended, perhaps my best way would be to hold my tongue. Your constant kindness and friendship to me and mine is such as I can never feel or acknowledge too much, and I have only now to regret that I did not talk over this matter with you before I left England; but, indeed, it seemed perfectly unreasonable to trouble you on an affair in which, as it should seem, you could have no personal or public concern, nor a sufficient probability of being useful to me to compensate for the bore. As far as Government were concerned they were apprised of my views for my son, and knew by what had already passed that the question must be between Lord Powerscourt, Lord Fitzwilliam, and me. One of these being in general opposition, and the other having taken as strong a part as he could against the Union, I thought, even independent of Lord Cornwallis' personal good intentions to me, I was morally certain that I should be allowed to attend to the essential and permanent interest of my family, at least without any meddling against me. But though I certainly know Mr. Cook and Lord Clare better than you do, it is plain I did not know them sufficiently, and they have been the means of inflicting upon me the severest mortification I ever experienced.

"In all county elections many private and particular considerations must enter, and I am certain that not you alone, but

every part of English administration, would have made me the most liberal allowance ; but, in this instance, every thing was so plain that misrepresentation, or rather lying only, could have excited a doubt. Nobody can doubt but that Lord Fitzwilliam must carry always one member. Mr. Westby was his man. Mr. Hume, the present member, has neither fortune nor natural interest, and Lord F[itzwilliam] denies that he has any connection with him. I was therefore naturally to point my opposition against Hume and endeavour to come to some understanding with Lord Fitzwilliam, which would have secured us both not only from defeat but from opposition in future. Lord Fitz[william's] votes being reduced in number by deaths in the rebellion, Mr. Osborne, rashly I think, thought he might be beat, and declared Proby a candidate ; but my letters both to him and Lord Fitzwilliam must have arrived in time to bring him back into the right way, which was to make such demonstrations only as would have led to an arrangement with Lord Fitz[william] for the general election ; and there being other candidates was the most favourable circumstance that could happen. Their object, you may rely upon it, was the same as mine ; and even (which I believe to have been impossible) if any junction could have secured success on the present occasion, it must have ended in a connection with Lord F[itzwilliam] at the end of the Parliament. But, on the supposition that nothing could be done with him, my next object must be to prevent Mr. Wingfield's success, as it would be more difficult to unseat him than Hume. Besides, Lord Powerscourt has behaved very ill to me, and ought upon no account to receive countenance from me.

"As to the strength of the county there is no doubt whatever of mine being next to Lord F[itzwilliam's] much the strongest interest. The Stratford connection, which includes Lord Powerscourt, is certainly powerful ; Lord Meath is nothing but a name. I cannot be very widely mistaken about the strength of the county, having in five successive contests taken by the hand the present Lord Powerscourt, Mr. Stratford, and Mr. Howard ; and I can safely say that they, each of them, appeared upon each occasion to have no solid support but mine. That part of the county which joins Dublin is, you know, crowded with the villas of attorneys and tradesmen who figure as the gentlemen of the county, but have no weight beyond their own votes. Lord Fitzwilliam's estate and mine cover a vast proportion of the cultivated part, and stretch from the villas to the borders of the county of Wexford ; and all the gentlemen who lie between us and the sea are connected with one or other of us ; but, independent of all this, Mr. Hume's election must have warranted a different estimate from Mr. Cook's. The same candidates were then declared. Proby, not being of age, could not stand. But Mr. Wingfield and the Stratfords, though they avowed a personal pique against Lord Wicklow for his conduct towards Mr. Stratford, struck their colours the moment my interest was declared for Mr. Howard. The Stratfords nearly divided their votes. Lord Powerscourt and Lord Meath supported Howard, yet Hume was victorious. It is certain however that he did not poll one hundred votes exclusive of Lord Fitzwilliam's tenantry, among whom he resides,

and who, when their landlord left them at liberty, mostly went with their neighbour. So that if it was not notorious that Howard was frightened by the anti-union cry, and fled the pit even before a third of my votes had polled, it would be clear that Lord Fitzwilliam could without any assistance return both members as easily as one. I wish you had not told me Cook was the author of your information, though indeed I should have had no doubt, when I heard the substance of it, that it came from him and Lord Clare; but, though I will certainly never open my lips about it, I am not hypocrite enough to prevent my countenance from betraying, if I should meet him, the resentment which I feel."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 17. Berlin.—"In the answer we gave to Sweden in 1780 there is a stipulation mentioned as contained in the twelfth article of our treaty with that Crown in 1661, concerning the goods of the enemy in neutral bottoms, which does not appear in Chalmer's edition of their treaty, the only one I have had an opportunity to consult; but the article, as it stands in Chalmer's, contains an express stipulation of great importance, which is found also in the Danish treaty, and which I think should have been noticed in the answer to Sweden. It states that, if the certificate and passport in due form is not produced, or there being any other just and urgent cause of suspicion, the ship ought to be searched. I should be much obliged to you if you would let me know how the treaties really stand. Pray tell me also whether we stop naval stores in Swedish bottoms as contraband, and if we do, on what pretence, as it appears against the treaty.

"As the public opinion is always of consequence, and as it is perfectly uninformed upon these subjects, it seems desirable that it should be known how far, upon this business, the letter of the treaties, as well as the general principles of the law of nations, is really in our favour. I have already remarked that advantage is taken of the public assertion of the Emperor concerning the convention of Malta, though even time has been wanting for contradicting it openly. Prussia will get out of the scrape if it can, but her fear of Russia seems very prevalent. As, however, she cannot commit direct hostilities, I presume you will avail yourself, as long as possible, of the benefit of a communication with her. I find by several applications which have been made to me, that if friendship between London and Berlin was well assured, our merchants would immediately establish themselves in Königsberg, Danzig, and Memel. Have you forgot Cuxhaven? You told me I was to have further instructions about it. I am inclined to believe, from several questions which have been put to me, that here at least there is an idea that the powers engaged in the armed neutrality might get out of the scrape by giving to Great Britain everything she contends for, as to search, as to naval stores, as to enemies' goods, and as to convoy where the King's ships only shall be concerned; but proposing to the belligerent powers to abolish, by consent, all privateering. In the present circumstance I conceive this might be of

advantage to Great Britain, and France would refuse her consent. As far as the neutral powers are concerned it seems a distinction without a difference; but one should be glad to turn the tables on the French if possible, and oblige them to refuse a proposition to which their own intrigues have given birth.

"Our situation is not pleasant, for the public opinion is that Prussia is too much involved with Russia to be favourable to us, and therefore we experience great coldness and neglect. The Queen has had an absolute flirtation with Bonaparte, and has drawn upon herself universal and loud animadversion. The Princess of Tour and Taxis has written to me again about the Marquis de Bombello.

"I have advanced one out of the two hundred pounds per annum which you authorized me to give. I am not quite sure I have done right. I have drawn on you for it to-day; he is to write to you to explain what he means to do for it, as well as to thank you." *Copy.*

Original written with invisible ink.

E. COOKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 20. Dublin Castle.—"I ordered your Lordship's subscription to be sent as you desired.

"We had in vain attempted, after Wingfield's being withdrawn as a candidate for Wicklow, to induce the Stratfords to retire. The principal gentlemen yesterday, before the opening of the poll, made Lord Proby and Benjamin Stratford consent to draw lots. Lord Proby won. Stratford then proposed him. We trust there is now little doubt of Lord Proby's success."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1801, January 21. Vienna.—"I could go on for hours if I were to tell you half the little intrigues and tricks that have signalized this new warfare between our two doughty champions. I have selected two or three that will best bear being related in a public dispatch, because it is so much the fashion here to talk of *principles*, and *honour*, and *political views* that, at last, all manner of people, myself among the number, may begin to believe what they are talking about, unless we take from time to time a peep behind the curtain.

"All my own fine speculations disappeared almost as soon as they were formed, and, as both sides have taken me more or less for their confidant, I have no difficulty in saying that Merfeldt and Dietrechstein are the two men who have done the mischief. Not that they had not many and powerful co-operators, but, without they had both done their utmost to irritate the minds of their respective chiefs, I think we might have kept decently together till the peace had been made, which was all that I ever expected.

"I yesterday gave a large military dinner to Prince John of Lichtenstein, the Prince of Schwartzenburg, and a party from head-quarters, Fasbinder included, to which Dietrechstein had the consummate impudence to invite himself, knowing who were my

guests, and that he was perfectly odious to the whole party. As soon as he entered the room, he took Fasbinder aside and kept him screwed up in a corner till dinner was on the table. At dinner he sat by him, whispered in his ear the whole time. After dinner he played the same farce again in the drawing-room, so as to leave the impression on the mind of *the by-standers* that he was sent on purpose to play some state trick, which nobody however could attempt to explain, nor could I take F[asbinder] apart to ask him what had passed between them.

"I dont think that the Arch-Duke can get on without Thugut, but this remains to be seen. If they keep on the reserve with France, which the Arch-Duke thinks they may do openly and with safety six months hence, perhaps Trautsmendorff may shuffle through the regular business afterwards; but who is to combat against French seduction and French menace in the mean time? I have not yet seen the man myself that I think at all equal to it. Thugut kept Fasbinder with him the other day three hours, asked him and obtained from him his opinion of every man of any note in the army, which the other was fool enough to give him in perfect confidence, when the old gentleman made him a low bow, observing, with a sneer, that if he had received such valuable information sooner he might have made great use of it. Observe that he had just got enough to satisfy him that he and the Arch-Duke (who, by the by, is as obstinate as the others) could not by any possibility set up their forces together now or hereafter.

"I have what the French call a *travail* ready for your Lordship on the subject of our several corps. I hope to be able to send it off on Saturday. In the mean while I trust you will not disapprove of my having dismounted the Condé corps, and sold 2,000 horses, the feed of which cost 2,000 florins, or very near 200*l.* a day. It is my own opinion that you should disband and pension the whole. As a military corps it is *quite incapable* of further service; and the difference of *et ceteras* between that state of existence and an equal number of *pensionnés*, even supposing the individual pay to be throughout the same, will be immense.

"I flatter myself, and Hope and Ramsey agree with me, that we can carry off, maintain, and recruit three Swiss battalions, provided their service be limited to Europe and the Mediterranean. I hope your Lordship will turn this well in your mind, and never, never give up Malta. With Malta in your hands, you will still be gods even at Vienna, in spite of Buonaparte. It opens a prospect in the East which, in the present state of things, has really no bounds. But I forget that I am talking to those who know its value, and ask pardon for my rhapsody."

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1801, January 25. Dublin.]—"Cooke says by this day's mail that the Wicklow election promises well. Lord Proby the 2nd day 27 ahead. The Stratforths are not playing *quite fair*, but he hopes to manage them. A second poll with such friends would be an awkward event. Lord Proby, 145; Ponsonby, 118.

"I hope your Lordship's cold is better, and that your Cabinet went off well. Lord Clare received the communication I made^d to him with much less warmth than was perceptible in the morning.

"I have received your Lordship's note relative to Mr. Foster."

W. DRUMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, January 27. Copenhagen.—"You will see by my dispatch the unpleasant language which, in the heat of passion, Count Bernstorff applied to me in our conversation this morning. This has certainly affected me, inasmuch as I really had a great regard for him, and believe him to be a man of integrity. I have no doubt, indeed, when he reflects he will be sorry for what he has said. If I had answered him, the consequences might have been disagreeable. I can have no fears of your Lordship giving me your support, as, in delivering the two notes, the first written by you, I exactly followed my instructions. I think, then, I may depend upon its [being] shown to all the world that, when I shall return to England, I shall meet with the approbation of Government. It is to that I alone look up, and with respect to the opinions of others I am, and ever shall be, indifferent.

"In the meantime your Lordship must be sensible how painful my situation is become, and how anxiously I look forwards to the day of my recall.

"I am afraid I have stated my conversation with Count Bernstorff indistinctly. Indeed, it is not easy to recollect the language of passion, which is never consistent. Your Lordship may, however, be assured that I did not yield one point to Count Bernstorff, and if I spoke less, I did not speak less firmly. My own opinion is that he will answer my note.

"I have much to regret that Ross did not arrive sooner. It would have been of the greatest importance to have had their answer before they had heard of the embargo."

Postscript.—"I find I have omitted to mention in my dispatch that Count Bernstorff took particular notice of that part of your Lordship's letter to me where you announce His Majesty's intention to pursue all such other measures *et cetera*. He asked what other measures; I told him I had no farther instructions upon the subject."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 27. Berlin.—"As there is no mention made in your note to the two Ministers that the engagements of 1780 are repugnant to the treaties of their respective Courts with England, though it is said in one of your despatches, I have some doubt whether I have done right to insist upon it. The stipulation for the free and full use of the Danish ports to Russia, in order to enable her fleets to act beyond the Baltic, is one of the secret and separate articles, and is found in the fourth volume of *Marten's Collection of Treaties*, a book which seems to be considered here as of high authority. It seems strong for making the avowal of its having

renewed, *sous la forme primitive*, the treaty of 1780, a ground for immediate hostility against the Court of Copenhagen."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 29. Berlin.—"The news of Kalitcheff's appointment appears to me too interesting and important for me to lose a moment in communicating it. This Court, I am sure, is under great embarrassments; but, as I think the influence of Russia preponderates, unless in the course of a day or two some strong and unequivocal demonstration of its pacific intentions towards us should manifest itself, I shall think it my duty, without waiting for farther instructions from home, to press in the strongest manner for an explicit answer whether Prussia will or will not avail herself of any of the distinctions which have been offered to her to avoid a war with his Majesty; for the now avowed correspondence of France and Russia seems to leave scarcely any chance of keeping in good terms with her but forcing her to an immediate decision, and any appearance of hesitation on our part might counteract a disposition (if such should appear to exist in the Danes or Swedes) to give way. In order not to let the thing cool, I shall seek an immediate conference with Haugwitz on the business of the Ems, in which I shall take occasion to make him understand that he must take his part unequivocally and without delay.

"Pray correct one expression in the copy of my note which you will have received by Johnson. Instead of a *eu l'honneur d'annoncer à son Excellence*, read a *pris occasion de dire à son Excellence*. It is so put in what was delivered to Haugwitz; but in your copy, the connection having been interlined without striking out the words first written, the transcriber made a wrong choice.

"I had some conversation with Haugwitz the evening before last. He laboured to impress me with notions of the facility of bringing about a reconciliation with Russia, and the necessity for our laying aside private considerations to check the progress of the French against the House of Austria. Kalitcheff's mission shows that his first insinuation has no foundation; and from the general complexion of his discourse, I should be tempted to infer that he meditates a pert but not an hostile answer to us, having no view but to gain a little time. The course of events however outruns his policy, and we must decide though he cannot.

"I shall be very glad to find myself at home again, if I continue to have the good luck of obtaining your approbation to the last."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SPENCER SMITH.

1801, January 30. Cleveland Row.—"I received by the last mails your letter marked *private* of the 30th November. I had already taken those measures for the new arrangement of the mission at Constantinople which the late occurrences there have rendered unavoidable.

"I have not seen General Smith, and I apprehend he is not in town. If I had seen him I should have had no difficulty in explaining

to him without reserve the impressions of concern with which I cannot but view those transactions. With this letter you will receive the official leave to return home, and with the reception of that you will understand your official character to terminate.

"As I do not know precisely on what footing you stand with the company on the subject of the period at which your allowances from them will determine, that point must be reserved for subsequent discussion with Mr. Bosanquet, whom I may probably see in the course of ten days or a fortnight." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1801, January 30. Cleveland Row.—"I have to acknowledge your private letter of the 5th instant. The great difficulty I feel respecting its contents rests on two points. First, the extreme uncertainty how far, in the present critical state of our affairs in every part of Europe, it can be possible for us to leave the Court of Vienna a few months hence without a resident minister of weight and talents equal to the task he may have to execute. And, secondly, the impossibility of our justifying in the present state of the civil list, and of all other public expenses, the giving any authority to our minister there to exceed the allowances as they stand according to the last augmentation. I have given to this point the fullest consideration with that sincere desire, for which I trust you will give me credit, of doing every thing that could depend on me to remove all difficulties that could be in the way of your continuing in a situation, in which you have rendered such great and important service, and in which I am confident you could most essentially promote the public advantage.

"But with the utmost extent of these feelings, I am compelled to say that I think further augmentation impossible; and with that impression on my mind the only thing I can do is to state it to your Lordship fairly and frankly." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, January 30. Downing Street.—"The substance of the abstract which I return you is much too important to be withheld, and ought, in some way or other, to be made public without delay. But I am not sure whether the statement ought not to be softened in that part (I have marked it) which relates to the strongest measures used by Russia towards Sweden and Denmark. The observation made in the abstract shews that these measures were not so much for the purpose of maintaining the rights of powers at war against neutrals, as of forcing neutrals to take part in the war. In this view this argument, and every other referring to the peculiarity of the present war, proves too much. You will see at once whether the statement can be so corrected as to avoid this objection.

"With respect to the mode of making these papers public there is some difficulty. The mode you propose seems to me much better

than to lose the benefit of them. But I doubt whether it would not be better either to lay them and the rest of the collection dryly (and without any preface, only with a proper title) before both Houses, and so print them, or, secondly, to send them with a circular note to foreign Ministers; in which case they might serve as a manifesto on one head of our case with Russia; and the interruption of all intercourse on the part of the Emperor would account sufficiently for our publishing what we have not directly communicated to the Court in question. Without some expedient I own I feel an awkwardness in the publication, though I am not sure that either expedient which I have suggested is right. At all events, I am anxious the publication should be speedy, and as the head and tail piece will any way be very short, the printing need not, I hope, be delayed."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 1. [Downing Street.]—"A communication which I received after I saw you from a quarter which I cannot name, and on which I can fully depend, left me no doubt that I was right in my supposition of the extent of the King's opinions, and that he meant I should know them. It was therefore impossible for me to write to him without stating my whole intention; which you will see I have done on the idea I explained to you, and which is the only one I could bring myself to act upon. I shall see you at dinner if I cannot call before. Pray return my paper, as I must shew it to Lord Castlereagh and one or two of our colleagues. I have not yet got the King's answer, but I know what it must be."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 1. [Downing Street.]—"You were not come home when I called, and having appointed Lord Castlereagh to meet me here, I could not stay for you. I hope to see you to-morrow morning, when I think our line for the day will be very easily settled. It seems to me that we need say nothing unless questions are put, which however I conclude they will be. When they are, a few words stating the simple fact that we have found it our duty to resign on a ground which may possibly produce more discussion on some future occasion, will be sufficient. The fact and the cause are in truth both sufficiently known; and if the fact had not been sufficiently notorious otherwise, it would be to-morrow; because I have found it necessary, in order to prevent a mischievous impression from indistinct or exaggerated rumours, to state it to-day to the Governor of the Bank in a way which he may report on the Stock Exchange to-morrow. I believe by this step much speculation and some alarm will be prevented."

Postscript.—"I rather think we shall find it easy to put off all debates, and choose a new Speaker (as a preparatory step) on Tuesday or Wednesday, though certainly our own resignations cannot well take place till late in the week following."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 3. Stowe.—"You know too well the interest

(I may say pride) that I take in all that attaches on your fame and honour to doubt for a moment the satisfaction I feel in the resolution taken by Mr. Pitt and you. The matter in dispute has always been very sore to the King's feelings; and I knew (as you did) that it would be a very severe struggle; but I really had imagined that he had made up his mind to what was in fact the *avowed* corollary to the Union, as one that was essentially necessary for the attainment of the essential benefits to be derived from it. I was aware a month ago of this difficulty; and I was sure that it was serious and real from the entire silence you observed to me latterly on measures which you had anxiously discussed with me in August last, and on which I agreed with you *in toto*. But it is indeed matter to me of the most serious alarm to find that the King is (to your belief) firm in his decision to change his Ministers on this dispute. At the same time, however, I differ with you as to the result; for I am persuaded that he will ultimately give way; particularly too when it is manifest that he could not out of any materials form a new Ministry on such grounds, which you will observe are exactly those on which almost every public man is pledged so deeply; and on which the difficulties would be multiplied tenfold on any such new Minister by the resignation of the King's servants on a ground on which all Ireland will run riot. Upon the whole then I should be satisfied, if you did not state the converse so peremptorily, that ultimately the King will concede, either from his own sense of the magnitude of the danger of every sort that he runs, or of the little chance of carrying his point by a new Ministry, or of the little chance of finding any Ministry who would be rash enough to undertake it.

"But be all this as it may, you have no alternative; for your opinions and your personal credit are at stake on this question; and I should have thought you, under all the circumstances of the Union question, the weakest or the wickedest Government if you took the contrary line. I have indeed much to say on every branch of this matter when we meet, but I am most happy that we all meet in perfect accord of political and private opinion."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1801, February 6. Cleveland Row.—"I owe it to you on every account not to delay apprizing you of an event which will, I know, give you sincere concern, and which, though matters have been for some time approaching to this crisis, has not been finally determined upon till within these two last days. This preface, added to the reports which must have reached you even at Berlin, will already have apprized you of the general result of what I have to communicate to you, which is that the King's present administration is dissolved, and that a few days will probably bring you the official notification of the appointment of my successor.

"The immediate and sole cause of this event is an insurmountable difference of opinion which has arisen between the King and the majority of his present servants on the subject of the measures to be adopted respecting the Catholics in Ireland.

“ I have long thought (although I am not sure that you are not of a different opinion) that to render the Union complete, and to derive from it all the advantages which it ought to offer to this country, it ought immediately to be followed by a removal of all the existing disqualifications. This opinion, confirmed in my own mind by every day's reflection on the state of that country, and on the general posture of affairs in Europe, has, after much deliberation, been adopted by Mr. Pitt and the majority of our colleagues, including, besides us two, Dundas, Lord Spencer, Lord Camden, and Windham. And upon the basis of this decision an extensive plan was formed and submitted to his Majesty for removing by a general law all religious tests and disqualifications throughout the United Kingdom, and for substituting in their place a strong political test, directed expressly against the Jacobin doctrines, and containing an oath of support to the present Establishment both in Church and State. And this would have been accompanied by other measures for the advantage and security of the Church Establishment, a part of which I once stated to you. As the great advantage to be produced by this plan in Ireland was the affording to the Catholics there, in the first moments of the Union, a pledge of the favourable dispositions of the Government and Parliament towards them, our opinions led necessarily to the immediate adoption of the measure. And finding on the King's part an invincible repugnance to it, arising from scruples which one must applaud even while one laments them, we could have no option left to us but that of retiring from his service rather than consenting to place ourselves in the situation of being to resist in Parliament a measure which we, in our consciences, think so highly expedient, both in itself, and still more particularly with a view to the circumstances of the present moment, when we seem to be so peculiarly called upon to do everything that properly may be done to attach the body of the people, and all the sub-divisions of it, as much as possible to the Government and constitution which they are called upon to defend.

“ I flatter myself that you will approve the steps which I have taken, even if you should not agree in the question of policy which has led to it. But I am still more anxious to impress upon your mind the indispensable duty, as I think it, of your continuing to give to the King's service the benefit of your exertions at Berlin, if, as I trust, the discussions there shall have taken such a shape as promises the maintenance of peace with that Court. It is the King's intention to form without delay a new government from among the supporters of the present system, and to place the present Speaker at the head of it. Our duty and inclination must both equally incline us to give to such a government every degree of assistance and support which it can be in our power to afford them ; and we have given to the King the strongest assurances to this effect. I trust that not many of those who now hold offices (not of the Cabinet) will quit their situations in this country on the present occasion. And, certainly, there is still less reason to justify such a step on the part of one of the King's ministers abroad, who is in no manner implicated in the difference of opinion which has

arisen, and whose sentiments, if I mistake not, rather accord with those of his Majesty than with ours on the very point which is in question.

"I will not conceal from you that I have a personal interest in making these suggestions to you; considering, as I do, our own honour as very deeply concerned in the avoiding all (even the slightest) appearances of giving, either by ourselves or by those intimately connected with us in alliance and friendship, any trouble, embarrassment, or increased difficulty to those who, at a crisis so very arduous, are to undertake a task from which the strongest nerves might shrink.

"I do not look without some gloomy apprehensions to the result of all this. But I have the satisfaction of thinking that I have seen and still see my own line clearly before me, and that, following that line, it is my duty to submit the event to Providence. To have done otherwise would have been to do evil that good might come of it." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 8. Berlin.—"The arrival of Mr. Shairp gives me the opportunity of adding a few words to what I said yesterday. Since I closed and sent off my dispatch, I have some reason to suspect that my conjecture as to the near approach of an open rupture with this country is premature. I received intimation from a very good source that Russia is not inclined to favour the Prussian views of aggrandizement. I also found the Danish *Chargé d'Affaires* much more coaxing and communicative than usual; very desirous of establishing a distinction between the case of Russia, as with respect to us, and that of Sweden and Denmark; and very full of hopes that the latter might be able to give us full satisfaction as to the innocence of the engagements she had taken before we should have proceeded to the last extremities. I understand also that this Court are most anxious to have us fairly embroiled with Russia upon the affair of Malta, and the embargo, so that, in conjunction with the other Powers, it may enter into explanations with us that may prevent the rupture into which Russia would precipitate them all. I learned, at the same time, that it was evidently embarrassed at this moment by something untoward in the state of its own particular politics with Russia. To-day I am assured that Count Keller has warned them that a reconciliation between Russia and Austria is in forwardness, and Mr. *Hudelst's* conversation with Haugwitz yesterday, of which he gave me an account this morning, confirmed beyond a doubt that something has awakened again a great degree jealousy of the probable renewal of a concert between Austria and Russia. I do not make this the subject of a dispatch at present, because I trust that, in two or three days, I may speak with more certainty, and, I hope, more satisfactorily. I am to see Haugwitz on Tuesday or Wednesday, and I must observe, by the by, that his tone with me is on a sudden totally changed, and become very gracious and inviting.

"I have thought it, on reflection, most prudent not to precipitate

my march, and I hope it will turn to advantage. I do not see that anything can have been lost by it. I shall endeavour to make what I have to say about the Elbe appear the effect of a disposition to favour Prussia, not to court her.

"I am sorry not to have been aware of the article in the convention of the 14th July, 1793, with Prussia, concerning neutral commerce, or of the use to be made of the convention between Denmark and Sweden of 1794. I shall immediately endeavour to supply the deficiency in these respects of the measures I have already taken.

"I cannot conclude without expressing my uneasiness in a situation for which I am conscious I am not at all fit at a crisis of such moment and difficulty. The want of habit in business, which at my time of life it is not easy to acquire, makes me liable to perpetual omissions; and, though I have hitherto received nothing but encouragement from you, I tremble at every step."

LORD WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 9. Queen Street.—"You will, I hope, pardon me if at a moment like this I venture to call your attention to my individual. It is to you and to your friends that I owe every thing, and it is to you and to your friends that I am and ever shall be proud to think that I belong. You would make me as happy as I can be under the present circumstances if it can be so managed that I may be indebted to your Lordship for any arrangement in my favour; and I hope you will not think me unreasonable if I express a hope that as much as has been done for others, and particularly for Lord Henley, who stands in the same predicament with myself, may now be done for me. I feel confident of your Lordship's support and protection upon this occasion, and I have the presumption to think that such a mark of favour would not be censured by any set of men."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and most Confidential.

1801, February 9. Vienna.—"I have not only abstained from writing on political subjects any way connected with this Court since my last of the 21st ultimo, but I have studiously avoided seeing any persons, or holding conversation with any body who might be supposed to know what was going on, so that for this time at least I am really in the dark. This sort of situation is however not pleasant to me, and is productive of no good, not even of that which it is intended to produce. But my respect for Lord Minto is such, my wish to do nothing that would give him offence or jealousy so great, whilst our opinions of men and things are wide as the poles asunder, that I am determined to persist in it; the more so as I find that talking to his lordship about M. de Thugut is exactly as hopeless as talking to *another person* used to be about M. de Puisaye. All the answer you can get is, M. de Thugut thinks or says *so and so*. It is in vain to say M. de Thugut thought *so and so*, and said *so and so*, on occasions when his thinking and talking precisely in the same manner brought about some great

calamity. The whole is like reasoning with the waves and the winds. It is not even writing on the sand, for it is not possible to make even a momentary impression. And yet, at this moment, I have no hesitation in saying that the Baron is taking the very steps that tend most directly to ruin himself, to ruin the country, and, above all, to keep up the fatal *prejudice* existing against the English in the public and the army, the only instrument in the hands of the enemy of which I am really afraid, and which, in a given time, one might not safely engage to break.

"There was one broad fair line which he might have taken, with honour and credit to himself, and *advantage to his country*. I am as certain as one ever dares to be of any human thing that the Arch-Duke wished to keep him, but His Royal Highness was not at that moment in a situation to owe him any obligation whatever, much less to sacrifice his principles and his way of seeing things to those of the Minister. It seems therefore to me that the Minister, if he had been guided by a spirit of true patriotism, and had been convinced at the same time that his own services were necessary to the salvation of the country, as well as those of the Arch-Duke, had no other line to pursue but, after protesting against His Royal Highness's principles, to declare his intention to direct the political counsels of the country according to those principles, to the very best of his ability and with perfect good faith. In the course of only one month's practice of a conduct of this kind, I am persuaded that the Baron would have been as much the master of the Arch-Duke's counsels as he ever has been of those of the Emperor. If he found himself unequal to the acting such a part, he should have retired like a man, and left the others to follow their own counsels, until they should think proper to call him back, when he might have returned with honour, credit, and, of course, increased influence. Instead of this he now keeps hanging about the throne, whispering in the ear of the Emperor suggestions which are known to come from him, but which he himself now (as always) lays upon England, suggestions which he knows to be perfectly useless as to preventing the evil he would correct, or bring about the good he aims at, but which clog and embarrass his antagonists on their march (the only good or pleasure he can derive from his present measures) and render the Emperor unhappy and discontented, sometimes with one set, sometimes with the other. I need not say that the consequence of all this, as far as we are concerned, is an increased field for French intrigue to sow and reap in, and a tendency in the opposite party to throw themselves into a French connection from a principle of spite, revenge, and the spirit of party and faction, which always, under similar circumstances, would take a similar direction.

"In my humble opinion the line we have to follow here is a plain and straight one, circumstances seeming to require a conduct as nearly passive as possible. Believe me there exist no means whatever of forcing this country again into war for *some time* to come, with any advantage either to ourselves or to Austria. Why then should we not act in the full spirit of the King's last admirable letter to the Emperor, and consider this peace *openly* as a measure

dictated by *necessity*, and desirable for ourselves as well as for our ally ; though the *necessity* which has so dictated is certainly a great and heavy calamity upon both the one and the other.

“ What is it to us whether Austria gains a little more or a little less on the Adige, whether she keeps Tuscany or no *for the moment*. It is admitted that the enemy is master of the conditions of peace ; that he has all the ports of Italy in the Adriatic, as well as those on the side of the Mediterranean, at his disposal ; that Naples is at his mercy ; and, whether the principle be right or wrong, that *all this* must be submitted to. No one feels more strongly than I do that *all this* was worth fighting for ; but it has been fought for, and we have been defeated. We have nothing therefore to do but to put up quietly with the loss, and to dream night and day on the means of repairing it. I trust however that we shall not be foolish enough to *talk in our sleep* ; for, if we do, there will not be wanting waking ears to hear us. The interval must be employed on close observation of the follies and extravagancies of our enemies, of which, rely upon it, they will be abundantly guilty ; in turning all their faults to our own advantage, in gaining friends, purchasing golden opinions, and, above all, in shewing by our conduct, our language, and our counsels that we have a deep and evident interest in the real welfare, prosperity, and aggrandizement of Austria. The rest must be left to time. Grant me only the fact that the enemy is master of the conditions of peace, and I pray for nothing so devoutly as that he may be insolent and rigorous in the extreme, as most fortunately for us he turns out to be. Give the House of Austria Salzburg and Passau on this occasion, and France shall have the three Legations (and ten such if they existed) at her disposal. A concentrated territory, a short interval of repose with the memory of defeat *which, to save the national honour, may be attributed to the injudicious counsels of an unpopular Minister*, and of insult and oppression on the part of the enemy, and of rich and fertile provinces which have been torn away from the hereditary possessions in a moment of weakness, for which the nation and the nobility do not *consider* themselves responsible, however they may really be so ; I ask no more, and am happy to obtain so much. If, in the course of a very few years, you do not see Austria spring up again with a degree of elasticity that will astonish the world, never put faith in me more.

“ I ask pardon for all this extravagance, as indeed I ought to do ; but if my nonsense has sense for its foundation, I think I may trust it to your lordship without a fear of being misunderstood or underrated.

“ The army is rising like a phoenix out of its ashes, and this wonder is effected without a soul in the town of Vienna having a suspicion of what is doing. I live in admiration of all that is going forward in the north. I consider our own situation, as I ought, with reverence, but without fear or doubt, and I never had better hopes of the result of the contest since the war began.

“ I think we shall embark nearly all our Swiss, providing the Austrians do not raise obstacles. For the *Condéans*, it is over with them. They are all gone mad in a body.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 10. Southampton.—“Ce n'est que ce matin que j'ai vue par les papiers d'hier, arrivés dans ce moment de Londres, que vous avez résigné votre office. C'est là que j'ai appris aussi la cause honorable de cette résignation, et que Lord Spencer, Monsieur Pitt, et Monsieur Dundas ont fait la même chose. Le motif de la démarche et la compagnie dans laquelle elle s'est faite est digne de vous, aussi je vous en félicite personnellement : mais quoique je suis persuadé que vous retourneriez tout avec la même gloire, avec laquelle vous êtes sorti, j'aime trop ce pays, auquel je serai attaché tant que je vis, pour n'être pas affligé et alarmé des suites funestes qui produira cet *interim*, pendant l'absence de la crème non seulement du ministère, mais de tout le pays. Je crains pour l'Irlande ; je crains pour la Grande Bretagne ; et je crains qu'au découragement que cela produira dans le pays, ne se joigne l'encouragement des ennemis internes et externes qui profiteront de la retraite de ceux qui ont conduit les affaires avec tant de vigueur, vigueur d'autant plus nécessaire que la crise des affaires générales ne fait qu'augmenter, ce qui exige impérieusement une énergie redoublée. La moindre faiblesse, la moindre petit pas fait en arrière du chemin qu'on a suivi jusqu'à présent, exposerait la gloire et les intérêts essentiels de la Grande Bretagne.

“Je vous prie d'exprimer ces sentiments à Monsieur Pitt.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 10. [Pall Mall].—“I should not have chosen the House of Lords for *conversing* on money with you ; my reason therefore for mentioning to you in that House, *with a little reproach*, the inexpressible pleasure which I requested you to allow to me in supplying your wants, arose from the determination of never allowing you to speak to me upon it. And for the same reasons I must insist that you do not converse with Bernard upon it, for I should indeed lose the gratification I so truly feel, if it could be possible for me to hear of such a proposition as that of interest, or of *principal*. Eastbury has given me the means of offering myself to you in such a moment, and I leave you to judge whether any other destination of this money can give me equal pleasure. The only request I mean to build upon this is, that which I earnestly make to you, of not throwing yourself so entirely out of London as I understood from Tom you had thoughts of doing ; and that the whole of this transaction may remain secret.

“And may your head ever lie on your pillow, as proudly and as contentedly as it will this night, with the satisfactory reflection of having sacrificed every thing to your sense of conscientious duty.”

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1801, February 11. Cleveland Row.—“J'allois vous écrire quand j'ai reçu votre lettre. Elle m'est bien précieuse comme un nouveau témoignage de cette amitié à laquelle j'attache avec raison tant de prix.

“ J’étois bien persuadé que vous ne seriez pas indifférent à ce que se passe dans ce moment, et je ne l’étois pas moins que les motifs de notre conduite mériteroient votre approbation. Je ne me dissimule pas l’effet plus ou moins dangereux pour la chose publique qui pourra en résulter, et je ne veux pas me donner la misérable affectation de vous cacher l’inquiétude que j’en éprouve. Si la chose auroit été possible, j’aurois tout fait (excepté de compromettre mes principes et mon honneur) pour ne pas quitter le service du Roi dans un moment de crise et de danger. Mais nous avons tous senti qu’il n’y avoit pas d’autre choix pour des ministres qui voient dans une grande mesure le salut de leur pays, et auxquels il n’est pas permis de proposer cette mesure au Parlement et au public.

“ Le Roi nomme ses ministres parmi les amis et les supporters de notre administration. J’espère que les principes resteront toujours ; personne n’est plus convaincu que moi qu’il n’y a que la fermeté qui puisse nous sauver ; et parmi tous les dangers qui nous menacent, je ne crains que le découragement et le désespoir. Dieu nous en préserve ! Car ce sont là les racines du mal partout ailleurs.

“ À Vienne on se conduit comme si l’ennemi étoit déjà maître de la capitale—ou plutôt comme on ne devroit pas se conduire même dans ce cas ; chez vous le mal s’empire, et Kalitcheff, que l’on a fait venir en poste de Dresde pour être Vice-Chancelier, est déjà réparti pour aller jouer le rôle d’ambassadeur à Paris. Louis XVIII. a été chassé au milieu d’hiver, avec des formes que les honnêtes gens n’emploieroient pas vis-à-vis d’un laquais que l’on chasse de sa maison.

“ Tout ceci est bien fait pour ôter à tout homme d’honneur l’envie de se trouver mêlé dans les affaires publiques. Je me trouverai fort heureux d’en être sorti, si ma patrie échappe à la contagion de ces maux ; mais si nous fléchissons, je ne pourrai jamais me croire étranger à la disgrâce et la honte de ce pays.

“ Conservez moi toujours votre estime et votre amitié. Combien je serois heureux si je pouvois me flatter de l’espoir de vous révoir un jour à Dropmore, et de vous en faire les honneurs en *country gentleman*.” *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 11.—“ Je suis trop affligé de tout ce que j’apprends pour ne pas parler de mes peines à un ami que j’aime plus que je ne puis l’exprimer, et que je révère, admire, et respecte comme le doivent tous ceux qui ont été comme moi à portée de le suivre, le juger, et l’apprécier. Est-il possible que vous quittiez le ministère. Je regarde en vérité cette nouvelle comme un si grand malheur pour la cause et pour moi, que je ne veux pas y ajouter foi à moins que vous ne me prononciez vous-même ma sentence. Il ne m’appartient pas de scruter les motifs qui vous ont déterminé à une mesure aussi cruelle ; mais je connois assez l’état des choses, et les intérêts de ma patrie adoptive, pour être certain que la retraite des deux grands ministres dont l’administration fera époque dans l’histoire du

monde, est ce qui peut arriver de plus malheureux pour l'Europe dans la circonstance. Vous avez éprouvé trop souvent ma franchise pour ne pas savoir que je ne flagorne, jamais ; ainsi vous me croirez sincère quand j'aurai l'honneur de vous dire que je régarde cet événement comme le coup de grâce donné à la bonne cause. Quelque soit le talent de vos successeurs, et de quelque peu de durée que puisse être votre absence des grandes affaires, le mal est irréparable. Je suis triste et triste et très triste ; vous seul pouvez me consoler par ces deux mots, *je reste*. *Then* (comme dit Macbeth) *I am a man again*. Que de malheurs je prévois ! *I feel now the future in the instant* (Macbeth).

“ Quoiqu'il en soit, daignez souvenir que vous m'avez promis une amitié constante, et Lord Grenville ne pourra pas se débarrasser aussi promptement et aisément de cette obligation sacrée que le secrétaire d'état de son portefeuille. Agréez l'assurance des sentimens à toute épreuve que je vous ai voué à jamais, et le renouvellement de mes regrets les plus douloureux.”

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1801, February 11. Cleveland Row.—“ Rien ne peut être plus aimable que les assurances que vous me donnez de la continuation de votre amitié, quand nos rapports officiels auront cessé. En cédant au motif d'un devoir indispensable, et en me conformant aux principes constitutionnels du pays que j'ai été appelé à administrer conjointement avec mes collègues, je n'en suis pas moins jaloux de conserver l'estime et l'approbation de ceux dont je connois la droiture et la probité.

“ Vous retrouverez (je l'espère) dans mon successeur les dispositions que j'ai toujours eu pour le maintien de la plus stricte alliance entre nos deux pays : et vous me conserverez, j'ose le croire, dans toutes les circonstances cette amitié que je mérite par la sincérité de mon attachement pour vous.

“ Je serois bien aise de vous voir un de ces matins, et de vous répéter de vive voix que vous n'aurez jamais d'ami plus sincère que le *particulier* qui vous écrit ces lignes.” *Copy*.

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, February 11. Cleveland Row.—“ Hammond delivered to me your very obliging message, for which I beg you to accept my best thanks. There is nobody to whom I should with more pleasure give up the very difficult and arduous situation which I have held than to yourself. You will find it surrounded with embarrassments in the present moment, from that despicable weakness which drives the powers of the Continent, from motives of fear alone, into the arms of France. My unchangeable opinion is that firmness will, and that firmness alone can, extricate the country from the difficulties which the successes of France upon the Continent have brought upon us. Excuse my taking the liberty of troubling you with these few words of opinion on points which your judgment will so soon be called to decide.

“ There are several points of business which I am compelled to

leave undone, because the state in which they are will not admit of their being brought to a point in the course of the few days which remain. On these I should be desirous of furnishing you with all the information in my power ; and, in general, if ten years observation of those wretched things which are called governments on the Continent of Europe can have enabled me to give you any knowledge of them beyond what you already possess, it is most completely at your service ; as well as every other means in my power to enable you to discharge the task you have undertaken, with honour to yourself and advantage to the public.

“ I take it for granted you will not wait for the formality of an actual appointment to call for such parts of the correspondence as you think likely to be interesting or useful to you. That with Prussia I would particularly recommend to your early attention, because *there* is, for the moment, the seat of the principal negotiations we are carrying on.

“ Let me know whenever you wish to see me, and be assured I shall always be at your orders, not on the footing of an ex-minister, but on that of a sincere friend and cordial well-wisher.” *Copy.*

RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, February 12. Great Cumberland Place.—“ It not being any longer doubtful that your Lordship, with your principal colleagues, has retired from office, I cannot refrain from expressing my sincere concern that a measure of so much consequence should have been found unavoidable, at a period still so momentous and critical. I am confident your Lordship will give credit to the motives which lead to the expression of my regrets upon this occasion. I have too clearly seen the danger to which the principles, which are the foundation of all social happiness, have been exposed not to have conceived the most favourable sentiments of the persons who have displayed so much firmness and perseverance in their defence. Much has been done, but the labour is unfinished ; and a change in the face of the adversary may prove as mischievous in politics as it sometimes has done in war. The preservation of the confidence and civil discipline of a free people requires an uninterrupted and steady administration ; and the duty of governing is never more arduous than when circumstances, such as at present exist, place the ill-disposed and the ignorant in the power of the unprincipled and the ambitious. These are considerations which must have been carefully weighed before the decision was adopted ; and it is only to be deplored that the occasion, which it is hoped did not relate to the principles of which Great Britain has shewn herself the champion, could not have been deferred to a future and more convenient day.

“ To these causes of public concern I must add what is peculiar to myself, the unexpected disappointment of my hope that I should have been able, had your Lordship remained in office, to effect a satisfactory settlement of those points of disagreement, the continuance of which can promise no possible advantage to either,

and may prove injurious to the more important interests of both of our countries.

"If, as there is reason to believe, a change has taken place in the Executive of the United States, though the general course of our affairs may suffer no material alterations, the new President will not be likely to go farther upon the subjects we have lately discussed than his predecessor, to whose administration he is supposed to have been in opposition. I mention this observation merely to justify my solicitude upon a subject which I know to be important ; and which I now fear, by remaining unsettled, may become the occasion of still further misunderstandings between our respective countries. But I need your Lordship's excuse for these reflections, so distinct from the real object of this letter, which is to express to your Lordship my unfeigned sorrow, in reference to the great interests which depend upon the issue of the contest, that your Lordship and colleagues should withdraw from office at a time when the firmness and vigour of experienced statesmen will, with difficulty, be able to save those invaluable rights, for the preservation of which, for others as well as for herself, Great Britain has so nobly contended."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MINTO.

1801, February 13th. Cleveland Row.—"I was unable, much as I wished it, to write to you by Tuesday's mail on the subject of the declaration which it became my duty to make that day in the House of Lords, respecting the speedy termination of my public services. Other intelligence will doubtless have apprized you of the grounds on which this determination on the part of Mr. Pitt, Lord Spencer, Lord Camden, Mr. Dundas, Mr. Windham and myself, became in our opinion absolutely indispensable. Report and speculation will perhaps also have conveyed to you other supposed motives for this resolution ; but I do not fear your thinking so meanly of any of us as to suppose us capable of assigning other reasons for our conduct, in so great and trying an occasion, than those by which, and by which alone, it was really actuated.

"Though public situations can, in the present state of Europe, be matter of envy or desire to no considerate man, yet I should be sorry to be thought to have adopted this step without concern, or to be either insensible or indifferent to the consequences which may, more or less, follow upon it. But there was no alternative except that of taking this step, or of agreeing to the disguise or dereliction of one's opinion on one of the most important questions in the whole range of our domestic policy.

"You will have heard of the King's determination to form on this occasion a new administration from among the friends and supporters of the present system. I most ardently wish that he may succeed, and certainly my best aid and support shall be given to those who undertake to carry on the Government on the same principles for which we have been so long struggling.

"I should do great injustice to my own feelings if I closed our official correspondence without thanking you in the warmest terms

for the infinite assistance we have derived from your services at Vienna. That they were not more successful can in no respect be attributed to you, but to the fatality which has prevailed in the Austrian councils and arrangements.

"I beg you to be persuaded that in all situations I shall ever retain a lively sense of your conduct, and sincere desire to cultivate your good opinion and friendship." *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 13. Berlin.—"My dispatch to-day and Haugwiz's note leave me nothing to say upon public affairs. Nor can I see that I have anything to do but to wait your orders. If circumstances permit, I should like to take Dresden in my way home, as I shall never have another opportunity of seeing the gallery. I also believe it may be the best way for Elizabeth and the children to go from thence by Brunswick to Hamburgh, as affording the best and most frequent bating places. She will be very unwilling to proceed before the weather grows mild, but, if we wait long, I believe we shall be obliged to come round by Constantinople. I must observe that there is a book lately published under the patronage of Government at Paris, called '*Etat de la France*,' where the nature and extent to the scheme which, at the bidding of our inveterate enemy, these northern powers have undertaken for our destruction, are so clearly unfolded, that it could not fail to make a deep impression if published in English, and accompanied with a proper comment. It is a most elaborate and able performance, and the sophisms are so ingeniously woven together that they cannot well be exposed as they ought without answering the whole book. Gentz is now busily engaged about it, and is assisted by General Stamford.

"I think the performance of Haugwiz, which I send you to-night, is, for a display of ignorance, impudent lying, and gross insolence, without a parallel. On reading over Pitt's speech and yours, I have hopes that you will not have disapproved of the substance of my notes. I rather wish I had made the last communication concerning Russia verbally, but I really thought that you had made a formal declaration of war in London. I think there is still some chance, though very small indeed, of your bringing back Paul, who, after all, is almost as much in his senses and much more honest than the King of Prussia."

Postscript.—"I believe General Stamford will retreat to England, and I suspect Gentz may be obliged to do the same.

"I forgot to mention that I learn from General Stamford that the Hereditary Prince of Orange has been with him to say that all the best affected of the Dutch think that the game is up for his father, but that, if old Stadtholder should retire, they still think something might be done for the son. In the meantime the Hereditary Prince suspects that Prussia is making or has made arrangements with France for taking possession of that country. The Prince is much distressed by the news from Holland, and knows not how to mention it to his father. It must be own[ed] it is very natural that the Dutch should refuse to enlist under such a leader.

"I am sorry to tell you that M. de la Palue is arrested at Paris.

"Sir James Craufurd and the merchants at the northern ports are prepared for the worst."

LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1801, February 13. Cleveland Row.—"I am extremely sensible to the kindness of your letter, and I beg you to be assured that, in the moment of quitting the public station which I have so long occupied, few things can be more gratifying to me than the hope of preserving the esteem of those for whom I entertain sincere and merited regard and attachment.

"It would be a foolish affectation in me to disguise the concern I feel in being under the necessity (according to the public principle on which I have ever acted) of quitting the public service in a moment like the present, when the storm appears to augment; and, yet, when I am persuaded that perseverance in our former course will soon bring us into port. But there are duties which an honest man feels too sacred to be trifled with, or compromised; and if I have ever been able to render any service, it has been by openness and plain dealing, qualities utterly inconsistent with the disguise or dereliction of one's opinions on great public questions.

"I do not agree with you in the effect which this event is likely to produce as to the great questions which are still afloat in the world. Sudden impressions of alarm are easily received in such a country as this, where they are propagated by newspapers and debates. But they are as easily effaced; and it would be to know very little of the present composition of the two Houses of Parliament to believe with the vulgar in the present moment, that there will be any want of great abilities to be called forth by great occasions.

"Be assured that in all situations, I shall always be anxious to deserve and to retain your esteem and friendship." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1801, February 13. Cleveland Row.—"You will have learnt from an hundred quarters that the present Government is at an end, and that our future intercourse can be only that of private friendship, such as I shall ever retain for you, and as I trust to find reciprocal on your part. The causes and grounds of this event you will learn from all the papers. The consequences are in the hand of God, *caliginosâ nocte premit Deus*. My best services as a private man are due, and will be given to the King's government, while it is carried on upon the principles on which we have acted.

"It would only tire you to repeat the assurances of the sense I entertain of your merits and services. I trust they will not be unrewarded." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, February 15. Vienna.—"I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's private letter of the 30th January, and I beg you

to accept my best thanks both for the explicit decision which it contains and for the friendly sentiments with which it is accompanied. Your Lordship will have seen in my former letters on this subject that I have no choice left, even if I were disposed to deliberate ; and I am therefore to acquaint your Lordship that I am ready to resign my situation as soon as a successor arrives, and I beg leave to express a wish that I may be relieved as early as possible.

“ I felt, with your Lordship, that a doubt might naturally exist concerning the propriety of leaving this Court any time without a minister on the spot, even after the peace. My request was only conditional ; that is to say, on the supposition that it might be found convenient to comply with it ; and I hope you will do me the justice to believe that, when the time came, I should not have proposed to return on a leave of absence in circumstances which would have made such an indulgence disadvantageous to the public service ; but that I should have merely desired to resign. I am sensible, however, that by this means some additional expense might have been incurred even by this short prolongation of my mission, and on that account I fully acquiesce in the propriety of your Lordship’s decision. I must, at the same time, add that, since the date of my letter, all that has happened on the Continent concurs to satisfy me that this Court cannot with propriety be left without a minister from England, even for a short time ; and, as things stand at this moment, I should myself have begged your Lordship to send my successor without further delay. For, since the turn which events have taken, I have never wished for any other option than that of a leave of absence, or a simple resignation. The cause which attracted me to this service no longer exists. The system which I came to support is reversed, and those with whom I have acted have fallen with it, and have made way for other men and for other views entirely opposite to those that went before. In these circumstances I cannot wish for my own comfort to learn this new lesson, and, in truth, any merit I may claim in my past exertions, and the very means I employed for success in the former period, are now converted, perhaps, into disqualifications for the period that is to come. This is undoubtedly the natural termination of my mission ; it is one to which I always looked as such ; and it has become no less proper, perhaps, in a public than in a private light. I leave the judgment that may be formed of my services in this mission with entire confidence to His Majesty’s justice and your Lordship’s candour, not to say friendship. I shall for my own part ever retain the comfort of feeling that I have done my utmost. This is a consolation entirely independent of success ; but if any thing could be deemed a gratification under a total failure of the ultimate object, it would be the reflexion that, in every thing that has depended on me, I have had the fortune to be uniformly successful in all that could lead to an opposite result from that which has happened. I shall detain your Lordship no longer than to express my full confidence that, in one shape or other, my unavoidable loss in this mission will be indemnified to the end ; and I hope your Lordship will allow me to add the assurance of the

comfort with which I have acted under your direction, and in grateful sense I shall ever retain of your indulgence and friendship throughout. I trust you will permit this period of official connexion to become an earnest of a more permanent attachment ; and I can safely assure your Lordship that nothing can be more gratifying to me through the remainder of my life than a permission to class myself amongst your friends."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 15. Park St., Westminster.—"I do not know whether I expressed with sufficient clearness, yesterday, the state of my opinion on the two points which made the principal subjects of our discussion.

"I would forego all the advantages that may be hoped from establishing again a good understanding with Russia, sooner than engage in a negociation so framed as that it must, in the end, necessarily lead to the surrender of Malta, whenever the French shall be expelled from Egypt, and the maritime rights of this country be secured. And, in the case of Denmark, I would acquiesce, if better could not be had, in a positive treaty, formed of course with all the precision and solemnity that words could give it, for securing to our fleet a free egress out of the Baltic, without exacting from the Danes, if they much resisted it, the condition of disarming."

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 16. Piccadilly.—"I have been this day, according to appointment, with Mr. Hammond at your Lordship's Office, and who showed me a copy of the letter your Lordship sent to the Treasury, and where I only find a nominal pension of £2,000 at my retreat. Your Lordship must remember that, although I had His Majesty's gracious assurance that I should not be removed from my post unless at my own desire, I wrote some years ago that, if your Lordship wished to send anyone to Naples in my room, I should be satisfied with a net income of £2,000, but not with a nominal pension one to that amount. Having been removed from Naples without my consent, or having had the smallest intimation of it from your Lordship until the moment Mr. Paget arrived at Palermo, I took it for granted that your Lordship had secured for me the net income I requested at my retreat after such long services.

"In the paper I left with Mr. Hammond sometime ago, the whole statement of my loss and heavy expenses brought upon me by the revolution of Naples was exactly laid down ; and that, during the last eighteen months at Palermo, I had been obliged to draw for no less a sum than £13,222 ; and that, unless I was assisted by Government with the sum of £8,000 to cover a debt that still remained unfunded after having sold the diamonds I had in presents from His Sicilian Majesty, I should remain in distress to the end of my life.

"Without entering further into my melancholy story, I entreat of your Lordship to let me have the same retreat that was given

to Sir Robert Keith, and which, by the enclosed, your Lordship will see was £2,250 ; and that His Majesty will grant me the £8,000 which lies heavy on me, and was really expended in what I thought indispensable in keeping up the character of His Majesty's minister at Palermo, and where I kept open house for the King's fleet for a year and a half. I really think that, having passed my whole life in the service of my King and country, I do not ask more than what is common justice. I rely upon your Lordship's goodness to recommend the above to the King our kind and royal master, who, I flatter myself, knows enough of my character to be sure that what I venture to represent is exactly true."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

Private.

1801, February 17. Cleveland Row.—“As this is probably the last messenger I shall have occasion to dispatch to you, I am unwilling to let him go without a few lines of private letter, though there is nothing for me to add on the subject of my dispatches.

“The new Government, contrary to the prognostics of many, is formed ; and, though the materials are not in every instance exactly such as might be wished, I have very little doubt that they will establish themselves in Parliament and in the country. My resolution is decidedly taken, upon a sense of what I think an indispensable duty, to give them every support in my power ; not a cold indifferent non-resistance, but active, eager, and zealous support ; for such I think they are entitled to at the hands of all who have a just sense of the interests of this country and of Europe.

“I have not the pleasure of seeing all my friends and connections share this opinion ; but I have no doubt of the soundness of the principle on which I act, and nothing will shake it.

“I very much wish that you may persuade yourself to remain at Berlin as long as there remains a British minister there ; which, if I were to augur from some circumstances that have come to my knowledge, will not be long.

“Upon a sort of overture from the Prince of Hesse, we are sending Mr. Vansittart to Copenhagen on a secret mission to see if they will (as they seem to hold out to us) abandon at once their League and all its principles. But I am convinced our fleet will be our best negociator there, and I trust it will not be long before its arguments are heard.” *Copy.*

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 18. Berlin.—“I trust you will not disapprove what I have acquainted you with in my dispatch of to-day. Paul is so vigilant to prevent naval stores getting out to England, that much more caution is necessary for them than in the case of corn.

“You must know everything relating to the trade upon much better information than I can procure here. I should fear, if I was to give credit to what is told me, that the shutting up the Elbe and Weser, which I fear we cannot prevent, will be a severe blow to England. As to the produce of this country and Russia, as much

of it as we have a real occasion for will, I doubt not, find its way to us. The passage of the Sound is here thought to be effectually shut against us, unless we can make ourselves masters of the Island of Zealand.

"What I am told is that, if we can avoid a rupture with this country till the middle of next month, every article which is intended for England will have sailed.

"I am just now told that Krudener is to go to Paris, Kalitcheff's mission being special and temporary.

"There is a poor man at Stettin called Lentze, who has a nomination of British Consul. I will send you by next post the papers of his case, and you will judge for yourself whether it is fit you should do anything for him. Mr. Garlike tells me he was employed here by Lord Elgin, and this office was meant as a reward and compensation for a post he gave up to attend to the business in which he was engaged by Lord Elgin. It produces, however, nothing, and the poor wretch is, as I find by concurrent accounts, in a state of most deplorable and disgraceful poverty."

Postscript.—"It is very singular that the important favour you granted for the Prussian ship to go to America and bring back 4,000,000 of *piastres forts* should not have been made use of, and that Hoym, whose province was so materially interested in it, should be ignorant of it. Many people here affect to believe that the King has not seen Haugwiz's answer, and has no mistrust of the style of it, but thinks it such as will be satisfactory to England as well as to the other Powers. I mention this, not as being important, but only to show that this hostile tone is unexpected, and what is the general notion of the inattention of the King of Prussia. His Majesty, by the way, seems at present wholly engaged, and so as to occasion much talk, with the charms of the Grand Duchess Princess of Mecklenburgh Swerin, who prolongs her stay till the 17th of next month."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1801, February 18. Vienna.—"Some indirect hints having reached me that I had been considered as not an unfit person for the important situation of Governor of the Island of Malta, I lose no time in mentioning this circumstance to your lordship, though I am yet very uncertain whether I ought to pay any attention to them or no.

"All that I yet know is that Flint was desired by Huskisson to write and ask me whether such a place would meet my own views and wishes.

"If there be nothing in this but idle talk, your lordship will have the goodness to take no notice of my having mentioned the subject. If there has been anything more serious in it, I still feel naturally anxious that your lordship should know my real opinion, before there be any question of making a nomination.

"If it be the intention of Government to make of this place, what I think it well deserves, a really high situation, such as would

enable the person to whom it was entrusted to do his duty in it in peace or war, in prosperity and adversity, for both are I think to be looked to; in one word, if it be meant that the Governor should really have power and confidence with the appointments necessary to enable him to fill the place with dignity, I know no one situation I should like half so much, nor one in which I think that my humble talents could be exerted with half so much advantage in the public service.

"I am so penetrated with the idea that this is the corner stone of the whole building, the point on which all our success in the East as well as the West must ultimately more or less depend, that my whole attention is turned night and day to the subject; and I feel a sort of confidence in myself that I could gain honour and reputation to my country, with many more solid advantages perhaps not yet estimated at their full price, or considered as impracticable.

"Having said so much I need not add that this is no more than the expression of my wishes and of my opinion to which your Lordship is so fully entitled.

"I am not the less at your lordship's command; nor would I ever accept anything from any quarter without your lordship's full and entire consent, and the certainty that your lordship wished the thing as much as those who offered it to me; and this will be the answer that I shall give, should ever the question come to me in a regular shape.

"I say this not knowing to what I am destined here or elsewhere, and anxious only to continue to bear my share in the great and honourable warfare in which we are engaged, in some manner or other that may shew that my past labours have not been neglected, and that I have not failed in my endeavours to deserve the good opinion and confidence of those who have employed me."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

1801, February 19. Cleveland Row.—"The allowance which I thought it my duty, previous to my quitting my office, to recommend to His Majesty to grant to you considerably exceeds the usual proportion of salary retained by foreign ministers on their retreat. I thought the difference due to the length of your services, but the case of Sir R. Keith can afford no precedent, his salary having been larger than yours. In the letter written to the Treasury on this subject, an express reserve is made for such consideration as His Majesty may be pleased to give to the peculiar circumstances of your leaving Naples, and of your residence at Palermo, and to the extraordinary expenses to which you were thereby subjected."

Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1801, February 19. Cleveland Row.—"You will receive this by the same mail which will bring you the official account of the appointment of my successor. As this letter will go by the ordinary post, I do not enter into any further particulars of what is passing here; but I cannot close my correspondence without once more

thanking you from the bottom of my heart for all the assistance I have derived from your exertions. If I had felt quite sure of the mode of recompense which you would have preferred, I would not have quitted my station without discharging this debt of gratitude in some way more solid than that of words. I have however spoken to my successor in the strongest terms possible ; and have obtained from him such promises as I feel I can rely on to acquit my own conscience towards you." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 21. Berlin.—“ We remain with very little doubt that I shall, with the return of the messenger, receive orders to go from hence. I am sorry that the weather has prevented your receiving the first intimation of the probable contents of the Prussian answer, before the answer itself.

“ I must own I see no way left for Prussia to retreat. The report is circulated to-day of the capture of Heligoland, and, if this Cabinet acts with consistency, I shall, as soon as it is authenticated, be ordered to depart.

“ The conclusion of peace between Austria and France, and the establishment of a basis for the peace of the Empire in which Prussia has not been consulted, is this day confirmed. The account sent to me by Mr. Elliott mentions nothing as to the conditions. I cannot hope that they are otherwise than disadvantageous in the extreme.

“ Against the northern Courts I hope you will act with vigour. I am confident it will rather advance than retard a reconciliation with the Emperor.

“ I mentioned that Krudener had waylaid Kalicheff. The report is that, at the arrival of the former at Leipsic, Kalicheff excused himself from seeing him on account of illness. That, on a second application for an interview, the answer was that fresh advices from Paris made it necessary for Kalicheff to proceed on his journey without loss of time, and that he actually left the place without seeing Krudener.”

Postscript.—“ The northern German neutrality will die a natural death at the conclusion of the peace. But, after having received the answer I have sent you, I cannot doubt but that you will approve my saying nothing on that subject to Haugwitz. After the many applications I have made for audience on that subject, and the Ems, his silence and his continuing to avoid me are proof of an hostile disposition, though the conversation with the Prince of Orange may indicate some stings of conscience.”

LORD MINTO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, February 25. Vienna.—“ I received yesterday from Lord Carysfort a copy of M. de Haugwitz's note of the 12th instant, which seems to leave little hope of avoiding a rupture with Prussia. One consequence of such a rupture seems likely to be an interruption of the established communications with England by Cuxhaven and

Bremerlehe. I should feel embarrassed indeed in the present moment to hazard the transmission of confidential despatches by English messengers, and until I am otherwise advised, I shall be inclined to avail myself of messengers dispatched by some friendly court, as I account those of Vienna and Naples to be. If it is found necessary to establish some more secret mode of correspondence, I shall endeavour to form some arrangement for that purpose, expecting, however, your Lordship's instructions on the subject. One of the grand objects proposed by the enemy being to cut us off entirely from the Continent, both in point of trade and correspondence, it is become peculiarly interesting to preserve the neutrality, at least of Austria. I fear that of Naples will be saved with difficulty, and if we should be excluded from their ports, those of the Emperor in the Adriatick will alone remain. This circumstance, no doubt, gives to the Emperor a solid interest in the preservation of his neutrality, and opens to him a prospect of great advantage both in trade and revenue. I do not neglect these topics, and I should have reason to be satisfied with the general tenor of the language held to me by the Emperor's ministers, if much reliance could be placed on general professions, or on the expression of general sentiments, at a time when it is established as a maxim of government that the Emperor can consult his own interest and his own opinion in nothing; and can refuse nothing, of any description or value, to the demand or the slightest nod of the enemy. I confess that, on the best view I can take of the present state of affairs and of the men who direct the measures of Austria, I am not without serious apprehension that the Emperor will fall under a total dependence on France, dignified by the handsome names of alliance and system; and that he will become the instrument of any projects dictated from Paris. The first of these may be expected to be the maritime conspiracy; and the favourite plan of Bonaparte for our total exclusion from the continent of Europe. I am again and again assured that no propositions of that tendency have hitherto been opened in any part of the negotiation with France, or in any form whatever. But while the French armies occupy the Austrian territory and even still hang over the capital, and while the French government retain the consciousness of their power to command at Vienna, there seems nothing to trust to on this question but the improbable or rather impossible chance of Bonaparte's forgetting the Adriatick and not hitting this obvious blot. In this view Count Cobenzl's journey to Paris may be considered as unfortunate, since it affords the opportunity of grafting these new pretensions on the treaty, and forcing the compliance of Austria while she still continues under actual duress. I do not know that these uncomfortable reflexions can lead to any useful conclusion; but they may serve at least to satisfy your Lordship that I have a strong sense of the importance of these objects, and that I shall omit no means of rendering service which the present circumstances admit of.

"One of Lord Elgin's messengers, who was despatched lately from Vienna, returned yesterday from the frontiers of Wallachia without any despatches from Constantinople, the communication with Bucharest having been interrupted for some time by the snow.

"I would take the liberty of suggesting to your Lordship that, when any intelligence of importance is sent from England to Constantinople, to India, or Egypt, there might be a convenience in its being communicated to me, as I am otherwise liable, on learning it from other quarters some time afterwards, to despatch the same intelligence by a variety of different routes at a great expense to Government."

LORD HAWKESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, February 26.—"I send you a note I received on Monday from the Danish minister, and the answer which it is proposed to return to it through Sir Hyde Parker. In case it should be necessary to have recourse to hostilities, it is intended as a kind of manifesto. I should be particularly obliged to you if you would criticise it without mercy, and make any alterations in it you may think proper."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 27. Downing Street.—"I am happy to tell you that the accounts to the last moment at which we can have them this evening are very favourable. And there is much more ground of confident hope than any one yet chooses to avow, for fear of aggravating disappointment, if (as yet may be) it should arise. Nicholl gave notice yesterday of some motion on the subject to-day, which led only to Sheridan's moving (before the motion was made) to adjourn in order to avoid discussion. I came in while Sheridan was speaking, in time to second his motion, and to say what I thought most useful at such a moment. The result was that the motion was waived, and that we are left completely to judge when the subject is to be again named; and the impression in the House seemed all that could be wished.

"Happily it becomes of much less consequence to say or think what, under other circumstances, would be done in other quarters; but as we are used to look at the worst as well as the best, it is not immaterial to say that I have had another interview at Carlton House, and learnt much about it, and I think every thing there looks well."

SIR JAMES CRAUFORD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 27. Hamburgh.—"It was with infinite concern that I learned by the last post the secession of a set of gentlemen from His Majesty's councils to whom the country and all Europe is under the highest obligation. Most particularly has it filled me with regret that your Lordship should have quitted the most important Department over which you presided, at a moment when the foreign relations of the country require more than ever the direction of a great, wise, and enlightened Minister; an event which I am convinced will be sincerely lamented by every friend to the British interests, and to that system which we have so gloriously upheld in every quarter of the globe. I trust however

that the causes, whatever they may be, which have occasioned this unfortunate event, will not be very durable in their operation, and that no very great period of time will bring back to your stations your Lordship and the worthy characters by whom you are accompanied in your retreat.

“As to what regards myself personally, my regret is unquestionably infinitely heightened by the recollection of what I and my family owe to your Lordship, which nothing certainly can ever efface from our remembrance. I beg leave to assure your Lordship of our most sincere gratitude, of our unalterable attachment, if I may be allowed to use that phrase.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 28. Berlin.—“How deeply I am afflicted with the calamitous news which, after so long an interval of silence, has reached me from England, I need not say. As to my residence here, I should not perhaps have thought of resigning just in this critical moment unless an Administration had been formed whose principles were decidedly hostile to those which have now for so many years preserved us from ruin; but, as you seem to attach some importance to my stay, I have written to Lord Hawkesbury in such terms as will have answered your purpose of shewing that the support you mean to give is sincere and zealous. When some little time has elapsed, I trust nevertheless that I may be permitted to come back and resume my ancient habits in the bosom of my family.

“I have seen Lutzow in consequence of your last dispatch, and have good hopes that something may yet be done in that business. It will be necessary for me to have full instructions and large and full powers in case the Emperor's answer is favourable, for this is the moment and the business to which the old proverb of ‘*strike while the iron is hot*’ must, above all others, apply; and your instructions, as well as the very nature of the thing, involve not only Malta and the embargo, but the armed neutrality. Some kind of saving, however unsubstantial, must, I fear, be found for the honour and dignity of these mighty potentates on the last of these points. I thought of some explanatory convention saving, as is done in the convention of 1794 between Sweden and Denmark, all former treaties respectively, and declaring that the force of the Confederates is to be exercised only in conformity to them, and to prevent abuses against those principles of the law of nations which have been universally recognized; and that the other new principles are what they propose as rules for their own conduct, and wish to recommend for universal adoption, but that no idea is entertained of obtaining the consent of other nations to them by force.

“In the appendix to the letters of Sulpicius, and in the letters themselves, and also in the collection of papers relating to the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, there appears to me to be a very material mistake and omission as to the treaty of commerce with Russia. The specification in the 11th article is not, as it is represented in the letters of Sulpicius, a declaration

of what shall alone be considered as contraband, but only a provision against the probable abuse, on the one hand, of confiscation or seizure under pretence that a ship carries arms though no more should be on board than the use of the ship or passengers requires, and on the other, of a cargo really consisting of arms being covered under pretext of their being merely for the use of the ship and passengers. This will clearly appear not only by the ordinary rules of construction, but of comparison with any other treaties where there is no specification of contraband, in which it will always be found that such and such articles only are to be prohibited, and that all other shall be deemed free. The true and only specification of contraband in the Russian treaty is, I think, to be found in the 10th article, where it is said the subjects may freely trade *sous condition qu'ils ne conduiront à l'ennemi aucune munition*; and *les munitions de guerre toujours exceptées, les susdits sujets pourront transporter sans obstacles toutes sortes de marchandises*. And at the time of making this treaty there could be no doubt of the interpretation of the terms *munitions* and *munitions de guerre*, at least by Great Britain, as she had recently fixed the sense she put upon them by the Convention of 1780 with Denmark, explanatory of these very words. I shall rejoice to hear of a British fleet in the Baltic. If the passage of the Sound cannot be defended, so as to make this impossible (which I fear is not the case) Denmark may be less inclined to submit; though I must own I have good hopes from that quarter, because I really think England is a more natural ally for that Crown than Russia. At any rate the explanation with Vansittart cannot take place before you will have received in England the impertinent note of Haugwiz, which, I think, can hardly fail of extending the embargo to Prussian ships, if not producing my immediate recall. Nothing however can be farther from determined, though the longing they have for Hanover gave them a momentary appearance of resolution. Many symptoms of this are discernible, and it has been conveyed to me through many channels in the course of the last week that this Court acts merely from the necessity it feels of courting the emperor, and that it is not too late for England, without making any material sacrifice, to regain his friendship. But the treaty between France and Austria, and Mr. Drake's intelligence of the sacrifices to be required from Bavaria, of the separate arrangement of the remaining indemnifications at Luneville, joined with many concurrent advices from the other quarters, put it beyond a doubt that France has entirely laid aside all consideration for this paltry Court; and this (though I know that not many days ago it was seriously in deliberation whether Hanover should not be invaded without waiting to know in what manner the British Government would treat the note) may have checked their sanguine hopes of immediate aggrandizement.

"I must now say a few words on that disastrous subject which you say has been the only cause of the change of administration. I never have approved either of the restraints on Roman Catholics or of the Test Act, and I must freely own that I have as little approved the manner in which Government has acted hitherto as

to the first of these objects. You gave to the Papists a consequence they were not justly entitled to, and suffered men without character, property, or abilities, distinguished only by their factions and even treasonable practices, to extort, by the most irregular and seditious means, what they ought to have received as a favour. But the measure you have described to me was worthy of great statesmen, and would have produced the effects you intended. To have relieved the Papists and not the Dissenters would have been only raising one faction in the place of another. Your plan would have united the whole people, and the oath you proposed is, in my estimation, an object of the utmost consequence; and, if ever you should establish it by law, I hope it will be contrived to have it administered with real solemnity. Every man taking it once should have a certificate of it, and the production of that certificate should stand in place of the frequent repetitions of the present oath of allegiance, and should be produced upon all important occasions, as of marriage, taking administration, receiving legacies, claiming debts, so as to keep the obligation and the value of it continually present to every man's mind.

"In short, I will support your new administration as long as you desire it, and with as much warmth and zeal as you can desire, both at home and abroad; but God grant the continuance may not be long. It is impossible they should, even with your tuition, conduct the State. You must resume your place."

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, February 28. Vienna.—"I cannot suffer Colonel Hope to leave me without adding to what I have said in my public dispatch my own private opinion that this officer was so particularly qualified for the situation in which he was placed that it will be an object well worth your Lordship's attention to keep him constantly in your eye for any service of the same kind on any future occasion.

"To much temper, management, and patience, he adds (as I have said in my public dispatch) the most scrupulous attention to his instructions, which he takes care thoroughly to understand; and above all (and what I prize by far the most of all his qualities as the most rare in a British officer) an unceasing care never to commit either himself or his employers without an intention so to do.

"He has made himself so thoroughly master of the whole and every part of the treaties that were concluded by me last year and of the principles on which they were negotiated and concluded, that I could, at any moment, have left the whole business in his hands with thorough confidence, and without a fear or uneasiness of any kind. In one word, I have had nothing but comfort and satisfaction, ever since he has joined me, in every department of the extensive business entrusted to my care in which he has had any concern; and I venture to recommend him very particularly to your Lordship's attention as an officer every way worthy of your confidence."

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

Extract of a letter respecting the papers delivered to the Irish Catholics in February, 1801.

[1801, February-March].—"Mr. Pitt thinks the fair statement to be made in case the papers [are] alluded to in Parliament, is that your Excellency felt it your duty, for the sake of the public tranquillity, to impress the Catholics with a strong sense of how much both their duty and interest enjoined a loyal and dutiful demeanour; that the precise terms in which it was done, not having been a matter of previous concert with all the persons to whom the sentiments might be referable, that the papers in question could not be considered as affecting them farther than they adopted them by their language in Parliament: that the sentiments *generally* expressed in those papers met his approbation. In respect to the pledge which might be attributed to the second paper, he should decline upon principle making any other pledge than his past conduct; what his future conduct might be would depend upon what he felt to be due to the question itself as well as to the public interest."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, Marh 2. Cleveland Row.—"You will have been made uneasy by the accounts you will have received of the King's health. Thank God, I can now tell you that our anxiety is almost (if not wholly) at an end. There seems to have been a crisis in his disorder yesterday which suspended for 24 hours the rapid progress he was before making towards complete recovery. This has terminated as favourably as we could wish, and the most confident expectations are now entertained and declared by his physicians.

"You who know that my attachment to him is quite independent of all official situation, past, present, or to come; but is the result of sincere gratitude, and of long opportunity of knowing and observing his character, will readily believe the happiness I have experienced from the favourable change. If I wrote by a messenger, I could tell you more of our domestic politics than I think right to entrust to this conveyance, but I see no reason to alter any part of the opinions I last expressed to you.

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 4. Berlin.—"It is exceedingly mortifying for me to have to address my dispatch of to-day to Lord Hawkesbury instead of you. I wish I had time to have it transcribed for you, though it bears the title of most secret. I cannot however suppose that the Office will conceal it from you. Prince Adolphus who, by the by, is by all accounts, as well as in all appearance, a very excellent and amiable young man, brought with [him] an aide de camp, Captain de Decken, with whom the King had been formerly intimate. On the 2nd day after their arrival, Decken came to me and told me he had a private interview with the King, and was ordered to communicate to me the substance of their conversation, and deliver me a message.

The conversation went to show the reluctance with which the King, under the terrors of France and Russia, engaged in measures he abhorred, and his determination not to go a step further than he should be compelled. The message was to say how earnestly he wished that Great Britain would try to satisfy the Emperor about Malta, which, he was convinced, might be done, and at much less expense than perhaps we thought. This once done, we should obtain satisfaction as to every other point, and he should be relieved from all his difficulties. This overture I thought not to be neglected, and determined to tell him under a promise of secrecy what had passed with Lutzow at first, and in consequence of your dispatch of the 17th. I, at the same time, directed Decken to tell the King that I would always obey his commands in conveying any suggestion of his to our Government, and in making to him directly, and not to be communicated to his ministers, any communication that my duty would permit, if he would point out a channel through which it might be done. Decken carried a written account of Lutzow's business, and a letter from me to which, by the King's order, he returned me an answer in writing the same day, of which, as well as my letter, I have sent copies to the Office. The answer contains thanks, expressions of joy and hope at finding a negotiation opened with Russia, a promise to do all in his power to promote its success, and an indication of the channel through which I might correspond with him in future. We met in the evening, but his Majesty's behaviour was not at all calculated to preserve the secret he kept strongly recommending to me; and the language and behaviour of the whole Court has taken quite a new turn upon it. I hope and trust that you will not disapprove what I have done. The having found a way to get at the King is what we have always wished, and is certainly a point gained, though I do not expect much to follow from it.

"The more I think of what has happened at home the more I am vexed. Such a Ministry cannot stand long, and cannot do good; but, I fear, will last long enough to break up completely the strength which supported you, and perhaps some intrigue will prevent your return to office. But I will say no more on this vexatious subject. In a month's time I trust we may have an answer from Petersburg. If that business is arranged satisfactorily, and the Northern war goes off in smoke, as I trust it will, I may surely then without blame ask to go home. My private affairs will furnish very ostensible reason, and I cannot bear my situation long, now that I am no more to correspond with you."

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, March 3. Palermo.—"It is just possible that, had I been at Naples before the signing of the armistice, it might have been in my power to have prevented it being carried to its full extent. I therefore think it my duty to inform your Lordship that I offered to go with the Prince Royal to Naples (the Russian Minister did the same), and that His Sicilian Majesty rather expressed a wish that the Foreign Ministers should not quit him. But what can be expected

from this Government after what I have related at the end of my Dispatch No. 4? I never thought General Acton otherwise than a very weak man, but it now looks absolutely as if he was doating. With regard to M. Italinsky, of whom so much is now expected, there hardly exists, I believe, a more upright man, but he owes his situation in a great measure to General Acton, to whose opinions I have in general found him inclined to bend. I saw him before his departure in a *maison tierce*. He assured me solemnly that he did not believe it to be the intention of his sovereign to act with regard to Naples as the French had made General Acton believe was the case. He said he could understand nothing of General Acton's conduct on the present occasion. I am only afraid that he will submit to be talked over. At present he considers the armistice as an instance of excessive weakness on the part of the Neapolitan Government.

"Until I receive your Lordship's instructions I have resolved to remain here, for, the ports being shut, I could not go to Naples in a king's ship without perhaps being exposed to what I certainly should not like to put up with; and I do not think that, under the present circumstances, I could with propriety go in any other way. Add to which I feel, after what has passed, that I could be of no service there. That Government is in a sort of fever at present which must take its course. Your Lordship may depend upon His Sicilian Majesty's attachment to England. I have very good reason for supposing that he is not only dissatisfied with what has been done, but with the manner of doing it. I have mentioned such a thing as the right of a sovereign not to ratify a treaty he may be dissatisfied with; but M. Serrati is a man who might have been an excellent Minister during a profound peace half a century ago. When I look around me and reflect upon the persons employed in the different departments of this government, I do not understand how the thing goes on at all. The fact is that General Acton will not employ people who are not blindly devoted to him, and he has certainly brought himself to think that this is a well governed state. I always return to a position I formerly made. There is neither army, navy, commerce, justice, agriculture, religion, or roads in these kingdoms. And as long as General Acton remains at the head of affairs, I despair of seeing any change for the better in them. He will listen to none but those who flatter him. At the same time there is not a man in these kingdoms fit to hold his situation. Your Lordship will naturally expect to see the armistice followed by a peace equally disgraceful and ruinous.

"I think it right to mention that a memorial was sent some time ago to the Emperor of Russia, drawn up by a person formerly French Vice-Consul at Cairo and since Consul at Rhodes. The object of this memorial is to point out to the Emperor of Russia the facility with which, by an alliance with Persia, he might attack His Majesty's East Indian possessions. Dumourier was pointed out as a proper person to entrust with the undertaking. I have not seen the memorial, but I am assured it is such as is likely to have a very strong effect on the mind of such a man as the Emperor of Russia.

"I shall await here with the most anxious impatience your Lordship's further instructions. I sincerely trust that your Lordship will feel that it has not been in my power to stop the mischief which has happened here. Everything that my mind can suggest I have written in the strongest manner to General Acton, and have urged to the Ministers here. Having no other conveyance, and being particularly desirous to hear from your Lordship, I shall send one of my servants at least as far as Vienna with my dispatches.

"Several orders and counter orders have been received for the departure of the three Russian frigates and troops from Naples, but I presume they will esteem it prudent not to risk a passage at this moment.

"Lord Whitworth, who must know General Sevatcheff very well, will certainly be of opinion that he is charged with no other commission than to present the Russian orders to His Sicilian Majesty. I however know that he is charged with nothing else. I have every reason to believe that the Russian General Borosdin, who commands those troops at Naples, always has been, and is, entirely in the French interest."

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MINTO.

1801, March 6. Dropmore.—"I received by the last mails your letter marked private, of the 15th of February; and I thought it my duty to communicate it to Lord Hawkesbury. You will have been apprized by the letters which you will have received both from me and from your other friends of the changes which have been determined on here, and of the circumstances which have prevented any of those changes being as yet actually carried into effect, except those of the Admiralty and of the Foreign Department. I have, however, the happiness of being able to assure you that the King's recovery is advancing rapidly, and that there is every possible ground of hope that nothing more will be necessary to be done for carrying on the public business than that the persons who happen to find themselves in the different offices of responsible government should continue to discharge the duties of them for a short period longer. If I had been in that predicament I should have felt it my duty to do my best in it, but I am certainly not sorry that accident had completed my release from a situation in which, under such circumstances, one could not hope to do much good.

"I take it for granted that Lord Hawkesbury will have written to you on what relates to your own situation, and it no longer belongs to me to do so. But I trust you are persuaded that I have not omitted to do the justice I owe to your exertions and services at Vienna; a testimony which inclination as well as duty will always make me desirous of bearing both in public and in private.

"I am highly gratified by the kind and friendly sentiments with which your letter concludes, and it will be a real pleasure to me to avail myself of any opportunity to cultivate a friendship which I sincerely esteem and value." *Copy.*

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, March 6th. Vienna.—“I received to-day with great and sincere regret your Lordship’s dispatch of the 20th February, acquainting me with your resignation. It is impossible not to consider this event, and those with which it is connected, as a very great public calamity. I can assure you that it is felt as such in this quarter of Europe, and that the dissolution of that administration of which your Lordship was a principal member has created a new consternation here, where, in the midst of their own weakness, they still looked with a sort of involuntary respect to the energy of our Government as the remaining stay and last hope of Europe. The acknowledged and proved talents as well as character of that administration had inspired universal confidence; and one always perceived on the Continent a sort of shabby hope that their own vices and degeneracy would in the end be redeemed by our virtues, resources, and constancy. The late events in England must be reckoned amongst those many and extraordinary interpositions of fortune in favour of our enemy which have so long seemed to make the worse cause appear the better. I am very imperfectly informed of the true grounds of all that has happened, but the general complexion of this change seems sufficiently ascertained to leave me no doubt concerning the part I have to take myself. Your Lordship knows I had already resigned my office on other ground. It would therefore seem affectation to offer this now as a sacrifice either to the principle of the measure that has been taken or to the personal regard, attachment and gratitude I profess towards the men. I must nevertheless so far gratify my own feelings as to declare that, considering the late change as turning on the question of Catholic emancipation in Ireland, I am desirous of adhering to Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, and shall be proud to rank with those who fall on that question. My opinion is clear whether I consider the point of honour, or the point of policy; and I cannot hesitate a moment in pursuing the only course that is compatible with the sentiments I have already professed and still retain on the subject.

“I dare say your Lordship will have already communicated my resignation to Lord Hawkesbury. I have to-day requested his Lordship that my successor may be appointed with as little delay as possible; and I am persuaded that your Lordship will approve of my having refrained, in this official act, from any allusion to other motives than those which I had formerly stated to your Lordship.

“I cannot close my official correspondence with your Lordship without repeating the lively sense I shall ever retain of your indulgence and kindness throughout; nor without expressing a sincere hope that this temporary relation may have laid the foundation of a more permanent connexion, and incline your Lordship to admit me amongst your sincere and personal friends.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 6. Downing Street.—“You will have seen the

bulletin of this morning. The private accounts were still more favourable and the progress since has been most rapid. I have just seen Dr. Willis, and find that the King has seen the Queen for above half an hour, and Willis since for above two hours. He was perfectly rational and collected the whole time, and conversed with perfect clearness on all that related to himself and the state of public affairs. He has since eat his dinner and drank some wine with apparent satisfaction. If things continue in this train, there is little doubt that the public account to-morrow will be that of convalescence. In the mean time we shall not venture to say more than that he is much better even since the morning, and mending rapidly."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1801, March 7. Vienna.—"I beg your lordship will accept my very sincere thanks for the very obliging manner in which you are pleased to speak of my humble services, and for the favourable light in which you have so kindly represented them to your Lordship's successor.

"My mission is of itself drawing fast towards its conclusion; my health has evidently suffered from the fatigues I have undergone during more than six years of the most active and laborious employment, without the intermission of a single day. The situation of my family at home is such as to make my presence there extremely desirable; in one word, every thing concurs to make me earnestly wish that I may have his Majesty's leave to retire for a time at least from the public service.

"I had already written to your Lordship, before I knew of the change that has taken place in the Foreign Department, to request a leave of absence, and I hope your Lordship will not refuse me the satisfaction of pressing this demand on Lord Hawkesbury, and expressing at the same time my earnest and sincere wish that his Lordship would submit my humble prayer to his Majesty to the extent I have above expressed.

"Your Lordship, I trust, knows me well enough to be persuaded that I would neither abandon my present situation without having placed things in such a state as that the King's service could not possibly suffer from my absence, nor express a wish to retire from public service unless I had other reasons than the fear of encountering the labour and difficulties by which it is attended, from which your Lordship well knows I have never shown a disposition to shrink.

"If his Majesty should be graciously pleased to grant my request, I must trust to his indulgent goodness to determine whether the situations I have holden, or my past labours in his service, have rendered me worthy of any mark of his royal favour on my retiring from public employment.

"My own wishes on the subject have but one object in view, namely, that my sovereign may appear to have been satisfied with the manner in which my duty has been performed throughout the many important and very confidential missions that have been trusted to me.

"I wish not to write on this subject to Lord Hawkesbury until I shall have heard whether your Lordship has had the goodness to mention to him my wish for a leave of absence."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1801, March 7. Vienna.—"The intelligence of yesterday, contained in your Lordship's public and private letters of the 19th ultimo, has quite overcome me. An intimation of something of the kind had reached us through France, but I was not prepared to receive anything so thoroughly disastrous. I consider this event as a great and heavy calamity that has fallen on the country, and I offer up my prayers, hope I have little or none, that it may not be the fore-runner of still greater evils. Those men, whoever they are, who have advised the king to this measure have more to answer for to their country than I would have upon my conscience for all that the country is worth. Mr. Pitt and your Lordship I know will forgive them; but the tougher materials of which I am unfortunately framed will require time to bend, much too long to have any hope of my acting under them to any good or efficient purpose for a long while to come.

"Setting however that consideration aside, there are others which make my line as easy to take as it has been readily and cheerfully taken. From its first formation I have been a warm though humble admirer of the Administration of which your Lordship has made a part. In all the trying scenes in which it has been engaged, I have been so sincerely and earnestly interested, and the habit of thinking and acting according to the wishes and opinions of its members is now so *rooted* in me, that my own political existence is, as it were, identified with the existence of that particular Administration to such a point as that I should as soon think of marrying again the day after I had buried my wife as of acting under a new Cabinet until I had had time to mourn and forget the old one, and to form my whole habits anew.

"I had besides so thorough a confidence in their firmness and their resources in times of danger, in their discretion, their honour and their talents, I considered the fortunes of my sovereign and of my country so safe in their hands, that no public calamity ever affected my courage or shook my resolution; every check, every disaster seemed to me easy to be repaired; and I appeal to my correspondence with your Lordship whether even the battles of Zurich or Hohenlinden, which might have terrified the boldest, ever drew from me an expression of despair or discouragement, or were ever presented by me to your Lordship in any other light, as far as ourselves were concerned, than as events which required the application of new measures and new resources, without a doubt but that those measures would be adopted and those resources found.

"These are comforts and consolations absolutely necessary to every man called upon to act in the situations in which I have been

placed in times like these ; all of which I now abandon, and to the privation of which it is not possible that I should accustom myself at once.

“ When I add to all these reasons a sense of the most unbounded gratitude, as an Englishman, for services rendered to my country, on which no human value can be set, and, as an individual, for unmerited kindness and protection, your Lordship will not be surprised that my language and my conduct should be so firm and decided on this occasion ; nor will you, I am sure, attribute to haste or warmth what is really the result of as much cool and deliberate reflection and discussion as four-and-twenty hours could possibly allow.

“ My connection with the Duke of Portland had, I own, induced me for a moment to hesitate ; but his Grace, to whom however I shall always consider myself under the greatest obligations, has entirely relieved me from all scruples on that head by appointing a successor to my office in the Home Department ; nor do I feel a doubt or a difficulty of any kind but from the possibility, to which some few circumstances seem to point, that a part at least of this new Administration is *really* formed by the old one ; and that it may be the real wish of your Lordship and your friends that those persons out of Parliament who are sincerely attached to you, should continue to serve. Now, upon this point, as I shall be very fair and open with your Lordship, I trust your Lordship will be the same with me. If such be really your Lordship’s desire, which I cannot well believe when I see the names of some of those who retire from office, you may be assured that there is no sacrifice of my own private opinion and wishes, however strong they may be, that I would not readily make on such an occasion, and for such an object. But it would be on your Lordship’s account alone, and not on mine, that I should accept any employment whatever were it offered me ; for, I beg your Lordship distinctly to understand, that both my opinion and my wishes are decidedly the other way, that my mind is entirely made up upon the main question, that I am sincerely ambitious of following your Lordship to your retreat, and that I shall have neither real comfort or satisfaction of mind in any other line of conduct.

“ I hold this language in the entire confidence that your Lordship will give me full credit for the sincerity of what I say, and, in that confidence I venture to send your Lordship the enclosed ostensible letter, and to request that you will make such use of it as you shall think most proper ; only observing, on the one hand, that my circumstances in life are not such as to make any mark of favour that his Majesty may bestow on me in my retreat *as a reward for my past services* an object of indifference ; on the other, that I would not for the world that your Lordship should, on my account, lay yourself under the slightest obligation to any person whatever, or, that anything given to me should be given in the shape of a favour conferred upon your Lordship. I have known what it is to live in confined circumstances ; and am not afraid to meet such a situation again. Too much of the public money has gone through my hands for me ever to dare to wish to be rich, and I had rather

leave a good name and a good example to my son than the first fortune in the united kingdoms.

¶ "With these sentiments your Lordship will see that I cannot be called on to make any great sacrifice on this occasion; and, if I could forget the state of public affairs, I am persuaded that I should rejoice in having found an opportunity, which I had never ventured to hope for, of convincing your Lordship that my attachment is as disinterested as it is sincere.

"I do not write to Mr. Pitt, because I shall rely on your Lordship's having the goodness to express to him the substance of what I say and think on this occasion; and I shall now only add my sincere and earnest prayers for your Lordship's happiness, and that our country may soon again have the benefit of your Lordship's services and those of your colleagues, in which case you may be sure that I shall be the first to fly to my post, wherever it may be assigned me."

Postscript.—"I foresee only one embarrassing case. What shall I do if I receive an offer of employment from Lord Hawkesbury before I have your Lordship's answer?"

"A communication from the Duke of Portland made through Flint (for I have nothing from his Grace) intimates that it was your Lordship's wish that I should remain here. This among other things makes me presume that an offer to that effect will be made to me from Lord Hawkesbury, that is, if I don't stand too much in the way of the views of a certain person too well known to us. My present opinion is that I ought to accept, *for the moment only*, in consideration of the state in which this Court would otherwise be left, and of my presence here on other business being still necessary; but expressing a fear that my health will not permit me to remain, referring to my request of a leave of absence made to your Lordship *before the change*, and expressing my confidence that I may be considered as holding the place *pro tempore* only. This will give me time to receive your Lordship's answer."

Postscript. March 9, 1901.—"Since the above was written I have received by Captain Cowan your Lordship's very kind letter of the 13th February. The answer to it will, I trust, be found in the preceding pages. I can only repeat my very earnest and sincere wish that I may be allowed to manifest my friendship and gratitude by sharing the honourable retreat to which your Lordship and your better friends have determined to retire."

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 10. Constantinople.—"Your dispatch of 30 January informing me that the king has been graciously pleased to permit my return to England, on account of my private affairs, was delivered to me on the 2nd instant by Mr. Maltas, the Levant Company's newly elected chancellor upon this establishment.

"In conformity to which, and the consequential arrangement of the company's concerns here in obedience to His Majesty's recommendation, I take the liberty of acquainting your lordship that I shall avail myself of my leave of absence as soon as I shall have

made over the affairs of my department in due form to the Earl of Elgin ; and that I can arrange the means of travelling as the circumstances of the times may render advisable or safe.

“ Upon which occasion your lordship will permit me to express some part of the anxiety I cannot but feel, though perhaps erroneously, at that part of your dispatch announcing the cessation of my appointments upon my arrival in England, and which are moreover therein alluded to as being merely those of secretary of legation, after having been repeatedly given to understand both from your lordship as well as from the ambassador, that His Majesty had been pleased to advance me to the rank of secretary *embassy* since the month of November, 1798. Your lordship will recollect that I have never been in the enjoyment of those of *chargé d'affaires*, and still less of those of minister plenipotentiary ; that my allowances even as secretary of legation have been far from cœval with the date of my service here ; while your lordship may not perhaps know that my pay from the Levant Company of £1,000 a year has ceased since the arrival here of the last advices from the company ; so that, should the king's commands take effect according to the literal tenor of your lordship's letter before me, I should find myself, with an expensive journey before me, reduced to such an irksome situation in point of income as I can hardly suppose to enter into to His Majesty's gracious intentions, any more than your lordship's, towards me ; but which, as standing thus in the text of this last dispatch, I am bound to remark in time, to obviate any future misunderstanding. With my pen then employed upon topics of a personal import, I crave your indulgence to remind your lordship that I am still deprived of any fruits from the King's benevolent declaration relative to my loss by the fire that raged here on 13 March, 1799, as conveyed in two several dispatches from your lordship of the same year ; while every one of my fellow sufferers by that catastrophe has been indemnified by their respective courts. Whereas I have only received a gratuity on the occasion from the Levant Company, amounting to little more than a third of my loss ; at the same time that the inferior officers of the mission have received relief both from the crown and from the company.”

THE MARCHIONESS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 10. Pall Mall.—“ Your kind letter has been a most reviving one to my poor friend Miss Mac, who was dreaming constantly of a jail, and is now delighting herself in the idea of not only being liberated herself from most dreadful anxiety, but also (what she feels more about than anything belonging to self) that she may still do good ; for I have the pleasure of acquainting you that (owing to the necessity of giving proper notice to the mistresses and servants, and also of keeping up an *appearance* of a school to prevent butchers and bakers from being desperate) the establishment is not yet dissolved, and (what added to Miss Mac's regrets) was lately got upon the best of footings with excellent people to manage the children, who were making great progress in every thing that is necessary for girls who must be to depend upon

their talents and industry. She desires me to tell you that nothing could have prevailed upon her to break up an establishment that does so much good but the *want of funds* ; and that if Government will be as generous as you mention in giving 700*l.*, she will undertake to educate, board, lodge, clothe the children *without taking any of the Committee money*, which would be a great help to the parents, and induce them to put their children to the school, instead of keeping them, as many do for the sake of the weekly allowance, in their wretched garrets, naked, starved and without instruction. If I was to say one hundredth part of what I feel, and what Miss Mac desires me to say to you for your great kindness, I know I should make you angry ; and as it is much to our interest to keep you in good humour, I shall only say what you know already, how affectionately I am and ever shall be yours.³⁴

J. KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most Private and Secret.

1801, March 14th. Whitehall.—“ We have this moment received the within from our Paris friend. By a separate note you see how he presses for some answer on that point which—whether the parties are in good earnest about it, or consider it merely as a salvo for their consciences, or whether they want to be in possession of such a declaration as they expect—is, at all events, made a *sine quâ non*.

“ The last letter from Flint will, for the present, answer the purpose, and prevent our friend from leaving Paris, where alone he can be of service to *us*. The Duke talked with Mr. Pitt on the subject, who thought £1,000 per month a good deal, but that the intelligence might prove well worthy of it. They both wished me to consult you, for, as I see that unless *we* continue this channel of information it will be lost, I am anxious to do it properly. You will see the answer Wickham gave on the point in October last. One of the drafts of an answer for your consideration Flint has put into my hands, the short one he translated from my English.”

Postscript.—“ A day or two ago I thought we might get right again, but alas it is all over.”

BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN MOORE to his father, DR. JOHN MOORE.

1801, March 16. Camp near Alexandria.—“ From Marmoris Bay to that of Aboukir we met with nothing but bad weather which dispersed the small ships which carried our cavalry ; most of them have not yet cast up. On the 1st of March we appeared off Alexandria, and on the second in the morning we anchored in Aboukir, with an intention instantly to land the troops, but the coast did not admit of the ships anchoring neare*n* than six and seven miles to the shore. Such a distance, with boats loaded with men, required calm weather. Unfortunately the wind blew fresh and the sea ran high. In this manner we were detained until the 8th. Had it been possible to land the first or second day after our arrival we should have had the advantage of surprise, and been

opposed only by the small garrison of Aboukir. We should probably have even been able to push thus far without material opposition ; but eight days gave the enemy time to assemble. We daily saw more men and more cannon. The spot upon which it was practicable to land was confined to less than half a mile, and was also in other respects favourable for defence ; it was such as to prevent our receiving any advantage from the fire of shipping or gun-boats.

“Notwithstanding every unfavourable circumstance, Sir Ralph was determined to make the attempt. The interest of our country and our honour as military men equally required it of us.

“The time which was given to the enemy to collect was employed by us in making the necessary preparations and arrangements.

“The first landing was to be effected by the reserve, brigade of Guards and part of Major-General Coote’s brigade, arranged from right to left in the order I have named them. These troops got into the flat boats and launches at two in the morning of the 8th, and assembled after daylight in a line, at about two miles from the shore, which small vessels had in the night been sent in to mark. It was 8 o’clock before the boats were all arranged and ready to advance. We saw the French on the heights with their cannon placed in readiness to receive us.

“Our fleet of 160 or 170 sail were at anchor behind us (on the spot where Nelson destroyed the French) filled with soldiers and sailors, our countrymen.

“The sun was bright and the day delightful. Fifteen pieces of cannon opened upon us as soon as we were within reach, first with round shot, and afterwards, as we approached, with grape, and at last with musketry. Our troops answered with huzzas, and the boats continued to advance. The right of the Reserve landed opposite to a high sand hill, which the French occupied, and which it was absolutely necessary for us to possess instantly. I determined to lead this attack with the 23rd and 28th regiments, and four companies of grenadiers and light infantry of the 40th, leaving the direction of the 42nd and 58th regiments to General Oakes upon my left.

“The men, as soon as they got out of the boats, formed and loaded with the greatest composure, though grape shot and musketry was falling on every side of them, and they ascended the hill without ever taking their muskets from their shoulders. We drove the French, took four pieces of cannon, and pursued them for a mile into the plain upon the left. The regiments with General Oakes, the Guards and others, met with considerable opposition, and were charged by the cavalry, which they repulsed. They pursued the enemy to the border of the plain, where we all joined, and they took three pieces of cannon. It was some time before the cannon, which had been landed with the troops, could be got forward. This and the total want of cavalry saved the French from being cut to pieces, and enabled them to retreat.

“The rest of the army landed in the course of the day, and in the afternoon we moved forward, the first line and reserve to a position for the night, two or three miles from the shore.

“Our loss in the landing amounted to 600 killed and wounded.

The next day I was pushed forward with the reserve a couple of miles in front of the army.

"In this position the army continued waiting for provisions and ammunition to be landed and forwarded until the 12th, when the army advanced in two columns, each composed of a wing, headed by the reserve, as an advanced guard. A corps of cavalry which had been opposite to me, during the two days I occupied the former post, retired skirmishing as we advanced; but as we approached the ground intended for our encampment, a body of infantry was seen at some distance moving towards us. This obliged the line to be formed, which was done accurately and quickly, and we instantly advanced. The enemy halted and retired, and we took up our ground. The position of the enemy on our front was strong, we are now upon it. The enemy's and our sentries and piquets were close to one another during the night, and it was evident that neither army could stir without an action.

"On the 13th we marched in two columns from the left, each composed of a line of the army, covered on the right by the reserve formed in one column.

"The design was to attack the right of the French, and if possible to turn it. We got into action instantly. The army formed in two lines; the reserve continued in column for the protection of the right flank. Our guns, without horses, could not by the sailors be dragged through heavy sand sufficiently quickly to keep up with the troops. That of the enemy was numerous, and, from having even 16 horses to some pieces, was extremely active. The cannonade was tremendous, and may be said to have mowed down our men; but nothing could overcome their cool intrepidity, discompose their order, or prevent their advancing. The French gave way on every side, and were pursued under the fire of the fortified position they had prepared and now occupy in front of Alexandria. A disposition was instantly made to attack this, but upon examining it, it was found to be so strong and so studded with artillery, besides being exposed to the fire of two forts beyond it, that even had the valour of our men surmounted the two first obstacles, the last would have rendered it impossible for them to hold their ground. Sir Ralph has therefore determined to remain on his present ground until heavy cannon is brought up to cope with that of the enemy and to cover our future movements.

"The last action cost us 1,300 killed and wounded. We expected no supply from the country—and we have hitherto got water, everything else is landed from the ships. We have been without tents or baggage.

"I have always had the best opinion of British troops, but their conduct since we landed in Egypt has surpassed every thing I had conceived, and I would not exchange these eight days' service for all I had before seen. The French have expressed their surprise, not they say at the courage, but at the coolness and regularity of the troops.

"It is impossible to foresee the event of this expedition. The position of the French is extremely strong, and when they are

driven from it, we have a siege to begin of a place not occupied by a common garrison, but by an army almost as numerous as ourselves.

"The climate has not yet affected us, but the hot weather which begins to set in, together with the labour of a siege, may reduce our numbers more than the sword, by which 2,000 are already *hors de combat*. Of this I am certain, that what men can do will be done. Obstacles may occur to prevent final success, but the honour of the country will not be tarnished, and the character of the army will rise in estimation to whatever it was on the best times. These considerations make me perfectly at my ease. Upon the 13th, when the attack of the enemy's position was given up, it became necessary to retire out of reach of their guns, to which we were exposed, and were losing men to no purpose. We therefore in the afternoon did so, and took up the ground from which we had driven them.

"Our right is to the sea; on the left the Lake Ma'adi and the Canal of Alexandria. A plain of about a mile and a quarter, broken, on our right, by small sand hills, separates us from the heights upon which the French are encamped. This is a tolerably detailed account of our operations since we left Marmoris.

"I am sitting on the ground and writing on my knee; my friends will I hope excuse me for not writing to them.

"I fag from morning to night and am perfectly well. I have had the good luck to escape unhurt, but many of my friends have suffered. This is the black side to which we must endeavour not to look." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, March 16. Dropmore.—"Four mails arrived yesterday, and brought me your private letters from February 21 to March 4, and as I conclude that the King's recovery, which, thank God, is now complete, will lead to your having a messenger from the Office in the course of this week, I send this to Hammond to go by that opportunity. All my opinions agree with yours as to the advantage and necessity of acting with vigour against the northern Courts; and, as our fleet sailed on Thursday last with a most favourable wind, I trust the first act of that interlude is already over, and that the whole will be concluded soon enough to leave us at liberty to pursue uninterruptedly our operations against France.

"I am very much obliged to you for the steps you have taken respecting your situation at Berlin. Your quitting in the present moment would really have been extremely injurious to the public service, as well as distressing to myself personally. Without agreeing in the full extent of what the partiality of friends leads them to feel respecting those who have quitted office, I certainly do not disguise from you that I think the public suffers considerably by the change. But it was become unavoidable when measures which we thought not only important but necessary in order to give this country its fair chance of struggling through its difficulties, were impeded by a cause such as that which is now allowed to operate. I am satisfied in my conscience that no motive short

of a religious scruple, grounded on a mistaken opinion of the tendency of his oath, would have induced the King to resist our advice and to change his government ; and, as far as personal kindness could go, nothing could be more satisfactory and even affecting than his conduct to us has been. To such a scruple I should have thought it was our duty to give way, if we could have done so without a sacrifice of the duty we owe even to the King himself, of leaving nothing undone which, in our deliberate opinion, we judge likely to fortify the country against its present dangers. But I thought at the time, and it was then no sudden resolution, and every hour's reflection has convinced me since, that it would have been unpardonable in us, with the opinions we held, to make ourselves the instruments of resisting the measures which are necessary in order to unite the whole people of Ireland, or to stand responsible to the public for the government when so essential a feature of it was conducted in opposition to our advice and our ideas, founded in no rational sense of policy, but in a scruple which, though respectable in its motive, is in itself totally groundless and absurd.

"Under these circumstances there could be no option for the King but to resort to Opposition for a government, or to endeavour to form one out of the under actors of the same Company. He would perhaps have consulted his temporary ease by the former, but every consideration of honour and principle led to his trying the latter ; and surely, when he does so, nothing but a real difference in principle could justify us (I mean not the late Ministers only but the whole body of Anti-Jacobins) in thwarting his endeavours or in withholding from them any support we can give them. I grieve that this is not more generally felt, but its not being so is only a motive to those who do feel it to use still greater exertions.

"As to our resuming our situations, I fairly say that I think it impossible. No one can expect that the King, acting from such a principle as he does, can give way ; and surely no one could advise us to do so except in such an extreme case of public danger as I trust will never happen. Should it happen, the difference of the individuals in office at the moment would probably not be of much real consequence.

"If the Court of Berlin send you away, we shall have the opportunity of talking all this over at our leisure. If not, I certainly should not feel myself at liberty to ask you (when the crisis is over) to remain at Berlin longer than was agreeable to yourself ; because your coming away then would not have the same appearance as if you quitted now. But I am very far from agreeing with you in the estimate you form of your own services in a line for which you are in many respects so peculiarly fitted, and in which you have so much distinguished yourself. The papers tell us that Lady Newhaven is dead. If so, that may perhaps be an additional reason for your wishing to come to England. But surely you had best do so in the first instance on a leave of absence, which will leave you at full liberty to take your decision here."

"After all the experience we have both had of this Court of Berlin, I really cannot still help being surprised at the meanness and wretchedness of this last step of endeavouring to keep well

with us after such a note as they have sent us, telling us that they are acting against us only from a fear of France and Russia. I wish they had not said so, because it was my firm intention to have delivered it as my opinion in Parliament in our next debate; and now I feel some scruple in saying so, which I should not have felt so long as they affected to bully. I am very curious to see how they will take Sir H. Parker's proceedings." *Copy.*

LORD HAWKESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 18. Downing Street.—“I return you Wickham's letters, which I have kept entirely to myself. My first idea was to have appointed him to succeed Lord Minto at Vienna, but this is impossible, as Starhemberg was ordered by his court to state to me that, in the event of Lord Minto leaving Vienna, they wished particularly *not* to have Wickham. The two situations which have occurred to me for him are America, or Russia when it is open; the latter is probably what he would prefer. I will take care that your promise to him respecting place is fulfilled.

“It is impossible yet to judge what will be the issue of our contest with the northern powers. France and Vienna are drawing closer together. Prussia is alarmed to the greatest degree; but is so pressed by Russia on one side, and France on the other, that she pretends to have no will of her own. Unless the appearance of our fleet in the Baltic makes a sudden change in the politics of Russia, the Electorate of Hanover will, I am convinced, be sacrificed. We shall probably hear from Sir Hyde Parker the beginning of next week.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, March 19. Downing Street.—“The Chancellor had sent me the same accounts in consequence of which I have had a memorandum made of the points which I think will be sufficient for your purpose, and of which you will receive a legible copy early to-morrow. I have also taken measures for your having the account of the general trade and that to the north, by eleven.

“I will call on you, if I get away from my death-bed companions, so as to ride about half-past twelve if that suits you. If you should be gone leave word in what direction.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, March 24. Cleveland Row.—“As I neither see nor know anything of foreign politics I can write to you only of our domestic affairs. The new Government are, I trust I may now say, finally established, and I make not the smallest doubt that, unless some great calamity happens, they will be able perfectly to retain their ground. The trial of Parliamentary strength has indeed as yet only been made in the House of Lords, but the result there has been so decisive that it will operate on the other. It affords abundant proof that the ground is, if not equally so, yet at least very sufficiently secure in the House of Commons. My most

earnest wishes are, and must be, with them. I confess I cannot conceive anything equal to the madness of the few among our own friends who are playing Fox's game (while they think they are playing ours) in endeavouring to overthrow what, under the circumstances, and with the unfortunate prepossession in the King's mind, was the only resource left to him against a Jacobin Government. I am very sorry to reckon in that number some of my own nearest connections, whose conduct would certainly make mine be called in question, and suspected of the most dishonourable of all collusions, if I had not reason to hope that twenty years of public life had established my character above such suspicions.

"I have, however, certainly no claim to control their opinions, and can only pursue my own course straightforward, in the very plain line which honour and duty have chalked out for me. As to any interference with the conduct of the business of the Executive Government, I make it a point most studiously to avoid it, but, if in Parliament I can be useful to them, I will to the utmost endeavour to be so.

"I have dwelt too long upon this subject, but just now no man here talks or thinks of anything else. In a fortnight I hope to have let or sold this house, and to have fixed myself at Dropmore, from whence I shall only come to town for the days of debate in the House of Lords. We shall not, as you will readily believe, keep our Easter there without thinking often of you and our dear Elizabeth.

"I imagine that before you receive this the issue of Parker's operations at Copenhagen, whatever it may be, will have been known at Berlin, and will in one manner or another have operated decisively on our situation there. The condition of the Prussian Government seems truly wretched; but, however one may lament it for [our] own sakes, it is impossible to pity them. Precisely what has happened has been repeatedly remarked to them.

"In reading over what I have written, it seems to me to be necessary to assure you and my dear Elizabeth, who might otherwise feel uneasy on the subject, that the difference which seems likely to arise in our political opinions and conduct will be very far indeed from making the smallest diminution of affection or cordial friendship. We have all felt, when we were younger and less wise than we may hope to be now, the folly of suffering such considerations to interfere with the domestic happiness and union of families, and I hope we have all profited as we ought by the lesson.

"If the King of Prussia is frightened into bullying, you will be ordered away on the news of Parker's arrival at Copenhagen. Possibly you may already have applied for leave of absence on account of Lady Newhaven's death, and, in either case, I shall hope that very soon after your arrival in England, you will come to Dropmore, and see how happily we shall live there as a country esquire and his madam." *Copy.*

BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN MOORE to his father, DR. JOHN MOORE.

1801, March 25. *The Diadem*, Aboukir Bay.—"My letter of

the 16th March, which went by the vessel which carried the public despatches, contained a tolerably detailed account of our operations from our departure from Marmoris.

"We were employed from the 16th in strengthening our position. In the meantime provisions, stores, guns were forwarding to enable us to advance, however desperate it might appear, to attack the strong position the French had taken. Sir Ralph was, I believe, determined to do it; but Menou, the French Commander, having collected his force from Cairo and every other quarter, joined the army in front of Alexandria, and attacked us an hour before daylight in the morning of the 21st. His principal attack was made upon our right, where I was posted with the reserve, and upon the guards, who were immediately upon the left of the reserve. The French had contrived to approach very near us in the night without being heard; but our pickets were alert, and our troops had stood, as usual, to their arms an hour before daylight, and were in this situation when the fire from the pickets commenced. The French attacked with shouts, drums beating, but were received by our fellows with that coolness which they have displayed upon every occasion since they landed. Their cavalry charged twice and got in amongst us, but were destroyed. A column of their infantry had actually in the dark slipped past, and got into our rear; the 42nd regiment faced about, charged, put to death or took prisoner every man of them. In short, after repeated attacks during four hours, every one of which was repulsed, they were forced to retreat under cover of a numerous artillery, with which they had pounded us during the whole of the action. Their loss is great; I never saw a field so covered with dead. We have buried 1,200 of them and 4 or 500 horses. Their loss cannot be short of 4,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our loss is above 1,000, of which above 400 belong to the reserve. Having lost so many of my men, it was but decent to get a lick myself. I accordingly was wounded in the leg, early in the action, but was able to continue in it till it was over. Anderson is wounded in the arm, General Oakes in the leg, and Colonel Paget in the neck. The command of the reserve falls to the 4th in rank (Colonel Spencer). Sir Ralph, poor man, is wounded in the thigh, the ball has lodged. I am assured that no material part is hurt. He has however still a degree of fever, and will, I fear, be incapable of taking any further direction this campaign. My wound is in the left leg, on the outside of the cap-bone, which is not touched; the wound is deepish and has about three inches of passage. I shall be at my duty in a fortnight. Oakes, Anderson, and I have come here to be quiet until our wounds are healed. Anderson has lost a brother, a lieutenant in the 42nd; he was killed on the 21st.

"It is difficult to say as yet what the issue of all this will be. Government have undoubtedly been deceived with respect to the force and situation of the French in Egypt. The Delta is a most plentiful country; their army wants for nothing, and in the last action their numbers exceeded ours; unless therefore reinforcements are sent in time, or the Turks act with energy, what chance have we with inferior numbers to dispossess the French of their strongholds.


"I have had the satisfaction of seeing the superiority of the British infantry over the French in three successive actions; we have beat them without cavalry and inferior in artillery. This is the army of Italy! but the prisoners say that the fighting there was nothing to this. I am convinced that nothing ever surpassed the determined valour of our men, and what I have witnessed here will be a subject of pride and satisfaction to me whilst I live. This goes by Constantinople; the opportunity was told me privately as a favour, and I have availed myself of it in haste.

"If you meet Lord Paget you may assure him that his brother's wound is not serious; he expects to be with the reserve in a few days, and to command it until Oakes and I can join."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, March.]—"Je conçois très bien qu'un homme qui a le façon de penser de Lord Grenville se trouve très heureux d'être actuellement *procul a negotiis* et dans une *private situation*, où il est, peut-être, encore beaucoup plus utile à sa patrie que tous ceux qui se trouvent sur le chandellier et en évidence. Mais vous me permettiez pour ma part de ne pas m'accoutumer à tout régime qui me prive de voir un des amis dans lequel j'ai le plus de confiance, et dont je consulterai toujours les lumières et l'expérience, tant qu'il aura la bonté de m'écouter.

"Permettez-moi, en conséquence, de vous prier de m'accorder un instant d'entretien, quand un jour vous serez en ville, et que vous n'aurez rien de mieux à faire. Mon projet n'est point de vous ennuyer de politique, quoique, comme dit Boileau, 'Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop'; mais j'ai besoin de vous voir, de vous dire combien je vous suis attaché, de vous entretenir de moi-même et des miens. Si ma demande est importune, pardonnez-la à l'amitié que vous m'avez inspirée, et qui est assez exigeante pour s'attendre à de la réciprocité. Daignez vous souvenir que vos bontés m'ont gâté; pendant votre ministère, vous en êtes puni actuellement. Voilà le seul reproche que le secrétaire d'état que nous regrettons tous, ait à se faire."



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LONDON, W.C

HIS MAJESTY THE KING has been pleased to ratify and confirm the terms of the Commission issued by Her late Majesty, appointing certain Commissioners to ascertain what unpublished MSS. are extant in the collections of private persons and in institutions, which are calculated to throw light upon subjects connected with the Civil, Ecclesiastical, Literary, or Scientific History of this country; and to appoint certain additional Commissioners for the same purposes. The present Commissioners are :—

Sir R. Henn Collins, Master of the Rolls; the Marquess of Ripon, K.G., the Earl of Liverpool, the Earl of Dartmouth, the Earl of Crawford, K.T., the Earl of Rosebery, K.G., Lord Fitzmaurice, Lord Alverstone, G.C.M.G., Lord Lindley, Lord Stanmore, G.C.M.G., Sir Edward Fry, Mr. John Morley, O.M., M.P., Sir H. C. Maxwell-Lyte, K.C.B., and Mr. C. H. Firth, M.A., LL.D.

The Commissioners think it probable that you may feel an interest in this object, and be willing to assist in the attainment of it; and with that view they desire to lay before you an outline of the course which they usually follow.

If any nobleman or gentleman express his willingness to submit to the Commissioners any unprinted book, or collection of documents in his possession or custody, they will cause an inspection to be made by some competent person, and should the MSS. appear to come within the scope of their enquiry, the owner will be asked to consent to the publication of copies or abstracts of them in the reports of the Commission, which are presented to Parliament every Session.

To avoid any possible apprehension that the examination of papers by the Commissioners may extend to title-deeds or other documents of present legal value, positive instructions are given to every person who inspects MSS. on their behalf that nothing relating to the titles of existing owners is to be divulged, and

that if in the course of his work any modern title-deeds or papers of a private character chance to come before him, they are to be instantly put aside, and not to be examined or calendared under any pretence whatever.

The object of the Commission is the discovery of unpublished historical and literary materials, and in all their proceedings the Commissioners will direct their attention to that object exclusively.

In practice it has been found more satisfactory, when the collection of manuscripts is a large one, for the inspector to make a selection therefrom at the place of deposit and to obtain the owner's consent to remove the selected papers to the Public Record Office in London or in Dublin, or to the General Register House in Edinburgh, where they can be more fully dealt with, and where they will be preserved with the same care as if they formed part of the muniments of the realm, during the term of their examination. Among the numerous owners of MSS. who have allowed their papers of historical interest to be temporarily removed from their muniment rooms and lent to the Commissioners to facilitate the preparation of a report may be named :—His Majesty the King, the Duke of Rutland, the Duke of Portland, the Marquess of Salisbury, the Marquess Townshend, the Marquess of Ailesbury, the Marquess of Bath, the Earl of Dartmouth, the Earl of Carlisle, the Earl of Egmont, the Earl of Lindsey, the Earl of Ancaster, the Earl of Lonsdale, Lord Braye, Lord Hothfield, Lord Kenyon, Mr. Stopford Sackville, the Right Hon. F. J. Savile Foljambe, Sir George Wombwell, Mr. le Fleming, of Rydal, Mr. Leyborne Popham, of Littlecote, and Mr. Fortescue, of Dropmore.

The costs of inspections, reports, and calendars, and the conveyance of documents, will be defrayed at the public expense, without any charge to the owners.

The Commissioners will also, if so requested, give their advice as to the best means of repairing and preserving any interesting papers or MSS. which may be in a state of decay.

The Commissioners will feel much obliged if you will communicate to them the names of any gentlemen who may be able and willing to assist in obtaining the objects for which this Commission has been issued.

R. A. ROBERTS, *Secretary*.

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This Report has been prepared and edited, on behalf of the Historical Manuscripts Commissioners, by Mr. WALTER FITZPATRICK. The Index has been compiled by Mr. M. C. B. DAWES, B.A.

INTRODUCTION.

The correspondence included in this volume embraces a period of five years : from February, 1801, to February, 1806. This comparative poverty of material, the three preceding volumes covering altogether a period of only three years, is a consequence of the change in Lord Grenville's political situation. From being a leading member of the famous administration which formed, sustained, and in a great measure directed two European coalitions against the French Revolution, and the recognised organ of its foreign policy, he figures as the reluctant chief of a small party, strenuously advocating the same principles in opposition, but divested of official authority, and cut off from those sources of information which had overflowed in his correspondence. Still, however inferior it may be to its immediate predecessors in general importance as a historical record, this volume possesses peculiar interest on account of the light it throws on Lord Grenville's own career, of which these five years of opposition formed the turning point, and on the domestic politics of Great Britain. Readers will find mirrored in its pages the various influences, foreign and domestic—fears and perils caused by the growing ascendancy of a conqueror of extraordinary genius and ambition, new motives of action arising out of the course of political life in England—under the operation of which ties that had bound Pitt and Grenville together for nearly twenty years, dissolved ; and were, in the case of the latter, replaced by a union with statesmen who for the same long period had been political foes of both.

In order to appreciate fairly the circumstances of a separation still resented by many who can see no fault in a historical idol, it is necessary to bear in mind Lord Grenville's situation in Pitt's first ministry and the conditions of Mr. Addington's accession to power. A great deal has been said of Grenville's political obligations to Pitt ; and no one could acknowledge them more fully or in more grateful language than did Grenville himself. But Pitt also owed a great deal to Grenville. It has become a habit in our days to ascribe to Pitt the merit of everything making for national glory or advantage that illustrates his first ministry. Panegyric of this sort is more than usually extravagant when applied to him. Perhaps no great Minister ever more freely appropriated the ideas of others, depended more on the assistance of able colleagues, or was more governed by their advice. The Dropmore correspondence affords abundant evidence that for considerable periods subordinate ministers—Lord Hawkesbury

in matters of trade, Mr. Dundas in war, Lord Grenville in foreign relations—shaped the policy of the country without detracting from Pitt's supremacy. In fact, Pitt carried his disposition to accept advice to a fault. Friends and foes agreed that it too often resulted in instability of purpose, a condition of mind especially fatal to success in war. Where alone Pitt showed himself as a Minister inexorably firm and consistent was in asserting and maintaining his own political supremacy; with which, it is only fair to add, in his own belief and in that of a host of fervent adherents, the greatness of England was closely identified. In his first make-shift Cabinet, all except himself members of the House of Lords, he had not, from various causes, a colleague on whom he could rely for efficient support. It was therefore of great importance to him to find in a near kinsman an able, assiduous, and devoted helper in whom he could absolutely confide. And as the country, recovering from the lassitude and exhaustion which resulted from the American war, began again to turn attention to its Continental interests, and Pitt made his first excursions into the field of foreign politics in which he never found himself quite at home, the need and the value of Grenville's services sensibly increased. And there was another advantage accruing from the association which Pitt probably prized more highly. It brought him the support of a powerful political connexion. Amidst all the selfish aims and freaks of morbid egotism which distorted Lord Buckingham's public conduct, he never wavered in affection for his youngest brother, or in care for his interests. At various times this tie alone kept him steady in his support of Pitt's administration; and it was probably to this family influence with its command of votes in the House of Commons, rather than to his own merits or the Prime Minister's appreciation of them, that Grenville owed his rapid advancement in an official career. Pitt and he, though strongly attached to each other, and having some personal traits in common, differed much in character and sentiment. Grenville was a Whig aristocrat, after the pattern of the statesmen who governed England from the Revolution of 1688 to the death of George II, who regarded France as a natural enemy, and were equally jealous of the Royal prerogative and of everything that savoured of democratic innovation. Although always ready to sacrifice his position in the ministry to Pitt's convenience, no matter how the change might affect his prospects or inclination, on points involving principle or personal conviction he showed himself inflexible even to obstinacy, and incapable of compromise. Pitt's opinions and sympathies were rather those of the great mercantile class whose good opinion he sedulously cultivated. His intellect expanded in peace and found congenial exercise in finance and the development of trade and industry. It seemed to shrivel and become sterilized in the breath of war. By nature and training he was more liberal than Grenville; more pliant in

discussion; but also much more prone to make expediency, which always kept in view his own predominance in the state, the rule of his political conduct. He had talent of a very high order, and transcendent gifts as a Parliamentary leader, without a spark of his father's genius. When the Whig statesmen who had separated from Fox coalesced with Pitt in 1794, they all, with the exception of the Duke of Portland, seem to have found themselves in closer agreement with Lord Grenville than with their chief, or the Tory members of the Cabinet such as Mr. Dundas and Lord Hawkesbury. Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham resigned office with him in 1801 solely on the Catholic question. All of them seem to have accepted indefinite exclusion from office as a consequence of their decision. Lord Grenville sold his town house, and retired to Dropmore, with the declared intention of restricting attendance in Parliament to particular emergencies. Pitt's resignation seems to have been due to various causes, of which the Catholic question was only one. No doubt he would have preferred to make the passing of the Act of Union the occasion of emancipating Irish Catholics. But when after discussion with Lords Clare and Auckland he became persuaded that the measure might more easily be carried through the Irish Parliament on the old lines of Protestant ascendancy, he threw the Catholic cause over. He enlisted Auckland's aid in framing the financial provisions of that Act on this understanding. George III's letter to him approving of his sending Lord Cornwallis to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant to pass that Act, expressly forbade all further concession to Catholics. Pitt knew from what had occurred during Lord FitzWilliam's vice-royalty in 1795 that this aversion was of the strongest kind, deep-rooted in religious scruple. When, however, after an unsuccessful trial, the Irish Government assured him that an Act of Union could not be passed without the help, or at least the neutrality, of the Irish Catholics, the Cabinet under his guidance authorised Lord Castlereagh to assure them that it favoured their claims. Armed with this new means of influence, Cornwallis passed the Act; but Pitt neither informed the King of his change of attitude towards the Catholics, nor the Catholics of the King's continued opposition to their claims. When the time came to redeem the pledge implied in the assurances given by the Irish Government, he hesitated and delayed until the secret was betrayed to the King by the Lord Chancellor, who led a large minority of the Cabinet in unexpected revolt; and the agitation produced by the revelation in the King's mind forced on an explanation. As Pitt afterwards told Canning, this loss of supremacy he had hitherto exercised in his own Cabinet "obliged him to resign."¹ And there appears to have been another which the King and Canning thought the principal motive. General distress

¹ *Diary and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury*, October 30, 1802.

and discontent caused by a succession of bad harvests, the unpopularity of the war, the isolation of the country consequent on the defeat of its continental allies, and the derangement of national credit, had convinced Pitt of the necessity of peace with France. But in existing circumstances he could not hope to obtain such terms as would satisfy Lord Grenville, and colleagues who shared Grenville's views. As Dundas said, it was desirable in the interests of the party that a new administration should be formed to negotiate peace. It seems clear, also, that Pitt and his more intimate confidants regarded the Addison ministry as a temporary expedient which would facilitate his return to the helm under more favourable circumstances, and, in the mean time, enable him to remain in power though divested of office. Addison, one of his oldest friends and followers, only consented to obey the Royal command at Pitt's earnest solicitation, enforced by an absolute promise of counsel and support. The exact terms of this pledge are not on record; but Pitt informed Canning that it bound him until Addison himself, or the King, or Parliament called on him to form another Government.¹ Before new arrangements were completed in February 1801 the King's reason gave way for some weeks under the strain of excitement. When his Majesty recovered he sent Dr. Willis with a message to Pitt which announced to him this restoration to health and reproached him with causing the illness. Pitt, in Addison's presence, charged Willis with the answer that he would never raise the Catholic question again during his Sovereign's reign. George III expressed satisfaction and relief, and for some days Pitt and those in close touch with him, Dundas, Canning and Rose, expected a Royal command that he should remain in office. But the King said nothing more, and when it was suggested to Addington that he should advise his Majesty to retain Pitt's services as Prime Minister, Addington declined. They could, he replied, offer that counsel themselves and take the responsibility of the effect it might have on the King's health. Pitt then interfered to curb the zeal of impatient adherents and gave up the seals. But he seems to have left Lord Grenville in complete ignorance of the pledge he had given to the King and the expectations he had founded on it.² The relations of these two statesmen to the new ministry differed widely from the outset. Pitt was its avowed protector and confidential adviser. Grenville was a candid friend who extended patronage to it on condition of good behaviour. In the minds of personal adherents of both it appears to have excited the same feelings of derision and distrust. Canning would only promise Pitt not to laugh at the new ministers, and seems to have allowed himself some latitude in performance. Lord Grenville's correspondence shows how he failed

¹ *Diary and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury*, October 30, 1802.

² Lord Stanhope's *Life of Pitt*.

to reconcile his nearest connexions to his own attitude of toleration. In fact, in point of ability, the new Cabinet presented a very unfavourable contrast to the last. It was composed of the inefficient members of the late Cabinet, Portland, Westmorland, and Chatham, and recruits of more or less promise, but selected mainly on account of conformity to the King's political views. Addison himself, an admirable Speaker of the House of Commons, had made no mark in politics. Lord Hawkesbury, son of the old leader of the "King's friends," now Earl of Liverpool, succeeded Grenville at the Foreign Office. Lord Loughborough, "an engineer hoist with his own petard," found himself, to his great astonishment, not only deprived of the Great Seal which the King gave to Sir John Scott, but altogether excluded from the ministry. Lord Auckland, Loughborough's reputed confederate, "an eternal intriguer," his Majesty said, again missed his aim of Cabinet office; but Lord Hobart, his son-in-law, replaced Dundas as Secretary of State for War. Mr. Pelham, who enjoyed an extraordinary reputation for statesmanship which his political career hardly justified, joined the Cabinet for a short time at the special request of the King; but never seems to have won the confidence of his colleagues, or to have acted cordially with them. But though weak in ability, the new administration possessed in abundance other elements of political strength. Formed on no-Popery and high Tory lines, it enjoyed in complete measure the favour of the Crown. Addington was a minister after the King's own heart. With Pitt's support he commanded large majorities in both Houses of Parliament. The Whig Opposition showed forbearance to a Ministry that was known to desire peace, and, in advocating peace, Fox now represented public opinion. At the same time Addington's courteous and conciliatory manners disarmed personal jealousies and dislikes.

At the outset also Fortune smiled on the new administration. In April intelligence came of two great victories, which lightened the depression caused by a long run of disaster. The first was the sudden breaking up of the "armed neutrality of the North." Lord Spencer had dispatched a powerful fleet under Admirals Parker and Nelson to assail this league at Copenhagen, its most vulnerable point. News of a battle fought by Nelson against the Danes on April 1, was followed in a few days by the receipt of a convention concluded by Parker with the Crown Prince of Denmark, by which the belligerents agreed to suspend hostilities for fourteen weeks, with liberty, if either thought fit, to renew the conflict at the end of that period. Lord Nelson had by this time so accustomed the British public to expect decisive victories at sea, that this apparently lame result of the expedition caused general surprise and dissatisfaction. Lord Grenville wrote to his brother

in high indignation against Admiral Sir Hyde Parker for not having insisted on unconditional submission. Letters, however, soon followed from Captain Fremantle, Nelson's particular friend and second in command during the action, to Lord Buckingham, which threw new light on the transaction and gave it a different complexion.¹ The Danes had defended themselves with the most stubborn valour. At the close of the day Nelson had silenced all their floating batteries; but of his own force seven ships had gone aground, and the others were riddled with shot, and encumbered with killed and wounded. Such also was the direction of the wind, that he could not rejoin Parker without passing under the fire of a formidable land battery which had held its own during the battle. It was Nelson's readiness and resource that not only rescued him from an almost desperate situation, but drew great advantage from it. He sent a message to the Regent that he should have to burn his prizes piled with wounded Danes, unless a truce enabled him to remove them; and he followed it up with his famous letter, "To the brothers of Englishmen, the Danes," which completely captivated the people of Copenhagen. The Regent, yielding to popular pressure, allowed Nelson to bring off his ships and rejoin Parker. But the British fleet could accomplish nothing more by force; and being short of water and other necessities must, Fremantle wrote, have returned at once to England if the Danish ports remained closed against it. The armistice negotiated by Parker saved it from this necessity, and enabled it to pursue its way into the Baltic. Just then news arrived of the murder of Paul I at St. Petersburg on March 24. This event put an end to the armed neutrality. Count Pahlin, Governor of St. Petersburg, who had organised the conspiracy against Paul, and for a time exercised supreme power in the name of his son Alexander I, removed the embargo from English goods, and sent an intimation to London of the young Czar's willingness to discuss differences in a friendly spirit with a view to an accommodation. Addington, in response to this overture, sent Lord St. Helens to negotiate peace at St. Petersburg as ambassador of George III. And shortly after, Count Simon Woronzow returned to his post as Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James.

In reference to Paul's assassination, Lord Whitworth wrote to Lord Grenville, with a safe malignity that contrasts painfully with former adulation: "I shall, as long as I live, celebrate as a festival the day on which I learnt the death of that arch-fiend Paul."² In the early days of the second coalition the unfortunate monarch seemed to rank in Whitworth's estimation as at least an arch-angel. It would appear from the care taken by the conspirators to conceal the crime, and from hints in Lord St. Helens' despatches, that the feeling it

¹ *Court and Cabinets of George III*, April, 1801.

² Page 4.

evoked in Russia, so far from being joy for a national deliverance, was one of mingled indignation and horror. The official announcement to foreign Powers ascribed the death to apoplexy, an ailment which had served the same diplomatic purpose on the occasion of the murder of Paul's father, Peter III. "Really," Talleyrand observed on reading it, "the Russian Government will have to invent another disease." The event, however advantageous to Great Britain, deprived the weaker states of Germany and Italy, whose existence was endangered by rapacity of France or Austria or Prussia, of their only staunch protector. In negotiations then proceeding at Paris, Baron Krudener, the Russian envoy, to Bonaparte's great embarrassment, insisted as conditions of Paul's friendship on the evacuation of Naples and Egypt by the French, and the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. The First Consul found Alexander's demands much less exacting. And though by Paul's death he may have lost a precarious alliance, that event removed the strongest curb on his ambition just at the moment when his authority became firmly established in France.¹

Following fast on the news from the North came intelligence of General Abercromby's brilliant victory of March 21 which demolished French supremacy in Egypt. In this case also military skill and valour had been largely favoured by fortune. Mr. Dundas had originally planned the British expedition with very imperfect knowledge of the difficulties it might have to encounter. A short experience of the hardships and privations involved in the conquest of the country, and, after the battle of the Nile, the interruption of all communication with France, had greatly discouraged Bonaparte's army. After his repulse before Acre, it required all his personal ascendancy over his troops to repress their disgust, and the mutinous spirit of many of his chief officers headed by General Kleber. Yet it was to this officer as the most competent that Bonaparte, on departing for France in the summer of 1799, left the defence of his conquest. Though one of the greatest generals produced by the French Revolution, Kleber was a confirmed grumbler, impatient alike of subordination, and of the labour and responsibility of independent command. Giving free rein to the feelings of anger and depression common to himself and his troops at being condemned to indefinite exile and isolation, he and they in official reports to the Directory, and in private letters, painted the situation of the army in the gloomiest colours; as being reduced one-half in strength, left without money or supplies, and encompassed by enemies. Sir Sidney Smith, commanding the British fleet in Egyptian waters, had correspondents in the French camp. Taking advantage of the ill-humour that reigned there, he brought about an agreement between Kleber and the Grand Vizier commanding the

¹ Thiers' *Consulate and Empire*.

Turkish forces in Syria, for the evacuation of Egypt by the French army on condition that it was conveyed back to France. In the meantime, however, some of the official despatches and private letters of French officers describing their situation in Egypt as desperate, had been intercepted by British cruisers and sent to England. The British Government, completely deceived, refused to ratify the convention of El Arisch, and ordered Lord Keith, commanding its naval forces in the Mediterranean, to inform Kleber that his army could only be permitted to return to Europe as prisoners of war. As a matter of fact the French general had at his disposal nearly 25,000 veteran troops, well supplied, and in the highest state of efficiency. Indignant at these new conditions which the Vizier seemed determined to impose on him, he destroyed the Turkish army in battle at Heliopolis, re-occupied Cairo, and the whole land, and atoned for past misconduct by establishing a just and firm government which won the respect of the population. An attempt to dislodge the French in these circumstances, of which Dundas had little knowledge, with any force that he could muster for the purpose, afforded little chance of success. It was a far more difficult enterprise than the conquest of Holland which failed in 1799. But in June, 1800, Kleber was assassinated by a Mussulman fanatic, and the supreme government devolved by seniority on perhaps the most incompetent general in the French army, Abdallah Menou. His incapacity being notorious, his chief officers caballed and disputed his orders, and the whole service, civil and military, fell into complete anarchy. The confusion was at its height when Abercromby reached the coast. Contrary winds prevented his landing for a week. But Menou remained with the bulk of his troops at Cairo till the British army had forced a landing, and advanced to a strong position on the road to Alexandria. Then he led a part of his force to attack the British lines, suffered a complete defeat on March 21, and shut himself up in Alexandria. Before despatching the expedition Dundas, better informed in regard to the strength of the French, had limited its object to the capture of the coast towns of Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta; and on quitting office had advised Addison to attempt nothing more.¹ But Abercromby's victory opened up more splendid results. Two Turkish armies poured into the country to help their British allies. Town after town surrendered to the combined forces, with hardly a show of resistance. General Belliard, commanding a garrison of many thousands of French, gave up Cairo in June at the summons of General Hutchinson, Abercromby's successor, and the Grand Vizier. The terms of capitulation were, in all cases, those which Sir Sidney Smith had been censured and superseded for offering to Kleber and his unbeaten army. The situation, however, seems to have amply

¹ Pellew's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*.

justified them. The climate and the heat told with terrible effect on General Hutchinson's troops. Of the 12,000 men under Sir David Baird, despatched to their aid from India by Lord Wellesley, less than 4,000 arrived fit for immediate service. And the surrender of Cairo enabled Hutchinson to employ his whole strength in the siege of Alexandria, the last stronghold of French dominion.

In the same month of June, 1801, Lord St. Helens and Count Panin signed a treaty at St. Petersburg which practically ended the quarrel between Great Britain and the Northern Confederacy for the defence of neutral trade. Each party made concessions. Russia gave up two points of the neutral programme : " Free ships make free goods," and the contention that ships of a neutral nation under convoy of a man of war carrying the national flag, should be exempted from search. But on the other hand the right of search was more strictly regulated, and was limited to the navy. Arbitrary seizures were restrained by heavy penalties. Appeals from the awards of Prize Courts were allowed. " Paper blockades " were forbidden ; in future the blockading force must be so strong and so stationed as to make an attempt to enter the enemy's port plainly perilous. Naval stores, which formed the staple of northern commerce, and food stuffs were no longer to be classed as " contraband of war." These were the chief articles, and the treaty was generally held to constitute a reasonable settlement. But when communicated by Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Grenville it drew from the latter a long letter of severe criticism and unfavourable comment.

On October 1, after discussions extending over five months, preliminaries of peace between France and England were signed in London by Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto. One of the chief difficulties of the negotiation had been Bonaparte's refusal to restore Egypt to the Turks. Although the Emperor Paul of Russia had insisted on this point, Alexander did not press it. But all the Consul's efforts to reinforce Menou proved abortive. And news of the capitulation of Alexandria, which reached Paris at the end of September, though unknown in England for some time longer, removed the chief obstacle to the conclusion of peace. Lord Hawkesbury immediately announced the event to Lord Grenville. " We retain possession," he wrote, " of Ceylon and Trinidad ; the Cape of Good Hope is to be made a free port ; Malta is to be restored to the Order, under the guarantee and protection of a third Power ; Egypt is to be restored to the Turks ; the integrity of the Turkish Empire and Portugal to be maintained ; the kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory to be evacuated by the French armies. I am inclined to hope that, under all the circumstances, you will consider this an honourable peace." On the same day Pitt, in announcing the signature of the treaty to Lord Carrington, described the conditions as " highly honourable and advantageous to the country, although not

perhaps in every point exactly all that was to be wished.”¹ In Lord Grenville they aroused intense indignation. He denounced the surrender of the Cape and Malta as a sacrifice of the honour, interests, and even safety of the monarchy. His brothers were equally unmeasured in condemnation. Before deciding, however, how the treaty should affect his relations with the ministry, he wrote to his principal colleagues in the late Cabinet to gather their opinions. Pitt defended it as highly expedient in existing circumstances. Dundas’s reply, marked *secret and confidential*, was characteristic. He emphatically condemned the concessions to France, but declared his intention to refrain from all censure, private as well as public, so as not to weaken an administration acceptable to the King. Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham having expressed full concurrence in his views, Lord Grenville gave notice to Mr. Addington of his intention to oppose the policy of Government in its dealings with Russia and France. He did so when Parliament met in an elaborate speech, which, after undergoing careful revision, was published by Cobbett, editor of the *Porcupine*, the most virulent assailant of Addington in the ranks of the press. But it produced little immediate effect. Public opinion was almost unanimous for peace. A mere handful of peers followed Lord Grenville in the House of Lords. In the House of Commons Windham did not venture to divide. The most distinguished military and naval commanders who had an opportunity of expressing their views—Lords Cornwallis, Moira, St. Vincent and Nelson—warmly approved the action of the ministry. In regard to the Cape, Pitt and Grenville were both consistent in the lines they pursued. During the conferences at Lille in 1797, Pitt had secretly authorised Lord Malmesbury to restore that colony to the Dutch in spite of Grenville’s official instructions to the contrary. But as to Malta, Grenville himself during the siege of Valetta had repeatedly disclaimed any intention on the part of the British Government to keep possession of the island. And although the disasters of the continental war seem at a later period to have suggested a more selfish policy, there had been no public announcement of a change of purpose. Besides, the British Government could only keep the island by setting aside the sovereign rights of its ally the King of the Two Sicilies, who contributed troops and ships for the capture of the fortress of Valetta on the understanding that, when taken, it should be restored to the Knights of St. John. Henceforth, however, Lord Grenville seems to have assailed the ministry with a personal animosity which it is not easy to account for, considering that the provocation was merely a political difference in which his opponents had the nation on their side. Addington and Hawkesbury had spared no pains to retain his goodwill. They had offered

¹ Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, Oct. 4, 1801.

an embassy to his brother, and to his brother-in-law, and given appointments to Mr. Wickham and other friends whose fortunes he had recommended to their care. Even when not agreeing with him, they had invariably shown deference to his counsels. But it would appear from his correspondence that from the moment of their opening negotiations with Russia, and more particularly with France, he watched their proceedings with contemptuous distrust. The fact seems to be that hatred of the French Revolution, and of Bonaparte especially, had mastered his judgment, and distorted his political vision. He could only see in the First Consul "a tiger let loose to devour mankind," and in the Consular Government "a band of robbers and assassins" that neither could or would make peace.¹ It should be recollected that, at this period at least, the Consular Government was probably the best France had seen for many centuries. It found the country at war with all the great powers of Europe except Spain and Prussia, convulsed by internal discord, and in imminent peril of being over-run and partitioned. It used the victories it gained to make peace with foreign nations; while at home it reorganised the State, reformed law, re-established tranquillity, order, and public credit, and restored religion.

Having liberated his mind by a public declaration against the Government, Lord Grenville retired to Dropmore and found solace during several months in literary and rural pursuits.

In November, 1801, Lord Cornwallis, who had thrown up the vice-royalty of Ireland, went to Paris at Mr. Addington's urgent request, as Ambassador Extraordinary, to complete the work of pacification begun in London. After a cordial welcome from all classes of the French population, and a long conference with the First Consul at the Tuileries, he repaired to Amiens to conclude with Joseph Bonaparte a definite treaty between the Republic and George III.

Addington, while leaning mainly on Pitt, lost no opportunity of strengthening his position by conciliating Whig opponents and, if possible, converting them into friends. Although Mr. Grey and Lord Moira declined his offers of seats in the Cabinet, several of the Whig leaders, more conspicuously Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Tierney, gave him active support in the House of Commons with the avowed purpose of excluding Pitt from office. During debate on the Budget, a fierce attack on Pitt's finance by Tierney, but faintly repelled, as it was thought, by Addington, deeply incensed the late Prime Minister, and brought him up from Walmer in February, 1802, to obtain explanations from his successor, which apparently allayed his resentment. While in town he called on Thomas Grenville and expressed great apprehensions of the danger threatening the country from Bonaparte's hostility and ambition. Mr. Grenville, in reporting this conversation to Dropmore, remonstrated with his brother for relinquishing by a life of seclusion all opportunity of

¹ *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

influencing the political action of his old leader.¹ Shortly afterwards a motion in the House of Commons reflecting on Lord Wellesley's proceedings in India, afforded an occasion for consultation which each of the estranged statesmen willingly seized. But although in conference at Dropmore they thoroughly agreed as to the danger to which the monarchy was exposed by Bonaparte's designs, they disagreed in regard to the policy that should be adopted. Pitt still thought peace highly advantageous if combined with vigilance and preparations for war; Grenville saw in it only inevitable ruin. But the meeting revived old habits of confidential discussion, and the interchange of friendly visits to Walmer and Dropmore.

The circumstances which thus troubled the pacific leanings of Pitt, had, as may be supposed, a disturbing effect on the negotiations at Amiens. One of Bonaparte's chief motives in making peace with England was a desire to restore the foreign trade and maritime power of France, almost annihilated during the revolutionary war; and the colonial dominion by which, according to ideas prevalent at that time, external commerce was best maintained and secured. But in pursuing an object vitally affecting the prosperity of the country he ruled, with his habitual energy and thoroughness, he showed a very impolitic disregard of British interests and susceptibilities. Hardly had the preliminaries of peace been signed when he despatched a large naval armament, carrying 25,000 troops, to bring more completely under his authority the French settlements in the West Indies; and especially the great island of St. Domingo, where Toussaint L'Ouverture, a Black of extraordinary merit, had established a negro republic only nominally subject to France. This display of naval force, ostentatious rather than formidable, as most of the men-of-war were only equipped as transports, aroused apprehension and clamour in England as a menace to British possessions, and provoked remonstrances from Lord Hawkesbury.² Explanations were given and finally accepted, but some mutual ill-humour remained. About the same time it became known, and excited jealous comment, that the Consul, by treaty with Spain, had acquired Louisiana in North America, and the island of Elba in the Mediterranean. More serious cause of dissatisfaction was given by the Consul's policy in regard to international trade. Early in the late war, the Committee of Public Safety had excluded English merchantmen from French ports by a decree which punished attempts to evade it by the confiscation of ships and cargoes, and the imprisonment of crews. It was assumed in England that these hostile regulations would be repealed or relaxed at the restoration of peace; and English merchantmen crowded French ports, only to find the prohibitive penalties strictly

¹ Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, February 24, 1802.

² Thiers' *Consulate and Empire*,

enforced. This harsh treatment naturally excited loud complaints. Cambacères, the 2nd Consul, Bonaparte's wisest adviser, suggested to him to supplement the political by a commercial treaty with England. Addington also, sincerely anxious for the success of his pacific policy, strongly hinted the necessity of such a measure to M. Otto in London. But Bonaparte, listening only to the interested cries of French manufacturers, refused adequate concessions; and the commercial class in England soon began to feel that peace with France had assumed a form of hostility more dangerous to their interests than war, which had given them almost a monopoly of the maritime trade of Europe.

This sense of disappointment and danger, affecting an interest on which the revenue and naval supremacy of the monarchy so largely depended, seems to have powerfully influenced the action of Pitt; and, more than anything else, strengthened the hands of the war party in England.

In the winter of 1801 the First Consul proceeded to Lyons to meet the delegates of the Cisalpine Republic. Amid scenes of extraordinary enthusiasm he was acclaimed as President of the state he had called into existence, and which now assumed the more ambitious title of the Italian Republic. His return to Paris was welcomed with public rejoicings; and all France responded soon after to the applause of the capital, confirming by a popular vote the decree of the Senate which made him First Consul for life. The growing power of one who had so lately been the most terrible enemy of their country, and with whom its present relations were so precarious, could not fail to arouse jealousy and misgiving in leading English politicians.

On the other hand Bonaparte found in the license of French newspapers published in London, the *Ambigu* and the *Courier de Londres*, a grievance to which he was morbidly sensitive, and which operated on his Corsican temperament with a violence that had its natural issue in war. After his rejection of the appeals made to him by the exiled French princes in 1800 to restore the Bourbon monarchy in France, an extreme section of their followers had hatched the plot of the infernal machine from which he narrowly escaped with life. He attributed the attempt to the Chouan chief Georges Cadoudal, acting with the sanction of Count d'Artois, in abuse of the shelter and support accorded to them by the British Government, as allies against the Republic. The *Ambigu*, an organ of the exiles, edited by M. Peltier, continued, after peace had been made, to assail the French ruler and his family with a latitude of vituperation and insult which sometimes outraged decency, and threw him into transports of anger. And when the British ministry, from whatever cause, evaded his demands that they should expel Peltier under the *Alien Act*, and remove Cadoudal and his followers to Canada, he regarded this denial as clear evidence of English ill-will. All

these causes of dissatisfaction had an injurious effect on the negotiations at Amiens. Discussion dragged on during several months. Both Governments made new demands, and insisted more obstinately on others that had remained unsettled. Neither any longer showed itself eager to smooth away difficulties. One article which had been agreed on in London, a Russian garrison at Malta, had to be abandoned. Alexander, having formed a Council of State composed of old Ministers of Catherine II, turned his attention by their advice to the domestic affairs of his empire, and avoided foreign entanglements which did not immediately concern Russian interests. He suggested, however, that the King of Naples, as suzerain of Malta, should be asked to furnish a garrison, until the restored Knights could command a sufficient force for its defence. This solution was adopted. It was also agreed that the island should be declared neutral, and placed under the guardianship of the six principal European powers. It was only, however, through the patient striving and combined personal influence of Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte that a definite treaty was signed at Amiens in March, 1802.¹ Their labours were not altogether barren. Peace was prolonged for another year. But it was peace rendered daily more precarious by the increasing jealousy and distrust of one of the parties, and the increasing irritation of the other. Though fiercely denounced by Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, the treaty, being supported by Pitt and Fox and the great body of public opinion, was approved by immense majorities in both Houses of Parliament. Mr. Dundas, now in confidential relations with Addington, from whom he, to Pitt's astonishment, accepted a peerage, went out of his way with the zeal of a convert, to sneer at the "new Opposition," as the Grenville party was called, as a factious clique; an unprovoked insult which terminated the more or less friendly connexion which had existed for twenty years between Lord Grenville and himself.

Hardly had peace been proclaimed between France and England when Bonaparte's over-vaulting ambition furnished new cause of dissension. By the treaty of Luneville, Switzerland, which the revolutionary spirit, aided by a French army, had transformed into a democratic State, styling itself the Helvetic Republic, recovered its independence. When the French troops withdrew from the country the adherents of the Federal system took arms, defeated the democrats, and summoned a Diet to restore the old constitution. Both parties appealed to Bonaparte, the beaten for aid, and the victors for forbearance. After hesitating for some time, he again sent an army into the country, assumed the office of mediator, and summoned delegates from both factions to Paris to aid him in framing a new constitution which all might accept. The Federalists appealed

¹ Despatches of Lord Cornwallis from Amiens, December, 1802, to March, 1803.

for aid to the Emperor, as immediately concerned in the treaty of Luneville, and to other European sovereigns who had been their allies. Lord Hawkesbury, on behalf of Great Britain, not only instructed Mr. Merry, the English Minister at Paris, to deliver a sharp remonstrance, but sent Mr. Moore, of the Foreign Office, as special envoy to Switzerland to encourage national resistance, without being in a position to render any effectual support. The other Governments appealed to accepted Bonaparte's explanations. Abandoned by the Emperor, their natural protector, the insurgents disbanded their troops; and a new constitution framed at Paris on the old federal lines restored general tranquility. But the Consul's violation of a recent treaty, and his contemptuous treatment of Hawkesbury's remonstrance, hurt national pride in England, and quickened a sense of insecurity; while the diatribes of the English press stung Bonaparte to fury.

In the course of the same year the First Consul incorporated Piedmont with France; took possession of Parma on the death of the Duke, in virtue of the arrangement with Spain which had made the Duke's heir King of Etruria; and, by threat of invasion, reduced Godoy Duke of Alcudia, who governed Spain by the favour of the Queen, to the condition of a French puppet.

But it was in Germany that the extraordinary ascendancy Bonaparte had already acquired in European politics was most strikingly exhibited. The opening years of the 19th century saw the Roman empire of the West, which for a thousand years since its re-establishment by Charlemagne, had claimed, and in some measure maintained a supremacy in the political system of Europe, crumble to pieces under his blows. The French Directory had purchased, the neutrality of Frederick William II, King of Prussia, by a secret agreement that he and other lay princes who ceded territory on the left bank of the Rhine to France, should be supported by the victorious republic in obtaining compensation for their losses by the secularization of ecclesiastical property within the empire. The Emperor had baffled the project for a time by dilatory discussion at the Congress of Rastadt.¹ But Bonaparte embodied this principle of compensations in an article of the treaty of Luneville, which the German Diet was compelled to ratify; extending the benefit of it afterwards to the dispossessed Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Prince of Orange. And by another treaty concluded between France and Russia in October, 1801, Alexander I agreed to co-operate with the Consul in framing a scheme to give that article effect. At the beginning of the 19th century Germany was still governed by a Roman Emperor Elect, and a Diet composed of three colleges, of electors, princes, and free cities. The free cities owed their political existence to the Emperors, who enfranchised them in the Middle Ages to counterbalance the power of their great territorial vassals. In modern times

¹ See Vols. III. and IV. *Dropmore Papers*.

most of them had sunk into complete insignificance. The Electoral College contained three ecclesiastics, the Archbishop of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, and five lay electors, representing Bohemia, Brandenburg, Saxony, Hanover and Bavaria. The College of Princes was composed of Dukes, Landgraves, Margraves, and a host of Bishops, Abbots, and other richly endowed churchmen, staunch adherents, as were also the ecclesiastical electors, of the House of Austria. By the scheme drawn up at Paris the electorates of Cologne and Treves, having been despoiled of their domains by France were abolished. The Elector of Mayence, *ex-officio* Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, though his see had also been despoiled, was allowed to retain his dignity, and given the bishopric of Ratisbon and other emoluments for its support. The College of Princes and that of free cities were dealt with in the same revolutionary spirit. The rich bishopric of Munster, and a multitude of abbeys and free cities in Westphalia, of far greater value than the territory he had ceded to France, were shorn of their rights and dignities, and handed over to the King of Prussia. Wholesale confiscations of the same kind in Bavaria and Suabia enriched the Elector and the Dukes of Wirtemberg and Baden, and swelled these two duchies into new electorates. But the Emperor's brother, the late Arch-Duke of Tuscany, received in the bishopric of Saltzburg only a very inadequate compensation for his losses in Italy, and that partly at the expense of his own family. This plan, being accepted by the Czar, was presented to the Diet in the names of France and Russia, with an intimation that it should be ratified within three months. In vain the Emperor and the despoiled sovereigns protested against a scheme which subverted the constitution of the Empire, destroyed the balance of power, and was in itself so unequal and unfair. Bonaparte turned a deaf ear to all remonstrance. Alexander showed more sympathy. But Baron Thugut's policy had completely estranged the Russian Court from that of Vienna. And the Czar himself was bound to the King of Prussia and the Electors of Bavaria, Wirtemberg and Baden, by personal or political ties. Finally, Saltzburg having also been made an electorate, and additional territory awarded to the dispossessed rulers of Tuscany and Modena, the new arrangements were accepted by Austria in a treaty concluded with France and Russia in December, 1803. The Elector of Hanover who had lost no territory, was awarded the great bishopric of Osnaburg as a peace-offering. But the British Government found itself excluded from all participation in a European settlement which virtually accomplished what had been the constant aim of French statesmen since the beginning of the 16th century, and to the attainment of which Richelieu especially had bent all the force of his genius, the overthrow of the Imperial sway of the House of Austria. Lord Grenville did not fail to enlarge

on a circumstance so humiliating to national pride in order to discredit the ministry. As a result of retarding influences Lord Whitworth and General Andreossi who had been appointed ambassadors to Paris and London soon after the treaty of Amiens was signed, did not proceed to their respective destinations until more than seven months had elapsed since the conclusion of peace.

During the summer and autumn of 1802 some of Pitt's intimate friends grew daily more urgent with him to resume the direction of public affairs. Pitt fully concurred with them that the time had come for his return to office; but his pledges to Addington bound him hand and foot, as neither the king, nor the public, nor the prime minister himself showed the slightest desire for any change of administration. Lord Malmesbury and Canning therefore set themselves to compel or persuade Addington to relinquish his post.¹ Pitt had been seriously unwell during the summer. It was arranged that he should repair to Bath, as well for the restoration of his strength, as to escape from his compromising position of standing counsel to the ministry, whose reputation for wisdom had not been raised by Lord Hawkesbury's injudicious meddling in Swiss affairs. Before he left Walmer Lord Grenville arrived there, not acting in concert with the others, but not less eager that his old chief should wrest the helm of state from incompetent hands which were letting it drift on political breakers. In the course of discussion Pitt sounded Grenville as to their uniting to form a new ministry, which should include Addington and some of his colleagues, and exclude the Catholic question from its programme. Grenville asked time to consult the leading members of the "new Opposition" before giving a definite answer. On his part he seems to have converted Pitt to his avowed opinion that the safety of the country required the permanent, or at least continued, occupation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope by British garrisons, in breach of the treaty of Amiens. At Bath Pitt found himself surrounded by friends intent on paving the way for his return to office. With the view of preparing the king for a change of ministers, Lord Malmesbury opened the subject in confidence to the Duke of York, who expressed warm approbation of the design; but being too cautious to entangle himself in political intrigue, suggested that some man of high political standing, some other Duke for preference, should wait on Addington, and impress on him the expediency of giving place to Pitt. The nearest approach to another Duke available seems to have been the Lord Chancellor; who, on being asked to undertake the mission, required time for consideration. Then Canning, giving effect in a more general form to the Duke of York's suggestion, drew up an address to the Prime Minister, which, having been shown by Malmesbury

¹ *Lord Malmesbury's Diary and Correspondence.*

to Pitt, Lords Morpeth and Levison Gower carried round to influential members of both Houses of Parliament for their signatures. But the movement had little success; and at Pitt's request, was not persevered in. Meantime Lord Grenville had informed his brothers of the overture made to him at Walmer. Lord Buckingham earnestly deprecated such a coalition as that proposed by Pitt on the ground that it must inflict irreparable damage on Lord Grenville's public character. And this view prevailing at a meeting of the chiefs of the "New Opposition" at Stowe, Lord Grenville wrote to Pitt declaring himself bound by it, but offering to support any administration Pitt might form. Pitt's reply expressed deep regret for the decision come to at Stowe. But, he added, that he had changed his mind in regard to his own line of conduct, since the conference at Walmer. The refusal of the other European powers to interfere in Switzerland showed that war with France could only be undertaken now under most unfavourable circumstances. He thought, therefore, that any measure, such as a refusal to evacuate Alexandria, which would certainly provoke immediate hostilities, should be avoided; and while peace was maintained, he saw no public benefit that could accrue from his resumption of office. It may be noticed here that when, in conversation at Bath, Lord Malmesbury made some disparaging remark about Lord Grenville, Pitt spoke in the highest terms of the qualities of his former colleague, and declared that he could not dispense with his assistance.¹

In a hostile atmosphere at Bath Pitt seemed for a time determined to break with Addison. He returned, unopened, papers submitted to him by Lord Hawkesbury on the plea of want of access to other sources of information. But the Prime Minister sent his brother Hiley, and Lord Castlereagh who had joined the Cabinet, on missions to his imperious protector, and by these marks of deference deferred a rupture. In fact Pitt had no cause of complaint against Addison that did not arise almost inevitably out of the situation he himself had created. He was impatient of Addington's reluctance to relinquish the position of Prime Minister, fully sharing the conviction expressed by Lord Grenville, Mr. Canning, and other ardent friends, that he alone could save Great Britain from the perils to which it was exposed from Bonaparte's ambition. But it was hardly reasonable to expect that Addison should see the situation in the same light. Addison had resigned the Speakership without compensation, at the earnest request of the King, and Pitt's own urgent entreaties, in order, as he seems to have believed, to rescue his Sovereign from a situation which threatened his reason, if not his life. He was naturally elated by the extraordinary marks of Royal favour showered on him, by his large majorities in Parliament, and by the success of his administration at

¹ *Diary and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury.*

home and abroad. The condition of the country had improved rapidly under his government. He had given no pledges to Pitt, and had done nothing to forfeit the benefit of the pledges given to himself. For the ministry had deferred to Pitt's counsels with a docility, or rather servility, sometimes discreditable to themselves and injurious to the state. When he arrived at Bath fresh from contact with Grenville, Pitt advised them to hold possession of Alexandria and the Cape. Orders to this effect were immediately despatched from London to the officers in command at both places. When the order reached Cape Town, the new Dutch governor and garrison had landed; the British garrison had nearly all embarked; and the latter rushed back from the transports before the eyes of the astonished Dutchmen¹ to resume possession. From Alexandria, Colonel Sebastiani, a French agent, reported to Bonaparte late in November that the British commander had no instructions to quit the place, although the time fixed for evacuation by the treaty of Amiens had long elapsed. Then Pitt, on being informed of the decision come to at Stowe, suddenly changed his mind. The ministry, he wrote again, should limit their measures of precaution to more than ordinary vigilance and preparation. A new arrangement, he added, must be made in regard to Malta. The War Office immediately countermanded its recent orders, and both the Cape and Alexandria were evacuated in February, 1803. The intimation from Bath regarding Malta was followed with the same implicit obedience.

Addington's finance was another sore point with Pitt. Two plentiful harvests had now followed seasons of dearth in England. Discontent calmed down. Trade and revenue flourished, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement, in introducing his Budget, exhibited a picture of national prosperity in some respects over-coloured, and apparently unfair to his predecessor. Pitt also seems to have resented the complacency with which Addington listened to compliments from Opposition leaders, and especially to Sheridan's brilliant speeches, bristling with invective against the late ministry, as want of loyalty to himself. But then, as Addington's friends remarked, it was his own intentional absence from Parliament for the purpose of avoiding close communication with the ministry, which had deprived him of opportunities for rectifying mistakes, and answering personal attacks. At Christmas Pitt left Bath, and after brief visits to Lords Malmesbury and Grenville, went on to Bromley to stay with Mr. Long, a common friend of Addington and himself. He appears to have been still in favour of maintaining peace. A few years more of tranquillity, he told Lord Malmesbury, would so improve the financial condition of England as to enable the country to bear the strain

¹ Colonel Moore, to the Marquis of Buckingham, *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

of war, no matter how prolonged. At Bromley he met Addison, apparently on their old friendly footing, and he spent some days at Richmond Lodge which the King had given to his favourite minister for life, as a country residence. But Addington, though he must have known of the movement for Pitt's return to office, avoided allusion to the subject, except by a hurried word at parting, which signified nothing. Pitt went back to Walmer decidedly out of humour with this unexpected reticence. And, excepting a confidential letter of advice to his brother Lord Chatham, held no communication with any member of the Government during the next two months.

Meanwhile the relations of France and Great Britain grew rapidly worse, in the absence of any attempt on the part of the British Government to improve them, or avoid a rupture. The mortifying rebuff he had suffered in connexion with Switzerland, and a determination in accordance with Pitt's advice not to carry out the articles agreed on at Amiens in respect of Malta, seem to have extinguished Lord Hawkesbury's pacific inclinations. Certain it is that, judging from the instructions given to him on going to Paris in November, 1802, Lord Whitworth was not sent as ambassador from one friendly power to another for the purpose of maintaining peace and concord; but rather as an emissary, amply provided with the means of corruption, to discover, under the guise of amicable intercourse, all that could be learnt of the resources, designs, difficulties, and alliances of a deadly foe. He was also charged to advert in official conference with Talleyrand to the aggrandisement of France since the treaty of Amiens, and report the answer; to avoid all reference to Malta; and to insist on the right of the British Government to make its voice heard in all political changes affecting the Continent.¹

It is not easy to see why Lord Whitworth was selected for such an important mission. His painstaking docility had commended him to Lord Grenville's favour. But in the whole of the Dropmore correspondence there is not a word of testimony to his professional ability or adroitness. And it would have been difficult to find a diplomatist less capable of forming an impartial opinion of the character, designs, and difficulties of the Consular Government. He went to France, as his despatches show, with an honest conviction that he was about to confront the "Corsican ogre," a fiend incarnate without a redeeming quality. His reception by the French authorities at Calais, by the population along his route, and by M. de Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Paris, was most cordial. But other official arrangements deferred his audience at the Tuileries for three weeks.

¹ Hawkesbury to Whitworth, November, 1802; Whitworth to Hawkesbury, November 16.—*F.O. Despatches.*

And during this interval, as might be expected from the tenour of his instructions and his own prepossessions, he found himself inhaling a political atmosphere charged with all the rancours, jealousies, and delusions of beaten parties in a period of revolution. His earlier reports are, in truth, curious examples of prejudice and credulity. Arriving in the French capital about the same time as Colonel Sebastiani's report from Alexandria of the continued occupation of that city by British troops, he announced to Hawkesbury, as an ascertained fact, that the First Consul, with the assent of the Czar and the connivance of the Turks, had decided on another French expedition to Egypt. The British Government, he urged, should send a powerful fleet to watch Toulon and guard the Adriatic. Bonaparte, whom he had not yet seen, he represented as a "duplicate of Paul," a madman swayed by evil passions.¹ A week in Paris, however, seems to have wrought a remarkable change in the Ambassador's view of the situation. He had lost all fear of Bonaparte, he wrote, on December 1, and merely despised him. The Corsican was so distrusted and contemned at home and abroad, his financial difficulties were so desperate, that peace would serve British purposes, and accomplish his destruction, more surely than war. He could not replace the army which had just perished in St. Domingo. But though helpless from exhausted resources, the man's blind ambition would drive him on to ruin. Let the British Government hold Malta and Alexandria and all his hostile designs would be baffled. In a later report, a midnight broil in the streets of Paris is adduced as proof that all France was ripe for revolt. On the day preceding that fixed for his official reception at the Tuileries, the ambassador seems to have been screwing up his courage for a great ordeal. Bonaparte's mortification, he wrote, December 5, on account of the reverse at St. Domingo, his jealousy and hatred of English prosperity and of the love of the British people for George III, would, no doubt, be all discharged on himself. But seeing the base arts by which the Consul's favour was courted by other powers, he would glory as an Englishman in being made an exception. Two days afterwards, however, in describing his public reception, and subsequent dinner *en famille*, at the Tuileries, he could find nothing to object to. In fact, during the whole period of his embassy Bonaparte, all the members of the ruling family, and the French Ministers appear to have treated Lord Whitworth and the Duchess of Dorset with great personal courtesy. But the ambassador's animosity to the First Consul never relaxed. He went so far as to "shut his doors" on Lord Lauderdale, and other distinguished English visitors to Paris, who showed a disposition to promote

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, November 16, 22, and 27, 1802.—*F.O. Despatches.*

cordial relations with the French Government; making an exception only in favour of the Duke of Bedford, whose high rank and estimable character seem to have compelled his respect. His despatches continued to run in the same vein. Bonaparte had fallen into universal contempt and utter impotence; but his furious passions, and especially his hatred of England impel him to persist in projects which lead inevitably to destruction. Occasionally this monotony of depreciation was seasoned with malevolent gossip in regard to the Consul's private life. He is depicted as leading a solitary existence, unloving and unloved; immersed in trivialities; devoting three or four hours every day to the perusal of private letters intercepted in the post-office, in order that he may find matter for the torment of his nearest relatives, as well as of everyone else within the sphere of his baneful influence. Of the able ruler, even of the man with ordinary human attributes, we have not a glimpse. We have a raging monster, rushing headlong into an abyss, "a scourge to himself and to the nation which for its punishment he has subdued to his will."¹ Curiously enough, Lord Hawkesbury seems to have accepted this hideous caricature as a true portrait. He told Lord Malmesbury at a royal levée that Bonaparte was mad. That, Malmesbury replied, was just what another British ambassador reported to his father about Frederick the Great of Prussia.² The only measure of the French Government in which Whitworth could see anything to commend was the new Swiss constitution framed at Paris. It was better, he wrote, than might have been expected; but he attributed this result altogether to the circumstance that the universal admiration excited by the dignified attitude of the British Government had held Bonaparte in awe. In a *most secret* despatch dated December 31, 1802, he reported having engaged an *individual* known to Hawkesbury, to supply him with information of Bonaparte's plans, difficulties, and resources, for a monthly payment of 200*l*. The despatches afford no clue by which this anonymous personage can be identified, nor indeed is he referred to again. One of the worst features of the Revolution, and not the least of Bonaparte's difficulties and dangers was the utter corruption of public life in France. He had to dismiss one of his oldest friends, M. de Bourrienne, from the post of private secretary, for betraying his confidence; and his brother Lucien Bonaparte from the post of Minister of the Interior, for peculation. The shameless rapacity of his two ablest ministers, Talleyrand and Fouché, was well known not only to himself but to every Government in Europe. But though sometimes in disgrace, they knew how to recover favour by divining and flattering his schemes of personal ambition, and making their services indispensable. These are

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 17, 1803.—*F.O. Despatches*.

² *Lord Malmesbury's Diary*.

notorious cases. But there is evidence in Lord Grenville's correspondence that more than one French politician who figures in history as a man of austere Republican virtue, had been at one time or another during the revolutionary war in secret communication with the British Government for the promotion of the Royalist cause. In the same despatch Lord Whitworth announced that he had sent agents in the guise of merchants to visit the chief towns on the French sea-board, especially Brest and the Channel ports, and furnish reports in regard to naval preparations. He had tried, he wrote, to use the American consuls for the purpose, but failed.

Up to this time Lord Whitworth's official intercourse with the French Government appears to have been unruffled by any inconvenient inquiry in regard to British delays in giving effect to the treaty of Amiens. In fact, owing to the negligence of the French Foreign Office, the guarantees for the neutrality of Malta, stipulated in that treaty, had not been obtained. In January, 1803, however, Talleyrand earnestly entreated the British Ambassador, in the interests of peace and goodwill, to have some check placed on the offensive proceedings of French princes in England; and on outrageous attacks on the First Consul not only by French newspapers published in London, but also by reputed organs of Government in the English press. And as the preliminary conditions agreed on with respect to Malta had now been accomplished by the election of a new Grand-Master and the guarantee obtained from the great powers, he asked when the British Government would restore that island to the Knights of St. John.¹ Whitworth referred the question to London. At the end of the month Colonel Sebastiani returned to Paris from his Eastern mission, and, a few days later, his confidential report to the French Government appeared in the *Moniteur*. This official publication of it gave Lord Hawkesbury an opportunity he was not slow to use. On February 9 he wrote to Whitworth that the treaty of Amiens had been negotiated in view of the actual possessions of France and England, and of the treaties by which the parties were bound. The French Government had since by its aggressions altered the balance of power, and therefore the British Government, by the law of nations, had a right to compensation. Nevertheless, the British Government was preparing to withdraw its garrison from Malta when the publication by authority of Colonel Sebastiani's report completely altered the situation. That report was so filled with false insinuations, and disclosed such hostile designs in regard to Egypt, that the British Government could not discuss the subject of Malta till satisfactory explanations had relieved its anxiety with respect to the policy of the First Consul. At the same time there

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 27, 1803.—*F.O. Despatches.*

appeared in the London *Morning Post* a violent article against Bonaparte which Whitworth, when Talleyrand drew his attention to it, pronounced to be “*anarchy of the press*” not liberty, and worthy of condign punishment.¹ As to Sebastiani’s report, apart from any significance attaching to its publication in the *Moniteur*, it is not easy now to discover all the hostile meanings read into it in a moment of intense excitement and suspicion. The writer himself seized the first opportunity of disclaiming to Whitworth any intention of insulting the British army. Talleyrand earnestly assured the ambassador that the Consul had no designs upon Egypt, and that her financial state made peace absolutely necessary to France. He attributed anything in the report that appeared offensive in England to the zeal of a young officer who interpreted the presence of British troops in Alexandria as a declaration of war. And he asked what satisfaction the British Government required. This was a question Whitworth could not answer. A few days afterwards Bonaparte invited him to a personal conference at the Tuileries. The Consul expressed disappointment that the treaty of Amiens had only produced jealousy and distrust. He would never acquiesce in a British occupation of Alexandria or Malta. He would rather see the British Government in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine. As to the persistent abuse of the London press, he did not, he said, so much complain of English newspapers as of French Royalist publications which openly aimed at rekindling civil war in France. Instead of sending Georges Cadoudal and his Chouans to Canada, as had been frequently promised, the British Government allowed them to remain in England in the enjoyment of pensions, hatching plots for his assassination. Every wind that blew from England brought him nothing but hatred. As to Egypt, he said, the continued occupation of Alexandria had already given him a fair pretext for sending 25,000 troops to aid the Turks in recovering that city. But Egypt was not worth the risk of war, and must on the break-up of the Ottoman empire fall to France. He had nothing to gain by a renewal of war, which he could only wage by a descent on England, in which the chances would be 100 to 1 against him. But he would risk destruction rather than suffer a breach of the treaty of Amiens. If peace were to be maintained, the conditions of that treaty must be observed, the French press in London curbed, and the protection now given to French conspirators in England withdrawn. This vehement address, which, as events proved, truly and frankly expressed the mind of the speaker, seems to have overwhelmed the ambassador. In reporting it to London, while admitting that there had been no lack of personal courtesy, he called it bluster, and therefore a sign of weakness. But his only effective retort to the catalogue of French grievances was a complaint of delay in

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, February 11, 1803.—*F.O. Despatches.*

satisfying claims of English merchants. A few days afterwards Bonaparte allowed himself to insert in his annual statement to the Legislative Assembly a wanton and most unseasonable boast of the superior power of France which could not fail to arouse national spirit in England, and stiffen the attitude of its Government. News of the British evacuation of Alexandria somewhat cleared the air. But on March 3 Whitworth called Hawkesbury's attention to a most scurrilous attack on Bonaparte in the *Courier de Londres*. If war broke out, he wrote, it would be owing to the effect on the Consul's temper of such abominable insults rather than to any political cause. Such power for working evil, he insisted, should not be allowed to an obscure paragraph writer. The emigrants seemed bent on forcing on a rupture for their own ends, and the Alien Act should be used to check their wicked designs.¹ So sensible indeed was the ambassador of the provocation given by the press in London, that he seems to have purposely refrained from remonstrating with Talleyrand against violent articles against the British Government which the First Consul, in retaliation, published in the *Moniteur*. On March 5 he sent a report of another interview with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on whom he had called to announce, as instructed, that Bonaparte having avowed hostile designs on Egypt (in his speech to Whitworth at the Tuileries) the British Government would keep Malta until security was given for its Eastern possessions. Talleyrand again disclaimed the intention imputed to the Consul. France, he said, was in no condition to provoke war with England, Russia and Turkey. He again asked what security was required, and offered to discuss any proposal of the British Government, as for instance, a European guarantee of the Ottoman empire, other than the retention of Malta to which France would never consent. Hawkesbury should now, Whitworth wrote, bring forward some definite demand. There was no appearance, he added, of warlike preparation in the French ports. The arsenals were empty. The fleets, dispersed at sea, were rickety, ill-found, and under-manned. The Consul had no money to equip them properly. On March 7, however, a message from George III to Parliament declared an intention of arming in self-defence, in view of preparations going on in French and Dutch dockyards. Two days later another message announced the calling out of the British militia. When Talleyrand afterwards observed to Whitworth that nothing was doing in French dockyards, and that the Dutch ships were notoriously destined to carry troops to St. Domingo, the latter could only protest that the British precautions were not meant as a threat. But Bonaparte saw them in that light alone, and his anger exploded during the next public reception at the Tuileries. In this celebrated scene he

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, March 3, 1803.—*F. O. Despatches*.

addressed the assembled representatives of foreign powers, and took care to dissociate Lord Whitworth himself from the reproaches so freely hurled at the British Government. Whitworth maintained a discreet silence, and afterwards obtained an assurance from Talleyrand that burning topics should in future be avoided at ceremonial gatherings in the Tuileries. Still the British Government, although pressed for an answer to the question of security, not only in Paris, but by General Andreossi in London, shrank from committing itself by any direct demand.

It would appear as if Addington at this crisis again felt the need of Pitt's counsel and support. Lord Melville had shown himself during the preceding session a zealous adherent of the Minister, from whom he had accepted a peerage, while declining office. On his return from Scotland in March, 1803, he went at Addington's request to Walmer with proposals for a reconstructed administration, in which Pitt and Addington should hold positions of equal rank, under the premiership of some common friend such as Lord Chat-ham. Pitt rejected this overture with scorn. He would only, he said, resume office when summoned by the King to form a new ministry of which he should be chief. Then Addington sent Mr. Long to Walmer with an offer to make way for Pitt if it should prove on comparing ideas that their general views of the situation coincided; and he asked Pitt to come to Bromley for a conference. Pitt agreed to this. Addington and Long seem to have anticipated little further difficulty in the way of an arrangement which should reinforce, while substantially preserving, the existing Government. But as Long left the castle, Lord Grenville arrived on a visit. We have the latter's own narrative of what passed between him and his host. Pitt acknowledged that Grenville's warlike policy was right, and that he himself had been mistaken in pursuing peace. They both agreed that Malta should not be given up. Asked again by Pitt whether he and his friends would consent to join an administration which should also include some of the present ministers, Grenville declined to commit himself until Pitt had been authorised by the King to form a new government. But he mentioned as probable conditions of such assent, (1) union with Pitt alone as premier; (2) full liberty to hold, and when necessary express, their views on the Catholic question, and on the conduct of Addington's ministry. He thought also that his friends would object to Addington or Hawkesbury being selected for any of the more responsible employments; and he felt certain that none of them would accept office except by the King's desire, freely expressed. Nothing, he declared emphatically, could be more repugnant to the principles and feelings of all of them than to have their services forced on the King. Grenville also urged Pitt to include, if possible, in a new administration men belonging to all the four existing political parties. Fox, it

was understood, did not desire office ; and it might be feasible, Grenville thought, to enlist the aid of Grey, Lord Moira, and Tierney, with great advantage to the State. A few days later Pitt and Addington met for conference at Bromley, when the latter found to his great mortification, that Pitt's dominant idea now was to return to official life with his former colleagues of the "New Opposition." Instead of an arrangement, as Addington seems to have expected, making himself and Hawkesbury Secretaries of State under Pitt, it was proposed to shunt him into a new post of Speaker of the House of Lords, and to move Hawkesbury into the background as Lord Privy Seal. With apparent acquiescence, though unconcealed dissatisfaction, he departed to consult the rest of the Cabinet. Next day a short note from him announcing that his colleagues, while anxious to serve under Pitt, could not enter into alliance with men who daily loaded them with obloquy and insult, put an end to the negotiation. Pitt afterwards drew up a statement of what he conceived to have passed in it, which he requested Addington to lay before the King. Addington's reply has not been preserved. But George III, deeply offended by the whole proceeding, which he regarded as trenching on the Royal prerogative, threw the chief blame on his old Minister, and refused to read his explanation.

While this negotiation was still in a hopeful stage, Lord Hawkesbury, now assured of Pitt's support, and incited by his knowledge of the King's wishes, replied to the repeated question of the French Government as to the security required for British interests in the East. The answer was Malta ; and it was couched in a peremptory form intended to compel acquiescence. Lord Whitworth received instructions, if discussion was unduly prolonged, to give notice of his departure from Paris. The British Government had, no doubt, made up its mind that Bonaparte's ambition must sooner or later bring France and England into renewed conflict. And the Consul's situation, as depicted in Whitworth's despatches, seemed to afford an exceptional opportunity of forcing him to fight under every disadvantage, or submit to a humiliating concession, which would give Great Britain command of the Mediterranean. Lord Hawkesbury, Whitworth had urged, should send as an *ultimatum*, "Malta or war" ; and all English papers coming to France should repeat "Malta or war," so as to give it the force of a national mandate.¹ It was an admitted fact that the French people were sick of war, and especially of maritime war, by which they had everything to lose and nothing to gain. The Bonaparte family also, mindful of St. Regent's infernal machine, and convinced that the first gun fired in renewed hostilities would give the signal for fresh attempts against the Consul's life by French refugees in England, spared no effort to maintain peace. Bonaparte himself, putting a strong

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, March 21, 1803.—*F. O. Despatches.*

rein on his temper, tried hard to come to an accommodation. He offered to join in a European convention for preserving the integrity of the Turkish empire. He proposed that the Czar should hold Malta in custody for the Knights, to which Alexander consented. But he also insisted on a strict adherence to the treaty of Amiens, as a point which involved the honour of France. Rather than give way on this point he was prepared "to lose fleets and colonies and commerce, and recover them all by an invasion of England." "It is painful," Whitworth wrote in reporting this declaration, "to see to what a state of depravity the leading men of this country are reduced. So far from feeling the least shame or remorse on such an unmanly method of retaliation on us, they not only excuse but applaud it."¹ Bonaparte also declared his intention of sending troops to occupy southern Naples and Hanover if the British Government retained Malta. And when this announcement provoked remonstrances both from Berlin and from St. Petersburg, he offered to submit unreservedly all questions in dispute between France and Great Britain to the Czar's arbitration. But although Lord Whitworth officially professed the most amicable intentions, and awaking to a sense of the gravity of the situation, really laboured hard, in conjunction with Joseph Bonaparte and pacific members of the French Council of State, to find some expedient which should satisfy the demands of Great Britain while saving the honour of France, the British Ministry seem to have deliberately adopted a policy of exasperation. The English ports on the Channel resounded with warlike preparations. The London papers supporting Addison showed daily less restraint in their philippics. Lord Hawkesbury openly sent Captain Wright, an enterprising British seaman, well known in France for his connexion with the Chouan insurgents during the last war, in a diplomatic capacity to Whitworth, in order that he might renew his old intrigues. This wanton provocation aroused the ambassador's anger; any other agent he protested to Hawkesbury would have answered the purpose better. Bartholomew Huber, who co-operated zealously with Lord Whitworth in seeking a peaceful solution of the questions at issue, afterwards declared that the main obstacle to an accommodation was the imperious tone of Lord Hawkesbury's despatches.² When sending as an *ultimatum* a demand of the island of Lampedusa for a British naval station, together with possession of Malta for ten years, Hawkesbury directed the ambassador, in case of demur, to bring negotiations to a close without further reference to London. Whitworth, in strange ignorance, apparently, of diplomatic usage, refused to deliver these conditions in writing to Talleyrand, thus giving the French Government just cause of complaint, and exposing himself to sharp reproof from his

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, April 7, 1803.—*F. O. Despatches.*

² Huber to Whitworth, May 17, 1803.—*Ibid.*

own official chief. In subsequent modifications of his *ultimatum*, which abolished the rights of the King of Naples and the Knights of St. John to the possession of Malta in favour of the Maltese people, who were declared English partizans, Hawkesbury limited the time allowed for acceptance to seven days, and again to thirty-six hours. And to the French contention that Spain and Holland as parties to the treaty of Amiens, and the six European powers who guaranteed possession of Malta by the Knights, should be consulted as to the changes proposed, he turned a deaf ear. "They treat me," Bonaparte exclaimed, "like a garrison that is summoned to capitulate." Lord Cornwallis had succeeded in concluding peace at Amiens by toning down Lord Hawkesbury's language, and assuming responsibility for concessions not authorised in his instructions, but afterwards approved. Lord Whitworth only ventured to transgress his time-limit, in the vain hope of forcing Bonaparte to yield on the subject of Malta. When he arrived in England on May 17, General Andreossi left London, and war against France was soon afterwards declared. During the debates that followed in both Houses of Parliament, Pitt defended the retention of Malta in one of his finest oratorical efforts. Fox condemned it in a speech which he himself regarded as his greatest, and which high authorities have pronounced to be unequalled for excellence in the debates of the British House of Commons. Ministers, supported for once by Lord Grenville, had large majorities in both Houses. As to the strength of their case, the historical student examining it without national or party bias, would probably regard it as of the weakest, and agree with William Wilberforce that Malta was dearly acquired by a violation of public faith, a nation's most precious possession.

Just before this debate, an offer arrived from the Czar to mediate between the belligerents. Lord Hawkesbury declined it on the ground that it came too late, war having been declared. After the debate, Fox made a motion in the House of Commons that Russian mediation should be accepted. Hawkesbury at first refused, but when Pitt expressed concurrence with Fox, consented with the docility of a devoted pupil. Early in June, votes of censure on the general conduct of the Government were moved from the Opposition benches of both Houses. To carry them Whigs and Grenvillites combined. Pitt, to the amazement of Ministers, took a line of his own, in concert with Lords Melville and Mulgrave in the House of Lords, but for which he failed to secure Lord Grenville's co-operation. While freely blaming the conduct of Government, he refused to join in expelling it from office, and moved, as an amendment, the order of the day. Ministers refused to accept such damaging patronage, and Pitt, to his evident mortification, found few supporters. The votes of censure were also rejected by large majorities. Lord Hawkesbury redeemed the pledge he had given to the House of Commons

in a somewhat peculiar fashion. Taking counsel with the Russian ambassador, Count Simon Woronzow, an implacable foe of the Consular Government, he accepted the Czar's mediation on all points in dispute with France except the restitution of Malta. When Alexander expressed dissatisfaction at an exception which made consent a mere mockery, Hawkesbury, again prompted by Woronzow, protested the surprise and disappointment of the British Government, which in keeping Malta acted solely from solicitude for the general interests of Europe, and in accordance with what it had understood to be Alexander's particular desire. By this time hostilities were in full progress, and Bonaparte being dissatisfied with the general attitude of the Emperor of Russia, withdrew his request for mediation. If we may judge from reports in Thomas Grenville's letters during the month of May of the rapid rise or fall of Government stock, then below 60, as peaceful or warlike rumours prevailed in London, war with France was not generally popular in England. No doubt, however, Bonaparte's order for the arrest of all Englishmen between the ages of 18 and 60 then in France, as hostages for French unarmed citizens captured at sea before war was declared, exasperated public opinion. It may be stated here that when Lord Hawkesbury protested against this decree as contrary to the usages of civilized nations, Talleyrand replied that all the powers of the Continent respected the liberty of merchants and other individuals travelling unarmed by land, and only made prisoners of armed men. France followed this custom. But the British Government having made prisoners of French merchants and other unarmed persons travelling by sea, France had treated unarmed Englishmen in the same manner. If the British Government would release unarmed prisoners taken from French merchant ships, the First Consul would also release the unarmed persons arrested by his order. Lord Hawkesbury does not appear to have responded to this offer.

Pitt's action in the House of Commons in dealing with the motion of want of confidence in the Ministry was deeply resented by Addington and his friends, much as they exulted in its conspicuous failure. They regarded it as a stab in the back from one pledged to support them. Addison, they complained, though head of an administration which enjoyed the undiminished confidence of the King and the Parliament, had offered to make way for Pitt, yet Pitt had dealt it a treacherous blow because it declined to coalesce with declared foes, whose enmity had been incurred by following his advice. Their resentment found expression in an anonymous pamphlet, which must have stung Pitt to the quick. A paper war followed, from which Lord Grenville conceived hopes of working again in thorough co-operation with his old friend and leader. In conference, their views and feelings seemed to coincide exactly. They agreed that the situation of the country was perilous ; and that the peril was greatly enhanced

by an incompetent administration. But when it came to a question of combined action for placing the direction of public affairs in more capable hands, Pitt drew back. He would heap scorn on the ministry, or damn it with faint praise as an independent critic, but do nothing to dislodge it from office. This attitude greatly puzzled and disheartened the "New Opposition." They began to doubt whether, while professing to respond with equal unreserve to the entire frankness with which Lord Grenville laid bare his views and intentions, Pitt, governed by secret ties or motives, was not playing a game of his own. An unlooked for disclosure did much to stimulate this growing distrust. During a visit to Lord Carysford at Eltham in the month of October, the Bishop of Lincoln told his host of the letter given or dictated by Pitt to Dr. Willis for the King, in Addison's presence, undertaking to lend no further countenance to the Catholic claims during his Majesty's reign; and the hopes founded on this communication of Pitt's remaining in office, which the Bishop thought had been blasted by Addington's secret machinations. The knowledge of this incident coming as a surprise to Lord Grenville and his friends, did much, apparently, to shake the confidence of the party in Pitt's sincerity.

As autumn faded into winter the political aspect grew darker without anything like correct appreciation by the British Ministry of the magnitude of the danger to which the kingdom was exposed. In fact, neither Lord Hobart, Secretary of State for War, nor any of his colleagues, was capable of rising to the full height of the emergency, because none of them was able to conceive what was possible for extraordinary genius and energy having absolute command of the strength and resources of such a powerful state as France had now become. Moreover, they seem to have swallowed with avidity Lord Whitworth's encouraging assurances that Bonaparte was universally hated and despised, and utterly without means of engaging in naval warfare. It was the old story of mistaking the whisper of faction for the voice of a nation. No doubt war with England was intensely unpopular in France. But the refusal of the English Government to fulfil the treaty of Amiens enabled Bonaparte to shift on to it the odium of hostilities. It was a challenge which, as he said, could not be declined without loss of honour; and in taking it up he had the support of all the great bodies of the state, and the vast majority of the French people. His financial difficulties were serious, but not insuperable. A rapid revival of national prosperity under his rule, and a more skilful and economical management of public resources, had brought up the annual revenue of France to 24,000,000*l.*, which amply covered ordinary expenditure in time of peace. This equilibrium, however, had been disturbed by a costly and disastrous expedition to St. Domingo. And war with England on the scale which he now designed, required an additional annual

expenditure of about 8,000,000*l.* Though French credit had greatly improved, the 5 per cent. *rente*, which fell below 10 under the Directory, had not yet reached 50, so that he could only borrow on usurious terms which his economical temper rejected. But by selling Louisiana to the United States for 60,000,000 of francs, he disarmed American jealousy which his colonial policy had aroused, and improved his financial position. He commuted the aid in soldiers and vessels of war Spain was bound to furnish to France by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, for a considerable monthly subsidy. And these supplies, augmented by voluntary contributions from France, forced contributions from dependent republics, and an improved system of taxation enabled him to begin preparations for a descent on England with his usual secrecy and vigour.¹

In the same credulous spirit the Ministry eagerly encouraged schemes of the emigrant princes for the overthrow of the Consular Government, which exposed itself to much obloquy and ridicule, had tragic issues for the House of Bourbon, and opened a way for the great enemy of that House to the summit of his ambition.

The hopes cherished by Lord Hawkesbury that the military occupation of Hanover and Naples by French troops must bring Bonaparte into conflict with the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were better founded, but proved equally fruitless. By the treaty concluded in 1795 between Frederick William II of Prussia and the French Directory, northern Germany had enjoyed during the succeeding years of war the advantages of peace under a Prussian guarantee. Frederick William III, after the rupture of the peace of Amiens, offered to hold possession of Hanover in the interests of George III, if the British Government would concede to North German trade the protection of maritime law, as interpreted by the powers which had formed the "Armed Neutrality." Lord Hawkesbury refused this proposal. Bonaparte then took possession not only of Hanover but also of Cuxhaven, belonging to Hamburg, in order to exclude British merchantmen from the Elbe; and the British Government, in retaliation, blockaded the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, the chief avenues of North German commerce. The consequence was that Frederick William found himself in a situation of extreme embarrassment, assailed at once by a storm of clamour from his own subjects, and reproaches of timidity from neighbouring states, which had hitherto enjoyed immunity from the evils of war, under Prussian protection. In regard to Russia, the new Czar, having banished from Court the chief conspirators against his father, formed a Council of State composed of old ministers of Catherine II, who pursued her policy of keeping the empire free from foreign entanglements in which its interests were not directly

¹ Thiers, *Consulate and Empire*.

concerned. After a little, however, he placed personal friends of his own age in the chief departments of state, in immediate subordination to his recognised Ministers. Prince Czartoriski, a Pole, was thus attached to the Imperial Chancellor, Count Alexander Woronzow, who directed the foreign relations of Russia. Under this new influence Russian foreign policy assumed a more enterprising character, and Alexander had begun to play the part of umpire of Europe. Count Woronzow, however, like his brother Simon, Russian Ambassador in London, cordially detested the French Revolution and all its works. Czartoriski had old and intimate relations with the Court of Sardinia. And Alexander, while condemning the conduct of England in keeping Malta, felt much keener jealousy of the continental aggressions of France. He not only protested at Paris against the violation of North German and Neapolitan neutrality, but offered to join his forces to those of Prussia for the purpose of expelling the French from Hanover. A powerful party at the Court of Berlin, supported by the Queen, urged Frederick William to accept this offer. But Count Haugwitz, whose influence was predominant in Prussian councils, steadily opposed a quarrel with France. Prussia had derived great advantage from friendly relations with Bonaparte, and the cautious statesman feared the lightning blows of such an antagonist, from which the distant succour of Alexander could afford no protection. The King therefore sent Lombard, his confidential secretary, to meet the First Consul at Brussels and discuss the situation with him. Bonaparte proposed an alliance between France and Prussia which should secure the former power against a new continental coalition during its conflict with England, and enable the latter to annex Hanover. Haugwitz and Lombard advised their master to close with this proposal. But it was too bold a course for Frederick William, who feared to offend the Czar; and preferred the half measure of a convention which, without identifying him so closely with French policy, might enable him to occupy Hanover, and at the same time afford some satisfaction to Russian complaints in regard to Italy. Bonaparte however insisted on an alliance, and negotiations on this subject were spun out for many months.

In the meantime the French ruler applied himself with extraordinary energy and concentration of purpose to provide the means of bringing war with England to a decisive issue by transporting 100,000 French troops, encamped in the neighbourhood of Boulogne, across the channel to Kent. When rumours of this design first reached England they seem to have awakened little alarm. Even that most enterprising of British seamen, Sir Sidney Smith, derided it as impracticable under existing conditions. But before six months had elapsed since the renewal of hostilities, gun-boats, gun-brigs, and sloops, armed, manned, and equipped for

battle, had begun to swarm forth from every port, creek, and inlet of the French sea-board, between the mouths of the Loire and the Scheldt. Favoured by storms and by calms, by fogs, dark nights, and ebbing tides, they stole along coasts and crept round head-lands, unseen by British cruisers or evading their attacks, until, in the course of time, more than 2,000 of them, carrying more than 3,000 guns, were collected in four harbours to the west of Cape Grignez, scooped out at Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Vimereux, and Etaples by the labour of the troops, and guarded by forts, and batteries of artillery.¹ When some faint knowledge of this formidable flotilla informed the public mind in England, rash confidence gave place to panic, and to a general conviction of the inadequacy of the ministerial measures of national defence. On December 31 Lord Grenville wrote to Pitt imploring him, in view of the public peril, to take the lead in a movement for ejecting an incompetent administration, and forming another composed of the ablest statesmen of the kingdom without distinction of party. A few days later the two statesmen met in London to discuss the subject. Pitt declared himself to be in general accord with Grenville's views, spoke of Addington and his colleagues with "hatred and contempt," but refused to lend himself to any plan of systematic opposition with the object of removing them from office. The unfavourable impression made by this decision on the minds of leading members of the "New Opposition" may be seen in letters of Thomas Grenville, Lord Buckingham and Lord Carysfort, dated respectively January 13, 14, and 17, 1804. Lord Carysfort's letter enclosed an interesting communication from the Bishop of Lincoln in regard to Pitt's political attitude. Shortly afterwards the Grenvilles and Lord Spencer met in council at Stowe, and resolved, with Windham's concurrence, to make an overture to Fox for a combination of the opposition forces in Parliament to overthrow the Government. Two propositions were formulated as a basis of common action; (1) that the public interests required the removal from office of Ministers manifestly incompetent to deal with the present emergency; and (2) that any new Ministry should be formed on the principle of comprehending the weight, character and talents to be found in public men of all parties without any exception. The negotiation seems to have been carried through by Thomas Grenville and a political adherent of Fox in the course of a morning ride in Hyde Park. Its successful conclusion was announced by Lord Grenville to Pitt in a letter dated January 31, 1804. The new coalition did not, however, include three prominent Whigs, Messrs. Sheridan, Erskine, and Tierney. Tierney had taken office under Addington. Erskine was willing to do so, if an opportunity offered. Sheridan gave the Ministry an independent

¹ Thiers, *Consulate and Empire*.

support. Pitt replied to Grenville on February 4, expressing regret but not surprise at a step foreshadowed in their recent discussion. The correspondence shows that the separation caused pain on both sides. It also marks the different characters of the men. We see in Grenville's letter the grief and misgiving with which a connexion cemented by long habit and deep personal affection was severed under the influence of an overmastering sense of public duty. In Pitt's the dominant note seems to be apprehension of the difficulties which the new coalition, though founded on principles of which he approved in the abstract, would place in his own way when called upon by the King, in the probable course of events, to form an efficient administration. Hardly however had the confederates opened their campaign against Addington in the House of Commons, when Pitt, as the Bishop of Lincoln shrewdly surmised, rushed into the thick of the fray in open co-operation with them. Before taking this decided part, he, using the Lord Chancellor as a channel of communication without Addington's knowledge, appears to have excused his action to the King by alleging the danger to which the monarchy was exposed by the incapacity of his present Ministers; the very plea which Lord Grenville had urged in vain in personal discussion with himself. His aid, though very effective, proved somewhat embarrassing. It would appear from a letter of Thomas Grenville that his instability of purpose, and his want of consideration for the tactics of his allies while exacting conformity to his own, severely tried even the good temper of Fox.¹ When actually engaged in debate the vigour with which he assailed his old friends and clients left nothing to be desired. Against such a combination of talent giving voice to public opinion, the Ministry could not long stand. Its majority in the House of Commons fell to 34 in the division on a motion by Fox for an enquiry into the state of national defence. Then Addington made an overture to Pitt for an exchange of views on the situation. This being curtly rejected,² he resigned office; and the King, through Lord Eldon, called on Pitt to submit proposals for a new Ministry. Pitt recommended a comprehensive administration on Lord Grenville's plan. But the King would not admit Fox to his councils, and only consented after long and pressing solicitations to accept Grenville. Fox at once disclaimed all wish for office, and requested his followers not to allow their minds to be influenced by his exclusion. For a short time Pitt indulged the hope of being at the head of a government composed of eminent men of all parties. But the Whigs, assembled for consultation at Carlton House, refused to separate from their great leader. And the other branch of the Opposition, meeting simultaneously at Camelford House, unanimously agreed that they could not

¹ T. Grenville to Lord Grenville, March 31, 1804.

² Dean Pellew's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*.

without a violation of declared principle, join an administration from which Fox had been specially excluded. Then Pitt formed a Cabinet, composed for the greater part of Ministers he had so lately denounced for imbecility, who showed no scruple in forsaking Addington, notwithstanding his fidelity to them.

The Editor confidently appeals to correspondence contained in this volume as completely clearing Lord Grenville from aspersions cast on him by modern worshippers of Pitt, who can see nothing to blame in their hero, and make Grenville the scapegoat for faults and failure which darkened the melancholy close of a great career. "It was from a sense of loyalty to Grenville," it is said, "that Pitt had suffered the negotiation for his return to office in 1803 to fall through, and now when the two statesmen could return together, and when, if ever, a strong government was needed, either a quixotic sense of honour or wounded pride induced Grenville not only to stand aloof from the new administration himself, but to do his utmost to prevent others from giving it their support."¹ It was not from loyalty to Grenville, but because he could not form an efficient administration without the statesmen of the "New Opposition" who had given such strength and character to his first ministry, that Pitt broke off negotiation with Addington in 1803. Neither was it a quixotic sense of honour or wounded pride that induced Grenville to stand aloof from Pitt's last administration. He could not have acted otherwise except in plain violation of principle and good faith. Moreover, he had specially warned Pitt that neither he nor any of his political friends would consent to accept office contrary to the King's inclinations. Grenville's letters to Pitt are frank disclosures of the writer's views and purposes, animated by warm affection for his old leader, and strong disinclination to separate from him which only a deep sense of public duty and urgent remonstrances from the friends who had followed him into opposition were able to overcome. They bear the impress of sincerity, and carry a conviction of it to the mind of the reader; and however prejudiced or intemperate some of the views expressed in them may appear, there is no trace in them of secret motive or personal ambition. Pitt's conduct, as revealed in his letters to Grenville, was that of a man hampered by unavowed pledges, playing a political game of his own, and consequently, sparing of confidence, uncertain and ambiguous in action. On points concerning the security of the monarchy, about which they had disagreed, Pitt in the long run came round to Grenville's views. But even when expressing full concurrence he refused, no doubt from unwillingness to offend the King, to join in any attempt to give practical effect to those views by constitutional action in Parliament, until Grenville took that responsibility on himself by independent movement, which finally carried him into a

¹ *Political History of England, 1801-1837.*

political connection incompatible with Pitt's personal objects, and therefore made separation inevitable. As for the charge that Grenville did his utmost to prevent the Whigs from joining Pitt, its sole foundation seems to be unworthy, certainly unfriendly, conjecture. No evidence is alleged for it. Lord Stanhope, who frankly avows a strong bias in favour of Pitt, founded on hereditary affection and gratitude, gives it no countenance. There is not a hint of it in the Whig memoirs of the time. All the known circumstances tell against it. Separate meetings of the two branches of the Opposition to consider Pitt's proposals, were held at the same time. The Whigs met at Carlton House, the Grenvillites at Camelford House, and appear to have deliberated and decided with entire independence. Nearly all the leading Whigs agreed with Fox in disliking and distrusting Pitt, and, as plainly appeared a year later, would not consent to serve under him. In Grenville's own party there was no difference of opinion as to the line of conduct imposed on them by the dictates of duty and honour. All Lord Grenville's correspondence, all that is known of his character from trustworthy sources, show him to have been incapable of anything savouring of base and secret intrigue; and that too against one for whom, as this volume amply testifies, his gratitude and affection burned brightly to the last. Lord Brougham's emphatic testimony to the great increase of public reputation accruing to the Whigs from Lord Grenville's connection with them is well known.¹ In the last volume of the *Memoirs of the Whig Party*, edited by Lord Ilchester, Lord Holland refers in the following terms to Grenville's separation from the Whigs in 1819: "It is painful that so honourable a career should end by a separation from many connected with and attached to him. The termination, however, like the course of it, was manly and direct. There was nothing sordid, nothing personal, nothing even inconsistent in it, on either side. I, for one, feel that among the rare gratifications of a public life, the reflection of having known and acted with such a man as Lord Grenville is not the least. . . . Mr. Fox gave me his true character in one word in 1805, when he said, 'I like Lord Grenville. He is a *direct* man.' " The political divergence which has been so unfairly criticized, and which dated from 1801, was the result of a difference of ruling motive. Grenville's dominant idea was the welfare of the monarchy, without alloy of personal aim; Pitt's was the welfare of the monarchy guided or governed by himself. In the circumstances of the State, Pitt's intense egotism and love of power became a public calamity. To stand in the way of his ambition was an offence that seems to have erased from his mind the longest record of friendship and service. For that offence, he treated Grenville as he had treated Addington; not only discarding him as a friend, but even withholding from

¹ *Statesmen of the Reign of George III.*

him the courtesy due to mere acquaintance. Had he been willing, as Fox was, to take office under a chief acceptable to both, the strong administration desired by all parties, and demanded by the public interests, might have been formed. As was seen after his death, the King must have given way when he had no longer a great minister's personal ambition to fall back upon. These dominating characteristics also became a misfortune for himself. In the early vigour of life, with a good cause, the favour of the Crown, and the support of the people, they had helped him along a path of peaceful reform and development, most favourable to the exercise of his great powers, to a height of fame and authority few English statesmen have reached. In the last stage of his career, when, in broken health, having lost public confidence, deriving little support from King or Cabinet, he found himself pitted in mortal strife against one of those men of all-embracing genius who appear at long intervals to dazzle and subdue the world, they led him, blindfold, from humiliation to humiliation, from disaster to disaster.

The measure, styled the *Additional Forces Bill*, brought in by the new Government to secure the country from invasion, and supply the shortcomings of its predecessors in office, proved a conspicuous failure. Assailed by all the parties in opposition, it exposed Pitt to the same taunts of incapacity he had so freely flung at Addington. Amidst the jeers of Addington's followers his majority in one important division fell below 30; and though he got through the session without actual defeat, he could no longer hope to bear up long against the increasing responsibility of his situation, without some notable acquisition of strength. He had also to contend against disadvantages arising out of the King's recurring malady, now complicated by incipient blindness; and dissensions in the royal family. Interesting details in connexion with the former subject may be found in Lord Buckingham's letters to his brother; the information they contain being derived from General Grenville and Mr. Fremantle, intimate friends of the Marquis, who filled confidential posts at Court. In regard to the latter subject, it may be stated that the King had refused an application from the Prince of Wales for high command in the territorial forces raised to repel invasion. Incensed by what he considered an insult, the Prince absented himself from Court. Shortly after the change of ministry in May, one of the more dangerous crises that periodically marked the course of his father's disorder, and an omission to publish the medical bulletins, led him to imagine that a regency was necessarily impending. In this persuasion he summoned to Carlton House Fox, Grenville, and other leaders of the coalition, constituted them his Privy Council, and by their advice addressed a letter to the Lord Chancellor challenging the conduct of the Ministry in carrying on government during the sovereign's incapacity without

authority from Parliament. The Chancellor replied that Ministers stood on their constitutional responsibility, and enclosed the bulletins, which hardly justified the Prince's indictment. When the King got better Pitt sought to reconcile him with his son, by inducing the latter to accede to his Majesty's desire of bringing up under his own immediate care the Princess Charlotte of Wales, eventual heiress to the Crown, then living at Carlton House. The Prince expressed his willingness to meet his father's wishes, and authorised Lord Moira to explain to Pitt and Lord Eldon, representing the King, the conditions on which his consent would be given. These appear to have been (1) that his wife, now living apart from him, should not be suffered to interfere in any way with their daughter's education, and (2) that he himself should have full liberty to choose his political connections. At this stage of the business, marks of favour publicly bestowed by the King on the Princess of Wales so enraged her husband that he broke an appointment for an interview with his father, and all hope of agreement seemed at an end. Through the continued good offices of Pitt and Moira, the interview took place later in the year at Kew, and was followed by a short visit of the Prince to Windsor Castle. During these meetings the King treated his son with cold civility, refrained from all allusion to his grand-daughter, and after the Prince's departure from Windsor, paid another visit to his daughter-in-law at Greenwich. He then ordered the Lord Chancellor to transmit to his son a memorandum of the arrangements he proposed for the education of Princess Charlotte. This paper contained no notice of the conditions laid down by the Prince, who returned it to the Chancellor, and refused to discuss his father's proposals, except through Lord Moira, then absent in Scotland. When Moira returned to London in December, 1804, his communications with the Lord Chancellor were resumed, and were continued at uncertain intervals during the whole of 1805. In the end the Prince of Wales seems to have had his way. It was arranged that the young Princess should live for half of the year with her grandfather, and for the other half with her father, and that her education should be carried on under their joint control. For the greater convenience of readers all the letters on this subject have been brought together in the Appendix.

In the course of their conferences in the summer of 1804, Pitt suggested to Lord Moira that the Prince of Wales should support his father's government, and offered that nobleman himself the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Moira replied that the Prince had determined to shape his conduct by the advice of the statesmen he had chosen as his councillors. For himself, he refused to separate from Fox. Mr. Tierney, in fact, was the only prominent Whig who leant to the idea of a junction with Pitt; and as regards Tierney, the Prince now put an end to their political connection.

Having failed to recruit his political strength at the expense of the Whig party, Pitt had two courses before him ; to open the way by resignation for the formation of a stronger Government, or to seek assistance from Addington, whom he had treated with such contumely, but who retained in opposition a considerable following in the House of Commons. His wisest friends counselled the former course. The King, however, brought all his influence to bear in promoting the latter ; and Addison, who had also to overcome strong objections on the part of leading adherents, consented to join the administration with Lord Buckinghamshire and Mr. Vansittart, on certain specified terms. This junction so far answered Pitt's purpose as to enable the ministry at the opening of the session of 1805, to command a sufficient majority in the House of Commons. But Pitt's jealousy of power made real union impossible. Addison having submitted, after a long struggle, to quit the chamber from which he derived political consequence, found himself, as Lord Sidmouth and Lord Privy Seal, a mere cipher in the Cabinet and the House of Lords. He had to share responsibility for important measures about which he was not consulted, nor allowed any share in shaping.¹ As he smarted under a sense of his mortifying position, controversy arising out of the charges preferred in the House of Commons against his colleague Lord Melville made it still more irksome. Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty in the Addington administration, had appointed a commission to investigate and report on irregularities in the accounts of the navy during the period when Melville held the office of Treasurer ; and Sidmouth had stipulated on joining Pitt that this commission should have the support of Government, and that himself and his followers should enjoy full liberty of action in connection with its reports. The 10th report of the Commission, issued in February, 1805, incriminated Lord Melville. Sidmouth, who thought the evidence conclusive, proposed that Melville should at once resign. Pitt, on the other hand, thought that the Government should stand or fall in defence of Melville's innocence. Neither opinion seems to have prevailed in the Cabinet ; but when Mr. Whitbread's resolution, carried in the House of Commons by the casting vote of the Speaker, drove Melville from office, Pitt, instead of appointing Lord Buckinghamshire First Lord of the Admiralty as Sidmouth had every reason to expect, gave the vacant post to Sir Charles Middleton, a veteran admiral, who was regarded at the time as a mere stop-gap. Sidmouth, Buckinghamshire, and Vansittart sent in their resignations. But as the session was at its height, the support of the seceders could not be dispensed with. By the personal intervention of the King, and explanations and promises from Pitt, they were induced to resume their posts. Some weeks

¹ *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, by Dean Pellew.

later Mr. Bond, a leading adherent of Sidmouth in the House of Commons, carried a motion against Pitt's most strenuous opposition, for Melville's prosecution by the Attorney-General. Though they had only acted with the liberty accorded to them on crossing over to the Ministerial benches, Pitt now declared his intention of "marking" the conduct of Bond and others of the Addington party, by withholding from them offices lately promised; and at the close of the session Sidmouth, in spite of the King's renewed solicitations,¹ finally severed a connection which brought neither credit to himself nor advantage to his friends.

Lord Melville's fall was a calamity for Pitt. It deprived him of his ablest and most experienced colleague, whose high Tory principles and pliant temper made him a favourite at Court, and greatly facilitated the transaction of thorny business with the King. Pitt stood manfully by his old friend, and by persuading the House of Commons to rescind its vote for his prosecution by the Attorney General, and substitute one for impeachment, probably saved him from judicial condemnation. But he could not shield him from disgrace, and by vain attempts to do so forfeited public confidence. Melville's political trimming after his resignation of office in 1801 had been a series of blunders, which raised up for him hosts of enemies. An unprovoked attack on Lord Grenville for translating into action opinions in which Melville privately concurred, gave indelible offence to old colleagues composing the "New Opposition." Grenville repaid the injury by abstaining and advising others to abstain from affording any countenance to the proceedings in Parliament against his assailant. But the whole party stood aloof from Melville in tacit condemnation. His short alliance with Addington, from whom he accepted a peerage, surprised and seems to have offended Pitt. His sudden desertion of Addington on a vote of want of confidence made him specially obnoxious to that minister's adherents. In his mode of meeting the grave charges preferred against him by the Naval Commission he showed himself equally injudicious. His defence at the Bar of the House of Commons, according to the impartial testimony of Wilberforce, strengthened the case against him; while the arrogant tone in which it was delivered hardened the hearts of opponents, and alienated the sympathies of many members who bore him no ill-will. The Whigs gave no quarter to a bitter and, as they thought, unscrupulous foe. And public opinion was vehemently expressed in petitions from the City of London and other great centres of trade throughout the kingdom, for his banishment for ever from the King's presence and councils. It may be said, however, that Melville's conduct in the last stage of his political career did not fairly represent his character. It

¹ Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, July 12, 1805.

brought into undue prominence the defects of his qualities. Besides, he had always been too conspicuously partial to his own countrymen in the distribution of enormous official patronage, not to have incurred great unpopularity in England.

Pitt's health now began to give way visibly under the increasing burthen of his anxieties. His friends seem to have generally felt that he could no longer carry on the government with credit, and that it had become necessary in the public interests to form a wider administration on the principles advocated by the Opposition. Lord Camden opened the matter informally to Lord Grenville; while Sturges Bourne and minor lights of the Ministerial party in the House of Commons discussed it eagerly with Lord Temple. Grenville, however, cut short Camden's approaches by an announcement that the Opposition chiefs would only express their views on the situation when direct proposals were made to them by Pitt, with the King's authority.¹ Then, it was understood that Pitt intended to bring the subject of a comprehensive Ministry again under his Majesty's consideration during a visit to Weymouth early in the autumn. There were gatherings of the Opposition for consultation, in anticipation of such an event, at Stowe, Dropmore, and St. Anne's Hill, to which the Prince of Wales invited himself with great perseverance; and it appears to have been a recognized condition of a new arrangement on a broader basis that Pitt should not hold in it the position of Prime Minister. At these meetings the Opposition chiefs came to know each other better. Their personal relations became more intimate, but strong differences of opinion were revealed. While Grenville seems to have approved of the foreign policy pursued by the Government, Fox, with wider knowledge and deeper insight into continental conditions, condemned it as premature and reckless. Speculations of coming change were suddenly ended at the close of September by an announcement that Pitt had abandoned all idea of negotiation with the chiefs of the Opposition.² He clung to office in the hope, which his sanguine temper informed, but which was, in truth, mere illusion, that the approaching triumph of the European coalition against France his lavish subsidies had forced into unhealthy maturity, would win back public opinion in England to his side, and give him a new lease of power.

When Bonaparte, during the short interval of peace that followed the preliminary treaty signed in London in October, 1804, devoted himself with such untiring energy to the work of developing the industries and the commerce of France, there is little doubt that he regarded his peaceful labours as ancillary to the great design which already dazzled his ambition of ruling all Western Europe as a modern Charlemagne. When the warlike policy of the British Government

¹ Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville, June 24, 1805; T. Grenville to Lord Grenville, June 25, 26, &c., 1805; Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, June 27 *et sequiter*.

² Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 4, 1805.

effectually thwarted his colonial and maritime schemes, he turned his mind with equal intensity of purpose to the conquest of England, as a more hazardous but a shorter step to the accomplishment of the same supreme object. The subjugation of England would at once place unbounded resources at his command, and paralyse a coalition of Continental powers by depriving it of a paymaster. He did not shut his eyes to the risks of the expedition; the chances against him, as he said to Lord Whitworth, were one hundred to one. But he had already achieved what ordinary men regarded as impossibilities. And he had undoubting faith in his star. At first he seems to have cherished the hope of finding some safe opportunity, afforded by favourable conditions of weather, to transport his army across the Channel in gun-boats without the protection of men-of-war. Admiral Bruix, who was in command of the naval armament at Boulogne, favoured this idea. But more prudent counsels prevailed. And he fell back on the plan of a secret combination of the naval squadrons then in various stages of construction or equipment in the ports under his control from Genoa to the Helder, to hold the Channel during the three days required for the passage of his troops. This plan closely resembled in its main features that which Alexander Farnese, the great Duke of Parma, had drawn up for a similar purpose in the 16th century, at the request of Philip II. of Spain.¹ In the circumstances of that time, and with the precautions insisted on by Parma, success was far from improbable. The Spanish monarchy was the greatest maritime power of the world. Its admirals, especially the Marquis of Santa Cruz, were the most renowned and experienced. Its revenues surpassed the combined revenues of all other European states. How Philip spoiled Parma's plan by blind adherence to antiquated methods and obsolete models; by neglecting its conditions of secrecy, despatch, and a harbour of refuge; and, finally, by placing in command of his "Invincible Armada" a courtier who had never served at sea, with strict orders to adhere in all events to instructions prepared for him beforehand in the seclusion of the Escorial, forms the introduction to one of the tragedies of Spanish history, and to some of the most glorious pages in the annals of England. At the beginning of the 19th century the circumstances were reversed; superiority in ships, in crews, in commanders, in resources, being immeasurably on the side of England. The Revolution had ruined the French navy. An aristocratic service, even more exclusive in all its higher grades than the French army, its officers had been proscribed as Royalists; and their places had been filled by men recommended for high command by furious Jacobinism, who led the fleets entrusted to them from defeat to defeat into

¹ Strada, *Belgic War*.

that state of general demoralization, which constant defeat produces. A bankrupt Republic fighting for its existence against coalesced Europe, had neither time nor means to repair losses at sea of exceptional severity. And although the victories of British admirals during the wars of the French Revolution were, as a rule, unusually decisive, they, with the exception of Duncan's action against the Dutch at Camperdown, were far less difficult achievements than those won by Hawke or Rodney against the admirals of the *ancien régime* in the days of its rapid decay. Bonaparte had to create the fleets needed to carry out his scheme of invasion, and then to find competent admirals, in whom fear of Lord Nelson had not extinguished every spark of enterprise. And although he could bring to the task unrivalled genius for organization and war, in a dearth of material and of crews it was necessarily a work of time. He, as Lord Whitworth reported truly, had found the French arsenals empty. A close blockade of the whole French seaboard by the fleets of Great Britain shut out fresh supplies of naval stores. Manning the gun-boats had nearly exhausted the available stock of experienced seamen in France. Consequently the descent on England which the Consul hoped to accomplish in the spring of 1804, had to be postponed till the following year. One fact of recent experience encouraged him to persevere. Of the four hasty and ill-equipped expeditions despatched by the Directory to the Irish coast, three, including that conveying the powerful army of Hoche, had completely eluded the vigilance of the British admirals. Only the fourth, carrying Wolfe Tone and his fortunes, had been overtaken and defeated by Admiral Warren. And throwing 15,000 French troops into Ireland was a leading feature of Bonaparte's plans.

This delay severely tried the First Consul's impatience; but, at the beginning of 1804, gave no promise of results prejudicial to his designs. The Continent remained in profound tranquillity. It is true that Admiral Warren, now British Minister at St. Petersburg, was able to inform Lord Hawkesbury that the Russian Government listened with increasing sympathy to his appeals to it to save Europe from French domination.¹ The Czar's persistent protests against the military occupation of Naples and Hanover, and his demands of compensation for the King of Sardinia, had caused intense irritation at Paris, and the withdrawal of the Russian Ambassador, Count Markoff, from that capital in the autumn of 1803. But Alexander could do nothing against France except in alliance with Prussia or Austria. And both of these powers turned a deaf ear to his suggestion of a defensive league against French aggression. The King of Prussia preferred negotiating with Bonaparte for the custody

¹ F. O. despatches from St. Petersburg.

of Hanover. The Emperor was willing enough to resist the Consul, but utterly unable. The last war had reduced Austria to the lowest stage of exhaustion compatible with independent existence. Defeat had crushed its superb army into an undisciplined and cowardly mob. Its finances had fallen into apparently irretrievable confusion, for no one had been found capable of grappling with the disorder. According to a report drawn up on the subject by Mr. Stuart, English Secretary of Embassy at Vienna, the annual revenue of the monarchy was £9,000,000 ; the annual deficit about £1,000,000 ; the public debt, excluding British loans, £10,000,000.¹ Venice detested an Austrian yoke, and desired union with the Italian republic. Disaffection had lately raised its head both in Hungary and Galicia. Count Louis Cobentzl, who had charge of foreign affairs, under the nominal control of the Vice-Chancellor, Count Colloredo, was a fairly capable, though not a strong Minister; but none of his colleagues was fit for the post he held by the Emperor's partiality. And there was no directing mind at the head of the State to bring order or system from the chaos of general mismanagement. In fact the situation at Vienna had only one hopeful feature. Francis II. had endeavoured, in 1801, to repair in some degree the disastrous effects of Baron Thugut's jealousy of Archduke Charles, by placing his brother at the head of the War Department, with absolute control. This able prince abolished the Aulic Council of War, shortened the term of service for the soldier, and began a thorough reform and re-organization of the whole military system. But he warned the Emperor that, with the limited funds placed at his disposal, seven or eight years would be required to restore the army to strength and efficiency ; and, in spite of his remonstrances, more pressing needs soon compelled a large reduction of military expenditure. In this helpless condition the Emperor, though daily wounded in his interests and in his dignity by the ambition and imperious language of the First Consul, could not venture on any step which might furnish a pretext for a quarrel. It must be added that the interests of Great Britain had been badly served by the appointment of Sir Arthur Paget as its Minister at Vienna. His despatches are by no means deficient in ability ; but an arrogant temper and offensive manners seem to have made him generally obnoxious at every foreign Court to which he was accredited. He was a favourite of Lord Grenville, who had aimed at raising the social character of the English diplomatic service by employing in it men of noble family, and who probably found traits in Paget not altogether uncongenial with his own disposition. In 1799, when British Minister at Munich, a quarrel with the Elector compelled Paget to quit Bavaria. Thomas

¹ Charles Stuart to Lord Hawkesbury, July 14, 1804. F. O. despatches from Vienna.

Grenville's extraordinary mission to Germany was then drawing to a close. On April 18 Lord Grenville wrote to inform his brother that Paget would be sent to succeed him at Berlin. Replying to this announcement on May 31, Thomas Grenville strongly deprecated the appointment. Not only Count Haugwitz, he wrote, but Count Goltz, Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, and Count Panin, Russian Minister at Berlin, a main prop of the Anglo-Russian alliance, protested against it. Their grounds of objection to Paget were "his want of knowledge of business, and a want of attention to it, together with a violent and headstrong temper, and an affectation of *brusquerie* in his manners and conduct." They disliked him so much, Grenville said, that there was little hope of friendly intercourse, a most important consideration in the existing relations of England and Russia.¹ In deference to this advice, Paget's destination was altered to the Court of the Two Sicilies. Here, as we learn from his own confidential letters to Lord Grenville,² a violent quarrel with Sir William Hamilton, his predecessor, which brought him into bad odour with the King and Queen, and subsequent conflicts with the Prime Minister, General Acton, made his situation neither pleasant to himself nor advantageous to British interests. Lord Hawkesbury, probably at Lord Grenville's recommendation, transferred him to Vienna in 1801. At first he seems to have spoken and acted in this new employment with the respect and forbearance due to the fallen fortunes of an old ally. But on returning from a visit to England during the winter of 1803-4, he suddenly adopted a bullying attitude, with the object apparently of forcing Austria into a league with England and Russia against France. His hectorings, and reproaches, and disrespectful bearing at Court threw the meek Cobentzl into a transport of anger, and deeply offended the Emperor. The consequence was that he found himself completely excluded from the confidence of the Austrian Government. Russian envoys to Vienna soon adopted the same systematic reserve in intercourse with him. And the British Government, while rewarding his zeal by making him a knight of the Bath, found it necessary to acquiesce in treatment of which he bitterly complained as an affront, and carry on its negotiations for a new coalition through other channels.³ The Foreign Office correspondence of this time preserves an interesting letter dated November, 1804, addressed by John Rea, an English resident at Vienna, apparently of influential position, to Lord Harrowby, which deplores the impediments cast in the way of a good understanding between the British and Austrian Governments by Paget's offensive conduct.

While things were in this state of comparative quiescence, the

¹ Dropmore Papers, vol. V.

² *Ibid.*, vol. VI.

³ Despatches from Vienna. F. O. Papers, 1801-1805.

sudden discovery in Paris of a plot hatched in England, in the councils of Count d'Artois, for the overthrow of the Consular government, gave an extraordinary impulse to the current of events. The plot was, in conception at least, a drama in two acts, with different sets of actors : the first being mainly concerned with the removal of Bonaparte from the political stage ; the second with a restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Georges Cadoudal, the implacable guerilla chief of Morbihan, undertook to assemble a band of his followers in Paris, lie in wait for the First Consul near the road leading to his country house at St. Cloud or Malmaison, overpower his guard, and put an end to, at least, his political existence. To restore the monarchy more powerful agencies were required : a French army commanded by a general able and willing to tread in the footsteps of General Monk. But there were circumstances in the existing situation which seemed to the credulity of the framers of the plot to place those means of success at their disposal. Moreau, the hero of Hohenlinden, had quarrelled with Bonaparte. His house in Paris was a centre of disaffection to the Consular system, much frequented by military officers who, for personal or public reasons, were jealous of the extraordinary fortunes and aspiring aims of one who had so lately been their equal. And it was believed that the soldiers of the old army of the Rhine, now assembled on the heights of Boulogne, were still devoted to the famous captain who had so often led them to victory. Moreau had hitherto meddled little in politics ; but in 1797 the Directory had deprived him of his command on the Rhine for holding back evidence, which had fallen into his hands, that General Pichegru carried on treasonable communications with the Prince of Condé while leading a Republican army. This circumstance seems to have suggested an exercise of imagination, not unusual in emigrant circles, which converted the avowed foe of Bonaparte into a secret adherent of the Bourbons. It happened also that in 1803, Pichegru, whom the Directory had deported to Cayenne in 1797, escaped from that penal settlement to England. Being misled by intelligence from Royalist sources at Paris, he accepted the dangerous mission of returning to that capital in order to persuade his old friend and comrade Moreau to stand forth as champion of the Bourbon cause. When Moreau had been won over, and the time for action arrived, Count d'Artois was to appear in the last scene of the drama, in the character of saviour of France, receiving the homage of a penitent nation as representative of his more sagacious brother Count de Provence, who refused to countenance any of the proceedings. Cadoudal went over to Paris with his band in August, 1803. Pichegru followed later in the year, accompanied by the brothers Polignac and M. de la Rivière, personal friends of Count d'Artois, and charged to prepare the way for his coming. In order to gain admittance into France, they all availed themselves of a secret perpendicular

tunnel in the Biville cliff, between Treport and Dieppe, which, unknown to the local authorities, had long been used by smugglers in carrying on illicit trade. Thence, using by-paths and secret hiding places, they reached the capital in safety, and remained there for months without exciting suspicion. They owed this immunity chiefly to Bonaparte himself. In order to conciliate public opinion he had abolished the Ministry of Police, and placed the department Fouché had made so terrible under the control of the Minister of Justice ; a change attended with great loss of efficiency. Pichegru had several interviews with Moreau, which quite dispelled the illusion which led him to undertake his mission. He found his old comrade a staunch Republican ; willing indeed to hurl Bonaparte from power, but not for the benefit of the Bourbons. Both generals appear to have shrunk with professional disgust from association with Georges, who forced his company on them ; and thus excited the ill-will of the guerilla chief and his companions. Neither Pichegru nor his aristocratic colleagues could discern any sign of a general re-action in favour of the cause they had come to serve ; and they were on the point of returning to England when the arrest and confession of a lieutenant of Georges, Bouvet de Lozier, in February, 1804, enabled the Government to unravel the plot, and arrest the leading conspirators, and Moreau as their accomplice. The Chouan prisoners, when questioned, repudiated with indignation the charge brought against them of intended assassination. They had enlisted, they declared, to fight openly against Bonaparte's guards, under the command of a French prince who was coming from England to lead them. This avowal aroused in Bonaparte a furious craving for revenge—the spirit of a Corsican vendetta. He openly declared that the first French Bourbon prince who fell into his hands should be shot ; and he sent Colonel Savary, one of his aides-de-camp, with a band of soldiers disguised as smugglers to occupy the Biville cliff and intercept the expected leader. Savary kept watch for three weeks in vain. A vessel said to be that of Captain Wright, from which the captured conspirators had landed, was seen to approach the coast several times ; but moved away, it was surmised, on missing some accustomed signal. While smarting under this disappointment, intelligence reached Bonaparte that the Duke d'Enghien had been for some time sojourning at Ettenhiem in the Duchy of Baden, near the confines of France. This unfortunate prince, intent on pleasure not political intrigue, and unsuspecting of danger, was suddenly surrounded by French troops, carried to Vincennes, and shot by sentence of a court-martial as an emigrant who had borne arms against France. Pichegru committed suicide. Moreau, condemned by a special tribunal to two years' imprisonment on some minor charge, went into exile. Georges and many of his band died on the scaffold. La Rivière

and Armand de Polignac owed their lives to the intercession of the Bonaparte family.¹

While this tragedy ran its course, the strange political melodrama was enacted in which Mehée de la Touche played the principal part. Mehée first acquired notoriety in the early days of the French Revolution by writings of a Jacobin cast; and as secretary of the Paris *commune* in 1792 became implicated in the September massacres. Later on, under the Directory, he held high posts in various branches of the administration. Bonaparte, after the 18th Brumaire, deported him as an extreme Jacobin and Septembriser to the island of Oleron. Escaping thence to England Mehée wormed himself into the confidence of the leading French emigrants, and was recommended by them to the Addington ministry as a valuable agent for raising up troubles against the Consular government. Lord Grenville had been extremely cautious in dealing with overtures of this kind. It was his custom to refer them all to Mr. Wickham, whose wide and intimate knowledge of foreign agents and intrigues made him difficult to deceive. Lord Hawkesbury appears to have so far followed this example as to introduce Mehée to Mr. Drake, the British Minister at Munich. It was an unfortunate choice. Drake, as earlier volumes of Lord Grenville's correspondence amply testify, was a man of unusual ability and energy who had done good service to the British Government in Italy and Germany. He was also incautious and credulous, though not to the verge of fatuity, as Lord Holland depicts him.² Zeal clouded his judgment. Thrown off his guard probably by the recommendation of the British Foreign Office, Mehée's wiles completely duped him. The cunning Frenchman having possessed himself of Drake's full confidence, and, actually or in prospect, of considerable sums of English money, went to Paris, betrayed his mission to Talleyrand, sent misleading information to Munich under Bonaparte's dictation, and received indiscreet answers from Drake, which compromised the British Government; but to the Consul's great disappointment, showed no knowledge whatever of the Chouan conspiracy. Spencer Smith, English Minister at Stuttgart, whom Lord Grenville had recalled from Constantinople at the special request of Lord Elgin,³ was another victim of Mehée less deserving of sympathy.

The execution of Duc d'Enghien sent a thrill of horror throughout Europe. But fear of Bonaparte repressed public expression of feeling in countries adjacent to France. The Czar, protected by distance, put his Court into mourning, and protested against the violation of German territory both at Paris and the Diet of Ratisbon. The King of Sweden, with

¹ *Consulate and Empire*.—Thiers.

² *Memoirs*. Lord Holland knew Mr. Drake as British Minister at Turin in 1794.

³ Vol. VI, Dropmore Papers.

characteristic vehemence, out-ran the example of his powerful neighbour. The King of Prussia allowed his negotiation with France to drop, and secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Russia. Count Haugwitz retired to his estates, and Baron Hardenberg, more influenced by a reviving national spirit, took for a time the lead in Prussian councils. But no German ruler from the Emperor to the Duke of Baden ventured to support the Russian protest at Ratisbon, which the Diet quietly shelved. No word of reproach was uttered, neither grief nor resentment was displayed by reigning members of the victim's family. And Bonaparte repelled Alexander's remonstrance by defiance and insult, with stinging allusions to the murder of the Emperor Paul, and the immunity enjoyed by that monarch's assassins. No doubt the publication by the French Government, with comments of its own, of the Chouan confessions, and Drake's letters to Mehée, somewhat tempered the odium attaching to d'Enghien's execution. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, at the demand of the French Government, sent passports to Drake and Spencer Smith. In France itself the abortive conspiracy undoubtedly strengthened Bonaparte's authority, and promoted his designs. Regicides and extreme Jacobins who had hitherto opposed him acquiesced in the supremacy of a ruler who had in a measure identified himself with them by shedding the blood of a Bourbon prince. The crime thoroughly cowed the more zealous Royalists; and while it answered Bonaparte's purpose by putting an end to plots against his life, it only checked for a moment the defection of moderate Royalists from the standard of princes to whom the Revolution had taught nothing. At the same time it gave a fiercer impulse to the Consul's ambition. Responding to his wishes, Senate, army and people acclaimed him as Emperor of the French. Thenceforward laying aside, or casting into the background, the nobler aims and useful labours which, in saner moments, he had recognised as his true titles to greatness, he made every step of his progress a fresh menace to the peace and independence of Europe. In place of the glorious warrior making victory serve the welfare of France; the pacificator, organizer, and legislator; the statesman intent on moulding into a new polity what was really conservative in the old order, and what was really progressive in the Revolution, the world saw lawless violence crowned and consecrated, armed with irresistible force, and impelled on a career of carnage and havoc by an insatiable thirst of military glory and selfish aggrandisement.

To Bonaparte's announcement that he had entered the circle of royalty the Kings of Prussia and Spain returned assurances of cordial welcome. The answer from the Court of Vienna was more reserved, and the assent conditional. Secularizations and other changes forced by France and Russia on the Diet of Ratisbon in 1803 had wrecked the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, reduced the Imperial supremacy of

the House of Austria to a barren title, and made the retention of that title precarious. Francis II, therefore, wished to secure the Imperial dignity for his family by adding the title of hereditary Emperor of Austria to that of Roman Emperor elect, which he owed to the suffrage of the Diet. Bonaparte agreed to this augmentation, and then overcame the Austrian monarch's reluctance to acknowledge an equal in Western Europe by threatening to withdraw the French ambassador from Vienna. The Consul's answer to his protest against the arrest of Duke D'Enghien so incensed the Czar that he at first resolved to recall M. d'Oubril, his representative at Paris, and without further parley break off relations with France. More cautious counsels prevailed. He addressed a note to the French Government repeating in language of studied moderation the demands he had already made for the evacuation of Naples and Hanover, and intimating that on compliance with these conditions his political attitude should depend. The King of Prussia offered his mediation. But the French answer was delayed for several weeks owing to Bonaparte's absence from Paris.

Meantime Pitt had succeeded Addington, and with Lord Harrowby in the seat of Lord Hawkesbury came a change in the methods of the English Foreign Office. Harrowby reverted to the line adopted by Lord Grenville for the formation of the third coalition against France, of making a Russian alliance the keystone of British foreign policy; and having obtained the Czar's general concurrence in the views of the British Cabinet, of allowing him to take the lead in negotiations for giving them effect. This was in fact the only road to success. Continental states which received with suspicion overtures from a great naval power, guarded by its belt of seas, and levying tribute from the industry and commerce of all other nations, to join it in war against France, would listen to them without repugnance from a great military power which stood forth in the common interests of Europe, without special advantage to itself, to protect the weak, and defend established order against revolutionary aggression. Pursuing it, Harrowby took occasion in despatches to Sir Arthur Paget to condemn the use of language or other conduct offensive to the Austrian Government; and instructed him to offer no advice to Count Cobentzl, except at the invitation of the Russian Ambassador to the Court of Vienna. He also informed the Czar, through Count Simon Woronzow, that the British Government was prepared to grant 5,000,000*l.* for the purpose of subsidising a fourth European league against France. While awaiting an answer from Paris, Alexander again sounded the dispositions of the Austrian and Prussian rulers, using Pitt's offer as an additional argument for active measures against Bonaparte. But the King of Prussia would not go beyond his defensive treaty with Russia. Archduke Charles and Count Cobentzl, on military and financial grounds, insisted that peace was

still necessary for Austria unless Prussia could be brought to join in war. The whole 5,000,000*l.* offered by Pitt would not suffice, Count Stadion declared at St. Petersburg, to place the Austrian army on a war footing for more than one campaign. A scheme suggested by Sir A. Paget, and approved by the British and Russian Cabinets, for turning out Count Cobentzl and replacing him at the Austrian Foreign Office by a more warlike Minister, had to be abandoned, because no other competent Minister could be found at Vienna. These checks were not encouraging. But a curt refusal from Napoleon to withdraw his troops from Hanover or Naples till peace had been concluded, gave a more decided impulse to the Czar's hostility. He refused to acknowledge the French Emperor; broke off diplomatic relations with him; and sent M. Novosiltzow, who enjoyed his full confidence, on a mission to London to arrange with the British Ministers the basis of a new coalition. Early in November the Emperor Francis II, alarmed by rumours of impending changes in Italy, followed the King of Prussia's example, by entering secretly into a defensive alliance with Russia against French aggression.

On the other hand an act of premeditated violence on the part of the British Government provoked a renewal of hostilities between England and Spain. King Charles IV. had bound himself by the treaty of St. Ildefonso to aid Bonaparte by sea and land in the event of France being at war with a third power. After the rupture of the peace of Amiens he tried to evade this engagement, but consented, under threat of invasion, to pay a monthly subsidy to France for permission to remain in other respects neutral. Addington's ministry, knowing the extenuating circumstances, and at the intercession of the Czar, tolerated this one-sided arrangement. But Pitt proved more exacting; and Mr. Freer, British Minister at Madrid, after angry altercations with the Prince of Peace, quitted the Spanish capital, leaving his brother to continue negotiations. These were prolonged till the time came for the arrival of the treasure ships carrying home the annual tribute to the Spanish Government from South American mines. The British Admiralty, without any positive rupture of diplomatic relations, issued secret orders for the capture of those ships; and of four Spanish frigates carrying 12,000,000 of dollars, three were taken by force, and the fourth went down in fight. This breach of the law of nations set all Spain in a blaze; and drew an immediate declaration of war from the Spanish Government, which placed its empty arsenals and decayed navy at Napoleon's disposal. In all respects this act of violence was a blunder; an outcome probably of the short-sighted rapacity which had so often, during Pitt's first administration, characterised Lord Melville's policy as Minister for War. It gave a severe shock to European opinion; and provoked an angry remonstrance from the Russian Emperor, whose resentment had been

already aroused by recent depredations of British cruisers on Russian and Danish commerce, in spite of the treaty concluded in 1801 by Lord St. Helens at St. Petersburg. In fact it would in all probability have retarded if not prevented the formation of a new coalition, had not Bonaparte's assumption of the title of King of Italy produced a still more decisive effect on the political situation. For how could Alexander, with any regard for the position he coveted of arbiter of Europe, urge Continental powers to join in resisting the rapacious violence of Napoleon, at the instigation and with the aid of an ally which, on the element where its strength prevailed, laid itself so plainly open to the same reproach.¹

The announcement of Napoleon's design to assume the crown of Italy created an extraordinary sensation at the Court of Vienna, and thoroughly exasperated the Emperor. Francis II's pride and his interests were equally aggrieved by it. As Roman Emperor he was King in Italy as well as King in Germany; and this usurpation foreshadowed the loss of Venice, which bore with impatience an Austrian yoke. He protested against it warmly as infringing the treaty of Luneville, and refused to acknowledge the new title. Unfortunately, also, evil counsellors took advantage of his extreme irritation to arouse his latent jealousy of Archduke Charles, and make him dissatisfied with the slow progress of that able prince in the work of re-organizing the Austrian army. By accident or design General Mack suddenly returned to Vienna in January, 1805, after a long period of enforced retirement. This celebrated soldier had figured prominently in Lord Grenville's correspondence during the latter part of the year 1793. As a result of reports from Lord Elgin and other British agents in Belgium of his extraordinary merit as Quarter-Master General of the Prince of Cobourg's army during the campaign of that year, he had been invited to England by the British Government to discuss with them a plan of operations for 1794. He appears to have been a theorist of uncommon plausibility, and quite abnormal self-confidence until confronted by the perils and difficulties of actual warfare. In peril and difficulty he lost his head. During the course of a few conferences with Pitt, Dundas, and Grenville, he was able to impress them all, and especially Pitt, with a profound conviction of his consummate ability as a strategist which remained proof against the effect of subsequent defeat both in Flanders and in Italy. No doubt this favourable opinion resulted in some measure from Mack's compliance in shaping his plans in order to secure the chief continental aim of British policy, the permanent exclusion of the French from the Netherlands. He seem also

¹ Lord G. L. Gower's despatches from St. Petersburg; Sir Arthur Paget's despatches from Vienna.—F. O. Papers. Thier's: *Consulate and Empire*.

to have been a proficient in the useful art of shifting the blame of failure to the shoulders of others associated with him. At all events, it was still, apparently, at the beginning of 1805, an article of belief among English politicians that he was a master of the art of war. More competent judges had arrived at a different conclusion. Bonaparte, when only an officer of subordinate rank, had told Bourrienne that this famous strategist was a mere pretender, whose incompetence would be exposed whenever he had to contend with a general of superior ability.¹ Nelson, from a short observation of Mack's proceedings as Commander in Chief at Naples in 1799, formed an equally low estimate of his merits.² Archduke Charles disliked and despised him as a charlatan. And although the Archduke's enmity was generally a recommendation to Baron Thugut, Mack had found no favour in the eyes of that all-powerful Minister. His return to Vienna was eagerly welcomed by Sir Arthur Paget. And Archduke Charles attributed to Russian, and more particularly English interference, now exercised indirectly and exclusively through Russian channels, the changes that followed in the Austrian capital.³ The Emperor, still violently excited, after a few conferences with Mack, whom he had hitherto disliked, fell completely under that general's spell. He removed his brother from the control of the War Department, re-established the Council of War, and assumed to himself the chief direction of military affairs, with Mack, installed in the post of Quarter-Master General, as his adviser and guide. The business of recruiting and equipping the army was now pressed forward with feverish haste. And as French troops began to assemble in Lombardy in order to grace with military pomp the inauguration of a new kingdom, Austrian troops were moved into the Tyrol and Venice, as if to guard them against attack.

By another coincidence, just as Mack emerged from retirement, the Czar despatched General Wintzingerode on a special mission to Berlin and Vienna, to insist in more peremptory language on the necessity of combined action against France, and to discuss some common plan of military operations.

Early in the spring M. Novosiltzoff returned to St. Petersburg with the scheme for a new coalition, as modified in London by the British Cabinet, after consultation with the Russian Ambassador, Count Simon Woronzow. Alexander's project had been armed mediation, undertaken by himself, and offering France terms of peace based on the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. Refusal was to be followed by war; acceptance by a general congress to guarantee the new settlement, and decide other questions affecting the future tranquillity of Europe. It came back to him little altered in form, but altogether different in scope and intention.

¹ Bourrienne's *Memoirs*.

² Southey's *Life of Lord Nelson*.

³ Sir Arthur Paget's despatches from Vienna.—F. O. Papers.

Without regard for past treaties, or present balance of power, the modified plan embodied the conditions which Pitt and Grenville had hoped to impose in 1799 on beaten, exhausted, and divided France before Bonaparte's return from Egypt. The country, empire monarchy or republic as events might determine, was to be reduced to its old monarchical limits; and all the territory it had acquired since the Revolution was to be distributed in such a manner as to form insuperable barriers against future attempts at expansion. In order to accomplish these objects, the coalition, if Prussia joined it, was to place at least 500,000 soldiers in the field; without Prussia, at least 400,000; Great Britain undertaking to pay at the rate of 12*l.* 10*s.* a year for every man actually serving, and to advance four months' pay to each confederate as preparation money. No effort was to be spared to obtain Prussian co-operation. The King of Prussia was to be offered the Rhine provinces, and all of Belgium not required to form a barrier for the Dutch extending from Antwerp to Maestricht, and including both cities. If he refused this bribe, the Czar was to compel him by force, if not to join, at least to allow a free passage through Prussian territory to Hanover, for an army of Swedes, Russians, and English or Hanoverians, to be assembled at Stralsund under command of the King of Sweden. In one respect there was a departure from British policy in 1799. Napoleon, after assuming the Imperial crown, had written again to George III. proposing peace. The British Ministry, mindful no doubt of the bad effect produced by Lord Grenville's haughty rejection of the French ruler's former overture on becoming First Consul, now agreed that Alexander, as a public manifestation of moderation and disinterestedness, should send an envoy to Paris with proposals which, while insisting on an abandonment of Italy and Belgium, left France in possession of her territory on the left bank of the Rhine. No one could have believed that such conditions would be accepted.

The British Cabinet, deceived by the facility M. Novosiltzow had shown in conforming to the views of Count Woronzow, seems to have expected that the altered scheme would have been adopted with equal readiness at St. Petersburg. But it encountered an opposition which Lord Granville Levison Gower, who supported the British proposals with tact, temper, and ability, found himself unable to overcome. The British conditions, Prince Czartoriski declared, took no account of existing circumstances. They were such as might be offered to an enemy who had lost one or more decisive campaigns, but not to a victorious power which had already vanquished three European coalitions. During the last ten or twelve years the Continent had been over-run and desolated by French armies. Sovereigns could only induce their subjects to face the calamities and privations of another conflict by convincing them that every effort had been made to avert it.

For this purpose the terms to be offered to France must take account of the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. The British Government, in keeping Malta, had repeatedly declared that it only did so in the interests of Europe, and because no other means could be found of preserving that island from the grasp of France. The Czar had offered, and was still willing, to solve the difficulty by sending to Malta a garrison of Russian troops. If Europe complained of French tyranny on land, it also felt aggrieved by British tyranny on the seas. Alexander, therefore, insisted that the British Government, as public proof of moderation and disinterested views, should consent to restore Malta to the Knights of St. John; and to submit disputed questions of maritime law for the decision of a European congress. Levison Gower, in order to save the treaty, made large concessions in regard to the terms to be offered to France, and consented to refer the question of the restoration of Malta to the British Government. He refused, however, to hold out any hope of departure from British maritime practice. But Alexander, when signing the treaty, as now revised, on April 11, 1805, made its ratification depend on the cession of Malta; and announced his purpose of persevering in his efforts to have the principles of naval warfare defined, and its practice regulated, by a congress of European powers. The Austrian Government, though still hesitating to pledge its co-operation, expressed entire concurrence in the Russian policy of observing recent treaties with France. The Emperor, it declared, required nothing in Italy but the fortress of Mantua or Peschiera as a bulwark to Venice and the Tyrol. So far as Austria was concerned Napoleon might, if he pleased, make his brother Joseph King of Lombardy; and keep possession of Piedmont, provided compensation were found for the King of Sardinia. Alexander, having despatched the amended treaty to London, requested the King of Prussia to apply to the French Government for a passport for M. Novosiltzow, whom he was about to send on a special mission to Napoleon.¹

The absorbing interest of events at Paris during the year 1804 seems to have hardly distracted Napoleon's attention from his expedition to England. The difficulties he had to encounter in manning, equipping, and collecting a fleet sufficiently powerful to protect the passage of his army across the Channel, and in finding admirals fit to lead it in a hazardous enterprise, have already been noticed. And in regard to the last-named impediment, time, instead of aiding, fought against him. Admiral Latour-Treville, on whom his chief hopes rested, died at Toulon in the course of the year. Admiral Bruix, who had charge of the gun-boats and all the preparations for a passage, did not long survive Treville. Admiral

¹ Lord Granville Leveson Gower's despatches from St. Petersburg.—F. O. Papers.

Villeneuve, sent by the Minister of Marine, with little opportunity of choice, to fill the vacancy at Toulon, was a skilful but irresolute officer, oppressed by a haunting sense of the deficiencies of his own fleet, and by almost superstitious fear of his great antagonist, Lord Nelson. In order to combat this timidity, and supply what was wanting in enterprise and audacity, Napoleon attached to Villeneuve Colonel Lauriston, one of his own aides-de-camp. The quarrel between England and Spain had caused a greater dispersal of the naval forces of the former power, and added something to those of France. At the beginning of 1805 Napoleon saw the menace of another European coalition looming faintly on the political horizon, and determined to finish, if possible, his conflict with England before this new war-cloud had time to gather and burst. There were in the principal French and Spanish ports between Toulon and Brest more than 60 ships of the line, besides frigates, in various stages of preparation. British squadrons kept them all under close watch. But equinoctial and other gales sometimes dispersed blockading fleets, and dense fogs baffled the most vigilant scrutiny. It was in accordance with these conditions that Napoleon shaped his final plan of capturing the British Channel. Secret orders were sent from the Ministry of Marine to the Admirals commanding in the various ports under its control, to sally out as opportunity might offer, and, using every subterfuge to mislead the enemy, shape their course for Martinique in the West Indies as a common rendezvous. It was expected that these expeditions would not only train and season the raw crews, but draw away English fleets from Europe for the defence of trade and territories scattered over the world, and left almost without protection. When the allied forces, united at Martinique under one command, had cruised for a sufficient time in American waters to effect the purposes of the voyage, then, by Napoleon's plan, they were to return with all speed in overwhelming strength to sweep the English Channel clear for the passage of the "Army of England," encamped along the heights of Boulogne. In January Admiral Missiessy, finding the coast clear, left Rochefort, and sailed with his small squadron to the West Indies. Shortly after, Villeneuve attempted to follow this example, but was caught in a storm, and his scattered and frequently dimasted ships with difficulty made their way back to Toulon. This rough experience did not raise the Admiral's courage. It was not till March, when the mistral had blown away Lord Nelson from the coast, that he ventured forth again, formed a junction at Cadiz with the gallant Spanish Admiral Gravina, and reached Martinique in May with 20 ships of the line and 7 frigates. But Cornwallis, commanding the Channel fleet, held Admiral Ganteaume and 21 ships of the line pent up at Brest. And 11 French and Spanish ships of the line at Ferrol were equally unable to elude the vigilance of a blockading force under Sir Robert Calder. Bonaparte, finding spring and

its storms passing away without the results on which he had reckoned, sent an express to Villeneuve to return to Europe with all the force he could muster after a cruise of forty days, raise in succession the blockade of Ferrol and of Brest, and with the fleets thus released added to his own, force his way at all costs into the Channel as early as possible in August.¹

Having made these arrangements for his great enterprise, Napoleon went to Milan to assume the Iron Crown. The pomp and splendour of the ceremony, the enthusiasm evoked by his presence, the homage paid to him by all classes during a triumphal progress through the historic cities of his new realm, exalted his pride. His ambition grasped the whole peninsula; and he spoke and acted as if he were already its master. The Queen of the Two Sicilies having ventured to object to the claim of supremacy implied in his title, he publicly threatened to expel her and her husband from Naples. He called the Emperor to account for reinforcing the Austrian garrison of Venice. He endowed one of his sisters, and then another, with Italian duchies and principalities. And at the request of the Doge and Senate he incorporated the ancient Republic of Genoa with the French empire. In answer to the application of the King of Prussia, which followed him to Italy, he ordered passports to be sent to M. Novosiltzow to meet him at Paris in July; intimating at the same time that Russian mediation would only be tolerated if it proved to be impartial, and not merely in the interests of England. But his annexation of Genoa had consequences he seems to have been far from expecting. It was as the last drop which made the Emperor's cup of mortification overflow, bringing more clearly before him the approaching fate of Venice. In vain Archduke Charles urged the weakness of the Austrian army, and Count Cobentzl the penury of the Austrian treasury. General Wintzingerode having failed in his mission at Berlin, whither the King had recalled Count Haugwitz to combat the war party, came on to Vienna to place at the Emperor Francis's disposal 120,000 Russian troops. At the same time the British Government consented to relieve his financial needs by an immediate advance of 1,000,000*l*; engaging not to claim repayment of this sum, even if Napoleon should accept the terms of peace about to be proposed to him. The projected French descent on England seemed also to promise an Austrian opportunity. In these circumstances Francis II signed the treaty of April 11, which had been transmitted to him from St. Petersburg. And before returning to the Russian capital General Wintzingerode, in concert with the Austrian Council of War and General Mack, framed a plan of campaign by which the allied powers undertook to place in the following October at least 400,000 men in the field against France.

In the meantime, however, an important change in the

¹ Thiers: *Consulate and Empire*.

political situation had occurred elsewhere. The British Government, while accepting with great reluctance other modifications favourable to France made at St. Petersburg in the treaty signed on April 11, refused to relinquish Malta, or to consent to any discussion on the subject of English maritime practice. This refusal put an end to the Czar's project of mediation. And intelligence which arrived about the same time at St. Petersburg of the annexation of Genoa, gave him a public pretext for ordering M. Novosiltzow, still at Berlin, to send back his passports to Prince Talleyrand, and return to Russia. But Austria absolutely required three months more to complete her preparations. These had already roused the anger of Napoleon. They must be discontinued, or the negotiations abandoned by Alexander must be resumed in order to gain time. It was proposed, therefore, that Russia and Austria should have full liberty, without forfeiting the subsidies stipulated in the treaty of April 11, to disclaim any alliance with Great Britain, until war had actually begun; and that the Emperor Francis should in his own name and that of Alexander, issue a Declaration offering Napoleon terms of accommodation based on the treaty of Luneville. The British Government accepted this arrangement. And Alexander secretly sent General Lascey, a Russian officer of merit and experience, to Naples, to study the country and its resources, concert measures with the Government, and take command of the Russian and English troops who were to be dispatched to its aid from Corfu and Malta.

Napoleon returned to France in July; repaired at the beginning of August to his camp at Boulogne; and passed in review all the forces assembled along the coast for the conquest of England. The Dutch and Belgian divisions of gun-boats under command of Admiral Verhuel, at Ostend and Dunkirk, now fought their way around Cape Gris-nez, and joined the rest of the flotilla at Boulogne and the adjacent harbours. Guns and material of war were put on board; and all arrangements were made for an immediate embarkation of the troops, on the appearance of the great French fleet now impatiently expected. Meanwhile Napoleon had kept close watch on the movements of Austria. Warnings from the Elector of Bavaria quickened his suspicions; and the answers to his repeated inquiries at Vienna proving evasive, he called on the Emperor to disarm. Francis II in reply issued the Declaration concerted with the Emperor Alexander. This manifesto completely opened Napoleon's eyes. He refused the proposals made to him; and ordered his Minister at the Diet of Ratisbon to announce that he would treat any act of hostility to Bavaria on the part of Austria as a declaration of war against France. Still Austrian movements were proverbially slow, and the most effective counter-stroke would be a successful expedition to England. A decisive victory, such as that of Senlac, followed by the capture of London, which, according to his

calculation, might be accomplished in a few weeks, would reduce the British Government to ask for peace, and by stopping the supplies of his continental foes place them practically at his mercy. But though he had faith in his star, the ordering of events was not in his power.

Lord Nelson, after some delay caused by false intelligence and contrary winds, had followed Admiral Villeneuve to the West Indies with only nine ships of the line. When the French admiral, who had 20 ships of the line under his command, and had captured an immense fleet of British merchantmen, heard of the arrival at Barbadoes of the great antagonist fear of whom dogged his movements like a Nemesis, he departed for Europe with a precipitation which not only disregarded Napoleon's orders, but flung away every advantage, moral or material, acquired in the outward voyage. Approaching Ferrol on July 22, he encountered Admiral Sir Robert Calder and fifteen English ships of the line. After a confused battle in a fog the hostile fleets separated. Calder fell back to join Admiral Cornwallis before Brest, carrying with him two Spanish men-of-war he had taken in the fight. Villeneuve, after some delay, reached Ferrol. He found there a reinforcement of eleven French and Spanish ships of the line in good condition, and peremptory orders from the Minister of Marine to proceed at once to Brest, and at all hazards raise the blockade. But the late action had so discouraged him that several weeks elapsed before he could muster resolution, under the vigorous spur of Lauriston's chiding, to quit his shelter. At the moment of departure Lauriston sent an express to advise Napoleon that Villeneuve was on the way to Brest. At sea, however, all the Admiral's misgivings returned; and being overcome by apprehensions that Nelson as well as Calder might by this time have joined Cornwallis, he suddenly turned his back to the unseen foe, and steered south for Cadiz. As it happened, Nelson had gone back to Cadiz in pursuit of his enemy. Hearing no news of him in that quarter, he had turned northwards to join Cornwallis, and then, worn out by fatigue, went on to England for a short rest. Cornwallis, after waiting a short time in expectation of Villeneuve's appearance, sent back Calder with eighteen ships of the line to resume the blockade of Ferrol. And, according to French official accounts,¹ Villeneuve might have brought thirty-five ships of the line to encounter only eighteen retained by Cornwallis; and been aided by twenty-one more which Admiral Gauteaume, forewarned from Paris, brought out from port, and ranged in order of battle in Brest roads. The British Admiralty, however, had by this time penetrated Napoleon's design. And Cornwallis, who had already won great renown for dogged valour and skilful manœuvring in the face of a more powerful foe, could have fallen back, fighting,

¹ Thiers: *Consulate and Empire*.

on the more powerful armament collected in the Channel, with which Nelson, two months later, won the battle of Trafalgar. Had Villeneuve executed Napoleon's orders with even moderate skill and vigour, it is well within the range of possibilities that, considering the magnitude of the opposing fleets, and the thousands of gunboats prepared to join in the fray, the English Channel in August, 1805, might have been the scene of the greatest naval battle recorded in history.

Towards the close of August, Napoleon, after several days of restless expectation, learned that Villeneuve had failed him. Ungoverned fury, it is said, seized him for several hours. Then calming himself by a strong effort of the will, he dictated to M. Daru at a single sitting the plan of campaign against the fourth coalition which military writers of all nations have concurred in extolling as a masterpiece of the art of war.¹ The coalition in truth rescued him from a most humiliating position. For nearly three years he had kept a great army encamped on the coast of Picardy; he had proclaimed to the world his purpose of leading it in a descent on England; he had devoted all the thought, energy, and resources at his command to preparations for this enterprise, with the ridiculous result of finding himself unable even to attempt it, except on conditions little removed from certain destruction. If he chose the safer course of abandoning it, he became the laughing-stock of Europe. From this embarrassing situation the precipitate policy and lavish subsidies of the British Government opened to him not only a means of escape, but a most advantageous issue. At the beginning of September the "Army of England," raised by constant labour and exercise to the highest point of military efficiency, was in full march to the Rhine.

According to the plan of operations adopted by the allied powers, against the advice of Archduke Charles, the principal Austrian army of 120,000 men, under the command of that famous general, was to take the offensive in Italy, by laying siege to Mantua and Peschiera. Archduke John, with 25,000 men in the Tyrol, was to support his brother. Another Austrian army of 80,000 men, under the command of the Emperor, with Archduke Ferdinand as his lieutenant, and General Mack chief of the staff, reinforced by 60,000 Russians under General Kutusow, was to cross the Inn into Bavaria. The Czar at the head of 80,000 Russians, stationed on the Polish frontier, was to persuade or compel the King of Prussia to join the coalition; or, at least, to allow a free passage to Hanover for 40,000 Swedes, Russians, and English or Hanoverians, assembled at Stralsund under the King of Sweden. 20,000 Russians from Corfu, and 5,000 English from Malta, were to land in Italy. And the British Government undertook to distract the forces of the enemy by expeditions to the coasts of

¹ Daru's *Memoirs*.

France and Holland. In pursuance of these plans, Kutusow crossed the Russian frontier into Galicia towards the end of August. A few days later the Emperor Francis sent Prince Scharwtzenberg to Munich with a summons to the Elector of Bavaria to join forces with the Imperial army on pain of being treated as an enemy. The Elector feigned compliance, and thus gained time to save himself and his troops by a rapid retreat to Wurtzburgh. Archduke Ferdinand and Mack pursued him, over-ran the electorate, which they dealt with as a conquered country, and finally took up a position on the river Iller, extending 25 miles from Memmingen to Ulm. It was a defensive position of great strength, if held by a sufficient force; being guarded on one flank by the defiles of the Black Forest, and on the other by the Prussian territory of Anspach. Napoleon's plan was a rapid concentration of all his forces to deal crushing blows at the armies of Austria, before confederates could come to their aid. He sent his Grand Marshal, Duroc, on another mission to Berlin, to offer Hanover to the King of Prussia as the price of an alliance. Having concluded a treaty of neutrality with the King of the Two Sicilies, he ordered General St. Cyr to evacuate Naples and reinforce Marshal Massena who commanded in northern Italy against Archduke Charles. Marshal Bernadotte at the head of the French troops in Hanover, and General Marmont with the army of Holland, crossed the frontiers into Germany and formed a junction with the Bavarians at Wurtzburg before the end of September, just as the advanced guard of Napoleon's army, under Prince Murat, flashed into the Black Forest. These movements left Hanover and Holland open to English invasion, but the British Government was not ready to take advantage of the opportunity. The Emperor Francis was still at Vienna. Archduke Ferdinand scared by the unexpected apparition of Murat's horsemen in the defiles of the Black Forest, hastily called a council of war, which decided to retire at once to the Inn, where Kutusow had now arrived. General Mack, however, dissented from this opinion, and produced a written order of the Emperor giving him absolute control of the military operations. Bewildered by Napoleon's tactics, and confiding in Prussian neutrality, he clung obstinately to the Iller; having recalled to his aid 30,000 troops from the army of Italy, and sent an urgent summons to Kutusow to join him by forced marches. But Bernadotte, disregarding Prussian neutrality, forced his way across Anspach; and the French sweeping round both flanks to the rear of the Austrians, cut them off from the Inn. In little more than a fortnight, Mack found himself shut up in Ulm with the wrecks of an army which, surrounded, beaten, and driven in from all quarters, had no resource left but to lay down its arms. Archduke Ferdinand escaped into Bohemia with about 1,500 cavalry. Of the 80,000 troops under Mack's command, 60,000 were killed or taken, together with 400 guns

and immense supplies of all kinds. The remaining 20,000 evaded or broke loose from the French net, and joined Kutusow on the Inn. Then Napoleon conducted the Elector of Bavaria back in triumph to Munich. Pressing onward he entered Vienna. Prince Murat, still leading the French vanguard, having captured by a ruse the fortified bridge over the Danube, near Vienna, the main body of the French army crossed that river, pursued the allied forces under Kutusow into Moravia, and took possession of Brunn, with the chief Austrian magazines. From Brunn Napoleon advanced to Olmutz to meet a second Russian army which the Emperor Alexander led in person to the aid of his unfortunate ally.

In Italy Archduke Charles, weakened by the recall of 30,000 of his troops to help Mack, so far from being able to assume the offensive, had to yield ground slowly to the vigorous attacks of Massena. Intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm hastened his retreat in the direction of Vienna, for the purpose of covering the Austrian capital. On the other hand, news of the landing of an Anglo-Russian expedition in Italy, checked Massena's advance. He sent back General St. Cyr to oppose these unexpected enemies, and discontinued his own pursuit of the Archduke.

Several weeks seem to have elapsed before the march of the "Army of England" to Germany came to the knowledge of the British Cabinet. So late as October 7, Thomas Grenville reported to his brother an opinion expressed by Lord Harrowby, who, though no longer a member of the Government enjoyed its entire confidence, that the Austrians had caught the French napping. Particulars of the catastrophe of Ulm, published in the *Moniteur*, not unnaturally excited incredulity in England; and when the event was certainly known in all its magnitude, the disappointment it caused appears to have been lost in exultation for the victory of Trafalgar. A few days later on, news arrived from Berlin which revived all Pitt's confidence in the success of the coalition. At the opening of the campaign, the Czar, according to previous agreement, had assembled an army on the Prussian frontier. Finding all the inducements suggested by the British Government in the shape of English subsidies and French territory fail to lure Frederick William III from his attitude of neutrality, he plainly indicated to the King that the allies could no longer allow him to remain an inactive spectator of their contest with France. Frederick William, roused to anger by this threat, declared his intention to repel force by force; called out a part of his army; and seemed on the point of accepting the alliance offered to him by Napoleon, when news of Bernadotte's march through Anspach aroused a storm of national indignation which swept all other considerations from his mind. Alexander at once changed his tone, paid a friendly visit to the Prussian Court at Potsdam, and was welcomed with enthusiasm. A free passage through Prussian

territory was opened to the allies. The two sovereigns swore eternal friendship on the tomb of Frederick the Great, and signed a convention known as the treaty of Potsdam. By this instrument Frederick William assumed in his turn the office of armed mediator. If Napoleon, after a fortnight allowed for consideration, refused terms of peace based generally on the treaty of Luneville, but ceding Piedmont to France, he engaged further to join the coalition with all his forces on the same footing as the Russian and Austrian sovereigns, and another special condition which Alexander bound himself if possible to obtain. This was the cession of Hanover to Prussia, already offered by Napoleon. If George III refused this concession, Prussia, while still requiring the British subsidies stipulated in the treaty of April 11, would co-operate with the allied Powers so long and so far only as might be required for the accomplishing of objects affecting her own particular interests, such as the expulsion of French troops from Hanover and Holland. These aims being satisfied, Frederick William was to have full liberty to withdraw from the coalition, on giving six months' notice of that intention. Alexander despatched M. D'Ouvril to London to communicate the treaty of Potsdam to the British Government, and persuade it, if possible, to sacrifice Hanover to the general interests of Europe. He then proceeded to join the Austrian Emperor at Olmutz; and Frederick William sent Count Haugwitz to Napoleon's head-quarters, as the bearer of the Prussian terms of peace.

When it was known in London that the war party had got the upper hand at the Court of Berlin, Pitt dispatched Lord Harrowby, clothed with extraordinary powers, and accompanied by Mr. Hammond of the Foreign Office, to conclude an alliance with the King of Prussia on the lines already laid down in the negotiations leading to the treaty concluded on April 11. A few weeks later a body of British troops embarked for Hanover, under Lord Cathcart as Commander-in-Chief. The War Office also sent Lord Harrington to Austria, to encourage the Emperor with assurances of the immense efforts it had in view for the campaign of 1806; and also as military adviser, to supply, apparently, the loss of General Mack. Harrowby and D'Ouvril met at Hamburgh, one on his way to Berlin, the other on his way to London. And as the instructions of the former envoy did not apply to the new situation created by the Russian mission, his first conferences with Baron Hardenberg, Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, were of merely a tentative character.

During the first part of the campaign of 1805, little was heard of the famous Austrian staff, governed by its three great chiefs, Schmidt, Weyrotha and Chatelar, which figured so prominently in Mr. Wickham's correspondence with Lord Grenville before the campaign of 1800, as an oracle of military science and a nursery of great captains. Chatelar had not

apparently recovered from the discredit attaching to him from Marshal Kray's defeat by General Moreau ; but his more renowned colleagues, so closely associated with the victories of Archduke Charles and Marshal Suvarow, seem to have been lost in the blaze of Mack's sudden ascendancy. It was only after the capitulation of Ulm and the appearance of Russian armies on the scene of warfare, that they emerged into prominence. Although Alexander at the beginning of his reign devoted much attention to the reorganisation of his forces, he had been unable to supply the wants that had detracted so much from their military efficiency in the time of Suvarow. They came again into the field unprovided with trained staff, or commissariat. The soldiers, mindful of many great victories and not inglorious defeats, considered themselves invincible ; and both hated and undervalued their Austrian allies. The generals of Russian birth, such as Kutusow, knew little of military science and probably despised it. But Alexander, appreciating as Suvarow had done, the conditions of civilized warfare, eagerly welcomed the advantage of Austrian staff officers and magazines. General Schmidt succeeded Mack at Quarter-Master-General, and was attached to Kutusow's army in its retreat to Moravia. Under his skilful direction the Russian general fell suddenly, and in much superior force, on the French corps of Marshal Mortier, marching carelessly without sufficient support along the left bank of the Danube, and nearly annihilated it. This success, the only notable one gained by the allies during the war, greatly elated the Russians ; but was dearly purchased by the loss of Schmidt, who fell in the battle. Weyrotha who, earlier in the year, declined an invitation from the Duke of York to fill the post of Director of the Military College in England, vacated by the death of General De Jarry, had succeeded Schmidt as chief of the Austrian staff, when, at the end of November, 1805, the French and allied armies commanded by their Emperors in person, confronted each other in the neighbourhood of Olmutz. The allied forces were the stronger, opposing 65,000 Russians and 25,000 Austrians to 75,000 French. Every other circumstance of their situation counselled delay. Strong Russian reinforcements were close at hand. Archduke Charles, leading 50,000 Austrian troops from Italy, had reached Gratz in Styria. Count Haugwitz had arrived at the French camp with the Prussian ultimatum. But Alexander was surrounded by a band of young officers, without military experience, full of presumption, and panting for battle. And Napoleon left no artifice untried which might hasten a decisive conflict. He sent Colonel Savary to Alexander with a request for a personal interview. Then, as if in panic, he broke up his camp in the night, and retreated some leagues to another position near Austerlitz, carefully chosen beforehand, and screened from hostile observation. The Russians followed eagerly. And when Prince Dolgorouki visited the

new French camp as the bearer of a civil refusal from Alexander of the interview proposed, and to make observations, Napoleon so ordered appearances, and spoke in such a humble tone, as to confirm the Prince in a false idea of the weakness of his army and his anxiety to avoid a battle. It so happened that, at the same time, in consequence either of the capture or depletion of Austrian magazines, or, as the Austrians averred, the improvidence of Russian soldiers accustomed to live at free quarters, dearth of food made itself felt in the camp of the allies. During the night of December 1, the Czar, without consulting the Emperor Francis, called on General Weyrotha to draw up a plan of battle for the following day. It was immediately prepared and transmitted to the generals charged with the execution of it. Its leading idea was to turn the right of the French army, in order to cut off the enemy's communications with Vienna and the Rhine. But, however able in conception, it had the practical defect of being executed without exact knowledge of the French position. On the morning of December 2, the allied army marched in a long column of five divisions along the heights of Praslin, facing the French camp, to execute Weyrotha's grand manœuvre. The leading division, on sweeping down from the high ground to envelope the French flank, encountered an unlooked for resistance, which brought the whole line to a halt; and while thus stationary, Napoleon sent forward two strong French divisions, supported by an immense park of artillery, which cut it through at the centre, where Alexander had taken his post. The French guns, following through the gap, wrought fearful havoc in the disordered ranks of the allies, spreading terror and confusion on all sides, and playing with terrible effect on the frozen surfaces of some adjacent lakes, across which crowds of fugitives sought to escape. Whole battalions of the Russians were crushed by the fire or engulfed in the waters. Other French divisions pressed forward to pursue the advantage; and the charges of Prince Murat's splendid cavalry completed the rout. The allies lost all their artillery and baggage. On the following day the Emperor Francis, with the Czar's consent, went to Napoleon's head-quarters to ask for an armistice, for the purpose of treating for peace. It was granted on condition that Alexander and his troops should at once withdraw from Austrian territory. At that moment apparently the French Emperor had not yet learned the full extent of his success. The Russian army was a disorganized mob, nearly surrounded by the French, and without supplies of any kind. Alexander gladly accepted a proposal which opened for it a safe retreat. He went at once to St. Petersburg, but sent his brother Constantine and Prince Dolgorouki to Berlin to place his remaining forces at the service of the King of Prussia. Then Napoleon, committing the negotiation with Austria to Prince Talleyrand, returned to Vienna to confer with Count Haugwitz. The

Prussian statesman had reached the French headquarters in Bohemia on November 28, in order to discharge his mission. Napoleon in a brief interview observed that he was about to give battle to the allies, and that the King of Prussia's communication had better be deferred. Haugwitz took the hint, and retired to await events at Vienna. At his second interview with the conqueror, instead of presenting the Prussian ultimatum, he offered his congratulations; denied all hostile intentions on the part of his sovereign; and finally concluded a treaty of alliance between France and Prussia, by which the latter power, in return for Hanover, ceded Anspach and other territory to Bavaria, and the Duchies of Cleves and Luxemburg to France. Having thus rid himself of Prussia and Russia, Napoleon imposed his will on Austria, which now lay at his mercy. By the treaty of Presburg, signed on December 27th, the Emperor acknowledged the kingdom of Italy, and ceded to it Venice and the Venetian provinces along the Adriatic; ceded the Tyrol to Bavaria, and all Imperial rights and domains in Suabia to the Elector of Wirtemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden; and agreed to pay to France an additional war contribution of 100,000,000 of francs. At the personal solicitation of Archduke Charles, whom he held in high esteem, Napoleon reduced this imposition to 30,000,000 of francs, the whole land being sorely distressed by famine. Francis II also consented to recognise his chief remaining vassals, the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, as independent kings, on the same footing as the King of Prussia. And thus the Roman empire of the West, restored in the year 800 A.D. by a warrior sprung from the barbarians who had overturned it, crumbled to dust under the sword of a soldier of the French Revolution, who again, after the lapse of 1,000 years, aspired to bring all Western Europe under his sway.

While the war was at its height in Germany, an Anglo-Russian army landed in Naples, and the King, notwithstanding his treaty of neutrality with France, joined forces with the invaders at the solicitation of the Czar. When this intelligence reached Napoleon he proclaimed that Ferdinand IV had "ceased to reign." Massena's troops, accompanied by Joseph Bonaparte, advanced into the kingdom. The Russians and English retired to their ships without striking a blow; the Neapolitan troops disbanded; the Bourbons fled to Sicily, and Napoleon became master of the whole Italian peninsula, with the exception of the strip of territory still left to the Pope.

In the meantime M. D'Oubril had arrived in London with the treaty of Potsdam. The British Government rejected the demand of Hanover as "inadmissible"; but accepted the alternative of an alliance with limitations as proposed by the King of Prussia. Lord Harrowby therefore offered Baron Hardenberg to subsidize 180,000 Prussian troops, to be

employed during the year 1806 in expelling the French from North Germany and Holland. Before any agreement was concluded, news reached Berlin of the battle of Austerlitz. Hardenberg at once assumed a reserved attitude; and when pressed by the Austrian and Russian ambassadors to carry out the treaty of Potsdam, took refuge, with evident embarrassment, in absolute silence.¹ Count Haugwitz returned to Berlin after Christmas, but threw no light on the situation; and when Grand Duke Constantine complained to the King of the mysterious conduct of his ministers, Frederic William declared his intention of making a personal communication to the Czar. Meantime Lord Harrowby fell ill, and got leave to return to England. It was only on the eve of his departure, early in January, 1806, that Baron Hardenberg informed him, with unconcealed shame and grief, that the King of Prussia had entered into an agreement with Napoleon to occupy Hanover till peace should be signed between France and England; but guaranteed the safe embarkation of Lord Cathcart's troops on condition that they abstained from all further hostilities against the French garrison of Hamelin.

Lord Harrington, whose mission to Austria had been cut short by the armistice which followed the battle of Austerlitz, remained at Berlin to fill the place of Lord Harrowby, till all the British troops in North Germany re-embarked for England in February, 1806.

William Pitt was the most illustrious victim of Austerlitz. He had gone to Bath early in December, suffering from gout, but in high spirits and full of confidence in the political outlook. The cure worked well, and promised to renew his strength for the conflicts of the approaching session of Parliament, when the shock caused by the sudden crash of all his hopes drove back the disease, with fatal effect, into his system; and he returned to Putney Heath in January, only to die. In the meantime the leaders of parties in Opposition had been at variance among themselves. During a gathering at Dropmore early in December, the views expressed by Whigs and Grenvillites on the question of the war differed so widely as apparently to forbid hope of any common plan of action against the Ministry. Lord Grenville, agreeing with Pitt rather than with Fox, had allowed his sympathies to take form in a neutral line of conduct, which exposed him to remonstrances from Thomas Grenville as being incompatible with his duty as chief of a party, and with the principles on which that party was founded. The battle of Austerlitz cleared the way for a better understanding, by merging personal partialities in a common sense of public danger. But it was not till the very eve of the meeting of Parliament in January that the various sections of the Opposition found a basis of union. In the course of a con-

¹ Harrowby to Mulgrave. *F.O. Despatches*, 1805.

ference with Thomas Grenville at St. Anne's Hill on January 12 Fox stated that, however much he condemned the origin and conduct of the war, he considered that the interests and honour of England now required that it should be pursued with the utmost vigour, and that all engagements with foreign allies should be strictly observed.¹ This announcement satisfied Lord Grenville, and left ground of attack open on which the Opposition could combine; Whigs, Grenvillites and followers of Lord Sidmouth being equally disposed to censure the measures of Government, offensive and defensive, against Napoleon as ill-judged and inadequate. Parliament had actually met, and a hostile motion against the Ministry had been framed, before the critical state of Pitt's health became generally known. His medical advisers, almost to the last, held the hopeful view that the only alarming symptom of his condition was extreme debility, which chiefly needed complete rest and freedom from worry. It was from Lord Wellesley, who had just returned from India, and paid a short visit to Putney Heath, that Lord Grenville learned the desperate case of the Prime Minister. Thenceforward the Bishop of Lincoln and Sir Walter Farquhar sent him daily accounts of the illustrious patient's rapid decline. Pitt died on January 23, 1806. Prostrated by grief Lord Grenville retired to Dropmore in order to escape from discussions to which he found himself unequal. None of his published letters, perhaps, place his character, whether as a statesman or as a man, in such an admirable light as those written by him during this brief period of seclusion. His advice to the Opposition, conveyed in a letter to his brother Thomas, was equally wise and high-minded. The deep affection and earnest solicitude for the honour of a lost friend and leader displayed in others drew a warm and grateful acknowledgement from Lord Chatham.

The King, after many fruitless efforts to avert the inevitable, authorised Lord Grenville to construct a new administration on Opposition principles. And the correspondence on the last pages of this volume is chiefly concerned with the formation of the Ministry of "All the Talents."

WALTER FITZPATRICK.

¹ T. Grenville to Marquis of Buckingham: *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE.
PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

VOL. VII.

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 1, Berlin.—“I have asked for leave of absence on account of Lady Newhaven’s death, and with a promise not to use it if any particular crisis should make it probable my stay would be useful, I therefore trust I shall have fully answered the object you had in view in desiring that I should keep my station. There is some juggle about the business which has been managed through Lutzow that I am not able to understand; but it should seem either that the communication to the Emperor has been suspended, or that they wait to declare his sentiments till the result of the operations of Sir Hyde Parker’s fleet is known. It is needless to trouble you with all the little circumstances on which I found this conjecture. It is sufficient that it evidently appears that it is yet possible the affair may be brought to a conclusion. Till then I should not wish to leave Berlin, and there is unluckily a present obstacle which we cannot surmount. The children have been attacked, as we fear, by the scarlet fever, and Dr. Brown says if it turns out to be so, they will be confined a full month. The conduct of this court continues what it has been, full of outward violence and private professions of good will. The truth is, at the present moment it is absolutely dependent on Russia or France, and I hardly know which is the most prevalent terror.

“I have just received your last letter, March 24. I have not time to answer it at large. It gives me great concern in every point of view. As far as I am concerned, I shall undoubtedly continue to act under and with the present Administration long enough to show that I at least consider you as perfectly sincere in the support you give them, and that I am influenced by that opinion. I must own, at the same time, that I am not sufficiently convinced of the abilities

of any of them, or of the principles of many, to have much confidence in them. The business of Parliament will be over for this session probably before I can return, and I cannot for a long time be called upon to give any public opinion about them, nor will I fix myself to any till I have seen you. I believe I need not say that we look forward with the utmost delight to the probability of soon making a visit to farmer William and his good dame.

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 12. Southampton.—“Cruellement persécuté dans mon pays où on ne cesse de fraper sur moi et mes biens, parce que je suis resté dans celui-ci, quoique j'étois resté d'après une permission qu'on m'avoit donné, et qu'il n'y avoit ni guerre déclarée entre les deux cours, ni proclamation public chez nous pour ordonner à tous les Russes de quitter l'Angleterre, j'avois déjà écrit au mois de février que je quitterois cette isle au mois de mai, mais avant l'arrivée de cette lettre, on m'a déjà traité en criminel. J'attens d'un jour à l'autre le passeport du gouvernement français pour pouvoir débarquer à Calais, et de là aller tout droit à Pymont où je vais me rendre.

“Je dois éviter Londres et la rencontre de tout ce qui est du présent et ancien ministère, car on m'en feroit un nouveau crime, et on persécuteroit ma famille. Au regret d'être obligé de quitter cette isle, j'ai encor celui de ne pas vous voir, et d'être privé de la consolation de vous exprimer de bouche ma reconnaissance pour toute les marques d'amitié et de confiance que je n'ai cessé de recevoir de vous, depuis que j'ai eu le bonheur de vous connaître. Croyez, je vous supplie, que je sens tout le prix de cette amitié et confiance qui m'honore.

“Je vous réitère ma prière d'avoir votre portrait que vous m'avez promis. Je vous prie de l'envoyer dans la maison de Mr. Thomson Bonar No. 32 Old Bethlem street dans la cité. C'est encor un ami bien rare à qui je dois infiniment, et qui est chargé de toutes mes affaires. Partout où je serai mes vœux seront toujours pour la prospérité du pays que je quitte, pour cet excellent gouvernement, le seul au monde où l'homme est dans toute sa dignité, et pour la prospérité d'une nation où j'ai le bonheur d'avoir tant d'amis si estimables ; parmi les quels vous êtes celui au quel je dois, et pour le quel je sens, un attachement qui ne finira qu'avec ma vie.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 12. Berlin.—“I have a letter from Tom, of the 28th, who excuses the barrenness of his epistle by saying that you are writing to me ; but I have not received a single

line from you either of that date or of the 3rd, down to which time I have despatches. He says you have learned and will tell me a new and more distant situation which is intended for me. This can only be Vienna, since, on the 28th, there was no expectation of sending a Minister to Petersburg. To that Court I certainly would not go, unless the reconciliation of the two countries appeared absolutely to depend upon the expedition with which a Minister should be sent, and nobody else could be ready at that moment. But nothing would persuade me to stay there. Indeed all I wish for at present is to return home, where my private affairs require my presence, and where we shall all be comfortably assembled, and have leisure to enjoy ourselves for some time at least, though I cannot but pray for your return into office ; and, to say the truth, I cannot sleep of nights for the terror I am in lest the inexperience of our new leaders should not steer us steadily and skilfully through the most intricate and hazardous navigation in which we are at this moment engaged. What will come of this attempt to negotiate with France ? And what could lead to it when all the advantage seemed on her side ? I trust that God will give us good success in the Baltic and in Egypt. Then indeed we may hold up our heads, and it is already a great point gained to be able to keep Malta without losing on that account the friendship of Russia. I have strongly solicited leave of absence to come home ; following in that your advice and Tom's, but not having the least intention of ever returning. I think the division on Grey's motion is decisive, but, somehow or other, I have no comfort in looking to the stability of the present ministry. Lord Hawkesbury writes that the king is going on well, and I trust it is so, but other rumours are abroad."

LORD HAWKESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 13. Sackville Street.—"I send you a letter from Lord Carysfort which will, I conclude, inform you of the important intelligence of the death of the Emperor Paul, on the 24th of March. I have just received from Monsieur Simolin a letter from Count Pahlen announcing this event, and the peaceable accession of the Grand Duke Alexander. It is written in the most conciliating terms, and marks the strongest disposition on the part of the new Russian government to renew their connection with this country. We have every reason to believe that our friend Woronzow is re-instated.

"Accounts have been received from Hamburgh, dated the sixth instant, which state an action to have taken place at Copenhagen on the first. The loss is represented to have been very severe on both sides, and the result is not mentioned ;

so that there can be little doubt that it has been favourable to us. We shall have, I have no doubt, further particulars in the course of to-morrow."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, April 14. Dropmore.—"I received a letter from Lisbon, with a message from M. de Pinto desiring my support of a request which, as I collect, the Prince Regent has made to this Government respecting the present situation of Portugal. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the particulars to be able to do more than to bear that testimony which I really think is due from me, to the upright principles and conduct of the Prince, as far as I have ever had occasion to observe them. Some instances of weakness we have unquestionably seen in the course of this great contest; but these may very well be accounted for, I had almost said justified, on the part of so weak a power as Portugal, when you consider what the conduct of the greatest monarchies in Europe has been. And although I know a contrary opinion is held by many, and that it is a sort of fashion to affect to discover instances of deep-laid schemes of perfidy in every step taken by the continental powers, yet I must declare my unaltered conviction to be that Portugal has, during the whole contest, adhered to its system of connection and alliance with Great Britain, with as much steadiness as can ever be expected from a power so circumstanced; and that it is very desirable to avoid on our part any step that may hereafter afford to a French or Spanish party at Lisbon the pretext of saying that Portugal was, under the circumstances which now exist, abandoned by Great Britain.

"I state this without reference to any particular subject as to which Pinto's message relates; but what I have said is no more than I owe in justice to them. I am very sure the importance of that connection is not more strongly felt by myself than it is by you." *Copy.*

LORD WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 16. Knole.—"Your congratulations and the terms in which they are conveyed call for my earliest and warmest thanks. Your lordship well knows the value I have ever placed on your esteem, and I have only to say that the most anxious desire to deserve it will follow me in every circumstance of my life.

"I shall, as long as I live, celebrate as a festival the day on which I learnt the death of that arch-fiend Paul. His successor will, I am persuaded, be anxious to remedy the evils which that madman was drawing upon his country, as well

as upon his natural friends. As such Alexander considers us, and he has a character to support his principles."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 17. Southampton.—"Mille grâces pour vos deux billets que j'ai reçu hier. J'allois vous écrire pour vous anoncer le changement survenu chez nous ; mais comme ce n'est plus une nouvelle pour vous, il me reste à vous comuniquer ce qui suit. On m'autorise à dire ici que dès qu'on nomera un ministre de votre coté pour la Russie, celle-ci en nomera aussi un autre pour l'Angleterre, et on me dit que l'Empereur me désigne à cette place. Je vous avoue que je suis si dégouté de tout service, que l'idée seule de rentrer de nouveau dans cette maudite gallère me fait frémire ; et, si je l'accepte, c'est pour très peu de tems, et uniquement pour coopérer au rapprochement des deux cours.

"J'ai trop bonne opinion de Lord Hawksbury pour n'être perssuadé qu'il vous consultera sur tout. Il est tout neuf dans les affaires étrençères, et il ne peut pas avoir de meilleur guide que vous. Or il est important que le ministre qu'on enverat chez nous soit un homme non seulement de beaucoup de sagesse, mais qui connoisse particulièrement le nouveau souverain, qu'il connoise aussi ses allentours, el le pays en général.

"Or il n'y a perssone de plus propre à ça que Lord Whitworth que l'empereur actuel aime. Je sais qu'on lui destine la mission de Paris. Elle peut lui être plus agréable, mais elle ne sera pas aussi utile à ce pays, car votre bonne ou mauvaise paix dépendra de votre bonne ou mauvaise inteligence avec la Russie. C'est elle qui fera hausser ou baisser le ton de Bonaparte, Le mariage de Lord Whitworth ne peut pas être un obstacle, car il peut n'y aller que pour huit ou dix mois, mais pour le premier moment il y sera plus util que tout autre. Dans le cas qu'il s'y refuse absolument, c'est Lord St. Helens qu'il faut perssuader d'y aller. Il ne sera pas aussi util que le premier, mais il sera plus util qu'un autre, parce qu'il connoit le pays, et qu'il est connu et estimé. Il y a un troisième qui, quoiqu'il n'a jamais été en Russie, seroit pourtant très util à cause de ses talents et de ses liaisons d'amitié avec le Comte Panin, qui a la plus grande estime et confience en lui, c'est votre frère. On a envoyé chercher le Comte Panin, et il sera très influent chez nous dans les affaires politiques. C'est donc à vous perssuader votre frère de faire ce sacrifice pour le bien de sa patrie ; qu'il accepte ce poste pour huit ou dix mois, ce sera toujours un grand bien. Au défaut de ces trois c'est Mr. Fawlkner qu'il faudroit choisir et perssuader. Il y a encor un quatrième, et quoiqu'il est probable qu'il ne l'acceptera pas, je ne vois pas pourquoi on ne fera pas la tentative de le lui proposer, c'est Lord Makartney ; la peine

n'est pas grande de tenter la chose. Mais si perssone de ceux-ci ne veulent aller chez nous, et que Liston est en état de santé à l'accepter, c'est encor un sujet tres propre. En tout cas je vous conjure de consseiller qu'on n'envoy perssone de vif, de jeune, et d'inexperimenté ; que ce soit un homme sage, posé, et qui a été habitué à traiter dans les cours étrangères ; car il aura à combatre Steding et d'autres ministres étrengers tres habils, qui connaissent le terein, et qui sont contraires aux intérêts de ce pays. Habitué à vous parler avec cette franchise insséparable de la vraie amitié, je vous avoue entre nous que je crains les liaisons de parentes, et leurs influences dans les affaires. Je crains que Lord Hawksbury ne noma à cette place son beau-frere Lord Hervey, que je connois beaucoup, ayant été ami intime de sa défuncte mère, que j'ai beaucoup connu en Italie il y a vingt-quatre ans, et je suis resté constamment en liaison d'amitié avec elle. J'ai vue croître ce fils, je le connois intimement ; il a la vanité, l'esprit, la légéreté et le déficit de jugement caracteristique de la famille. Il est Hervey, Hervey, et Archi-Hervey, de manière que je tremble que ce ne soit lui qu'on nome ; et si on le fait, je m'attens à mille follies de sa parts ainssi qu'à mille regrets de la vôtre. Pour l'amour de Dieu empechez une nomination aussi malheureuse. On peut le faire sans choquer les parents, en diseut que dans les circonstances scabreuse, il ne faut envoyer qu'un homme rompu dans les affaires, et que l'empereur même ne trouveroit pas bien qu'on lui envoi un homme qui n'a jamais été employé, et qu'on le traite comme une petite cour d'Allemagne, où on envoi les comencents.

“ Vous vous souvenez que quand Lord Whiteworth alloit partire de chez nous, et avant que Casamajor en fu chassé, le Comte Panin m'a écrit, et vous a aussi écrits à ce qu'il me semble, pour prier qu'on envoi Garlic [Garlike] comme chargé d'affaire à Petersbourg ; il le connoit, l'aime, et l'estime. J'ai proposé à Lord Hawksbury de l'envoyer tout de suite comme chargé des affaires chez nous, en attendent l'arivée du nouveau ministre. Je ne sais s'il le fera, mais je vous prie de consseiller à votre successeur de le faire sans tarder.

“ L'union de la Russie avec l'Angleterre a été votre ouvrage ; coopérez, je vous suplie, à leurs rapprochement. Vous le devez à vous meme, à votre patrie ; et je suis sûre que vos consseils seront suivi par votre successeur qui a du jugement, de la docilité, et qui a pour vous cette considération que vous inspirez à ceux qui ont l'avantage de vous connoître.”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, April 17. Berlin.]—I send you by Sir Francis D'Ivernois's desire, a copy of the work he is about to publish. A letter was to have accompanied it, but, being enclosed to Garlike, it is gone to Petersburg. I have just had a letter

from Lord Nelson informing me that he has sailed from Kioge Bay for the Gulf of Finland. He has sent a letter to the Swedish admiral at Carlscrona to tell him that, though at the Emperor of Russia's desire he suffers merchant ships to pass unmolested, he shall certainly attack the Swedish fleet if he meets it at sea, and therefore he advises him in a friendly way to remain in port. And the appearance of the fleet at Revel the new emperor is to consider as *a very great compliment*. If there are no actual hostilities before the arrival of Garlike or Lord St. Helens, I think the presence of the fleet may do good, but I have no doubt on my mind that the northern powers mean to make it up with us. Prussia is civil to excess, and promises speedy satisfaction about Hanover ; and they have to-night, at my desire, sent special orders to the Baltic ports for the supply of the fleet. Haugwiz has quite changed his language about Bonaparte, whom he has now found out to have no essential difference in character and principle from his Jacobin predecessors, and who, he is persuaded, thinks only of war. He seems very jealous of an intimacy between France and Austria, and to point at a defensive confederacy of the remaining powers in the north, for there no longer exists any in the south. The decisions of Prussia however still wait upon the nod of St. Petersburg. I have not time to write what I originally intended, therefore you must excuse this abrupt conclusion, and wait for the departure of another messenger.

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1801, April 21. Camelford House.—“ One reason of my writing to you less frequently of late has been the great uncertainty which I felt there was whether my letters would reach you at all, except by being sent back after you to England. I now take it for granted that, either at Berlin or Vienna, you are still likely to remain some time longer on the Continent. I presume they begin at Berlin to be very sorry for the folly and wickedness of their conduct ; and if they could suffer for it without its affecting our interests, I should greatly rejoice.

“ We received yesterday the news of the armistice for four months concluded at Copenhagen. I know nothing of the light in which it may be considered by the Government, not having seen anybody from whom I was likely to learn it. The critics out of office think Parker has exceeded any powers that he could have ; and has very much frittered away the good effects of his (or rather Lord Nelson's) victory. I have, myself, not the smallest doubt that Denmark would have acceded to any ultimatum he had thought proper to require. I cannot therefore think that he has done well in frustrating our principal view in sending him, which was the separating Denmark by force and definitively from the

armed neutrality. But much less can I conceive how any English officer could think himself justified in granting an armistice to Copenhagen, while Hamburg remains occupied against us by the Danes. If he avails himself of the interval to strike a blow at Carlscrona, for Revel is of course out of the question now, or if he lays Dantzic, Memel, and other ports under contribution, this may excuse but (I think) not justify his conduct.

"I know nothing of the language Prussia may have held to you since the great change which the two events of Petersburg and Copenhagen have produced in the face of affairs in Europe, but I think they must feel much embarrassed indeed how to get out of the scrape. If Egypt turns up well, which the first accounts seem to promise, France will probably be too happy to conclude such a peace with us as, I fear, the present Government will think themselves very happy to conclude with her.

"With respect to domestic politics, I was confident of the event, and it has fully justified the speculations I stated to you. Unless any great calamity happens there is not a doubt of the present ministers finding full support in Parliament and in the country. And there are even many who support them more willingly than they would have supported us, from a belief that our opinions and wishes are less pacific than those of our successors. You will probably have seen in the papers that I have omitted no opportunity to take my part, such as I have thought incumbent upon me as an honest man, and on the principles on which I had before mentioned to you my intention of acting.

"I have been fortunate enough to sell my house in town very advantageously, a circumstance not indifferent to me, as I certainly have not made my fortune in office; and I now look to the expectation of remaining chiefly at Dropmore, with the exception only of an occasional attendance in Parliament on great days. I must not say that I am impatient to see you there, for I conjecture that you may still be very useful indeed in the present circumstances either at Berlin or at Vienna. But when you do return to England the farmer and his dame will be most happy to see you there.

"Woronzow tells me that he is to give assurances of resuming his character here as soon as a minister is appointed by us; and I understand that, in the interim, Garlike is to go as *chargé d'affaires*, which I am very glad of." *Copy.*

BRITISH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

COLONEL ROBERT ANSTRUTHER to COLONEL BROWNRIGG.

1801, April 20. Camp near Alexandria.—"From the papers which were enclosed in my last, you would see what plans of operation were proposed for us here. That against

Rosetta has been adopted and carried into effect without loss or difficulty. Spencer marched from hence with about 500 British and 4,000 Turks on the 2nd. Owing to tempestuous weather which delayed his progress, he did not reach Rosetta till the 9th. The enemy had reinforced their corps there considerably; but when they found themselves attacked by such superiority of numbers they retreated, without making any stand, across the river, leaving a garrison in the small fort at the mouth of the Nile. Spencer's corps has been gradually augmented in proportion to the detachments which there was reason to suppose the enemy made from Alexandria; there are now on the Rosetta branch ten battalions of British under Cradock, and a body of Turks whose numbers it is not easy to ascertain, but they amount certainly to above 5,000 men.

"The fort at the mouth of the river having surrendered, and the navigation consequently open, General Hutchinson will proceed to-morrow to take the command of that part of the army and will operate towards Rhamanie [Rahmanieh]. At that place there is every reason to suppose the enemy to be in considerable force, the garrisons of Damietta, Randsdiera and Cairo have been assembled there, as well as large detachments from Alexandria, and there probably Menou will make his last stand before he suffers himself to be blocked up in Alexandria.

"The Vizier has advanced with more rapidity than we hoped from him. It is true he has met with no resistance, the object of the enemy being evidently to risk no action but with his force assembled, and intending probably to throw the whole into Alexandria, there to await reinforcements from France. We know that the Vizier was at Belbeis eight days ago, that a detachment had taken possession of Damietta, and we are now assured that he has entered Cairo. You will understand that the fort at Damietta, and the citadel at Cairo he has no means of reducing.

"In the meantime we have cut the canal of Alexandria by which the low plain to the south and south-west of the town is overflowed, and the communication between the town and the country will be rendered very difficult. The impossibility of investing the place has determined to this step, of which however the advantages are somewhat problematical; as we know not the extent of the country which will be laid under water, it is impossible for us to calculate all the consequences. Upon the whole therefore the situation of things in this country may be considered as follows:

"The Turks are in possession of the whole country to the eastward of the Nile, excepting the forts of Damietta and Cairo, which we shall enable them to take.

"We have a firm hold of the Rosetta branch, and a great part of the Delta, and have a fair prospect of forcing the enemy from Rhamanie [Rahmanieh], either by a direct attack in conjunction with the Captain Pacha's corps, or by a movement combined with the Vizier from the side of Cairo.

"The French have the communication open from Cairo to Rhamanie along the river, which is covered by their gunboats ; and from Rhamanie to Alexandria by means of a large body of cavalry to which we have little to oppose. They hold, as yet, the upper part of the Delta from which they draw their supplies. They have put Alexandria into a respectable state of defence, and will be enabled, with six or seven thousand men, to make a long resistance ; but we possess the canal, so that if the unanimous assertions of all travellers are founded, as well as the information collected from the people of the country, they cannot have a supply of water beyond the months of October and November. At [the] same time I have many doubts on the subject. We have found water in abundance where it never was expected ; and it is not impossible that, by digging to a considerable depth, the enemy may find it either in the old town, or along that part of the canal which they possess.

"In consequence of this persuasion, I am still strongly inclined to return to the attack of Alexandria the moment the rest of the country shall be in our possession ; until that place falls we are never secure against the exertions which France will make to retain this most important possession, the value of which even in its present state is immense, but which presents *capabilities* beyond calculation. One must feel some regret that there is a probability of its returning to the horrible government of the Turks, still more that there is a chance of its remaining with the French. If we had not more foreign possessions than we can manage or defend, and if it would not raise the whole world against us at a moment when we must try to keep at least some friends, I venture to say that a small addition to the present army would leave me neither of the causes of regret mentioned above.

"Supposing it not impossible that at the present moment the situation of affairs here may be of importance to be accurately known, I have written you this long detail, from which it may be fairly said that our allies and we have full as much of this country as the French. In order to render my account more intelligible, I send a plan of the triangle between Rhamanie, Alexandria, and the Rosetta, more accurate than anything published, although not entirely correct.

"The army remains perfectly healthy, the climate is delicious, our supplies of all kinds are abundant, in almost every respect our situation is the reverse of what we had been taught to expect.

"The fleet which escaped from Brest has given us most serious alarm ; we know not now where they are gone. They were seen near Cape Bonna [Bon] in Africa three weeks ago, steering to northward ; that looks like an attack on Sicily or a return to Toulon. All calculations here are, of course, made *barring reinforcements to the enemy.*" *Copy.*

ARTHUR PAGET to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 23. Palermo.—“I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge your Lordship’s letter of the 20th February, the contents of which have given me as much real concern and uneasiness as any event which ever came to my knowledge. How we are to go on without your Lordship, Mr. Pitt, and Lord Spencer is what my mind is upon the rack about, and is likely to continue so, for I am confident that three such men are not to be found in Europe; and I own that the motive of their resignation, as I understand it, enhances their character in my opinion as much as any one of their public acts.

“I may now own to your Lordship that I am most completely disgusted with my present situation. My only wish is to be removed from it, and my wish is founded both on public and private reasons. Your Lordship is pretty well acquainted with the former, and General Acton’s late unaccountable conduct has considerably added to them. With regard to the latter, the appointments are really inadequate to the situation, the consequence is that I have always been and continue to be a burthen to my family, which is a most cruel reflection.

“Your Lordship will, of course, have heard every account from Egypt down to the 2nd April, which is the latest I know of; but I cannot help extracting a passage from a letter from my brother Edward who commands the 28th. He says, ‘with all the system and regularity of a Berlin review, the British never acted more like Britons than on these occasions.’ It seems that almost everything has been done with the bayonet.

“There is one subject which dwells sorely on my mind, it is Malta. You may rely upon it that if Captain Ball is not sent there, some mischief will happen.

“I sincerely hope for a continuation of your Lordship’s friendship.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, April 30.—“I have just now met Addington in the Park, who stopped to tell me the agreeable news of Mr. Lock the consul having arrived this morning through Paris, where Lucchesini told him on Friday last that the Consul had received accounts of a decisive action having taken place in Egypt in favour of the English who had taken Menou prisoner. Major Kerr, who came with Lock, heard this report likewise at Paris, accompanied with the circumstance of the French army having obtained a capitulation by which they evacuate the country. Lucchesini spoke with certainty of this news to Lock, and as he added that the French Government were

endeavouring to suppress the knowledge of it, that would account for the French papers of the 26th, which arrived yesterday, being silent on the subject.

"I should guess by this communication between Lucchesini and Lock that there is no cordiality between the Consul and the Prussian minister, and there will probably be less than ever now that Prussia has consented to open the German ports, though I do not find the evacuation of Hanover will follow upon that of Hamburg.

"Since my last conversation with you I have learnt from a channel upon which I can depend that the Prince strongly professes his determination to take no step of any sort, and that Lord Thurlow is of opinion that nothing should be said or done by the Prince or by any of his friends; this accords with what both you and I guessed would be the case, and you may depend upon this being the case as late as the day before yesterday. I was prevented from going to Stowe with my brother, who returns directly to town on Monday, and tells me he means to make you a special and separate visit to Dropmore."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1801, May 2. Dropmore.—"Mille graces pour votre lettre de dimanche. Vous savez tout l'intérêt que je prends à ce qui vous régarde personnellement, et je suis d'ailleurs trop attaché au système d'union entre nos deux Cours pour ne pas réjouir de ce que vous continuez d'occuper un poste où vous avez tant de moyens d'y contribuer.

"Vous etes trop bon Anglois pour ne pas vous réjouir avec moi du succès brillant et décisif d'Abercrombie. Ce qui me plait encore plus que la conquête de l'Egypte, c'est d'avoir montré à ces messieurs, qu'à nombre égal, le soldat Anglois vaut bien le François, et que nous sommes les memes Anglois par terre, qu'ils nous ont si souvent connu par mer." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, May 2. Dropmore.—"I feel it impossible for me to decline transmitting to you the enclosed letter from my relation Mr. Wyndham, with my best recommendation of the request it contains. You will find in the correspondence very strong acknowledgments from the British merchants of the uncommon zeal and activity he has repeatedly exerted in their behalf." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 4. Berlin.—"I must own I have no inclination to remain abroad in any situation under our present ministers,

whose incapacity I cannot disguise to myself ; and what you say on the subject of peace completes the measure of my alarm for the public interest.

“ We stand now in a very high situation, and the present crisis will establish our superiority, or deprive us of all the fruits of the struggle we have maintained.

“ I never doubted what would be your opinion of the convention of armistice. Captain Doyle, whom the admiral sent here, told me that our commanders considered Revel as the great object of their expedition, and that they had done everything in securing time for doing their business there. It is however pretty clear that the business is essentially done in the north, though we must not attempt to carry it with too high a hand ; because, if they do not speedily agree with us, we have, in fact, gained nothing by the battle of Copenhagen but honour, and the fleet must be supported by a considerable body of land forces to do anything decisive upon a second attack.

“ I have no idea of Bonaparte making peace but upon such terms as would be ruin to us, and indeed, the general opinion here in this respect accords with mine, and points to a new Continental war. The language of Prussia has been quite friendly ever since the battle. The plan of shutting the rivers was immediately declared to be abandoned, and I transmit by this messenger full assurances that the King of Prussia will not retain possession of the electorate. Affairs in that quarter are very critical. I have no doubt but that the order for the evacuation by the Prussians will be the signal for the entry of the French, who will march the instant they see a certainty of Russia and Prussia being reconciled to us, without waiting till any concert can be formed to prevent them.

“ There is some reason to think Haugwiz is tottering. Schulenburg will, in that case, be the man to come forward. Haugwiz has lately received and introduced an agent, who has resided here some time by connivance, as *chargé d'affaires* of the Batavian Republic. This has been commented with much disapprobation. The Hereditary Prince of Orange means to speak strongly to the King ; and, stating all his reasons for distrusting Haugwiz, to desire that some other minister may be named to treat the business of his indemnifications. It is openly talked of that the King is much displeased with the conduct of his affairs, and even Lombard is thought to be tottering.

“ Haugwiz tells me he has undoubted information that, by a secret convention between France and Spain, the latter is to pay for the Duke of Parma's establishment in Italy by large sacrifices in America and the West Indies.

“ Hamburgh will be evacuated by the Danes forthwith, and all impediments to trade and navigation in that city

and in the Elbe are removed. If my private affairs would permit me, I think Elizabeth might not dislike, and might not suffer in her health, but the contrary, by going to Vienna ; but I should really fear for her if she was to pass another winter here. However, for the reason I have already stated, I wish to return home ; and, as Lord Hawkesbury tells me Mr. Casamajor is coming to me, that circumstance is decisive. I will not remain with a man whom universal report describes in such colours."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 6. Charles Street.—" Instead of Lord Buckingham's return to town yesterday there arrived from him a letter of summons to his wife and children to go down to join him at Stowe where he proposes to remain the whole of this month ; with him therefore I have no opportunity of talking about the geography of Homer. I perfectly agree with you in wishing that we could have added with Reynell's assistance a new Homeric map to adorn the Adelphi edition, and I will make another effort upon that subject through Lord Spencer, although with no great hopes of success. But short of furnishing a new and valuable map, I should be sorry to see any addition ; anything of an inferior description or of a patched and garbled shape would rather clog and load our book than give to it either advantage or beauty. The Bryant controversy will make a very ample volume by itself, and if Carlyle keeps his word, I understand we are to expect from him what will much assist the formation of a new Homeric chart. Having however told you my own fancy on this subject, I can only desire you for the determination to please yourself, and in so doing you will be sure to please me. I do not now say anything of the account which you sent me ; because my bill *per contra* of maps and other things exceeds your demand upon me in some pounds, and it will be less trouble to settle all when all is paid. When it shall please God to send us a little rain I hope to come down to you for a day or two, and Fisher, as I find, has the same project.

" I hear no news either from Kew or from Egypt, but Lord St. Helens is still in town, and I am to meet Woronzow to-day at dinner at Lord Camden's.

" Pelham's marriage with Lady Osborn is announced, and Meadows is to carry his best brains to Dublin immediately. Does not Meadows' journey to Ireland put you in mind of the reason for sending Hamlet to England ; ' he shall recover his wits there, or if he do not, it is no great matter, for there the men be all as mad as he.' "

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 7. [Charles Street.]—"I found in Count Woronzow at Lord Camden's more inclination to talk to me of the affairs of his court than I knew how to disappoint, although I told him fairly that I had not accepted of his offer to send a letter from me to Count Panin, because I did not like even the semblance of mixing in business which I was ignorant of, and unconnected with. His wish however was, as I found by his conversation, that I should say to you what he imagined you might make useful to government from your acknowledged desire to serve them. The main point of this was that his hopes of things going on well at Petersburg were much improved by his finding that Krudener had already been charged to tell Lord Carysfort that the first communication made respecting the Russian adherence to the principles of the northern neutrality, was not to be taken *à la lettre*; and he seems confident that as soon as Kotchebey shall have arrived at Petersburg, the language there will be more direct and more favourable. Another good symptom likewise he thinks is to be found in a *circulaire*, which has arrived here as well as at the other courts, directing all correspondence to be addressed to Count Panin; and this he thinks favourable, not because he holds Panin in as high an estimation as he holds Kotchebey, but because it proves a diminished influence on the part of General Pahlen, whom he considers as more Swedish and Prussian than either English or Russian. He told me that he had sent a memoir to Count Panin, the object of which was to prove to him that the advantage of the new system of neutrality would be entirely Swedish instead of Russian; and he took occasion to express some anxiety that, though he had sent you a copy of this paper six days ago by the post to Dropmore, he had not yet heard from you, although he had desired you to send him the paper back. With this general conversation was mixed a good deal of question on his part as to the prudence of our government in so eagerly soliciting a negotiation for peace; and he expressed, quite as strongly as I myself feel it, great distrust of any real intention on the part of Bonaparte to make peace with us. He rests much upon the importance of our not entirely abandoning the coast of Egypt, if we succeed in driving the French from it; and he suggests, what in that case seems to me very desirable, if it shall be found practicable, namely that we should hold Alexandria and Rosetta and Damietta by Sepoy troops with British officers from India. How far the arrangements of the India army would admit of this may be a question, but there seems no doubt that troops of that description would have less to fear from climate malady and excess of every sort than European regiments who, under British discipline, would drop off in Egypt as rapidly as in the West Indies.

For himself he said he had fairly told Panin that he could be of no use for any other system than that of intimate alliance between Russia and Great Britain; that if that system was adopted at Petersburg he would again serve for ten or twelve months before he totally retired; but all that you have probably heard from himself."

Secret. LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, May 8. Dropmore.—"I think I cannot do better than send you the enclosed just as I received it. What Woronzow says of the dispositions of his court is very material; the rest may be more or less worth attention according to circumstances. I would certainly wish to urge in the strongest manner upon your consideration the suggestion respecting Alexandria. So long as the war lasts, if we do not hold Egypt we shall not and cannot have an hour's security that the French will not by intrigue or by force wrest the possession of it from the Turks, if we leave it solely in the keeping of the Ottoman Government. I am very confident that it would not be difficult, with a little management, to convince the Turks themselves of this.

"I cannot help taking this opportunity to express to you, with a freedom which I am sure you will not misinterpret, my strong doubts whether it be wise to go so far as I think Lord Hawkesbury said you were inclined to go, in consenting to the restitution of the Danish vessels taken by the effect of the embargo; and since I really believe that this disposition will give you no new facilities at Petersburg, where they will not care one farthing for the clamours of the Danish merchants; and I think the permanent interests of this country are very much concerned in leaving at Copenhagen a strong impression of the certain loss which Denmark incurs when she embarks in any such confederacy as the present. Beside this consideration, I think the probable discontent which such a restitution must create in our navy a very serious consideration. It seems to me that nothing can be clearer than the line of considering Parker's declaration as a declaration of war, which in effect it was; and proceeding thereupon to the condemnation of the Danish prizes. But if you once suffer the question respecting them to be mixed in your negotiations at Petersburg, you create a point of honour there, which it will be very difficult to get over." *Copy.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 8. Downing Street.—"I have had the honour to receive your kind letter this morning which, under the calamity that I have suffered, has afforded me great conso-

lation; as I cannot but consider it as a clear proof of my continuing to preserve that place in your friendship, which I have ever considered as the most honourable and flattering circumstance of my life."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 9.—"The *Louisa* is arrived and brings a naval lieutenant with dispatches from Lord Keith up to the 19th, on which day the *Louisa* left Alexandria. This evening's gazette will be a better history of the killed and wounded than I can give to you who have heard no names, but I write this line to tell you that Lord Spencer has conversed with the lieutenant whom he describes to be a very intelligent man, and is highly satisfied with the accounts he brings of our general situation in the country, and the warm confidence which he expresses of the certain success of our expedition. He describes the troops to be very healthy, and very much satisfied with the skill of their general; he says that communication has been had with the interior of the country who appear to be well disposed to us; that there is the most perfect good understanding between Keith and Abercrombie, and that the gallantry of our troops at their first landing exceeded all that had been seen by any of those who had been in former actions. Our whole loss of killed and wounded up to his departure is very heavy, not less than 1,600; that of the French is described by him however to exceed 3,000. It is a mortifying circumstance that the frigate which got into Alexandria was seen by the *Flora*, but the Frenchman, having got our private signal, was regarded as an English frigate till it was too late to recover her from under the guns of Alexandria.

"The Paris accounts still insist that they have 18,000 men in Egypt, but if their army had been anything really considerable they would have been enabled to collect a much larger force to dispute our landing, as the contrary winds kept us six successive days before we were able to land. I tremble for our Dutch negotiator at Petersburg, for I hear his language before he went was in the lowest possible key, and that he held forth by the hour upon the folly of maintaining what he called *abstract questions of right*, and upon the *impossibility of England maintaining any system against the inclination of the united powers of the north of Europe!!!*

"Lord Egremont tells me he is sorry to find that Law and Erskine tell him it is of the greatest importance to his brother's cause that you should be subpoenaed to prove that he could not follow his wife to England without having first obtained the king's leave of absence from Italy. I thought however I might safely say it was not a trouble that you would object to, if it really was deemed necessary to the success of the case."

HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 12, Downing Street.—“I really cannot sufficiently express to your Lordship my sense of obligation for the unreserved manner in which you communicate to me opinions to which I attach the greatest value and importance. In the suggestion respecting Alexandria I entirely concur. With regard to the vessels, now in our ports in consequence of the embargo, I own to you I have some doubts of which, I cannot help thinking, you would partake if I had an opportunity, which a letter does not well afford, of stating to you all the circumstances of our situation with reference to the northern powers, particularly Denmark. I am however satisfied of the propriety of proceeding to condemn captures made at sea, since the declaration of Sir Hyde Parker.

“The Lord Chancellor saw the King this morning, and his report is satisfactory to the greatest degree.”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, May 15. Dropmore.—“I have many thanks to return you for your Egyptian news, which, but for the loss of poor Abercrombie, I should consider as very favourable. It seems evident that we had rated Menou’s force too high, but that in military preparation is a fault on the right side.

“I can perfectly understand that a correct judgment cannot be formed on the question which I mentioned to you without the knowledge of many circumstances with which I am necessarily unacquainted. But I owed it in friendship and good wishes to you to express to you my general impressions on the subject, when they happen to be as strong as they are on that point, and I was confident you would see it, as you have done, in its true light.” *Copy.*

Enclosure.

Egyptian news, communicated by Mr. Addington.

“The despatches from General Hutchinson and Lord Keith go down to the 7th of April and give an account of the battle of the 21st. The French made the attack with nearly their whole force, having collected at Alexandria twelve demi-brigades of infantry, of the fourteen they have in Egypt, and all their cavalry except one regiment. The conflict was most severe, the enemy behaving with great spirit; but they were everywhere repulsed by the superior steadiness and bravery of the army, and retired to Alexandria with the loss of 3,000 men. The British lost in killed and wounded about 1,300. Sir Ralph Abercromby received a mortal wound early in the action, but continued to direct it till the

close, when he was carried off, having fainted through loss of blood. This great officer died on board the *Foudroyant*, on the 28th.

"General Hutchinson appears to have conducted the affairs of the army with great judgment since the 21st. The troops continue very healthy and are abundantly supplied with provisions and water.

"The Capitan Pasha was arrived with six sail of the line, and about five thousand land forces, said to be tolerably good.

"An expedition against Rosetta was on the point of proceeding under Colonel Spencer. General Moore's wound is slight.

"The French army that made the attack on the 21st is stated at between eleven and twelve thousand men. Generals Lanusse, Baudet, and Riouse were killed; Regnier and three other generals wounded."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 17. Stowe.—"I have not altered my plan of passing some days with you at Dropmore, though I varied my arrangements after I got here; for having found the seed wholly in the ground, and my yeomen impatient for their fourteen days, I determined to get rid of that duty now, that I might not be called for it from Essex in the course of the summer. We therefore embody to-morrow.

"I should think from Hutchinson's letter that the question of Alexandria must be now quite clearly decided in our favour; and what is equally material is, that we appear to have broken that magical invincibility *sur terre* of the great nation; and not by one accidental advantage, but by a systematic operation, and in three distinct and heavy actions. Every thing seems to point out the battle of the 21st as the last serious struggle in that country; though I do not expect that Alexandria will capitulate till Menou knows as clearly as we do, that Gantheaume is *hors du combat*. And what is to be the result of all this? excepting always the wreath of laurel which it is to give to those so well entitled to it, I mean the *new* ministry. Will it shake Bonaparte, and give us the prolongation of the war on the same grounds as Brissot originally made the war; or will the great man make the peace and keep it? My own speculations rather lead me to think that for him *omnis salus bello est*; for the Jacobins will be too strong for him if he weakens his army, which he must do after a peace; and, at all events, I think that our present most unwise, ministers run much too violently into a language and conduct the most unlikely to lower the tone of French insolence. All I hear of Ireland inclines me to think that he will strike at it if he can at any risk get his fleet to sea, and get 10,000 men on shore; in which case I hope that the Lord Primate, as the

least mad of the three, will command the army, and leave Lord Hardwicke and General Meadows at Dublin to take care of the Church.

"But from all these details of ministers and generals, it is most delightful to turn to our prospects of harvest, and hitherto there never was a more lovely prospect. And the last genial week of south-west rain has given a new face to the country; and, thank God, a new face, and that a very long one, to all the mealmen and bakers."

Postscript. "My son is gone to Avington to cool his indignation by trout-fishing. I do think that Addington deserved most richly the dressing that Dick gave him. Will they venture to *prorogue* the Parliament? Surely that question deserves much serious consideration."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 18. Southampton.—"Je suis tout aussi peu satisfait de la *politique temporisante et cédente*, que vous l'êtes vous-même à ce que vois. Vous vous souvenez que je vous ai dit à ce sujet la dernière fois que j'ai eu le plaisir de vous voir; j'ai dit la même chose à Monsieur Pitt, à Monsieur Addington, et à Lord Hawkesbury. J'ai fait mon devoir en bon Russe; c'est à ceux qui gouvernent à faire le leurs en bon Anglois; car je vois que, chez nous et ici, on ne s'aperçoit pas qu'on joue le jeu qui convient aux intérêts de la Suède, de la Prusse, et de la France."

LORD HOBART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 19. Berkeley Square.—"You will probably have heard from Lord Carrington that the second reading of the Enclosure Bill is fixed for Friday, and as we shall certainly have a great difficulty in carrying it through our House, and therefore be very much in want of your assistance, I should hope you would be able to attend.

"I have had some, though not much communication with Lord Eldon upon the subject; and although I cannot say he is very confident in his expectation of the success of the measure, he is, I believe, disposed to try it as an experiment; and upon that ground, I have no doubt, will give it his support.

"From all I can learn respecting our situation in Egypt, I conceive that if the French are not considerably reinforced, and our troops do not become very unhealthy, we must succeed.

"The position of both armies when the last accounts came away was such as to render an attack on either side too hazardous to be attempted; but it is confidently said that, as we command the canal of Alexandria, the French must

make some great effort before or during the month of August in order to obtain a supply of water.

"The hot season was certainly coming on, but our people were encamped near the sea, had finished their entrenchments, and would probably have no duties of fatigue to perform; and above all, the tempestuous period being over, we were likely to make the blockade of the port effectual.

"You will, I am persuaded, have received better accounts from others, but I could not suffer so interesting a subject to pass wholly unnoticed."

LORD HOBART to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 22. Berkeley Square.—"The Bill is ordered for committal, though not without some very inauspicious appearances.

"We were forced to fix on Wednesday as the only open day next week; but if you cannot attend, we must postpone it to the Monday following. Be so good as to let me know whether you are likely to be able to come to the House on that day, as I should endeavour to prevail on as many persons as I can to be present, and should not wish to make the exertion for Wednesday if we are likely to put off the debate.

"The Chancellor, I fear, will work himself into determined hostility to the measure, though he unquestionably conveyed a very different intention in his conversation with me."

Most private. J. K[ING] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, May 28.—"I hope we shall be able to return with, or soon to follow you to Dropmore. I was so thoroughly convinced before I received your note of the truth of your suggestion, that I had, last night, a serious conversation with the Duke on his return from Bulstrode. He has this morning seen Addington, and if Pelham feels as he ought and I trust will do on the subject, an arrangement may be made by translating Lord Liverpool to the Presidency and Pelham to the Duchy, which would keep the Duke here for the present. I found, not on the part of Pelham but in another quarter, an eagerness to accomplish the change which satisfied me that no time was to be lost in representing to his grace the bad effects of the change, which he was in no respect called upon to make, and by which the real interests of Government would suffer. I believe Addington is convinced as well as the public of the value and disinterestedness of the Duke. More when we meet."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, May—June.] "Je ne me pardonnerai pas à moi-même si je ne m'empresse point d'informer mon ami

d'un événement auquel mon cœur me dit que le sien voudra bien prendre part. Un courier de Vienne en m'apportant les assurances et les preuves les plus flatteuses de la satisfaction de mon maître, scellées d'une générosité sans exemple dans mon pays, m'annonce la volonté de sa majesté que je reste en Angleterre, où elle juge que mes services peuvent lui être essentiels. La noblesse de mon souverain envers moi a fermé la bouche à l'économie de celui qui vouloit que je quittasse ce poste, et l'Empereur a bien voulu me permettre de le servir ici au lieu de m'employer autre part. Mon attachement à votre patrie me fait jouir doublement des bontés de ma cour. Ce sentiment y a bien plus de part que l'amour propre. Nous causerons sur cet objet la première fois que j'aurai l'honneur de vous voir. Me voici dévoué à jamais à celui qui me traite aussi bien. Je suis convaincu que vous partagez tout ce que j'éprouve, et j'aime à me flatter que vous ne doutez point que la Cour de Londres ne peut pas avoir un ministre impérial plus imbû des bons principes et plus anglais que ne l'est celui que vous honorez de votre amitié."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 1. Wimbledon.—"I have your letter respecting the sketch of the movements of the army in Egypt. Upon looking at it you will see it is entirely confined to that. What I send you is a copy of what I caused to be made from the one communicated to me by General Dundas. I have no other, and, therefore, when you have done with it return it to me. I have no objection, of course, to your ordering a copy to be taken for yourself.

"It is still our intention to see you before going north, and I thought of doing it the end of this week, and to have gone straight from Dropmore to Scotland. But I am afraid I shall be detained here some days longer than I intended. The Accomptant of the India Board is to be here this morning with the accounts which are arrived from India, and which, agreeable to the Act of Parliament, have been laid before the House of Commons. If they are complete or in sufficient order to be reduced into the shape of a Budget, I am afraid I cannot be so shabby as to turn my back upon it, even out of office; and, if I undertake it, I suspect it will lead me into a somewhat more detailed explanation than if I had been to remain in office, or had the prospect of doing it after the return of peace; when the whole system, with all its consequences retrospective and prospective, will fall in propriety to be stated to the House."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 3, Downing Street.—"I have the honour to send your Lordship the inclosed letters which I have this morning

received, and also the extract of a letter from Mr. Thornton containing some observations on the use of Indian corn. I expect another letter by the next packet on this subject, which I will lose no time in transmitting to your Lordship."

Enclosure I.

— THORNTON to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1801, March 9, Washington.—"I write immediately to Baltimore to Mr. Wood, His Majesty's Vice-Consul, to procure the 20 barrels of Indian corn which Lord Grenville desires ; and I will give him, as well as other merchants, notice that they may ship corn for this object of feeding horses. I would refer you to Mr. Strickland for the most accurate information upon this point, for he paid great attention to it here, and spoke highly in its praise ; and you will give me leave to add the little I have learnt on the subject. In general, for horses employed in the common work of the farm or the draught, it is an excellent food, but there is danger in long journies of horses foundering upon it, unless the corn is very old and dry. New corn will swell in the stomach, and is very dangerous. I shall make it a point in a day or two to get certain and accurate information on the whole of this business, and I desire Mr. Wood to procure the oldest corn he can find. People here mix their Indian corn with bran, moistened with water, with chopped straw and chopped corn stalks, particularly when green ; whether this corrects the injurious effect of corn I know not. It is certain that, in the Southern States, oats are rarely used." *Extract.*

Enclosure II.

VICE-CONSUL WOOD to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1801, April 10, Baltimore.—"I beg leave to trouble you with the enclosed letter for the Right Honourable Lord Grenville ; it is on the subject of 20 barrels of Indian corn which Mr. Thornton says you have directed to be shipped on account of his Lordship.

"Of this grain, and the meal that is ground from it, there are immense quantities shipping for the ports of Great Britain and Ireland, which cannot fail to be a reasonable supply of nutritious food, and will no doubt greatly relieve the poorer classes of His Majesty's subjects."

Private. WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 4. Vienna.—"In my letter of the 18th February I desired your Lordship would have the goodness to

inform me whether I should continue to draw on the Secretary of State for my current and extraordinary expenses, or leave the whole as a charge on the commissariat, from whom I had been supplied with all that I wanted since the arrival of Mr. Wood on the Continent. Not having received any answer to that letter, I have drawn as usual on the Secretary of State according to my original instructions, and I send your Lordship enclosed a copy of the letter of advice I have written on the occasion to Lord Hawkesbury, from the contents of which I trust that your Lordship will be satisfied that, in what regards my personal expenses, I have neither exceeded your Lordship's expectations, nor what I was justly and fairly called upon to expend. Indeed, to say the honest truth, I am myself surprised to find that I have expended so little.

"I have had no answer on the subject of the service of plate concerning which I wrote to your Lordship in the same letter. At present I am the value of the service out of pocket, not daring to carry that article to account without an express authority to that effect, notwithstanding your Lordship's private letter, of which, of course, I shall never make any use but with your Lordship.

"I hope to leave this place on the tenth, and arrive in England about the 12th."

Enclosing : a copy of an official letter to Lord Hawkesbury, with an account of personal expenses for one year, amounting to 4,685*l*.

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 4. Crillon's Hotel, Brook Street.—"Je suis ici depuis hier-au-soir, ayant reçu des lettres de créance dans mon ancien caractère, parce qu'au moment de leurs expédition, on ignoroit chez nous la nomination de Lord St. Helens comme ambassadeur en Russie. J'aurais aujourd'hui à trois heures l'honneur de présenter mes créditives à sa Majesté le Roi dans la maison de la Reine. J'ai cru de mon devoir de vous informer de ça, comme un ami qui s'intéresse à tout ce qui me regarde."

Private. WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 11. Vienna.—"I send your Lordship, with real satisfaction and pleasure, the enclosed account of the moneys actually expended for the subsidiary corps, every possible article of expense included except loss on exchange and commission. From each of the three sovereigns who furnished their troops I have obtained receipts in full of all

demands, as well as from the contractors, and acknowledgements that all claims whatever have been satisfied by the British Government.

"The whole expense is very much within the estimate, a circumstance that may, in some measure, be attributed to your lordship's influence; for no other consideration but my personal attachment to your lordship, and the repeated and unbounded marks of friendship, consideration, and confidence I received from you, could ever have made me go through with the labour I had undertaken, or bear up against the numberless difficulties and vexations of every kind which I had to encounter.

"Your lordship may now perhaps have the leisure to compare the sums expended on this occasion with those incurred by former subsidiary treaties. It will be only when this shall be done, fully and fairly, that I shall have any hope of having my labour on this occasion estimated by others than your lordship, at what in my conscience I believe them to be worth."

Enclosure: An account of money disbursed for the pay and subsistence of foreign troops in the service of Great Britain, amounting to 1,281,260*l*.

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 12. Downing Street.—"I have the pleasure to return to your lordship Count Wedel's letter, and the copies of your answer to it, and of your letter to Lord Hawkesbury. His lordship has desired me to express his sense of your kindness in communicating to him Count Wedel's letter; but he is of opinion that, as Count Bernstorff may be hourly expected, Mr. S——'s being *advised* to quit the kingdom at the very moment of the arrival of the former, might have a suspicious appearance; and therefore that it is most expedient to wait until Count Bernstorff's arrival, and for Lord Hawkesbury to state to him in their first interview that Mr. S——'s conduct in this country was such as to render his presence here no longer expedient, and that the order for his departure had been suspended only by the expectation of shortly seeing Count Bernstorff, and of explaining to him the motives of this measure.

"The inclosed letter to your lordship was received by the mail which arrived this morning. There is an account of Lord Carysfort being greatly recovered from his accident, of which I presume that your lordship has had an account. If you should not, I think it right to mention that, in consequence of a fall down stairs, Lord Carysfort had dislocated his shoulder; but he states in his letter by this mail that he was then so well as to be able to venture out in his carriage."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 13. London.—“I have just heard from the Bishop of Bangor that the thirty copies of l[arge] p[age] and small will be sent by the waggon of next week to Charles Street. They have determined not to make their sheet of *variantes* a part of their edition, and they give us for our private property six copies of l[arge] p[age] and six of small. I think they judge right upon the whole, and our own six copies will be the more valuable for this exception in our favour. The Bishop desires that you will be so good as to pay in at Child’s immediately one hundred guineas, for the use of the Clarendon Press, to the account of Dr. Marlow, Vice-Chancellor. He apologises for asking guineas instead of pounds by stating the increased expense of Porson’s collation; and I have, in consequence, ventured to assure him that if he can suggest to us any decorous mode of our contributing to lessen that expense to the University Press, we shall readily and willingly adopt it.

“My dealers in house and land are so good as to give me a great deal of trouble about my little cottage, without advancing in the business. I shall therefore abandon the thing to the newspaper and to Froggatt, and hope in two or three days to come down to you at Coleshill.

“The last wonder that I hear of is Sir C. Grey’s intended peerage; as he and his son have not quarrelled, how is it possible that the son should acquiesce in so gross a sacrifice of his views of power and ambition. I understand nothing done by Opposition, and scarce anything done by Government, who seem to me all at sixes and sevens.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 17. Wimbledon.—“Doing my last duties to India has kept me here at least three weeks more than I intended. I will however perform my promise of not going from this without seeing you and Lady Grenville at Dropmore. We cannot pay you a long visit at present, but we will be with you before dinner on Saturday, and stay till Monday.

“Thinking of seeing you at the time I received the enclosed, I did not send it to you, but, as nothing further has arrived since, you may probably like to read the enclosed private letter from Colonel Anstruther to Colonel Brownrigg.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, June 22. Charlottenburg.—“I am very sorry to see by one of your letters that you think it probable the present

ministry may listen to terms of peace with France not corresponding either with the advantages we have gained or a due regard to our future security. If, in the present state of the French armies, peace would not expose the dominion of Bonaparte to hazard, it is obviously good policy for France to purchase, even by large concessions, the means of restoring their marine, in order to begin a new war with us upon more equal terms. I think however I can distinguish in all the measures and publications of the French Government such a spirit that, it may fairly be presumed, they will bring forward demands to which even the present ministry will have too much sense and courage to subscribe. The two points on which I find it most difficult to make up my mind are Hanover and Portugal. The sincerity of this Court with respect to the former is much to be suspected; and I fear we have no means of protecting either. The occupation of Hanover by the French must be a circumstance of alarm to Denmark, and perhaps it might not be impossible to engage that Court, and Sweden also, to lend their troops for its defence. The Hanoverian army is, for its numbers I believe, very good, and would easily be augmented. These forces, with the addition of 10,000 British, might make a stand sufficient to encourage Prussia, or at least to keep her in check. Haugwiz professes to be waiting upon the court of St. Petersburg, and it is certain that Lucchesini is in such disgrace at Paris that Bonaparte has caused it to be notified here that he will not treat with him; but, nevertheless, and in spite of many hints about concert against France, I cannot help suspecting that the two Governments understand each other, and in particular are very likely to agree about Hanover. While the business with the northern powers remains unsettled, and the conduct of Prussia is equivocal respecting Hanover, I think I cannot well avail myself of my leave of absence.

Postscript. "Having expressed so much disgust at the appointment of Mr. Casa Major, I think it but justice to say that I find him much less formidable than I expected. He is very sensible, and has pleasing and gentlemanlike manners, and his behaviour to me is as attentive and obliging as possible. But he is captious with others to a degree that must make him miserable, and, unless he can be broke of it, will certainly bring him into scrapes."

OFFICIAL BULLETIN.

1801, June 29. Downing Street.—"Intelligence has been this day received from Lord Elgin (dated May 23rd) that General Hutchinson with 4,000 British troops and an equal number of Turks, had, on the 9th ultimo, defeated the French near Rahnanieh and obliged them to retire towards Cairo,

after leaving a small garrison in the intrenchments of Rahnanieh.

"On the 10th the fort surrendered, and the combined force then proceeded towards Cairo, having concerted their movements with the Grand Vizir, who was then at El Hanka, a position about four leagues from Cairo. Our loss at Rahnanieh is stated not to exceed 30 men.

"A reinforcement of 3,000 British troops had arrived at Aboukir about the 6th of May."

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 11. London.—"Un courier de Lord St. Helens, arrivé par mer aujourd'hui de Petersbourg, a apporté la convention signée par lui, le dix-sept juin, avec le Comte Panin, et ce dernier me l'a communiqué aussi. Elle est bien faite, et termine tous les différends sur les principes des neutres d'une manière satisfaisante pour ce pays et pour le mien. La Suède et le Denemarc n'ont rien su de cette convention, et on vat la leurs communiquer en leurs ofrent d'y accéder si elle veulent. Je la fairai copier, et je vous l'enverrai lundi ou mardi."

Enclosure. COUNT PANIN TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1801, June 18. St. Petersburg.—"Le traité qui rétablit la paix entre l'empire de Russie et la Grande Bretagne a été signé hier, dix-sept du courant; je m'empresse d'en transmettre l'agréable nouvelle à votre excellence, et je profite du courier de Lord St. Helens pour vous faire tenir la copie de notre convention, avec ses articles séparés et secrets.

"Cet acte va être communiqué confidentiellement aux Cours de Stockholm et de Copenhague par une déclaration qui les invitera à y accéder, et il semble que l'une et l'autre ne peuvent recevoir qu'avec réconnoissance les stipulations que notre auguste maître a arrêtées eu leur faveur. Sa Majesté Impériale vous défère le caractère d'ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à la Cour de Londrès. Le rescrit par lequel l'Empereur vous invite à accepter ce titre honorable est déjà signé, de même que la lettre de créance; et un courier, dont je hâte l'expédition autant que possible, vous les apportera peut-être en même tems que la présente. Il sera chargé également de toutes les pièces relatives à la négociation qui vient de se terminer si heureusement.

"Sa Majesté Impériale désire que vous mettiez tous vos soins à faire accélérer l'expédition des ratifications du Roi, et nous avons tout lieu de croire que cette tâche vous sera facile à remplir." *Copy.*

Private. GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 11. Downing Street.—“I am desired by Lord Hawkesbury to inform you that a cutter arrived this morning from Petersburg with a convention signed on the 17th of last month by Lord St. Helens and Count Panin. By this convention the right of visiting by royal ships of war, but not by privateers, neutral vessels sailing under convoy is distinctly recognized; and no other restriction is attached to the mode of exercising this right than such as Lord St. Helens by his instructions was authorized to admit. In this and in all other respects (all our principles of maritime law being solemnly recognized) the convention is as satisfactory as could be desired. Sweden and Denmark are invited to accede to it, but Lord St. Helens would not consent to Prussia's being invited, and insisted that the adjustment of the differences with that power, in consequence of the predicament in which it had placed itself, should become the subject of a separate arrangement. The Emperor of Russia also agrees by the convention to grant an equitable compensation for the losses sustained by British shipping in consequence of the embargo in Russia.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 13. London.—“J'ai passé ce matin chez Monsieur Pitt pour lui lire la convention signé à Petersbourg, en cas qu'il ne l'a pas eu des ministres actuels, après quoi je voulois vous l'envoyer à Dropmore. Je n'ai pas trouvé Monsieur Pitt à sa maison, où on m'a dit qu'il est à la campagne, et ne reviendra que demain. En même tems j'ai appris par hazard que vous deviez venir ce soir en ville.

“Je vous envoie donc ces pièces, en vous prient de les communiquer à Monsieur Pitt après que vous les aurez lue, et de le prier de me les renvoyer à Welbec Street, No. 55.

“Demain matin sera achevée la copie de ces mêmes papiers que je vous enverrai, et que vous pourrez garder si vous le voulez.

“Je suis bien aise d'apprendre que vous venez ici, car vous ne seriez jamais guéri de votre fluxion à la campagne, ne peuvent vous empêcher d'aller à cheval, et de rester à l'air malgré les vents et la pluie.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 14. Downing Street.—“I have the honour to transmit to your lordship, by Lord Hawkesbury's desire, the dispatches received on Saturday last from Lord St. Helens, inclosing the convention.

“It was my intention to have waited upon your lordship this morning, but I have been prevented by business; I however hope to have that pleasure to-morrow.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HAWKESBURY.

1801, July 15. Camelford House.—“I received last night from Mr. Hammond the despatch, with the treaty enclosed, from Lord St. Helens, which he sent me by your directions. While I congratulate you sincerely on the restoration of friendship between this country and Russia, I owe it to you in friendship not to conceal from you the great uneasiness which I have felt on reading some parts of the treaty, the objections to which I am persuaded escaped Lord St. Helens’s attention, when he consented to them on the part of this country.

“It has always been my system when a thing is done to endeavour to make the best of it; but as I understand that you have it in contemplation to propose an additional article to remedy the omission by which the commerce between France and her colonies is opened to neutrals—contrary to the now undisputed law and uniform practice of this country—I cannot let any false delicacy prevent my submitting to your consideration whether other amendments should not be attempted upon points not less essential than that is. You will easily judge that I can have no other motive for doing so than friendship and good wishes towards yourself and the Government of which you form a part, and an anxiety for the public interests. At the same time it is very possible I may be mistaken in some of my apprehensions, and the rather as I write this without any book of treaties to refer to.

“In paragraph 1, of article 3, in the copy sent me, the words are *pouvront naviguer librement aux ports sur les côtes des nations en guerre*. But I presume the word *et* is omitted by mistake of the copyist between *ports et sur*. And if this be the case, I apprehend that it is at least very doubtful whether, in fair construction, a right to trade freely not only to the ports, but also *sur les côtes*, along the coasts, may not be understood to include the right of trading from port to port, which it was the very object of Lord St. Helens to exclude, and which we never can yield without great detriment to our interests. The inconvenience resulting from paragraph 2 in its present form I understand you are aware of. But the great difficulty I feel is on paragraph 3. I conceive we have always maintained that, by reason of the thing itself, and by the general principle of the law of contraband of war, naval stores serving for the equipment of ships of war are necessarily included under that description; and consequently that every case of treaty in which we have agreed to a more limited enumeration was an exception to this general principle; but that, where no treaty exists, the principle equally applies to naval as to military stores. This doctrine it seems to me particularly important for us to maintain at this moment, when we have no commercial treaty with Holland, and probably shall have none if we were to-morrow at peace with her; and when our commercial treaties both with

America and Russia itself are of limited and short duration. Now the words of this paragraph plainly declare not that the king agrees to let such and such articles pass freely on board Russian ships, although they are contraband of war, but that both the king and the emperor agree as to what *ought to be called* contraband of war, and declare that they *acknowledge as such* no other articles except the military stores enumerated in the treaty; adding—which is still more extraordinary—that all other articles not only are not contraband, but *are not naval stores, ne seront pas réputés munitions de guerre et navales*.

“When Russia hitherto has hesitated to renew her commercial treaties we have always had to say to her that with them had also fallen to the ground the special privilege granted by them to Russia as to the transport of naval stores, and that no treaty existing, the general law of nations on the subject revived and would, in case of war, be exercised by us. But now we have not only given this special privilege to Russia by a permanent treaty independent of all commercial treaties—a measure at best of very doubtful policy—but we have declared the exception itself to be the general rule, and have recognized the special privilege as matter of universal right. I speak from much experience of negotiation with America when I venture to assure you that, if my apprehension of the fair construction of this stipulation be just, and the matter is as I have stated it, you will find the effects of this alteration of your ground most sensibly when you come to treat with the United States for the renewal of our treaty with them.

“I have not the former Russian treaties by me to refer to, and will not delay this letter for the purpose of looking into them, because, if any alteration can be made, time is precious. But I cannot help thinking from recollection that the old treaties as renewed—I think—in 1797, were not liable to this objection; and even if they were so, the present occasion was one where it was highly important to rectify an error leading to such extensive and dangerous consequences.

“In paragraph 4, the distinction between *et* and *ou* seems rather too nice for supporting so material a claim as that we assert of blocking our enemies’ ports by cruising squadrons, especially because the neutral argument against such blockade has always been that our ships so cruising were not *at all times suffisamment proches*, to constitute an evident danger of entering.

“Paragraph 5 is, I fear, in the first sentence in direct contradiction with what we must maintain and what the 4th article seems to intend to maintain; I mean the right of detaining *on suspicion* as stated in all the former treaties. It is here expressly said that ships shall not be detained except for *de justes causes et faits évidens*; so that to justify detention there must be manifest and certain facts in violation of neutrality, and damages must now be given by our courts whenever

ships are detained without such manifest facts. Whereas the present practice is to restore without costs in those cases where the captor has had reasonable grounds of suspicion, though he cannot bring such proof as will justify condemnation.

"Now I am afraid you will think me very critical when I come to speak of the 4th paragraph of the 4th article, but I do not in my conscience think that any sworn arbitrator of competent understanding and knowledge of the law and practice of treaties would construe the first sentence of this paragraph in the sense which Lord St. Helens wishes to give to it, and without which it gives up the whole point for which we armed and fought at Copenhagen. The practice contended for by Denmark was that their fleets sailing under convoy should be exempted from all other search except that our ships of war might send an officer on board the neutral ship of war and there receive communication of the papers and certificates belonging to the different merchant ships of the convoy ; adding that if these papers were found *en regle* no other search could take place. How does this paragraph vary from that claim ? No otherwise than by adding the words and *s'il n'existe aucun motif valable de suspicion*. But let me ask you how it is possible that a *motif valable de suspicion* can exist previous to the actual search of the ship. It can never be, except in the single and very rare case where the Government has received previous intelligence of some contraband or fraudulent trade with the enemy, and sends its cruisers out to intercept the particular ship to which such information relates.

"In the present practice the search precedes the suspicion. We examine the papers on board the ship to which they relate. We compare them with the appearance of the ship and its crew and cargo. We question the crew, we judge on the spot of an infinite variety of small circumstances which often constitute just ground of suspicion ; and the officer then acts at the peril of paying the costs and charges of the vessel which he unjustly detains. But when he, being on board a Danish frigate, is shown through a spy glass a certain number of ships (suppose they were actually French ships with crews entirely French, loaded with gunpowder, and destined to a blockaded port), and is then desired to look at a set of papers *en regle* which the Danish captain keeps in his cabin for twenty years together, to be applied to all possible ships he may have under his convoy, what can the British officer do, or what *motif valable de suspicion* can there arise from the distant view of the ship to which he is told these papers apply, and which he is not permitted to search unless such a motive already exists, and is declared by him to the neutral captain of the convoy. And all this too, not under the former penalty of paying the costs of undue detention, but under that of *further punishment* ; a term which I doubt whether you will find in the whole code of our maritime treaties ; but which was certainly never before used to secure neutral vessels against search and detention.

“To all these objections you must allow me to add one more against the 8th article, where again Lord St. Helens seems to have been betrayed into the admission of the very thing which he professes himself to have wished to combat; and I fear has been so betrayed by the same original error which has led to so much other mischief in framing this treaty, the consenting to take as the basis of it the inadmissible conventions of armed neutrality concluded in 1780 and 1801 between the northern powers. You will, I am sure, not have overlooked the circumstance that in this 8th article we bind ourselves, not only that these stipulations shall be permanent *as between* the contracting parties, but, in the very words of the neutral conventions, that they shall serve as a constant rule to the contracting parties in all matters of commerce and navigation; which necessarily implies that they are to be a rule to us in our transactions with other powers as well as with Russia; or, in other words, that they are, as Lord St. Helens expresses it, ‘to convert the present special engagement into a general rule of maritime law.’ If the words have not this sense they are useless, for every treaty binds the contracting parties in their transactions with each other.

“I need make no excuse to you for the length of this letter, for, if my apprehensions are just, you never can be called upon to consider more important questions than this instrument involves; and I should have been deficient indeed in that openness and sincerity which I trust you will always find in all my conduct, if I did not take the very first moment to express to you without reserve the sentiments which the first perusal of this treaty has impressed me with. I shall be sincerely glad either to be convinced that I am wrong, or to learn that means have still been found to prevent the mischiefs which, if I am unhappily right, must follow from the ratification of this treaty.” *Copy.*

HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 15. Wimbledon.—“I need not say that a recommendation from your lordship would always have great weight with me; but, in the present instance, I have not the merit of acting upon it, as my best services in favour of Sir Christopher Pegge were promised this morning to the Duke of Portland, who is unquestionably a perfectly proper person to succeed Dr. Vivian in his professorship.

“If twelve o’clock to-morrow should perfectly suit you, I shall be happy to see you at that hour.”

Private. GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 15. Downing Street.—“I am very sorry that I have been prevented from fulfilling my intention of waiting

upon you this morning, first by the rain, and afterwards by the mail and a Cabinet which is now sitting.

"As I understand from Talbot that your lordship returns to Dropmore to-morrow, and as I expect to have more leisure next week than I shall probably have for some time to come, I propose to myself the pleasure of paying my respects to your lordship and Lady Grenville at Dropmore on Sunday next, if that time should be perfectly convenient to your lordship. If it should not, I will defer my visit to another period.

"In order that no time might be lost I gave your lordship's letter to Lord Hawkesbury this morning, but he has promised to return it to me in order that a copy of it may be taken by either Mr. Wynne or myself.

"I inclose a bulletin of the intelligence received from Lord Elgin relative to Egypt."

Enclosure.

"General Baird is arrived at Suez with the reinforcements from India. Colonels Murray and Wellesley are with him.

"The Grand Vizir has defeated the French near Cairo.

"There are no details of this action.

"General Sir John Hutchinson has taken prisoners 700 French who had attempted to embark on the Lake Burlos, in order to escape to France. He has also taken 500 camels and 100 dromedaries, who were conveying provisions to Alexandria, together with 800 French troops (of which 200 were cavalry) who composed the escort."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 18. London.—"Je vous envoie la copie d'une lettre que j'ai reçue hier par courrier. Elle vous fera plaisir par l'amitié que vous avez pour moi. J'ai indiqué à Lord Hawksbury, Lord Carysford, et il m'a promi de lui en faire la proposition."

Enclosure.

ALEXANDER I., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA to COUNT
WORONZOW.

1801, June 10. St. Petersburg.—"En ordonnant à mon ministère de vous faire connoître dans tous ses détails la négociation qu'il vient de terminer heureusement avec le Lord St. Helens, je me suis réservé la satisfaction de vous témoigner tous les sentimens qu'a excités dans mon ame la lecture de votre intéressante dépêche du dix-huit mai dernier. Non, assurément, elle n'est point trop longue; et bien loin de

regretter le tems que j'ai employé à en prendre connoissance, je dois vous remercier de m'avoir jugé digne d'entendre les vérités, dont l'accès devoit toujours être facile ; et qui, pour le malheur des souverains, ne parviennent presque jamais au trône. J'attends de votre fidélité et de votre patriotisme que vous continuerez à me parler avec la même franchise, et, en retour, je ne négligerai rien pour vous convaincre du prix que j'attache à cette qualité, et combien je désire qu'aucuns de mes sujets ne craignent de me déplaire en m'exposant sans réserve ce qu'ils croient utile au bien public. Il me sera surtout très agréable de vous inspirer cette confiance. Vous reconnoîtrez celle que je vous porte dans les résultats de la négociation avec la cour de Londres. Des motifs que vous saurez apprécier m'imposoient la loi d'y comprendre les intérêts de mes alliés, en tant qu'ils étoient compatibles avec ceux de la Russie ; mais je n'ai pas voulu attendre l'assentiment des cours du nord pour conclure l'acte de la pacification ; et l'ancienne convention maritime a subi plusieurs changemens, déterminés en partie par vos sages observations." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD WORONZOW.

1801, July 19. Dropmore.—“C'est avec un vrai plaisir que j'ai lu la copie que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer de la lettre de l'Empereur ; et cela non seulement par une suite de l'amitié que je vous ai voué, et qui me fait voir avec une satisfaction infinie que l'on sçait enfin vous rendre la justice que vous méritez ; mais encore parceque c'est un vrai bonheur pour l'Europe de voir un empereur de Russie qui désire de connoître la vérité, qui encourage ceux qui la lui disent, et qui demande les conseils d'un homme éclairé et vertueux.

“Puissiez vous jouir longtems de cette confiance honorable, et du sentiment délicieux de n'avoir jamais sacrifié à des intérêts personnels votre âme, et les principes d'honneur qui vous dirigent, et conservez-moi toujours votre amitié qui m'est si précieuse.”

Postscript illegible. Copy. Secret ink.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 27. Charles Street.—“My intended journey to Wales has been first delayed then disturbed. It was delayed by a letter from Lord Hawkesbury on Friday night, desiring to see me on this morning. Having heard of Lord St. Helens' determination to return to England, now that he has got his peerage in his pocket, I suspected this to be the subject of the proposed conference, and therefore very reluctantly

consented to put off my journey, which stood for Saturday. I went to Downing Street to-day, and there Lord Hawkesbury with a good deal of embarrassed preface of the importance of Petersburg, of the necessity of sending an established ambassador there, of its becoming the first situation in the foreign line, proposed it to me. My answer was as short and civil as I could make it, acknowledging his motive for the proposal to be the wish that it might be agreeable to me, but assuring him that I had at no time of my life entertained a thought of embarking in foreign mission, and that the only occasions where I had made exceptions to that rule were such as belonged to claims of confidence, and to pressing temporary business, such as I could not refuse myself to. We parted very civilly and I go to-morrow to Althorp. I take for granted that Lord Hawksbury did not seriously imagine that I should go to Petersburg when all is done that could be interesting; but I imagine that he had been pressed to this by Woronzow and Panin, and that he likes to have to say to them that he has pursued their wishes as far as belonged to him.

"It turns out that there is no chance of Watkin's obtaining leave of absence now, and perhaps therefore there is no hope of my finding myself at Wynnstay; how far this may derange my projects I have not as yet decided, but at all events I go to Althorp to-morrow.

"The good fortune of our navy has abandoned us with our old Admiralty board. To the loss of the *Hannibal* we must add that of the *Swiftsure*, with no other consolation than that Ganthaume, who has brought her to Frejus, has not succeeded in landing a single man to join Menou.

"Nelson and Trowbridge have undertaken the coast defence from Orford to the Nore inclusive, and Lord Cornwallis is to-day at Colchester in command of the Eastern District. I still think it is more demonstration than serious attack which is hanging over us, but it is right to be prepared. When you write, direct to Charles Street, as my steps are uncertain."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 30. Althorp.—"As soon as I had read your letter here, which brought me the news of Lord Dartmouth's death, I turned in my mind as well as I could the means of suggesting to the Duke of Portland your being named by him to the office of High Steward. If that appointment were one which were fit on your account to be asked, there could be no shade of difficulty in my writing to the Duke upon it; but, to say the truth, I feel for you, and I think you seem to feel for yourself, that this appointment could have no other grace or value to you, excepting as it seemed likely to be agreeable to the leading persons, and to the general body of

the University, and to be adopted by the Duke in that view ; but as a personal obligation, I cannot think it worth your acceptance, nor should I, in your situation, annex any sort of value to it as such. This being frankly my opinion, I have suspended the step of my corresponding with the Duke upon it until I should more decidedly hear from you that you wished me to do so, in which case I will not lose a moment after his return from Weymouth : but in order to put this forward in the only shape in which I think it desirable and decorous for you, I have written to the Bishop of Bangor to tell him how acceptable I knew this appointment would be to you, if it arose from any notion that your holding that situation would be agreeable to the University, and I submitted to his discretion whether, in this view, he might not with propriety and advantage mention this matter to the Dean of Christ Church to be suggested by him to the Duke of Portland ; and I have done this in the first place because it will so take the creditable shape that I wish, and secondly, because I know that Jackson is the person with whom the Duke will concert this appointment, and by whom he will be much regulated in the disposition that he will make of it. The two candidates whom I should guess to be in any question are the Duke of Beaufort, and Addington ; and with the tendency which Oxford always professes to government, if the old connexions of the first do not prevail, I should think it not unlikely that much stress may be put upon the advantage to the University by placing the First Minister upon the staff of it ; though, on the other hand, his conduct when candidate for the seat in Parliament has made him unpopular with his own college. Pray tell me how far you agree or differ with me upon this subject, that, having told you what I think, I may do in it whatever you most wish.

“Your account of Woronzow’s and of Hammond’s conversation confirms me in my guess that the proposal made to me had been pressed upon the Foreign Secretary, and that he could not seriously imagine it was an idea which could for a moment be entertained by me. I think I had some little merit in keeping my countenance when he told me that Lord St. Helens had gone to remain there, but that the *severity* of the climate made it impossible for him to do so. You recollect that he went in the middle of May, and will return in August. Colonel Sir Watkin will not have leave to receive us at Wynnstay, and Colonel Lord Spencer hesitates about leaving his yeomen to the menaces of the French, so that Major Grenville, though much inclined to doubt of any actual invasion taking place, does not find temptation enough to pursue his journey to Wales.

“It is possible that I may still keep my northern promise, and go in about ten days to the north ; if I do not I will then endeavour to join you at Cirencester about the time you mention ; but I rather incline to look at the new

improvements at Castle Howard, which is an engagement that I have successively made and broken for these last 5 years.

“ I delight in your complete success as to road and common, and do not wonder that you hang at home to overlook it, but I still wish that you would, if possible, rout the two remaining inhabitants of Handkerchief Piece ; both your augmentation of the flower-garden and your walk across the lawn must, as I should guess, wait for the downfall of the pale and of the hedge before the *unity* of the ground, as the picturesquers would call it, can be well ascertained.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 30. Berlin.—“ The expectation of peace with France seems, I think, by the accounts which have lately reached us from London, to be much weakened, and the danger to which we have been exposed from the dispositions manifested by our new ministers will have been probably dispelled by the restless violence and ambition of the enemy. I am by no means satisfied with the situation of things in the north. If Russia had manifested an intention to act in concert with us, as far as the exhausted state of her resources would admit, everything would be tending to a point from which we must derive advantage ; but I fear that France is acquiring influence at Petersburg, and that I must therefore entertain strong doubts whether the business of Hanover will have so favourable an issue as I expected some days since. When this is brought to some conclusion, I mean still to avail myself of my leave of absence, and to return about the beginning of October, that is, when the heats are past, the roads in good order, and we have a better chance of a steady wind for the passage. It would, on some accounts, be desirable to defer our removal till the spring. But I have some business too urgent to be neglected, and am very uneasy at Proby's situation, who may, I fear, be still some time without a ship, and is too inexperienced not to get into scrapes if he remains without control on shore.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 31. Colchester.—“ You have no idea of the constant employment in which I have been engaged ever since we moved hither. All our generals agree in keeping us to the strictest alert, though none of them seem to give any credit to the invasion from the Dutch or Flemish coasts. It is indeed most certain that France did not intend it, or was not prepared for it. It was not possible for her ever to find our eastern coast so defenceless, either on the water or ashore, than it has been within these few days ; and ever since the 12th of this

month the wind has blown steadily from the south-east, which is exactly the point in the compass the most favourable for their sailing and their debarkation, and the spring tides only began to fall on the 27th. I cannot therefore help thinking that Bonaparte and Addington, from very different considerations, agree in exciting this alarm which has certainly caught John Bull very universally. Most truly I agree with you in the real alarm I feel from all these projects of driving the country, the mischief of which is in every point of view incalculable; and I am very glad to find that General Balfour (who commanded here till Lord Cornwallis took the command yesterday) understood by driving the country nothing but driving or destroying horses and draught cattle, and as many of the slaughter cattle as the commissary might wish to collect for the troops; beyond this I am sure will not be practicable, and, if practicable, would still be a very hazardous and probably mischievous operation. We are all ready to move at a moment's warning."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, July 31. Althorp.—"In consequence of your letter of the 29th which I have just now received, I have again written to the Bishop of Bangor to tell him that there is nothing to be done upon the subject of the High-Steward. Generally speaking, I should have said that you had nothing to regret in its present disposition, but I confess that I should have much liked it for you at this particular moment in the particular shape which I had mentioned, because, originating with the University themselves, it would have been the best public testimony which they could have given you of their being satisfied that your political measures were not considered by them as hostile to the interests of the church. If this, however, was not to be, and if they chose to put by their ordinary course of connecting themselves in this shape with one of the great families of the country, the present appointment is otherwise creditable enough, and furnishes to the black coats of Oxford a fair access to the ecclesiastical patronage of the Chancellor, and a more ample fund of solicitation than he will well know how to satisfy.

"Lord Cornwallis's command, as I understand it, is limited to the Eastern District, but I presume that the same motives of acknowledged superiority in his profession which place him in the expected point of attack, will carry him also wherever that attack shall take place. By what I hear from good authority, I understand that he is not satisfied with his disposable force, and I am not surprised at that when Lord Buckingham tells me that their whole force amounts only to 4,500 men between Yarmouth and the river Thames. There is, however, to be a meeting of the Cabinet with the Duke of York at

Mr. Addington's to-morrow, to concert new measures of defence, and I am a little surprised, though very well satisfied for the benefit of the consultation, that Pitt is to take part in this military conference. There had been a report that the neighbouring yeomanry of all the counties round London were to do duty there in case of an invasion, and now again I understand that is contradicted; if you know or suspect anything of our destination in such a case, pray write me a line, because in that case I would not go a pleasuring quite so far as Yorkshire and Westmoreland, but would content myself with a little inland circle perhaps of Warwick Castle, Kenilworth, Hagley, and Cirencester."

Private. GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 6. Downing Street.—"I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of Tuesday last. I have lost no time in obtaining the information which you desired to receive; and I can now assure your lordship with perfect confidence that it has never been the intention of Government to call out the yeomanry, or to employ them in London or in the environs. The East India Company Volunteers (2,400 strong) have offered their services for any part of the kingdom; but I understand that it is proposed to employ them only in the place of the guards, if it should be thought expedient to send the latter to the coast.

"The apprehensions of an invasion, in consequence of the good spirit of the country, and the measures of defence which have been taken, are, I think, almost wholly at an end.

"Lord Nelson returned yesterday from Boulogne, after having destroyed two floating batteries, one gun-brig, and five gun-boats. These were stationed *without* the batteries; the enemy's loss *within* them has not been ascertained."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 7. Clarges Street.—"If I have not written to your lordship sooner it has been because I had nothing to say on the only subject upon which your lordship desired me to write to you; and, if I write now, it is only that you may not suppose that I am inattentive to your wishes; for not one syllable has yet passed between Lord Hawkesbury and myself either on the subject of my present or future situation. I have however seen him three times, and dined with him twice, and have no reason whatever to be dissatisfied with the manner in which he has received me, or the confidence which he has shewn me. Whether it is that he feels a little uneasy on the subject of Vienna, or that the arrangements about Berlin and Petersburg are not yet finally made I cannot pretend

to say, but there certainly is a something which prevents his speaking out; and he is gone down to Weymouth, and I have leave to go into the country without our having come to any explanation whatever.

"I understand, however, as well from the Duke of Portland, as from the Office, that it is generally understood that I am to have Berlin; and that there is a disposition on the part of Mr. Addington to make any provision for me that my friends may think desirable, either as to pecuniary arrangements in the way of a contingent pension, or to any personal mark of honour that I may wish to receive hereafter for the better supporting my dignity abroad, particularly pointing at a red riband.

"I tell your Lordship just what I have heard myself, and shall wait the accomplishment of what is promised with due patience.

"I am going down to Weymouth on Friday next, in consequence of a wish expressed by the Queen to know something of the Duchess of Wirtemberg; and of a question asked directly by the King to the Duke of Portland whether I did not mean to go there. I shall go from Weymouth across the country to Yorkshire, and return from thence about the end of September, when I hope your Lordship will allow me to pass another day at Dropmore."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 8. Berlin.—"I quite forgot to tell you that I think the best way of sending Count Stadion's wine to Berlin would be to consign it to some mercantile house in Hamburg, directing them to forward it by the safest and best conveyance. I do not name one to you, as I have not been satisfied with the care and attention of that which I have myself employed.

"The King of Prussia has declared by his ministers, and by word of mouth to M. de Krudener as well as to me, that he will hold the electorate only at the king's pleasure, and for the purpose of keeping out the French. In short I must own I think we ought to be satisfied with what has passed, and that advantage may be derived for the future from appearing to give the king the confidence he claims.

"I fear matters are not going on quite well in Russia. The emperor has testified a strong interest about Hanover, and Krudener has exerted himself to the utmost; but there is certainly a convention with France on foot. I hope it will be something very inoffensive, but Lord St. Helens seems apprehensive that it embraces the most important objects.

"Prussia confines its demand of indemnity to the bishopric of Munster, and Haugwiz has formally desired M. de Reden to dispose the Hanoverian government to instruct its minister at Ratisbon to second the views of his court in this respect.

"I hope now shortly to avail myself of my leave of absence.

I have some doubts whether I shall be approved for what I have done about Hanover, but I believe, in my conscience, that more could not have been done."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 10th. Althorp.—"The expectation which you held out to me of our passing the greatest part of the month together in hunting the steeples would certainly have decoyed me away from all other projects if I had not already taken my engagements, in despair of its being possible for you to leave the new arrangements of the new road. To-morrow we go from hence for 4 or 5 days to see Warwick Castle, Kenilworth, Birmingham, Hagley, and the Leesowes; and next week I set forth to Castle Howard, from whence I shall make a little northern circle of smaller or larger diameter as time, curiosity, or invasion and yeomanry may determine; but, at all events, I think the middle of next month at farthest will bring me again into cockney neighbourhood.

"I yesterday received a short letter from Lord Carysfort dated 30 July; I find by it that he talks of availing himself of his leave of absence this autumn, partly from an anxiety which he feels about Lord Proby, who, not finding a ship, has found himself in love and in danger of matrimony; and partly because in the ardour of Lord Proby's matrimonial pursuits, he seems to have done less of his father's business than of his own. This is an unlucky event; and though, by Lord Carysfort's manner of speaking of it, I take for granted there is nothing decidedly objectionable about the intended lady, yet I agree with him in most heartily wishing that Lord St. Vincent may terminate this embarrassment by giving him a tight frigate, instead of leaving him to provide himself with a pretty wife. Lord Carysfort says nothing by which I can judge decidedly of his intentions, but as far as I can guess, I understand him to mean for himself a short temporary absence in the autumn. Of course you will not mention the circumstance which he describes to be the cause of this intention.

"I am surprised to observe that, notwithstanding the slender means of preparation which Lord Nelson found at Bologne, and which he left still lesser than he found them, our government still feels so much alarm as to direct the embodying of the supplementary militia in the very eager and first burst of the corn-harvest. I am always a friend to active preparation, but for a measure of so much inconvenience and unpopularity, there should be (as perhaps there is) the plea of strong and urgent necessity. For my yeomen, I have communicated to them the paper which I have received, and have recommended detached meetings of 10 or 12 for an hour now and then as suits the shopkeepers, until we can meet after the harvest."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 14. Downing Street.—“The enclosed extract of a letter from Mr. Tooke, and a private letter from Lord Minto to Lord Hawkesbury contain all the intelligence which has been received here relative to Egypt. What Lord Elgin can be doing we cannot conjecture, for surely between the 17th and 19th of July he might have found time to have digested and transmitted any information which he might have received on this interesting subject.

“Lord Nelson sailed again yesterday morning as it is supposed for Flushing.”

Extract not found.

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 21. Downing Street.—“A dispatch has been received from General Hutchinson, dated 29 June from the camp before Gizeh, by which it appears that the combined armies invested Cairo on the 21st of that month. On the 22nd the enemy made proposals for capitulation, and after a negotiation for several days, they agreed to surrender the town and ports on condition of being allowed to march to Rosetta with their arms, artillery, and baggage, from thence to embark for the ports of France. The British forces took possession of the gate of Gizeh on the morning of the 28th. The enemy's forces of all kinds in the town amounted to about 6,000 men.”

EDWARD FISHER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 21. Pall Mall.—“By Mr. Addington's appointment I have just had the honour of seeing him. The object of this visit was to propose to me the exchange of the office which I possess by your Lordship's kindness, for one of increased value, and requiring less confinement to London, namely, the agency for Upper Canada, which, he stated, as worth from 300*l.* to 400*l.* *per annum*. This arrangement, as you will easily believe, did not meet with any difficulty on my part, and it will in consequence take place immediately.

“In this conference Mr. Addington took occasion to state to me the situation I held on his list of preferment to the English Boards of Revenue, and on my observing it differed widely from that I was led to believe from your lordship's interpretation of Mr. Addington's words, he said he would not decide on the matter till he should have the honour of seeing you.

“Being desirous of paying my respects to you and to Lady Grenville, I shall endeavour to leave London for a day for

that purpose. I will take that opportunity of stating to your lordship what further passed between Mr. Addington and myself."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, August 27. Berlin.—"Lord Hawkesbury had mentioned to me the embassy of Petersburg before I received your letter. I was not aware that there was any doubt about the allowance, but I certainly agree with you that it would be madness to take it unless upon the same appointments as the three ambassadors received at Paris, Madrid, and the Hague, before the peace. The residence is much more desirable now than it was some time since; and the difference of the retreat, as it would enable me to make my son's situation more comfortable, is not to be overlooked; but I hope to be allowed to come home before I am called upon to decide. The climate is not properly unhealthy, though there are some constitutions which do not well support its rigour. But even in the depth of winter, a fortnight is sufficient to reach, with women, a milder climate. As to this Court, I own I am sick of it. If it can be influenced, it must be by that of St. Petersburg; so that I might flatter myself that I might be more useful there, and there is some gratification in getting a step. But I have told Lord Hawkesbury that I cannot think of it without the extended allowance."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, September 10. Brocket Hall.—"Just arrived here in my way from Castle Howard, and finding by your letter that you are returned to Dropmore, I shall defer my visit to Petworth and Gosfield, and come and pass a few days with you, and with Charlotte before she goes to the west and I to the wars, which latter event takes place on the 28th. I see that we have read, as we were sure to do, the Russian treaty with the same eyes. As I hope to be with you almost as soon as this letter, I do not write a word about it, except to desire that you will give me credit for a discreet control of my impatient temper when I tell you that I did not express a word of dissatisfaction upon this subject, when I was hard pressed upon it in the house which I have just left."

J. HILY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, September 20. Great George Street.—"By Mr. Pitt's advice, to whom I had been referred by my brother on the accompanying memorial of Sir Ralph Woodford, I

take the liberty of writing to you, and should esteem it a favour if you would have the goodness to inform me whether you recollect any promise having been made to carry into effect the arrangement which he submits ; or, if not, to what you conceive, from your recollection of the case, he is fairly entitled.

“ I cannot help taking this opportunity of assuring your lordship that it has not been from a want of repeated and pressing solicitations from me, that no report has yet been made by Mr. Wyatt on Mr. Mason’s petition respecting some iron gates, about which you wrote to me in the spring.”

Endorsed. “ Answered 22nd. That I have no recollection of it.”

LORD HAWKESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 1. Downing Street.—“ I send this letter by a messenger to inform you that preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and France have been signed this evening. I will send you a copy of the treaty in a day or two, in the meantime I will inform you in confidence what is the substance of it.

“ We retain possession of Ceylon and Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope to be made a free port, Malta to be restored to the Order under the guaranty and protection of a third power, Egypt to be restored to the Turks, the integrity of the Turkish empire and of Portugal to be maintained. The kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory to be evacuated by the French armies.

“ I am inclined to hope that, under all the circumstances, you will consider this as an honourable peace. I feel as strongly as any man that new difficulties may open upon us in consequence of this event, to what extent and of what nature it is impossible to speculate ; but I am confident that nothing could have been reasonably expected from a continuance of the war which would have justified us, under present circumstances, in rejecting these terms.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 2. Aylesbury.—“ A letter from Pitt to Lord Carrington has just brought him the news, which you will probably have heard still earlier, of the preliminaries of peace being signed yesterday. The terms in which Pitt speaks of them shew that he is well satisfied with them. I am more anxious to learn what our naval establishment is to be than to know what are to be the articles of mutual concession, if indeed they are to be of that description. My next anxiety is to know whether Government has made any

arrangement respecting our yeomanry and volunteer corps ; many of them become *ipso facto* dissolved by the peace. For my own part I think I am entitled to construe the peace into definitive treaty, and therefore I shall go on with my exercise till Thursday, when long and tedious quarter sessions have put an end to my campaign. Not knowing, however, whether you will mean to pursue your quartering on the 5th, although I entirely think it desirable to do so, I wish to hear from you a line by return of post hither, unless you will send over to Wycomb, where I mean to pass Saturday night and Sunday, and to return to exercise early on Monday morning.

“My chief reason for making this enquiry of you is in order to know how your project stands for our meeting at Stowe, as I have not a word from my brother upon that subject.”

H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 4. Wynnstay.—“This morning’s post brought us the agreeable intelligence of the signature of the preliminaries for peace. I am at present in a state of great suspense, as we have not yet heard if the negotiation is to be carried on in England or by a British minister in France. My first impulse upon hearing the news was to set off immediately for London for fear of losing my chance of accompanying Lord Whitworth, should he be the person fixed upon to go to Paris ; but my brothers thought it would be better for me to write to him and wait four days for his answer, as it would be a pity to abridge my holidays by a fortnight, and run a chance of finding when I got to town that a French negotiator was to come over here. I do not think I lose anything by this arrangement, as I must have heard if Lord Whitworth was going quite immediately, and I can easily be in town in twenty-four hours after the receipt of his letter. I wrote to him by to-day’s post, to tell him where I was to be found, and to ask if he thought it expedient for me to go up directly in order to be upon the spot, and to give him any assistance preparatory to his setting off. I hope you will be so kind, in this instance as well as in every other, to give me a little of that advice of which I have so often felt the value, and of which you have been so liberal to me, I reckon that I shall be able to get your answer at the same time as Lord Whitworth’s.

“I was very sorry that, owing to your being from home, I had not an opportunity of seeing you before I set out for Devonshire, as I wished particularly to consult you respecting the duration of my holidays. I hope you do not think that six weeks is too long an absence from town, as that is what all the clerks are allowed.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 4. Wycombe.—“ The post of yesterday morning brought to me at Aylesbury your letter of the 2nd, and at the same time brought also a few words from my brother from Gosfield, dated October 1st, in which he tells me that, despairing of accomplishing our triple Stowe project on account of the increased alert upon the coast, he had determined to come down for one day only, and would be with me at Aylesbury on the evening of the 7th, on which day my exercise ends on account of the sessions. I wrote a few lines to him in answer, to say that I concluded this new event would give him new liberty, and allow him to pass some days at Stowe where you had told me you hoped to meet us both. I have no doubt but that he will contrive his arrangements so as to bring this to bear, because he had already, before this event, expressed great anxiety to converse with you and with me together upon the state of public business ; and certainly that anxiety will not be diminished by the contents of the extraordinary *gazette*. I cannot understand how you imagine me to have any knowledge of the conditions of the preliminaries ; neither Lord Carrington nor myself having heard one word beyond the vague guesses and suggestions of the *Evening Courier*, which are of a description so intolerable that I had hoped there could not be the smallest affinity between those terms and the terms which Pitt’s letter had described to Lord Carrington under the general expressions of being highly honourable, and advantageous to the country, although perhaps not in every point exactly all that was to be wished. The manner however in which you who know them have spoken of them almost staggers my former incredulity, and makes me fear that too great a part of the statement of the *Courier* may be a true statement. If it be, there never was conceived so disgraceful and desperate a surrender of the honour, the interests, and the future security of this country as that to which Mr. Otto has persuaded Lord Hawkesbury to affix the consent of the King and his ministers. With this apprehension, however, which arises out of your letter of to-day, in addition to my own uneasiness, I feel very sensibly for yours, for as I saw Pitt’s letter to Lord Carrington, which was written on the 1st October the moment after the preliminaries were signed, I can have no doubt that, whatever they be, they are highly approved of by Pitt, and appear to have been known to him before they were agreed upon, and therefore, as I imagine, must have received his previous concurrence. In this deplorable state you will naturally judge how much, for your sake as well as for mine, I wish to converse with you. It seems probable to me that, with Lord Buckingham’s earnest and active mind, he will almost do anything to meet us as soon as he possibly can. I therefore rather suspect that he will still come down on the 7th or 8th, and I know not whether I should not almost recommend to you to name only three

or four days to your yeomanry; that exercise will be enough to shew them that you do not consider the preliminaries as disbanding them, and you will then be free on Thursday or Friday; on one of which days, if Lord Buckingham comes to Stowe, I hope you will come likewise, or, if Lord Buckingham does not, I will then come to you at Dropmore.

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1801, October 4. Dropmore.—“Long before this letter can reach you, you will have learnt the news of the signature of the preliminaries with France, by which we give up everything everywhere, except Ceylon and Trinidad; even Malta—and what is, if possible, more than that—even the Cape of Good Hope.

“What my impressions and feelings are on this occasion it is difficult for me to describe to you, but you will judge of them by what I know you will yourself feel on the subject after what you said to me here.

“I know not whether it was your intention to come to town at the meeting of Parliament which, the papers tell me, is fixed for the end of this month. If it was not, I do not think that you are likely to feel the situation in which we shall stand so tempting as to induce you to accelerate your journey. But if you do come, it would be a satisfaction to me, beyond what I can describe, to have the opportunity of conversing with you on this subject before I take a part which, whatever it be, must be full of embarrassment and difficulty.

“You can witness for me that at no period of the greatest difficulty did I ever entertain an idea of agreeing to concessions that can be named with these, which are now (after all real difficulty has been by the effect of your councils and exertions surmounted and done away) lavished as the price of a peace which neither these nor any concessions can render permanent.

“You can also witness for me how little my mind is disposed to make to the King’s kindness to me so ungrateful a return as that of harassing his government, or stirring up or encouraging any factious opposition to his measures.

“But, is it not too much to expect that I should say, or acquiesce in its being said, contrary to my own conviction of the truth, that the measures in which I bore a share have reduced the country to the desperate necessity of purchasing a short interval of repose by the sacrifice of those points on which our security in a new contest may principally depend?

“If you do not come, have the friendship to write to me with your accustomed frankness on this most interesting subject, and tell me how you feel upon it for what regards yourself, and what part you think most consistent with integrity and honour in so difficult a situation.

“I direct this to Melville, because I think it more sure of catching you in case of your being on any excursion.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 5. Hollwood.—“ I have been so long accustomed to find my opinion on most important questions concur with yours that I cannot entertain one different from you without very much distrusting my own judgment. But on the present occasion, the sentiments which I entertain are certainly very wide of what appear to be yours. I agree with you indeed in thinking that the permanence of peace under the present circumstances (though there are many chances for it) ought to be considered as very precarious ; and that we ought therefore to be constantly prepared for the possible renewal of the contest. But I cannot, and I think you would not, push this consideration so far as to make it a reason against any treaty with the present French government ; and, if once the question of peace or war is looked at only as a question of terms, I am far from thinking that those now agreed to can, upon the whole, be denied to be honourable and reasonably advantageous. I certainly regret very much that the Cape is not retained, and that the arrangement with respect to Malta is not more precise and definite. But to the first of those points I know that great Indian and naval authorities attach much less value than I have been used to do ; and, with respect to the second, I do not think we could make our possession of it the *sine quâ non* of peace, and, if not, I know no more satisfactory arrangement that could have been made in the present moment. At all events, as far as security at home is concerned (to which you seem principally to refer) neither of these points, if conceded to us, would have materially affected it. The great object in my mind was that the general complexion of the peace should be such as not to appear in any degree dictated, and that we should reserve what is most essential for the security of our East and West Indian possessions. For the latter purpose I think we have accomplished much in retaining the great naval stations of Ceylon and Trinidad, which, in various views, I consider as the two most valuable acquisitions we could select ; and I think the credit of the transaction completely established by having not only preserved all our ancient possessions, and obtained these islands in addition, but by having been enabled to stipulate in favour of the allies who adhered to us. I know that a stipulation of this sort, dependent on the good faith of those with whom we have been treating, is not to be too much relied upon ; but it is at least honourable on the face of the treaty ; and it gives to the powers in question a chance of preservation, of which they would have had little or none in the event of the continuance of the war. On the whole, looking at the terms in themselves, and combining them with all the difficulties attending the continuation of war, and the little prospect of being able to make any material impression on the

enemy, I cannot but think the conclusion of the treaty fortunate for the country, and see no ground which would justify me in my own mind from withholding the fullest support and general approbation. I shall however be most anxious to talk the subject over with you at large before Parliament meets, and shall be happy to come to you at Dropmore as soon as I return from Walmer, where I must go in the course of the week. If you can conveniently write to me in the meantime, I should like much to know what are the particular grounds on which your objections to the transaction chiefly rest."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1801, October 6. Dropmore.—"You will easily believe that few things could have given me more concern than the fundamental difference which appears between our opinions, and which must, I fear, manifest itself in our conduct, on this most important question.

"To state to you by letter all the grounds of my objections to this treaty (as far as it has yet been explained to me) would be a task of time and labour. They rest unfortunately on all the same points on which you ground your more favourable opinion of it.

"I do not object to the having signed a treaty with France—I thought the evident insecurity of such a treaty was not (under all the circumstances of public affairs) a sufficient reason against concluding it; but I did always think that this consideration ought materially to influence the terms.

"I consider the present treaty therefore merely with reference to the question of terms, as it affects our security at home and abroad; the balance of strength, particularly of naval and colonial strength, between us and France; and, above all, the general credit and dignity of our national character.

"In all these points it appears to me most miserably defective; but (if I am not mistaken in my interpretation of the short and ambiguous expressions from which alone I derive all my knowledge of the facts) it is most of all so in the last point; which I agree with you in thinking by far the most important.

"To discuss, one by one, the comparative importance of the only two of our acquisitions which the present Government has retained, and of all those it has ceded, would not perhaps be a fair proceeding towards the negotiators of this treaty. The just way, unquestionably, of trying such a transaction is to view the whole together. This I have done, and on this my opinion rests. If instead of this, we were to go into the detail of the cessions, the grounds of opposition to the treaty are almost without number. To have ceded to France, Martinique, Malta, Minorca, the Cape, the Dutch

Settlements both in the East and West Indies *and even Cochin*, and to have obtained nothing in return but the name of peace, is such an act of weakness and humiliation as nothing in my opinion can justify.

“If better terms could not be had, and if, as you say, we could make no impression upon France and her allies by continuing the war after we had conquered all their colonies, and annihilated their commerce, a position in which I am not very well prepared to agree, yet I may at least ask whether in this state they could make much (or any) impression on us. And if they could, let me then ask what security we have against their doing so now, and whether their means for that purpose are lessened, or increased, by this desperate act of our Government which disbands our force while that of the enemy remains entire, which relaxes at once the spring by which their predecessors had wound up the spirit of this country to resistance, and which gives up into the hands of France the command of the Mediterranean sea, the command of the West Indian seas, the command of all navigation to and from the East Indies, and the means of collecting at any moment, in the very heart of our East Indian territories, an European force to any extent which the immense military establishments of France may place at her disposal.

“I am going to Stowe at the end of this week, having contrived so as to get rid of my yeomanry on Friday. It would, for obvious reasons, have been more satisfactory to me if I could have seen and conversed with you first, as I shall not feel satisfied with any decision I may take as to the extent to which my conduct ought to be governed by my view of this subject till I have discussed the matter fully and thoroughly with you. All confidence in the present Government is completely and irretrievably destroyed by their conduct in this negotiation, and in that with Russia. What in that state I ought to do, and what I ought to wish, is a question of more difficult solution. You do not name any particular day for coming here. I should naturally stay at Stowe till about Saturday se’nnight, but a day or two either way would make no difference, and I could easily accommodate myself to your convenience if you could let me know by to-morrow’s post what day it would suit you to be here.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE

1801, October 6. Aylesbury.—“I have just now heard from Lord Buckingham, who tells me that he will be certainly here to-morrow evening, that he hopes to get home from the quarter sessions on Friday to Stowe, where I shall wait for him, and where he tells me that he has written to press you to come and pass with us the four or five days of his stay there.

I trust therefore that you will join us by Saturday at latest, though you will be sure to find me there any time after Thursday morning.

"I find my brother officers here disposed to agree with me in their general conversation upon what is known of the terms of the peace, though my captain dwells a good deal upon the necessity of some peace. Fisher writes me word that he hears Lord St. Helens talked of to conclude the definitive treaty at Amiens: I do not think they could have found a better man for that purpose."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 6. Hertford Street.—"Ever since I received your lordship's very kind letter of the 7th ultimo, I have been wandering all over the country and only took up my habitation here on Thursday last. Your lordship will probably have discovered before this that it was against a greater person than myself that the Philippic in the *Moniteur* was directed. I cannot however be sorry for the mistake, as it has given me so pleasant and unequivocal a proof that the interest your lordship is pleased to take in my welfare is not confined to the time that I am acting under your orders, and that I shall have as much of your confidence and esteem as an individual, as I enjoyed when a minister.

"I cannot however flatter myself that I shall long escape similar attacks from the same quarter; nor, in the present state and temper of things and persons, should I be at all surprised if I were to become, as far as a man of an independent spirit can do, the victim of that spirit of persecution to which every one who has taken the line I have done will now be necessarily exposed.

"I will fairly own to your lordship however that it is not so much on account of anything that can come from France, as from what passed on my leaving Vienna, that I should think it an object not to go to another foreign Court without some ostensible mark of my sovereign's favour. I cannot flatter myself that any circumstance attending the transaction can be long concealed; nor, on the other hand, can I help feeling that it will ever carry with it something like a stigma, and that, whilst so honourable an appointment at that particular period of my life could have been considered as a direct and distinguished mark of my sovereign's approbation, the tardy nomination to Berlin (if it take place at all) unless accompanied by some mark of honour, will have the appearance either of being brought about by suing and solicitation, or, at best, as a provision for an individual who was hanging as a dead weight on the arms of Government; for, as to my past services, I can never hope that they will be taken into the account.

They are neither valued, nor understood, by anybody but your lordship.

"In this state of things it is very important for me to fix my situation in life as soon as possible, and to provide against the consequences of my being sent home again at the solicitation, demand, or suggestion of the French Government. Beggars must not be chusers, but what I look to, what I should most like in every point of view, and what I certainly mean to ask, with your lordship's approbation, is the Privy Council instead of the red riband. With *that*, and something like confidence from the department under which I acted, I still think I might obtain consideration abroad, and render my country some service under the present administration; and, at least, have something more of consideration at home without the necessity of soliciting *de novo* on my return. I own, however, that I feel so deeply depressed by what has just happened, and see such a gloomy prospect before me, as not to be very anxious about anything.

"God grant that your lordship may have the fortitude on this occasion to suppress what I know must be your own feelings and forebodings; and that we may not see the friends of the king and of good government, *openly* divided among themselves, at a time when, in my mind, there is greater need of union and of mutual support than ever.

"If the meeting of Parliament should make no alteration in your lordship's plans, I will come down to Dropmore before November, otherwise not before the first recess."

LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL SPENCER.

1801, October 6. Dropmore.—"You will have seen, long before this, the detail of the conditions on which peace has been concluded with France. What judgment you will have formed of them I know not, but I confess they appear to me so inadequate to any reasonable expectation, and of a nature to leave the country, especially if they are followed by any considerable reduction of our force, in a state of such extreme insecurity, that I do not see how I can easily avoid stating some part of these opinions in public.

"By a letter I have this day received from Mr. Pitt it appears that he thinks more favourably of them. You will readily believe that, if anything could shake my opinion, it would be the knowledge of a contrary sentiment on his part. I am, I confess, extremely anxious to know what you think on the subject, and what part you think it honourable and fitting for those who quitted the King's service in February to take on this occasion.

"I see by the papers that there is an idea of Parliament meeting about the end of this month, or the beginning of November. If it could be possible for you to give me a day

here any time before that, and after next week during which I shall be at Stowe, it would really give me very great satisfaction. But if you cannot contrive this, I would manage so as to come to town for that purpose, whenever it suited you best.”
Copy.

[GEORGE CANNING] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 7. South Hill.—“I have been intending ever since June to pay the visit to Dropmore which some mistake about Dundas’s and Lady Jane’s proceedings prevented us from paying at that time till now, when the summer is nearly past, and therewith the season of family visiting gone by. But I am not the less desirous of coming to you, if you will receive me alone, some time before the meeting of Parliament. On the contrary I look to you for comfort—if any is to be had—under the events which have just taken place, and which really have—at first hearing at least—quite astounded and dismayed me.

“If you are likely to be at home and disengaged, and if it would be convenient to you and lady Grenville to receive me on either Saturday or Sunday next, I should be very glad to visit Dropmore on either of those days.”

E. FISHER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 9. Pall Mall.—“I have lost no time in calling on Cobbett, and delivering to him a copy of your inclosure. I told him that in putting into his hands, for insertion in the *Porcupine*, a contradiction of a paragraph that appeared in that paper, I trusted that no comment whatever would be made upon it; and that he would be cautious not to give admittance in his paper to any observations upon what might be supposed to be the opinions of Lord Grenville on any public measure, till after his lordship had himself delivered them, where only they ought to be delivered, in his place in Parliament. I added that it was but common justice, as well to Lord Grenville in this particular, as on every other occasion, and not only to him, but to every other public parliamentary character, to suspend criticism on their supposed sentiments till they had made a public expression of them in Parliament. He told me he felt the justice of my observations, and that he would not fail to comply with my wishes as far as related to any remarks on the opinions of Lord Grenville; but not so with regard to the opinions of Mr. Pitt, and the part he had had in these preliminaries. His information was such as not to leave the shadow of a doubt that Mr. Pitt had been consulted in the whole negotiation, and that he was committed to the support of the treaty in Parliament; a treaty, he said, to his mind filled with present ignominy

and future miseries to his country ; and he therefore considered it his duty not to omit any opportunity of rousing the indignation of the public, as well against the treaty as the authors of it. With respect to the contradiction of the paragraph in Thursday's *Porcupine*, he was too much rejoiced to find there was no truth in the report which he had heard of Lord Grenville's speech to his yeomanry, not to seize the earliest opportunity of giving insertion to the contents of the paper I had delivered to him. In order to avoid committing your Lordship in any way in this conversation, I took care that he should understand everything I said as coming from myself alone.

“ Of this unfortunate peace with France my own opinion, and it coincides with that of the public as far as I have yet heard any opinion expressed on the subject, is that not only this country but all Europe is placed by it at the feet of the Republic of France. I cannot tell you with what emotion I read that part of your letter where you so kindly mention your apprehension that the part you are likely to take in Parliament may affect the fulfilment of the minister's promises in my favour which had been obtained at your instance. Indeed you only do me justice in believing that I cannot entertain the most distant wish that my interests should in any way interfere with your conduct in or out of Parliament. On the contrary, as it is from your kindness I hold my present income, so would the relinquishment of it be to me a sensible gratification if, in doing so, any fresh proof would be found of my zeal for your service, or attachment to your person.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 9. Park Place.—“ I found your letter on my return to town yesterday, but too late to answer it by that post. I had made my arrangements for setting out to-day to Walmer, and as you are on the point of going to Stowe, I think it best not to defer my journey, and to return long enough before the meeting to give us full time to talk over the new and painful situation in which our different view of this great question places us. I am afraid our opinions in the main are too much on each side fixed to make it very probable that by any discussion they can be brought nearer to each other on the immediate merits of the treaty ; but, with respect to the practical line which we may be obliged to take in consequence, I shall be most anxious to talk it over very fully, as the decision upon it must be most material not only personally to our own credit and satisfaction, but to every public consideration that can most nearly interest us. I confess fairly I cannot at present see how any line can be adopted tending materially to endanger or embarrass the present Government, without leading to consequences which you of

all men living would be most anxious to avoid. At the same time, under the conviction you entertain, I am fully aware of the delicacy and difficulty of your situation. All detail on such a subject must be reserved till we meet. My present idea is to stay at Walmer about ten days or perhaps a fortnight, and I shall be happy to come to you the first day you are at leisure after my return."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 9. Clermont Lodge.—"I will certainly so arrange my motions as to have it in my power to wait upon you at Dropmore before the meeting of Parliament, which I see is now fixed for the 29th. If it should suit you, I believe Monday the 25th will be the day on which I think I could most conveniently be with you, and, if I hear nothing further to prevent it, I shall consider it as so fixed.

"As to the conditions on which peace has been concluded I confess that, although I had formed no very sanguine expectation of our being able to make it on such terms as I should have thought favourable, even under that impression I could not avoid being disappointed at the terms on which it has been made. I will not enter more on this now than to mention that Mr. Pitt having been so kind as to write to me an account of the terms as soon as the preliminaries were signed, and to ask my opinion of them, I shortly stated to him some of the reasons why I could not think so well of them as he seemed to do.

"The other part of your inquiry, what it will be proper for those to do on this occasion who quitted the King's service in February, is rather more difficult to answer, because I am much afraid that they will differ in opinion upon this point, however much in general they have agreed on others. I shall, however, have great satisfaction in talking over the whole of this matter with you, and greater still to find that our opinions and determinations coincide."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1801, October 10. Duneira Lodge.—"I last night received your letter of the 4th, and I am truly unfit to give you any advice on the subject. Immediately on the receipt of Mr. Pitt's letter informing me of the outlines of the peace which had been signed, I wrote him by the return of the post to say that, although from the manner in which the negotiation had commenced my hopes were not sanguine for a creditable issue, I still had flattered myself that the negotiation would end

leaving us in the possession of Ceylon, the Cape, Malta, and Trinidad ; but that I had never allowed myself even to suspect the abandonment of the Cape and Malta. It is long since I had given up any idea of indemnity, but I hoped we would obtain security for what we had got. By giving up the Cape we have given up one of the essential points of security to India ; and we have done even worse by giving up Malta, for we have abandoned Egypt to a future danger from France, and we have abandoned the proud pre-eminence we had obtained in the Mediterranean. If we had stationed ten thousand of our troops in Malta, and preserved it as an exclusive naval station, such a force joined to our naval superiority would have given a *real* guarantee to the states in the Mediterranean and Levant, in place of that childish interposition in favour of the Neapolitans and Turks which, I understand, makes a part of our treaty. I don't perceive why either Malta or Egypt made any part of the treaty. They were in no sense possessions of France ; we had possessed ourselves of them by the valour and success of our arms. The fate of Malta was very proper subject of arrangement between the Order, Russia and us ; and, in like manner, Egypt was most proper to be settled on some secure and permanent footing by the joint interposition of the Russians, British, and Turks ; but there was not a pretence for admitting either of these points to be the subject of negotiation between France and us ; and I was really hopeful that these were the necessary consequences of the complete success of our arms at Malta and Egypt.

"Writing to you who have been accustomed to think on these subjects with all their relative bearings, it would be absurd in me to trouble you with extensive details on the various gloomy prospects which this transaction presents to my view. I have told Mr. Pitt that my best consolation was the chance that my time of life was such as might afford me the prospect of escaping from being a witness of the calamitous consequences which, in my judgment, must result from such an end of the contest.

"Such are my feelings, and they, joined to other considerations, obviously point out to me the line of conduct I ought to pursue. I cannot, on the one hand, sanction such a peace by any vote of approbation from me ; neither, on the other, can I by expressing my sentiments in public on the occasion mix myself in those debates and altercations which must tend immediately to weaken the king's government, and ultimately end in a factious opposition to it. Such a line of conduct is incompatible with my principles and declared course of conduct. If his majesty's ministers had been compelled to come to Parliament and announce the necessity they had been reduced to of carrying on the war, I should have felt it my duty to have appeared in my place, and to give them my decided and eager support. Circumstanced as matters

now are, I have not the smallest thoughts of coming to town at the meeting of Parliament; indeed it is not impossible that I may carry into earlier execution the resolution I had formed of retiring totally from Parliament at the close of the session. I find myself so comfortable with my farm and my plantations, it requires very little additional inducement to persuade me to make my retirement from all public concerns and avocations perfectly complete. You'll observe that I have marked this letter as *private and confidential*. I mean to impose upon myself silence and reserve; for if I do not find myself at liberty to give my sentiments of disapprobation openly and in their proper place, I should feel it unpardonable to spread my sentiments in private, and thereby, so far as my influence goes, do in an unfair and unmanly way that very mischief which my feelings of duty prescribe to me to avoid in public."

H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 11. Wynnstay.—"Many thanks for your very kind letter which I received yesterday. Owing to my being at Llangedwin I did not receive it in time to enable me to answer it, which otherwise I certainly should have felt it both my duty and inclination to do.

"When I called the signature of the preliminaries *agreeable intelligence* we had not heard a word of the terms, which we agree with you in thinking most disgraceful.

"I this morning received a very kind answer from Lord Whitworth, saying that Lord Cornwallis was to go to Amiens, but that the mission to Paris had been offered to him, which he thought he should accept, and desired me to turn in my mind whether I should like to accompany him. In my answer to him I said that 'I hoped he would allow me to defer any positive answer till I had consulted you and my other friends; that I feared that as the situation would be considered as permanent, I should not be allowed to hold the *précis* writership at the same time, and that of course I must be a good deal governed by the opinion of far more competent judges than myself whether they think it advisable for me to throw that up, and embark at so early a period of my life in the diplomatic career.'

"I hope when I get to town you will allow me to have some conversation with you on the subject. I do not think from what I have heard you say that you would wish me to give up Smedley and my other masters for such a situation."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MULGRAVE.

1801, October 13. Stowe.—"Long before this letter reaches you, the preliminaries of peace, such as they are now published to the world, will have engaged your attention, and your

judgment will probably be in great degree formed upon them. What that judgment may be I know not, but I think I owe it to our friendship not to delay expressing to you those impressions which they have produced on my mind, and the resolution to which those impressions will probably lead.

"Although the present Government had, as I originally understood, accepted their situations with the intention of pursuing the same system of measures which they had supported individually in the hands of their predecessors, yet from some symptoms I had observed, particularly in the conduct and issue of the negotiation with the northern powers, I was prepared to expect a greater disposition to concession in treating with France than I had ever been able to consider as advantageous or safe for the public interests.

"But I confess that the extent of what is now ceded to France goes so much beyond those expectations, and the consequent insecurity of the situation in which we shall be left appears to me to be productive of such extreme hazard to the country, that I cannot think I should be justified in concealing these opinions; especially as it is only by impressing Parliament and the public with a just sense of the danger, that there is any hope of leading them to think at all of those measures of precaution and preparation which such a situation indispensably requires.

"Nothing can be farther from my wishes (even if I had in other respects the least pretence to attempt it) than the influencing on this subject the opinions of any other persons. I have the misfortune on this point to differ completely from Mr. Pitt, with whom I have so long agreed on all questions relating to it. I may also possibly, and even probably, differ from others whose opinions I value highly; but with so strong an impression on my own mind upon a matter which so nearly concerns the merit or demerit of all my past conduct, and in which the future safety of the country is so much interested, I cannot but act on the best judgment of my own mind.

"What your opinions are I know not, and have no grounds to conjecture; but in this difference of opinions between two persons whom you have jointly supported in public, and to both of whom you are attached by private friendship, I thought I owed to you an early and explicit statement of the fact.

"I expect to see Pitt next week at Dropmore, but I have no hope that discussion can bring us nearer in opinion on this subject, though nothing, I trust, will ever alter our intimate friendship. When you come to town or its neighbourhood, I shall be most anxious to converse with you on the whole business." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, October 14. Stowe.—"In writing to you on the subject of my other letter (respecting M. de Nagell, sent the same

day), I cannot avoid adding a few words on a point with which my mind is in the present moment much more occupied.

"When Lord Hawkesbury had the goodness to apprise me of the conditions on which peace had been concluded with France, I did not conceal from him the impressions which the first knowledge of those conditions produced on my mind. The treaty itself has since been published, and after the most deliberate consideration both of that and of the convention of St. Petersburg, the merits of which I consider as in a great degree connected with it, I feel that public duty will compel me to express in Parliament my deep regret at the manner in which both these negotiations have been terminated; and my conviction of the absolute necessity of providing by all possible means of precaution and preparation against the new and imminent dangers to which I fear the country is exposed.

"I shall not be in town till a day or two before the meeting. When I come, I will, if you will allow me, state to you more particularly in conversation the grounds of these opinions. But I was unwilling to delay so long apprising you of the determination which, however reluctantly, I have felt myself obliged to adopt. I owe it also to Lord Hobart and Lord Hawkesbury to make to them the same communication, but I have not thought it necessary to trouble them with separate letters, and I trust you will have the goodness to state the circumstance to them.

"I can with perfect truth assure you that nothing but a sense of indispensable duty could have led me to this separation from those for whom I entertain sentiments of friendship and regard, and whose measures I was most sincerely desirous of supporting." *Draft.*

HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 15. Wimbledon.—"I have just received two letters from your lordship, and beg to assure you that I shall not fail to bear in mind your testimony in favour of Baron Nagel, which entirely accords with all that I have ever heard respecting him.

"Though it was impossible for me to learn without regret your lordship's sentiments concerning the preliminaries of peace with France, and the convention at Petersburg, my best thanks are due to you for the openness and candour with which the communication has been made, and for the expressions of kindness and friendship with which it was accompanied."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 16. Downing Street.—"I have deferred writing to your lordship for some time past under the

expectation of being able to inform you of the fall of Alexandria ; but although there is little doubt that that event took place early in September, there is as yet no official account of it.

"Some time ago I received a letter from Lord Elgin in which he requested me to apply to your lordship for a copy of a private letter which he wrote to you on the 4th November, 1798. I shall be much obliged to your lordship, if it can be found without giving your lordship too much trouble, if you will have the goodness to send it to me, in order that a copy of it may be taken and forwarded to Lord Elgin by a messenger, who will be dispatched to Constantinople in the course of a few days.

"By a letter which I received by the last mail from Lord Carysfort, I learn that he proposed leaving Berlin on Sunday ; and, in compliance with his desire, I applied to the Admiralty for a frigate to be sent to Cuxhaven to bring his lordship and family to England. The *Shannon* frigate has been ordered for this service.

"I have the honour to inclose to your lordship a copy of your letter to Lord Hawkesbury on the subject of the Russian Convention, and also a copy of the letter from Colonel Malcolm to Lord Elgin which I mentioned to you at Dropmore."

LORD MULGRAVE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 18. Mulgrave Castle.—"I shall be happy to converse fully and confidentially with you on my arrival in London, upon the subject of the letter I have just received. I confess myself under considerable difficulties respecting the line of conduct to be pursued in Parliament on the discussion of the preliminaries of peace. The terms cannot, I should think, be fully approved by any but those who admitted and ratified them ; that they are not such as Pitt would have stipulated I must firmly believe, till I hear the contrary from himself. His support of them I therefore attribute to his magnanimity, and to the controlling influence of a dilemma which I strongly feel in the present situation of Parliament and of parties. It is obvious that the present administration could not maintain themselves either in Parliament or in the country without the support of Mr. Pitt and his friends, and without the general opinion which prevails that he watches over, guides, and assists the conduct of the ministers of the Crown. This general opinion might perhaps seem to render it still more necessary for the leading members of the late administration to assert on this occasion the importance of that character of vigorous policy which distinguished their conduct in government, both with respect to our enemies, and as relating to the great objects of our power, security,

and glory. But, at the same time, the more immediate inconvenience and the more pressing danger which would arise from displacing, or even totally discrediting the present Government, without having any set of efficient men to place in their situations, may render it expedient rather to gloss over the defects of the treaty of peace (which at all events cannot be set aside) than, by the exertion of strong talents and popular character, to weaken the influence of Government in the country. There certainly is reason to apprehend that the foreign and domestic enemies of the country and constitution will continue an active and vigilant pursuit of their objects. Mr. Fox's speech at his anniversary dinner, is a specimen of what may be expected from Jacobin factions in the country. If Mr. Pitt and his friends should (as they can) overturn the present Administration, what would be the situation of the country. The King will not replace his late servants on the terms which they think absolutely necessary to enable them to serve him ; there would therefore remain no set of politicians to form a ministry but that party whose professed principles, and uniformly rash conduct in and out of government, would only tend to accelerate the approach of dangers which you see as a distant consequence of the terms of peace. It must, I conceive, be considerations of this nature alone which could lead the great mind of Pitt to sanction, or warp it to approve terms in any degree inadequate to the full extent of those claims of security, which the glorious superiority of this country in the contest with its powerful enemy might entitle it to demand, and would enable it to enforce. Pitt's support in the House of Commons will be all-powerful ; but can the Government make a respectable appearance in the House of Lords, with no auxiliary reinforcement to the talents of Lord Hobart and Lord Pelham ? I think not ; and in my present view of the question, I apprehend more danger from enfeebling the Government at this moment, than from omitting to enlarge upon the formidable preponderance of strength which has been allowed to the *enemy*, for such, I am convinced, they still *remain*.

"I most earnestly wish that your mutual friends (I do not presume to hope that I could effect it) might be able to bring you and Pitt to something near a similarity of sentiment, which, without sacrificing your former public declarations, might keep you both short of political hostility, and avert any marked censure of the existing Government. This has the appearance of recommending what is called an half measure ; but half measures sometimes become necessary in delicate circumstances, such as those under which the public safety now labours. It is impossible to express one's sentiments fully in a letter. I shall wish to have much explanatory conversation both with you and Pitt. The dangers of the treaty, whatever they may be, are unavoidable. I only dread the creating others more imminent in addition

to them ; and therefore am rather inclined 'to take up this mangled matter at the best. Men do their broken weapons rather use, than their bare hands.' ”

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 18. Berlin.—“As I have finally determined to begin my journey next Friday, I shall not write a long letter. You will readily believe that I shall be a very short time indeed in England without seeing you. We shall then have a great deal to talk over, and I a great deal to learn. In the meantime Hanover is yet not evacuated, and though the two great German Powers make very fine professions to each other, they are yet not agreed upon any point, and thwart each other in everything they can. We shall be at least five days going to Hamburg. I hope we may find a frigate at Cuxhaven.”

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private. 1801, October 21. Patna.—“I did not receive your kind letter of the 20th February until the middle of last month, the dispatch having been delayed at Bassorah for want of a safe conveyance. Your letter was peculiarly acceptable to me, as it is the only communication (save a brief and most cold epistle from Dundas) which I have received either from the old or new Ministers since the change. The change itself is a most miraculous event ; the causes of it utterly incredible (if not attested by such authority as yours), and the consequences most formidable. I should have concurred most decisively in your opinion respecting the complete union of the Catholics, as a necessary part of the general materials destined to form the cement of the new fabric. This, as you may remember, was my opinion long ago, when I pressed the necessity of the union at Holwood and elsewhere in various debates and discussions. The obstacle of the coronation oath may be *respectable*, but it is a gross error. I agree with you in the propriety of contributing every aid to the new Administration ; but it is ludicrous to be so Be-jenkyed, and so Be-blockheaded, and so Be-quizzed, and so Be-black-guarded ; however I rely on Addington ; and we must make the best of the other parts of the bargain. I am very glad that I was absent from the scene ; it would have been a most painful sight. With regard to myself, I am desirous of returning home ; but I feel it to be a duty not to suffer this charge to devolve into any hands which have not been specially appointed by the Government at home to receive it. When my provisional successor shall have been named, I shall exercise my discretion with regard to the propriety of returning

immediately ; always adverting to the condition of the public interests here, and to the calls for exertions which perhaps might not be within the power of another man unpossessed of equal advantages of established influence and authority. With all these sentiments I think I may hope to be in England in the summer of 1803. I am now making a royal progress through the provinces ; and have been highly pleased with the expedition. I mean to be absent from Fort William for some months, having now a council there (for which I have long contended) on which I can rely for the dispatch of business in the ordinary course.

“ I am in very good health and spirits ; although the Directors have been very vexatious in disturbing many of the details of the government. Addington will tell you that they have not moved my temper ; which I am resolved to preserve unruffled to the close of my administration.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, Oct. 21. Downing Street.—“ I have at length the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that a dispatch has been received this morning from Sir John Hutchinson, containing an account of the surrender of the French army at Alexandria on the 2nd of September. The garrison consisted of eight thousand soldiers and twelve or thirteen hundred seamen. They are not to be treated as prisoners of war, but are to be embarked for France as expeditiously as vessels can be procured for them.

“ The French ships of war and merchant vessels are given up to the combined English and Turkish commanders. The different actions which preceded the surrender reflect the highest honour on the British troops. Sir John Hutchinson mentions not only their heroism but their discipline also in the most enthusiastic terms.”

Postscript.—General Baird with four thousand of the troops from India arrived Cairo on the 10th of August. The remainder were daily expected.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 22. London.—“ I have seen so few people in London since I came here that I scarcely know more than I did last week of the opinions which prevail respecting the peace. The only persons whom I have heard endeavour to justify it take no other ground than that of necessity, and admit to the fullest extent all that can be said of the inadequacy and insecurity of the conditions on which it stands. I am told that though the word peace be popular amongst the lowest classes, yet amongst persons of all descriptions who affect

to reason upon the articles, they are considered as a confession of our defeat. Of the magnates I heard very few opinions quoted, but I know from good authority that Lord Fitz-William is determined to oppose the peace even if he should be single; and I am assured that he has been equally loud in his disapprobation of the language which was held at the Whig club. This latter sentiment will not be a little strengthened by what Fawkener has just told me of accounts being come that they have planted the "Tree of Liberty" at Nottingham. Lord Gower is not expected in town; Lord Hertford is here, probably not knowing that Lord Whitworth is to go to Paris; Lord Essex has said one word to me in passing which sounded to me like approbation of the peace. Meantime the language of the officers and supporters of Government is not very confident; they talk of people hanging back in the House of Commons; and I have heard it said that there are 50 in that House expected to be in opposition, and as many as 30 in the House of Lords; but all this must be very vague as yet, for town is still empty. I have reason to believe that the Ministers have made up their minds to retain 90 regiments, but I have not heard upon what establishment. Lord Cornwallis is expected to go on the 31st. The accounts which I hear of Ireland are as unpromising now as the last were of which I spoke to you; and I am the more struck with this as my historian is a very sanguine politician, and a supporter of Government.

"The *Gazette* of to-day would have made me feel proud a month ago, but I now feel more of mortification at our civil misconduct, than of exultation in our military success. Look at the Turkish treaty where, on the 9th October, Bonaparte gravely promises the Turk to evacuate Egypt, and both consents to and requires the acknowledgment of the 'seven islands.'"

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 23. Gosfield.—"I have just heard from a channel which you will easily guess, that *he* has been told in secrecy both by Lord Hawkesbury and by Mr. Otto, that Tobago is to be ceded by France to Great Britain for an *equivalent*, which *he* collects from both, is to be the sum due on the account of the prisoners. This is I think not unlikely, though it is possible that Lord Hawkesbury may be the dupe of such a proposition which, as far as *he* collected, is not a secret article; and in any view of the question, the proposition of a *purchase* precludes all idea of a benefit obtained or retained by the negotiation. I have likewise this morning heard from another person (a quarter from whence occasionally I pick up odd communications and whom you will guess) that *he* was told on Wednesday 'Lord Grenville has notified

his intention to oppose the peace and the Russian treaty.' The two observations that were added were 'I am not surprised at it,' and 'this has once more united the family again.' To all which not one word was said. I do not know why I trouble you with this nonsense; but I collect from it that the pill of the peace has not been very easily swallowed. How do you like the treaty signed by Talleyrand with the Turk on the 9th October, stipulating that they shall have in Egypt every advantage that shall be given to any other power; and in every other part of the Turkish dominions, they shall be on the footing of the most favoured nation, in their relation of peace and intercourse; in exchange for which they promise to evacuate Egypt, in which they had not a soldier or a seaman after the 2nd of September."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 25. Gosfield.—"I had very little doubt when we discussed the matter together at Stowe but that Government would dissolve as soon as possible; but I very much doubt whether that can be quite so soon as you have been informed, as I cannot persuade myself that they will venture to leave the country for 50 days without the securities of different sorts that expire with the war; and which, if they are only to be renewed in part, will require more time than can be employed between the 1st November and the 25th of December; however we have learnt to our cost *nil admirari*! The threat of dissolution has been employed in the way you point out. Sir R. Williams is one convert to the opinion of Carnarvonshire, who have declared that the high price of corn was owing solely to the war, for that it fell as soon as the peace was known! Bulkeley is, I fear, bit by the same Welsh logic; and I know of two others who argue in the same manner. At the same time I have reason to think that Government find their peace less popular than they expected. I think the Turkish treaty is the consummation of the impudence of France and of our imbecility."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, [October 23-31.]—"I return to you the letter of Lord Glastonbury, which is written with a more vigorous pen than I expected from Butleigh, but I presume he will satisfy himself with this written protestation to you, and will not quit his after-dinner nap in Somersetshire for the noisy wranglings of the House of Lords.

"I have seen Windham and find him as ardent as I expected, but very accessible to all suggestions as to the imprudence of mixing in the debates on peace the feverish topic of the

restoration of monarchy ; he seems much impressed with the advantage of confining himself to the two points, of vindicating his own character from all approbation of the peace, and of rousing the country to a proper sense of the dangers which are incurred by it.

"I still hear that the Government are now looking to a large peace establishment, though I am told that, a little while ago, they had certainly determined differently."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, October 26. Park Place.—"I passed my time so pleasantly in hunting and shooting ; and found myself so much the better for sea air that I have been tempted to stay as long as I could at Walmer, and am only just arrived in town. I could not now well leave it again, and my coming to you would answer little purpose, as you are probably moving this way, and Hammond seems to think you may be expected tomorrow. I only write therefore to say that I am here, and shall be happy to know as soon as you arrive."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, November 6. Charles Street.—"It is reluctantly that I send instead of bringing to you what I possess of the debates respecting the northern convention, but the cold air of yesterday, in a cold walk with Lord Buckingham, broke through the thin case of my head, and it would be good for nothing but sneezing if I were to put it into a chaise to-day to carry it down to Dropmore. If, nevertheless, you still wish to talk this point out with me, perhaps you would come to town after church on Sunday, and there would be in that way ample time for discussion before Tuesday ; yet I am so little versed in the subject, and you are so much so, that I do not easily see what help I could give you.

"To say the truth, as far as I can form an opinion, it would lead me to doubt much of the expediency of your presenting to the House any regular series of propositions upon this subject. In the first place such a proceeding would appear to me to have more the appearance of a regular course of hostility to the Government than you think it desirable to adopt ; in the next place it would be represented as a measure calculated to invite renewal of hostilities, which no man will now venture to look at ; and may give to the general turn of your supposed political opinions the character of too great an inclination to engage the country in war. Nor would it in any view be desirable that you should place so strong a record of your opinions on this subject as would lead people to imagine that your future return into a situation of government

must be immediately followed by discussions with the northern powers of a nature likely to produce war with them. If instead of a string of propositions you take only the natural course of commenting in a speech upon the treaty which has been concluded, it seems to me that you will be equally able to deliver your opinions, and that those opinions, offered in the shape of advice to ministers how to pursue those objects which are deficient in the present arrangement, will be the most decorous and becoming shape in which you can be seen by the public upon this occasion.

“Perhaps my ideas may carry me farther than you may approve of when I tell you that, in your situation, I am inclined to believe that I should state in a speech all the ideas which I entertained upon the matter; that I should endeavour forcibly to recommend those ideas to the notice of Government; and that I should conclude by saying that I would still hope those ideas would be acted upon in negotiation, and that with this hope I should forbear giving a vote against the measure, although I could not in conscience express my approbation of it. This is all that has passed in my mind since I last saw you, and all that I could have said if I had been enough without cold to come down to you; but your own judgment will certainly better direct you upon this as upon all other subjects of this description.”

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, November 26. Dropmore.—“Mr. Fisher having mentioned to me what you had the goodness to say to him the other night at the play, I cannot omit expressing to you the sense I entertain of this instance of a liberality of sentiment on your part, for which I certainly had already given you credit; but the assurance of which is not on that account the less entitled to my acknowledgments.” *Copy.*

HENRY ADDINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, November 27. Downing Street.—“I am much gratified by your letter, as I truly value your good opinion, and as it is not possible for political differences to divest my mind of those sentiments of regard and esteem with which I shall ever remain; (and it is very painful to me to address you in a style of such formality).”

H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 3. Downing Street.—“I send you an extract from a letter which I received from Cockburn about

the wine which he promised to get you last year. If you do not want it, I am sure Watkin will be too happy to take it off your hands. I cannot conceive what accident can have happened to the books, but I will enquire.

"I have found in this office a quantity of private papers which belong to you. I have sealed them up in green bags, and intend to send them to Camelford House, for Killick to take them down to Dropmore."

Enclosure.

ALEXANDER COCKBURN to H. W. WILLIAMS WYNN.

"I hope ere this you have received the books which I sent for Lord Grenville by the British merchant ship *Jane*, Captain Reynolds. Your silence, however, on the subject makes me fear that some accident has prevented their safe arrival. You may remember that I promised last year to send Lord Grenville some champagne, an unlucky accident made it impossible for me to fulfil my promise. I have now, however, purchased seven chests of the finest Burgundy (I believe in the world) and if Lord Grenville likes to have it I will send it to him with Lord Carysfort's effects whenever the Berlin mission is finished. Each chest contains 54 bottles at 2 15 marks per bottle; according to the present exchange 4s. sterling. You will therefore observe that if they are sent as I propose they will cost very little more than his port wine. I am sure that in England he could not get such for a guinea a bottle.

"I wish, when you see Lord Grenville, you would mention to him how happy I should be if at any time I could render him any services, or make myself useful to him here; that nothing can efface from my mind the recollection of his kindness to me; and that, during my life, I shall ever be ready to prove myself worthy of it."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1801, December 6. Dropmore.—"In the course of the last summer I wrote to Lord Hardwicke to mention to him that, if Government was not under any engagement which prevented it, I should be highly gratified by his allowing it to be understood that his good wishes respecting the approaching election for Waterford went with Sir John Newport, who has already declared himself a candidate. In addition to the claims which a most respectable situation at Waterford afford him, Sir John Newport adds the merit of an early and decided support of the union; and my intimate knowledge of him, commencing almost with our childhood, enabled me to do

that which I would do for very few men living, to pledge my own honour and character for his loyalty, his attachment to the principles of good government and British connection in Ireland, and his general uprightness and integrity. Lord Hardwicke's answer was such as I expected from our long friendship; expressing a desire, which I am sure was perfectly sincere, to do what might be agreeable to me, stating that his government was not under any other engagement respecting the election at Waterford, and intimating a strong disposition on his part to comply with my request; but adding—as I thought with great propriety—that he could not come under any final engagement on the subject of an election for the Parliament at Westminster without previous communication here. The matter rested here, and by a letter lately received by Sir John Newport from Mr. Abbot, I imagine it still remains in the same situation, as far as the Irish Government is concerned; but as it is necessary for Sir John Newport's interest that he should, as soon as it can be done, be apprized of any final resolution that may be taken on the subject, his brother Mr. William Newport, who is now in London, has requested from me a letter of introduction to you, paying me the compliment of saying that he wishes rather to come to you with that introduction, even under the present circumstances, than to avail himself of the friendship of any of his other connections. I am perfectly sensible that having felt myself obliged to express a public dissent from the measures which Government has been pursuing, and being unwilling to give any other assurance or pledge of my future Parliamentary conduct than may result from my public character and principles, it neither becomes me to ask, nor is it to be expected, that the King's servants should give their support to any person in the approaching elections, on the ground of any wish expressed by me. But I thought I should neither do justice to you, nor to Mr. Newport, if I declined the step which he has now requested; and the effect of which will only be to give him the opportunity of stating to you in person his brother's pretensions to the support of Government on this occasion, and to afford you the advantage of seeing a person on whose declarations (whatever they may be) you may, I am certain, rely." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, Dec. 15. Stowe.—“I have just got rid of my French princes, and while they were depending I had too much mercy upon you to dream of exposing you to what I well know you would have disliked. But I cannot agree to let you off and your good wife from your promise to us for Christmas, and therefore give you the earliest notice that our fires are excellent, the new room entirely warmed and more truly comfortable

than anything I ever hoped for. *Arrangez vous* therefore, for no excuse will be permitted.

Postscript.—"Lord Moira has certainly been in negotiation, and probably in concert with Mr. Grey ; but I cannot conceive Mr. Addington weak enough to take the former (who is most ready to accept) without the latter."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 20. Stowe.—"A bird has whispered me that your plantations have interfered with your speeches, and that the Russian speech is not finished, nor that on the preliminary treaty even begun. I know how to estimate your comforts, but indeed I shall be heartily disappointed if you suffer anything to put you by from such a *mémoire justificative*, which I think on many grounds so essentially necessary to *us all*, but to you more than to *all of us*. I believe you will not be sorry to hear that I have thought it became me to offer Windham a retreat at St. Mawes, in case of disappointment with his weavers ; and he has accepted the offer in a manner that shews me that he estimates it very high. For every reason it is agreed to keep it a secret. Has Mr. Pitt stopped the negotiation with Mr. Grey ? You cannot tell me, nor can I tell you that the fact is so ; but I have reason to know that it is so said by a person who looked to such a negotiation ; and certainly there are symptoms that lead me to imagine that Mr. Addington will go through this session as he has begun it, and will save himself from opposition by coquetting with them.

"The army is to be what you see thrown out in the papers ; namely, 101 battalions making 70,000 men, exclusive of six (or eight) black corps to be paid by the islands, and 34 regiments of cavalry making 20,000 : added to which are the horse guards 800 ; and the 7 battalions of foot-guards, 4,200, makes above 100,000 men, exclusive of artillery and marines. The militia establishment is likewise to be raised to 70,000 English, and 10,000 Scotch. This is, I think, sufficient to satisfy *us* ; and Mr. Pitt told a person who repeated it to me, that Mr. Addington was sufficiently provided with the necessary taxes ; at the same time I know that the latter doubts his means."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 23. Hertford Street.—"I am ashamed to think that I should have been near a week without communicating to you a piece of intelligence which, though of no consequence in itself, concerns me and my interests very nearly.

"After the last drawing room, Mr. Addington sent for me to say that, in a conversation which he had just had with the king on my subject, his majesty had been pleased to say that he thought very right and proper that I should have a seat in the Privy Council as the reward of my services during my last mission; and that it should be given immediately so as that it might not be supposed by any body to be other than what it really was, and, above all, that it might not be considered as an appendage to the Berlin mission.

"I understand from the Duke of Portland that it was the intention to have conferred this honour on me much sooner, but for some circumstances (not personal to me) which I will explain to your lordship when I see you at Dropmore.

"I received a very flattering letter from the Treasury the other day, founded on the report of the Army Comptroller, to say that the treaties I had made not only appeared to be much more advantageous than any former ones of the kind, but that, through my exertions, they had been carried into execution on principles of economy deserving the highest commendation. I take it that it was this report which induced Mr. Addington to mention me to the King."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1801, December 28. Charles Street.—"I told you in my last that I could not believe the prevailing report of the Brest fleet having been suffered to sail by our government upon no better assurances than those given by the Great Consul respecting its destination. I was however yesterday evening assured from undoubted authority that sixteen sail of the line have actually sailed with above 10,000 troops, and I have great reason to think that our government have ineffectually endeavoured to prevent this measure by their negotiations with the French Republic.

"The consequences of this expedition appear to me full of danger of every sort; some danger certainly of St. Domingo being merely a pretext for covering intentions of an immediately hostile description to us in the West Indies; and although I do not incline to think that Bonaparte will throw away the advantages of this treaty by beginning hostilities before he has received the benefits of it, still I think this speculation is not a sufficient security against the danger of our losing Jamaica in case that speculation should appear to be unfounded. But the real and immediate mischief which I see in this expedition is that, by suffering Bonaparte quietly to place this powerful armament in the middle of our West India islands, before the definitive treaty be signed, we are absolutely placed in the most undisguised state of dependance upon France as to any requisition which she may make in constructing the definitive treaty; for how can we affect

to hesitate to comply with her demands, when we see that a renewal of hostilities would begin by putting our enemy in possession of some of our most valuable islands in the West Indies ? And if it be true that our government has in vain endeavoured to resist this, our future danger is still more increased by our present submission. In this view I may perhaps feel it necessary to say a few words in the House, to endeavour to call the attention of the country to this very interesting subject ; at all events I mean to go down to see what they do with their adjournment, and whether there shall appear to be fit opportunity of my saying a few words. I am sorry for this disappointment. If I am kept by the same business from Dropmore, I then hope to meet you at Stowe on Wednesday."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801, December 28.] Twickenham.—" Quoiqu'il y ait bien longtems que je n'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir, et que peut-être vous n'avez entendu parler de moi, je compte trop sur la stabilité de vos sentimens pour ne pas douter que vous ne conserviez souvenir et amitié à un des hommes qui vous est le plus attaché. J'ai essayé deux fois d'aller vous chercher à Dropmore, et j'ai toujours joué de malheur, et appris à *Salthill* que vous n'y étiez pas. Comme c'étoit pour rencontrer mon ami et non pas pour me faire écrire que j'allois chez vous, *I never left my name*. Je n'ai pas été plus heureux *when I called at Lady Camelford's*. Permettez-moi donc de vous demander quand je pourrai vous trouver chez vous. Daignez me mander quel jour vous serez en ville, et à quelle heure vous voulez recevoir votre ancien ami. J'ai réellement besoin de vous révoir, et de vous parler de mes sentimens pour vous qui ne varieront jamais.

" L'événement n'a que trop vérifié ce que j'ai marqué à ma cour dès le lendemain du jour où nous avons eu le malheur de vous perdre. Quelques conversations que j'ai eu avec Mr. Addington, et votre successeur, m'ont confirmé dans mon opinion ; et je n'ai cessé d'écrire à Vienne que la paix de l'Angleterre seroit faite quand *le monstre Corse* le voudroit. La manière dont je me suis expliqué sur nos traités me donne au moins le droit de m'affliger de ce qui s'est fait chez vous. La dernière digue qui s'opposait à l'anarchie vient de céder, et nous allons, au lieu d'une invasion, avoir une inondation de régicides. Je crois le mal sans remède, à moins d'un miracle de la Providence, et je suis trop franc pour ne pas avouer à mon ami que le mode de cette paix me fait même craindre une quantité de maux incalculables, avant la culbute générale que je considère comme inévitable. Peu de gens ont comme vous et moi la satisfaction de pouvoir se dire à eux-mêmes qu'ils n'ont eu aucune communication directe *quelconque*

avec les scélérats qui triomphent. Tout ce qui vient de se passer en simplifiant beaucoup la politique, dont il me paroît que le principe est à présent *partout* de céder *sur tout*, diminue nécessairement les occupations de ceux auxquels le désir et l'espoir d'opérer le bien ne permettoient jusqu'à présent un instant de repos. J'y renonce pour le moment, et je me réserve pour l'occasion si jamais elle se présente. *Meanwhile* je me trouve heureux d'avoir réussi à échapper aux effets de l'extrême bonté de mon maître, dont la confiance flatteuse m'a destiné à plusieurs reprises à l'ambassade de Paris. L'ami de Lord Grenville *will never creep at the proud feet of the Corsican usurper*.

“La circonstance actuelle a bien été le creuset de la fermeté des caractères, et ce pays-ci peut se glorifier d'offrir *dix sages* dans la chambre des Pairs. La Grèce n'en comptait que sept, et les autres nations de l'Europe n'en ont peut-être pas autant ensemble.

O tempora ! O mores !

“Je ne puis m'empêcher, avant de finir, de vous parler de l'effet qu'a produit sur moi le superbe discours que vous avez tenu l'autre jour. Je vous assure que je n'en ai jamais lu ni entendu qui fut plus fort de raisons, de principes, de logique et d'éloquence que cet incomparable *speech*. Je vous y ai retrouvé tout entier, c'est vous dire que j'étois digne de l'entendre. Adieu, agréez hommages et tendresses de la part de *L'anglo-austrian*, et pardessus tout, *Antigallican*, habitant de Twickenham.”

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801.] Cleveland Square.—“I should be very thankful to your Lordship to let me have some papers relative to the Irish Dissenters and Catholics, which I left with you last winter. The former are drawn up by a Mr. Black, the latter by Sir J. Hipposley. Mr. Abbot informs me that the arrangement for the Dissenters is to be proceeded with, and wishes for the information contained in those papers. The arrangement for the Catholic clergy seems for the present likely to stick.”

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1801.] Cleveland Square.—“I return your Lordship many thanks for your kind attention to my request; you have returned all the papers which I left with you, and I have only to lament that the purposes to which your Lordship meant to apply them have for the present been frustrated. The comprehensive system which you had in view will sooner or later accomplish itself, but it never can be effected with the same grace which would have attended it had it immediately followed the Union.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 20. Harley Street.—“J’ai reçu hier du peintre Romney votre portrait ; vous avez exaussez mes vœux en m’accordant la faveure que je désiroit tant d’avoir. J’ai à présent la satisfaction de posséder l’image du ministre le plus éclairé, le plus ferme, et la plus honnêt que j’ai jamais connu, avec le quel j’eus le bonheur de traiter, et qui m’a constamment honoré de son amitié, de sa confiance, et des lumières du quel j’ai beaucoup profité : aussi lui ai-je voué un attachement qui ne s’éteindra qu’avec ma vie.

“J’ai remarqué avec une satisfaction extrême que vous tenez à la main [main] le traité que nous avons signé ensemble, et qui posa le premier fondement à cette union entre les deux pays qui n’a été interrompu sept ans après pour le malheur de l’Europe que par des circonstances si peu naturelle et extravagantes qu’aucune prudence humaine ne pouvoit prévoir ni empêcher. Cette malheureuse mésintelligence a cessé, voilà tout : mais pour rétablir l’ancienne intimité, la renforcer, et la rendre permanente, il faut que le même ministre qui était au timon des affaires politique de la grande Bretagne, et qui forma cette alliance, retourne à son poste pour faire cet ouvrage utile aux deux pays, et salutaire à l’Europe entière ; car je vois avec douleur que, malgré la tendance naturelle et réciproque des deux pays à cette union si désirée, ceux qui se sont emparés ici de la manœuvre du vaisseau de l’état qu’ils conduisent avec tant d’inabilité, sont tout-à-fait au-dessous d’un si grand ouvrage.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 25. Charles Street.—“Whenever your printer furnishes to me the slips of your speech I will forward them to you with as many censures as I can devise to keep them company.

“I think with you that our weekly journal is very dull in its outset, and if it does not shew a little more vivacity, I should think with less confidence of its extensive circulation than does its editor. If, however, it be read, and if it continue to shew to the public of the country how little even their base fears ought to find of future security in their dishonourable submission, and how much their danger increases by the multiplied concessions of their government, if these things are read, they are so true that they will sink into the mind by their own natural weight, without wanting any assistance of genius or vivacity to give them effect. To-day everybody is asking one another whether the French have demanded and obtained the island of Elba. I understand they have, but when I am asked I say, and that with some truth, that I

am not altogether without anxiety lest it should be demanded of us to hang up Grant and his little garrison for their audacity in defending Porto Ferraio against the French arms.

"What can they mean by respiting Wall a second time? There were two other charges against him which were not tried, because though a man can several times commit murder, he can be hanged but once. The expectation of the lower class is so alive to this case of public justice that a pardon would be intolerable, and repeated respite without pardon is wicked torture."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 26.—"Cobbett sent me two sheets last night, and I forward them to you by this post, with pencil marks in reference to the *valuable* annotations of my critical pen. If they are not clear enough to be legible to you, you may comfort yourself with my sincere assurance that they are not worth the trouble of decyphering. I heard yesterday that the language of our minister at Amiens, in a letter to a confidential friend, is full of complaints at the unmeasurable prolongation of his exile; and if I do not refine too much, I think I see traces in his friend's conversation, of some uncertainty as to the result being such as was expected.

"I hear nothing of new arrangements, but I think Sheridan's Whig speech, in which he questions himself, and obtains from himself such satisfactory answers, indicates a desire on his part of shaming his friends out of an arrangement which he may suspect they incline to.

"Tierney, at a large dinner at Addington's the other day, congratulated him upon the *appearance of an opposition, good for constitutional purposes, and not dangerous to his power*. I believe Addington would be better pleased with a plain course of undisturbed power, and that he does not much look out for these decorations to which Tierney is something more habituated than he is.

"I rejoice that the sun is shining upon your gravel-carts."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, January 30.—"As far as I can form an opinion upon the subject, I am rather disinclined to the idea of annexing Sulpicius to the publication of your speech. In the first place I see in this shape no particular advantage, because to all who are likely to pursue this subject, both the letters of Sulpicius and the name of the author are sufficiently known; and the direct reference made to them in the speech of Lord Hawkesbury must have made them still more notorious; if therefore on the last blank page of your speech, Mr. Cobbett

announced that the letters of Sulpicius were to be had at his shop, all those who wish to put together what is written by you on the matter will easily thus be reminded how to do it; but my chief apprehension of its being made a part of your speech is that the volume of it will be thus very much increased, and upon a subject so little inviting as the northern neutrality, I would not discourage the reader by shewing him too many pages to wade through. This is my chief objection. Another is that your adding those letters to the speech, makes you more prominent and more active in publication, than I think is desirable. A speech steals out, and nobody knows how, but an addition to the speech would give it too much the air of a political pamphlet. *Dixi.*

“Lord Glastonbury assures me that he knows that the negotiations with Grey and Lord Moira are brought to an unsuccessful conclusion, as they stipulate for the repeal of the treason and sedition bills, which is refused. I know not how any of this is. I have just heard that Sir William Pulteney is dead.

“Your neighbour Dupré has bought Lord Howe’s in Grafton Street for 8,000*l.* Hester is fat and flourishing, and is panting for the possession of Sir R. Lyttelton’s house in Piccadilly.”

Private. WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 9. Hertford Street.—“Your Lordship’s letter of this evening has very much surprised me. On Sunday, at 5 p.m., Mr. Addington made me the offer of Ireland which I accepted under certain conditions; but the strictest secrecy was required and promised till Lord Hardwicke’s approbation should be *formally* obtained. You may naturally suppose that I did not wish to be exposed to a refusal, and therefore that I made my first stand there; but I was answered that both Abbot and Charles Yorke had *formally* engaged for Lord Hardwicke’s full and unequivocal wishes being for my appointment, in preference to that of any other person. It was however thought more decent that nothing should be said to *anybody* till an answer had come from Ireland to the first letter which notified the intention to offer the situation to me. This was even carried so far as that I was forbidden to call on the new Chancellor, though I knew that he had been earnest for my appointment, and had said everything that could be said to fix Mr. Addington in his resolution.

“I shut myself up to-day that I might see nobody. I have really seen nobody, and till I received your Lordship’s letter I thought the thing a profound secret.

“I this instant receive a letter of congratulation from Colonel Hope, saying that Mr. Addington has mentioned it to a friend of his.

"I will tell your Lordship much more on the subject if you will give me leave to call on you on Thursday morning after breakfast. I will not give your Lordship the trouble of calling here."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 16. London.—"The papers will have shewn you the new degradation of the House in the suppression of Lord Folkestone's motion against the printers of the *True Briton*; upon Sheridan's speech in their defence, Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, and other ministers nodded assent to all his speech, and the order of the day was passed upon Lord Folkestone's motion, because, as William Dundas told him, Government, being abused in opposition papers, were determined to defend their printers in the same practice. I was told that Lord Folkestone would only give notice yesterday, and therefore I was not in the House.

"The paragraph in the *Moniteur* seems to announce the *Department of Piedmont* as subject to France; and I am told to-day that it is universally believed that we are to have Martinique for Trinidad, and for our claim on account of prisoners; an exchange which at first sight I am not disposed to complain of, because I apprehend Martinique to be a much more secure possession to us, and Trinidad to be less valuable to France than to us, because it will demand a greater capital than France can yet furnish for the cultivation of it.

"These successive acts of conquest on the part of France do begin to make considerable sensation, but whomever they may alarm, they do not alarm the Government, for Charles tells me that Vansittart speaks of the disbanding all the yeomanry as the only measure which he hears of respecting them.

"Fox, as I hear, will oppose the referring of the arrears of the civil list to a committee to-morrow, but he will probably defend the Prince's claim to his Cornish arrears, and so far save hostility with respect to him.

"This matter at present occupies the conversation of London, and it is generally stated that the arrears will be above 600,000*l.*, and the Prince's claim near 400,000*l.*; but the accounts will be presented to-day. I am told in the city that there are many faces which grow very long upon finding that in addition to the positive prohibition of English goods in France, and in the Batavian Republic, the new duties in Spain do likewise amount to a virtual prohibition.

"Can it be true, as it is confidently reported to me, that to secure the independence of Malta, we take upon ourselves the payment of the Neapolitan garrison there. Where will all this childish folly end?

"Ross speaks with little hope of seeing his friend from

Amiens, and thinks there is a hitch about Turkey. Prussia has endeavoured, being backed by France, to obtain Mechlenburg; but this has been stopped at Petersburg with great anger at the attempt."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, February 18. London.]—"I cannot avoid writing one line to you, in answer to your letter of to-day, to urge you on no account to delay to come up to London, if there is any new sensation whatever from your hand more than belongs to the spot which was hurt.

"Lord Spencer some years ago was himself a good deal affected by a thorn which wounded his foot, and though care prevented real mischief, it was by early and unremitting attention that he did so. Do not imagine that your feeling this pain in your elbow *immediately* after hurting your hand is any real security as distinguished from my case; the singularity of my case was the late appearance of the consequences of the wound; but in all this uncertainty I own I should feel better pleased if you would come up but for the single object of asking Farquhar or Home whether any and what precautions are necessary. I know that fatigue and much exercise must be avoided, while you have any suspicion on this subject, therefore as you cannot work in the country, you had better come and be idle for a few days in London.

"You see by what passed yesterday that Addington means that the Prince's claims should be established; and yet I remember that Pitt formerly contended that, even allowing his claim, the set off on the other side would still leave him debtor.

"Lawrence tells me that you have fallen into a small mistake by mentioning the order for the advantage of America as the *only* relaxation of our principle; he says there was a second order in 1798 of stronger effect which you should have noticed, and which you will find at the end of Robinson's reports."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, February 20. London.]—"I will get from White's the 1st part of the 2nd volume of Robinson, which contains the order of 1798, and Sir W. Scott's remarks upon it; I cannot depend upon getting Hammond's frank for it, but, as I presume, if you remain at Dropmore your Auditor's messenger will go down to you on Monday, I will send it to Oxford Street.

"I should at all events recommend to you to publish a supplementary postscript, because I think what Lawrence describes of the order does very much affect the whole of that part of your argument which applied to the *single exception* made

by us in favour of America. In order to prevent your being attacked upon this point too soon, I should even advise you to make Cobbett immediately advertise that in a few days will be published a postscript to the appendix to your speech.

"I am glad that you talked to Fulwasser, and yet I think him hardly equal to any conversation on lacerated tendons; surely you had better come up for two days to write your postscript, and to satisfy yourself and me by seeing Home.

"Pitt has just been sitting here for an hour with me, and has already made me almost too late for the past.

"We differ much, but I see we entirely agree as to the magnitude of these last events, and, upon the whole, his conversation is more in his own style than I expected it."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, February 23. London.]—"I rejoice very much in your determination to come up to-morrow, and the more so because Fulwasser's practice can hardly be such as to make him a competent judge of the case in question: I think it very probable that you may not be told to take anything but precaution against over-fatigue and irritation, but still I wish that you may be told so by somebody who is better qualified to judge than your country councillors can be.

"You say nothing about desiring Cobbett to announce a postscript, but the more I think of it the more necessary it seems to be; for in truth the whole of your argument on that particular point is affected by the *generality* of the order of 1798. I depend upon seeing you to talk over with you the conversation which I mentioned to you. Let me know as soon as you come."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 24. Charles Street.—"I sit down to supply what the hurry of yesterday's post did not allow me to write, and what I had trusted that I should have had an opportunity of saying to you, although it is scarcely worth troubling you with any written detail in order to describe the conversation which I had mentioned to you. What struck me a little was that Lord Spencer had remarked an unusual promptitude in his neighbour to return his visit, and to declaim against the insolence and ambition of Bonaparte; and it did not seem quite by hazard that to me, who had called at his door, he likewise came the very next morning and stayed a considerable time with me. He talked very soon without any apparent constraint, and we had a very familiar, easy, and friendly discussion of all the late events which have happened. I told him that I would not say a word to him about the preliminary articles, on which subject I know that we had different

opinions, but that I was sure if I spoke to him as a friend to the preliminary articles, he would not deny how much even his expectations of any of the advantages of those articles must have been discouraged by all the subsequent instances of the increasing rapacity and undisguised ambition of Bonaparte, as they were seen in the possession of the Cisalpine, of Piedmont, of Louisiana, and not least neither, in the circumstances of the general and active display of all the naval force of France for the nominal object of St. Domingo. To all these points he was so impatient to express his assent that he would hardly wait till I had stated them before he spoke even more strongly upon them than I had done, and among other things he expressly said that he would grant to me that, in any other times, any one of these events would of necessity have produced from hence a war with France; but he took great pains to prove that, bad as this situation was, it would not be mended by renewing the war at a time like the present when we could not hope for support from either Germany or Russia; though he agreed that if they would act with us, and shew real disposition and means to do so, that would alter the question. I told him that I took for granted that the French occupation of Italy, with a large army at the Imperial Venetian frontier, must probably have produced great alarm at Vienna, and strong reclamations here, which, I supposed, might be improved into confederacy; but I asked what hope we could ever have of exciting a proper spirit of resistance upon the Continent, if we ourselves were the first to shew a readiness to bend to the yoke of France; and I told him plainly that, with the low and desponding tone which government had given and were giving to the country here, I did fear that all the proper feelings of English resistance to the power of France would be irrevocably lost, even when we might have no choice but that of submission or defence. This he stoutly denied, and said he should have no fear of finding the mind of the public right if he had made up his own; and I agreed with him that *he* could do so, but that this government could not. The best part of his conversation was his declared sense of these new dangers; the worst was that when I asked him how far he could carry his own ideas of the necessity of temporising, and whether he was prepared to see France take possession of Spain and Holland and so on in succession, and I must say that, even to this, he doubted whether in the present moment we ought to shew resistance by war.

“Upon this I put the case to him of France herself renewing the war with us, and I think he scarcely affected to resist in argument this state of the question; but said that he should be for an establishment so large as almost to amount to defensive war; and to this I answered that, if so, we should make no material difference in things by this peace, except that we should give our enemy the cessions of the peace, and undisturbed means of arranging his future attack, while we, with the

expenses of war, had none of the advantages either of war or peace.

“He ended by saying that he thought it a very doubtful and difficult question whether we should gain as much as our enemy would by this interval. I told him I should again pursue him on these subjects, to which he very cordially assented. I wish you were more in the habit of communication with him ; I think he courts it, and that he is more accessible to our view of the matter than he has yet been.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, February 27. Charles Street.—“It was because I imagined that Pitt was accessible to the influence of conversation, that I so much regretted your being so entirely out of the reach of all communication with him ; however inclined as I really am to seek for such opportunities myself, they are not easily found ; and as they belong not to my ordinary habits, they awaken in some degree a jealousy with respect to their object that is not favourable to give such impressions as arise out of the renewed habits of old and familiar intercourse. With regard to yourself none of these objections apply ; and there is moreover the additional inducement in him to listen to you from the political weight which your opinions are likely to have. The more I think of this particular topic the more do I persuade myself that considerable advantage would be likely to arise from it. In the first place the subject, as arising from these recent events, is entirely new, and offers to those friends of the preliminary articles who choose to look for it a consistent mode of declaring their sense of these new dangers without the unpleasant task of recanting their former opinions ; and whatever difference of opinion there was between you and Pitt upon the preliminary articles of peace, as there is no great difference between you as to the dangers of these subsequent events, why may not one hope that communication upon these agreed points may lead Pitt to acquiesce in the conclusion which ought to arise from the consideration of these dangers ? Why, at least, should he not be induced to think that those who reluctantly differed with him are rather seeking for all means of doing away those differences, than dwelling singly or solely upon them ? Why, if the question of his own decision upon the steps which ought to be taken to resist the overbearing ambition of France be left in any degree doubtful, as in my conscience I incline to think it is, why should not the chance be taken of bringing that decision to a right bias, by his seeing that such a decision may lead to renew those connections which I am sure he cannot but regret, and which the encreasing difficulties of every hour must hourly lead him more and more to value and to desire.

“I know with all this that there is a sort of solitary

consolation which you find in keeping entirely clear of discussion, as well as of business, when everything takes so disgraceful and unpromising an aspect ; and I think I see strong symptoms in your letter of your inclination to indulge yourself in this sort of negative gratification of not hearing or talking of anything so bad as the present state of politics consists of. If this feeling be so prevalent with you as that it is painful to you to resist it, I do not know why I should press upon you a task which may be both ungracious and unprofitable ; but if you are a free agent in this respect, and if you allow yourself to be influenced by a desire rather to do all that may turn to good than to do only what is gratifying, and what may appear to be the bare line of duty, then and in that case I think you will be disposed, in reflecting upon this subject, to think that you should not let the present moment go by unemployed.

“ Perhaps my own inclination would, in your situation, be to write to Pitt, and to ask him plainly how far he did or did not agree with you in your sense of these new dangers subsequent to the preliminary articles ; telling him fairly of the duty which seems to be imposed upon him of not letting the courage and spirit of the country be irrevocably lost at a moment when every reasonable man must agree that it may soon be called again into question for its independence and existence. If his answer seems to invite a discussion, you might then come to town ; if it does not, you will at least have done something more for the gratification of your own mind.”

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1802, March 3. Dropmore.—“ I learnt yesterday, by an extract which I read in a newspaper, that Count Dietrichstein had, in a pamphlet published here, renewed some of those unfounded assertions respecting the causes of the failure of the campaign of 1799, and particularly of the separation of the armies on the Swiss frontier, which he at that time circulated, and which, I remember, you were then instructed to contradict.

“ There are many reasons which induce me to wish to do away by some authentic statement, supported by proper documents, the unfavourable and injurious impressions which those assertions, coming from a person employed in high stations, must create on the Continent respecting the conduct of this country. And the materials furnished by the papers which I possess, would be sufficient for the purpose, even without the assistance of your correspondence, of which I have not got here any copies or abstracts.

“ Dietrichstein’s pamphlet I have not yet seen, but I have sent for it ; and, if you had leisure to look out the two or three dispatches which relate to that point, and your note

to the Arch-duke Charles upon it, that would be all that would be wanted for the purpose of stating the truth in a manner to carry irresistible conviction. Perhaps when I read the whole pamphlet it may appear to me less entitled to attention than it now does ; but, if the contrary should be the case, I should then most earnestly wish to intrude even on your present occupations, by requesting you, at your leisure, to put down a short statement of what occurs to you upon it.

“I am perfectly aware that after I have drawn any such answer to M. Dietrichstein as I have in view, I cannot publish it without the King’s permission. Nor indeed should I wish to do so. I should therefore, in that case, send it to Lord Hawkesbury, and request him to signify to me the King’s pleasure respecting its publication or suppression. If the Government had any views of co-operation or concert with Austria against France, I can readily imagine that such a publication might be injurious to the success of such projects, and, God knows, I should be the last man in England to desire to incur any such risk. But, as it seems too evident that nothing of this sort is either decided by them or in itself practicable, I do not imagine I could run counter to their wishes in doing justice to myself personally, and to the conduct and character of the country.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1802, March 3. Dropmore.—“I see by the papers this morning that Sheridan has announced a discussion in the House of Commons respecting the late arrangements in the Carnatic ; upon which subject there has also been some conversation in the House of Lords. I feel myself in a very awkward situation in what relates to this point. By some accident which I cannot explain, it is now more than a year since I have had from Wellesley any other letters, except one or two which were merely introductory of East Indians returning home. I am therefore totally unacquainted with every part of this subject, and neither know what has in fact been done, nor what share he has had in doing it. At the same time, I do not think I am quite fulfilling what he has a right to demand from me in suffering his character to be implicated, as I am told it is, in conversation on this subject, without shewing myself ready to discharge towards him the duties of that friendship which I have so often experienced at his hands. Especially as I know from what has passed on another subject, that it is no longer to the East India House or to Whitehall that he can look for protection and support.

“I am so little in the way here of hearing what passes in political discussion, other than such as the newspapers contain, that I am probably ignorant of many particulars on this point which are the common conversation of St. James’s Street.

You will not suspect me of wishing you to tell me anything the disclosure of which would be a breach of confidence on your part towards persons with whom I neither am, nor mean to be, in habits of confidence ; but, subject to that reserve, whatever you can tell me of Wellesley's conduct and situation, and of the means by which I can make myself useful to his credit and reputation and honour, would really relieve my mind from much uneasiness which I now feel from a total ignorance on the one hand of what I ought to do, and from a great reluctance on the other to sit still and do nothing when his character is at stake.

"I do not write any thing to you about the late events, but I cannot think that we differ much upon them. I see nothing likely to bring me to town before the discussion of the definite treaty, unless the payment of the civil list arrears should be opposed in the House of Lords, which I do not think likely. Whenever I do come I confess it would give me great pleasure to talk with you *prospectively* of the present situation of public affairs, and of the scenes which are now passing on the continent, and of those which, as I think, are preparing for us.

"As you probably have more than enough of such discussions in town I do not invite you here for the purpose of passing two or three days in the same amusement ; but whenever you can spare me that time to look at my new road, and to see Dropmore in its present shape, I shall be heartily glad to see you." *Copy.*

Private. WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 4. Hertford Street.—"I shall not lose a moment in complying with your Lordship's wishes expressed in your letter of yesterday. I send Dietrichstein's pamphlet enclosed, and, in the course of a day or two, you shall have copies and extracts of all my dispatches relating to the subject, with such notes upon them as may be likely to refresh your Lordship's memory. My note to the Arch-duke Charles, your Lordship may remember, was never delivered. The instructions to frame and deliver it only reached me the night before the battle of Zurich, when the Arch-duke had already marched to Manheim, so that I had no chance of seeing him for some time to come. In the mean time Lord Mulgrave and Lord Minto, the former verbally, the latter in writing, had given *the lie direct* in so very unequivocal a manner that I thought *more unnecessary*, and so explained myself to your Lordship at the time. I will endeavour to find Lord Minto's note.

"Dietrichstein's pamphlet is below mediocrity, but it certainly contains the mischievous assertions of which your Lordship complains, in very unqualified terms, and they appear

to a certain degree founded, from the art with which he has contrived to confound all manner of times and dates.

“Lord Hardwicke behaved very handsomely on the subject of my appointment, so that I trust I shall find my situation, in that respect at least, pleasant.

“There is still however much unsettled matter of dispute between the Lord Lieutenant and Lord Pelham, in which I shall do my best to avoid taking a share, if Lord Pelham will have the prudence to permit me to follow that line.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 4, Park Place.—“Having heard by report that the arrangements in the Carnatic were likely to become matter of discussion, I some time since desired to see the papers which have been received from India on the subject. As however they are very voluminous, and the business did not seem then to press to a day, you will not wonder that I have hitherto found more entertaining reading, and have therefore not made progress enough in them to be able to give you any particular information on the subject. I have seen enough however to shew that the act is principally Wellesley’s own, and I shall therefore now look into the correspondence as carefully as I can, and shall be very glad to talk it over with you before it is agitated in either House. Considering your connection with Wellesley, I think there can be no impropriety, though you stand in the situation you describe with respect to Government, in my asking for his sake, the liberty to show you the papers if you have no objection to seeing them. Whether Government has formed any or what opinion on the subject I do not know, but I may probably have an opportunity of hearing soon. It will be a great satisfaction to me to talk with you prospectively as you propose, on the present strange and uncertain situation of things. With respect to their actual complexion we cannot much differ, nor much I should think, on comparing our opinions, as to any practical inference; but whether we differ or agree, I shall like very much to discuss the whole.

“If you are likely to be at liberty the beginning of the week, I think I could easily come to you at Dropmore Monday, or at latest Tuesday; and I shall be very glad, in the interval of our speculations, to mix the much pleasanter occupation of looking at your *arrondissement* and acquisitions at Dropmore.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802], March 5. Stowe.—“My accounts from London all agree that Ministers have worked themselves up to a momentary tone of firmness in which I have no confidence, for I am

persuaded that they are ready to sign to articles specifically worse (independent of the Italian question) than those which we conceived utterly incompatible with our immediate honour or security, and still more incompatible with our future prospects.

"Tom wrote me word of the opening which [Pitt's] conversation with him had given on this subject, and of the pains which he had taken to urge you to fortify in [Pitt's] mind the alarm that he had taken so strongly; but he tells me since that you had declined it.

"I cannot but think it highly advisable that the alarm should be sounded as widely as possible, and with that view I heartily approve the conversation of Elliot and Windham, and I wish that you could have reconciled it to yourself to have contributed to this work by attack in the House of Lords, and by communication where it is reasonable to think you could have made impression. I am satisfied that the fabric is shaken to its centre."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 5. Charles Street.—"I am very well enabled to give you an account of Count Dietrichstien's pamphlet, since he sent me a copy of it a fortnight ago, with an accompanying letter of flattery in his usual style. When I read the pamphlet I found it was written to contradict a paragraph in the *Times* of 1799, which charged him with ordering M. de Chateler to retard the siege of Turin till the Russians should have left Italy. To acquit himself of this charge he proves that Chateler did not command the siege, and that he had neither communication nor authority for communication with him; he does moreover add what his opinion was of the *defective* plan proposed to Austria by England, and of my having stopped him on that subject at Berlin by telling him that the English plan had already been arranged and announced at Vienna. He was right if he thought fit to deny the treachery imputed to him by the *Times*; he was wrong in publishing his opinion or his official communications about the plan of the campaign. I answered his letter therefore by telling him that nobody had ever talked of the paragraph in question, that I had never heard of it, and certainly would never have advised him to have written any answer to it, but should have thought he would have done better to have taken no notice of an anonymous newspaper two years old; but I said nothing of the plan of campaign, being unwilling to further any discussion with so *indiscreet* a Minister. He replied to me in a letter of still greater flattery to me, and to my *digne frère*, whose speech he applauds up to the skies; and to all this palaver I have made no rejoinder, being very desirous to close a correspondence which I should not willingly have invited.

"I will shew you the letters and pamphlet when I see you, but there is nothing in the letter which could warrant any animadversion on your part, unless Lord Holland should adopt his censure, and then you will be able to answer for yourself with propriety in the House of Lords.

"I am very glad that you have written to Pitt, and I hope that if he cannot go down to Dropmore, you will come up for a day or two to London, where, besides politics, you are much wanted by Randolph, who is invested with full powers to treat with you respecting Demosthenes.

"What I have heard of the debate in the House of Commons, and particularly Baker's speech, in addition to the general appearance of the House, bespoke a very considerable change in the public mind since those topics had last been discussed. Pitt, though in town, was not present; and Lord Castlereagh's speech, though very feeble and much below par, gave an impression of more difficulty as to the treaty than had hitherto struck the public mind; in addition to this the sudden sailing of seven sail for Torbay has so much encreased the public apprehensions that stocks have fallen to-day, as Coutts tells me, $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. I suspect by the embarrassed and dejected Treasury Bench which I saw, that they feel themselves forced to add so largely to our means of defence that they tremble at the possible effects of the faintest shade of vigour and exertion; and yet, for my own part, I am persuaded that this will rather accelerate the peace, and that the treaty will come as soon as ever Bonaparte thinks our Ministers will really give no more."

Private. WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 6. Hertford Street.—"I think you will find in the enclosed papers all that I have in my power to furnish your Lordship with on the subject of Count Dietrichstein. I have no copy of Lord Mulgrave's dispatch to your Lordship, after his interview with the Arch-duke near Schaffhausen, but he there gave so plain and full a disavowal, in the King's name, of the supposed wish of this Government that the Arch-duke should retire from Switzerland, as in my opinion (particularly after I had seen Lord Minto's note to Thugut) fully answered every object that your Lordship could have in view. I therefore (and also because I did not see the Arch-duke till the end of October) thought it might do harm, and could do no good *at that late moment*, if I were to carry my instructions into execution.

"Dietrichstein has frequently denied to me that he ever discouraged the attempt to pass the Aar. Tolstoi on the contrary, the Russian envoy at the army, declared *that he heard him* remonstrate strongly with General Schmidt, and declare that the Courts of Petersburg and London would be offended with the measure.

“ Your Lordship will observe that, at that moment, neither Tolstoi nor myself had any knowledge of the real wishes of our respective Courts on the subject.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 10. Charles Street.—“ I have only time by this post to send you Cobbett’s answer to my enquiries, and you will be satisfied with it.

“ I am told by undeniable authority, but as a *profound secret*, that France has even refused to acquiesce in Malta being garrisoned by a Neapolitan garrison. How that discussion will end I know not, nor do I conceive why France should object to this Neapolitan proposal, although I see a thousand reasons why we should ; perhaps the Great Consul expects from the weakness of our Government that he has only to go on objecting about Malta, untill we agree to put it into his hands. I rejoice to hear that Pitt is with you, and so do many others ; the public grow sensible of our danger, and are impatient to see some better defence than is now found in Downing Street.”

Enclosure :—A letter from William Cobbett to Thomas Grenville in regard to the publication and rapid sale of Lord Grenville’s speech on the preliminary treaty with France.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 13.—“ As I hear nothing from you respecting your Dropmore conference, I presume that you have nothing interesting to tell me of it, and yet I am curious to know the general tenor of it, and the more so because it seems impossible that his prospective view can differ much with yours. The latter events have made a convert for us of Lord Glastonbury who, in his conviction of the hostile intention of France, is now the loudest in deprecating the conclusion of the treaty. I hear it whispered about that we claim to retain Malta to ourselves, and I imagine this arises from its being now known that Russia will not have it, that France will not let Naples have it, and therefore it is presumed that we shall keep it, but I know not how to believe that we have vigour enough to make such a requisition, or that France would have the folly to refuse Malta to Naples in order to cede it by preference to Great Britain. Your friend Woronzow is impatient for your arrival in town, and is sick of the weakness and incapacity which he daily sees in the foreign department ; you may guess of the indignation with which he told me that a few days ago Lord Hervey desired Lima to give him a dinner, then desired him to ask Otto, then desired that Lord Hawkesbury might likewise come there, and the evening concluded by Otto’s going with them to the opera, where he sat all

night in their box between Lady Hawkesbury and Lady Hervey. In short Woronzow's patience is quite exhausted, and he talks of Lord Hawkesbury only now by the name *ce jeune Nigaud*.

"I presume that your old friend King has recovered his temper and understanding, for although I scarce know him, he accosted me to-day in the streets with very tender enquiries about you, and great expressions of impatience at your continued absence from London."

LORD ELDON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 12. London.—"I return you my sincere thanks for your obliging letter. I am not likely to alter the opinion to which your Lordship alludes, and I know too well the value of the fewest words your Lordship might be disposed to state on any subject in the House of Lords, not to be covetous of your Lordship's attendance, if there should be occasion for it. But I believe that the present bill for further suspending the Residence Act has no object but to extend the suspension for such further part of this session, as may give time to pass, if the Houses shall think proper to adopt it, a bill which Sir William Scott means soon to propose to Parliament; and the substance of which must be communicated to your Lordship as soon as he has quite determined what he will abide by, and I hope that determination will be found in a few days. I am reasonably sure that the proposed Suspension Bill has no other object, but, if it should have, your Lordship may rely upon my taking care that you shall have such notice of the day proposed for a second reading of the bill, as to secure to you the opportunity of conveniently attending it."

POLICY OF GENERAL BONAPARTE.

INFORMATIONS SECRÈTES MAIS CERTAINES. *Translated from German to French by Count Starhemberg.*

[1802], March 15.—"1. Il est certain que Bonaparte veut non seulement envahir toute l'Italie, mais aussi l'île de Sardaigne qu'il a de projet de révolutionner et de réunir à la France. Les personnes qui doivent entâmer et achever ce nouvel œuvre d'iniquité sont déjà nommées, et parties depuis plusieurs mois. Salicetti est un de ceux qui en est chargé, et il s'arrête pour le moment à Lucques. Selon toute apparence l'escadre de Gantheaume et la flotte de Brest qui a passé dernièrement le détroit de Gibraltar, ont la même destination. Il paraît important au gouvernement français de réaliser ce projet.

1. "Pour se rendre sérieusement maître de la Corse qui tire des grands secours de la Sardaigne.

2. " Pour se dédommager de la perte de Malte, par un beau et bon port dans la Méditerranée.

3. " Pour avoir plus de facilités à faire des incursions dans le midi du continent de l'Italie, ou, du moins, pouvoir le tenir constamment en respect. Ses vues expliquent la raison du délai que la France a mis jusqu' à présent à conclure sa paix avec le Roi de Sardaigne.

2. " Le Comité révolutionnaire de Naples existe encore à Paris et continue à entretenir une correspondance et des liaisons très étroites avec la nouvelle république Italienne. Un certain Baribelli né dans la Valtalène, mais qui a été au service de Naples en est un des premiers agents. Il est surtout lié avec et a été appelé à toutes les délibérations sur les affaires d'Italie. Un de ses frères est employé actuellement dans le gouvernement.

3. " La France pourrait bien être incessamment en froid avec la Prusse. Bonaparte et Luchessini ne s'aiment pas réciproquement, et le Consul n'a pas voulu jusqu' à présent recevoir les nouvelles lettres de créance du ministre de Prusse. L'origine de cette haine de Bonaparte pour Luchessini vient 1. de ce que quand ce dernier était en Italie en 1796 avec une commission secrète de son Roi, et ayant l'air de vanter en toutes occasions les hauts faits de Bonaparte, il doit lui avoir conseillé une opération militaire qui n'a point réussi, et qui a coûté sept mille hommes à la France ; ce qu'on ne lui a pas pardonné encore.

2. De ce qu'en dernier lieu à Paris Luchessini lui a adressé la parole en italien devant des étrangers, ce que Bonaparte n'aime point, craignant que cela ne lui fasse tort vis-à-vis des français.

4. " On ne voit pas d'autres livres dans le cabinet de Bonaparte que les *Commentaires de César* et les *Capitulaires de Charlemagne*. Il les étudie constamment, et s'explique ainsi comment il est continuellement occupé de plans d'une domination insatiable, et de conquêtes qui paraissent chimérique, mais auxquels il est d'ailleurs déjà porté par son caractère. Il est aisé en comparant ceci avec les événements du jour, de juger de tout ce que cet homme, qui se croit tout possible, médite encore si on le laisse faire. Aucun traité, aucune promesse ne sont sacrés pour lui. L'amitié dans son sens n'est que la soumission de son ennemi, et la paix une trêve, ou plutôt la destruction ou ruine totale de celui avec qui il l'a fait."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 15.—" I am much obliged to you for the very interesting account which you have given me of your Dropmore conversation, and do most entirely agree with you in the advantage which is to be expected from a renewed and improved intercourse under the critical circumstances in which

the country, and everybody in it appears to be placed. My friend in St. James's Place concurs so much in this view of the subject, that he writes to you by this post to desire you to come to town a day sooner than you had proposed, in order that you three may have an unembarrassed and uninterrupted opportunity of talking together after dinner in St. James's Place, and I heartily hope that you will not disappoint this expectation. My own conviction still is that the treaty will come, and that some roundabout contrivance will be adopted respecting Malta which will satisfy everybody in France and nobody in England except our ministers. In truth, the mass of those whom I meet in the streets will not easily be satisfied, and you may guess how general this change of opinion is when I tell you that the faithful Hatsell, though he holds us bound by the preliminary articles, laments openly that they were ever signed; and that you now scarcely find anybody who considers the peace other than as a mode of our stripping ourselves to become an easier conquest to France; and I am assured that this language is nowhere more universally prevalent than in the city.

"I am happy that I shall soon have the means of talking over these matters with you. Pray do not disappoint Lord S[pencer] on Thursday."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 15. London.—"I was very happy to hear that we were likely at length to have the pleasure of seeing you again in town; and my purpose for writing to you now is to endeavour, if possible, to accelerate that satisfaction by proposing to you to come and take a dinner here with us on Thursday next. My reason for naming that day is that Pitt has promised to dine with us on it; and I really do think that it may be of some service for us to have a little confidential conversation with him, if possible, before he shall have again involved himself in new pledges to the measures of the present Administration, which, if the current report of the day says truly, he will very shortly indeed be called upon to do by the arrival of the definitive treaty, which, as far as I can collect from tolerably good authority, is now on the eve of coming. Under the hope that you may agree with me in thinking such a communication useful, and that you may, in consequence, be induced to come on Thursday, I shall not ask any other man for that day till I have your answer. If Lady Grenville comes up with you, Lady Spencer will be extremely happy to see her too."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, March 30. Harley Street.—"J'ai vue hier le fameux traité. Il a surpassé mon attente. C'est la pièce la plus

absurde en son genre, et vraiment honteuse pour ce pays, qui depuis le règne de Charles second n'a fait aucun traité dont il auroit pu rougir. Il part aujourd'hui un courrier pour la Russie, ce qui m'occupera assez pour détailler à ma cour toutes les bévues et la pusilanimité de ce misérable ministère. Si vous pouvez me recevoir après demain, mercredi, à l'heure qui vous conviendra, je vous ferai un détail de la honteuse transaction que j'ai vue,"

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, April 11. Harley Street.—“ En quittant l'Angleterre pour six mois, je pars dans l'espérance que Dieu aura pitié de ce pays ; qu'il le délivrera d'un ministère inepte, dont la concentration est réduite à trois individus, dont l'un est réduite à trois individus, dont l'un est un bon homme, excellent pour la chaire de la Chambre des Comunes, mais incapable pour celle de premier ministre ; dont le second est précisément (comme disoit Linguet d'un autre ministre) plus étranger dans les affaires que ministre des affaires étrangères ; et le troisième, n'ayant aucun autre talent que celui de l'intrigue, est encor gouverné par son beau père, le plus intrigant des hommes, au point qu'en dernière analyse, c'est ce beau père qui, sous mains, fait jouer tous les ressorts de ce trio singulier. Toutes les mesures de ce Cabinet concentré sont incohérentes ; car les trois associés ne se concertent que sur les mesures propres à se conserver en places, sans se soucier d'un accord parfait pour la conduite des affaires, faisant chacun tout ce qui lui plaît dans son département. Celui des affaires étrangères est mené par le beau frère du principal, et ce beau frère est un poux à lier, qui gouverne son chef, et est en même tems gouverné par Otto, qui s'est tout-à-fait emparé de lui.

“ Ce misérable ministère entré, Dieu sait pourquoi et comment, en place, n'est occupé qu'à s'y maintenir à force de souplesse, en cédant à tout le monde, amis ou ennemis, sans considérer le bien de l'état. Cette bande inepte et lâche a cédé sur tous les points à Bonaparte par la crainte de la guerre que ces gens sont incapables de conduire ; elle a eu tant d'effet sur eux qu'ils n'ont pas vue ou se sont dissimulés à eux-mêmes que la France avoit plus besoin de la paix que l'Angleterre ; vérité incontestable prouvée par les conditions du dernier emprunt qu'on vient de faire ici. Ils cèdent aussi en tout au propagateurs de l'anarchie, eu laissent expirer, au lieu de renouveler, les actes les plus salutaires que vous et vos amis avez fait passer pour maintenir et renforcer votre bienheureuse constitution, qui fait la gloire et la sûreté de votre patrie. Ils iront de cession en cession, et de bassesse en bassesse, tant au dehors qu'au dedent [dedans] du pays, en l'avillissent de plus en plus à la face de tout l'univers.

“ En comparant cette misérable conduite avec la saine

politique, la dignité, et la vigueur que déployoit le précédent ministère, le cœur me seigne de voir cette différence.

“Je suis sûr que ni moi in perssone autre n’a pas besoin de vous exhorter a perssévérer dans votre énergie acoutumée, et que vous ne cesserez de faire tous vos efforts pour remédier au mal, qui pour peu qu’il dure, perdra ce pays sans retour. Si je ne suis pas déçu dans mon espérance, vous et vos amis reprendrez vos places avant mon retour, et dans ce cas je vous supplie d’avoir de la bonté pour le secrétaire d’ambassade le Baron de Nicolay que je laisse ici en qualité de Chargé des Affaires. C’est un jeune homme de beaucoup de mérite, d’excellent principes, que je connois depuis sa naissance, étent intimement lié d’amitié avec son père depuis quarante ans. Son caractère, sa sagesse, et son jugement inspirent avec raison la confiance pour lui à tous ceux qui le connaissent.

“Conservez-moi votre amitié qui m’est chère, qui m’honore, et que je me flate de mériter par l’attachement que je vous ai voué pour la vie.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, April 28. Downing Street.—“Having communicated your note of this morning to Lord Hawkesbury, he has desired me to inform your lordship that the treaty will certainly not be laid before the two Houses this day. It is not yet determined whether the treaty will be laid on to-morrow or Thursday, but as soon as I am certain of the day, I will not fail to apprize you of it.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, May 2.—“I have just received your letter which is not very different from what I expected it to be; and, in truth, the inclination of your mind is so strongly marked in it, that whatever may be the natural eagerness of my temper or the earnestness of my opinions, I do not see motive either of duty or of advantage sufficient to press against so decided a bias as I see in your sentiments upon this matter, and therefore I am perfectly ready to acquiesce with you in the nullity of the present moment.

“Windham and Elliot intend to be in the House to-morrow, and to open their minds upon the occasion of the two months’ additional estimate which was to be moved, but which, I hear to-day, will be a whole year’s estimate; if Pitt could have been induced by you to take the same opportunity of adverting to the facts which I mentioned in my last, perhaps some considerable influence might so have been had upon the public mind; but without Pitt no effect will be had in the House by the remarks of the alarmists in the present moment.

"Kinkel, who is just arrived, tells me that the Hereditary Prince of Orange is actually gone to throw himself at the feet of Bonaparte at Paris in order to entreat him not to take the Nassau estate from his father, by giving it to Nassau Usingen in compensation for what he loses on the left bank of the Rhine, a menace which Bonaparte daily threatens to carry into execution. To this humiliating embassy the king of Prussia makes himself a party by sending a minister of his own to accompany his brother-in-law to Paris. It seems possible that a farther arrangement respecting Holland may be in question, and that the Hereditary Prince may become the Melzi of the north when he has sworn fealty to Bonaparte ; and yet I think the Great Consul will not trust him so far. Will not our ministers rejoice in this event, and boast of what they would have done if the House of Orange had trusted to their interference at Amiens ?

"Cobbett presses for his money immediately. Pray send me a draft payable to Windham or bearer ; I write to my brother for his also. I have had so many busy nothings to do, that I have not latterly had a single moment to myself so that you must not wonder that I am silent about Homer in the present moment."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, May 19.—"I find by what I hear that Government mean to make a point of writing out the impression of the arguments against the peace, and that Lord Hawkesbury is giving all his time to arranging the materials of his speech, which will be printed within the next week or ten days ; under these circumstances it seems to me more than ever desirable that your speech should likewise appear in as short a time as possible ; and though it sounds somewhat ungracious to say so to you, I confess that I would willingly sacrifice something of the polish and perfection which time would give to it, in order to have the advantage of its reaching the public eye now that the public attention dwells so much upon the subject. Your fame and reputation is enough established not to require, on that account, a laborious highly-wrought performance, and your speech will be good enough to do you ample honour if you publish it according to your best recollection, and agreeably to such notes and memoranda as you may have at hand. You know that I am seldom found on the side of persuading my friends to save their labour ; neither would I do so in this instance if I were not strongly impressed with the belief, that a less correct and less perfect sketch of your speech, if it appears promptly, will have twice the effect that would be had from the most exquisite shape of it, if that should retard its appearance now that all the world are eager for it, and loaded with all that the government presses can give to them

in defence of the peace. I have taught myself to think these suggestions important enough to pursue you with them by the post to Dropmore ; when I have said my say, it is for you to do as you like. Fisher would come to you whenever you please. Randolph leaves town for Oxford on Thursday se'nnight, and is very anxious to settle with you about Demosthenes before he goes. I have told him that I would say so to you, though I was not sanguine as to your coming on Wednesday morning as he wishes."

Private. MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 8. Fort William.—"I have received your kind letters relative to the change of administration, and your letter in the character of an idle, poor, itinerant country squire. Both were pleasant and melancholy to my soul.

"I could not but smile at some of the appointments, while I trembled for the result ; and I admired your magnanimity, and laughed at your occupations ; but I wept over the loss of your services in such a crisis ; and my indignation mounted at the idea of your being obliged to deprive yourself of any article of your former enjoyments. You know my great value for Addington ; from him I should expect much good service in any station ; but is he quite equal to that of Commander in Chief ? Pitt, according to the usual course of his indolence, left me without a line from him on the subject of the change ; and Dundas wrote me a dry letter containing nothing more than the newspapers had announced. In this situation I was obliged to shape my own course without a guide, and I have determined to remain here until the expiration of my intended period of pilgrimage, unless Pitt should recall me, or I should be otherwise relieved. In the interval however an episode of the grand action of the poem has arisen between me and the Court of Directors, which I think may terminate in my return to Europe in 1803. I refer you to Lord Dartmouth and to Addington for the particulars of the quarrel. I am very indifferent to the issue, which is of little importance to my fame, fortune, or convenience. It is of some to the public service, which I certainly possess more ample means of conducting through the arrangements of the peace than any new Governor General could bring with him.

"I hope, however, that nothing can detain me in India beyond 1804. I suppose you will see Colonel Harcourt, who carried home my last dispatches ; he is a great favourite of mine. I wish to God you had been with me on my voyage and march to Lucknow ; it is impossible to conceive so grand a scene. I was highly amused for eight months, and I think I have done some good. Henry has proved a most useful assistant to me. I am in very good health and spirits, and as my anxieties and labours relax, I return to my Greek

and Latin. Adieu my dear friend and remember me to Lady Grenville.

"I do not agree with you in your opinion of the extent of the danger to be apprehended in India from the peace; but although I do not think the danger so great as you consider it to be, I am far from thinking India so secure as Stinkingson states it to be. *Mon Dieu quel charivari!* I really can form no conjecture what atom of this chaos is to be uppermost, or what system is to be regenerated into its primeval chaos! I think myself happy in my exile. I believe I should have expired of grief, shame, and indignation, if I had been on the spot."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 11.—"Sir William Scott took fright and has withdrawn his bill till next year; and Dickenson brings on another protecting bill which will pass without difficulty, though I wish to except the cases of prosecution at the suit of anyone actually resident in the parish during the months for which the penalties are sued. However my zeal will not keep me beyond Monday, on which day (if you will insure me from your diplomatic friend) my wife and I with George and Mary will come to you, and we will beg your hospitality till Friday morning.

"The dissolution will according to general belief not be protracted beyond the 22nd. A day was, however, lost yesterday by the manœuvre of Mr. Robson, and I think it possible that more checks of the same sort may occur. Every one here is satisfied that Dundas (Lord Melville) takes office. He went to Walmer on Monday with the intention according to the *Morning Chronicle* of engaging Pitt to take office, but according to me with a very different plan, namely of procuring from Pitt a due discharge and character from his last place. I have reason to know that his acceptance of office has been stated as the surest barrier against Mr. Pitt and against us."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 12.—Windham is gone to Norwich to meet a formidable opposition carried on by King-Killer Smith. I have a vague recollection of his having been implicated in the rebellious projects of Stone, and I think he absented himself some time from Parliament for fear of being expelled. If you have any accurate remembrance of any of these facts which can be talked of, it might be useful to Windham if you will enable me to give him any such information.

"The Fortescues and Buckinghams both seem to have an immediate project of Dropmore, mine is something more

distant as I have hitherto fixed no time. The expectation of dissolution, however, increases every day, and there seems no doubt of it's taking place between the 21st and 26th.

"The dull task I had imposed upon myself is fortunately put by ; Lord H[awkesbury] does not print his speech, and our friends agree that the work which we had talked of is not only unnecessary, but would be improper without it."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, June 19.—"The passing and repassing of so many copies to and fro has a good deal disordered the accuracy of my recollection with respect to the exact detail of the L. P. Homers. I have, however, found your original copy with the India prints and *variantes*, as you described it, and I have this day given it to Mr. Herring to bind for you. With respect to the stained leaves in your copy, you had better send me an account of them, and I will add them to the list which I am making out of others in order to send to Oxford, and to have them replaced as far as the waste remaining there will supply. At all events we will make out your own copy perfect.

"I thank you for your *memoranda* respecting Smith, although I yesterday heard such favourable accounts from Windham, that I am in hopes he will scarcely want the benefit of his opponent's character.

"Watkin has a serious embarrassment before him in Montgomeryshire. Mr. Cockburne has canvassed him for this interest in Montgomery where, under Lord Hereford's protection, he is going to oppose Lord Clive. Lord Hereford is the old head and leader of Watkin's friends in the county, and to offend him may be a real difficulty ; on the other hand, to assist him would be an open act of hostility to the Powis interest. I am therefore disposed to recommend to Watkin to endeavour to pacify Lord Hereford by the assurance of his taking no part against him, and to satisfy Lady Clive by assuring her that he had directed his agent to take no part in the borough election. This is not good, but I see nothing better to be done. I am, however, much afraid that the Welsh fever of Watkin's friends will hardly make even this course acceptable to his old connections with Lord Hereford.

"I still hear the 28th or 29th named for dissolution ; I shall scarcely leave London much before that time ; but whenever I do my first step will be to Dropmore."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1802, July 1. Althorp.]—"I cannot help thinking that it would be desirable for you to see Windham, and to converse with him in such manner as you may deem most prudent.

Knowing as he does of your residence upon the sea coast, and expressing as he did to me some impatience and curiosity to hear the result, any longer delay of communication might appear to him to be more than accidental. It is likewise probable that Canning may, when he returns to his neighbourhood, say something to him which he would rather have expected to have heard from you ; and, farther, some suggestions of the present possibilities may lead W[indham] to give, if he can, a better direction to his friend Cobbett's Saturdays.

"You would find Windham by a line to Binfield, or by a letter to Pall Mall, but I am pretty sure he is at Binfield."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 8. Stowe.—"My election took place at Buckingham yesterday, and on the same day the melancholy Barnard was defeated at Aylesbury, an election in which I believe nobody else could have failed with the same means of success ; but to be a good electioneerer is not the fate of all men, and to fail in that talent is not to incur any very severe censure. I am glad to find that my brother has taken no declared or personal part in it beyond the expression of his good wishes, and such assistance as he could naturally furnish, so that to him there is at least no personal disappointment. You will have heard of the Jacobin triumph at Norwich. Windham speaks vaguely to my brother of the possible chance of the county for him, but I consider that suggestion as having no solid ground, and therefore am glad that he has found refuge in the peaceable port of St. Mawes where his constituents though less numerous will, however, be less troublesome. The election there most probably took place yesterday.

"Lord Temple's election takes place on Tuesday next ; I therefore shall pass Sunday and Monday at Wotton, and shall fly from thence to Dropmore on Tuesday morning in order to escape that celebrity, and the quarter sessions which take place on Thursday and Friday ; but Lord Buckingham returns on Friday night to Wotton where I have promised to return to him, and have encouraged him to believe that you will ride back with me on Friday evening or Saturday morning, that we may pass a few days comfortably together in the old nest. Pray do not disappoint this project. I shall see you on Tuesday at Dropmore, but I write now to give you previous notice and to prevent your engaging yourself for Saturday."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 8. Park Place.—"I returned to town yesterday, and shall remain in its neighbourhood for a week or ten days, before I go back to Walmer. As I shall probably not move

from thence till late in the year, I wish much to pass a couple of days with you before I go thither, and shall be happy to come to you at Dropmore either on Wednesday or any later day next week, if you have no engagement to make it inconvenient to you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 12. Stowe.—"The letter which I enclose to you from Coutts will explain itself; be so good as to return it to me. I have written to assure him, with Lord Buckingham's concurrence, that neither of us are likely to attribute bad principles to him because he got 10 or 12 votes for his daughter's husband; I have told him that though I should not have voted for Sir F. Burdett, I thought it very natural that he should, particularly with the motives which he describes for his wishing to see Sir Francis in Parliament. Lord Buckingham will write him a word, and it would be kind to him if you would do so too. I think it is childish in Lord Hawkesbury to have taken this step; Coutts is no Jacobin, but if the government announce him as such, they do all that in them is to make him so; he is not young, and he is sick, and he is very susceptible upon these subjects, so that a kind word from you will do him good.

"Here we are still with 'hey ho! the wind and the rain.' My brother is got quite well, and we wait only for the sun that never shines and for the new moon that is to make him shine, to begin out course to Warwick castle; but as we insist upon a solid promise of fair weather before we stir, we cannot at soonest quit Stowe before Thursday or Friday next, and I have written to Charlotte to desire her to come here, as the only possible security for her knowing any thing positively of our uncertain steps."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 14. Downing Street.—"A very short time after I had last the honour to speak to your Lordship on the subject of the secret service account I accidentally met Mr. Deare, who informed me that, on examining the warrants for money issued on account of secret service, he entertained no doubt that the Commissioners for auditing the public accounts had no authority to take cognizance of your Lordship's secret service account, and he therefore presumed that you would have no further trouble upon the business. To my great surprise however on Friday I received the letter from Mr. Deare which I now inclose. On Monday I called upon that gentleman, and had a long conversation with him. He informed that his opinion, in which Mr. Cobbe (the other

Inspector General) coincided, remained as I have before mentioned, but it had been overruled by the Commissioners. We then entered into a discussion of the articles described in his letter as objects of surcharge or 'as requiring farther attention.' With respect to query No. 25, Mr. Deare suggested that the only expeditious and feasible mode of settling the difficulties respecting the fees would be for your Lordship to present a memorial to the Lords of the Treasury reciting—that the Commissioners for auditing the public accounts had transmitted to you a statement of your secret service accounts in which they had charged you with the *gross* sum issued from the Exchequer, but that you could not give an account of any other than the *nett* sum which you actually received; and that the difference between the *gross* and the *nett* sums arose from fees, chargeable at the Exchequer and Treasury, of which fees, for the reasons assigned in your former answer to the 25 query (I enclose a duplicate of the answer) it was impossible for you to furnish any account; and therefore praying that the Lords of the Treasury would direct and instruct the Commissioners for auditing the public accounts to pass your account for secret service money, and to insert in their return to the Treasury a disallowance of 22,049*l.* 17*s.* 5½*d.* the difference between the *gross* sum issued at the Exchequer and the *nett* sum received by you. A return to this effect would be a complete discharge to your Lordship, and Mr. Deare informs me that, in case of difficulties, it is a very common procedure for the Treasury to authorize such disallowances. Query No. 32 relates to the sum of 100*l.* stolen out of the desk of the messenger at the Exchequer. In my former answer to this query, I enclosed the oath of the messenger that this sum was actually so stolen, but as this has not appeared to be satisfactory, the request of a farther disallowance for this sum might be inserted in the memorial to the Lords of the Treasury. I also beg leave to suggest to your Lordship whether it might not be proper for you to desire the Lords of the Treasury to disallow out of the balance in my hand the sum of 500*l.* expended by you, or Sir James Burgess, in the year 1793, for which no receipt has hitherto been found. Your Lordship's draft for this sum still remains in my hands.

"With respect to Queries 33 and 34, I presume that there will be no difficulty.

"On the subject of the 3rd and 6th articles, I have proposed to Mr. Deare (who assures me that this mode will be perfectly satisfactory) that Sir James Burgess and Mr. Frere should not take any new oath, but should each give your Lordship a new receipt stating respectively that during the period (designating that period precisely) in which they acted as Under Secretaries to your Lordship, they had received the sums with which they are charged.

"If your Lordship should approve of this suggestion of

presenting a memorial to the Lords of the Treasury to the effect above mentioned, I should be much obliged to your Lordship if you would have the goodness to send it to me before the 31st of this month, as, upon that day, I intend going with my family to Eastbourne for five or six weeks."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1802, July 16. Dropmore.—"I have received your letter with the inclosures, and I lose no time in transmitting to you a letter to the Treasury on the subject to which it relates.

"With respect to the competence of the Commissioners to examine and pass these accounts, you must, I am sure, remember that, instead of wishing to dispute it, my desire has always been to take every step on my part that could tend to remove difficulties, and to bring the account under their audit. I have therefore no remark to make as to the difference of opinion between them and their inspectors on this point, or as to the grounds of their decision upon it.

"The extreme rudeness of their stile and manner could not but strike me on the first perusal of the paper which you have received from Mr. Deare; but I suppose they imagine this to be a way of paying court to their superiors, and I therefore do not think it worth my while to bestow a second thought upon it.

"My only solicitude has been in drawing the letter which I inclose to you, to mark in the clearest manner that I am making a claim of justice and not an application for favour; and I most earnestly intreat you to keep this constantly in your view in any further explanation which you may be called upon to give on this subject. There is nothing to which I would not submit rather than to put myself in the situation of soliciting from the Treasury relief or assistance in passing an account of public money.

"When you return from the sea you will make us very happy by passing a day or two here if you can.

"I will request you to have the copies made for the Treasury of the papers to accompany my letter; the originals you will of course carefully preserve, and I will thank you, at your leisure, to have a full copy made of the whole for my use.

"You will have the goodness to write to Sir J. Burges and Frere, transmitting to them the observations of the Commissioners as to No. 3 and 6, and the form of oath or receipt required by them. It is best to do it in the mode the Commissioners point out, as their mode of transacting business appears not to be at all conformable to Mr. Deare's opinions.

"It will, I think, be necessary to extract for the Treasury only those parts of your correspondence with the Commissioners which relate to the points mentioned in my letter. The business will thus appear in a clearer shape than if you added any other matter." *Copy.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, July 22. Downing Street.—“I had the honour to receive your letter of the 16th by Mr. Fisher on Saturday afternoon, and on Monday morning I sent to the Treasury your Lordship’s letter to Mr. Vansittart, with the papers to which it refers. I have not yet received any intimation upon the subject of it from Mr. Vansittart or from any other quarter ; but your Lordship may be assured that, in any future explanations which I may be called upon to give, I shall most carefully attend to the clear distinction which your Lordship has desired me to keep in view. Indeed I can say with truth that I have never for a moment lost sight of it, as after every conversation which I have had upon this subject with Mr. Deare or the Commissioners, my impression has uniformly been that I had manifested more warmth and indignation than the occasion would perhaps justify.

“I have received a letter from Sir James Burges (in answer to one that I sent to him at Tunbridge) in which he informs me that he shall be in town in the course of a few days and will make a new affidavit in the form which (if they still consider it necessary) the Commissioners may prescribe.

“As Frere is abroad, and as his affidavit must be sworn to before a Baron of the Exchequer, I see no other mode of removing the difficulty with respect to him than that of his signing a receipt to the effect which I mentioned in my last letter.

“I think I shall be able to settle Sir William Hamilton’s business without any further expence to your Lordship. The bills which have remained unpaid are the usual quarterly bills of extraordinaries allowed to all foreign Ministers, which Sir William’s agent omitted for several quarters to lay before you for signature.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 1. Eastbourn.—“I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a letter with its inclosure which I have this morning received from Mr. Deare.

“The money was paid by Sir James Bland Burges to Mr. Gregory, and the receipt which he represents to have given to me was in lieu of one given by his brother to Sir J. B. Burges. I am entirely ignorant of the service performed by Mr. Gregory, but I can easily infer, even from his own representation, that it was of a secret nature. If, however, your Lordship be of a different opinion, the receipt can be withdrawn, and the secret service fund reimbursed by an application to the Treasury for 700*l.* expended by Mr. Gregory.

“At all events this spirit of impertinent investigation on the part of the Commissioners for auditing the public

accounts must, I hope, be soon checked by a very high hand, or there is no calculating the mischief which it may produce.

"It was my intention to have answered this letter myself, but being anxious to have your Lordship's sanction in every step which I may be compelled to take in this business, I have thought it right previously to learn your Lordship's sentiments as to the mode and spirit in which Mr. Deare's letter should be answered. My own impression was to have stated to Mr. Deare my astonishment at the conduct of the Commissioners in assuming the right of deciding on what is secret service and what is not; and that before I can so far violate the trust reposed in me by my situation, as to enter into any explanation which may betray official secrets, I have a right to enquire on what authority they claim the privilege of making the requisition contained in Mr. Deare's letter. If however it be proper in the Commissioners to make this requisition, I would have observed to them that, in the event of Mr. Gregory's having been employed on a secret mission, his travelling expenses would necessarily have been defrayed out of the secret service fund; and that if the Commissioners had read Mr. Gregory's letter with attention they would have perceived that, although the receipt was given to me, the money did not pass through my hands; as it was paid to Mr. Gregory's brother in the year 1791, at which time I was not Under Secretary of State. If however your Lordship will have the goodness to return Mr. Deare's letter to me, and inform me, by letter addressed to me at this place (where I arrived last night and hope to remain four or five weeks) in what manner I should reply to Mr. Deare, I will most scrupulously obey your direction.

"Mr. Gregory's conduct in answering Mr. Deare's letter without previous communication with Sir J. Burges or myself appears to me extremely culpable."

GEORGE HAMMOND TO WILLIAM GREGORY.

1802, August 5. Eastbourne.—"In consequence of a letter received from you by the Commissioners of Public Accounts, a copy of which has been transmitted by them to me, I am to request that you will furnish to me for Lord Grenville's information a statement of the application of the sum of 700*l.* there mentioned, in order that his Lordship may be enabled to judge with greater certainty whether the said sum ought to be included in his account of secret service money; or whether the same ought to be accounted for by you under any other head; or, lastly, whether application should be made to the Treasury to allow the same as money expended by you on His Majesty's service." *Draft by Lord Grenville.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 8. Eastbourne.—“ I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a letter which I have received this morning from Mr. Gregory. It does not appear to throw much new light upon the business, but I am now convinced that the money must have been paid to him on account of secret services.

“ The Commissioners for auditing the public accounts have required the Duke of Portland and Lord Hawkesbury to give in a statement of their secret service account ; but as the former conceives they have no right to make this requisition, and has desired the opinion of the Crown lawyers to be taken upon the subject, Lord Hawkesbury intends to delay giving any answer to the Commissioners until that opinion shall be received.”

Enclosure.

WILLIAM GREGORY to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1802, August 7. London.—“ In reply to the request you make to me in your letter of the 5th instant, I have the honour to state to you that the 700*l.* received for my account by my agent in 1791 at the Treasury, were paid to me, partly in reimbursement of the expenses attending the execution of a commission in Portugal and Spain in the year 1790, and partly in remuneration for my time and trouble in the execution of that commission. I was charged with the commission directly by Mr. Pitt ; and the correspondence relative to it was conducted, while I remained abroad, through my relation Mark Gregory, who was then in personal communication with Mr. Pitt, but who is since dead ; and on my return to London in April 1791, I was referred to Mr. Long of the Treasury who, I presume, settled the account (the amount of which was received after I had again left England) under the directions that he received from the proper authority.

“ The difficulty which has arisen respecting this article of disbursement in my Lord Grenville’s account, must, I conceive, have resulted from the circumstances of the transaction having occurred under the administration of his Grace the Duke of Leeds as Secretary of State in the Foreign Department, and the money having been directed to be paid soon after my Lord Grenville succeeded his Grace in that department, by which means his Lordship had little or no cognisance of the transaction itself, and consequently no circumstantial traces of it have remained in his Lordship’s recollection. If any other elucidation within my power be required to settle this business with the necessary regularity, I shall readily give it.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 15. Eastbourne.—“I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of your letter to Mr. Gregory, and also the copy of the letter which, by your Lordship’s desire I sent to him on the 5th instant.*

“The original of the former I send to him by this post under cover to Mr. Broughton who is acquainted with his address. I desired King before I left town, to furnish me with a copy of the report of the crown-lawyers on the Duke of Portland’s representation, and as soon as I shall receive it I will transmit it to your Lordship.

“This place is far the pleasantest sea-bathing place at which I have ever been. The houses are few in number, and as they are now generally occupied, there would be no probability of engaging a suitable house for your Lordship at present; but I should imagine that in the course of two or three weeks the probability would be greater.

“If I can be of any use to your Lordship in this respect, I beg leave to offer my services. As your Lordship may never have been on this part of the coast, I think it right to inform you that this place is divided into Eastbourn, at the distance of a mile and a half from the sea; Southbourn, three quarters of a mile from the sea, and the Sea-houses which are upon the beach.

“I am ignorant of the rent of houses at the former place; but at Southbourn they let for about five guineas by the week, and the Sea-houses are let from six to eight guineas by the week. I have one of the latter, for which I pay seven guineas, and which, as I understand, is one of the most comfortable houses here. It consists of a parlour, drawing-room and three good bed rooms, one of which could be converted into a second parlour. The accommodations for servants are very good. My family will remain in it till about the first week in October. If that season should not be too late for your Lordship I could secure it for you from the time of my family quitting it. Linen, glasses, and other necessities are provided by the owners of the houses.

“I think that your Lordship would be pleased with this place, as the bathing is remarkably good, and the rides and walks are delightful.”

Enclosure.

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM GREGORY.

1802, August 12. Dropmore.—“I have received from Mr. Hammond your letter to him of the 7th instant.

“Before I can take upon me to swear that the sum in question was paid to you for the performance of a secret service, it is

absolutely necessary that I should be satisfied what was the particular nature and object of the commission for the reimbursement and remuneration of which it was to be applied.

“The money appears to have been paid to you in 1791 by my directions out of the secret service fund. I have therefore no doubt that it was then understood by me that it was to be applied for purposes of that description, and (if I mistake not) I have a pretty clear recollection of what those purposes were. I should certainly consider that a due compensation of your expence, and a reasonable reward for your diligence and labour in the discharge of any commission of *a secret nature* would fall correctly and strictly under the description of Secret Service. If therefore by *fully* explaining to me what was the nature and object of the commission in which you was so employed and remunerated you should satisfy me that the same was (as I think that I recollect that it was) of a secret nature, I shall have no difficulty in swearing positively, as I could now swear to the best of my recollection, that the money in question was paid to you for a secret service. And if you, on your part, know that such was the destination and application of this payment, I can see no difficulty in your taking an oath to that effect.

“But if you neither feel yourself justified in taking that oath, nor explain to me the particulars of the transaction in such a manner as, by bringing it fully to my recollection, can alone enable me to charge myself with it, I must in that case content myself with referring the Commissioners of Accounts to your receipt, as being under the express terms of the Act of Parliament a full and ample discharge for myself, and I must leave you to account to Government for the application of the sum, in such manner as the Lords of the Treasury may direct, or as you may be required by law to do.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, August 21. Wynnstay.—“You, who know from the recollection of your last year’s excursion how difficult it is to find under such circumstances one writing hour in the whole twenty-four, will not wonder that so many days should have elapsed between my receiving your letter, and my answering it. My brother and I arrived prosperously at Birmingham, and my first care was to visit Mr. Egginton who showed to us the drawing which you had sent of the Wotton window. The shape of it appears to me to be very light and rich, the arms well disposed, and (with one or two exceptions of the different neighbouring compartments being of one and the same yellow) the colours appear to harmonise extremely well. As far therefore as the beauty of the design is to be considered, I should be very well disposed, with one or two very slight alterations, to think that the effect of it would be extremely

good wherever there was space enough for the fair execution of it. Unluckily you have not taken with you *memoranda* enough of the very limited scope which can be allowed in the Wotton chancel window to your heraldic exhibitions; and upon applying your design to the proportions such as they really exist, it is obvious that all the art of Egginton cannot find room enough for the seven isles of the Durham drawing; and he himself is clearly of opinion with us that, though the design of the drawing is extremely pretty, it cannot be made applicable to so confined a space, the partitions of the seven isles alone taking up a very considerable portion of what must be given to the light of the window. In addition to this, my brother remarks that the walls of the chancel must be rebuilt to admit such a window, and that, besides the expense attending such an operation, the execution of the stone work (for Egginton says the frame must be of stone) is far beyond the skill of any country mason, and would therefore demand the additional cost of London workmen being sent down for the building. These objections appear to me to be insurmountable as to the execution of the plan which you sent, and Egginton has undertaken to describe these objections more at large to you, and to send to you a sketch of a more simple project which seemed to all three of us to be much more applicable to the spot than the rich and extensive design which you had drawn. The object of this proposition is to make the chancel window accord with the old chapel window, and to insert in those divisions the arms of my father and mother and the seven children in best taste in which Mr. Egginton can place them. A slight sketch which he drew seemed to be very unobjectionable, and he promised to employ himself for some days in the arrangement of it, and, when he had satisfied himself about it, to send on to you a drawing of it coloured according to his own ideas. Thus, therefore, I have been content to leave the matter for the present, and the rather because, in the first place, I see my brother is very desirous of some such idea being adopted, and there is ample time for discussion, as nothing can be done till the possession of the chancel is actually secured to the owner of Wotton. For my own part I shall be well content with almost any plan that can be proposed, being much more solicitous to see the thing done, than to criticise or object to the different shapes in which it may be done. In the meantime you will be glad to hear that my brother is so pleased with our Birmingham artist that he has given him large orders for the windows, and he is to go to Wotton to see the church in order to insure the better execution of the designs, so that you will have the advantage of Egginton's advice after that he shall have examined both chancel and chapel with his own eyes.

"Our tour hitherto has been very prosperous, my brother continuing in good health and spirits, and the weather uninterruptedly fine, although in this moment it begins to look

a little threatening. We go to Bangor on Friday next, and after a week's stay there and perhaps at Beaumaris, if the season continues favourable we shall return by Hafod, Dinevor, Swansea, Tintern Abbey, Hampton Court, and find ourselves at Stowe about the 16th September for my brother's yeomen ; if it rains and blows upon us we shall come home sooner. I could almost have wished for Elizabeth and for you that you had taken for your autumnal bathing a southern coast instead of one as much to the north-east as Ramsgate ; yet Charlotte tells me that Elizabeth will probably move to Bognor after Margate. Some how or other I hope to meet you at my return, though if Parliament does not meet till after Christmas, I may perhaps go to Yorkshire in October, if I can take courage enough for such a northern expedition in the end of the year ; but all this is *adhuc in nubibus*.

"I had a letter two days ago from Lord Carlisle pressing earnestly that we shall have some explicit communication, and urging the absolute necessity of distinct and decisive determinations before the business of the session begins. If I go there, I can talk with him upon the matter ; for the present I have written to say that I agree with him in thinking such an explicit course very desirable and even very necessary, but that I had some doubts whether it would be very easy to obtain that information which we must all equally wish to be possessed of. I told him that our difficulties seemed to be very much increased by the extraordinary situation of the public mind, which seemed to distrust the capacity of the present ministers without any anxiety to change them, and to be governed by their fears of the power of France without showing any disposition to resist the daily and hourly increase of it ; but I added that we live in times so fertile of events that, without being very sanguine, it was probable enough that between this time and the end of January we might better see what could be done than I knew how to hope for under all the actual difficulties of the present moment. In truth I do entertain great doubts as to any good being done in the present state of the public mind, though at the same time I feel entirely persuaded that this state cannot continue. If I was to believe my Welsh intelligence it cannot be long before there will be a very material change ; for Mr. Cholmondeley of Vale Royal told me that he had just received a letter from his dear friend Lord Belgrave who assured him that he knew that it would be difficult if not impossible to *persuade* Mr. Addington to *retain* his situation. What this new affectation of our new minister is I do not pretend to understand ; but nonsensical as it sounds, it is rather curious when one recollects the intimate footing upon which Lord Belgrave always stands with Addington ; yet I apprehend that it amounts only to an indirect puff of the minister to attribute to him this *nolo episcopari*, of which I have not heard till I found it upon these Welsh mountains. I am told that Sir W. Scott has spoken

pretty loudly of the mismanagement of administration in the general election ; he will probably go on to carp at them and at those who oppose them."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, September 6. Wynnstay.—"Just returned from the Carnarvonshire mountains I find here your letter of 30 August. We are now advancing fast on our road to Stowe, where we expect to arrive on Tuesday the 10th, in order that my brother may meet his yeomen on Monday the 16th. My original intention was to have gone to Dropmore on that day, but as I guess from your letter that it is possible that you also may be wheeling to the right and left, I should in that case probably go to Wimbledon if the Spencers are there, and come back to you after your visit to Walmer. I do not much like Margate or Ramsgate, but if I find that the Carysforts are on the Sussex coast, I should in that case perhaps go and pass a few days with them ; but at all events I should be glad to find a letter at Stowe on Friday to tell me decidedly as to your yeomanry ; meantime I enclose to you a buck warrant which will be good till the 26th September when the season ends. I hope to see you so soon that I will not prolong this letter by any political remarks ; certainly in the present posture of affairs I do not see any credit or advantage to be got by active opposition. At the same time, I do think that while the government writers are daily endeavouring to lower our credit by imputing to us projects of eternal war, if those imputations are not repelled successfully by us, they will at last, by alienating the public mind from us, prevent us from being able to do what little good we otherwise might. It therefore seems to me to be highly desirable that there should be an attendance in parliament to do justice to ourselves by our own language, and to do justice to the country by animadverting upon the total incapacity of our ministers to conduct the government even upon the disgraceful system which they themselves have adopted. This course seems to me highly desirable, but as I know how difficult it is to obtain from anybody parliamentary attendance without immediate and great political objects, I confess that what I recommend is rather what I wish than what I expect ; and although it is both easy and necessary for us to prevent our names being used as synonymous terms for war, and although it is equally easy without referring to war or peace to point out the daily domestic blunders of our incapable ministers, I own I think it probable that we shall all incline to the idle and popular system of *laissez faire*, till some pressing call shall arise out of the strange state in which things now stand.'

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, September 19. Althorp.—“Having some business which will soon call me to town, I think that I shall manage more conveniently to go directly there from hence, rather than from Dropmore; this will of course delay my seeing you for some days, although, as I hope, not for many; I will write to you from Charles Street as soon as I can finally decide about it.

“Lord Spencer’s letters of to-day from Wimbledon mention that Farqhar had told Lady S[pencer] that Pitt was again quite well, and she adds that his going from London was only by mistake of Pitt’s servant, who had been ordered to ride over to Margate where Pitt had fancied Sir Walter was, and the servant’s zeal was such as to pursue the doctor to London much against his master’s intention. I hear no other news.

“My brother will take care of your justices as soon as he can, and has no apprehension that you can have anything to fear from the wanderings of the Grand Junction Canal.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, September 26.—“I have reason to know that the king has been seriously uneasy on the score of Mr. Pitt’s state of health, foreseeing that his death must displace Mr. Addington, and I know that he expressed at the same time his full conviction that *Mr. Pitt never would resume his office*. He told the same person that the Catholic question was not the real ground of Mr. Pitt’s resignation, but ‘that he could not carry on the war, and could not bring his mind to make the peace;’ I find that Hildesheim and the German *et ceteras* have severely indisposed him to his ministers, and that, by name, he blames Lord St. Helens ‘who gave no information whatever of the Russian understanding with France, and Mr. Addington who has so incautiously committed himself against all continental connexions.’ These are little indexes to the thermometer of his feelings, but in truth they lead to nothing.

“I find the popular cry against the *English Privy Council* of the Consul extremely strong; and the conduct of Mr. Fox really is inexplicable, as I cannot yet persuade myself that he means all that Mr. Cobbett imputes to him; and yet it seems impossible to account for all this flirtation on any other principle. At all events this new standard of opposition puts us, if possible, at a greater distance from them.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 3. Walmer Castle.—“I have heard nothing of the excursion to the sea coast, which you talked of before we parted. The season is now so far advanced that if you

still intend it you have not much time to spare, but at present it has everything to recommend it, and I should be extremely happy to find that you had fixed on any part of the coast which might give me a chance of seeing you here. I shall remain here to the end of this month, when, out of precaution, I shall go for a few weeks to Bath, which I believe is more likely than any thing else to establish the health I have now regained. If any change of your plan should prevent our meeting here in the interval, I shall endeavour to call at Dropmore in my way to Bath. I say nothing on all the events which are passing on the Continent. They lead to considerations much too large for a letter, but which I should wish much to be able to talk over with you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 14, Charles Street.—"The distant period to which our meeting at Brighton had been deferred by your present arrangement, had already made it necessary for me to put by the notion of keeping lodgings there for so long and useless an interval; and I had therefore already written to surrender up my Brighton mansion when a letter which Lady Camelford was so good as to send to me, relieved me from all difficulty on that score by telling me that the place is still so crowded as to make it impossible to find even the two rooms which I asked for. Under these circumstances therefore, not forgetting the absence of Lord Egremont which I hear is to last three weeks, I think I have not heart enough left to look at any coast or coasting excursion, and that the extent of my absence from London will not exceed a visit to Audley End, till you come back to Dropmore. Lord Carysfort has agreed to meet me at Lord Braybroke's to-morrow se'nnight, and if the weather is fine, we shall pass five or six days there together. I do not hear more of news in London than I did near Beaconsfield; but I am told that the non-evacuation of Malta continues to affect the stocks; and all that I hear of our ministers is lamentation for their incapacity both for peace and war."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 22. Stowe.—"Your letter had been opened at the Post Office, though in such a way as not to enable me to prove that it had been opened and resealed. I mention this that I may not be supposed to have quoted any of the opinions contained in it. And as it is possible that this may undergo for the same reasons the same examination, I will only say that I am utterly incredulous as to any idea of a war, for I am persuaded that whatever may have been the causes (and there may be many) that have led to angry discussions with

Bonaparte, there is no humiliation and no expedient for the moment, however weak or unsafe, to which the ministers will not submit, rather than risk the war ; and in truth I feel this country and its means so much put down by the peace, that I am half inclined to believe that the *manus tendamus inermes* is the only alternative left to us, if France will be contented to manage the little remains of English spirit left amongst us, by bringing us to the bridle by more gentle degrees.

“To us indeed, all that has arisen and all that may arise is not unexpected ; and it is as little matter of surprise, that others are coming fast round to our ideas ; but this triumph is matter of no consolation to me, nor do I envy those, whoever they may be, who are to undertake to repair the mischief already done. As to the continuance in office of these wretched shadows, it seems (whether peace or war) impossible that they should continue ; and in either contingency, my first object, most certainly, that Mr. Pitt should resume his office. *But I verily think that even in his hands the game is lost.*

“I have just heard from George Nugent, dated September 6. The accounts from St. Domingo are full of disasters. The troops from various causes nearly dead or dying ; only 4,800 men fit for duty. The black troops very mutinous and disorderly ; and the white inhabitants dying by hundreds in the towns, to which they are confined by the savage desolation spread through the country not only by the black insurgents, but by Christophe’s blacks, who rob, burn, and murder just as much as the others. Add to all this that their navy, from first to last, are impeding Leclerc in all his objects, with most avowed hostility to Bonaparte. His letter is too long to transcribe ; but the result of it is, that he considers St. Domingo lost, unless 12,000 men at least are sent out to secure it.

“As to your idea of meeting at Dropmore a few days before the 22nd, I shall have great pleasure in such a plan ; but I think for very many reasons we had better transfer our meeting to Pall Mall, where I will come *en garçon*, and will give you bed (including Lady Grenville if she accompanies you) as it probably will be expedient that we should see *others* before we finally decide upon our language. I can foresee much advantage that may arise from *communications*, which I will not state for the amusement of Lord Auckland.’”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 22, Charles Street.—“I was much gratified in receiving from you so full and so interesting a communication at a moment when so many circumstances had occurred to make me very anxious to hear from you. If I was a little disappointed in your medical bulletin, which falls a little short of what we had been taught to expect, I was on the other hand very agreeably surprised to find that the change which

had taken place in the language and opinions of your invalid had so much outstripped the improvement of his bodily health ; that change, as far as I can collect, appears to me to be of a very important and promising description. If the present step has been indeed taken without any previous communication with Pitt, if he is unshackled by any obligation or disposition either to defend the improvident and unconnected baseness of this measure, or to vindicate the new disgrace which it's failure is likely to bring upon us, if his own opinions are decidedly in favour of our retaining at all events the two great points in question, and if he is fairly determined to announce those to be his sentiments and to support them as such with the fair weight of his talents and influence, I do really incline to think that almost every thing which could be desired in his instance appears to be already gained. I say almost every thing, because I fancy that I see in your letter a stronger sense of the only thing wanting than I can believe will be found wanting in fact and in practice, however it may seem to be so in previous discussion. I can perfectly understand and approve with you in theory the delicacy of not appearing to be contending for power, and admit, if you please (though that is going a great way), that a demand on the part of the public seems almost necessary to furnish the means of making that new power useful ; but yet, giving to this consideration all it's due force, I do not think any such consideration can practically stand in the way of the natural course of proceeding in this business. If the general course of your friend's sentiments is as strongly marked as you describe them to be, if he really does think upon the two essential points which you mention, that in all cases and at all events those two points must be directly and openly insisted upon, and that not to do so would be to destroy the safety and the interests of the country, if such and so strong in his sense of the importance of these measures, he will and must feel it his duty to pursue them, and he will not suffer himself to be diverted or deterred from doing a duty of such high import, because he will read in some newspaper paragraphs that by maintaining those opinions he is only paving the way for his return to power. You see that I am all this while begging the question in supposing that these are measures which cannot be supported by the present ministers, and I own that, though I have no information upon that subject, I think what we have seen of their administration fully justifies me in begging that question. But even supposing that this speculation is unfounded, and that the equinoctial winds have blown into them a new character of vigour, activity and combination, yet still as I am convinced those winds have not wafted hither any new confidence to the country at large in their present ministers ; as, on the contrary, every mouth is full of despair and despondency at their utter incapacity, their new courage, if they have any, will turn to no warlike account ; for to see

them carry on the war, if war we are to have, is what, I do verily believe, the country will not bear to see. Upon the whole then, as, on the one hand, I cannot believe that the sentiments which you describe are such as your friend can, out of delicacy to himself, allow himself not to assert and to urge, because they are of too large a consequence to bear any such personal managements, on the other hand I do not think that the sort of points to which such personal management or such delicacy should apply, are likely to be of real weight, in the very critical position in which the country seems now to be placed. His line being once announced upon the great topics which you mention, if he stirs not one step beyond his bare duty in supporting that line, I still incline to think he will have done enough. What does not depend upon *him* is indeed a very different consideration. Of that and of the other interesting parts of your letter I am no less anxious than you can be that we should converse, and wait only to hear of your arrival at Dropmore to go there."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, October 28. Charles Street.—"I am this moment returned to town. I will endeavour to be with you tomorrow, if I can get a little business that I have here to be finished early enough for me to set forth. If I should be detained to-morrow morning I will, at all events, be with you on Saturday to dinner.

"As I am to see you so soon I will not advert to your last letter more than by observing that the error which you correct in my version of your first, makes a very important difference in the state of things, and may lead to a result very different from that which seemed to belong to your first narrative as I interpreted it.

"Lord S[pencer] intended to pass from Norfolk directly across to Althorp about this time, so that I fear all immediate communication with him of any near access will be difficult; yet it is perhaps neither prudent nor possible to discuss these points with him by letters. I will however write to him to see what facilities he offers as to our meeting. A letter which I received from my brother the day before yesterday leads me to expect and hope that we shall have him at Dropmore. I write a line to him to-night to tell him that I shall be with you either to-morrow or the next day at furthest."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 1. Stowe.—"When I came here yesterday I was a good deal disturbed to find my brother in some degree of confinement on account of his leg; a very slight pressure

of rubbing one leg against the other had broken the skin of the old wound, and he is obliged to have recourse to a plaster and to a horizontal posture to prevent the inflammation which would arise if he dropped his foot to the ground. I do not understand that there is any actual unpleasant appearance, and my brother speaks very slightly of it himself, but there is something quite dispiriting to me in the frequency of these returns, which show a state of body so prompt to create the alarm and apprehension of mischief.

“Upon the subject which has occupied our time entirely since I have been here, I have persuaded him to write to you himself, and therefore I do not enter into much detail about the present disposition of his mind which you will best see from his own pen, and hear, as I trust, from his own mouth ; for, in truth, with all the disposition in the world to save you the inconvenience of moving, I cannot but think it indispensibly necessary that we should talk this interesting subject over together ; and, as my brother is utterly unable to move, I should hope that you will agree to his wish of seeing you here on Saturday and Sunday next. I shall by that time, or rather by Friday, have returned from Althorp, and shall be able to tell you what is the course of Lord Spencer’s opinions. Indeed I am not without hopes that I shall prevail upon him to ride over hither to meet you, which is another motive for me to wish at all events that you would give Saturday and Sunday to Stowe. Of course I should wish to know your determination and therefore will desire my brother to forward to me to Althorp your answer.

“The general turn of my brother’s thoughts and reflections upon the communication which I made to him is certainly very unfavourable to the sort of arrangement which I repeated to him as having been discussed between Pitt and you. He dwells much, and perhaps not without reason, upon the danger of your suffering in public opinion by your consenting to sit in Cabinet with Addington and Lord Hawkesbury and Dundas ; the two first of whom have been so often reproached by you with incapacity and error upon the same topics of war and peace which must continue to occupy the new Cabinet ; and Dundas, whose abuse of your motives and conduct, make it impossible for the public to believe in any real cordiality between you and him, or indeed in any such agreement as is necessary to the good harmony of an administration. He thinks likewise that, in this situation, you would be put forward to stand the brunt of the unpopularity of renewed war, and that you would be seen fighting this battle in concert with all those who, having some of them made, and some approved, a ruinous peace, must either be considered as acting upon different principles from you, or as having obtained from you the sacrifice of those opinions which have been proved to be just and well founded. These dangers he considers as very much increased by the additional circumstance of the

compromise which seems likely to be required upon the Irish question, a compromise which he personally feels great difficulty if not the impossibility of giving himself to, his opinions being already so strongly committed to that object. With respect to Windham he agrees with us both in the absolute necessity of not suffering any indignity to be put upon him by the invidious preference of which we had talked. These being his general objections upon the first mention of the subject, he seems strongly of opinion that the most prudent and becoming and safe course for you would be to withhold yourself from an arrangement such as that which was discussed ; and I confess that my mind is not free from the impressions which act so forcibly upon his. The magnitude, however, and importance of the considerations which this question involves make me wish to avoid giving my hasty opinion, and the expectation which I have of seeing you here in the end of the week will give me the opportunity of more deliberate reflection than I have hitherto had upon the matter.

"I am going this moment to Althorp, and shall return on Friday. My intention is to make the same narrative precisely to Lord S[pencer] as I did to my brother, and to avoid, as I did with him, making any comment, or offering any judgment till I see what is the natural impression which the bare narrative makes upon his mind. I apprehend that he is likely to feel strongly the Irish question, and the disgrace of according with Addington and Hawkesbury."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 1. Stowe.—"You will easily believe that my mind and every moment of my time has been most fully occupied by the very interesting communications which Tom has made to me from you, and upon which I am only prepared to offer to you the very crude and undigested reflections that have occurred to me, in the discussion with him of what I understood now to be the proposition floating in your mind, namely of assisting Mr. Pitt to form a Cabinet composed of Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Dundas, Lord Spencer, Mr. Windham and yourself, with the addition of the Lord Chancellor, and of the Duke of Portland or some other person of that description from amongst the present ministers, or with some other not very material change. It seems difficult to ascertain correctly from the long details of your conversation with Mr. Pitt, how far you stand *engaged* to him, supposing Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham willing to accede to such an arrangement ; and under that uncertainty I feel some little awkwardness in giving you the first blush of my opinions ; and should have paused upon it if Tom had not urged me to state them to you immediately. You must therefore take them undigested and unarranged, but they will

at least occupy your thoughts so far as to enable you to satisfy my mind upon them when we meet, which, for the reasons given in Tom's letter which he has read to me, and which I enclose to you, I trust will be. I clearly understand the proposition to be, not that of forming an administration in the usual way, that is with *carte blanche* from the king, and with materials or rather persons acting in unison of opinions together ; but to be an arrangement of infinite difficulty, having for its object the placing Mr. Pitt at the head of government, notwithstanding his public and private *embarrassments* of every sort, and consequently with an imperious call for great sacrifice of whatever stands in the way of that object. The first sacrifice is that which I know you make, but for which no one will give you a moment's belief, namely, your own personal wishes for personal ease out of office. The next sacrifice is that of your own feelings when called upon to sit in a Cabinet with Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury, to whose ignorance, imbecility, and deception on the public, as well as their criminal annihilation of the internal and external political strength of the country, you have imputed and must still more strongly continue to impute the present tremendous crisis. For this sacrifice the public will, I am persuaded, give you no credit ; but on the contrary that it will expose every member of such a government, but more particularly you, inasmuch as your language and sentiments have been more prominent on these points, to well grounded reproach of such a nature as to shake all public confidence in you most of all, but in every member of such a Cabinet. And when you add to the consideration of those political opinions that induced them to make such a peace, the particular opinions avowed by Mr. Addington in Parliament, and ostentatiously held out as the shibboleth of that party, of disclaiming all foreign alliances and interference with continental objects, let me ask you, what confidence can you expect *in your particular department* from those to whom you must immediately look for personal confidence in you for a different system. The next sacrifice as arising out of this plan is that of the indulgence to the Catholics *in Ireland*. You will remember how strongly you stated that measure as one from which you could not depart, in your valedictory speech in the House of Lords ; and you will remember the sort of manifesto printed by Lord Cornwallis and given to the heads of that party in the shape of a letter through him to them from Mr. Pitt. I do not now mean to go into all the history of that paper, or of your speech, and that of Mr. Pitt, of Lord Spencer, and Mr. Windham ; but I mean to recal your mind to the impression and belief of the public as to the *pledge* then given, and for which *pledge* that body felt themselves invited to forego any public measure that should distress the government, and to ask you, what you can expect save the bitterest reproach and the increased animosity of a body stung by disappointment, and very ill-disposed to

admit any explanation of expediency for postponing the performance of that to which they and I verily believe every one else conceives you personally pledged. And in truth, if I were inclined to admit the distinction which Tom tells me had passed across your mind, of considering this question coupled with the Union, and therefore one that might be put by without inconvenience to Ireland *now*, the union having rolled over our heads for two years ; let me ask you upon what grounds of expediency could you put it by in the moment of a new war, believing this measure, as you do, the most likely step for conciliating attachment and confidence to government in the most vulnerable point in our dominions.

“These are serious considerations to you. The profligate abandonment of political opinions which formerly used to bind public men, has for the last 20 years nearly annihilated all public confidence ; but, I thank God, the imputation has not reached you, and even with your opponents (as well new as old) those who differed with you on the peace gave you full credit for the consistency with which you maintained former opinions and lines of conduct. Consider how this is to apply to such a coalition with men thus publicly pledged to opinions so different from your own, and to a compromise or rather an abandonment (for so I have argued it) of your opinion upon a point of such importance as to have justified you (in your explanation in the House of Lords) in quitting the king’s service under all the circumstances of that moment for that very point. You will observe that I have said nothing yet on the question of your sitting in Cabinet with Mr. Dundas, for that proposition stands on different grounds from the question of Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington. In the first place there is and must be a wide difference in comparative unfitness of sitting in Cabinet with the *makers* and with the *approvers* of the peace ; and certainly whatever guilt belongs to the measures that have during the summer weakened and disarmed the country, attaches upon the two former, and not upon Mr. Dundas. But I am free to own that personally I should in your situation feel perhaps more repugnance in the intercourse with him, than with the former ; and yet when I consider the influence and assistance which he brings to government, particularly in the Indian department, I should be satisfied that I gained my *quid* for the *quo* ; and therefore, though personally I dislike the man, and really think that much of the failure of the war in his department is fairly imputable to him, yet I should advise you in that instance to waive considerations that are merely personal, and not to think of making him the exception to the proposition of *re-establishing the old government*. That proposition would re-admit Mr. Dundas, but it would not apply to Mr. Addington or Lord Hawkesbury. I say nothing of the specified arrangement for Lord Hawkesbury, because I take for granted with you, that no preference of the sort to which my brother adverts in his letter, can be intended as against

Mr. Windham, if it is really meant to conciliate the co-operation of the former administration ; but it cannot escape your observation that the introduction of two persons into the Cabinet so distinctly in hostility with you as these two delinquents, supported in their jealousies and dislike of you by Mr. Dundas, Lord Chatham, and perhaps the Chancellor (from House of Lords jealousy) must inevitably sooner or later operate on the mind of Mr. Pitt ; more particularly when much of the same jealousies and dislikes, of the same persons, will apply to Mr. Windham, whose eagerness and want of management will probably give them grounds for working upon, which your prudence and your influence over Mr. Pitt's mind will enable you to parry in your own instance, though you may be equally committed by the same attack upon Mr. Windham.

" You are likewise well to consider the *certainty* that this difference of opinion must break up the government whenever you are officially called upon to treat for peace, unless Mr. Pitt can make up his mind to remove Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington at such a moment, which certainly is at least as doubtful as the king's consent to such a removal would be at that period. And, above all, you are to consider that your resumption of office claims for yourself and for Mr. Windham the entire responsibility of the war from all descriptions of people, for a period and for objects not defined, and consequently, according to common reasoning, for eternal war, unless you should be prepared to sacrifice your present opinions by signing a peace short of that which you shall deem secure or honourable. You will observe in this argument I do not dissuade you from incurring an honourable responsibility or risk ; but I urge you not to charge yourself and Mr. Windham (the two supposed advocates for war) with this impression for objects which, constituted as this Cabinet is proposed to be, must ultimately be disclaimed, certainly by those who have made, and probably by those who have approved the peace.

" I must likewise observe to you that, believing the war inevitable, the concoction of such a Cabinet, even if it were not exceptionable in the points to which I have adverted, not only does not add to the strength of the old government, for it leaves no opening either for the talents or the influence of any one that might be a useful accession, such as of Mr. Grey, or of the non-efficient description of the Duke of Portland ; but it weakens the old government by the introduction of those seeds of discord that must inevitably tear the fabric in pieces. In a word, suppose yourself for a moment perfectly uninterested by feelings of any sort on the question of confidence to such a Ministry, whether from the public at home or from foreign powers, and I am sure that you would not entertain it for a moment.

" After stating this, I must add that it is far from being clear to me that these sacrifices on your part, or that of our

friends, are at all necessary for placing Mr. Pitt at the head of government ; for though I do not mean to impute to him in the slightest degree any unfairness towards you, it is impossible not to observe that he stakes nothing upon his game compared with that which this arrangement requires from you. His *embarrassments* in removing Lord St. Vincent, Lord Pelham and Lord Hobart (none of them personally connected with him) will cost him nothing ; and although I am satisfied that he is much in earnest in wishing your support, and that of our friends in their respective offices, yet it is probable that he is prepared to go to the head of the Cabinet constituted as it now is, in all contingencies of the failure of this negociation ; being secure, as he now is by your explanation, that he will be supported in his war by us ; and I must remark that Mr. Canning's letter on which he is now employed, may, if Mr. Pitt should be obliged to disclaim and disavow it, ultimately make it impossible for him to refuse to take that step, even though your or Lord Spencer's opinion, which Mr. Canning cannot yet know, should completely put an end to the ideas of a cabinet such as were opened at Walmer.

"Nor is it quite clear to me that a government thus formed by those who made the peace and supported it, would be in reality weakened by the non-accession to it of you, Lord Spencer, and Windham. I know how much they would lose of talents ; but I know and estimate very highly the value of union, and it is obvious that less clamour would arise against them than against you for sacrifice of opinion, or for that *war mania* which many sober persons, and all the disaffected persons, would fear or affect to fear from your counsels.

"If however I am right in my persuasion that you will be deemed to have sacrificed much of your personal fame and credit, of your former opinions, of your predictions now justified by the events, of the measures to which you are pledged, by a compromise both with respect to measures and to the men with whom you are to act, and all for the love of office, to which all that you now do will be imputed, it is impossible for me not to pause upon your proposition.

"I have intimated to you strongly my opinion that you should not shrink from an honourable risk and responsibility. I certainly felt that risk when I encouraged your opposition to the peace ; and I should now urge you to resume office with Mr. Pitt provided that the Cabinet was changed (I except the Chancellor) leaving, of course, to Mr. Pitt to settle his *embarrassments* by means of subordinate offices. The old government might then be resumed. The Home Department, vacated by the Duke of Portland's move to the Presidency of the Council, would be given to Windham, and the Secretary at War with the Cabinet might be offered to Mr. Grey, unless we could induce my brother Tom to take it. This you will observe even goes the length of preserving to Lord Westmoreland the Privy Seal, but my advice would be that Mr. Pitt should

dispose of it to some efficient purpose. In stating all this I do not urge it as anything that you can do, but rather offer it as a picture of what I would wish were done, though it cannot be done by you. I give you great credit for the management of different sorts that have led Mr. Pitt to all the avowals, and all the strong steps of communication that he has authorized. I expect much good from the whole of it, but I cannot think that the shape which you jointly have given to this proposition is likely to serve the public, or to contribute to the character or satisfaction of any party concerned in it. He must be judge of his *embarrassments*. That chapter is not new to me, for I foresaw it when you resigned ; and if no solution for them can occur but that which you have stated to my brother, I am inclined to think it better in every sense that they should be avoided altogether by leaving you and our friends out of his arrangements. Our course is then clear, distinct, and liable to no mistake or imputation.

"I cannot help observing how much is assumed in all these transactions of the probable sentiments of the king, which at the same time cannot be reasonably judged of, without much more *certain grounds* than those which have been put forward. I do not dispute Canning's information ; but I have strong reason for thinking that no disposition existed at a very late period for placing Mr. Pitt at the head of government ; still less do I imagine that any wish of this sort exists for replacing any of the old ministers ; and least of all do I imagine that he has any idea of removing Mr. Addington. And if no such *sure grounds* exist, though I think your communications with Mr. Pitt and your management of him invaluable to the purpose which ultimately must arise out of them, yet it is possible that they will not lead immediately to a change of ministry. In a word the whole is in Mr. Pitt's hands ; he may go to the head of government tomorrow if he chooses it, or he may let things take their usual course, and may wait his moment to overthrow the old, and to form a new Ministry. *My opinion is that he will prefer the former.*

"But I am most anxious to talk over with you all that is best for your fair fame and honour. Tom has told you why I cannot move, and I think it highly useful that Lord Spencer and you should meet ; I therefore press you earnestly to send me back my groom with a very short note of one line in answer to this tedious letter, made more long and tedious by my anxiety for you. That line will, I trust, tell me that you will be here on Friday or Saturday for one day ; for as Tom returns from Althorp on Thursday evening or Friday, I wish you should know Lord Spencer's opinion as soon as possible.

Postscript.—"Surely, surely, if Mr. Pitt wishes union with you as heartily as I trust he does, some arrangement might be made for Tom in the Cabinet. I cannot say how mortified I should be at his exclusion."

PAPER GIVEN TO MR. CANNING.

1802, November 8.—“Supposing a new Government were in other respects to be arranged in such a shape as that we could hope to be of use by taking a share in it, we should feel as to the Catholic question a sincere desire to find, if possible, such a solution as might be satisfactory to his Majesty, and at the same time not inconsistent with the maintenance of our public characters.” *In Mr. Pitt's handwriting.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1802, November 8. Dropmore.—“In the hope of seeing you here on the 17th or 18th, I reserve till then the principal part of what I have to say to you on the present state of public affairs, as it results from the extraordinary events which have taken place, even since we parted. But in such a moment as the present I think myself bound not to keep you one day unnecessarily in ignorance of one circumstance which may materially influence your decisions and measures.

“Unless our present difficulties can be removed by some miracle, for nothing less could do it, I am confident that the public will not any longer bear with the imbecillity of the present Government. You know it has all along been my fixed opinion that, whenever this happens, a call will be made upon you such as you cannot decline; and that your own interest and honour as well as the public welfare are very deeply concerned that this call should be made before the mischiefs of the present management shall have become irretrievable.

“When we conversed on this subject at Walmer, I thought it possible that, with this view, such arrangements might be made before the opening of the session, as would enable those with whom I have been acting for the last twelve months to take their share with you (if you wished it) in carrying on a Government formed to meet the present exigency; and that we might content ourselves with looking to you alone for the maintenance of those principles in the discussion of which I had found that you and I completely agreed; and might therefore feel a considerable degree of indifference as to the other individuals (whoever they might be) whom you might wish to bring back into the Cabinet, or to retain there. But we were both of us aware how much the actual renewal of hostilities in Parliament, and that too under such circumstances as the present, must necessarily alter my situation, and that of my friends in this respect.

“This event seems now inevitable, considering that I am now writing to you on the 8th of November and that Parliament meets on the 16th. It is therefore perhaps not very material

to add, what however I feel I cannot conceal from you, that, even in discussing with others the opinion above stated, I have found many more difficulties than had occurred to me upon it ; and that, on the whole, we really do feel that all our means of being of any use would be totally destroyed, and our own public characters rendered justly questionable with the country, by any such compromise as that on which you and I conversed at Walmer.

“The grounds of this decision I shall, I trust, have the opportunity of explaining to you in a very few days, and I am sure I shall succeed in convincing you that, in fully acceding to it, I have not in the smallest degree been influenced by any diminution either of personal affection towards you, or of that firm conviction which I entertain as a public man, and which I shall always be most ready to express, that from the dangers which are gathering so thick around us, it is you and you only that can, under the mercy of God, protect and deliver us.” *Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 8. Pall Mall.—“I have wished much for the conversation which you propose, and with a view at once to convenience and satisfaction, to have made the occasion of it a visit to you at Dropmore. But I am set fast unfortunately by the necessity of an operation of no importance or danger, which, not being capable well of being deferred till Parliament shall break up, must take place now lest I should be still confined when Parliament meets. I must trust therefore for communication upon those most anxious subjects to the medium of your brother, unless you should chance to be in town for a day, or I should find the necessity of my confining myself ends sooner than is supposed.

“I have as yet no idea of the course to be pursued (nor is it easy in so varying a state of things) other than to give a lecture to the *country* upon the nature of its situation, the errors of its former opinions and conduct, and the necessity of its preparing itself, not physically but in spirit, in a frame and temper of mind, for a more dreadful struggle than any that it has ever yet experienced. As to the Ministers it really seems, besides that it is bad taste always to indulge in triumph, that they are not mark sufficient ; the shot must fly over their heads. Indeed I am much of Cobbett’s opinion that, unless a spirit gets up in the country, preceding a change of Ministry, and independent therefore of that which a mere change of Ministry might give, it is of no great consequence who the Ministers are. They may retard our fate, but they will never finally prevent it. Elliot is come from Scotland, and is, like myself, very anxious for concert and communication.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 8th. Downing Street.—“I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship a letter which I have received from Mr. Deare on the subject of Mr. Gregory’s receipt, together with an extract of the Attorney General’s report upon the Duke of Portland’s representation respecting secret service.

“I hope very shortly to have the pleasure to see your lordship in town, and to have some further conversation with you in order (if it be possible) to bring the business with the Commissioners of public accounts to an immediate termination.”

Enclosure 1.

PHILIP DEARE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1802, November 5th. Somerset Place.—“The Commissioners for auditing the Public Accounts having had under consideration your letter of the 20th of last August, and having come to the undermentioned resolutions thereon, they have directed me to communicate the same to you for the information of Lord Grenville.

“With respect to the sum of Seven Hundred Pounds received by Mr. Gregory from Lord Grenville; Resolved, that Lord Grenville’s affidavit is sufficient; and,—Ordered

“That Mr. Gregory be not again called upon to account for the same, the money having been paid to him for performing a secret service, and not for the purpose of being paid over to any other person by him as consul.”

*Enclosure 2.**Extract:—Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown.*

“As the account of the money issued for secret service is contained in the imprest rolls transmitted half-yearly by the Auditors of his Majesty’s Exchequer to the Commissioners for auditing the publick accounts of the kingdom, it is their duty under the provision of the 25 George 3d, C. 52. to call upon the Secretary of State for his account of the expenditure of the money so issued to his Grace; that is to say, for such discharge *only* as is required by the Act of the 22 Geo. 3d. Ch. 82, namely, his own or his Under Secretary’s affidavit with respect to the money expended at home for secret service, in detecting, preventing, or defeating treasonable or other dangerous conspiracies against the State; and for money remitted abroad for secret service, the receipt of the person to whom the same was remitted, with the proof of his handwriting.

“This we conceive to be the true construction of the two Acts of Parliament above mentioned, and avoids all the

inconvenience and mischief which the Duke of Portland very justly apprehends would arise from a disclosure of the particulars of such an account."

SP. PERCIVAL.

THOS. MANNERS SUTTON.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 15. Bath.—"I am very much obliged to you for both your letters. The first of them I should have answered more immediately, but I was prevented by going from hence for a day or two to Burton. Though your decision gives me on many accounts great pain, I am not the less sensible of your continued kindness in putting me as early as you could in possession of it. It would still be a great relief and satisfaction to my mind to be able to talk over with you again the whole of our situation before your part is taken; but this I am afraid is now impracticable, as under all the present circumstances, I have determined to avail myself of the plea of health for remaining here a fortnight or three weeks longer, and to avoid being present at the opening of the Session. I should, notwithstanding, be very much tempted to come to you at Dropmore for a day, and return hither; but in the short interval now left, I do not see how I could do so, without creating too much observation.

"With respect to the general state of things, I scarcely know anything of what has been passing since I came here, except from the newspapers, and have no means of forming a final judgment of what may be the issue of the present crisis, or what I should myself think the exact line to be pursued. Two things, however, I am afraid are but too clear, that all chance of resistance in Switzerland is at an end, and that there is no present hope of any aid either from Austria or Russia. If this be the case, though we have abundant provocation to justify us in any steps of precaution or hostility against France, I much doubt on reflection the policy of determining, in consequence of what has passed, to insist on retaining our conquests at the hazard or rather with the certainty of immediate war. I believe it would be wiser to avow openly that we should have been ready to embark to the utmost extent in any concert with the powers of the Continent which could have been effectual for its purpose; that we consider all that has passed as necessarily creating a state of the utmost jealousy and suspicion; that we must, as things now stand, trust for our own safety only to such a state of extensive and constant preparation as may enable us to meet an attack at any moment; and that we shall be always ready, whenever the policy of other powers admits of it, to join with them for the general defence of all that is left to defend in Europe. You know that, on the first view, I concurred with you in a

different opinion ; but, after looking at the question in all its views, I think that the line I now state would be the best for our own security, and afford the best chance too in the end of retrieving the affairs of Europe. As to myself, I am persuaded that any idea of my returning to Government being either useful or practicable is out of the question, unless in the event of war having taken place, or at least being evidently inevitable. If, contrary to my expectation, that should happen, the call may be made upon me in a way that I should still think myself not at liberty to decline, though your decision would add the greatest possible discouragement to the attempt. Short of such an extremity, I see nothing to be gained by the public, and much to be lost to my own credit and character by listening to the idea ; and most of all while the issue of the discussion now pending remains to be decided. This is the general outline of the best opinion I have been able to form. I should have liked much better to be able to discuss at large with you all the grounds of it, and to compare it with yours ; but I have been anxious at least to state it to you as distinctly as I can within the limits of a letter. I must however add that circumstances may have arisen of which I at present know nothing which might lead me to a different conclusion.

Postscript.—"I, of course, suppose some fresh arrangement to be made about Malta, which however I feel to be a point of the greatest difficulty."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 15. Charles Street.—"I sit down to write a few lines to you, although the only subject on which I am earnest to converse with you is one of so confidential a nature that I do not quite like committing it to the hazard of the post ; and yet, as time presses, I believe my prudence must upon this occasion give way to my zeal. Lord C[arlisle] came up yesterday from the north, and I find him in his conversation precisely such as I had expected upon the points that we have discussed ; he has however conceived a notion which he has entrusted to me as being now floating in his mind without any positive decision as yet taken upon it. It is the notion of his taking the necessary steps for speaking his mind upon the present state of things, and upon the absolute necessity of supplying to the Government more vigour and abilities than it now possesses. This opinion would likewise be described by him as what he has collected to be the general sense of the country, and he is inclined to think that he should name Pitt by name upon that occasion. His chief inducement seems to be that of thinking it particularly becoming to him to take this step, both because he was the first to express his distrust of the present Government, and chiefly because professing, as he means to profess, not to take office, he thinks

on that account a representation from him, so justified, will be less objectionable, and more likely to be useful.

“The *tête-à-tête* in question is one which would not be agreeable to him, but he is disposed to think it a duty imposed upon him by his sense of public danger, and his only present hesitation is the fear of doing harm where he means only to do good. For my own part I scarcely know how to wish to assist his decision, because the expediency of the measure depends upon an estimate of temper, character, and circumstances of which I am too little informed to make a sufficient judgment in the case. The inclination of my mind as at present is to think that it would be not unbecoming, and that though it might produce no other good, it is a testimony for himself and his neighbourhood of the sense entertained both of the weakness of the present government and of the obvious mode of giving strength and confidence to it; and I do not see any real mischief to apprehend that ought to stand in the way of this possible chance of doing good. Pray let me have a line from you, by some coach to-morrow, on this subject, because naturally there may be question of this for Wednesday or Thursday next.

“What do you think of my being informed from undoubted authority that two Swiss gentlemen of the highest respectability and character, having come over hither to communicate with government ten weeks ago about the state of Switzerland and the possible wishes or inclination of the British Government as to the future and ultimate position of that country, what do you think of those gentlemen returning to Switzerland a fortnight or three weeks ago, to say to those who had sent them, that in ten weeks in London, with every powerful recommendation and intercession made by their English friends, they were not able to arrive at any sort of communication with any part of the English administration ???

“Windham is not quite well, but hopes to be so; town is filling, and the *Morning Chronicle* is making me Speaker. I had some thoughts of writing to Abbot to assure him that he may spare himself the trouble of a canvass upon a subject where he is certain not to have me for an opponent; but perhaps it will do as well if I disclaim in conversation with everybody as I do, all idea and notion of any such arrangement, as far as I am concerned in it.”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1802, November 16. Dropmore.—“Although your resolution of staying a fortnight or three weeks longer at Bath deprives me of the great satisfaction I should have felt in conversing with you again before I take my part in Parliament, yet I really heard of it with the greatest possible

pleasure. I am convinced that it will be materially useful to your health, but I rejoice at it even more because I am quite sure that it is, as matters now stand, by much the most advantageous line you can pursue for the maintenance of your own character and situation in the country.

"I feel with you all the difficulties both of the public line to be pursued in the present crisis, and also of your own particular conduct if you were now called upon to extricate us from this situation while the issue of peace and war may still be considered as doubtful. And, as I am still persuaded that this work can be done by you alone, I think it infinitely important that whenever you do come to it, no fresh embarrassment shall have been thrown in your way by any language you may in the interval have held in Parliament, at a time when the full means of decision cannot be within your reach.

"One great ground of my anxiety for your re-assuming the government before the meeting of Parliament was that I still flattered myself that, by the effect which such a change would have produced in France, war might have been avoided; and that by being known to possess the courage, the talents, and the public confidence that such an extremity would require, you would have been able to close these discussions without having recourse to it, and in a way which, by raising our character abroad and our public spirit at home, would materially have added to our future security. I assure you that I look with as much uneasiness as you can to a new war to be undertaken without allies, and to be carried on without any visible object of animating attack; and I feel this impression the more strongly since I have learnt, by enquiring into the details, that our means even of home defence have been reduced very far indeed below what we had imagined when we discussed that point at Walmer. But, on the other hand, I fear that if a great country like this, after an ostentatious display of impotent resentment on such points as have now been in question, shall then shrink from the contest for the want of that assistance which there was from the beginning no reason to expect, we must be so lowered in our own eyes as well as in those of other powers, that we shall have little chance thenceforth of finding any means, either at home or abroad, of resisting farther encroachments even on our most immediate interests. It could not be hoped that Bonaparte would use this advantage with moderation. We should practically have submitted to his claim of excluding us from all concern in the affairs of the continent; and, penned up as we should be in this fold, we could hope for no aid from others when it is our turn to be driven to the slaughter house.

"It is not reasonable that you should be called upon to decide between this alternative of difficulties; for you have had no share in the desperate folly that has brought it upon

us in this pressing and urgent shape, precisely when we were least prepared to meet it. A paragraph which I will enclose to you under this cover from a letter I received this morning from my brother Mr Grenville will shew you the extent of that folly. He does not name his authority, but I am sure he has not taken up such a story lightly, and you will remember that what I told you at Walmer, from my own knowledge, as having passed last spring, precisely resembles it.

“Still this decision, difficult as it is, must be made by this country in one shape or other : and if they call upon you, as I think in all reason and prudence they ought, to make it for them in the only way that you can make it, that is with a full knowledge of the grounds on which it is to rest, and with full means to give to your plans the fair advantage of being executed according to your own ideas, I do not see how you are at liberty to decline the call. But, in the present moment, you are not bound to take any step ; you have the best of all reasons for taking none ; and you could take none that might not infinitely increase the difficulties of that situation in which you will unquestionably, a little sooner or a little later, be called upon to act. In the meantime you can do nothing better for the interests of us all than to preserve your character untainted by a mixture (either real or supposed) with such counsels as now govern us, and to keep a station *despicere unde queas alios, passimque videre errare, atque viam palantes quærere.*”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, November 17. Charles Street.—“I received your letter yesterday evening, and my object was perfectly answered by it. Upon a matter which appeared to me so doubtful, I was anxious to know whether any decided objection occurred to you, because, in that case, I felt I had probably still the means of stopping it ; but now that I see your mind with mine is rather inclining to the measure as a harmless one, than dreading any extreme inconvenience from the pursuit of it, I shall leave it to the chance of it's own natural course without much either of expectation or apprehension. The news of your yesterday's letter has just been told me in the streets by a person to whom Addington had mentioned it. ‘Pitt's health’—said he—‘though better, is so far from being re-established, and Hiley, who has just left him, sees him to be so little strong, that, much as we want his advice and assistance in Parliament, we have been obliged to have a prior regard to his recovery, and therefore we have prevailed upon him to take another fortnight or three weeks of the Bath water, instead of coming up as he had thought of doing to the first meeting of Parliament.’ Certainly some such ingenious suggestion was absolutely

necessary to ministers, in order that, by making Pitt's absence their act, they might prevent any suspicions or lukewarmness in his friends, when they have to comment upon his absence at so critical a moment.

"The sun, after whose complexion you make such tender enquiries, has latterly approached very much in colour to the moon, and appears to have contracted all the changeableness likewise which is imputed to that delicate luminary. What I expect to be the result of this short fever of courage in our government, is, that Andreossi will tell them that they are not to attach any real consequence to the newspaper paragraphs of the *Moniteur* ; and that, as for the *Argus*, they will prosecute their printer, if Addington will prosecute Cobbett, and therefore complete satisfaction will be stated to have been obtained upon that subject. Further we shall have to hear that there have arisen some difficulties in executing the provisions of the treaty of Malta so as to provide for the independence of the Order ; but that with the amicable disposition and language of the French minister, it was to be hoped that some satisfactory solution will be found to those important difficulties ; and then, in a certain time, we shall have a new bundle of new tongues that will marvellously concur in preventing the possibility of the island being under the influence of France ; and for this new instance of the wisdom of our ministers we shall have to express a due sense of what has been acquired by the happy union of temper and of firmness in the councils of the present Cabinet. If you persist in not coming till Friday I will forgive you, though I know not whether Lord B[uckingham] and Lord S[pencer] who expect to meet you to-morrow here, will be so indulgent. At all events I will have a dinner for you likewise on Friday, but you had better come to-morrow. Windham is well enough to dine here, and I have asked Elliot, but nobody else."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 3. Bath.—"I have delayed thanking you for your letters, as well as for your Greek extract, from having nearly determined to come to town in the course of this week to attend on the Army Estimates, in order to have at least the satisfaction of making my protest against the absurdity and mischief of all the doctrines which Fox has been attempting to establish. On comparing however the different accounts which I had from town, I hardly thought that the impression he was likely to make rendered it worth while to come merely for that purpose ; and, in every other view, I am much better satisfied with remaining here at present. I now mean to prolong my stay till near Christmas, and then to return to Walmer, and continue there at least till Parliament meets. If you are likely to be at Dropmore,

as I conclude you will towards the end of this month, I shall be particularly glad to call there in my way. There is scarcely anything which can afford me a greater relief and satisfaction than to have an opportunity of talking over with you all the multiplied difficulties of the time, which are not a little increased by the events which have passed since we parted."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 16. Bath.—"Your last intelligence respecting Malta was in all its parts perfectly new to me, and is indeed most extraordinary. It seems impossible to doubt the authenticity of any of the particulars which came within Ruspoli's personal knowledge, and were stated by him to your informer. But he may perhaps have had less accurate means of information with respect to the supposed acquiescence of our Government in the Pope's nomination; and, without absolute proof of it, I cannot bring myself to think that all our preparations are to end only in the absolute surrender of Malta, for all practical purposes, into the hands of France; and yet such would unquestionably be the effect of the measure said to be agreed to. I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know if you consider your intelligence with respect to this particular point of the part taken by our Government, to be as certain as the rest of the history. I am also anxious to learn whether you have heard anything more with respect to the transfer of Cochin to France, and whether you conceive the fact can be sufficiently established to make it an ostensible ground to reason and act upon.

"The question which you refer to in one of your letters, on the tonnage duty, is, I see, not to be discussed till after Christmas, and we shall therefore have an opportunity in the meantime to talk it over. My present impression upon it is that although, *prima facie*, anything which seems to give a possible preference to foreign shipping over our own is wrong in its principle, yet that the present tax is so slight as not practically to produce any effect. I mean to stay here till to-morrow se'nnight, and hope to reach Dropmore Monday or Tuesday following, and to pass two or three days with you, if it does not break in on any of your engagements for the holidays."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 21. Charles Street.—"I rejoice to have to tell you that my brother is well enough to return to Stowe to-morrow, and to give good promise of entirely re-establishing himself by a future course to Bath, preceded—as I hope—by Cheltenham. In the meantime the *Annual Register*

arrangement is considered as completed, and is to be sanctioned by the general meeting of this evening, so as to allow our friend to go to-morrow morning by appointment and to settle his terms with the outlandish politician. The other arrangement is likewise advancing, but it looks only at present to a morning share. Evening would I think better answer the purpose in question ; but upon the detail of this subject I feel myself so unable to make a competent judgment, that I cannot go beyond giving all general encouragement to any of these schemes that shall appear to the undertakers to be practicable.

“ Our House, as I am told, adjourns to-day, first to Friday and afterwards to Monday, because the Chancellor has declared he will not pass the bill before Monday. In the current circle of London news is Dundas’s peerage, and some speculation of his replacing Pelham. This does not sound very improbable to me, though I have no good ground for believing it ; if however I care about it, it is because such an event may in some degree weigh with your expected visitor, and lessen the chance of his looking eagerly to other changes.

“ I am told in Pall Mall from pretty good authority that Steel, embarrassed by the present state of men and measures, would be desirous of quitting his present office, if he could secure anything for his son ; this is of no other importance than inasmuch as it furnishes new facilities, and Sheridan’s language both public and private is so avowed and vehement a defence of administration, that I cannot help believing he has a view more or less distant of joining them in office.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 25.—“ A new trace of dissension in the Cabinet has appeared within the last two days, which I will not let pass without mentioning it to you. It seems that the informers and attornies have lately left the clergy to fasten upon the clothiers ; they have rummaged out obsolete but existing laws in which they found large penalties for manufacturing cloth except with certain threads and of certain breadths ; penalties for employing any persons not having served a regular apprenticeship ; forfeiture of all unshorn cloth exported from this country, such as our Bath great coats and such like ; in short a formidable list of breaches of laws, some as old as Edward VI., and so entirely disregarded that the execution of them would attach upon all the dealers in fine cloth, and some of those who deal in coarse also. Regular notice, however, having been given by the attornies of their pursuing these penalties and confiscations in regular course, the clothiers at the meeting of Parliament stated their case to Addington who promised them immediately an Act of Suspension of the above laws until a new detailed law should

pass upon good consideration of the subject. It was not till to-day that I heard to my utter surprise that such a Bill of Suspension being silently brought in by Vansittart, had actually passed our House without the smallest notice of the nature of this bill ; a bill which after all, whether actually justifiable or not, could only be justified by a satisfactory statement of the necessity of the case, and such evidence upon it as ought to warrant so strong and extraordinary a measure. This bill however, such as it was, went up to the Lords with the Navy Bill, and was read, committed, and reported without notice ; but the report being now upon the table of the Lords, the Chancellor and Pelham have both in private expressed their entire dissent from such a mode of proceeding, and consequently Lord Walsingham did not move yesterday for the third reading, and the matter so stands at sixes and sevens ; the clothiers, alarmed at this check after the dependence which they had placed upon this promise of Addington's, and Addington not knowing how to prevail over the difficulties which are made by the Chancellor and Pelham, both as to a suspending bill being an unconstitutional measure, and as to the indecency of any such important measure being taken without evidence. The best that the clothiers can hope is that the Lords will recommit the bill in order to receive evidence, and then the Commons will be put in the disgraceful state of having done with their eyes shut what the Lords can hardly be brought to do upon evidence and enquiry. But exclusive of these considerations, I am assured that this perversity of the Lords, following upon the Navy Bill, which they have amended into it's being ineffectual, has created a serious ferment among the Ministers of the first and second order."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1802, December 27.—"I am just come from the House of Lords ; the Chancellor has shown no other hostility to the bill than by deferring the committee till after the holidays, for it seems the question now was only a second reading. Pelham was more direct and manly in his objections to the measure being pursued without sufficient evidence, and he likewise expressed his dislike of the principle of suspension ; but to my utter astonishment, the Chancellor, who is the natural guardian of the law, and whose opinions were pledged against the principle of suspension, did not say one syllable upon that part of the subject ; and he was very washy and very unmeaning in that which he did say.

"It turns out upon enquiry that Vansittart proposed to Abbot to have evidence in our House, but Abbot put it by as unnecessary, and said the petition to our House was sufficient ground of notoriety.

"Canning was to have gone to-morrow to meet Pitt at Park Place, and to have gone on to Dropmore, but Mrs. Canning is not so well and he now doubts.

"I know nothing of the arrangements which you allude to, because though they were in a good train, yet I have only communicated with Lord B[uckingham] upon them, and since his departure for Stowe, I am quite in the dark.

"Canning says he feels sure that there is no chance of Dundas taking office with them, but I think he is too sanguine."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 1. Harley Street.—"Arivé ici il y a dix jours, après un voyage continuel de onze semaines, dans une saison horrible, et par des chemins plus horribles que le saison même, je me trouve dans l'état d'un homme qui sent toute sa faiblesse après une fièvre, longtems continué, qui vient de le quitter. Je ne suis pas en état de sortire de chez moi ; je l'ai fais pour une demi-heure, il y a quatre jours, pour affaire pressente, et ça m'a beaucoup fatigué, de sorte que je suis encor à me réposer des fatigues passées. Je n'ai pas eu encor mes audiences de Leurs Majestés, ni ne sais quand je pourai les avoir.

"Il n'y a que ces circonstances qui ont pu m'empêcher jusqu'à présent d'aller à Dropmore, pour jouire de la satisfaction de vous voir, et de causer avec le plus respectable et le meilleur ami que j'ai.

"Si vous ne venez pas en ville pour le dix-huit, je viendrez à Dropmore après ce jour."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 16. Stowe. "I will only say on the subject of your last letter that I agree with you in all the inferences you have drawn ; but from many of the circumstances that occur in the composition of this drama, I think that the final *anagnorisis* (to use Aristotle's phrase) will be brought forward more rapidly than the principal actors of all descriptions would mean that it should. Many circumstances convince me that Bonaparte is looking to immediate war, and that Ministers are *convinced* he does so.

"I know of two facts, one in the military and the other in the naval department, that have occurred since Wednesday last, that are decisive proofs of this *conviction*. We shall hear about the end of this month what the orders from hence (and the winds) shall have done respecting the Cape, and I shall not wonder if that is made the point on which much of the question is to turn. The Dutch governor-general, with his admiral, and staff, and troops, sailed in the *Bato* of

74, from Plymouth, on the 30th September, and from the Madeiras on the 24th October; they would reach the Cape by the 30th November, and either they or we shall have a frigate home in two months from that date; which probably (if the West Indian accounts are correct) will bring us news from Campeachy and the other points in the Bay of Honduras, from which, I believe, that we are now actually driven away. God knows what means will have been left to us of fighting that battle, which sooner or later must be fought for our existence.

"My hopes are low, for I verily think that every day's delay adds rapidly to the mass of weakness that will on the day of trial prove too heavy for us. These facts or opinions Mr. Freeling is most heartily welcome to. But I do not mean that he should understand me when I tell you that chapter the first is completely settled as you and I wish; and that chapter the second is, I trust, in such train as will within a few days answer our objects; but it will be necessary to forego the advantage that was proposed for my friend who in this, as in other objects, might wish for the benefits but is bound to look to the black side of the picture. I shall know more *very shortly*, and will write to you.

"I have been very ill since my return to Stowe; and am by no means satisfied with myself. The faculty want to send me to Bath, but so long as I have the faculty of deciding I shall object to Bath in winter. I look to it, however, in March, and my present intention is to be in town about the 4th or 5th of February."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 19. Charles Street.—"I had been as much struck as you was with the strange unbecoming tone in which our Minister had addressed those who came to him to support them in making claims which are founded upon specific treaty now existing between nation and nation; and it had not escaped me that the Foreign Secretary is now the advocate for the exploded arguments of Chauvelin, which I had imagined none could have adopted but those few who represented us as aggressors in the last war; but nevertheless as the claims of these Anglo-Gallic creditors are with everybody unpopular, and in the opinion of many untenable, I do not expect to see any sensation produced by this quotation from Lord H[awkesbury]; and I am very much mistaken if the answer to your letter will in any degree correspond with your expectations. All that I have lately heard makes me look with much less confidence to the quarter which naturally excites the greatest curiosity; a much greater intercourse has already prevailed than, from all I had heard, could reasonably have been expected, and the result of that intercourse is, I think, already strongly marked.

"I dined yesterday in Conduit Street, *en troisième*, and found there much stronger expressions of fear than of hope, and little room to believe that any useful effect can be produced. I stayed, however, till eleven to urge everything that I could think of, and find my host disposed to make one vigorous effort, by showing to his friend how much the real strength of the country must depend upon the language used by him on the first day, and by appealing to him whether any consideration should justify him in not speaking out enough to ensure the keeping the strength of the inland sea. His own language is more eager and decided than I have known it yet, but I see plainly that he is recently impressed with the belief of things having turned much against his wishes and expectations in these few days. He thinks that his friend will loiter about in town, and with the great men till the meeting. The only chance I can hope for, if this continues, is that he will be really induced to take part with, and actually to join, what is too weak for present service, but what the circumstances of the day and character of those who should decide otherwise, still will keep up and maintain."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, January 20.] Charles Street.—"The Homer *erratum* is palpable enough; I will send the set of plates as you desire to Bernard.

"I forwarded your letter to Stowe by Thursday's coach, but have heard nothing of it's arrival, although I wrote by the post of Wednesday to announce it. I learn by our friend in Conduit Street that, in the conversation which took place between in and out, not a syllable was said or the most distant allusion made to that matter which we thought might perhaps be faintly hinted, in order to obtain credit for an offer having been made which, at the same time, it was not meant should be found possible to be accepted; not one word of the most distant reference to the subject.

"I was yesterday assured that Nepean is out. Having been roughly treated by Markham, he complained to his old friend Lord St. Vincent, who told him his best way would be then to go out; and he has accordingly named his own prize-agent Tucker, or Trotter, or some such name, to succeed Nepean. Lord Melville is not expected before the beginning of March.

"Government disclaim having any official notice of the Honduras business, but even the peaceable St. Helen's assured Lord Glastonbury that, if it be true, we must go to war. Where we shall go I know not, but I fancy the whole country feels that we are going fast to the bottom.

"Pitt is said to have had a slight return of complaint in his stomach; but he comes up to the birthday, at which I own I think it would be better that you should be seen too."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 23. Charles Street.—“I have not seen my host, because, as it seems, we were yesterday at each other's doors about the same moment. I had, however, tried the same course through the medium of St. James's Place, and the report which I have just received of that conversation appears to show so much of fluctuation, uncertainty, and modification both as to the time and to the terms in which any thing is to be said, that I count very little upon the steady opinion which is still delivered as to, what I call, the substantial and important article of strength which is in question. What signifies it how far any opinion is felt, and acknowledged in private, if nothing but the publication of that opinion can make it useful; and if the publication is withheld, or is pared down into insignificance, from motives of personal delicacy and embarrassment. If that which is necessary to be had, can be had only in one way, how can any correct mind permit itself to think that personal embarrassment should be allowed to stand against public safety; or how is it possible, with embarrassments in every course, not to prefer that course which at least produces the first step to public security? To these questions I can frame no answers that are satisfactory to my mind. The general result which you describe as the impression which you receive, appears to me likely to be that which we shall all agree in as being the most fitting and decorous to the persons concerned. I must also add that I am sometimes inclined to think that even public advantage may be better obtained by such a course being adopted on our side as the end of your note points to.

“When do you mean to come? Lord S[pencer] goes to-morrow to Norfolk till Saturday next. Pitt meant to go to Walmer yesterday. Nepean is not out, but it is thought that he stays in only till they find some arrangement for him. I hear unpleasant whispers about the progress of the new navy commission. Have you ever heard of any supposed enquiry into a direction to issue navy bills, not for naval purposes, but merely as a financial manœuvre unconnected with the navy? Did any such thing happen two or three years ago?”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 25, Charles Street.—“Sunday being the seventh and not the first day of the week, I naturally interpreted the phrase of next week written on last Sunday, to mean the week that is now current; but as there can be no possible motive why you should come a day sooner than you like, so neither can there be any embarrassment except the disappointment of those who expect to meet you here. In truth, you must see that the disposition of my mind is

not such as to look for any real good to be now done by pressing forward on our part, and I have taught myself to believe that we shall do what is most useful as well as most agreeable in keeping "our presence like a robe pontifical." Nevertheless, as we are immediately pledged to two or three questions, we must neither abandon our opinions, nor those of our friends who have promised to maintain them, and therefore, to avoid any such appearance, I hope you will find it convenient to be here by the 3rd, as your being out of London at the meeting will perhaps disturb those who have undertaken points which they will wish to talk over with you. If it was not for this consideration, I know no other that would tempt me to press you in the least upon Parliamentary attendance in the present moment."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, January 27.—"G. Berkeley has desired to talk over with me a letter from a private seaman of the *Jamaica* frigate in the Downs, to his brother in London, who is a servant of the Margravine's, and who had tried to obtain his discharge. In this letter, dated four days ago, the seaman desires his brother to take no more pains, as the ship had been suddenly ordered to sea, and they imagined they were going to the West Indies. The man tells his brother that upon orders coming down for the ship's sailing, the crew went aft to state to the captain that they had 19 *months' pay* due to them, which they hoped to receive, and which, as you know, they are entitled to receive by a special Act of Parliament before they sail; the man says, however, that they obtained no hopes of relief, and he adds that the Admiralty do what they will with the seamen now, but that *it will not long be so*. I mention this fact to you to show the strange misconduct which prevails now at that Board; we shall soon hear of mutiny on this subject abroad, where our ships are not relieved as they ought in order to be paid; but this fact of the *Jamaica* is so strong, so directly against law, and so likely to be of serious mischief, that I have prevailed upon Berkeley to write a line to Lord St. Vincent to tell him the facts as he hears them; adding only that he thought it his duty as a naval officer to state these facts to Lord St. Vincent, in order that he might be sure that his Lordship was apprized of them. Did you ever hear of such unprovoked and wanton disdain of all the common attentions to the laws and practice of the service."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1803, January 30. Dropmore.—"Although everything that is daily passing takes away more and more the little hopes which I had entertained of such a change of system on the part of

this country as can alone in my view of things save either Europe or ourselves, yet the news which I yesterday heard is of such a nature that I could not satisfy my own mind if I forbore to take the first moment of communicating it to you.

“Fagel has been here for a day on his return from Holland, and tells me that, since he left that country, he has learnt from thence that Bonaparte has demanded of the Dutch Government the gratuitous cession of *their whole frontier*. This, he says, is the expression used in his letter. He knows no particulars; but supposes that these words must mean Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-duc and Grave. And with this demand, he says, the Dutch, feeling their own inability to resist, have determined to comply, and the rather because all these places are at this hour in fact garrisoned by French troops. The circumstance, he says, has been communicated to Liston, and is of course known to this Government. And it is under these circumstances that we shall be to hear, in a few weeks, of the actual surrender of the Cape.

“There is but one person in this country that could have prevented this; there is but one that could now apply the only remedy which can save us, if any can. That person has waited for two years to see the malady increase to a point at which it may perhaps even now be far beyond his skill or means. And he is still waiting, and deliberating upon personal delicacies, which a *very strict* conscience would perhaps not allow to influence even a vote upon a turnpike bill, but which no man of correct practical virtue could (I should have thought) admit at all into his deliberations, when the question is whether, by giving free scope to the dictates of his own heart and judgment, he shall do what can alone save his country, and what he alone can do; or whether, by upholding a system which he cannot approve, though he is loth to condemn it, he shall add daily to his own embarrassments, and ultimately disable himself from acting even in the moment when he himself at last will wish to act?

“My anxiety on all these accounts is increased by my long and sincere affection for the person of whom I speak. Whatever may be the lies of faction, *he* does not think me interested in my advice, or conduct, for he *knows* the contrary. And if he feels any pain from the freedom with which I draw this picture, he is certain that my uneasiness proceeds in great part from what I think I see of his situation.

“I was sorry to hear that you did not talk of being in town till about the 15th. I shall go from here on Thursday, and I do not think my stay will be prolonged much beyond the 15th. I can do no good, and shall by that time or near it have done all that duty can require of me.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 1. Charles Street.—“The Dutch intelligence to which you very naturally attach so much importance appears to me, as it does to you, to offer the most solid and most striking ground which can be taken for our making one last solemn appeal to the sense and feeling of the country, and the motion which you have projected appears to me on every account the most desirable which can be framed. As far as I can trust my own judgment, I attach so much consequence to this measure for its standing *alone*, that, if I were the only person concerned, I should not hesitate to say that I would confine myself to this measure, and put off the two other discussions till a later period. The question of *Swisserland* would, as I think, very naturally wait for the completion of its present plan of government, before the whole matter would appear to be enough concluded to furnish a full scope for examining into the conduct of Government respecting that country; and I should not imagine we should find any sort of difficulty in inducing Lord M[almesbury] to take this course respecting his question, if this course be indeed the best. Of the Dr., I am more diffident as to any chance of prevailing upon him, because I think he is more easily persuaded to undertake speeches than to postpone or abandon them, and if he makes any difficulty he has so strong a claim upon us that we cannot perhaps resist. I confess, however, that I think the instant revival of these questions had better be avoided, if it can, because the impression of our active hostility will be renewed by them, and being renewed will not be explained away by anything we can say afterwards; but of this we will talk when we meet.

“My poor brother, as I find from Lord Temple’s letter, has been again attacked as he was in London, but is now recovered, and Lord Temple writes to beg me to urge his going to Bath immediately.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 3. Walmer Castle.—“I am much obliged to you for the interesting and important news contained in your last letter. Some fresh encroachment of this nature is what we have for some time been expecting, and, if it takes place, it will certainly advance the crisis to which we have been looking, and for which, therefore, it is impossible for one’s mind to be unprepared. I see the approach of such a crisis with great grief from a consideration of all the circumstances of the country, and the whole state of things and of parties. With respect to myself, I cannot help believing that, as things stand, you greatly over-rate any use that I can be of. As far as I can be of any, it is not a false sense of personal

delicacies that will restrain me ; and I really have no wish so strong as to fulfil, if I can, what is really due to my own character, and still more to the country. But on these grounds I see no line that I can properly take, at present, but that of finding the best opportunities for declaring in public my general sentiments on the line which we ought to pursue in our foreign politics, and in our establishments and finance. I have already stated them explicitly to Government. What will be their conduct remains to be seen, and (from what you tell me) it will perhaps speedily be put to the test. My subsequent conduct must be regulated by the opinions I hold on these great points ; but in maintaining them as I must do, I earnestly wish, if possible, to avert the necessity of any change, because I really do not see, at the present moment, the prospect of any being affected in a way to promise real benefit to the country. I ought also to add that I am perhaps a little influenced (not, I hope, by any personal laziness, but) by a real doubt whether (though certainly much improved in my health) I am, at least as yet, in any degree equal to the exertions which a new style of things would require from me. I have endeavoured, as far as I can, to shew you the real state of my mind, and I hope it will not be long before we have the opportunity of talking over these points more at large. I shall not fix the precise day for my coming to town till I see what is likely to be the course of business, but, at all events, I shall not be later than towards the end of next week, which will, I hope, leave an interval of some days before you return to Dropmore.

“I looked at the report you referred to in a former letter of Lord Hawkesbury’s conversation with the British creditors. It is in many respects a strange one, but it does not seem to make him a party to the objection founded on the Alien Bill ; and I own I do not think that argument likely to make any impression that deserves much notice.”

Private. MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 16. Barrackpore.—“The departure of this packet is so pressing, and I have been so harrassed by business and vexation for sometime past, that I cannot at present attempt to express the full extent of my sentiments upon the contents of all your kind and affectionate letters. Indeed, until recently, I entertained strong hopes of being able to return to England in the present season, and I trusted that I should have seen you before any letter could have reached you.

“You will find that I wrote to you, although not by the *Georgina*, by the overland packet which departed a few days subsequent to the dispatch of that vessel ; I have also written

to you since my resignation of this government ; and I directed Colonel Harcourt in the most particular manner to call upon you in town or in the country, and to explain to you fully the nature of my situation. Colonel Harcourt unfortunately did not remain long enough in England to enable him to see you ; and I now find, that you could not have been on terms with Ministers to admit of your having access to my dispatches by the *Mornington* and by Colonel Harcourt. Until your latest letters I entertained no idea of the nature of the division between you and the Ministers ; nor could I form a correct judgment until very lately of the painful alternative, to which I am likely to be reduced upon my return to England. You are already apprized by my last letters of my sense of the exigencies (both with reference to my own honour and to the public interests) of this laborious station ; and you know my judgment with regard to the necessity of my holding it, until I shall have completed my political and financial arrangements in India. This judgment was subject to alteration, according to the nature and extent of the support which I might receive from home. For it was obvious that any defect in the support of my measures at home would absolve me from every obligation of duty towards this station ; since any such defect must frustrate the objects which require my continuance. Whatever may have been the conduct of Addington and his Cabinet in other respects, they have certainly afforded me a very decided and honorable support, since I brought the state of India distinctly under their view, and declared my intention to return home, unless enabled by proper aid to complete my public plans. Addington has acted on this occasion with considerable kindness and affection, as well as with great public zeal. That the alternative to which I was reduced, of resigning or of making conditions for my continuance, was produced by the weakness and instability of the counsels of the present Cabinet is a lamentable truth. But I have every reason to believe that I shall now receive from them the necessary support for bringing my administration to a prosperous, and, I trust, a splendid termination in January, 1804 ; when I propose to embark for England. In all my most important dispatches of a confidential nature to Addington, I have referred directly to you and to Pitt ; in the full confidence that you were both upon terms with the Ministry to communicate freely, at least on every question which related to my discharge of this great trust. To Pitt I distinctly referred for his instructions with regard to my conduct, and more particularly with regard to my continuance in India. But I never have received a line from him.

“ Your sentiments have been fully stated to me in favor of my return ; but they rested on the supposition that I should not be supported in bringing my administration to an honorable close ; and in this respect I have no reason to

complain. Under these circumstances, every motive of public duty and of regard for public character appears to me to demand my continuance here until I shall have completed my own plans, which I entertain little doubt of accomplishing before the month of January, 1804.

"With regard to the more general question to which most of your able, and, I must add, most eloquent and affecting letters are directed, I cannot by this dispatch convey any adequate idea of my sentiments. I have expressed some notion of my feelings on this most painful subject in a letter to Addington, of which I enclose an extract. In many points my opinions coincide entirely with yours. The peace is in the utmost degree perilous and humiliating. It is not so dangerous, however (if a manly policy be maintained) in India, as you seem to apprehend, nor is our general humiliation at all felt *here*. Although most of the names in the Administration astonish me, they are nearly all men of honor and common sense; and your early letters upon the new Cabinet express a strong hope of their success. That they possess no great degree of energy as a Cabinet is too evident; and I believe I need not express my sorrow for the change. The question, however, will still remain, whether it is our duty to aid their weakness, or to drive them from their offices? This question must depend on so many circumstances of detail, which can only be decided on the spot, that I declare myself to be unable to determine at this distance any part of it, beyond the immediate extent of my particular duty, in my station, and in the actual crisis of affairs. Addington has certainly manifested great firmness and friendship in his support of my administration; at my departure from England, I respected and esteemed him highly, although I never imagined that he could have been selected for his present office. Of the mysteries of his appointment, I am ignorant, nor can I now imagine why Pitt and yourself are not in your proper places. But I am not therefore prepared to say that the grand enemy is best to be resisted by weakening the hands of the present Ministers.

"At all events I am determined on one point, that no human power ever shall interrupt for an instant the cordiality of my affectionate and established friendship for you; the assistance which I hold myself bound to afford to the public service, must be limited to points exclusively of Indian government, and Indian interests. If we should unhappily differ on other points, we must either contrive to compromise our differences, or I must withdraw to my farm and my books.

"No power of expression can convey a just representation of my ardent sense of your conduct towards me since my departure from England, and especially since the villainous faction of the Nabob's creditors and of the Directors has levelled the late scandalous attacks against me. In your public and animated support nothing is left for the most nice sense of honor or the most passionate desire of fame to lament

or to require. You may rest assured that every word of your speeches, and every point of your conduct, of which I receive innumerable testimonies from various quarters, is recorded in my breast, and will never perish but with my existence. If no other tie of friendship existed between us, this alone would be sufficient to unite us to the end of our lives ; and I declare solemnly, that I know not the sacrifice which I would not make to preserve our cordial intercourse upon my return to England.

"Thus much I thought myself bound to write, although in great haste, and without order or connection. I trust that my brother Henry, who returns to England in a few days with the documents respecting Oude, will be able to give you full information on every point respecting my sentiments and situation. By him I will regularly answer all your letters.

"Pray remember me kindly to Lady Grenville, and to Lord Buckingham ; to him I will write by Henry.

"Your kindness to Richard is a most grateful proof of your regard for me ; I receive most admirable letters from him, and I really hope that he will be found an useful instrument in the preservation of our country, *si Pergama dextrâ defendi possunt.*"

Enclosure.

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to HENRY ADDINGTON.

Extract. 1803, February 12. Barrackpore.—"You may be assured that I continue to repose the most cordial confidence in your public and private honour, nor have my sentiments of friendship, kindness, and personal respect, ever suffered the slightest abatement. The information which I have received from various quarters of the zeal, assiduity, and firmness which have distinguished your support of my character and public services in the present crisis, has not been lost upon my mind, but it has not in any degree excited an emotion of surprise. Whatever may be the vicissitudes of public affairs, I think I can rely on the immutable firmness of our friendship. I have suffered the most severe pain from witnessing, even at this distance, the differences which prevail between some of those persons who must ever be the primary objects of my esteem and regard, as well as of my most respectful attachment. I trust in God that I shall never be called upon to decide upon a choice of political alternatives, which must involve my friendship with one or other of such parties. My greatest ambition, upon my return to Europe, would be to become the bond of union between them, and to be the instrument of reconciling those who ought never to have been divided. Having no personal objects to pursue, having been removed from the scene of contention and possessing, I trust, the

confidence of all my former friends, my endeavours will be uniformly directed to produce such a co-operation among them, as shall present the most formidable obstacle to the attempts of that faction, which never can gain an atom of strength, or of character, otherwise than at the expense of the public safety, and of the established constitution. With these sentiments, I desire neither power, emolument, nor honours upon my return to England; my wish is to preserve the regard of my friends for myself, and to preserve or rather to restore their union for the preservation of the country. In such a course office or honours will not engage my attention; but I never will withhold my assistance from the public service, while the cause which has so long united us shall demand my exertions." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, February 20.]—"I send you the enclosed letter which I have just now received from Lord Temple, and which contains a good account of my brother, except that I think there is great danger of his prescribing for himself more Bath water than is fit for him in his present state. What Lady Buckingham can mean by urging us not to trouble him with politics at a moment when we are preaching nothing to him but the inutility of his thinking about them, I do not pretend to understand.

"Everything is settled—two hundred by monthly payments has been offered and accepted. I hear no news except that the two reports which I told you of my hearing appear to tally with what my Conduit street friend has just heard of the absentee, who is said to give as a new reason for absence his conviction that the event is very fast approaching which he thinks ought to take place without being promoted by him. Lord Pepper said two days ago that the Government would not give up Malta."

Enclosure.

THE MARCHIONESS OF BUCKINGHAM TO EARL TEMPLE.

"We go on better and better. To-day being fine, after the glass of water we went in the post-chaise to the top of Landsdown, where your father got out and walked round Sir Bevil Grenville's monument, and looked very curiously at it, and seemed thoroughly to enjoy his airing. He always says the water feels like a cordial, and warms him throughout the moment he swallows it; he has hitherto taken but one glass, and that at noon, he will soon begin drinking before breakfast. If, please God, we have no drawback, I have great hopes; but I am sure *every* thing depends on persevering with great

quiet, for I attribute great part of his amendment to his having nothing to do but to read an amusing book, and am convinced he would not have got well as long as we had continued at Stowe, even with the only occupation of militia and county business. What would it have been if politics had once laid hold on him? Preach this up with all your oratory to our brotherhood. Indeed they would soon be convinced of this were they to see Lord Buckingham for one day; he can not even write a letter without the most evident marks of fatigue. He has rubbed in no mercury since he has been here, nor I think shall we get him to do it unless he feels any return of pain; which, thank God, he has not; and I hope will not."

Private. MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, February 27. Fort William.—"The advanced period of the season has compelled me to dispatch Henry in such haste that I have been unable to accomplish my intention of replying regularly to all your letters; which, however, I hope to be able to effect before the departure of the last ships.

"In the meanwhile I refer you to Henry, who is fully apprized of my sentiments on every public and private topic, and in whose discretion and honour you may place the utmost degree of reliance."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 14. Bath.—"Very many thanks to you for your clue to the inextricable labyrinth of conjecture, on what had been done or left undone by our Ministers to bring us to the difficulties of the present moment; yet the wildest conjecture would have been completely at fault before it could have hit off such a chase as that which you have described. If I were bound to give an opinion, it would be that Bonaparte's violence and presumption have hurried him much too fast; and that he will admit a negociation upon Malta in order to regain the advantage of preparation, which I take for granted, by no means keeps pace with his vindictive detestation of this country; and Mr. Addington is so completely tied by various circumstances to the chapter of negociation, that he will not be able to bring the matter to that shorter decision, which *possibly* might be more politic for us. I say *possibly*, because I really am too much uninformed of the state of numbers both of our army and navy to be able to judge whether we shall grow comparatively stronger by delay. Of our regular army I know nothing, except that none of the troops announced for the West Indies, or for India, in the vote of November last have yet sailed. I should, therefore, state our cavalry, guards, and infantry in Great Britain,

Ireland, and our Channel Islands, at about 52,000 effective men ; our militia is a mere name, for *no* county has as yet completed its ballot, and some *have not even begun*.

“Bad as this is, I fear our naval report is more unfavourable. The stock of naval stores and of naval victualling is most calamitously defective ; and of the general state of our ships, you will be able to judge decisively when *I assure you* that even if we do not send one ship to foreign duty, we shall have for home service only the seven ships commissioned before this alarm, and not stored and manned ; to which are to be added thirteen ‘*serviceable*,’ and perhaps six, or at most seven, that may be collected from those now in dock, and from those which may be fit for service, though not having been examined since the peace they are not reported ‘*serviceable*,’ and this is our only navy for home defence. Still, however, I fear that, wholly unprepared as we are, notwithstanding all our warnings of every sort, we shall be comparatively worse this day three months ; and therefore I agree with you that Bonaparte will negotiate. As to Mr. Pitt’s assistance, I am not yet quite sure that Mr. Addington (and still less am I sure respecting the King) will think of him, but as a ‘second in this war, not as a leader.’ If so, he will hear of no invitation of that nature, nor do I think he will have any option put to him save when, in all human probability, it will be too late. The temper of the country must be very different from what it now is, before any personal friend of Mr. Pitt would wish him to be called to conduct a negotiation, which we know beforehand must end in a war, made necessary not only by the ‘folly,’ but by the treacherous determination of the two last Ministers to see nothing that they did not like, and to take no measure whatsoever on the only point remaining in discussion, on which not only all England but all Europe was hourly reminding them. It is indeed a personal gratification to us to recollect that no part of the tremendous mischief hanging over us is imputable to our councils ; but that gratification will go but little way to comfort in the hour of ruin. However, we must persevere in one straight line ; and I should now dread nothing so much as an invitation to you to assist in negotiation such as I have described it. Mr. Addington has made the peace, he must announce it gone, before you can embark in the public service. Any arrangement short of this will throw the war upon your shoulders. Will Mr. Pitt see this in the same point of view ? I should think not, and yet it applies to him almost (not quite) as strongly as to you.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 16. Walmer Castle.—“I am very much obliged to you for your letter. It is scarce possible to suppose that your informant could be inaccurate in his report of the

conversation he had had, and yet I know not how to believe that Lord St. H[elens] could mean to make the assertion imputed to him. The simple fact is that I have not written a single line to Addington, either on the subject of Malta or any other, during the two months that I have been here, nor have I written one word to any one of his colleagues, except my brother. To him I certainly stated very fully (in answer to a letter I received from him) my opinion of the danger and disgrace which would arise from giving up the place without fresh and substantial security, especially after Sebastiani's report, and the Consul's communication to the French Legislature; but this statement was made in strict private confidence, that he might give it whatever weight he chose in forming his own individual judgment; but on the express condition that he should not say one word of my opinion to any of the Cabinet. I am perfectly sure that he will have complied most scrupulously with this condition, and besides my reliance on his exactness in this respect, I have another security for this letter never being brought as a proof of my advising Government, as it expressly stated my determination to remain here in order to avoid being importuned to express an opinion. So much with respect to any letter of a recent date. I am equally confident, on memory, that I have never in writing to Addington at any previous time mentioned this subject, except *once*. The period I allude to was just before the opening of the session in November, when after expressing my doubts of the prudence of pushing the question of Switzerland to a rupture, I added, in a single line at the end of my letter, that I took for granted a separate arrangement must be made respecting Malta. With respect to my general sentiments of the importance of the place, Addington is certainly fully apprized of them from former communications. I have repeatedly stated those sentiments in conversation to various persons during the last twelve months; and I particularly explained them to Lord Castlereagh when I saw him at Bath in the end of December, and afterwards to Addington himself, as well as to Lord Hawkesbury and the Chancellor, when I passed through London in January. I have troubled you with a very long history, but I feel anxious that you should know the real state of the case; and I hope you will have the goodness to take an opportunity of undeceiving your friend, as well as to contradict the report if you hear it from any other quarter. The details of this account, and particularly what relates to my letter to my brother, are of course meant *only for yourself*. I do not enter on the wide field of our present situation. It is impossible to view it without infinite anxiety, and I feel this impression the more deeply because I see no part that I can take, at least in the present moment, which could contribute to diminish its difficulties and dangers."

Postscript.—"I should add that the only other person connected with Government to whom I have written has been Steele, and to him only on points of finance. To Lord Alvanley, indeed, I lately stated very shortly my general line of thinking on our present situation, but it was quite in a private letter, and one which (even if he were in more habits of political intercourse) he was very little likely to have communicated."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 23. Walmer Castle.—"I have certainly no thoughts of going to town while the present state of suspense continues; and am therefore particularly happy in the prospect of seeing you here. Besides every other account on which I shall rejoice in it, I wish much to mention to you a communication made to me within these two days, which, though in its present shape leading to nothing, will probably in one event be followed by some proposal that I may not be at liberty to decline. Any day next week that suits you best will be perfectly convenient to me, but as the Bishop of Lincoln is coming to me for a day or two in the beginning of it, perhaps you will like as well to defer your visit till Wednesday, that we may be more at leisure."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 23. Downing Street.—"I have the honour to send to your Lordship four parcels of books which I have received from Mr. Talbot, and which I imagine are intended for your Lordship. By a mistake of the messenger who brought the two first parcels, they were taken from him at Dover, and sent to the Custom House in London; in consequence of which an expense of 3*l.* 6*s.* 4*d.* has been incurred, according to the messenger's memorandum which I have the honour to enclose. I have endeavoured, but without effect, to obtain from the Treasury the repayment of the duties. The messenger who was charged with the two last parcels brought them to town without any interruption at Dover.

Postscript.—"If your Lordship wishes to have any more books from Paris, I will desire Talbot to have the parcels made of a smaller size, which circumstance will probably prevent their being detained at Dover."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], March 24.—"Many thanks to you for your very interesting communications. Bonaparte's answer probably will not have taken quite so much time to compose as Lord

Hawkesbury's seven good reasons for not giving up Malta ; still, however, I think that the French preparations are not as forward as I had at first imagined. But if he knows as well as you do (and probably he knows it much better) that we are comparatively weaker every day, he may still put off his definitive answer for three weeks.

"In consequence of your doubts, I have satisfied myself that the effective force of cavalry, infantry, and guards in Great Britain, Ireland, Guernsey, and Jersey, is not less than 52,000 men ; perhaps you do not include the seven garrison battalions. Still, however, this is cruelly short of what it ought to be for foreign duties and for home defence. The militia, with everything to discourage it, wants nearly one-half its numbers.

"I wish you to know that I have reason *to be sure* that the language of the King has from the first moments of this alarm been *extremely eager* for the war ; and that he has occasionally spoken of *your opinions* as having been more congenial to his own than any that he had heard on the views of France ever since the peace : and he is represented to me as having *urged the Ministers to the war which he says is inevitable*.

"Nothing in all this is interesting save his opinion on the necessity of the war, but, with the certain loss of Hanover, I cannot explain his eagerness. You will guess my information.

"I have very little doubt of Lord Melville's acceptance if he sees either of two games open to him ; the prospect of inducing Pitt to join with him (so soon as war is declared) in supporting Addington ; or the prospect of turning the Ministry out with greater advantage so soon as he thinks the moment is ripe for doing it with Pitt's assistance. My speculation, however, is that he will *bona fide* join them, and try to urge Pitt to support them out of office."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March. Charles Street.—"Having been lucky enough to conclude my Midhurst committee and report it to-day, I have scarce five minutes left me for the post to answer the letter which I find from you. I should judge by your account that, little as the chance of recovery is, the present state may perhaps be prolonged for some time. I am sorry for the distress and fatigue of the poor little woman, and do not wonder that you should be anxious to relieve it as much as you can. Your presence no doubt is peculiarly desirable just now, but that must be governed by your own feelings only. The inclination for the revival of the question which had slept is now revived, and I am persuaded it will be brought to action ; I still continue to think that it has the same advantage and disadvantage which we have so often talked over, and I think the

expediency of the measure more doubtful from there appearing to me some doubt whether it is wished to be pressed by those whom it chiefly regards. If the production of it be made matter of common council I should dissuade; if it is pursued only in the shape mentioned in Grosvenor Square, the same course must be pursued by us. My brother and Lord S[pencer] come to-morrow. I am in hopes Wrottesley will speak after Berkely to-morrow. Yorke's Volunteers still stand for Wednesday, and still nobody knows what he is to do; a pretty mode of preparing this particular description of 370,000 men, who are to be disposed of without communication previously had with any of them or of their officers. All those whom I have consulted are anxious to refer only to the general principles of your plan, to leave them the full and compleat discussion of their own, and not to hamper ourselves by originating bills which depend upon details and execution that we cannot control. I have shewed the copy of your letter where you wished, and to one or two more to whom I thought it useful. I need not tell you how much these important topicks press for communication with you."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 27. Bath.—"When I assure you that your last letter has gratified me to the fullest extent of my wishes, I mean to avoid the trouble of composing, and to you the trouble of reading verbiage upon the matter of it. My Lady-day rents seldom make their appearance at Coutts' till about the 10th of April; and on that day Bernard is to repay to me 1,000*l.* which he borrowed from me for my land-tax trust. This money will, therefore, be more readily convertible to your purposes, if it is perfectly convenient to you to wait these 14 days; but if not, you will let me know it, and the 1,000*l.* shall be placed to your account by return of post. You may likewise depend upon the remaining 500*l.* in the course of the next twelve months at furthest; and if, upon winding up this bottom, you find that you had calculated (as it often happens) short of the truth, you must let me know what is to be added to these 1,500*l.*, which is all that you state in your letter.

"I have heard from the Cape, dated January 14th; my correspondent states our land force to be 1,600 effective rank and file, and states that the Dutch fleet are going to Batavia in the course of a few days. Claris said publicly that he had been taken twice and would take care not to be caught a third time. I see that Lord Melville's return from Walmer has been followed by a long discussion at the Queen's house, and I have no doubt but that he is now the real and efficient Minister. Lord Moira has been spoken to, but, as I am *assured*, he has refused to come in *except in force*."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, March 28. Harley Street.—“ Je vous envoie les deux lettres que j'ai écrites, et j'ai joints aussi celle de mon frère pour le Comte Markof, afin que vous puissiez les lire au maître de la maison où vous allez demain. Je vous prie de me rapporter ces papiers. Je fais des vœux ardens pour que la personne que vous allez voir, prenne pitié de son pays qui continue à se dégrader. Le vaisseau de l'état est battu par une tempête horrible, il est tems que le pilote habil reprenne le soin du gouvernail, et de la manœuvre de ce vaisseau en danger.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 1.—“ Since you left London, what I have heard strongly leads me to believe that I was right in my conjectures as to the object of the letter which was sent from London to the north, and I am assured that the writer of that letter has distinctly expressed his wishes to be such as I have talked over with you (himself out of the question) ; and farther, that the writer of the letter has declared that he thinks it would become the owner of the great house in Pall Mall to propose and assist that arrangement with all the influence of all his friends.

“ The person to whom the letter was written has, I believe, been more reserved in his conversation, but I know that the day before yesterday, upon somebody quoting to him the danger of eternal war if Lord Grenville returned to office now, he said ‘ quite the reverse ; I think the apprehension of that reproach would be ample security against Lord Grenville’s acting so as to deserve it.’ ”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 2.—“ I have received yours of yesterday and will meet you on Tuesday at dinner. I think there is much to regret in finding that practice pares down so closely the wide and magnificent views of extensive theories, because whatever had been the practical difficulties, the great advantage of the general result and the proofs it would have afforded of real sacrifices proportioned to the difficulties and exigencies of the times, would perhaps have greatly over-balanced the inconveniences which first stood in the way of all great theories. The different character proposed to be adopted must evidently be more of an apologetic kind, and will entail the necessity of explanation upon points, which one could wish should not appear to want any. Of this, however, hereafter. I hear nothing new ; but in general the expectation of domestic changes occupies the public attention even more than the arrivals of couriers.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 6. Harley Street.—“ Je serai demain chez moi, et à vos ordres, depuis onze heures jusqu'à une heure après midi.

“ On vient de m'apporter la belle édition d'Homère que vous destinez à l'Empereur, et que je lui enverrai par un vaisseau qui doit partir dans vingt jours d'ici pour Petersbourg.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 8.—“ Lord S[pencer] and I intend to come to you at Dropmore on Sunday; we depend upon your not dining till six, because we shall not be able to arrive before that time.

“ I am told from good authority that Mr. A[ddington] has been with the Duke of Devonshire at Devonshire House; this agrees with what you had already heard, and perhaps explains the undefined project hinted at by the seaside of something that would not long last.

“ My reflection is the same that it was, namely, that all this makes what we talked of more pressing than ever in point of time; for it may come so late as to lose its value, if care be not speedily taken.

“ The King complains so much of rheumatism, that he says it disables him from putting on his own stockings, and prevents him from sleeping.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 8. Downing Street.—“ I had the honour to receive your letter last night, and I have this morning seen Mr. Brook, who has promised to send me any farther information which he may receive respecting Lord Camelford, and which I will forward to your Lordship without delay either by messenger or express. I have also written a private letter by this day's messenger to Lord Whitworth, and have desired him to communicate to me any particulars which he may be able to learn relative to Lord Camelford's actual situation. I may expect to receive Lord Whitworth's answer either on Thursday next, or on the Sunday following.

“ In conformity to the note which I received from your Lordship on the day on which you set off for Walmer, I wrote to Heriot and desired him to abstain from inserting in the *Sun* and *True Briton* any paragraphs respecting Lord Camelford. In his answer he promised that he would do so, but I will see him to-morrow and repeat this injunction.

“ I therefore trust that every measure has been taken, not only to prevent Lady Camelford's receiving any sudden shock, but also to procure for your Lordship some positive information with regard to Lord Camelford.”

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 14. Downing Street.—“I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship a letter which I have received this morning from Lord Whitworth. I did not think it right to send it to Lady Grenville, lest by any accident it might have fallen into Lady Camelford’s hands ; but I have written to Lady Grenville to inform her that Lord Camelford has not been ill-treated by the French Government, and that he is now on his way to England.

“Mr. Wynne has desired me to acquaint your Lordship that the German letter which you forwarded to me to be translated by him was merely a begging letter. As I have some notion of having formerly seen the handwriting of the French letter—which I also enclose—I have sent to the Post Office to withdraw the two letters mentioned in it, which I will forward to your Lordship as soon as I shall receive them.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, April 14.] Bath.—“I have received your long letter, and I answer it for obvious reasons most shortly.

“I subscribe to every opinion stated by you ; and very particularly to that which urged the addition of the materials number 4. I deprecate the necessity of including no. 3, unless no. 4 is likewise added, and I think for ourselves, that our Stowe opinions of October last are very much strengthened, and apply more strongly to the present moment than even to that of October. Beyond this I will not say one word, for I think I see clearly that there is no real intention or wish on the part of government to see Lord Spencer, Windham, or you in office ; and all that has passed gives abundant means to them of not offering that which you most certainly do not ask from any one.

“As to the means that might be employed by a firm and able government, I really begin to doubt whether it is possible to recover enough of the ground which in every way has been lost by these two fatal years to give us a reasonable hope of escaping the punishment due to the extreme misconduct of the people who have borne out our imbecile government on the question of the peace. The storm is thickening every moment, and I am satisfied that we shall have war, because I think Bonaparte will find it his interest as well as his wish to use the means which he has so well collected for our humiliation.

“I leave this place on the 18th, and pass two days at Avington on my road to Stowe, where I wish to pass 14 days ; but we must meet, and perhaps it would be easy for me to pass either Friday or Saturday next at Dropmore if you are there, for it will not be above ten miles out of my way. Let

me know therefore by return of post whether you will be returned to London, or whether you can give me (if you should be there) a *tête à tête* mutton chop at Dropmore."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 15. Cumberland Place.—"I am going to Elton upon a little business, and though I mean to return on Tuesday before dinner, yet as it may happen that the country may tempt me to stay a little longer, if you should want me in the House of Lords you will be so good as to write to me.

"I wish to put you in mind that Lord Moira and Lord King, both of them expressing themselves towards you in terms of the greatest civility and respect, put off what they had meant to say on Lord Auckland's financial statements because they supposed you might wish to take a part in that discussion. I do not exactly know the time they named after the recess, but I believe it was Wednesday, and I think you would not wish, whenever it comes, that they should neither see you in your place, nor have heard a word from you.

"I regret very much to see you remaining at Dropmore when Pitt is not only in the neighbourhood, but, I am well convinced, actively employed in making arrangements for a new administration. I will not allow myself to believe that you are not in correspondence with him on this occasion, or that he will take any decisive steps without you. But if I should be mistaken, I hope you will not suffer it to be impressed upon the public mind that you are laid aside because nothing short of actual war will satisfy you. Though war may be inevitable, and the nation may undertake it vigorously, it will not be popular, and Lord Spencer and you seemed to me to take the best possible ground when, upon the King's message, you rejoiced in vigorous measures as the only means, if any means could now be effectual, of preserving peace. It is in consequence of what I have heard that I have been induced to say this. I have no information but report. You know my motive, and my ambition is to see you in office again."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, April.] Monday.—"Upon the order of the day, which was the Consolidation Bill, Addington said that he found opinions would differ upon that discussion, as to the different propriety of that measure in the different cases of hostilities or of accommodation arising out of the present discussions with France; and as (much as he regretted the present state of suspense) he had the greatest expectation of being able to make a communication to the House on that subject before

Monday next, he moved to put off the Consolidation Bill till next Monday. Upon this Shaw Le Fevre urged this as a reason for Patten likewise deferring his motion, and Fox, Ryder and Canning joining in this request, he agreed to make his motion immediately subsequent to the communication taking place; which is perhaps as good a state as the business can stand in. In the House of Lords, the Chancellor being confined by illness, nothing was said. Lord Carlisle hears that Addington thinks it will be war, and is in a great fright; that the negotiation is got again into the hands of Talleyrand, who kicks at all notion of our keeping Malta for any time; and therefore, I suppose, there will still be a short term of two or three years which we shall accept.

“Lord Hawkesbury has told Grey that they shall resist the committee on the state of the nation.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 17. Bromley Hill.—“I should have written to you sooner, but I could not have told you with any confidence till after what passed yesterday, the probable result of the communications which have taken place since I came here. All prospect of the proposition coming in a proper shape seems now at an end. From the tenor of the conversations which I held with Addington in the course of Sunday evening and Monday morning, I should rather have guessed that he would have brought himself (though reluctantly) to do all which depended upon him to meet the ideas I stated to him, and to put the business into that train which might possibly have led to a satisfactory arrangement. His letter, however, of the 12th (which I received only late the next day and which I enclose with everything else that has passed in writing) led to a very different expectation. You will see in the next paper the copy of my answer, which was followed yesterday by his letter No. 2. To the latter I at first returned an answer barely acknowledging the receipt of it; but as it seemed to put a most inaccurate construction on the whole transaction, I thought it right on reflection to send him this morning my letter of which the copy is marked No. 2. This I trust will completely obviate the danger of misrepresentation on any material point, and particularly on that in which you and those who stand in the same situation with yourself, are most immediately concerned. I meant that it should at the same time avoid the possibility of appearing by explanation to afford the slightest invitation to any fresh overture. I have recapitulated in it, with all the accuracy I could, the substance of the most important parts of our conversation, and I cannot therefore put you in possession of the state of the case more fully by writing than by referring you to this paper. I should be very desirous that you should

communicate the whole of this information, *in strict confidence*, to Lord Spencer and your brother; but I am most anxious that it should go no farther, and that no particulars should at present transpire. I must beg you to return the papers if possible in the course of to-morrow, lest I should receive any answer from Addington which may require my referring to them. In the present state of things it is not my intention to stay long near town, and I believe, on Tuesday, I shall go for a day to Lord Carrington's at Wycombe, and afterwards to Wilderness in my way to Walmer. Sunday, I dine at Wimbledon. Pray let me know what your plans are. I will certainly make my arrangement so as to meet you either in town or at Dropmore, if you are likely to be there."

Enclosure.

CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. PITT and MR. ADDINGTON.

HENRY ADDINGTON to W. PITT.

1803, April 12. Downing Street.—"There is to be a meeting of Cabinet to-morrow at Lord Chatham's, when I propose mentioning the subject of our conversations at Bromley Hill. I think it, however, incumbent upon me to acknowledge that, after the best consideration which I have been able to give to the proposed arrangement, my opinion respecting it remains unaltered; but if I could justify the recommendation of it upon public grounds, the only honourable course I could pursue would be to concur in the sacrifices it would require, and to put myself entirely out of the question, and this I would do with the utmost readiness, and the most perfect satisfaction. I will only add that the objections to what has been suggested respecting the Speakership of the House of Lords appear to me to be insurmountable under any circumstances; and I am convinced that they would appear so to you upon farther consideration. I have here expressed only my own sentiments, and I am very sorry that it was not in my power to write to you earlier in the day. With those of my colleagues you shall be acquainted either to-morrow afternoon, or on Thursday morning; indeed, if I hear nothing to the contrary from you, I will endeavour to be at Bromley Hill by one o'clock on Thursday, but I must return to dinner. In the meantime I shall entertain a hope that you may not feel it necessary to adhere, in it's full extent, to the proposition which you have made." *Copy.*

W. PITT to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1803, April 13. Bromley Hill.—"I shall certainly be at your orders at the time you mention to-morrow, if you continue anxious to see me, but I can have nothing to add

to the explicit statement I have already made to you of my general ideas ; and as you already know the *only grounds* on which I can entertain any farther discussion on the subject on which we conversed, I trust you will not think it necessary to give yourself any farther trouble upon it, unless, after consulting your colleagues, you feel it advisable *on those grounds* to recommend that step being taken from the highest quarter which I have felt it my duty to represent as an indispensable preliminary to my entering on the formation of any plan of arrangement. As my opinion on this point cannot admit of alteration, it would be fruitless to resume our discussion if you entertain, on your part, any idea of its proceeding on any other basis." *Copy.*

HENRY ADDINGTON to W. PITT.

1803, April 14. Downing Street.—“It is necessary, notwithstanding the intimation contained in your last letter, that I should acquaint you with the sentiments of his Majesty’s confidential servants on the subject of our conversations at Bromley Hill. I stated to them the motives which could alone induce you to think of returning to office, and the outline of the only plan upon which, as it appeared to you, an arrangement could be advantageously made. They all expressed in the strongest terms the satisfaction which they should derive from the union of those who had concurred in opinion respecting the leading measures of Government ; but they feel that what appears to them to be due to the interests of the public, as they might be affected by the declared opinions of some of those who were proposed to be comprehended in such an arrangement, would not allow them to give their advice that steps should be taken towards carrying it into effect.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to HENRY ADDINGTON.

1803, April 15th. Bromley Hill.—“On receiving your letter I abstained from doing more than acknowledging it, because I felt unwilling to make any observations on a subject which I considered (as I still do) as brought to a decided issue. But, on reflecting on some passages in that letter, I am not sure whether they do not give reason to think that you have, in some respects, understood what has passed between us in a different light from that in which I viewed it, and in which I hoped it had been placed by the whole tenor of our conversations. I refer to those expressions which seem to imply that you considered yourself as authorised to state to your colleagues a specific and positive proposition as made by me, and as containing the outline of a plan of arrangement, which it was for them to consider

whether they ought to recommend to his Majesty to carry into effect. I certainly do not consider myself as having made to you *any* proposition on the subject. Our interview originated as I conceive, in a strong wish expressed by yourself that I might be induced to return to my former situation in the King's service. On this point I stated that the only ground on which I could think myself called upon to give any positive answer to such a proposition, or to say any thing which could be in any degree binding with respect to the details of any arrangement connected with it, was that of receiving some direct previous intimation of his Majesty's wish to that effect, together with full authority to form, *for his Majesty's consideration*, a plan of arrangement, *in any manner* I thought best for his service, *as well out of those who were in the former as those who are in the present Government*. I added that the *whole and every part* of such plan, when submitted to his Majesty, must of course depend on his approbation or rejection; that nothing could in any instance be so adverse to my sense of duty and propriety, as to press for a moment any part that might not be consistent with his Majesty's opinion and inclination; but that, in case of any such objection, it must be open to me to judge, whether it did not in my opinion render it impossible for me to engage in his Majesty's service.

"With respect to my colleagues in the former Government, I also stated, that until I was enabled, in consequence of such previous authority from his Majesty, to make them a distinct proposal, I could neither be authorised to state, nor could in fact expect to know what would be their determination upon it. In all our subsequent conversation that had any reference to detail, I wished you to understand that I could only state to you the outline of my present ideas of such arrangement as the circumstances appeared to me to require, in order to enable you to judge how far, in your present situation, you felt it to be your duty to recommend to his Majesty to honour me with the intimation of his pleasure, on which any proceeding must be founded; and finally, in proceeding to explain these ideas, I certainly apprized you in the strongest manner of my intention to include, in any plan of arrangements which I might submit to his Majesty, former colleagues of mine (in case they consented) to whose opinions on the measures of Government your letter immediately refers. You will perceive therefore from this explanation that it does not in the smallest degree tend to vary the grounds on which the objections of yourself and your colleagues to the ideas I entertain, appear from your letter to be formed. Indeed no consideration would have induced me to trouble you with it, if I thought it calculated to produce such an effect, much less if it could lead to the possibility of reviving between us a discussion with respect to the object which was in view, which I consider as now finally and absolutely closed. My only motive has been the desire of endeavouring to prevent

any possible misunderstanding with respect to what has passed, in case it should ever become necessary hereafter to refer to any part of the transaction." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1803, April 16. Dropmore.—“Your servant arrived here late last night with your letter, and the papers enclosed in it, which I now return agreeably to your desire. In every respect but one the perusal of those papers has afforded me the highest satisfaction. Nothing could be more gratifying to my feelings than to observe the honourable, wise, and dignified line on which your own conduct has been rested, and the fresh proof which you have given of unabated friendship and good opinion towards myself. The only cause of regret which this transaction can afford is to be found in the consideration of any circumstances, be they what they may, which continue to deprive the public service of your character and talents, at a time when both are so necessary to the preservation of the country.

“Agreeing with you, as you know I entirely do, in the absolute necessity that before you could proceed to form the plan of any new arrangement you should be authorized to that effect by the only person from whom you could properly receive that authority, and being no less persuaded in common with yourself that, in the progress or conclusion of such an arrangement, it would be equally inconsistent with prudence, as with duty, for any individuals to consent to take a share in it, unless called upon to do so by the wishes and commands of that person, it is unnecessary for me, especially in the turn the business has now taken, to repeat to you what I have uniformly said on that subject, both in my own name, and in that of those with whom I have agreed in opinion on the late measures.

“But if we could, even now, believe that any consideration personal to ourselves did form the real obstacle to an arrangement calculated to give to the country the fair benefit of your services, there is no entreaty we should not make to induce you to forego any such consideration. It is too apparent that this is not the case, and that the real desire has been that of strengthening by the accession of your name a system of government which is too weak either to carry on the public service with any prospect of advantage, or even to maintain itself, and not that of enabling you to exert your own abilities and to apply your just weight in the country to the formation and conduct of a Government suited to the exigency of such a crisis.

“I am going this morning to Wimbledon to make to Lord Spencer the communication of these events as you desire. I shall stay there to-morrow, and will drive down with you either here or to Wycombe on Monday or Tuesday, as may suit you best.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, April 16. Bromley Hill.—“I shall be in town early on Monday morning and will call on you before twelve at Camelford House; we may then settle about Dropmore. I cannot well avoid going straight to Wycombe on Tuesday, and could not come to you before Thursday. In town I am afraid Monday and Tuesday morning will not allow of much leisure, but Thursday I am quite at liberty, and if you do not want to be in town, shall be very glad to pass it at Dropmore. At any rate, I would come to town that day if we cannot conveniently arrange it otherwise, as I have fixed nothing more than to be here on Friday, and go to Wilderness on Saturday.

Postscript.—“I would have proposed to call at Lord Spencer’s on Monday morning, to have taken my chance of finding both him and you there, but I think crossing the common in that direction just now would add a little to the number of wise speculations which are as well avoided.”

THE COUNTESS OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, April 16.]—“The Bishop of Lincoln has just been here to ask me whether I had any tidings about your coming to town. He was at Bromley yesterday morning when a *letter arrived* which puts a complete close to all the pending negotiations, and Pitt looks upon it as so entirely concluded, that he is at present thinking of returning to Walmer early next week. The Bishop is very anxious for you to see Pitt, and to learn from him the detail of all that has passed, which, as far as it relates to Pitt, will be satisfactory to you. He suspects that some favourable intelligence has been received within the two last days from the Continent, which makes the Doctor still think of running alone a little longer. Pitt will probably pass Monday next at the Deanery, but, of course, wishes his being in London not to be published. If you will write me an answer to this, I will transmit it to the Bishop.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], April 17. Bath.—“One word only to say that though as no one is more sensible to the blessings which the steerage of the old *Palinurus* would give to us at the moment of such a storm, I am most delighted that he has felt all that we could have wished him to feel, as due to the King, to the country, to his own honour, and lastly (though not least) what is due to us in this matter. Whatever is to be the result, I shall ever be most happy that this most insidious proposition (for the general report states it so) has been put by. As to what is

ultimately to happen, it is much beyond the speculation of Bonaparte, even though his commercial commissioners may have reported most accurately upon the value of your rhododendrons, of my oaks, and Mr. Pitt's Walmer farm.

"Adieu! I hope to be with you on Thursday, and direct to you in London without any fear that Mr. Freeling should make use of this letter in any way he likes best."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 1. Walmer Castle.—"I arrived here on Friday evening too late for the post, and therefore could not answer your letter till to-day. Your explanation of the difference of 141,000*l.* in the statement of supply is clearly right, and perfectly satisfactory. Your reasons are equally so for not striking off the sum of 133,000*l.* for increased balance in hand, for which credit is taken in Vansittart's abstract. The question respecting the allowance of 126,000*l.* for deficiency of malt can only be ascertained by knowing whether a provision for that deficiency is actually included among the miscellaneous services for the year. If you will take the trouble to send to Rose, he can at once clear it up by a reference to the Vote of Supply. If it is not included, I suspect the sum of 624,000*l.* is itself too large instead of too small, as the average deficiency is (if I recollect right) more than 126,000*l.* I have not seen the appropriation paper to which you refer, but the sum of 497,000*l.* is stated as interest and charges of the Austrian loan, in the last printed account of the Consolidated Fund, and I am pretty sure is correct. Perhaps the difference of 37,000*l.* may arise from the Sinking Fund of 1*l.* per cent. being omitted in the other account. On the whole I think your statement will be as clear as possible not only to those who understand the subject, but to any persons who are capable of forming any idea on a question of figures. Perhaps its effect may be made more striking and the result more likely to be remembered, by dividing the comparison formally under three heads in the manner I have marked in the paper. You will also find one or two slight alterations suggested in the second page, which strike me as making the sense more correct. The only material suggestion is in the last page. I doubt whether it is wise, in framing the result stated in the conclusion of the statement, to take it so much for granted that *no material* reduction can be expected in our establishments. I certainly despair of their being brought (within any moderate time) to Addington's estimate, but I am not quite clear that they may not safely be reduced in another year by 1,000,000*l.* or 1,200,000*l.* below their present amount. At all events I should think it safer to state this point more cautiously, and I have put down some words for that purpose. I do not know whether you have had occasion

yet to refer to the accounts of the 5th April last. They certainly cannot be brought to contradict the accuracy of your statement as drawn from the papers before you ; but they are material with respect to the practical question of our future prospects ; and they are the more likely to be introduced into the debate because, on the face of them, they shew a large increase of revenue in the last quarter. I send you the only account I have received on the subject, and there are some articles on which I cannot judge without further explanation. You will observe that in the permanent revenue (exclusive of new taxes, and of land tax, which last can only be estimated on the average of a year) there is an increase of about 600,000*l.* But only 44,000*l.* of this is in the general revenue, and the remainder is under the head of sugar, malt and tobacco, and may probably therefore be only casual in this particular year, as there is reason to believe that the sugar duty is from temporary causes more productive than usual, and the malt still more so. This point, however, cannot be fully ascertained without an accurate comparison with the produce of those duties on an average, and particularly in the quarter ending 5th April, 1802. This information also Rose could, I dare say, furnish you with. I have troubled you as you desire with all the observations which occur to me. Your debate I suppose will now come on at all events, though I have little faith that the ultimatum will have been received even by that time, unless it announces war."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 1. Harley Street.—"Comme le Prince Casteleicala vous a communiqué ce qu'il a reçu de Gallo, et que je l'ai prié de vous raconter ce que m'a écrit le Comte Markof sur le même sujet, j'ai cru qu'il valoit mieux vous donner la copie de cette information. Elle est incroyable, et couvrira ce ministère Lampédousien d'un ridicule infassable dès qu'il produira cette belle transaction aux deux chambres du Parlement. En attendant, ça restera entre nous."

Enclosure.

COUNT MARKOFF to COUNT WORONZOW.

1803, April 25. Paris.—"Whithworth sort de chez moi ; il m'a dit qu'il a épuisé ses instructions et ses modifications : parmi ces dernières il a proposé la conservation de Malthe pendant un certain nombre d'années, jusqu'à ce que l'acquisition que l'Angleterre fairoit dans la mer d'Afrique de l'isle de *Lampedouse*, appartenente au roi de Naples et actuellement *déserte*, fut mise en état de recevoir les escadres anglaises, et de former un établissement dans la Méditerranée. On a refusé

net la proposition de garder Malthe plus longtems, de quelque manière que ce soit.

“Quant à l’isle de Lampedouse on a offert de concourir à cette acquisition de tous les moyens possibles, parcequ’on ne demande pas mieux que d’embarquer l’Angleterre dans une entreprise qui lui coutera des sommes immenses, et qu’on sera le maître d’anéantire à l’instant où on la vera devenir de quelqu’utilité pour l’Angleterre.

“L’ambassadeur d’Angleterre s’attend à recevoir sou peu de jours son *ultimatum*, et, en même tems, l’ordre de partire, si cet *ultimatum* n’est pas admis dans un certain terme fixé. Le ministère d’ici attend la rentrée des réponses de notre cour, et Talleyrand me dit également qu’on n’admettra aucune composition sur l’article de Malthe.” *Extract.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 1-10.]—“Lord Pelham tells Lord Darnley that he means to announce that, *contrary* to expectation, Lord Whitworth had stayed at Paris, and therefore the communication must be deferred till the English messenger returns, which he will in three or four days. I know from my *old authority* that the new proposition made to us was that we should evacuate Malta, and that it should be garrisoned by Russians, Austrians or Prussians; this was after they had refused us Malta for ten years. We are angry at Lord Whitworth for staying only to send us such a proposition, and we have nevertheless sent to Paris to say that we will hold Malta till Lampedusa be made a safe port, and we accompany this with a secret article, to say it shall not be deemed a safe port before ten years are past. Lord Whitworth is ordered to come away in thirtx-six hours if this is refused. I presume it will.

“I hear France wants time, having a Newfoundland fleet out, St. Domingo fleet out, and Spanish treasure coming home. Nothing will be objected in House of Lords or House of Commons to-day.”

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 10. Harley Street.—“Vous pouvez bien croire combien je prens part à l’affliction où vous êtes, ainssi que Lady Grenville, par le malheur qu’elle a eu de perdre une mère si justement chérie.

“J’ai respecté votre douleur, et je n’ai pas cru devoir vous importuner par mes lettres; mais je crois qu’à présent il est du devoir d’un vrai ami de vous avertire qu’il est très important à un homme de votre grand caractère de venir au secours de votre patrie dans les circonstances actuelles, qui deviennent de moment à moment plus difficiles et plus allarmentes. Vendrédi

prochain sera un jour trop important dans le deux chambres pour que vous puissiez vous absenter. Excusez la liberté que je me permets de vous donner ce *hint*."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 11. Walmer Castle.—"As I understand the message can hardly be expected before next Monday, and the consideration of it will probably not be sooner than the Monday following, I do not mean at present to be in town sooner than Saturday. Sunday, or any day afterwards I shall be quite at your commands, and if it will suit you better than coming to town, will come down to you at Dropmore for a few hours any morning you like. I do not propose a longer stay, because I am afraid it would be breaking in upon Lady Grenville; though I hope she is beginning to recover from the shock she has had to sustain, as well as from the effects of so much continued anxiety and fatigue. Have the goodness to let me find a note in York Place on Saturday (unless you write so that your letter may reach me here on Friday) saying what you wish. I am not a little impatient to learn your expedient about Malta, which I certainly cannot divine. In the meantime I will be very cautious on the subject, though it is rather late as I have never hitherto had much reserve in stating my opinion upon it."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 11. London.]—"The newspapers and Lord Spencer's letter to Tom will have put you *au fait* of every thing that passed here yesterday. Lord Fitzwilliam rose to speak at the same time as Lord Carlisle, but Lord Carlisle getting the start of him, he contented himself with dividing. The minority were Darnley, Spencer, Fitzwilliam, Albermarle, Yarborough, Cawdor, Carlisle, and myself. Lord Spencer spoke very well. Moira went upon the steps of the throne, saying that as he could not attend himself to-day, it would not be proper for him to vote the short adjournment. The Duke of Clarence did not vote, Cumberland voted with the majority, and the Bishop of Chester, as I was told, after the question put, went away without voting. The division in the Commons was, I think, very strong, and I dare say you are not displeased that it was called for when Tom was absent. I reckon that we cannot take into consideration the papers that will be communicated on Monday till towards the end of the week, and I hope no material debate will come on till you are present, as there is nobody who can at all supply your place.

"I am one of those who are still in doubt whether the communication on Monday will be as decisive as it is

expected. Lord Whitworth not having left Paris on the day fixed, something has probably been thrown out to amuse ; and I dare say the orders were not sent to Andriossi to ask for his passport till the French Government had good reason to think that Lord Whitworth would not stick to his point."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 12. London.] Monday.—"I write this line to tell you that Pelham gave his notice, and Lord Spencer as had been agreed, said a few words to justify the vote of Friday, and to take credit in acquiescing in the delay which Ministers asked for.

"In our House Addington said that when he spoke on Friday he believed Lord Whitworth to have left Paris, that unforeseen circumstances had prevented his leaving Paris, that the House would not now ask him to describe those circumstances, but he would say that those circumstances must be decided upon *to-morrow* or *Wednesday morning* at latest, so that he had the strongest possible conviction of being able in a very short time indeed to make a communication to the House ; not a word was said.

"Thelusson and the French houses in the city say it will be peace, but the language of government runners is war.

"The King's having come to town on Saturday for six hours gives some suspicion of some arrangement being contriving."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 13. Charles Street.] Tuesday. Charles Street.—"My kitchen is still an hospital ; Lord Carysfort has therefore undertaken to receive you on Thursday, and Lord Spencer, Windham, Elliot, and Canning, will meet you on that day in Cumberland Place. I will send my carriage to Pall Mall at six to fetch you, that we may go together, and I will bring you back. I can likewise take you to the House on Friday, so that you will have no occasion for your own horses in London. I hear nothing new to-day, even in report. I do not find that there is any reason to expect Pitt before the final conclusion of this business, but I take for granted that you will, by this time, or by to-morrow, hear from him."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 14. Charles Street.—"You was scarcely gone from town before Pitt arrived in Pall Mall, and Pitt was hardly come before the messenger from Paris, who at one o'clock brought the news that Lord Whitworth on Thursday night was to sleep at Chantilly, on his road to England. Bragge has just told me that Addington sends a message to the

Lord Mayor with this account ; he added that Bonaparte had referred the question to his Council of State, and that, in consequence of their decision, Lord Whitworth left Paris. Rose tells me that Pitt, whom he has just left in Baker Street, had determined to go down to you to Dropmore to-morrow, and means to set out about twelve, so that you will hear from him the latest and fullest accounts of all that is known here. I have met almost all the Ministers riding about *comme si de rien n'étoit*, although, by Lord Bathurst's account, the stocks have fallen to 57.

"The King has countermanded his horses and stays in town. With all this there is still a latent hope of peace, even though Lord Whitworth should arrive ; and it is said that the discontent in Paris at the departure of Lord Whitworth is very universal. Will Addington stick to his text of yesterday, and really make no communication to the House on Monday, if the wind should be contrary enough to prevent Lord Whitworth from arriving ? If there was any other government this question of doubt would seem childish to propose, but now it is a fair matter to speculate upon. Our friends are all very impatient at your absence ; surely you had better come with Pitt to the message, and return again afterwards to Dropmore."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 19. York Place.—"I return the four papers you left with me. The letter from Woronzow to his brother here refers to a copy of the instructions to Count Marcoff as being sent to him for his guidance. Marcoff's letter also refers to a copy of the Emperor's rescript (which probably is the same paper) as sent by him ; but no such paper accompanies either of the letters given you ; and it's contents would probably be very material towards understanding more distinctly what sort of arrangement Russia points to. On the face of these papers the overture rather strikes me at present as less promising than it seemed to you ; though not, I believe, to such a degree as to make any material difference in the proper mode of treating it."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May.]—"J'ai été vous chercher inutilement ce matin, je voulais parler un instant des affaires du tems à mon ami. Ce sont les seuls momens de consolation politique que j'éprouve. Les régnans, qui ne savent pas régner, ne m'entendent pas, quoiqu', en général, ils soient personnellement bien pour moi. *Frendonreich* m'a prié de vous redémander ses papiers ; je crois qu'enfin Lord Hawkesbury le verra, il me l'a promis ce matin, ce sera de la moutarde après-dîner. Vous savez sans doute que *le Valois* est déjà formellement

incorporé à la France. Nous avons parfaitement reçu M. Diesbach, espèce de ministre Suisse et très bien pensant. M. de Cobentzl l'a voit prié de demander des lettres de créance, et il paroissoit un favori ; mais un billet de Champagny, qui a exigé son renvoi comme un homme dont les principes étoient hostiles à la France, lui a valu de notre part l'ordre de quitter Vienne. *O tempora ! O mores !* Je ne crois pas que les grandes puissances fassent fortune à la longue comme *Pertinax Sycophant* dans le *Man of the world*, (*all by bowing*).

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, May 26. York Place.—“I was very sorry to miss seeing you before you left town, though even then I fear it was too late to entertain any hope of changing the course which you mean to pursue. I do not like to break in upon you to-day, when it would only interrupt you, but I cannot help writing to tell you that, though I certainly have no idea of disguising my real opinion respecting much of the past conduct of Government, I shall feel it necessary to state how far I am from approving an attempt to remove them by Parliamentary censure. And the same sentiment which I must state in the House of Commons will probably be expressed to-day in the House of Lords.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 28], Saturday.—“The failure of yesterday's ballot, which was put off till this day, makes my journey impracticable for to-day, and Canning having desired to see me on Monday morning, and Lord Carlisle to-morrow, I fear I must abandon all hopes of seeing you at Dropmore. Lord F[itzWilliam] with whom I passed three hours this morning, is well satisfied with all the resolutions, but wishes to take the three first on the first day, to which I presume there can be no objection. I have, however, engaged that you shall call upon him on Wednesday at three to settle finally, and I have desired Lord Carysfort to give you and me a dinner on Wednesday also.

“Canning tells me in his note of to-day that the P[ee]rs wish to stick to their original three resolutions ; we must, therefore, look to a second day, as well as you.

“Stocks have risen 3 per cent., as they were sure to do from the discussion of yesterday ; and although there is little substantial ground in what passed yesterday, one sees in the eagerness with which people interpret what was said, how eager they are for the event which they have now new hopes of seeing arrive.

“I do not absolutely find whether [Pitt] gave notice or not for Friday ; if he has not I know not whether Tuesday (the day after Addington's Budget) would not be our most propitious day ; but this must depend on the wishes of our friends.

At all events Lord F[itzWilliam] says his motion shall stand for Thursday."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, May 30.]—"Canning has settled with me to make a new arrangement of the Res[olutions] (leaving out the 4th) and writing the 5th and 6th in one, to have them all moved on Friday together, this course is thought the most advisable, and we find the Budget is put off till Friday se'nnight or perhaps even later.

"How far Lord F[itzWilliam] adopts or disapproves of this in the Lords I do not yet know, for he is out of town and does not return till to-morrow. I will expect you on Wednesday between two and three; our friends meet us at Lord Carysfort's at dinner on that day.

"Pitt returns here from Bromley on Thursday."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], June 5. Stowe.—"I write to you to express my satisfaction at all that I have seen or heard of your labours; and perfectly agree with you that Thursday would have been decisive against the Doctor, even if the House of Lords debate had been less decisive as to Mr. Pitt's total separation from him. Lord Hawkesbury's attack upon Pitt was exactly every thing that I could wish; and the utter despondency of his speech, as well as of that of Lord Castlereagh, shews plainly how little they trust to the Doctor's new recruits. I have no idea that Lord Moira can be sufficiently insane to engage in such a bark; but I perfectly agree with you that Addington has made up his mind to try any experiment that can enable him to live over to-morrow; though it will as certainly annihilate him next day. All this can ultimately end only one way; and whether that necessity will occur a little sooner or later is of little importance except in the most important point of view, namely, that of the national distress.

"As to yourself, I shall be so glad to see you, and so unwilling to put by any opportunity of intercourse that may be broken in upon by so many public and private chances, that I am very anxious that you should begin your tour with Stowe, which may put you on your road to Wales and back through the northern counties; a tour that I should recommend very much in preference to Devon, which will put your good women too near Cornwall."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, June 16.—"Pitt, as I understood from the first, had not meant to oppose the Budget, at least in it's opening, but I just hear that although he goes to-day to Walmer, he returns

to town in three days, and therefore probably for some of the details of the business.

"The points that seem most questionable are first, as to the land tax, that although it is divided into the shares of 1s. for the proprietor, and 9d. for the tenant upon all *existing bargains*, yet wherever there is no lease, and wherever any estate now on old rents is to be raised, the whole of the two taxes, amounting together to $8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., will fall upon the landlord. I yesterday met with a man of large landed estate who told me that he had just now settled for a rise of his estate, the new leases of which were not yet executed, and that he is already told that his tenants will not agree unless their 9d. tax shall be allowed for in their new bargains. Surely, in this view there is no just proportion kept between the tax on land and the tax on money. The other question the most mooted is as to the propriety of the exemption of foreigners, not only because it will create fictitious holdings in our funds, but because where the holding is real it gives the foreigner too great an advantage. The price and value of the funds will be lowered by this tax, and so the foreigner will have the advantage of the tax in buying at a lower price, while he incurs none of the disadvantage by the payment of the tax, and is therefore able with the same sum to buy a larger profit than an English dealer can. Rose says it is folly in the extreme to think that the consumption of tea and wine will not be affected by such enormous taxes."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, June 18.] Charles Street.—"I can give you no positive intelligence as to the Report of the Clergy Bill, other than they expect to finish the details to-night, and if they do, it will be reported Monday or Tuesday. The chief object of the two Houses sitting to-day is, as I am told, to receive a message from the Crown about arming, which message will be taken into consideration, as I hear, on Monday; but they appear to be so little prepared with their plan and message that I cannot undertake to say more than that Addington yesterday told Lord Ossory that his arming message would come down to-day, and would be considered on Monday. The only general description which I hear of it is something of a ballot of all men between 16 and 45 to serve in the regular army, but not out of Great Britain and Ireland. My own notion would rather be a ballot for immediately completing your regular army according to the ordinary rules of service, but I must repeat that I hear daily of such changes in the plans of Ministers on this subject as announce no well-considered or mature arrangement on their part.

"The language of Government runners and of Court runners in the last days has been to deny the existence of any supposed objection to P[itt] at Bromley Hill, and much is whispered

of the advantage of union. I hear, too, that our Scotch *Confederate's* language about the present Ministers is less hostile to them than it was, and many little circumstances concur to make me rather believe that the idea is entertained of obtaining effective support to Government by their reconciliation with P[itt].

"In the meantime I have secret but certain reason to know that strong demonstration is made at Paris of all sorts of professions to a third Power as to disposition to furnish every possible facility for accommodation ; some things that I hear of this nature, though too secret to put upon paper, are to the greatest degree curious and interesting although difficult to decipher.

"If you ride up Monday morning, I think it probable that day, or that and the next, would give you *clergy, arming message*, and a better knowledge of the interesting news which I hint at."

LORD GRENVILLE au MARQUIS DE WELLESLEY.

1803, Juillet 12. [London.]—"Il y a deux jours que j'ai reçu votre lettre du 16 février, et j'y réponds en ce moment quoique j'ignore entièrement quand j'aurai occasion de vous faire parvenir ma réponse. À l'égard de votre séjour dans l'Inde, il y a long-tems que cette question a été décidée, et telle est la distance qui nous sépare, qu'avant que celle-ci ne vous parvienne, le tems fixé pour votre départ sera déjà arrivé. J'ignore entièrement si l'événement de la guerre que nos sages ministres ont enfin déclarée les aura engagés à vous prier de continuer encore quelque tems votre séjour dans l'Inde. Il n'y avait personne capable de mieux apprécier qu'eux la certitude de cet événement, en sorte qu'on doit supposer qu'ils ont pris toutes les mesures que le moment exigeait ; mais cependant tout nous fait voir qu'ils ont été pris au dépourvu comme si cet événement avait été le moins attendu. Il n'est pas en conséquence improbable que lorsqu'ils ont vu que la guerre était inévitable, c'est-à-dire, le jour qu'ils l'ont déclarée, ils peuvent vous avoir expédié l'ordre de rester dans l'Inde. Mais c'est ce que j'ignore entièrement ; je ne puis en conséquence en raisonner. Si cela n'arrive point, j'espère que rien ne m'empêchera d'avoir le plaisir de vous revoir l'année prochaine, en supposant qu'à cette époque vous ayez encore *une patrie à revoir*.

"Quand je me sers de cette dernière expression, ne croyez pas que mon mécontentement de la conduite du gouvernement ait en rien changé mon opinion sur les moyens et les ressources de ce pays. Je n'ai jamais été du nombre des *aboyeurs* sur ce sujet. Il est moins question ici d'opinion (si je ne m'abuse pas moi-même), que d'une parfaite connaissance qui équivaut à une certitude, lorsque je dis que le

pays possède non-seulement d'abondans et amples moyens de défense, mais même encore de faire repentir sérieusement notre ennemi de sa conduite hostile, et de le forcer à nous craindre et conséquemment à nous respecter. Mais jusqu'à présent, il y a eu tant d'indécision, de timidité, et de lenteur dans toutes les mesures prises pour obtenir des ressources, et tout notre courage porte en ce moment à tel point l'empreinte de la crainte, que je ne puis avoir la satisfaction d'être fondé à rendre justice, sous ce rapport, aux talens qui sont mis en œuvre et aux dispositions prises.

" Mon plan de conduite politique a, comme vous l'aurez vu, dévié de plus en plus de celui du Gouvernement. Quant à l'opinion que j'avais énoncée sur la paix, j'ai en ce moment la satisfaction de voir qu'on me rend parfaite justice dans tout le pays. Non-seulement les événements subséquens ont prouvé que le petit corps avec lequel j'ai agi de concert en cette occasion était composé des seules personnes qui sussent alors apprécier cette mesure et ses conséquences ; mais on a eu l'aveu général que nous avions bien vu les choses. Toutes les infâmes calomnies du gouvernement sur ce sujet, sont retombées avec une double force sur leurs têtes. Dans tout ce que j'ai fait depuis, et dans tout ce dont je me suis abstenu, vous reconnaitrez, j'espère, ces sentimens et ces principes, desquels aucune opinion, quelque défavorable qu'elle soit à la conduite personnelle de tout individu, ne me fera jamais dévier.

" Si j'avais été sûr d'une occasion, je vous aurais écrit le détail de ce qui s'est passé en avril dernier, au sujet d'un changement projeté dans le gouvernement, et je vous aurais expliqué (selon ce que j'en ai pu comprendre), les bases de la conduite que *Pitt* a tenue depuis. J'éprouve un grand plaisir à voir que tandis que ma brouille avec Addington devient de jour en jour plus sérieuse, tous les motifs qui nous faisaient différer d'opinion et de conduite, *Pitt* et moi, diminuent journellement : nous n'avons pas encore pu assimiler complètement nos plans de conduite politique. Notre situation en vérité est, sous un point de vue essentiel, tout-à-fait différente. Quoiqu'il n'ait point recommandé Addington pour son emploi actuel (et en effet, qui le connaissant pourrait le faire ?) cependant il lui a accordé une portion d'influence plus active que mon opinion ne m'aurait permis de lui accorder dans la formation de la nouvelle administration. Il a conseillé ses mesures long-tems après que j'ai eu cessé de communiquer avec eux, et il les a approuvées dans les différens points qui me paraissaient les plus criminels, et qui l'étaient en effet comme l'événement l'a prouvé. Il est en conséquence plus restreint dans sa conduite que je ne le suis, et il ne jouit pas en ce moment de l'inestimable avantage que j'ai, de n'avoir jamais caché, ni compromis mon opinion sur des matières d'une telle importance politique ; mais je crois que ses idées sur leur conduite publique ne sont pas très différentes des miennes ; si toutes fois elles diffèrent en rien ; et à tout cela,

il faut ajouter un ressentiment justement mérité, en raison de la conduite personnelle d'Addington envers lui ; il ne cherche plus à cacher ses sentimens. S'il vous a écrit (ce que sûrement il aurait fait, s'il ne s'était pas mis dans la mauvaise habitude de n'écrire à personne) si dis-je, il vous a écrit, il vous aura exprimé, j'en suis persuadé, tous ses sentimens sans réserve, et c'est dans cette persuasion que je vous parle autant de ses opinions. En vérité la mesure qu'il a adoptée dernièrement, (je veux parler de sa motion d'adjournement, ou de son vote de censure mal-jugée en elle-même, comme je pense qu'elle l'a été, et malheureuse dans ses résultats, puisqu'elle a diminué son influence publique), a au moins le mérite d'exprimer d'une manière non équivoque sa désapprobation de la conduite du gouvernement.

" Je ne me hazarde pas à deviner quels nouveaux événemens auront lieu avant votre arrivée ; et le seul avis que je desire vous donner, ce que je vous ai déjà suggéré plus d'une fois, est de ne vous engager à rien avant votre arrivée ; mais de vous conserver la liberté d'agir d'après tels motifs que vous jugerez devoir diriger votre conduite, lorsque vous serez sur les lieux, et après que différens rapports avec les personnes qui sont à la tête des affaires dans les diverses subdivisions des partis, vous auront mis à même de juger ce qui vous convient le mieux. A l'égard de l'idée énoncée dans l'extrait que vous m'avez envoyé de votre lettre à Addington, vous devez, je crois, ne l'envisager que comme un des événemens possibles les plus réculés. Quant à des inimitiés éternelles, j'en déteste l'idée ; et si j'ai une inimitié éternelle, ce n'est que contre les partisans d'un principe aussi détestable. Mais on doit beaucoup à l'opinion publique, ainsi qu'à la situation personnelle et au caractère des individus, qu'il faut respecter, long-tems après qu'ils ont cessé d'avoir du ressentiment, ou de se plaire à en donner des preuves. Et rien ne paraît moins probable que de nous voir à aucune époque rapprochée, (je crois que je pourrais dire à aucune époque de notre vie) *Pitt* et moi disposés à établir avec Addington des rapports de confiance et d'amitié.

" Les papiers, si vous les avez, vous informeront que toutes nos conversations roulent à présent sur l'invasion ; et qu'enfin nous commençons à prendre des mesures pour nous mettre en état de faire face à nos ennemis, s'ils venaient à bout d'effectuer un débarquement, qui, quoique très improbable, n'est certainement en aucune façon impossible. Parler de conquérir ou subjuguier dix ou douze millions d'hommes, s'ils sont préparés pour le combat et dirigés par un gouvernement désireux et capable d'animer leurs efforts, serait complètement ridicule. Mais l'expérience nous a fait voir que le nombre seul d'habitans, et de plus, des avantages de position locale, ne sont rien, si la direction de la défense reste entre les mains d'hommes qui ne sont distingués que par leur imbécillité et leur faiblesse. Même en Hollande, et plus encore en Allemagne, en Italie, en Suisse, ce ne sont point les habitans, mais les

gouvernemens qui par leur faiblesse ont livré leur pays ; et de la même manière, si dans cette île, ou en Irlande, nous éprouvons quelque échec considerable, nous en serons redevables, non pas à la timidité et à l'ignorance de la nation, mais bien à celles du gouvernement. Vous aurez déjà été à même de juger jusqu'à quel point ces qualités existent dans le Gouvernement actuel, si (comme je le suppose,) vous avez, avant d'avoir reçu cette lettre, lu la correspondance de Lord Hawkesbury avec Otto et Lord Whitworth, et comparé les dates des différens contre-ordres au sujet du Cap, pendant le cours de nos communications avec la France.

“ Il serait superflus d'ajouter à la longueur de cette lettre, en m'étendant sur le plaisir que j'ai éprouvé en trouvant dans la votre ces expressions d'amitié, qui retracent notre ancienne et continuelle liaison. Je n'ai jamais fait pour vous plus que vous n'eussiez fait pour moi en pareille occasion ; et si l'intrigue projetée contre vous est totalement sans effet, et vos mesures justifiées avant d'avoir été condamnées, je ne puis me flatter d'avoir contribué à ce résultat par mes efforts ; quoiqu'il en soit néanmoins, vous pouvez, je crois, regarder l'affaire comme terminée. Il ne paraît pas qu'il en ait été soufflé un mot au parlement jusqu'à Noël ; et je crois réellement que nous n'avez rien à craindre. La seule chose à appréhender à ce sujet ne pourrait être que la peine et le désagrément d'une contestation particulière de cette nature.”

Lord Grenville's letter to Lord Wellesley dated July 12, 1803, and that of Henry Wellesley to his eldest brother dated July 28, 1803, having been captured on their way to India by a French man of war, were translated and published at Paris by order of the Consular Government. It was in their French dress, as we have them here, that they reached the Governor General.

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 23. York Place.—“ The House of Commons and Cinque Ports and Trinity House arrangements have left me so little time for several days that I have not been able to write to you. I have now only time to say that I flatter myself you will have seen that the plan at last extorted from Government is at least free from any of the revolutionary organisation you seemed to apprehend, and has been rendered in its progress a measure that may be essentially useful both now and hereafter. I have been unable to avoid engagements for to-day and to-morrow, or I would have endeavoured to pass them at Dropmore. Afterwards I shall only wait for the last stage of the Income Bill on Tuesday, and go then to join my volunteers at Walmer. I shall probably, however, return in the course of next month, and if you remain at Dropmore, I shall hope to be able to come to you. Perhaps you will be tempted to come and look at the French cliffs in the course of the summer.”

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, [July 27–28]. House of Commons.—“The plot thickens, or rather the piece opens with an incident as dreadful and alarming as can well be conceived. A messenger has arrived, a few hours since, from Dublin, bringing an account of an insurrection having broken out, the extent of which is not distinctly known, and which Ministers do not seem disposed to state even to the extent to which they do know it; but of which the first effects have been the murder of the Chief Justice (Lord Kilwarden) who is said to have been pulled out of his carriage and torn to pieces by the mob; and of the foreman of the grand jury, a Mr. Clark, who is reported to have been killed as he was carrying up an address to the Castle. From some circumstances too, mentioned to me by Corry, it would seem that this was only part of a rising which was to take place at once in various parts of the kingdom. It is not at all clear that when the messenger came away the insurrection, even in Dublin, was got under. In fact I should rather conclude, from what I first heard from persons not connected with Government, and afterwards from the language of some who were, that, at the time of the letters being sent off, the issue of the contest remained still in suspense. A more frightful picture of the state of things in that part of [the] empire cannot well be conceived, because even if the present insurrection should be suppressed, what must be the condition of a country in which such an insurrection could ever have broke out? The papers, of course, of this evening will be full of the news, but I thought I would send you the present hasty account, formed from the best intelligence which I have hitherto been able to collect.

“I wish I could balance this in any degree by accounts of the activity of our preparations here; but, on the contrary, everything that I hear shows that the conduct of the Ministers in the execution of their measures is quite of a piece with the feebleness and dilatoriness which they have shown in bringing them forward. If I may rely upon Thelusson, who is now come to town, a camp of 1,300 men in his neighbourhood had for their whole ammunition 600 ball cartridges; and about the same number with others. I am afraid, too, that the whole of this general training will take the shape which you observed with you, of a separation of the town and village aristocracies from the lower orders of the people. The only cure that I can see is what we were talking about, of forming more efficient corps out of the remainder.”

HENRY WELLESLEY au MARQUIS DE WELLESLEY.

1803, Juillet 28. Londres.—“Je viens d’apprendre par Lady Wellesley qu’une dépêche par terre doit partir le 28, et j’espère que cette lettre vous parviendra assez à tems pour

vous mettre en état de faire vos préparatifs pour quitter l'Inde en Janvier prochain. Je vais vous faire part, aussi bien que possible, de tout ce qui s'est passé relativement à l'Inde depuis mon arrivée ; et alors vous serez en état de juger quel degré de support vous devez attendre des ministres actuels, et si le Conseil du Contrôle n'a pas été réellement transféré du Conseil à la Cour des Directeurs. Je suis arrivé à Londres en juin, et je me suis de suite présenté chez le Lord Castelaragh, qui m'a reçu avec la plus grande honnêteté ; il m'a parlé de vous dans les termes les plus favorables ; il a approuvé toutes vos mesures, mais, en même tems, il est parfaitement évident qu'il ne peut pas obtenir ce que la Cour des Directeurs a pris la résolution de ne pas accorder. Il m'a beaucoup parlé du collège, et m'a paru bien convaincu de l'importance, ainsi que de la nécessité de l'institution. Il croyait, m'a-t-il dit, qu'il viendrait à bout de faire consentir les Directeurs à sa continuation suivant votre plan, avec quelques modifications que vous ne jugeriez pas conséquentes. Il m'a dit que les Directeurs lui avaient écrit, sur ce sujet et sur d'autres, plusieurs lettres fort sèches, et que rien ne pouvait lui être plus désagréable que la situation dans laquelle il était placé.

"J'ai dit au Lord Castelaragh que, dans cette occasion, la Cour des Directeurs vous avait décidément manqué de parole, car une des conditions principales aux quelles vous deviez rester encore un an dans l'Inde, était qu'ils ne se mêleraient en rien de vos nominations ; qu'ils avaient déplacé un homme qui avait passé par tous les grades inférieurs au service de la Compagnie.

"Je lui ai dit ensuite que votre santé était très bonne, et qu'il n'y avait point de sacrifice que vous ne fussiez prêt à faire pour le service public ; mais que je croyais qu'il était impossible que vous restassiez dans l'Inde, au-delà du mois de Janvier prochain, à moins que vous ne fussiez vivement sollicité à ce sujet par les ministres de Sa Majesté et par la Cour des Directeurs ; que quant aux ministres de Sa Majesté je croyais qu'ils étaient d'opinion que votre séjour dans l'Inde était une chose très désirable sous beaucoup de rapports ; que pour la Cour des Directeurs, il devait savoir si elle le désirait ou non. Il ne m'a pas répondu sur le premier point ; quant au second, il a été assez clair ; car il m'a dit que la Cour des Directeurs avait été si courroucée au sujet des opinions que vous aviez manifestées dans quelques-unes de vos dépêches, (ce qui prouve qu'ils n'ont pas la moindre idée des vrais intérêts de l'Inde, et que sous ce rapport ils ne sont guères que des *entêtés imbéciles*), qu'il était persuadé qu'ils désiraient plutôt vous voir résigné, quoiqu'il leur fût impossible de ne pas reconnaître que la continuation de votre séjour dans l'Inde ne pouvait être que très utile aux intérêts publics.

"Dans une autre conversation que j'eus avec le Lord Castelaragh, il me parla beaucoup des négociations Marattes, et je réussis à le convaincre de la justesse de vos mesures à

Ponah, et des grands avantages qui devaient en résulter, si nous venions à établir notre influence dans cette cour. Il me demanda de nouveau si vous aviez pris une détermination fixe sur l'époque de votre retour en Angleterre : je lui répétais ce que je lui avais dit dans une autre occasion, à quoi il ne répondit point. Il me parla de la nomination de Barlow, et me demanda si je croyais que vous l'approuveriez ; je lui dis que vous aviez la meilleure opinion de Barlow, mais que vous pensiez qu'aucun employé de la compagnie ne devait succéder au gouvernement général ; je lui dis aussi que la nouvelle nomination était inutile, puisque Barlow avait été antérieurement désigné pour vous succéder provisoirement, et qu'il était préférable d'attendre votre retour avant de présenter personne pour cette nouvelle nomination. Je crois qu'il y a une certaine intrigue secrète concernant la nomination de Barlow, et voici ce que c'est : lorsque les ministres proposèrent Lord W. *Bentick*, pour Madras, la Cour des Directeurs fit les objections les plus formelles à cette nomination, mais elle fût enfin obligée de céder, en se consolant par l'idée qu'un de ses propres employés serait nommé au gouvernement général.

“ J'ai vu Addington à dîner chez le Lord Castelnagh : il me parla de vous dans les termes les plus pompeux et les plus affectueux. Il me parla aussi de la nomination de Barlow comme d'une mesure qui devait vous être très-agréable. Le résultat de mes conversations avec Lord Castelnagh m'a convaincu que les ministres sentent toute l'importance de la continuation de votre séjour dans l'Inde, et qu'ils désirent beaucoup que vous y restiez, mais qu'ils ne sont pas assez forts pour contester ce point avec la Cour des Directeurs, qui est également déterminée à vous forcer de revenir. Je crois qu'on pourrait se livrer et avec succès à de nouvelles tentatives, pour engager la Cour des Directeurs à solliciter la prolongation de votre séjour. Mais après les avoir vus tout récemment violer l'engagement qu'ils avaient pris de ne se mêler d'aucune de vos nominations, il ne serait ni sage, ni de la dignité, de faire aucune démarche qui donnât à soupçonner que vous désirez rester dans l'Inde, ou que tout motif autre qu'une intime persuasion que ce n'est que pour le bien public, pourrait vous engager à rester une heure de plus que l'époque que vous aviez fixée pour votre retour.

“ Je reçus du président une réception civile mais très froide : il me parla des améliorations dans le commerce, mais ne dit pat un mot de mes services personnels : il me parut disposé à trouver quelque chose à blâmer dans tout ce que nous avons fait à *Ponah*, et nous nous séparâmes après une conversation de dix minutes : lui me disant qu'il avait tant d'affaires qu'il n'avait pas eu le tems de lire les dépêches (quoiqu'elles fussent à l'hôtel de l'Inde depuis cinq jours), mais qu'il espérait avoir de fréquentes occasions de causer avec moi sur les affaires de l'Inde. Je ne l'ai pas vu depuis (quoique je sois resté quinze jours à Londres, pour en avoir l'occasion), et la cour n'a pas

même eu la civilité de m'engager à un des diners qui se donnent tous les mercredis. J'ai depuis été forcé de revenir à *Chester-House*, en raison de ma santé, qui est toujours très mauvaise.

“Une autre motif qui me fait désirer votre retour est la position des différens partis en Angleterre. Je suppose que vous avez reçu une lettre du Lord *Grenville* à ce sujet ; mais je vous dirai tout ce que j'en sais, et que je tiens en partie d'un intime ami de *Pitt*. Il paraît qu'Addington a proposé, il y a quelques semaines, a *Pitt* de rentrer ministère à certaines conditions. *Pitt*, sur cette ouverture d'Addington, commença une négociation avec lui, expliqua les conditions aux quelles il désirait faire partie du ministère ; déclara qu'il n'insisterait pas pour y faire entrer personne contre qui le roi pourrait avoir quelque objection, mais qu'il insisterait sur ce que toute l'affaire demeurât secrète jusqu'à ce qu'elle fût totalement arrangée, et, qu'en même tems, il se réserverait la faculté de se retirer de la négociation, s'il était d'opinion que ses services ne pourraient pas être utiles au bien public. À ces conditions il donna le tracé de son plan à Addington ; désigna plusieurs personnes qu'il voulait proposer, et dans le nombre se trouvait Lord *Grenville* ; continuant cependant toujours à déclarer qu'il ne voulait introduire personne malgré le roi, mais qu'il se réserverait la faculté de se retirer. Addington proposa ce plan à ses collègues qui le rejetèrent, et la négociation fût rompue. À présent tous les amis d'Addington déclarent que *Pitt* a refusé d'entrer au ministère, parcequ'il voulait qu'on lui accordât d'y faire entrer *Grenville*, et ses amis. *Pitt* comme vous l'aurez vu, a depuis été opposé à Addington, dans la Chambre ; et ils ne se parlent plus à présent. Lord *Grenville* (qui est l'organe de *Canning*.) m'a dit que *Pitt* avait un tel mépris pour Addington, qu'il ne voudrait pas à présent agir avec lui à telle condition que ce fût. En même tems *Pitt* conteste tous les jours dans la chambre contre l'acte de défense, comme un avocat pourrait le faire ; et par les vrais moyens qu'il a employés, il l'a rendu propre à remplir l'objet proposé, ce qui n'aurait jamais eu lieu autrement. Dans une occasion, il divisa la chambre ; et à l'étonnement d'un chacun, la division était de 50 membres. Néanmoins, je pense avec beaucoup d'autres qu'il est impossible que les choses aillent long-tems sur le pied actuel, et je crois que *Pitt* rentrera dans le cours d'une année. Ceci me fait désirer que vous soyez sur les lieux, pour faire partie du nouveau ministère, qui alors serait excellent, si *Pitt* était à la tête. Qu'en pensez-vous, je vous prie ? Vous seriez en état d'obtenir tout ce que vous voudriez relativement à l'Inde, et si vous le jugiez convenable, d'y retourner comme gouverneur-général.

5 Août.

“J'ai commencé cette lettre à Londres, mais ayant rencontré le Lord *Castelragh*, il m'a dit que les dépêches ne partiraient pas avant dix jours.

"Pole, a été chez Addington, pour lui parler de moi ; et il m'a promis de consulter le lord Castelnagh sur les moyens de forcer les Directeurs à me récompenser pour mes services dans l'Inde. Je n'attends néanmoins rien d'eux."*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 29. Pall Mall.—"Though I have seen several letters from Dublin I learn nothing further than what the papers contain, unless it be that it was a complete surprise, and that there are great complaints, both there and here, of the supineness and inattention of the Government. Whether the story be true of the arms in the Town House having been seized I don't know upon any certain authority. If it is, the expression will not be far wrong, which they complained of so much last night, that the city was upon the point of being lost.

"By a refusal to let Robert Crauford go on, on a point to which, to say a few words, and which could not, to be sure, have been pursued to any length, they have driven him, happily, to the making a separate motion which is fixed for Monday next, and which will relate to the new measures for the defence of London. He wishes for some assistance in the framing his motion. His own ideas are, of course, confined pretty much to the immediate object. But it may be a question whether, if he will consent, the resolutions should not extend a little further, though not so far, I think, as to encroach upon what we were talking of lately, and which I hope you have not lost sight of. In letters from Norfolk I hear sad reports of supineness and apathy, and, in some degree, of disaffection of that sort which I have always apprehended, which shows itself not in open treason or sedition, but in a great relaxation of zeal and loyalty. Ten years of such language as Messrs. Sheridan and Tierney, the new allies of Ministry have talked will have produced more mischief in that way than their support of their present friends, not in their vigour but in their want of vigour, is likely to do good.

"The post is going. If I hear anything particular in the course of to-morrow I will let you know. But perhaps the best way, now the dust is laid, is to come yourself."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 29. Stowe.—"Finding that the zeal of the Buckingham yeomen was ready for a campaign in Stowe Park on the 1st of August, I have descended from the beautiful mountains which form the vale of Llangedwin to the flat scenery of this country, and shall begin my military labours in it on Monday next. How long they will last it is not for me to determine.

* See note at foot of page 175.

"The sudden explosion at Dublin announces very fully that the co-operation of Irish rebellion is one of the active means of Bonaparte, and I do not doubt but that the movement at Brest which was reported by Cornwallis, was intended to be a movement of promise to the friends of France in Ireland. My brother sees much ground to rejoice that the Irish insurrection has been as usual premature, and I rejoice with him in that sense of his joy ; but at the same time I cannot help saying that the proof which this event affords of the total surprise upon our Government in Ireland, totally destroys whatever confidence one might have had in that quarter from their repeated assertions of the entire security which prevailed as against all chance of Irish insurrection. My brother's accounts state to him that some information had been given to Government in Ireland some days previous, but that they thought no new measure necessary, and therefore that nothing was done till the armed mob of Dublin had possessed themselves of the Mansion House, and plundered it of 600 stands of arms which were deposited there. The best hope is that, as the country mails had arrived at Dublin, it does not seem as yet that there was any general co-operation in the distant counties. That we should have such Ministers in such a moment is of so desperate a danger that one hardly knows how to think that the country can have a fair chance of escape.

"I rejoice to hear that your numbers encrease, and that there is no recruiting officer so active and so successful as you are. The enclosed letter which Lord Buckingham desires me to send to you from Cathcart, announces to you an excellent adjutant. Lord Buckingham has written to accept him for you, and to desire him to be sent immediately. You are probably aware that cavalry corporal in Life Guards is cavalry sergeant."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 31. Stowe.—"It is not till this morning that Lord Hobart has sent here any such communication as applies to the questions of your letters of the 28th and the 29th, which letters I undertake to answer as well as I can, Lord Buckingham being entirely engaged by a variety of official letters for this morning's post, and having desired me to become his secretary to you. Lord Hobart's is, however, nothing more than a printed circular letter, all the material points of which I have copied for you and enclose herewith. You will observe that he has given no answer as yet to the conditions on which Lord Buckingham made the offer of volunteers from this county, and until he does it is impossible to know how far it is fit to proceed in obtaining volunteer offers upon those special conditions which Lord Buckingham stated ; namely, of their being attached to their own county militia, or forming a separate corps, as in clause 54, in case

of invasion. Lord Buckingham, however, is employed to-day in making a new offer to Lord Hobart, which, is as I think, a very handsome offer, and may very probably be received. It is that if Government will provide arms for the three-fourths of the first-class, Lord Buckingham will undertake at his own expense to clothe them in a regular uniform. He imagines that these three-fourths will turn out to be about 3,000 men, the clothing of which would cost him at least 4,000*l.* or 5,000*l.*; but, if this is accepted by Government, I think the offer very creditable to my brother, and very likely to become a powerful inducement to raise a sufficient number of volunteers in the county to suspend the compulsory effects of the Training Bill. At all events, however, the schedules must be completed in the first place, whether this offer be or be not accepted by Government.

"I now proceed to answer such separate questions as I find in your letters, and as I know how to give any answer to. Lord Buckingham promises to you the formal letter of notification of Lieutenant-Colonel in the first moment that he can spare to write it.

"I enclose to you one of the forms of returns according to your desire; it must, when completed, be returned to Lord Buckingham. My brother has carbines for his men, but no pistols, although they have goat-skin coverings and holsters. Aylesbury, as I understand, has pistols and holsters, but no carbines, except in the proportion of 12 for each troop. My brother's new recruits are so anxious to have their clothing that he cannot send a pattern jacket as yet, but he will do so in two or three days. Lord Temple comes here on Tuesday, and I shall learn from him whether there is any variance in any of the Aylesbury outsiders from those of Buckingham. With respect to your idea of opening books for volunteer infantry *according to the terms of the Act*, there can be no objection to the pursuing that course, as the exemption which Lord Buckingham asks for respecting their being only attached to their own county militia, or formed in distinct corps, will be an additional boon that will be very grateful to them, no doubt, if it can be obtained. I told you in my last that your adjutant was provided and upon his road to you. The limits of the military district for volunteers *who clothe and arm themselves*, is Bucks., Bedfordshire, Oxfordshire and Northamptonshire, but yeomanry and Training Bill levies are, as you see, to go to any part of England in case of invasion. Gwynne has offered to come whenever he is wanted, but Lord Buckingham thinks there is no use to be made of him until the returns are made to the schedules of the Army Bill. With respect to Grenfell's information, you will see that he was well informed, as Lord Hobart's circular, of which I enclose extracts, evidently cancels the former propositions for volunteer infantry; and it is undeniably true, as you state it, that, according to their present system,

there would be no difference between volunteers and trained bands. The merit of Lord Buckingham's offer of to-day is that it provides the distinction of their being clothed, and therefore ready for service, instead of being the *rudis indigestaque moles* which trained bands must be.

"Mason has written a growling letter, to which Lord Buckingham means to answer by suggesting to him that he must try to make the Amersham troop a squadron, of which he is to be Major, and young Drake and Sir G. Russell the two Captains.

"I take for granted by seeing Lord Kirkwall in the papers as Captain of the Denbigh Foresters, that he does not mean to join your corps, but I suppose e'er now you have written to him and heard from him.

"Lord Buckingham has written to Lloyd, who will accept the inspectorship, but thinks it would be necessary that you should likewise write, and that you should find a colleague for him.

"Lord Buckingham has issued new brown cloaks with red collars, made by contract by Dickie, army clothier, London; the old cloak cases were leather rollers with pocket in lining for a couple of shirts; they were made at Buckingham.

"Thus ends my list of answers such as I am enabled to give them. It is some thing to find by the papers that there is no new Irish war out of Dublin, but the surprise of Government under all the circumstances is such as utterly destroys all possibility of confidence in what they think or say upon the subject."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 2. Stowe.—"Just returned home from our yeomanry exercise, I find your letter of the 31st ultimo, and do not fail to acknowledge it, though I have but very little time to answer it before dinner and post.

"Lord Buckingham had a confidential line to-day from Lord Hobart promising him an official answer to-morrow or next day, and telling him the general grounds of that answer which appear to my brother to be very satisfactory.

"Lord Hobart says that the yeomanry and county volunteers will be counted as part of the three-fourths of the first class; and that, moreover, twenty shillings will be allowed per man to clothe them, and a shilling a day for their exercise on every day, except Sundays, on which they exercise. Moreover, he says that although arms cannot universally be allowed, that the county of Bucks is one which will be provided. He seems also to think that by the immense number of volunteer offers already made, the compulsory part of the bill will in no instance probably be resorted to. This is the substance of what I collected from Lord Buckingham, that he is officially to hear to-morrow or next day. Nothing is

intimated about the offer made by Lord Buckingham, and he himself has not yet determined whether, under these new circumstances of allowances for clothing, exercise *et cetera*, he shall or shall not adhere to his first offer.

"I am glad that you like Lord Cathcart's adjutant, and hope you will succeed in making Colonel Shairp a yeoman lieutenant, as a second adjutant will certainly not be allowed. Your numbers seem as prosperous as one could wish. We had only seven absent this morning out of 137, and I understand Lord Temple furnishes as large a list or somewhat larger from Aylesbury.

"I am probably not more partial than Lord M[almesbury] W[indham] and E[lliott] to the measures of Government, but I am myself most clearly of opinion that we do better in the present moment by zealously executing the measures of ministers than by arraigning them or protesting against them in Parliament. It is very well for those few who have made a point of attending and resisting the defensive plans of our Ministers, to continue to do so if they think it useful, but I have great doubts whether that conduct has been advantageous to those who have adopted it, and I have no doubt at all that for us, who have taken the course of executing their measures instead of debating against them, the best and most consistent and most useful course will be to continue to try to make sense of their nonsense by doing whatever seems practicable; and that, in so doing, we do what, for a hundred reasons, is better than the most eloquent protest which can be put upon the journals of Parliament.

"Such, at least, is the general course of my own opinions, subject always to the consideration of better judgments.

"I hope by the continued silence of the papers as to Irish rebellion, that it has not spread as widely in the country as such extensive preparations in Dublin had seemed to announce; but it is a miserable thing to see that, even on this pressing and important point of danger, it is impossible to place the least confidence in the Government, or in their assurances."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 7. Stowe.—"I rescued the papers in question from the state of disgrace to which you had exposed them, and with the exception of some few who were already mutilated, the whole muster-roll of them is packed up and given to Fremantle, who passes this morning either through Beaconsfield or Maidenhead, and who undertakes from one of those two places to forward them to you without loss of time. My brother has heard nothing from Lord Hobart to-day.

"I have a letter from Yorkshire to-day complaining of the total want of arms, and ridiculing the notion of calling people to train in a churchyard without putting into their hands

one weapon of offence or defence. The magazine of Hull contains only 1,800 arms, and that is to supply the supplementary militia and the army reserve!!! Do you remember a fortnight ago that Addington, being asked in the House as to the supply of arms for the Training Bill, assured the House that Government had for a long time past adverted to that subject, and that there was an ample supply of arms to carry the Training Bill into effect. I go to-morrow to look at my old Aylesbury friends, at such of them at least as are not up to their ears in wheat and barley."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 9. Stowe.—"The post of this morning has brought hither Lord Hobart's answer respecting the numbers of our yeomanry, and the allowances for exercising the volunteer infantry. Lord Buckingham is perfectly satisfied that the first paragraph is a complete warrant to him to include all the troops which he had described to Lord Hobart as being within the arrangement which he proposed, and has desired me to tell you that you may go on with the eight troops, and that he will draw for them all. With respect to the allowance to be paid by each parish of 2s. 6d. for every day's drill, the plan which he means to follow, and which he recommends to your hundred, is that the magistrates and gentlemen should make a fund consisting of the twenty half crowns to be paid by each parish for twenty days' drill; and should, out of that fund, provide payments for an adjutant, sergeant-major and sergeants of companies. He recommends the selecting for adjutant some half-pay lieutenant upon the allowance of 50*l.* or 60*l.* *per annum*, or less if less will do, out of this fund; and for the sergeants of companies, any old militiamen who will certainly give their assistance for even less than half a crown a day, sergeant's pay being only 1s. 6d. per day.

"The expression of 'the serious inconvenience to Government' is too comical to escape your notice.

"The last paragraph of Lord Hobart's letter is the grateful acceptance and acknowledgment of my brother's offer; but as my brother has not absolutely decided whether he shall not require some additional exercise for the proposed county, he has desired me not to copy this paragraph, in order that nothing may be finally announced about it until he has finally determined upon the conditions of his offer. As soon as he shall have fixed it, he will communicate it to you.

"My second enclosure is an opinion on the militia laws which, as it is completely new in practice, is formed, as I suppose, upon a melancholy view of the difficulty or impossibility of filling up the militia with no other assistance than that of the fines.

"I exercised with 119 yesterday at Aylesbury, officers included, and about 50 have promised to work with the adjutant from four to six every Monday evening. The return of volunteers in these hundreds will amply supply the demand of the Training Bill; and I trust that in your neighbourhood the plan will be equally successful. Mrs. Stapleton is gone to Elton. I shall probably go on Friday to Althorp, unless my brother should want me for any help; and I may perhaps ride over to Elton from thence, but you shall know and hear from me.

Postscript.—"Lord Temple's Aylesbury are deficient of one lieutenant and one cornet; if you have any candidates that you cannot provide for, they would probably be gratefully received. The sage Bernard is one captain, but did not produce himself; if you have a captain to sell, perhaps Bernard might be tempted to fight on foot."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, August 10. Elton.—"I received yesterday with a parcel from town, a pamphlet written by Genz [Gentz] upon the French *compte rendu*, with a letter from Count de Montjoye Fröberg, who has been employed to have it printed. Count Montjoye Fröberg tells me that a few copies only have been printed, and that the communication is to be considered as confidential, Genz's situation at Vienna rendering that precaution necessary. He adds that it is his intention to send a copy to you, but, as he is not acquainted with you, he desires me to inform you of it, and apologize for his taking the liberty. This man was introduced to my acquaintance by a letter from Genz. I have heard him very well spoken of, and his conversation appears that of a man of sense and information. He lived in Jermyn Street when I was last in town, but as I have forgot the number, I send my letter to Coutts, who knows where he will be found.

"I had a letter about ten days ago from Genz at Vienna, who tells me he is preparing to attempt the apology of this country and distinguish its cause and its merits from those of its Ministers. He has desired me to send him *les pièces que Lord Auckland a fait imprimer avec un de ses derniers discours*. As I never send for Lord Auckland's speeches, I do not know what he means; perhaps you can tell me. He seems (from some newspaper report of your speech upon Lord King's motion) to have taken up some notions about our finance much more desponding than you would wish to circulate. Your object upon that occasion was not to represent a distressed situation of the public resources which no prudence could remedy, but to detect a false statement of the Minister's (which he had sent abroad to get a little temporary popularity) and to expose his absolute want of any rational system of finance.

But as the notions which circulate upon the Continent at the present conjuncture may materially affect this country, both now and at future periods, I could wish to have a hint from you what points I should particularly recommend to Genz, and what turn I should endeavour to give to his work before I write to him."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, September 3. Harley Street.—"Sa Majesté l'Empereur ayant reçu l'édition des Œuvres d'Homère que vous avez eu l'attention de lui envoyer, m'a chargé de vous témoigner toute la reconnoissance que lui inspire cette marque de votre égard envers sa personne. Infiniment satisfait d'avoir une aussi belle édition des œuvres du plus grand poète, il l'a mise dans sa bibliothèque, très flatté de les avoir d'une famille, dont les talens, les vertus, et le profond savoir sont connus à toute l'Europe; et qui, particulièrement, par vos principes politiques, par votre zèle pour la bonne cause, par votre amitié et attachement pour la Russie, a mérité l'estime générale de mes compatriotes, et, particulièrement, celle de sa Majesté Impériale."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, September 16. Gosfield.—"From Althorp and from Elton, by way of Audley End, I arrived here the day before yesterday with Windham, whom I had picked up at Lord Braybroke's. He is now gone on to pass a day or two with Sir James Craig and Sir Sydney Smith before he looks after his Cromer volunteers, which make the ultimate object of his excursion to Norfolk. His stay there cannot but be limited, because I see that he considers the meeting of Parliament as being inevitably fixed for November, and all that one hears or observes seems to show that the state of the public purse alone will make that meeting necessary, particularly if it be really true that after all the cookerics of the Property Tax Bill, it is still found too unintelligible and impracticable to be carried into effect. The military associate of your financial criticisms in the House of Lords is, as I hear, louder than ever in his attack upon this article of the public administration, and announces his determination of stating in the first moments of the session, the delusion that has been practised upon the public on this subject. I differ with him only as to the choice of this word, because I do think that the gross negligence and ignorance which has marked their money statements has been too gross to delude anybody but themselves. My friend who has just left us here seems to be of opinion that Ministers will begin their session by provoking an early discussion of the Catholic question, in order that Addington may take his ground

of opposition to it. There seems to be some ground for this conjecture, and my friend himself is confident that he is well founded in entertaining it; but upon this, as upon other matters, I hope soon to be able to converse with you, and the chief object of these lines is to learn from you what is the present state of your military labours, and whether in a few days I shall find you at Dropmore, or shall only hear of you with your flying squadrons among the woods and defiles of the Chiltern Hills. I have written to Major Lord Temple to know when he has directed his squadron of Aylesbury to embody for exercise, in order that I may see my old friends there; and I take it that the Buckingham and Winslow in addition will give me ample occupation for the next three weeks; but, at all events, I shall find time to come to you, so let me know about you as soon as you can."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803,] September 17. Stowe [Gosfield?].—"Tom is with me and talks of going soon to Dropmore; he brought Windham with him, who is gone to Norfolk to raise a corps which I prophesy will not be very soon found to his liking. His accounts of Ireland are as gloomy as mine: I have very particular reasons for believing that Lord Cathcart's instructions are such as General Fox resisted, and that Government have taken the resolution to force forward a most explicit avowal of the re-establishment of what they call the old system of English government in that kingdom. My information states that Lord Hardwicke has been induced to agree to it by Lord Redesdale, *against Mr. Wickham*. But whatever these great or little men may think upon it, I have no doubt but that the system of force to its full extent is entertained and will be pursued; and I have as little doubt that it will succeed in creating a new and general rebellion.

"*Postscript*.—Since I wrote this my fears respecting Ireland and my information respecting Lord Redesdale are confirmed. He has been writing *ostensibly* to Lord Fingall in the style of a fanatic of 1640, and these documents have run like wild-fire through all Ireland! He is certainly the real governor, *et Dii boni*, what a governor!"

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 7. Althorp.—"I write one line to tell you that I have come over hither for to-day and to-morrow and return to Stowe on Sunday. I saw Mansell at Aylesbury, who, on finding that I had fixed on the 24th for our inspection, intends to propose to you as early a day afterwards as may be for the inspection of the northern regiment. Our Aylesbury squadron

have very handsomely offered me to come over to Stowe for regimental exercise on Thursday and Friday, the 20th and 21st, and on Monday the 24th for inspection; so that all our difficulties about place are at an end, if Lord Buckingham sends me word that he approves, as he probably will, of this proposal.

"The Northamptonshire inspection is over. The general thanked them, but with some reserves of 'considering the short time they had been levied,' which did not sound very gracious. He criticised some of the horses, which he would not have done if he had seen mine at Aylesbury first; and he observed to Lord Spencer that there was no use for our service in any of Dundas's movements, but that we should act as skirmishers, as he saw the provincial troops act in America. I presume one may defend oneself by pleading ignorance upon a point upon which neither our civil nor our military governors have condescended to offer us any instructions. He, however, ended by announcing that he would come two or three days and ride about with Lord Spencer and his yeomen, though he observed it would be very troublesome to him to do so. All this I tell you to prepare you for the 13th. I imagine that it is through the Lord Lieutenant that the days of inspection should be settled with the inspecting-general, and therefore I presume that I am right in requesting you to name to him the 24th for our inspection, if that day be agreeable to him. Stowe must not be named till I have my brother's answer.

"Elliot writes word that the alert and the hurry of preparations continues in London to announce the expectation of attack, but says that only ten days ago, a post-captain commanding a corps of sea fencibles on the coast of Sussex, had still in vain applied for arms, and was still left ten days ago without any.

"Lady Buckingham has written to me from Gosfield, in great anxiety about my brother's having pocketed his resignation and carried his poor legs to Harwich. I cannot tell you how much I am vexed at this inconsiderate delay of his resignation, which still must arise out of illness, and that illness must come but too soon by his carrying so disordered a frame to fatigues and exertions that he is so little capable of supporting. Lady Buckingham says her only hope is in you and me to persuade him, but alas my rhetoric was in vain employed upon this subject every day that I was with him."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803,] October 9. Gosfield.—"I returned the day before yesterday from Harwich, having made a last and fruitless effort, in consequence of the alarm of immediate invasion, to resume my command, but a very slight exertion of one day so completely crippled me that, after trying twice the effect

of the hot sea-bath, I determined to make the sacrifice that has cost me very dear, and I have requested the King's leave to resign my regiment. I have been very ill both in body and mind and beat down for want of sleep, my pains having increased so much by the warmth of my bed. However, I am told that I am to be better. For the present I continue here, unless the landing should drive me hence, and in that case I must go to Buckinghamshire, though God knows very useless in every sense of the word. I enclose to you a letter from Gwynne aide-de-camp, and have sent a copy to Tom requesting him to send it to Mansell for the north yeomanry and infantry, and to Paulett for the middle infantry, and directing them to forward these returns to you. You will of course look to the returns of your own division and send the abstract of the whole to Gwynne."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 9. Stowe.—"I write one line to acknowledge your letters of the 6th and 7th, the latter of which seems to clear away the difficulty of the refusal of our adjutant's pay. Where it will be paid is another question, and perhaps you had better direct the same mode of application in your case and mine as in that of Mansell; but I do not know what the mode is by which Mansell is paid.

"I rejoice to find by my brother's letter of the 7th, that my brother being made ill by one day's exertion, has returned to Gosfield, and *has resigned*. I wish now he would come to Stowe. His indisposition will allow of his continuing you his vice, and will be his excuse for having nothing to say to Gwynne, whom I can undertake, and save him all trouble. Do not forget to let me know if Gwynne approves of the 24th. My brother gladly accepts the Aylesbury offer to come to Stowe, and, when you name the 24th, you will, of course, tell Gwynne that, though my brother is absent, I can give him a bed at Stowe.

"I am now here till the 24th, or possibly after that—Fremantle desires me to put off exercise till the 17th. I have told him it is impossible, but I suppose he will not come till then.

"I can get no answer from Lowndes, who does not seem very accessible, but I will do all I can to get you a return; there is no trace here of your letter to me. Lord B[uckingham] has certainly had it and burned it."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803,] October 14. Gosfield.—"I have this moment received your letter, and am very grateful for all that you say and all that you do to relieve my mind from all that presses upon it.

I am very unwell in health, but my spirits are still more depressed, beyond what they would be by illness, from the sense that I can lend no exertion to assist in any way at such a crisis. As to returning to Buckinghamshire, I cannot look to it at present, but about the beginning of November I shall go to Stowe, if I am not driven from hence before that time. I cannot understand the delay of your infantry arms, for all Essex is fully provided, and I have heard of other counties; nor can I conceive why they should choose to put into your hands such a document of criminal neglect.

"I have just heard from Tom, who desires me to recommend to you the name of *Lord George Grenville* to be cornet in the middle regiment of yeomanry cavalry. I find that he has recommended Robert Lowndes to be cornet, *vice* Tookey, resigned, and therefore George will be the youngest cornet.

"I will write to Yorke to urge training of [dues ?] for I find that in the Cottesloe hundred there are two refractory parishes that will not pay till they see what they will be compelled.

"Some particular circumstances have satisfied me that the Texel armament, which in number of troops and of water craft is much the largest, is destined for Lynn. This has set me to examine that plan, and it is obviously so much the easiest from turning all our lines of defence and of operation, and from having the certainty of forty-eight hours uninterrupted in their debarkation, that I am satisfied they will gain greater facilities for their move of 94 miles to London, than by attempting Harwich or Dover at the distance of 72. We can spare no troops from this coast to check such an attempt, so long as the other armaments threaten the coast of Essex; and one forced march of the enemy of less than 30 miles from Lynn, and of 25 from Wisbeach, gives them all the French prisoners now at Norman Cross, guarded only by one militia battalion. Pray look to the extreme facility of this project, which, I again repeat, I have very strong reason to *know* to have been in the contemplation of Andreossi, but it was joined to a feint upon Hull from the Elbe which is probably now at an end."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 20. Walmer Castle.—"I am ashamed of having appeared so tardy both in answering a gentleman's letter and returning an author's works. Do not imagine, however, from it that I have been indifferent to either. The fact is that I received your packet just as I was going to my brother's quarters at Chatham, and as he wished much to read the manuscript I left it with him. I have since been expecting to hear from him on the subject, but I have now written to him begging him to return the papers to you, under Hammond's cover. I flatter myself he cannot see any reason to object to the publication, and as far as my opinion goes, I wish it most

eagerly, as I think it may prove essentially useful. It might, however, be rendered useful in a much greater degree if, after stating (as you have done in the preface) that the instructions given are to be considered only as relating to broken and detached parts of education, and not as forming a system, you would take the trouble to supply (as you very easily could) this deficiency. Formidable as the enumeration may seem, it would, I am sure, cost you very little labour to lay down a complete course of study, with a list of authors in the several branches of classics (especially Greek), mathematics, and philosophy, ethics, public law and treaties, history and memoirs, and what (for want of any other terms) I am afraid I must be contented to call *statistics*. By the latter I mean of course Adam Smith, and a very little besides. You will, I am sure, not think that any one of these branches is superfluous, with a view to making a man such a scholar as may best qualify him for public life; and I know, too, that my father would not have omitted any one of them, if he had been to give at one view a general outline of a plan of education. Pray consider whether you could not compress the detail of what I propose in a narrow compass, and whether you can render a greater public service than by teaching young men of hope and promise how they may really employ their time to the best advantage from the period of coming to the University till five-and-twenty, and as long after as they please.

“These ideas may seem a little romantic when we look at the present breed of statesmen, but perhaps they may not be quite thrown away in some future generation, if it should ever again be thought that there is room for something more than *moderate talents* and *moderate acquirements* in managing the concerns of a great empire.”

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, October 30. Elton.—“Elizabeth will write to you with more detail what passed during the bishop of Lincoln’s visit to us the end of last week. When the bishop first entered upon a political conversation with me, he introduced it by speaking of the certainty of Pitt’s appearing at the opening of the session; of his resentment of the conduct of Mr. Addington; that I was for some time persuaded that he would act a vigorous and decided part; and that the principal or rather the only difficulty which still weighed upon his mind was the danger of throwing the Fox party into a close alliance with the ministry. This was said in such a manner, the bishop at the same time affirming that Mr. Fox would be content to remain out himself provided his friends were admitted into a new arrangement, that I though the was endeavouring to learn what might be my sentiment upon some negotiation which he knew to be on foot. I did not hesitate to say that I thought

such an accession of real strength and reputation was not to be neglected, especially if all difficulty about Mr. Fox himself was, as he seemed to be certain, entirely removed. But I afterwards found that in the bishop's opinion the easiness and good nature of Mr. Pitt's temper is such that it is even now no improbable conjecture that he may forgive Mr. Addington. It is, however, in the bishop's opinion, certain that he will attend at the opening of the session, and speak his sentiments whatever they then may be. The bishop himself makes no scruple to say that, if his pupil does not now stand forward, openly censure the conduct of ministers, and press for their removal from office, the great talents which he possesses may again, after a course of time, bring him into power; but he will completely have destroyed his own consequence for the present, and the situation he has hitherto held in the public estimation. With these feelings he is very anxious that those who think as he does, whose abilities Mr. Pitt respects, and whose friendship he confides in, should at this moment see and talk with him, and counteract the impressions which other persons who have access to him may make upon the easiness of his temper and his good nature. To suppose that Mr. Pitt can be influenced by the most contemptible agents against his own conviction, against his interest, and against his principles, notwithstanding his sense of the public danger, is to impute to him a degree of weakness which is not credible, and which would make his alliance of no value to any part[y]. His sincerity appears more fairly questionable. It is a fact which is very striking, if you are hitherto unacquainted with it, that Mr. Pitt wrote a letter in the presence of Addington, which was read and approved by him, to be communicated by one of the Willises to the King, by which he was to pledge himself not to bring forward the Catholic question; and it seems evident to me from the tenor of the conversations I have heard, that, in the interval of suspense occasioned by the King's illness, other steps were taken besides what I have just stated, not unknown to Mr. Pitt, and frustrated or eluded, in the bishop's opinion, by the art and pertinacity of Mr. Addington only. If you had communication of all this at the time, it is all well; but, if not, the sincerity of the Great Man's conduct cannot be defended. As things stand at present, the bishop will have represented to Mr. Pitt not his own opinion only, but that of others of his friends, that even those who gave such an extraordinary proof of attachment to him as to vote for his question of adjournment, will leave him, if he does not take some firm and decided part at the meeting of Parliament. The bishop seems to think it important that you should see Pitt at this juncture, and to be upon the whole persuaded that his resentment against Addington, particularly excited by the pamphlet, burns very high; and that, if there is still any hesitation, it proceeds not from want of inclination to oppose

with vigour, but doubt as to the means and mode of doing it with effect. In the meantime the presumption of ministers is rising every day, and Lord Westmorland told the bishop here, 'you see that all they told us of Pitt's power and influence in Parliament is come to nothing. He was to have swallowed us up at once, but he made the trial, and Mr. Addington appeared a greater man than he.' The bishop seemed to wish that something like the call that was made last year for Pitt by Cartwright, Sir H. Mildmay, and others, might again take place, and to think that it would decide him. I told him I thought it not probable that men of that description, having been once disappointed by him, should commit themselves again; but that, upon the first indication of Mr. Pitt having determined to act against ministers, I did not doubt but that he would have their support. In truth, unless you were sure of him, it is folly any longer to embarrass your own measure with any consideration for him."

THE COUNTESS OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, October 30.] Elton.—"It is a very long while since I have heard from you or even of you, but as I know you always save your poor eyes as much as possible, I should not even now write to you were I not desirous of communicating to you some conversations which I have had within the two last days with the b[ishop] of L[incoln]. He seems even more desirous than ever that his friend should come forward at the meeting of Parliament, and though he has not seen Mr. P[itt] lately, he hears that his language has been that of great resentment at the general conduct of the Government towards him, particularly at the publication of the pamphlet. Three weeks ago he said that he was determined to attend on the first day of the session and avow his sentiments, but still the b[ishop] seems to apprehend a change in those sentiments from the extreme lenity and facility of his temper, in the event of any conciliatory steps towards him being taken by Government. If, however, the general tone of the party may be learned from Lord Westmorland (who dined here two days ago) they mean to set Pitt at defiance; saying that his House of Commons division plainly showed his inferiority in point of strength to Addington; indeed Lord Westmorland's language on this point was coarse and almost indecent with respect to his former friend. The b[ishop], however, so far agrees with Lord Westmorland as to think that Mr. P[itt]'s political importance will really be lost if he plays the same game that he did last year, and he is very anxious to prevent, if possible, the accession of Fox's party to Government, which would perhaps be hindered if *you* and *they* could *understand each other*; as he says he thinks he has reason to believe that Fox has no *personal* political views whatever, and

therefore some arrangement with him might possibly be managed. Under these impressions the b[ishop] wishes very much that P[itt] should not be left entirely at this moment in the hands of the Philistines, and unequivocally offers himself to do anything that you may think expedient in any possible shape. I hear Lord Chatham complains loudly of his brother's conduct, and says that Pitt's ambition could never be more fully gratified than by coalescing with the present Government, whom he would find willing to accede to all his views. P[itt] speaks much of the fear of disturbing the K[ing]'s mind, and indeed he seems to have more apprehension on that subject than the present state of the K[ing]'s health seems to call for. Did you know that in the interval between P[itt]'s resignation, and his actually going out of office, he made Doctor Thomas Willis the channel of a promise which he made to the King never to bring forward the Roman Catholic question. The message was given to Willis in the presence of Addington, and the b[ishop] saw the letter which Willis actually wrote to the K[ing] on the subject. Notwithstanding this, I am tempted to believe that the promise *did never actually* reach the K[ing], as I was told last winter of the King's *then* mentioning the Roman Catholic question as an insurmountable barrier between him and his old ministry. It is more than probable that you may be perfectly acquainted with every circumstance to which I have alluded, but, on points of so much importance, it is better not to leave anything to probability. We are in all the horrors of a review to-morrow, and moreover the perspective of a review in hard rain, which will be particularly unfortunate to my poor husband's gouty habit and swelled legs, which, alas! but little accord with his present avocations."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 7. Elton.—"I certainly agree with you that, after all we have already said in Parliament, we are not called upon at the present moment for more than to mark our opinion that every part of the subsequent conduct of Administration has only served to confirm the judgment we formerly passed upon them. At the same time, as they must bring forward new measures, and must attempt to botch the old ones at the very beginning of the session, our attendance cannot long be withheld; nor will there want opportunities for Pitt to mark his concurrence with us if, at length, he can be roused to act a vigorous and manly part.

"With respect to the Catholic question, the difference you state as probable I consider as certain, after what I have heard and communicated to you. And on this as well as on other occasions, I shall feel great pleasure in the comparison that must be made of your firm, manly, and consistent

conduct, with the shifting, undecided, and fluctuating behaviour in another quarter. On the question itself, if ever it comes forward, you and I shall probably differ. Of the policy of a general comprehension I have no doubt. The mode of effecting it is very disputable. That admitting the Roman Catholics of Ireland to sit in Parliament and hold offices like the members of the Established Church is called for by the peculiar circumstances of Ireland, I cannot admit ; I think the very reverse. Instead of tending to pacify Ireland, it seems to me likely to produce an immediate civil war that would shake the kingdom to its base ; and even if it should fall short of such a calamity, it would continue to inflame beyond all former example the animosities between the two religious parties."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 13. Elton.—"I would have copied the enclosed, as I doubt whether you will be able to read it, but I have not time. It is from Judge Osborne, who has just been on a special commission to try the persons detained for treason in the north of Ireland. I think his account not uninteresting at this juncture."

Enclosure.

Extract.—"It is now clear beyond a possibility of doubt from the investigations at Downpatrick and Carrickfergus that the rebellious spirit has not gained any ground, but, on the contrary, is completely down. I do not go so far as to say that all engaged in the former rebellion are converts in principle, but they are in general (I mean the Dissenters of the north), steady now ; though I think they wish to place their loyalty on rather an unsatisfactory basis, namely that the country is in danger from the Catholics. It is a lamentable thing that the country should be so considered in that state with respect to foreign invasion, that it should be thought prudent to give countenance to such an opinion in order to fix that party. I know not how far the Government avow it, but this I know, that in the north-west with the exception of Donegal, and as far as I have seen in the north-east, the yeomanry corps are all raised on the Orange principle ; and the line of demarcation between Catholic and Protestant is at this moment more visibly drawn, and more odiously, than it ever was within our memory. This may be a good principle for a recruiting sergeant, but it is none for a statesman."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 29. Charles Street.—"The navy estimates come on to-morrow ; the army is fixed, as I understand, for Monday ; if on this latter question you think any previous

conversation useful, or wish to have the subject pressed, you had better come for that purpose on Saturday. But do as you will, for it is so difficult to say enough upon that topick without saying too much, that, great as the temptation is, the embarrassment of the matter is likewise very great. Sussex is reinforced, and has now about 10,000 regulars and militia. The whole of regulars and militia in Kent and Sussex, including cavalry regiments and artillery, is near 33,000; on this return I know I can depend. These are :—

16 regiments of Regular Infantry	12,800
Militia	14,300
Regular Cavalry.....	4,000
Horse Artillery.....	400
Artillery	600
	<hr/>
	32,100

This is thin enough, but it is better than it was.

“My brother comes Sunday or Monday for certain.

“We have taken Surinam, and are firing and bell-ringing as if we had drowned the French, as well as plundered the Dutch.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, November 30. Charles Street.—“I think *the* answer a most heartless and washy performance; the general tone of it apologetic to such a degree as to create in the reader no belief that the writer himself is confident in his own cause, and from the beginning to the end the prominent feature of it is rather the fear of giving offence than the desire of doing justice and of asserting truth. I should likewise be not a little struck by the feeble and unequal vindication of Lords Grenville and Spencer and Mr. Windham if I could have expected that, where the principal hero is shewn to so little advantage, the secondary personages had any chance of being placed in fair and favourable lights. But my greatest objection to it is that, as universally as it is read, it gives the impression of that neutral and negative course being now as much as ever the course adopted and pursued by the person of whom it chiefly treats, and I already find that more is lost in this impression than is gained by the few contradictory facts which are so delicately touched upon in it.

“There is some little expectation of debate on our army estimates, which, I hope, will be put off till you are come to town. Fox most certainly attends, and by what I hear will certainly attack. I believe that even beyond his own opinions, which are insuperably contemptuous of the Doctor, he is determined to show that his sentiments are not to be looked for in Sheridan’s contrivances.

“Perhaps C[anning?] will think this an occasion which

would admit of his appearing and taking part ; at least I am not aware of any inconsistency or inconvenience that his appearance would produce to him."

THE COUNTESS OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803, November. Elton Hall.]—"I send you, by Lord Carysfort's desire, an extract of a letter which he wrote yesterday to the bishop, in answer to that which you will already have received from Lord Carysfort.

"We are to be in town, I believe, before the meeting of Parliament, and indeed the state of politics and of his Lordship's leg equally incline him to leave Elton."

Enclosure.

Extract.—"Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt being agreed upon so material a point as the necessity of removing Mr. A[ddington] from his present situation, it must be a matter not only of regret but of surprise that they should not be able to reconcile any difference of opinion between them as to the sort of opposition to be carried on against him in Parliament ; and I cannot help thinking that Mr. Pitt's avowal that he intends opposition would in itself be sufficient to incline (not merely Lord Grenville and his friends who have made it a principal object to be united with Mr. Pitt, and place him again at the head of affairs, but) all the parties who mean to oppose, to leave the mode pretty much at his option.

"I lament extremely that I was so unfortunate as to have left town before you called in Cumberland Place, and more that your Lordship did not see Lord G[renville], for your letter leads me to think that Mr. Pitt and he may not have understood each other. Lord G[renville]'s attachment to Mr. Pitt has been so conspicuous, and I am persuaded that his communications have been so frank and explicit, that I cannot account for Mr. Pitt's using any reserve with him ; and I must be of opinion that greater openness, where there is such solid ground for confidence, would lead to more satisfactory results."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 2. Walmer Castle.—"The subject of the letter which I received from you yesterday is a very large and a very difficult one ; and I shall be most anxious to converse with you fully upon it as soon as possible. I hope to be at liberty to leave this place on Monday se'nnight, and to reach town that day, or at latest Tuesday morning, and shall be extremely glad if it suits you to come to town about that time. My ideas, as far as I have hitherto had an

opportunity of considering the question (which I have done at different times) correspond very much with those you suggest. The second of the two measures you have in view might, I am inclined to think, be rendered more complete and effectual by adding to the mutual guarantee of individual merchants and bankers, an engagement on the part of the public to receive the paper so guaranteed (under proper regulations and for a limited time) in payment of taxes, and an association among landed proprietors to receive them in like manner in payment of rent. But to render this measure safe, and to prevent giving a false credit in many cases, it may perhaps be necessary to have (if the time will admit of it) some previous secret Commission to examine the solidity of the Houses to whom this measure should apply, and to ascertain and limit the amount of their circulation. These, however, and many other details of great delicacy and difficulty, must be reserved till we meet. Another point nearly connected with this, and which also strikes me as of great importance, is how to prevent the danger of large classes of manufacturers being suddenly deprived of their subsistence, if any alarm should lead in any part of the kingdom to a general stagnation of business. I write this, as you will perceive, in great haste, having just at present hardly any leisure from my new duties."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 3. Charles Street.—"Tuesday is now become as good as Wednesday, because Leigh has this moment told me that the army estimates do not come on till Friday: I still feel persuaded that something must be said by the new as well as the old on that occasion. I find Elliott so indignant about the Martial Law Bill being renewed without any new information to Parliament that he is almost determined to speak upon the second reading on Monday: the subject is a delicate one, inasmuch as the language one holds will be represented as opposing the prosecution of vigorous measures in Ireland, and, if any thing is said by any of us, great care must be taken to avoid coming within that imputation; my notion of what is desirable would be to plead the absolute necessity of Parliament giving sober and mature consideration to the present state of Ireland, and to complain that Government without giving any real grounds of judgement to the United Parliament, expect that Parliament to act only upon the changeable and changing and inconsistent language of ministers respecting that country; a language which in the last session began with calling the insurrection a formidable rebellion, and then treated it as no other than a partial and temporary tumult; and that in this session begins by expressing the King's hopes of permanent tranquillity there,

and six days afterwards goes on to renew the *precise bill of last year*, the preamble of which recites a *rebellion now raging in Ireland*; such remarks as these might be directed not against the measure so much as against the neglect of ministers in not laying proper ground for the measure, and against the inconsistency of ministers in their language and conduct respecting Ireland; and might be the best first vehicle of our opinion that the affairs and state of Ireland require sober and mature deliberation, grounded upon authentic documents and Parliamentary grounds. To do this well would perhaps be more than one is sure of, and to do it ill would be a great mischief. The old Secretary at War and Russian ambassador, as Lord Temple tells me, sat by him, Lord Temple, in yesterday's short discussion.

"I am glad you think as I do of the shabby performance which I mentioned: if it were possible to write half a dozen letters they might appear separately, and would be capable of being reprinted together, and so would have a double effect.

"My Wiltshire cousin has called to tell me how desirous he is to take his share in any attack on ministers, and begs to know of anything that may include his assistance; he is for the present gone back to the country, supposing nothing serious to be done till after Christmas."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 20. Charles Street.—I have a negotiation upon my hands, the success of which, like many others, I have satisfied myself will be better assisted by my speaking out plainly, than by my keeping a mysterious secret. My brother, whose kindness, as you know, always runs before every possible circumstance that can contribute to the comfort of any of us, had commissioned me to look about and to hire for him an unfurnished house at the rent of 250 or 300 pounds *per annum*, which house, when become his, he intends to insist upon your occupying and keeping warm and comfortable for him: in this commission I am irrecoverably engaged, and therefore I do not write to consult you about my accepting or not a commission which I have accepted, and which I owe to my brother the faithful execution of; but it has occurred to me to-day that, seeing as I did your predilection for Lord Harrowby's house, which was to cost you about 500 pounds, my brother's commission would be best satisfied by his giving the sum which he has named for the annual rent of that house, by which means you will have at the cost only of 200 pounds to yourself a house which you and Lady Grenville seemed to have no other objection to than that it cost 500 pounds. I am myself so struck with the advantage of this arrangement that I could not avoid discussing it with

my brother, who approves highly of it, altho', in case of your declining this, I must execute his original commission as I had promised to do. Write therefore to acquiesce in our dearest brother's kindness, and write likewise to Lord Harrowby to fix him. If you saw anything when you visited Lord Harrowby's house that created an objection, give me at least a hint where I can best execute my remaining commission the most to your mind."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 21. Charles Street.—"I enclose to you Lord Harrowby's answer to my protest of yesterday against his parting with his house, till he should have heard from you.

"I had a letter to-day from the person whom we met on the east side of Grosvenor Square, to say that '*in deference to the judgement of others*' he had declined for the present the matter that he had mooted to me; that if he altered his mind he would give me the earliest notice, and that he need not add that the matter, if brought forward by others, would have his warmest support.

"My answer was to thank him for the frankness of his communications; to observe that the inconvenience of bringing on the question was that its effect would have tended to strengthen those whose power I thought a great evil; and that the advantage of the question would have been to have shewn, however ineffectually, a disposition towards conciliation that could not but have been of publick benefit; that I hoped his decision was for the best, and easily could see how necessary it might be in such a matter to defer to the inclinations and opinions of others. I added that ministers were, as I heard, more intent upon preventing enquiry into the last insurrection, than on taking measures to prevent a renewal of the same scenes; but that York's assertions had been too strong to be patched up *with the publick*, and that I could not be sorry for any topic the discussion of which must draw the attention of the country to what had passed, and might probably again pass in Ireland. Elliot and Windham will be at Beaconsfield on Monday or Tuesday, and I have half invited them to Dropmore on Wednesday by half promising to meet them there on my way to Stowe."

The SAME to the SAME.

1803, December 24. Charles Street.—"The town has been full of the Brest fleet, but Nepean denies it, and says the whole story is a fiction caused by the arrival of an Admiralty express which came, but came from a very different quarter, and brought no Brest news whatever. I see no objection to

your writing to Kent *generally* to say that the idea which had been entertained was not to be pursued at the present, and was not likely to be resumed in that quarter without some new change of circumstances of which previous notice would be given.

"I hope certainly to be with you on Wednesday, and Elliot tells me that he and Windham will be there on that day and sleep there."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, December 25. Walmer Castle.—"Allow me to remind you of your promise to send me your code for the volunteers. I hope there will be no treason in sending it under Hammond's cover. In spite of winter gales, we are again taught both by accounts from the opposite coast, and by intimations from headquarters, to expect some early attempt from the enemy. Just at present the weather puts it wholly out of the question, but the suspense from day to day will probably keep me here till the meeting of Parliament, and prevent my seeing you, as I had hoped to do, in my way to Bath.

"I conclude nothing interesting will be likely to arise for a few days after Parliament meets again. Before anything does, I shall wish very much to talk further with you on the strange state of things."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], December 25. Stowe.—"Indeed you waste your time and paper very idly in employing them on so very trifling a matter as the very small token (which Tom undertook to arrange) of my wishes that you should not feel yourself checked in any of your views of amusement of Lady Grenville of yourself or of *the Doctor*, by the not having the lodging for which you were looking: be so good therefore as to arrange your matters and you will find that Mr. Coutts will have the 300*l.* ready for you.

"I cannot understand the meaning of all this alarm on the Eastern coast, but the troops are all very alert there (amounting *entre nous* by last week's return to 27,600 rank and file) and all neutrals are ordered out of the ports between Hull and the Thames. Surely our Government cannot expect an invasion on Essex and Suffolk in January! The same authority whom I quoted to you for Russian news tells me that things look worse for us in that quarter; and an authority equally good of Addington's confidence tells me that the Doctor is confident that France must give way in this struggle in the course of the next six months, from absolute want of money and means. How can this be?"

"I have just got a note from Lord Carysfort and Elizabeth to tell me that they will be here on the 7th, when we shall have Lady Williams and Tom, and I shall be extremely tempted to find out that he and I can do nothing in the way of yeomanry without you."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1803], December 30. Stowe.—"I have received your letter and its enclosure and have delivered it as you wished, it being in every particular everything I wished. Tom will be here to-morrow and will, I am sure, be pleased with it.

"I find that Government are very seriously alarmed, and are endeavouring to spread that alarm of invasion which I cannot prevail on myself to credit. Perhaps they may find it essential to cry out, but the old story of the wolf is, I think, very applicable to the present moment, for I am much mistaken if the people at large join in that cry. I hope that you have seen the sermon to us all on the subject of coalition in the *Morning Chronicle* of Wednesday last, and the supplement to it, evidently written by Mr. Sheridan, in the same paper of yesterday.

"I trust and hope that the Doctor has seen them, for they must be highly gratifying to him.

"I hear that he is fully satisfied that Pitt and Fox can never agree; and I hear this from a quarter I credit."

LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1803, December 31. Dropmore.—"By this post or the next you will receive, under Hammond's cover, our cavalry and infantry regulations. I shall be very happy if they are of any use to you.

"Should Bonaparte have derived no other advantage from the present panic of Government than the keeping you at Walmer till Parliament actually meets again, I think this may stand him in the stead of many victories. If he can keep the Government, the Parliament and the country in the present state of inaction and suspense, he accomplishes that object which he ought most reasonably to pursue. There is no other means of speedily and effectually putting an end to this evil, but by an understanding between the considerable persons in the country, forgetting past differences, and uniting to rescue us from a danger which is not the less fearful because it may not be quite so immediate as those which we had the good fortune to escape this year. The success of such an experiment depends entirely on the advantages which the present moment affords for it. If we all remain looking at each other, and forbearing to act separately lest we should render future co-operation

more difficult, or should contribute to the success of something that we may think not the best, the consequence must be that new circumstances will arise to make all co-operation impossible, and that, in the end, no men or description of men will find themselves strong enough to do the country any real service in or out of office. I conceive, therefore, that we all owe it to ourselves, to one another, and to the country, to make up our minds upon this great question during the present recess, and so far to act upon the decision as to have ascertained whether what we think best can be effected, and, if not, what other course remains for us to pursue. But for this purpose communication and intercourse during the course of the next month is indispensably necessary, and I am so much impressed with this that, although as you well know not naturally of a very locomotive disposition, yet I should not for a moment hesitate in meeting you, if that cannot be in London which would be on many accounts the best, then at any other place (Walmer included) that you may prefer. You will see in this anxiety to communicate with you the same sentiments public and private towards you which I have uniformly felt for more than twenty years, and which have not varied even when our opinions upon particular questions have not been in unison. It is, and I am sure it always will be, the first wish of my heart that our lines may entirely agree; and, next to this, that if they cannot entirely agree, they may as little differ as possible. But indeed this is not a moment in which I can think it right or honourable for either of us to forbear to speak and act decidedly, and to take, while it is yet time, all honest and just steps for giving weight and efficacy, and for procuring support and authority to those opinions on which (if they be right) the safety of the country depends.

"You are already in possession of all facts that I am myself in possession of up to this time. Much more you must have heard than I can even guess as to the opinions of those whose opinions may have weight with you; and when you consider the circumstances in which I am placed, you will, I am sure, not be surprised if you should think you see some personal impatience of the present suspense mixed with a very sincere opinion that, on public grounds, that suspense is more to be deprecated than *any* one, I speak absolutely without exception, of the three or four different ways in which it may be terminated.

"I go to town for Wednesday and Thursday to settle about taking Lord Harrowby's house. A letter from you, directed to me at Lord Fortescue's in Grosvenor Square, would find me there either of those days." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 4. Walmer Castle.—"I feel very truly obliged to you for all the personal kindness and friendship

expressed in your letter, and enter very fully into your feelings as to the necessity of our settling with as little loss of time as possible whatever may be the course for each of us to pursue. If I should find that I am likely to be confined much longer to the coast, it will be the greatest possible satisfaction to me that you should execute your kind intention of coming here ; but I wish much, if possible, to save you the trouble of so distant an excursion, and I begin to think that I may be released sooner than I expected. A few days must probably now decide whether the enemy entertains any serious intention of making an attempt at this season ; as the wind is now perfectly fair, and the weather much more favourable for their purpose than could be expected during the winter. If, therefore, they do not make use of this opportunity, I shall hardly think it necessary to wait their motions much longer. There is certainly an appearance of activity on their coast, and another large reinforcement of gun boats, I believe, found its way to Boulogne yesterday, without the possibility of being molested ; but, notwithstanding these preparations, and the intelligence which Government appears to have received, I do not much believe they will try the experiment, on the faith of so uncertain a promise as that of a calm day in January."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 7. Felbrigg.—"I shall never be able to get to town by Saturday. I had written to Elliot wishing even for a longer respite, though I suppose I must now give up any such hope. I *suppose* this, however, altogether upon the footing of *confidence* : for I do not myself see what there is which we shall have to do or to decide immediately ; and still less what there is which I shall not feel very glad to find already decided. If I were not pleading to those, who being once in London, were *Nescii humanis precibus mansuescere*, I should say that, if there was nothing immediately to be done, I might, in respect to counsel and deliberation, wait till Tuesday or after. I shall not however venture upon this unless further advised and authorized. Should it happen that, after pushing to reach town by Sunday, I should find that you were gone to Dropmore, and nothing was to be done in the House on Tuesday, it would be charity to let me know, even though I should at this time have left Felbrigg. Were there time, I should do some good by going through Colchester, and talking about what we have been projecting here, with Sir James Craig ; unless indeed the account is true that Lord Cornwallis is about to be appointed to the eastern district, a change which, at this period, I hardly know whether to be glad or sorry for. I am at present, as you see, wholly engrossed with the military campaign. I shall, however, from this moment transfer myself with all diligence to the Parliamentary one."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 8. York Place.—“I have thought it best to make use without delay of the interval which the present state of the weather affords, and am here for three or four days. I would propose coming to you at Dropmore, but there are a few persons whom I shall wish to have the opportunity of seeing in town, and I should also not like to add so many miles more to my distance from Walmer, in case any real or imaginary alarm should suddenly call me back. I therefore hope it will not be inconvenient to you to come up to town. The sooner you can, the better.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 12. Althorp.—“I write a line from this place, where I arrived yesterday, to tell you that the new Irish Secretary is Sir Evan Nepean. The offer of succeeding to Nepean at the Admiralty was made to Mr. Marsden, who declined accepting it, and intimated at the same time his determination to quit the office of Under-Secretary to the Admiralty which he has long been weary of. It seems doubtful whether Lord St. Vincent will at once make Tucker Secretary to the Admiralty, or whether he will begin by placing Tucker at first in Marsden's room; all this, however, is speculation as to future arrangement, but the two Secretariats of the Admiralty are actually vacated. How far the Irish Marsden will be reconciled to serve under Nepean may be a question as difficult to solve as it is difficult to conceive what particular motive should have led to so whimsical a nomination for Ireland as that of a man entirely unconnected with the Lord Lieutenant, the Secretary of State, and the country and business where he is going to preside. This change in all its circumstances seems to announce more weakness and rottenness in the present feeble system of government than I had suspected; and I should almost incline to think that they could not maintain themselves or be maintained, if they were not fortunate enough to find an artificial strength in the marvellous weakness of those from whom they naturally should expect their downfall. A report is current, and is said to be not without authority, that Addington has very recently represented in the closet the impossibility of his going on, and that he was answered by being told that he could have no real difficulty while he met with no real opposition. I do not vouch the truth, but I do not utterly reject it as incredible.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1804, January 13. Althorp.—“I have communicated to Lord Spencer the letter which you enclosed to me from my brother, as well as that which contained your own sentiments

upon it. I confess that I am not disappointed now at the determination which it announces, because I was not disappointed at the sight of the few previous lines from William which you had shewn to me at Stowe, and which left no possible doubt as to the result of the conferences in Baker Street. It is easier however to see the inefficiency that so much disgraces the principal actor in this tragedy, than to decide upon the parts which it leaves to us to act in it. I continue to agree with you as much as I did in thinking that it is our business to pursue the course which we have followed, and to obtain the best assistance which we can get in making that course effectual. Perhaps I may entertain some degree of doubt whether that line, which you so naturally dwell upon as our obvious resource in the present circumstances, be as much in our reach to decide upon as might be imagined; but of this as of every other part of this interesting discussion, I must defer the details till Monday, on which day I shall return to Stowe to dinner, with your horses if you send them to Towcester, or otherwise with post-horses.

“Lord Spencer’s intention had been to go up to town for the birthday, and from thence to Norfolk for ten days shooting; but as he agrees in the necessity of discussion upon this important matter, he has abandoned his project of the birthday, and has undertaken to come over to Stowe on Wednesday next to meet William and you and me on that day. He desires you therefore to have the goodness to apprise Lord Grenville of his having put off his journey to town and Norfolk, in hopes of meeting him at Stowe on Wednesday; and, further to ensure this desirable object, he will hold himself equally ready for Thursday or Friday if either of those days should be more agreeable to Lord Grenville for our meeting at Stowe than Wednesday. By sending to Dropmore you will have an answer, and I can communicate it to Lord Spencer from Stowe on Monday, if Lord Grenville should prefer Thursday or Friday to Wednesday.

“No successor is appointed to Nepean, who goes to Ireland; Marsden of the Admiralty still declines, but this is *entre nous*.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, January 14.] Stowe.—“I cannot repine at the circumstances that induce Lord Spencer and Tom to press you so earnestly to meet them at Stowe, for they will at all events give me your society for one day. Fix your day, and a pair of my horses shall meet you at Winslow at such hour as you shall appoint to help you on to Stowe. If you want a saddle horse pray let me know, but otherwise I send none, as I think your servant always goes on the box.

“As to the decision that seems to be taken I could not help

observing to Tom that I am satisfied (if Pitt's mind is as much incensed as you think it) that he will gradually heat himself in the discussions which he announces, though I am equally satisfied that his only *decision* is to let *us* make the opposition to Addington as strong as we can make it by any means in our reach, and to secure to himself the undisputed right of taking such part in whatever of any sort arises out of it, as he may at the time think proper.

"It is useless to comment on such a game, but I am satisfied that this is his course, though I think that in various ways and from various causes he will be forced to abandon it, and in the mean time he will lose in strength and character, and the ministry will stand till some great national calamity drives them out.

"Our line in all this appears to me very clear, namely, to increase the activity and energy of our opposition, to endeavour to find grounds on which as many can act in concert as possible, looking for that concert with Mr. Fox in the same manner as Lord Rockingham, Lord Shelburn, and twenty other discordant *Dii Minores* acted together, and endeavouring to find grounds occasionally on which Mr. Pitt may, for reasons of his own and perhaps unexplained to us, give us the advantage of his attack. Out of such an opposition it is possible that the good many arise of routing the Doctor, and I am ready before hand to say that, though I have a most decided opinion of what might be best for the succession to him, yet I am contented to think that we had done much good even if the result of it were that Pitt should join Addington, or that Fox should form a Ministry entirely of those whose opinions during the last ten years have been most adverse to ours.

"I look on those two results as being very bad, but as very possible; and I am prepared to work against the Doctor even if I were sure that one of these was the only alternative.

"I have nothing more to add upon this subject except that I can account for Mr. Pitt's conduct in this matter only from engagements which I verily believe he has taken with the King, in favour of the Doctor, by which he is hampered. I *know* that Addington countenances the story now circulated of Mr. Pitt's negociation through Willis with the King after Lord Spencer and you had resigned; and says that Mr. Pitt's offer was that of putting by the Catholic question, and of entire co-operation with Addington as Secretary of State: surely this cannot be *all lie*.

"As to Addington's present fears I *know* them to be great, and that he has been flirting with some of the Irish Catholic clergy; but *you may be sure* that the project of pensioning them (as this will be termed) will not be accepted, for *they dare not*. They are going to print *Lord Fingall versus Lord Redesdale*."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 17. Elton Hall.—“On my arrival here this morning I found the enclosed letter from the bishop of Lincoln, which was plainly intended not to be kept secret from you. I apprehend that the present state of public affairs as well as of parties does not make it probable that you will bring forward immediately any question of opposition. Our opinion of ministers, and of those parts of their conduct which have been the sources of the public calamities, has been strongly and specifically declared; and the ordinary course of Parliamentary business will present many occasions which it would be impossible for us to let pass without marking how strongly the judgment we had formed of them and their measures has been confirmed by subsequent events. Whether this is what Mr. P[itt] would call a *teasing, harassing opposition* I know not; but, though consistency requires that we should not abstain from it altogether, it might, I presume, be in the power of Mr. P[itt] to moderate it, by giving assurances of his readiness and determination to stand forward whenever there shall be an opportunity of exposing the incapacity of ministers in any important degree, or on any material point. Upon the whole I judge from the bishop's letter that Mr. P[itt]'s mind is really more inclined to opposition than might be supposed from his conversation with you; but, if that is the case, it is unaccountable that he should use so much reserve with you. Whatever he may ultimately determine, I must always think that he has given proof of a littleness of character in some respects that will greatly diminish my confidence in his abilities.”

Enclosure.

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1804, January 13. Stevenage.—“I was summoned to town the beginning of this week by Mr. Pitt, and I received your Lordship's letter at his house, where I slept on Wednesday. I immediately went to Cumberland Place with some hope of finding you there, as I knew that Lord Grenville was in town; but you had set out for Stowe.

“I will write to Doctor Pearce, the Master of Jesus College to-morrow, and I am very confident that he will make every possible search after Irish manuscripts in the University and College libraries. You shall know the result.

“Your Lordship of course knows what passed between Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt. I lament exceedingly that, while they agree in the necessity of Mr. Addington being removed from his present situation, they differ in their ideas of the *sort of opposition* which ought to be carried on against him in Parliament. I am, however, by no means without hope that

many questions will arise in which they will be disposed to adopt precisely the same line of conduct, and in which they will have also the concurrence of Mr. Fox and his friends. I wished much to have seen Lord Grenville, but I had not a proper opportunity of calling upon him. I might perhaps have stated to him my opinion, confidentially, that Mr. Pitt will in a short time, at least, if not immediately upon the meeting of Parliament, take a stronger line of opposition than he at present intends or even would allow to be probable. His opinions and feelings, both upon public and private grounds, are such that it cannot, I think, be long before he fully expresses them; but this probably will not take place till it is called forth by some new occurrence, I mean some objectionable measure or palpable omission on the part of Ministers, and they will soon furnish such an opportunity. In that case Mr. Pitt might not confine himself to the point in question, but might take a retrospective view, so far at least as to afford him a ground for declaring his conviction of the incompetency of Ministers, and the danger in which the country is placed by their negligence and want of talents. All this, however, would be greatly checked by any violence or intemperance on the part of Lord Grenville. It may appear a strange opinion, but I think that the more moderate Lord Grenville's language is, the more hostile will be that of Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt cannot bear the idea of a teasing, harassing opposition; but, as far as I can judge, he is ready to stand forward whenever there shall be an opportunity of exposing the incapacity of Ministers, in any important degree or upon any material point."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 25. London.—"My correspondent proposed either to meet me to-morrow half-way for a couple of hours' conversation, or that I should go and pass a day with him on Saturday. I have preferred the first, because I think, as I have told him, the earliest moment is the best. You will therefore expect no letter on Friday as I am to see you at dinner. I have asked nobody, as I think we had better be alone, unless you choose that I should ask E[lliott] with whom I have conversed to-day. My Yorkshire friend concurs entirely, and so does E[lliott]; write a word about E[lliott], aye or no."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, January 26. Charles Street.—"I am just returned from my morning ride, and have only time to write three or four lines to tell you that nothing could be more prosperous than the expedition from which I am just returned. Our modified line is perfectly agreeable, and I was told that the

only difficulty was to overcome a personal indolence and dislike of London which must be endeavoured to be subdued. He is doubtful almost of any effect, even from the most extensive plan, but agrees that this must be tried, because, if anything can do, this will. There was not a word that passed beyond the limits which we had agreed upon. I think he is inclined to consider your armed plan as the best subject in point of priority, and I find him recurring again to the advantage of resuming the motion which he had conceived useful, and which he had postponed. I am to hear again as soon as he can hear from the one or two to whom he writes."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, January 31. Audley Square.—"You will remember that I fully explained to you in our late conversations the decided opinion of those with whom I have acted for the last three years, that a declared and regular opposition to the present Government was now more than ever an indispensable public duty; and I stated to you the line which I thought it was likely we should pursue, when they were apprized by me that your resolution was finally taken not to act on any such opinion, either on the extended and comprehensive plan which, in common with them, I had wished, or even on any more limited scale. I mentioned to you this at the time as my own conjecture merely, and liable of course to be altered by discussion with them; but I found in fact that I had judged rightly of their opinion, which proved to be very little, if at all, different from that of which I had spoken to you.

"That personal affection which never can be altered by differences of political conduct, even if they were much greater than I flatter myself are at all likely to be found between us, and a determination that every part of my line shall be both open and unequivocal, make me very desirous not to withhold from you the knowledge of the step which we have taken in consequence of the opinions I have stated. In this communication you will find nothing more than you will hear openly declared in Parliament whenever the occasion may arise. But you will attribute this circumstance not to any reserve of mine, but to the simple fact that, meaning to do nothing but what we think just and honourable in itself, and incumbent upon us as the necessary result of the opinions we have long professed, we are determined that what we do shall be openly avowed, without mystery or concealment of any kind.

"What I have, therefore, to state to you is, that an opportunity has been taken to explain to Mr. Fox that we hold, and as we believe in common with him, two principles of action as indispensable to any reasonable hope of saving the country from its present dangers. First, that the

Government which now exists is manifestly incapable of carrying on the public business in such a manner as the crisis requires ; and that persons sincerely entertaining that opinion are bound to avow and actively pursue it. And secondly, that if now, or hereafter, there should arise any question of forming a new Government, the wishes and endeavours of all who mean well to the country should be directed to the establishment of an administration comprehending as large a proportion as possible of the weight, talents, and character to be found in public men of all descriptions, and without any exception. To this was added our decided opinion that it was not necessary, for the purpose of acting on these two principles, to extend the communication to any other matters whatever ; or to enter into details of any kind not relating to the Parliamentary business which may from time to time be brought forward. And, above all, that anything leading to compromises of former opinions, or to engagements for future arrangements, was to be carefully avoided, in order that it might be, at all times, and with the strictest truth, distinctly and publicly denied.

“I have thus stated to you as exactly as possible what has been said on our part, and I trust I have reason to rely with full confidence on the continuance of those sentiments which you have expressed to me respecting the whole of the conduct which I have observed towards you.

“I very much hope that you continue in the resolution of coming up at all events to the meeting of Parliament. I have reduced to paper the heads of the plan which I opened to you in its first outline. If you continue to think the idea worth pursuing in its details I shall be very glad of the opportunity of shewing it to you in its present form. I see as yet no reason to relinquish my hope of its being supported by all those whose assistance I should think conducive to its success ; and I need not tell you how much, in my opinion, your’s is included in that description.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February 2. Elton.—“We set out to-morrow, and shall be in town on Saturday.” “I wish I could hear on my arrival that you had seen P[itt] again and found him more reasonable and decided, for, when I recollect the language which has been held since the peace by Fox, and the monstrous lengths he went before, I cannot but shrink from very close connection with [him] ; and yet, if the other does not stand forward, it seems inevitable.”

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February 4. Walmer Castle.—“I am much obliged to you for having put me in possession as distinctly as you

have done of the line which you, and the friends with whom you act, have determined to pursue. After the full explanation you had given me of your sentiments in our conversations in town, I cannot be surprised at this determination; but I confess that the more I reflect on the subject, the more I regret that the view you form of what is incumbent upon you leads you to embark in a system in which I find it quite impossible to concur, and which, I fear, will not be productive of any increased credit to yourselves, or any advantage to the public. The immediate effect of an active opposition will be to harass a Government confessedly not very strong nor vigorous in itself, and in a situation of the country the most critical, with the constant distraction of Parliamentary warfare. Such a line, though conducted by the first talents and abilities, will, I am confident, not be supported by any strength of numbers in Parliament, nor by public opinion. It will therefore have very little chance of accomplishing its object of changing the Administration, and certainly none of doing so in time to afford the country the benefit of abler counsels to meet the difficulties of the present crisis. Those very difficulties it will in the mean while certainly aggravate; and even if, sooner or later, it should make a change necessary, I am afraid that instead of leading to the establishment of a comprehensive Administration (such as you describe) it will tend to render the attainment of that object more difficult if not impossible. Whatever unfavourable impression may at any time have existed in the highest quarter towards any of the parties engaged in such a system, will, of course, be strengthened and confirmed; and the natural consequence will be a determination, even in case of a change being found necessary, to put, if possible, a negative on them, in forming a new Government. In the event of such being the state of things, I cannot help foreseeing great mischief to the public, and the source of great uneasiness and embarrassment personally to myself; as nothing is more probable than that a call might then be made upon me which I should feel it impossible to decline, and that I should have no means either of forming that comprehensive Government which I agree with you in thinking most desirable, or of obtaining the assistance of those with whom, from public and private feelings, it has been the greatest happiness to me to act during almost the whole of my political life. I am aware that in these considerations there is nothing which I have not before stated to you, and indeed, if there were, it would be too late now to urge them. I have, however, naturally been led to express them again on the present occasion, and having done so, I need hardly add that the line which I must take under the present circumstances will be simply that of giving my opinion fairly on the measures and conduct of Government in important points, and suggesting whatever may appear to my own mind most essential to the public safety, abstaining at

the same time from all attempts to embarrass the Government by any system of opposition.

"I had intended to have come to town the beginning of next week ; but as I do not wish to make a long stay, and as I imagine no occasion will arise for much discussion till the second reading of Yorke's new Volunteer Bill, I shall now defer my journey till Friday. On my arrival, I shall be very glad to converse with you farther on the general plan of armed force which you described to me in the outline ; and if in the interval you could without inconvenience send me a copy of it, I should be very glad of the opportunity of previously considering it, in the shape to which you have now reduced it. In thinking over the subject since I saw you, I certainly see great difficulties and objections ; but I am sure that I shall think it well worth while to look at it in more detail, before I venture to form a final opinion."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February 13. Charles Street.—"I expect to see you in town to-morrow according to your first intention. I met P[itt] to-day and walked some way with him and Lord C[amden]. I find him fully satisfied of the total insufficiency of the present Bill, and I mentioned the course I had talked over with you. His doubt was whether, as their Bill professes to consolidate the whole system, we should not be obliged to debate the whole system on their narrow ground ; and he suggested the mode of suspending the Committee on the Bill till the House in a Committee should debate the whole subject of the defence of the nation. I consented, but Lord C[amden] interfered by observing that such a notion would be of too decided opposition, and P[itt] seemed struck with this true Arlington Street observation. I left them in that state, but P[itt] expresses a very earnest wish to see you, and therefore I mention this as an additional motive for bringing you if possible to-morrow. I think the printing the circulars will put off Yorke's second reading till Friday. F[itzwilliam] comes to-morrow, and likewise is impatient to see you."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, February 14.] Wednesday. House of Lords. Concerning legal opposition in the House of Lords to a private Bill for Aylesbury, promoted by Lords Buckingham and Grenville.—"In truth, however, I was not sorry to put it off for another reason which will equally make it necessary for you to come to town as soon as you conveniently can : and that is the certainty of the King's insanity having returned, which is now universally known, and makes a strong sensation.

The facts that have come to my knowledge *as certain* are these. He rode three hours on Saturday evening, and had a restless night. He recovered a little on Sunday, *having slept in Chapel*, but was hurried in coming back. They contrived to walk him that evening in the Long Walk, and Sunday night he slept better, though not well. On Monday morning he walked before breakfast over all the home works for above two hours; and at breakfast Simmonds, *who has never left him*, made him promise to dine at two; instead of which he rode till *past five*, notwithstanding every exertion of his three sons to get him home. At dinner he was very unquiet and could not be kept to his seat, getting up perpetually from his chair though eating, and latterly grew so angry and violent that they endeavoured to prevent his evening ride; but his irritation increased, and Simmonds was called in, and succeeded almost by force in putting him to bed about half-past nine. It was then determined to bring him back to town, and the Queen came away about nine next morning. Simmonds could not get the King into his carriage till one, and with the greatest difficulty succeeded. He has been out this morning with the Duke of Cambridge for a short airing, but the impression with everyone is that it is hopeless. Lady Charlotte Finch told yesterday the lady who told me that the King is gone back unwell, and the reports of his health are very unsatisfactory. These are her exact words, after she had seen the Queen. My accounts from two other certain quarters are equally bad. I likewise know that Pitt yesterday told Lord Lowther that he feared we must look finally to a regency; and this moment Lord Lowther told my reporter that Mr. Pitt would immediately look to it. None of the ministers were in the House. The Lord Chancellor looked very ill, and Lord Walsingham told me he was *very ill, and his mind very much* disturbed. I am now going to Lord Fitz-William's, and if I can hear anything sufficiently interesting I will write to you, directed to be sent to you from Beaconsfield by some one of the early morning stages. But under all these Aylesbury circumstances I will not allow myself to doubt that you will come to my assistance on Friday, for indeed it will be impossible for me to fight a moment without you."

Postscript.—"Lord Bulkeley is this instant come to me in Pall-Mall to tell me that it is fit I should know that the whole game is considered as up by those nearest to the King, and that he tells me this (*being the first communication we have had*) on the most certain grounds. *Mine are equally certain.*"

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, February. Fort William.—"This letter will be delivered to you by Captain Charles Wyatt of the Corps of Engineers on the Establishment of Bengal. On my arrival

at Fort William in 1798, I selected Captain Wyatt on account of his professional character and experience to carry into execution a plan which I had determined to adopt for the improvement of the public buildings and of the town of Calcutta, and he has accordingly been employed with great assiduity, skill, and success, on this important duty since that period of time.

"In the course of Captain Wyatt's superintendence of the duty which I had entrusted to him many improvements have been effected in the town of Calcutta; and the health and convenience of the inhabitants of this populous city have been essentially promoted by the able suggestions, and the laborious services of Captain Wyatt. But Captain Wyatt is entitled to particular credit for building the new Government House at Calcutta, the plan of which was formed by him in 1798, and which has since been completed under his immediate superintendence. This extensive building reflects great honour upon Captain Wyatt's professional talents, and it has been finished with an attention to economy which affords the most honourable proof of his public zeal and integrity.

"In addition to these services, the public interests have derived great benefit from Captain Wyatt's labours in other branches of the general plan with respect to public buildings in Bengal; and in consequence of Captain Wyatt's suggestions, considerable reductions have been effected in the charge for public offices and buildings, both at Fort William, and at almost every station under the Presidency.

"I am extremely anxious therefore that Captain Wyatt's reception in England should be distinguished by the countenance of my friends, and I shall acknowledge with gratitude any mark of favour which you may be pleased to manifest towards him.

"In addition to the public considerations which have induced me to recommend Captain Wyatt to your favourable notice, I have a great respect for Captain Wyatt's private character, and I feel a most cordial interest in his future welfare and happiness. He is a most worthy man, and has possessed my confidence and esteem during the whole period of my residence in India. I request therefore that you will receive him with particular kindness, as a person whose character and disposition will justify any attentions which you may have the goodness to confer upon him.

"Captain Wyatt is nephew to your architect of the same name."

Private. MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, March 14. Fort William.—"I am very anxious that you should converse with Lieutenant-Colonel Hoghton, who carries home the treaties of peace with the Mahratta confederates. You will find him extremely intelligent; and

I recommend him particularly to your notice as an officer for whom I entertain the highest regard and esteem."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, March 25. Bath.—"As to your projects I cannot but smile at seeing you settling them as gravely as if such a person as Bonaparte, or his still more dangerous co-operator the Doctor, did not exist in the world. Long before June the Cinque Port colonel and all other scientific commanders will have been satisfied how idly the real strength of the country will have been wasted. But before that time we must in some way or other have disposed of our yeomanry who, I have ventured to assure Mr. Yorke, will not (unless they have much altered their opinion) agree to be called out upon permanent pay *under military command*, instead of being trained for 14 or 20 days in the way in which they had proposed soon to assemble for exercise; the way to which they have been used, *and under their own officers*. But I have added that as 'I have not been able to procure a printed copy of the Bill as amended on the report, it is possible that the old Act under which they were trained may be repealed.'

"I have an order for all the [Commanders of] regiments of cavalry and infantry volunteers to appoint a paymaster from out of his subalterns with a pay, when embodied, of 15*s. per diem*, or out of his quarter masters, serjeants, or privates, with a pay of 12*s.* It is very long, but you shall have it copied, and in the mean time you will look out. I should think you had better engage a new yeoman for the express purpose of making him a paymaster, as much caution will be required in the choice.

"I have begun to bathe and drink, but of course I do not feel any sensible change yet. I shall, however, be better able to judge of myself and my motions in the course of a few days."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, March 31. Charles Street.—"I had written to F[ox] originally to tell him how much P[itt] had expressed himself desirous of joint strength upon the question of a committee of the House on the state of defence; then again I had to write the day before yesterday to state that in consequence of Yorke's opening Bill, P[itt] was partly inclined to hitch on his army of reserve motions upon Yorke's bill, and therefore that P[itt] wished F[ox] to defer giving notice till after Yorke's bill. The consequence of all this eternal uncertainty must be to create distrust in the practicability of any arrangement of measures which depend upon P[itt] who does not seem to know his own mind for two days together; and accordingly I find by the answer which I have just

received from F[ox] (and which I will bring to Dropmore), that he is worried and disconcerted by having always to pursue a concurrence which he never obtains, and if he shews any impatience upon this subject, I take for granted that there are many of his friends who are still less tolerant than he is. I had mentioned to F[ox] your incipient intention of moving to repeal the clause of the levy in mass Bill, and he tells me that he has not examined the law of the question, but is persuaded that he shall agree with you whenever he has conversed with you about it, and that he is disposed to connect his motion with yours upon the matter. I think this very desirable, and I write a line to him to say so, and to ask him to name some day when he will come and meet you here with only one or two to talk the thing over; perhaps to-morrow se'nnight would be a good day, though I see F[ox] wishes not to come till towards the end of the following week.

"Lord Carnarvon is obliged to be at Highclere on the 10th, and meant to leave town to-morrow, but as he is anxious to be quite in concert with you, and to act with you in this measure on which he is very eager, I have persuaded him to stay in town till Saturday next that he may see you on Thursday and Friday. He and Lord Glastonbury are both anxious that you should move a formal repeal, and not let the business go off incidentally.

"I write these few lines to-day partly because you may perhaps see C[anning?] to-morrow, and partly because there is no post to-morrow. I will come on Monday, and Elliott talks of meeting us on that day."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 7. Bath.—"I find that the language of Ministers still announces the King as gaining ground, though my information states him neither to gain mental nor bodily strength. He saw the Queen again on Saturday last and (as is said) with less agitation than the Saturday before. Kew or Windsor are still out of the question though eagerly looked to. Many interior evidences *within the House* concur to make me think that those who know the truth despond, and I have reason to believe that Addington thinks very ill of it.

"As to my proxy, it is as you well know most entirely at your service; be so good, therefore, as to send me one, for I have none with me.

"The more I see of the volunteer Bill the more I dislike it. The only real operation of it will be the ruin of the army and militia, and the resignation of the force whenever it is wanted."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 18. York Place.—"I have thought it best to put off my opposition to Yorke's Bill till the report, as I find

there has not been sufficient notice to ensure a full attendance to-day. This being the case, I shall remain at home to nurse my gout, and shall be very glad if you can call here any time in the course of to-day, as some things have arisen which I wish much to mention to you as soon as possible."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 20. Bath.—"I have just received the parcel. The contents did not in the least surprise me, for there were yesterday very evident symptoms that had fully satisfied me and through me the Bishop, who is gone to-day to Brazenose in despair at having recollected that he has not taken the oaths, and consequently can give no proxy. I have, however, no doubt that if I go to town before Friday next I shall have influence sufficient with the Bishop to persuade him to come to town for three or four days. My coming must depend upon you, and as I now *understand you*, one word will enable me to decide. My own opinion is that though the first explanation may take place, it will for many reasons stop there for the present. But if not, the result will be *that* which we foresaw in December last, and which we agreed would be *a great object gained*. I repeat that if you seriously wish me to come up, I will do so on Thursday even if I am to return to Bath; but the next seven days will decide much upon my strength, which is recovering, and upon your wishes. All I beg is, one word as daily as you can make it; and pray send me a blank proxy which I will try to make Lord Bridport sign. He seems much disposed to it.

"Cleaver thinks that Euseby, who is in town, should be tried for by Lord Egremont, for he is very angry at Lindsay's promotion to Kildare. Pray consult Tom whether *he* can try him; of course if he thinks my name can assist, he will use it. He likewise thinks he is sure that Bishop Horsley will vote with you if you *choose to ask it*.

"I am just come from the bath, and writing drives the water into my head."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 24. Bath.—"Bishop Cleaver meets me on Thursday night at Maidenhead, and we come up together early on Friday; I have got Lord Bridport's proxy, and it is still possible that I may bring you another. At this distance it must of course be difficult for me to make out your list; but my list of what I consider effective and certain are only 72 peers; but I make out fourteen more doubtful amongst those who used to vote with Mr. Fox or Lord Moira against

you. Cleaver appeared certain that you could gain Bishop Horsley's vote if you chose to have it. I shall endeavour to get at the Bishop of Ferns (at least to make him stay away) through his brother. I have just seen Lady Spencer, so that from her accounts and yours I think I see clearly that the Doctor is in most serious difficulties *of all sorts*. I am persuaded from my accounts that the King is utterly incapable of a council.

"If you can call for half an hour in Pall Mall I shall be there before twelve on Friday.

"Lord Waterford arrived here from Ireland yesterday and went up to town immediately. *He is against us.*"

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, April 29. [York Place.]—"On my return home this evening, I find an intimation that I am to have a communication *early to-morrow*, but I have no new means of guessing what will be its nature. Probably by twelve to-morrow I may be able to let you know whether it turns out to be anything that ought to affect the proceedings of the day, and I will call on you as near that time as I can."

Private. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 6. York Place.—"I called to give you an account of the state of things up to this time. I now expect to see the King to-morrow morning. Till then I can say nothing decisive on the first point I have been aiming at, but I am afraid there is very little chance that my verbal representation on that subject will be more successful than those in writing have been. It seems pretty clear that a sufficiently explicit communication will be made in the House of Lords to-morrow."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 7. York Place.—"I am expecting every moment a summons from the Queen's House. I will call on you as soon as possible after my return from thence. If you should be gone out, pray leave word when I can see you before four."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, May 7. Camelford House.—"Since I saw you I have had the opportunity of conversing with the persons whose opinions it was necessary for me to learn, before I could give you any final answer. Those opinions appear to be all of them in exact conformity to that I had already intimated to

you as probable, and it is therefore best that you should lose no time in acting upon them. But before they are laid before the King we should wish to have the opportunity of stating upon paper the grounds on which they rest, in order that His Majesty may not believe that any slight motive would induce us in such a moment to decline any public service which he may think us capable of rendering. This paper I hope to send you in the course of to-morrow." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 7. London.—“ I have just got certain information (which cannot be mistaken) that Lord Hawkesbury came to his office at nine this morning in great apparent agitation ; and has sent round every messenger in waiting and many extra messengers summoning the Lords to attend as *early this day as possible*. He has likewise got three or more messengers returned in the course of the night who were sent off on Friday and yesterday for fresh proxies.

“ Surely this does not look like the *something satisfactory* that we understood to be settled last night for the House of Lords.”

EARL SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 8. Wimbledon Park.—“ I return you the copy of the letter which you have been so good as to send me, which I think unexceptionable. It places our line of conduct on this occasion on its true grounds, and is, at the same time, so expressed as not to be liable to any imputation which one would desire to avoid.

“ I am very sorry that you have had the trouble of sending after me, and if I had known that you intended at all events to send the answer to-day, I should willingly have waited in town to have saved you that trouble.

“ I cannot say that I feel very sanguine on the subject of any change being produced by this communication on Pitt's mind, but *nous verrons*.”

Private. LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1804, May 8. Camelford House.—“ I send you the enclosed, which I will beg you to lay before the King as the ground of our declining your offer. I still indulge the hope that your farther representations to him will save both to you and to the country the perilous step in which you are now engaged.” *Copy.*

Enclosure.

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1804, May 8. Camelford House.—“I have already apprized you that all the persons to whom, at your desire, I communicated what passed between us yesterday, agree with me in the decided opinion that we ought not to engage in the administration which you are now employed in forming. We should be sincerely sorry if, by declining this proposal, we should appear less desirous than we must always be of rendering to His Majesty, to the utmost of our power, every service of which he may be graciously pleased to think us capable. No considerations of personal ease or comfort, no apprehension of responsibility, or reluctance to meet the real situation to which the country has been brought, have any weight in this decision; nor are we fettered by any engagements on the subject, either expressed or implied; we rest our determination solely on our strong sense of the impropriety of our becoming parties to a system of government which is to be formed, at such a moment as the present, on a principle of exclusion.

“It is unnecessary to dwell on the mischiefs which have already resulted from placing the great offices of Government in weak and incapable hands. We see no hope of any effectual remedy for these mischiefs but by uniting in the public service as large a proportion as possible of the weight, talents, and character to be found in public men of all descriptions, and without any exception. This opinion I have already had occasion to express to you in the same words, and we have for some time past been publicly acting in conformity to it; nor can we, while we remain impressed with this persuasion, concur in defeating an object for which the circumstances of the present moment afford at once so strong an inducement, and so favourable an occasion.

“An opportunity now offers such as this country has seldom seen, for giving to its Government, in a moment of peculiar difficulty, the full benefit of the services of all those who, by the public voice and sentiment, are judged most capable of contributing to its prosperity and safety. The wishes of the public on this subject are completely in union with its interests; and the advantages which not this country alone, but all Europe and the whole civilized world, might derive from the establishment of such an Administration at such a crisis, would probably have exceeded even the most sanguine expectations. We are certainly not ignorant of the difficulties which might have obstructed the final accomplishment of such an object, however earnestly pursued. But when in the very first instance all trial of it is precluded, and when this denial is made the condition of all subsequent arrangements, we cannot but feel that there are no motives of whatever description which could justify our taking an

active part in the establishment of a system so adverse to our deliberate and declared opinions." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 19. London.—“Though this letter is to go through the Post Office it will convey to them no news, though it may be news to you that the King is supposed by every one to be very much deranged.

“Much was built on the hopes of being able to move him to-day to Windsor, but *Dr. Symonds* has stated the decided impossibility of such a journey in the present state of *irritation*. I quote the name and the phrase, being certain of both. The Duke of Cambridge accompanies him in his daily airing; the Queen and Princesses following in another carriage, *having found it impossible to control the King to any propriety of conduct in their coach*. But what is most material and admits of no doubt is the letter written by the King on Thursday night, and directed by him to the *Earl of Salisbury*, in a style of great bitterness, utterly incoherent and unconnected, reproaching him with ingratitude after he had made him a Marquis and given him the Garter, and assigning reasons for promoting Lord Dartmouth and Lord Aylesford. This letter was seen by many yesterday, and the original was put into the hands of my informant, who read it very carefully twice, and tells me that the first sentence is kind and connected, but that the conclusion of near thirty lines is unconnected and bitter. Many other stories are in circulation, tending to establish the same fact, but I was anxious that you should know *what is certain*. I likewise know that the queen, princesses, and those of his sons who see him, all think very ill of him. No order is given yet for the birthday, and the ladies who are looked to for the signal for new gowns have not as yet, in any case, ordered their birthday dresses.

“Under all these circumstances you will not wonder that our new Ministers should look very blank, and that they have found great difficulties in filling their vacancies. Lord Hawkesbury speaks of his ill treatment, and Lord Liverpool and the younger Jenkinson were in opposition on Thursday, till the latter was named Secretary of Legation to Vienna, Lord *Dunlow* the India Board, with H. Wellesley, who is succeeded in the Treasury by young G. Rose. The old Rose joint Paymaster. The India Directors waited on Lord Melville on Thursday to solicit the benefit of his *assistance and advice*, which he promised them! This is all my budget; and God knows it is gloomy enough.

“Lord Chesterfield wrote to the King on Monday to offer his office, and to return thanks for the promise lately renewed of the blue ribbon, but at twelve this day had received no answer, and thinks very ill both of his office and Garter.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 24. Charles Street.—“The Duke of Montrose told me to-day that Government (as such) will not take part in the Aylesbury Bill, or send cards out for attendance, but that every individual would take what part he might fancy upon the subject.

“You will have seen our ineffectual effort yesterday to stop the march of the Lords’ Amended Volunteer Bill, but Pitt was determined to divide if pressed upon it, and it was thought better to content ourselves with the conversation that took place. Why our committee have determined to disagree to your clause for not making commanding officers publick accountants I know not ; you will know if you chuse to hear the reasons which our committee will give for that disagreement.

“The town is full of the same sort of reports as those which you left behind you. No Master of the Horse finally named, and no Lords to fill the vacancies in the Bedchamber.

“I was told yesterday by a friend of P[itt] who knows the fact, that P[itt] has been obliged to apologize to Lord Euston for [tur]ning out Smith, and puts it upon his finding it impossible to refuse to Lord Hawkesbury to keep Wallace !!! I think you named to-morrow or Saturday for your return, so I suppose we shall meet at dinner on Sunday in Grosvenor Square. You would be much missed there if you did not come.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, May 30. Buckingham House.—“I send you one of my stable people with this note, as it is too delicate to trust to the chance of the coach. The Prince before dinner took Lord FitzWilliam, Lord Carlisle, and me (for Fox was at the House of Commons) aside, and told us that the King’s situation *was desperate*, and that he should wish to converse with us after dinner. I observed he was very discreet on the subject of the King’s illness during dinner, but evidently he had much on his mind, and we observed that he was very deeply engaged with the Duke of Richmond who was next him. Tom and Grey and Windham went away as soon as the cloth was removed to the House of Commons, and after coffee the Prince took first Lord FitzWilliam for half-an-hour, and then he called me. It is very difficult to detail a conversation of half-an-hour, but it began by stating the certain information he had received from *every branch* of the royal family, but particularly from the Dukes of Kent, Cumberland, and Cambridge, of the King’s situation whilst at Windsor, and of his personal conduct *to them* and to the queen and the princesses in their presence ; and his conviction from these whom

he named, and from other information, that the King was *as bad and perhaps worse than ever*. That he was satisfied that the moment was approaching in which there would be no alternative but that of a regency; that he wished not to precipitate that discussion, but to be prepared for it by the advice of those whom he trusted, and to put himself entirely into the hands of a very few, whom *he would anxiously press and even command* to dine with him for the purpose of receiving advice on the steps to be taken whenever *that moment forced forward* the discussion of what might be best for the country. That he desired to confine that dinner to FitzWilliam, Carlisle, Fox, Grey, Windham, T. Grenville, you and me, excluding every other person whatsoever, (and by name *Lord Thurlow, who possibly might be unpleasant to Lord Grenville*) and to receive and abide by their advice. That he had *already* ordered the Lord Chancellor to attend him to-morrow, and had intimated what he meant, namely, to order him to report to him *de die in diem* a written report of the King's health, for which he should be considered responsible; that he was determined to wait for what might occur, but that he conceived the state of his Majesty's health *irrecoverably gone*; and that in a few days the voice of the country would force a communication from Government, and that he wished to be prepared for it by advice. He detailed all that had passed on the King's illness between him and ministers since February last, and added that for above six weeks the physicians and the ministers had ceased to communicate to him one iota. He then said that he knew your difficulties as to a regency if we were driven to it, and that he was prepared to give every facility to you on that head, and to accept *the whole of the restrictions as a temporary arrangement*, according to the spirit of Pitt's letter to him of 1788; but that he must know what he was to depend upon, and that he must throw himself on our advice.

"He added that the Duke of Richmond had advised him to this measure, and had offered (as a man abstracted from all party) to move whenever we should advise in this matter. I, of course, referred all this to discussion with our friends, eagerly applauded his forbearance, urged the continuance of it, and stated how little I was pledged to any regency opinions, but how much I was decided to uphold your fair fame and your consistency so far as they were involved in this question, supposing it forced forward by the King's illness. On this I urged him, and shewed him most clearly the advantage he would gain in public opinion by accepting *instantly* the bill such as it was proposed to him in 1788. He agreed to all this as clearly as I could, and I am satisfied he will lend himself to all you could wish on that head. This very long explanation led to many other details, but it ended in his directions to me to write to you to consider all the circumstances that might press out of the situation of the

King, if it was as desperate as he believed it, and to order you to dine with him on Friday for this purpose. I hinted Aylesbury to him as a challenge thrown out by the Lord Chancellor and Lord Thurlow to us for Friday; and he said he would direct *them both* to put off the discussion; for that this matter was too near to him to delay the consideration of it.

"I afterwards had a very long conversation with Fitz-William, who urged me to press upon you to come up to this meeting for the purpose of *taking him* under our *direction*, for that unless we moderated his impatience, and advised him well, he would get *into worse hands who would mislead him*; and after a full explanation from me of all I felt of your regency difficulties, he said he considered your character for consistency as deeply as his own, and that he would lend himself to any arrangements that could induce the Prince to take *all* the restrictions as a temporary arrangement on the presumption of the King's recovery, subject (according to Mr. Pitt's reservation) to new arrangements if the regency were to be permanent, and if that prospect of recovery diminished. But I find your presence so anxiously pressed, that I promised to state all this with my advice to you to think the matter over; and, at all events, the Prince *directed me to command you to attend him, for that he considered this the most critical period of his life.*

"All these discussions with him, Carlisle, and FitzWilliam, lead us to a very late hour, and my private communication with the latter was most satisfactory, but very long, and it is now half-past one; so that I can write no more, but beg you to send my boy back immediately with one word that I may put off Aylesbury if you agree (what indeed you cannot avoid) to meet this party; and, in that case, let me know when you come, that I may be in the way to receive *you here*, and to tell you all that passed."

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to the PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, June 10. London.—"The Chancellor has laid before His Majesty's confidential servants the letter of the seventh instant, with which he was honoured from His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on Friday morning. The Chancellor has already had the honour of transmitting, with the concurrence of His Majesty's servants, the opinion, given by the physicians on the 5th instant. He now encloses, pursuant to His Royal Highness's desire expressed to His Majesty's servants, that of the 31st of May, which the physicians thought it advisable to draw up with a view to its being laid before His Majesty; and he transmits with it a further opinion given as late as last night.

"His Majesty's servants have thus laid before His Royal

Highness the most authentic information upon the state of His Majesty's health up to this time ; and they observe that it is His Royal Highness's intention in future, to desire the physicians to make communications upon this most interesting subject directly to himself.

"In consequence of one part of His Royal Highness's letter, His Majesty's servants feel it incumbent upon them to represent to His Royal Highness that they have not been so unmindful to their own duty, or of the province of His Majesty's physicians, as to have referred to the judgment of those physicians any legal or constitutional point. The opinion of the physicians (founded upon a knowledge of the circumstances of His Majesty's situation) fully confirmed by their own observation, appears to them to form the best ground upon which they can judge of the actual state of His Majesty's health.

"Thus informed, it has remained for them to regulate their public conduct in the discharge of the trust which His Majesty has been pleased to repose in them by a sense of [what] their public duty, and their allegiance to His Majesty, have indispensably required of them ; and by those considerations they must continue to be guided." *Copy.*

Two enclosures.

Enclosure I.

1804, May 31.—"We continue to be of opinion that His Majesty is sufficiently recovered to be capable of exercising his high functions ; but there are still certain symptoms remaining, which make us apprehensive of a relapse, unless His Majesty will strictly and uniformly exert himself to correct those ideas which occasionally shew themselves in his less guarded moments. For, we cannot conscientiously pronounce His Majesty to be out of danger of a relapse till those symptoms no longer exist. We, therefore, think it our duty to express our opinion of the absolute necessity of His Majesty still conforming to medical guidance, till we can have the satisfaction of declaring that the recovery is perfect."

(Signed) L. Pepys.
H. R. Reynolds.
Francis Milman.
W. Heberden.
S. F. Simmonds.

Copy.

Enclosure II.

"In giving an opinion on His Majesty's state since Tuesday last, we beg leave to refer to the judgment we

expressed on that day, and declare that the favourable opinion then given has been daily confirmed."

(Signed) L. Pepys.
H. R. Reynolds.
Francis Milman.
W. Heberden.
S. F. Simmonds.

9 June, 1804. *Copy.*

The PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, June 19.—"The knowledge which the Prince of Wales has at length obtained of the King's actual state compels him to express to His Majesty's ministers his sense of what has hitherto been done on this most delicate and interesting subject. The discussion is in many respects painful to him, but his silence might imply an acquiescence in proceedings, which both as a dutiful and affectionate son, and as a faithful subject, he has every reason to disapprove.

"It is now not less than five months since His Majesty was afflicted with a return of his former unhappy malady. His recovery, however advanced, is still imperfect, and his situation continues to require the guidance and control not only of his physicians, but also of their inferior attendants. Of these distressing circumstances no communication has ever been made, either to His Majesty's Privy Council, or to his Parliament. His Ministers have claimed, on the contrary, to act in such a situation from their own authority, and appear to conceive that the trust which His Majesty has reposed in them for very different purposes empowers them to exercise their own discretion on public interests to which that trust certainly does not extend. Without any communication with the Prince, His Majesty's medical treatment has been regulated under their orders alone, even when it became necessary to exclude from His Majesty the whole of his own family. By their opinions it has been determined at what seasons His Majesty should be importuned with difficult business, and exposed to fatigue the most likely to obstruct his recovery. And by their judgment alone it is now decided that, under the British constitution, the King's commands may legally be received on the highest matters of his government, at the very time when his person and all his ordinary actions are subjected to constant and necessary control.

"Under such circumstances, the Prince can no longer forbear to express his entire disapprobation of principles and measures which he sees to be full of danger to the British monarchy. He cannot acknowledge in the King's Ministers an authority which they have assumed, as he believes, without warrant, and which is manifestly capable of the worst abuse. Still

less can he recognise a practice so injurious to the constitutional rights both of the Crown and of Parliament, as that under which His Majesty's government has been administered for the last five months, while His Majesty's person has been under restraint, and his Parliament, though sitting, kept in utter ignorance of his real situation. Against the alarming consequences of such a precedent the Prince of Wales feels it his indispensable duty to make this his solemn protest, as the King's son, as the first subject of his empire, and as the heir apparent of his throne. And if the hopes which he now anxiously cherishes of His Majesty's immediate and perfect recovery should unhappily be still disappointed, he thinks it necessary to require, on the behalf both of the King and of his people, that all future proceedings in this momentous business shall henceforth be strictly regular, warranted by some authority already known to the law, or, in cases of unforeseen difficulty, referred to Parliamentary decision.

"This explicit declaration of his sentiments on so solemn an occasion the Prince has judged to be due to his sovereign, to the country, and to himself. The necessity of expressing them adds to the pain which he feels from the afflicting circumstances to which they relate. But he should never cease to reproach himself if any apparent acquiescence on his part could be thought to sanction a course of conduct which he must always deeply regret to have seen pursued." *Draft by Lord Grenville. Endorsed:—*"(This draft was, I believe, still further altered before the letter was sent. G.)"

COLONEL J. McMAHON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, July 12. Carlton House.—"By the command of the Prince of Wales, I have the honour to enclose your Lordship the copy of a note which His Royal Highness received from the Lord Chancellor on the 10th instant, in answer to his communication of the 2nd instant."

Enclosure.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to the PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, July 10.—"The Lord Chancellor has communicated to His Majesty's Ministers the note with which he was honoured from His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on the 2nd instant.

"It must be most painful to His Majesty's Ministers to receive the repeated intimation of the unfavourable view which His Royal Highness has taken of their conduct; but, as His Royal Highness is pleased to intimate in his last note that he has nothing to add to his communication of the 19th of June, His Majesty's servants deem it necessary only to entreat His Royal Highness's permission to refer to the notes which the

Lord Chancellor has had the honour of submitting to His Royal Highness, in which they have presumed respectfully to state to His Royal Highness the principles of duty and allegiance to His Majesty by which that conduct has necessarily been regulated.

"The Lord Chancellor begs leave to assure His Royal Highness that he has not failed to weigh with the utmost deference and attention such parts of His Royal Highness's communication as more immediately concern the Chancellor himself; and with every sentiment of respect to His Royal Highness, he has to lament that he cannot feel it consistent with his duty to His Majesty to enter into a full explanation upon the subject.

"It is this consideration which compels him to restrain his anxiety to do justice to himself; an anxiety which must be proportioned to the consciousness which the Chancellor asserts, that in the discharge of his duty to the King, he has been actuated only by motives the most pure, and directed, in all circumstances, by the best judgment which he could form with respect to the nature of that duty, considering it with reference both to example and principle." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, September 8. Wynnstay.—"Your letter found me yesterday, but newly returned a little more to the southward after having ventured as near the Scotch borders as it is safe for any man to do who may be disposed to question the omnipotence of the Lord Advocate of Scotland, Elliot, to whom long habit has made this subjection more tolerable, went gaily on from Carlisle, after having passed eight or ten delightful days at Windermere or Keswick; to me the gratification of all that romantic and beautiful scenery exceeded all that my most sanguine expectations had promised to me; and brought me back to the same objects not only without being satiated with them, but with an eager determination to employ six hundred miles upon the same objects again, if no natural or political [convulsion] of the country shall have changed the face of it, or have deprived me of the means of enjoying it. Upon invasion, however, in spite of the long train of military go-carts, the long subscriptions of the hackney-men, the long speeches of Sir B. Watson, and the long paragraphs of the ministerial newspapers, I continue to be incredulous. In truth, as it seems to me, the ministers themselves do in their own persons but faintly support the alarms which they endeavour to excite, for the Secretary at War, whom I met at Trentham a month ago, disclaimed all knowledge of any immediate pressure; and went accordingly to Scotland till the end of September. Dundas is learning the conduct of the navy by studying the manœuvres

of the bathing-machines at Worthing, and Lord Hawkesbury is exercising the vigilance of his Home Department in a close attention at Weymouth upon all that may be curious and interesting to him to observe in that quarter. Of the refreshed giant what I hear from pretty good authority is that there has been lately in all his manner and appearance so much distress and dispondency, that he seems so 'absorbed and melancholy, and ailing' that his friends are extremely uneasy about him; and that it is impossible to see him without feeling persuaded that 'some great crisis is at hand which entirely overcomes him.' I tell you this precisely as I heard it two days ago in a letter of good authority. How to comment upon this fact I know not; my own conjecture has been that we are more looking after peace than after war; and certainly, while peace offers so little security as in the present moment it does, it would be a high trial of any man's nerves to rest the security of the country upon the faith of a treaty signed with Bonaparte; but yet, with Pitt's very, very sanguine temper, it is difficult to believe that he would not teach himself to think peace as defensible now as he did when he defended the treaty of Amiens. Some conjecture that his own health is impaired, and some attribute his despondency to the unsatisfactory state of health in another quarter; but tho' I hear what might confirm this latter conjecture, I have not certainty enough to rest entirely upon it. With respect to the explanation that has been in part supplied to you, it is evident that the *whole truth* must go a little farther than what has been described to you. I am told that Lord Melville and the Chancellor were the two negotiators; that they held out to the P[rince] the gratification of his favourite wish of his military rank, while the King had never for a moment given the slightest ground for such a hope; the consequence was that, after the time of the interview had been fixed, and before it took place, the P[rince], having ascertained his favourite object to be unattainable, regarded this continued refusal as a new proof of there being no sincere wish for reconciliation. It is added that a new arrangement for Princess Ch[arlotte] at Windsor, and for the Princess of Wales in Greenwich rangership for life, without his knowledge or concurrence, contributed to encrease his dissatisfaction. With all, however, that looks so unpromising to Government, I am inclined to believe that, tho' there is no general satisfaction in what is doing, there is no general desire for active opposition; and in that case Pitt will meet Parliament stronger than he left it. Nothing can be more uncertain than my steps, till you want them with you."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, September 9. [Stowe.]—"I return you the letter which you sent to me, which confirms most fully the opinions

I intimated to you in my last letter. I was well aware of the total and absolute loss of all influence of the queen, and there is a history belonging to that chapter which I cannot state by letter, but which is decisive on the impaired state of the King's mind. He was very sturdily disinclined to any reconciliation; and certainly had expressed himself quite up to the day of the interview, as determined to that measure from principle of expediency only. The measure of removing Princess Charlotte to Windsor, *even though the Prince of Wales should object*, is announced without any management; and I should imagine that this will be a *casus belli* between the father and son. Surely in all this, Mr. Pitt (for I say nothing of those minor actors, Lord Chancellor and Lord Melville) has been most disgracefully ill-advised; for it is difficult to conceive any state of things that could justify the risk of various kinds, and repay him for running that risk of putting his fingers *entre tel arbre et tel écorce*.

"I hear a little of Weymouth, and I understand that the whole is very childish, and that they are too happy to get him safe on board from ten o'clock till six, out of the view of all that come to look at him. These constant salutes from all the frigates, yachts, and batteries, both on going on board and on returning, are new *and by particular order*. The old rule was to salute only the first time of going on board, and on the usual gala days. But this is only one of a thousand proofs of weakness, which I verily believe was found so troublesome near London, that Mr. Pitt was too glad to lend himself to the Weymouth journey, to remove the King from *his* presence and councils. At the same time I perfectly agree with you that the Colonel in Kent is as fully entitled to the attention of the public as the King in Dorset. Sir Brook Watson is a most excellent ally in the military project of crying out for invasion; but charm he never so wisely, I cannot find one creature who believes that it will be attempted. The expence, however, if I may judge of it from all that is wished to be done in this county, is unbounded.

"I do not wonder that Boconnoc should occupy you so entirely; you know my partiality to it, and at some less busy moment I shall hope to share with you the tranquility of those lovely vallies in which I have passed such happy days.

"I cannot *débrouiller* the Vienna measure, which is big with everything most dangerous and most humiliating; nor can I better understand the Petersburg language to France, being convinced that Alexander is anything but *Great*."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, September 23. Stowe.]—"My accounts from Weymouth are the same. *Mens non sana in corpore sano*. The

stories multiply, and the Hanoverian review with all its very many circumstances has made great impression. Pitt has taken care that his three Secretaries should relieve each other, so that the K[ing] never has been unwatched for more than three days, and the result of all this, that on the 20th September a proclamation has been signed fixing 27th November for the dispatch of business in Parliament, thereby giving 69 days' notice; a circumstance that clearly marks to me Pitt's sense of the risk that attends the delay of that proclamation.

"On that day then we are to meet, and to be told of no one victory or advantage, and to hear that the result of the add[itiona]l force bill is an army diminished near 3,000 men, a militia diminished about 1,000, volunteers ditto near 17,000, (and probably many more not returned in the monthly states), sea fencibles ditto above 2,000 (by paying off the block ships to the river ships); artillery ditto about 300 men; and the seamen, till the last East and West Indian arrivals had encreased the levies, had not kept up to the 97,000 returned in June last as effective.

"This, I have reason to think, is nearly if not exactly an accurate statement of the result of that wonderful operation. As to Pitt himself, he is really as mad as the K[ing] ever could be as to his own hobby-horse of waggons and cars, which occupy his whole mind. Sir Brook yesterday sent orders to his commissioner here for arranging the move of 37,000 men, in case of invasion, in the following proportions:—

"*First division from Newport to Dunstable.* To move in ten divisions at various intervals of six, twelve, and fifteen hours, but all to move in the course of five days, and to be collected at Newport: 25,000 men in 1,577 waggons with 7,885 horses and 9,262 trusses of wheat straw. *Second division from Tingewick to Hardwicke and from Hardwicke to Amersham.* To move in nine divisions at various intervals of hours, but all to move in the same course of five days and to be collected at *Tingewick*; 11,729 men, 735 waggons, 3,675 horses, 4,410 trusses of wheat straw.

"The same to be collected at *Hardwicke*! making a total to be collected from the Newport, Buckingham, Ashenden, and Cottesloe Hundreds of 3,047 waggons, 12,235 horses, 18,282 wheat straw trusses.

"And orders that these waggons are to move (day and night; in the *sands* of Dunstable and in the *clays* of our vale) at the rate of five miles per hour!

"I had determined (as I have not been consulted) to leave all this to its fate; but as, upon fuller reflexion, I have thought it too serious a thing to play with, I shall write to shew the *impossibility* of such an arrangement.

"With all this Mr. Pitt is certainly very unwell, and very desponding, and speaks of this Russian breach with France as a matter from which we are to expect *little or nothing*; in

confirmation of which you will see that Lord Granville Levison is still in London. What is all this to end in? Surely Mr. Pitt cannot be blind to all that must fall upon his head whenever the scene is fully opened to the publick. Addington is very loud in singing his own triumph, (and to say truth Mr. Pitt has given him full grounds) and the Weymouth tone is to abuse the dear Doctor for not abiding by *his promise to the K[ing] to give Mr. Pitt his 'constant support.'* So are the tables turned. Adieu; when you return to Dropmore we must meet to talk. But all I now write may be read at Charing Cross.

"I did not think when I wrote that the new triumphs which Lord Melville's folly has (by his sea-trips) adopted as his own, would have been ready so soon. My fears, which I expressed to you, of the failure of this new *charlatannerie* have been too well verified, notwithstanding the letter (written as I am well assured by Lord Melville and Pitt at Walmer and signed Keith) to Mr. Marsden to inform their L[ordship]s at the Admiralty that the project would succeed whenever it was tried upon a larger scale! George Berkeley has made an admirable drawing of what he calls Sir H. Popham's flag-ship; with Lord Melville's head appearing above the water's edge in a fire-coffer, and with three references, namely, (a) the fire-coffer under water; (b) the paddle or oar; (c) the noddle or head. But surely all this must shake publick confidence (if such a thing exists) most wonderfully. My accounts of Weymouth, *from the same undoubted authority*, are progressively less favourable; and I now know *from certain authority* that Mr. Pitt is, within these ten days, satisfied that the King is hourly losing ground, and is most seriously alarmed respecting it. At the same time I do not expect any explosion till later in the year.

"My two last letters from Ferrol are so curious, that I have determined to send them to you, and I will beg you to return them to me unless I can persuade you to come here for three or four days. Tom comes here to-morrow, and after Lady Fermanagh and her party leave me (they come on Wednesday and go on Friday or Saturday) I shall be alone."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, September 23. Castle Howard.—"Having extended my tour from Wynnstay hither for the object of Fountain's Abbey, I find with the equinox the winds and the storms which decidedly pronounce against any more northern projects for this year; after a few days, therefore, spent here, I shall turn again to the southward, and hope to find myself at Elton about the first of October. From thence I shall probably pass on to Stowe and Dropmore, waiting nevertheless to hear of the yeomanry campaigns in both places, in order that I may not

run my head against inspecting field officers, generals of districts, and the new manœuvres which must necessarily belong to the evolutions of the volunteer carts and coaches in the wide and hard roads of Stowe and Wotton. Write me word, therefore, of what you know of the middle and southern regiments, that I may dispose of myself accordingly.

"The papers of to-day confirm the account which Fawkener had sent me of the meeting of Parliament early in November; and as we have good reason to know that Ministers had calculated their money resources to last them up to January, their present meeting implies an error upon that score to a very considerable extent either in deficiency of receipt or in excess of expenditure. I do not find that anybody here has heard anything upon the subject of the report which had been made to me respecting the giant refreshed, so that my speculation upon that report is still as helpless as ever."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804, September 30. Stowe.]—"I now write to copy an extract upon which *I can depend* respecting the K[ing]'s health. 'You may depend upon it that the K[ing]'s situation accords perfectly with the short account contained in your letter, but I am sure that when the season advances and prevents the constant air and exercise, things will not go on even so favourably as at present. It is impossible to describe half the hurry and irritation that constantly occurs, and, unless it abates, no frame can continue to support it.' This is so much from the fountain head that I was anxious that you should know the opinions of one who is particularly able to form a good judgement, but is biased by wishes and by interest in favour of his recovery.

"My son writes me word from Coxheath that Mr. Pitt and L[or]d Chatham both told him that 'no good was to be done from this Russian quarrel with France, unless the Austrian Emperor would likewise take part against his new brother,' which Pitt said was not unlikely, but which L[or]d Chatham (not having learnt that part of his lesson) said was not to be expected. They are both very low on general politics, and Pitt very sore that he has got no men by his Bill, which he told Lord T[emple] was 'full of difficulties.' I have now obtained a detail of the wonderful expedition fitting in the most secret recesses of Portsmouth-yard, under the advice and direction of Sir H. Popham, who, I know, is higher in your good books, than in mine; *for I think ill of him.* The project is to tow a fire-vessel without masts, and level with the water, thirty-two feet long, into Bulloigne [Boulogne] harbour. The eight boats that perform this miracle are rowed *under water*, each by two men whose head and shoulders only are above water. The experiment has been tried in the basin at Portsmouth

by night, and the boats moved very rapidly. The whole will be ready by about the 14th October, and will be tried, as I suppose, at the spring tides, which are the 19th and 20th, under Sir Home's orders! In all this *charlatannerie* I have no faith.

"The temptation will be irresistible of calling (in the two Houses) for a return of the encrease of the vol[untee]r force, army, r[oya]l artillery, and marines, since the 5th and 29th of June, under the operations of the Act entitled 'for *amending* the Provisions of the several Acts relating to Volunteer and Yeomanry Corps,' and of an Act entitled 'for establishing and maintaining a permanent *additional* force, and for *augmenting* H[is] M[ajesty's] forces.'

"I take it for granted that this will find you at Boconnoc, but as your time for exercise approaches so soon, I conclude that I may soon hope to see you here.

"There has been a private flirtation carried on at Brighton between the P[rin]ce and the Doctor, who rode over several times from Worthing, and met H[is] R[oyal] H[ighness] on the Downs. But last week Addington, Tiernay, Erskine and Dallas dined with him!

"How much have you given to Bonaparte to intercept and to print your letter directed to L[or]d Wellesley? And what an egregious simpleton Mr. H. Wellesley appears to be, though perfectly matched by his L[or]d Castlereagh."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, October 11. Stowe.—" I know not whether I have had an opportunity of congratulating you upon the capture of the *Aplin* with its cargo of manuscripts. I never before felt the same partiality for the official paper of the Imperial Consul, whose publications in this instance have been highly useful and honourable to you; and it is not a little gratifying to me to find from various quarters that there is but one opinion upon the letter of the ex-Minister to the Governor-General.

"I hear nothing where I am which can be new to you, unless it is new to you that there are immediate and sanguine hopes of such an arrangement as our friend at the Palladian bridge has long been seeking for; perhaps this is a moment at which such an arrangement might become peculiarly useful."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 8. Charles Street.—"Mr. Fisher of Elton to whom at my request you promised your vote at the next election of the Master of the Charter House, has just been with me to tell me that Mr. Beardmore is dead, and that he thinks

he has a good chance of being chosen. He is told that a Mr. Wollaston of Cambridge is his most formidable antagonist; besides this candidate Lord Bath supports a Mr. Thomas; and Dr. Rayne, the school-master, will likewise make a strong fight. If the election takes place in a fortnight as it is expected, there will probably be very few voters, and it will be a very near race.

"Nobody can tell me distinctly why Parliament is deferred, but I suppose it is partly because they find they can scramble up money to go on, and partly because time, which cures all evils, may amongst others cure that of the barren and unproductive defence Bill. I hear to-day that Lord Harrowby is gone to Bath, and that his brother says he must quit his office from ill health. Will Lord Hardwicke come and try his hand at foreign dispatches; or will Yorke cross over, as Lord Hawkesbury did, to shew that it is a new government because the two Secretaries have changed places? Canning, if there was likely to be a question of him, is, I am informed, not thought to be in high favour in Downing Street. After all, very likely Lord Harrowby will take a new lease with the Bath waters, and all these speculations sleep again till he is out of health again.

"In the circle of foreign ministers there is a whisper that the King of Prussia has taken fright at the activity and neighbourhood of his French friends in Hanover, and has formally announced that he cannot patiently see any augmentation of French force in a country so near his own. I think some of the maps which I sent you from Berlin might have suggested this apprehension earlier, and after he has so long been patient why should he become impatient now? I do not believe it."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 11. Charles Street.—"I have had an opportunity to-day of learning, from a channel which I can entirely trust to, so curious and interesting an account of the state of the P[rin]ce's negotiation, as described by him up to a late hour last night, that, in default of any post, I am almost tempted to send my groom with this letter to Dropmore to-morrow morning early. Lord M[oira] is described by his master as having come up to town on his own private business, and from town to have visited his master at the seaside. While he was on this visit, the letter from the Chancellor (which I mentioned in my last) arrived by a messenger, and Lord M[oira] persuaded his master to come up to town with him. On the following morning (I cannot distinctly make out whether on Friday or yesterday or Saturday last) Lord M[oira] was sent for by Mr. P[itt] and the following is the account given by Lord M[oira]'s master of the report made to

him of that conversation ; namely, that Mr. P[itt] had sent for him to say that there were good hopes of bringing about an interview of reconciliation between the K[ing] and the P[rince], upon which subject he wished to discourse with Lord M[oir]. It was answered that the P[rince] was in town, which furnished great additional facility. Mr. P[itt] went on to say that he very much wished the interview to take place ; that he himself had never seen anything in his own observations of the K[ing] that did not shew him to be fit for business, but Mr. P[itt] had no hesitation in adding that he had received from other persons a different account, and that it was highly desirable to make a proper provision for a case of so much real distress to the country ; that his own idea most certainly was that of the P[rince]'s being at the head of the regency both for the civil and military government of the country ; that he trusted nobody whatever could be found who would hold back or refuse himself under such circumstances of public danger, and that he particularly wished to know Lord M[oir]'s opinion upon this part of the subject. To this Lord M[oir] is described to have answered that for himself he must fairly say that he would not sit in any Cabinet from which Mr. F[ox] was excluded. No more of the report of this conversation was detailed to me ; but I learnt that from this interview Lord M[oir] went to the Ch[ancellor] and described himself (by his master's account) to have reproached the Ch[ancellor] with having been the cause of this calamity by too early a production, and by premature assertions of competency which, in removing controul, had removed the only chance of perfect recovery, and that for all the distresses of this moment he was above all others eminently responsible. This subject is said to have been pressed so home that the Ch[ancellor] burst into tears, and bewailed himself for having ever accepted a situation which was the misery of his life, as his most conscientious desire of doing the best had ended in doing what was approved of by nobody. My report ends there, because the memory of my informer supplied no more ; except to say that it was the P[rince]'s intention to send for F[ox] to-day. It was further added, as an observation made by Lord M[oir], that he had received private intelligence of some strange irregularities on the 4th and 5th of this month, and that he was satisfied the real motive for the adjournment of Parliament was solely and entirely in this subject.

"I am quite aware of the difficulties which must attend the exact recital of conversations of this kind, but it seems to me difficult to imagine that there could have been such an entire misunderstanding or exaggeration as that the conversation with Mr. P[itt] should not have turned upon the subject which is quoted ; and for any such subject to have been started by him, it is manifest he must have thought there was pressing and weighty occasion for entering into

such discussions. If F[ox] is sent for, it is probable that you will hear from him an accurate account. If the information which I can trust to, was accurately reported by Lord M[oir]a and by his master, it would seem as if this important discussion was actually brought to a point; and although I do not know of anything that you can do, I feel that it may be of advantage to you to turn this in your thoughts before-hand, and therefore I am inclined, at all events, to send my groom with this to-morrow.

"I should add that I am assured that within these three or four days the mother and the second brother have conveyed the most conciliatory messages to the eldest brother, and that Harry the Ninth is grown quite loud in his praises. If I send my groom, he will leave his horse at Cranford Bridge, and take a post-horse from thence so as to return to town upon his own horse the same day.

Postscript.—"Just as I close this letter I have ascertained that the P[rin]ce has sent at five this evening to Woburn for Mr. F[ox]. Yet how is it possible that matters should be so far advanced as the report of P[itt]'s conversation implies, without it's being even suspected by the public?"

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 12. Charles Street.—"I find by my informer, that upon a second edition of the same narrative from the same authority, it appears that the most *important* part which I quoted of the conversation in Downing Street was not as prominently and distinctly brought forward, as the first narrative had represented it; so that some of the high colouring which was to be apprehended has evidently been given to this important part of the transaction; nevertheless my informer assures me that *it* did make *a part* of the conversation in question. I conclude therefore that your conjecture is quite correct, and that the stranger in Downing Street was sounded rather as to future projects and provisions, than upon any immediately to be brought into action from the necessity of the thing.

"I have this moment seen F[ox] getting out of his post-chaise, but I had scarce spoke to him before the master came up, and, as I retired, the master said to me that he would desire F[ox] to tell you and me everything.

"I will write a few lines to Stowe to-night to describe the general state of the thing such as I conceive it, but I have scarcely time to write more than very few words."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 13. Charles Street.—"Having been obliged to go after Lord Sp[encer] and Wi[ndham] to-day,

and having likewise to write into Yorkshire, I can only hastily copy over to you what I have written to Stowe.

“As soon as F[ox] had quitted the P[rince] yesterday evening he and Sh[eridan] called upon me here. The first and main object of their visit was to say that the P[rince] had directed them to make to me (for the information of yourself and Lord B[uckingham] the following communication : that an interview had taken place that morning at Kew between the K[ing] and himself, but without any political reference whatsoever ; and farther he directed us to be informed that in a conversation which took place between P[itt] and Lord M[oir] upon some enquiries made by P[itt] as to the possibility of the P[rince]’s friends co-operating with the K[ing]’s government, that Lord M[oir] had answered that after the communication which the P[rince] had last session with those whom he had thought fit to consult with, he, Lord M[oir], would not advise the P[rince] to try to influence the political conduct of his friends, without the concurrence and communication of those same persons whom he had called to his councils last session, and the P[rince] desired that we should all be informed that he entirely approved of and assented to the answer given by Lord M[oir] to Mr. P[itt].

“This was, as well as I recollect, the purport if not the exact shape of words of the message sent to us. What I have farther learnt is that Ti[erney] avows his using his best efforts to engage the P[rince] in unison with the present ministers, who are doing all they can to invite it by the most distinct professions of their intention to give him (in that case), all the authority, influence, and pre-eminence which he can look for. You know, however, that his mind rests entirely upon military rank and command ; and it is not easy to conceive, however eager ministers may be to obtain it, that the K[ing] will ever concede anything upon that subject. At the interview were present the K[ing], Q[ueen], and P[rincess]es, and D[ukes] of Suss[ex] and Cam[bridge] ; no embrace or shaking of hands, nor one word of allusion to the late separation or to the present interview, nor any remark besides the ordinary course of conversation ; the Q[ueen] found an opportunity of telling the P[rince] it was not her fault that this meeting had not taken place before. The K[ing] appeared to the P[rince] much fallen away, but Sheridan who saw the King at Lymington at a sort of *levée* there, and was spoken to for near half an hour, says the K[ing]’s conversation was remarkably cool and collected ; and I find there is a general belief that the last fortnight did the K[ing] much essential benefit, and produced an almost incredible change for the better ; so that what I had heard of the 4th and 5th was perhaps as much exaggerated as a good deal of what I first heard appears to have been. The P[rince] is to take the D[uke] of Cl[arence] down to dine at Windsor on Friday, and Lord M[oir] returns on Saturday

to Scotland. This negotiation therefore may be considered as concluded, and if it be so, I confess I do not see what advantage the ministers who have been so zealous for it are likely to derive to their own power.

What Lord K[illeen]'s account was to you of Irish intelligence I know not, but F[ox] thinks that the *question* must come on very early in the session, and that it will produce the same distinction of parties and persons which was left at the end of last session; it is material to add that the P[rince] in conclusion said yesterday that he wished the question to come on as early as possible, and that he the P[rince] should certainly himself vote for the question. Sh[eridan] says that, as lately as ten days ago, Addington was more bitter than ever against the present ministers, and was pressing him Sh[eridan] to move on the first day the repeal of the Defence Bill. I understand Parliament will not meet till the 17th, so they have two months more of preparation; and yet I am inclined to think that their active canvass, and all their diligent endeavours, will rather betray the sense of their own weakness, than add any real accession to their strength.

"Your friend Wor[onzow] suspects and fears they are looking to Henley upon Thames for the successor to Lord H[arrowby]; he Wor[onzow] wishes Cann[ing] and thinks it likely.

"I have just heard from good authority that Lord Mel[ville] congratulated Lord M[oir] yesterday on the interview, and added that he hoped it would not end there; both of my visitors however are satisfied that nothing will induce Lord M[oir] to accept. Sh[eridan] talks with great and I believe real earnestness of his wish to counteract T[ierney]. He says Ti[erney] told him that he Ti[erney] might go to Ireland, but he believed he should not.

"F[ox] is returned to Woburn and then goes to Whitbread's."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 16. Charles Street.—"I am just returned from passing two days at Wimbledon with Lord Spencer, and I have found Wind[ham] here impatient to tell me that the P[rince] had sent for him yesterday to relate to him all that had recently passed. The account up to Monday night tallied tolerably well with what I had heard from him through F[ox] and Sh[eridan]; but you will remember that I told you F[ox] thought with me the whole thing concluded; and went early next morning. Tuesday, to Woburn. Now the P[rince] tells W[indham] that Mr. P[itt] sent for Lord M[oir] early on Tuesday to tell him that the K[ing] would see him Lord M[oir] yesterday at Windsor; and I understand Lord M[oir] to have asked the P[rince] what he Lord M[oir]

could say, if the K[ing] should press him upon the subject of *general union* ; a subject which the P[rince] says Mr. P[itt] had in his last conversation with Lord M[oira], professed to be still his own desire and wish. The P[rince] related that in case the K[ing] should urge this to Lord M[oira], his advice to Lord M[oira] was, to decline entering into details of any length, and that he should rather refer the K[ing] to Mr. P[itt] as being acquainted with all Lord M[oira]'s sentiments on this subject. Lord M[oira] was to return last night from Winds[or], and there has been no communication to any of us of what has happened there ; but it is evident to me that the negotiation is renewed in this manner, after F[ox] had returned with the impression of its being all at an end. I am therefore glad to find that Wind[ham] wrote to F[ox] last night an account of all that the P[rince] had said to him.

“It is farther important that you should know that Wind[ham] told me that when the P[rince] had spoken of the probability of the K[ing] pressing Lord M[oira] upon the subject of general agreement of all the P[rince]'s friends, including F[ox] and you, Wind[ham] said he had unequivocally then told the P[rince] that he thought no such union desirable, but that it was better that Mr. [Pitt] should take his course and that we should take ours. Upon Wind[ham] repeating this to me, I said that I must fairly tell him that I thought we were so placed as to make it impossible for us to discourage or to refuse discussions upon general union, after having made that the touchstone of all our political conduct last session ; that I agreed that the difficulties were increased, and that what had passed might fairly lessen the most sanguine hopes for success from it ; but that still we could with no consistency do other than profess our hope and desire of its being found practicable. This is important, and therefore I write to name it, and to shew you that something is still stirring.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 21. Charles Street.—“Having passed the last two or three days with General Ross at Russell Farm, I returned to town this morning and found a note from Sheridan, *dated last night*, in which he tells me that he has great satisfaction in informing me that all the negotiations proposed to or proceeding from Carleton House closed *on that morning* by the Prince's adopting the only line of conduct which anyone who really regards his interests or his honour could wish to see him adopt : and this was formally communicated by Lord Moira to Mr. Pitt. Sheridan adds that he will call and tell me the particulars. The whole matter therefore seems finished for the present, though I cannot conceive why in that case the P[rince] should be gone to Lord Thurlow to Bath, as to-day's papers inform us.

"I am glad that what I said to Windham meets with your approbation; although the only use of saying it is to set ourselves right, but without any hope, as it should seem, of altering his sentiments; at least so I apprehend from seeing precisely his opinion on this matter stated in the last Cobbett in a manner too much bearing upon the face of it, that the opinion there stated of having no connexion with Pitt is the opinion of all the leading persons in question. I cannot approve this, and yet under our present penury of printed papers, it is hardly possible to remedy this evil as it should be.

"Your anecdote about Canning and Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury is a stronger proof of the lowered tone of our ministers' spirit and feeling than any that I have yet heard. I must write of Sheridan's message to Stowe."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 23. Charles Street.—"Sheridan having proposed to tell me what is called the particulars, I made an appointment with him to which of course he did not come; and I cannot say that I much regret this failure, because, though it may be well to know the general results upon these subjects, it is much to be desired to be as little as possible *e secretioribus*. Mean-time you will be amused to hear that the visit to Bath has no reference to the general matters, but relates altogether to the little adopted child, the retaining of which is the fever of the present moment; and the legal consultation sought for is to furnish the means of continuing to keep the child against the vehement reclamations of Lord H. Seymour and the other guardians. It is curious to observe too that, while so much pains are taken to keep one's neighbour's daughter from the care of her guardians, there is the same undiminished jealousy of one's own daughter being taken away from the care of her natural parent.

"I heard yesterday, and from good source, that the P[rin]ce has spoken out to Tierney, has told him that he is convinced of his friendship, and in return for it, assures him of his own wish for his general success, but that upon political subjects and persons their opinions differ so very much, that he wishes T[ierney] to take his own part in whatever way he likes without any reference to the political opinions or conduct of the P[rin]ce. This accords with the expressions of Sh[eridan]'s note to me, and seems to shew that Sh[eridan] has had a signal victory over his political rival for the favour of Carlton House."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 24. Charles Street.—"There has been some strange confusion in the communications which took

place previous to the family interview. I have now discovered that the Ch[ancello]r and Mr. P[itt] had in these communications suggested to the P[rince] that it was the wish of the K[ing] to take the Princess Royal under his own eye with an establishment of his own appointing, leaving to the P[rince] the power of visiting and seeing his daughter when he wished it. The P[rince] maintains that his answer was uniformly the same on this subject; that he would never make any bargain or condition about his daughter, nor suffer her to be removed from under his care, although he should certainly never object to the K[ing] seeing her when he wished it. The P[rince] having, according to his account, never varied one iota from that answer, whenever the subject was named to him, and hearing nothing of it in the interview with the K[ing], has just now received through the Chancellor a paper from the K[ing] in which the K[ing] seems to consider the removal of the Princess as a matter agreed upon; and talks of taking into his own hands the sum allowed for the maintenance of the Princess Royal, and of distributing it into a new establishment under the care of Lady Waldegrave, Bishop Fisher, a Swiss gentleman and others. At this paper, I am told, the P[rince] is very indignant, and intends to answer it by referring the K[ing] upon that subject to his the P[rince]'s conversations with the Ch[ancello]r and with Mr. P[itt] and all this in the determined resolution not to part with his child. If this be so, and I have no reason to think that I am ill-informed, the determination which seems to be taken on both sides cannot be persisted in without producing more fever and ill blood than we have yet seen.*

“F[ox] was in town yesterday morning, but had returned to St. Anne’s before dinner, so that I did not see him. I have not seen S[heridan] but what I told you of the P[rince]’s declaration to Tierney is repeated to me to-day as quite authentic.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 26. Charles Street.—“Lord Spencer, as well as yourself, seemed to entertain the notion of voting the mastership to Fisher and the living to Rayne, and Fisher does not think it for his credit to say more upon that subject than to remark that the mastership alone is only 200*l. per annum*, and that the living was added to it 30 years ago in consideration of that salary being too small for enabling the master to keep his house warm. The election will run near; it is supposed Pitt and his brother will not vote; Addington tells Fisher he has promised no candidate, but will vote with Lord Ellenborough, who will not promise anybody. I shall be very much delighted to have little woman and you to dinner on Thursday and Friday, and hope Lord Spencer will

* The correspondence here referred to on the subject of the education of Princess Charlotte of Wales, is given in the Appendix to this volume.

come up to vote and meet you. I will send my carriage for you to Oxford Street on Thursday, a little before six.

"Meantime Sheridan has called upon me, and has confirmed all that I had told you upon my former information. It seems in the *first* negotiation Lord M[oi]ra had induced the Prince to allow him to say that, if there was a cordial reconciliation, the P[rin]ce would be willing to meet the K[ing] half way in discussing such an arrangement with the K[ing] for the P[rin]cess R[oya]l as might place her exclusively under the care of the K[ing] and P[rin]ce, or as L[or]d M[oi]ra had expressed it, the K[ing] holding her by one hand and the P[rin]ce on the other. But a main condition of any such arrangement was that there was to be no tampering with the P[rin]cess of W[ales], and it now turns out that the interview between the K[ing] and P[rin]cess of Wales in August was thought a breach of this engagement, and contributed to break off the then proposed reconciliation. When at last it took place lately at Kew, the P[rin]ce had expected the K[ing] to mention the subject to him, but neither then nor in the three days at Windsor was one word said to the P[rin]ce; but two days after his return from Windsor the P[rin]ce finds that the K[ing] goes and passes a whole day alone with the P[rin]cess of W[ales] at Greenwich; and the next day the Ch[ancello]r was sent to the P[rin]ce with a paper from the K[ing] which begins by stating that the P[rin]ce *having expressed a wish* that the P[rin]cess R[oya]l should be put under the special control of the K[ing] for the care of her person and education, H[is] M[ajesty] proposes to make a new establishment, a new residence, and so on. The P[rin]ce is quite furious, but writes a temperate answer to the Chancellor in which he returns the paper, denies his having expressed the wish there quoted, refers to L[or]d M[oi]ra for the truth of this denial, protests that he has not heard a word upon the subject, and insists that the Ch[ancello]r and Mr. P[itt] should explain distinctly to the K[ing] all that L[or]d M[oi]ra had said to them by the P[rin]ce's direction. This answer was sent yesterday by the P[rin]ce to the Ch[ancello]r. You see what a wretched state of things arises out of all this imperfect and oblique intrigue.

"The message to Tierney from the P[rin]ce was as I told you, and moreover Lord Moira by the P[rin]ce's order told Mr. P[itt], before he went to Scotland, that the P[rin]ce was no longer desirous of any military rank or command whatever."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, November 27. Charles Street.—"The Prince having somehow or other found out that you was to be in town on Thursday and Friday, has sent me his orders that *you and I*

should dine with him on Thursday ; and that he had sent likewise to Windham. L[or]d Spencer having promised to be my guest on Thursday, I have got him into the scrape by letting the P[rin]ce know that he was to be in town likewise. Still however we shall have a snug comfortable dinner here on Friday. I will call for you or send the carriage for you on Thursday at six."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 14. [Stowe.]—"You are distinctly charged with having *writ* the letter sent by the P[rin]ce of Wales to the L[or]d Chancellor ; and this is told to me, as a point so certain, that no doubt can exist upon it. I know not whether it is worth while to undeceive *anyone* on this subject ; but I rather think *not*. The demand will be persisted in, to its fullest extent ; and the L[or]d Ch[ancello]r and Mr. Pitt are understood to be *pledged to carry it*. At least all discussion on this subject is now to pass through them, as it has been put entirely into their hands. Such is *my belief* of the present state of this very painful and difficult matter, *on which Pitt's uneasiness increases*. Addington *is said* to have listened to ideas of joining Gov[ernmen]t, and this coalition *is considered and stated* to be certain. With all this, I understand that the opinions of those about the king's person are not sanguine respecting his present health, or the future prospects, supposing him to be much disturbed by any domestic or political *contre-temps* ; and how it can be imagined that such difficulties of both sorts are not to occur I cannot conceive.

"Pray let me know how your leg goes on, and let me have your news in return for mine *on which you may depend*."

"Much is built on the wording of a letter sent by L[or]d Moira to the L[or]d Chanc[ello]r in the summer ; which *is stated* to be a direct, distinct, and irrevocable acquiescence of H[is] R[oyal] H[ighness] in the idea of placing his daughter's education completely and *exclusively* in the King's hands."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 21. Charles Street.—"You will be as much shocked as I was to learn that melancholy event which makes the subject of the enclosed letter. Poor L[or]d Proby, besides being a generous and amiable young man, and likely to rise high in his profession and in the estimation of the country, was also the best son and brother that ever was, and consequently his loss will be unusually afflicting to all of our dear friends at Elton. If I had been able to move I should have gone down there, but yesterday I was seized with the return of my naval rheumatism in my neck, and am therefore entirely

unable to move. I have written to L[or]d Carysfort, but what matters it? What have letters to do in the first pressure of such a calamity? You will observe that even in these moments however L[or]d Carysfort has not neglected to apprise my brother of what must of course affect his parliamentary arrangements. I have no guess what my brother's inclinations will be, nor whether it would occur to him to think of the second brother; nor yet whether, if that option was given to the Colonel, it would be best for him to avail himself of the offer. Perhaps upon the whole, considering his own attachment to the army, and the protection and favour of the D[uke] of York, it may not be wise in him to risque it by the chance of a few parliamentary votes which he may think it right to give against the Duke's wishes; it is however premature to discuss this, as I do not know that my brother has any such offer in contemplation.

"Gen[era]l Grenville is come to Mr. Metcalfe's, waiting for his own house to be ready for him, but confined at present by a humour in the inside of his mouth. L[or]d Glastonbury is expected in a week. I know nothing distinctly of L[or]d Moira's interviews, but I hear and believe that Pitt has no dispute with him about the former negotiation, and is now occupied in finding some middle course, which is to carry the Princess Charlotte to Windsor, and yet to leave the Prince a share in the care and control of her education; and perhaps L[or]d M[oi]ra may usefully assist this arrangement which might furnish the most desirable solution to the business."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1804], December 21. [Stowe].—"I should spare myself the trouble of writing to you in answer to your long letter, having been so disturbed by this shocking calamity to the poor Carysforts, if I did not think it right to let you know that I have the most decisive and positive information that appearances at Windsor are most unfavourable; there is an evident alteration for the worse; great irritation of manner and general system; and in various particulars that cannot be described, but are decisive with those who know his habits, and can hourly observe them.

"I find likewise that the L[or]d Ch[ancello]r *has been stated* 'so undecided, so cowardly, and so dirty' that much is not expected in his personal contest with L[or]d Moira.

"Addington *is expected* to support, though *it is stated* that 'the ill-blood between Pitt and him is not done away.'"

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 22. Charles Street.—"It is very kind in you and Lady G[renville] to offer to go to Elton. If you

can prevail upon them to come away with you to Dropmore, that would be, as I should think, the arrangement that would be likeliest to assist (as much as it can be assisted) the distress of this calamity. I am still confined to my room or I would have done my best to have met you there *on Tuesday*. L[or]d Moira has been in town these two days; so has Fox and the Prince, and they dined together at Carleton House yesterday; but, being confined, I have seen nobody and heard nothing, except that Fox has said he was satisfied with L[or]d M[oir]a, and the P[rin]ce has said that L[or]d M[oir]a has just now again refused the foreign seals.

“If you go on Tuesday, pray write me a line from Elton the day after you come there, to tell me how you find our poor dear friends there.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804, December 28. Charles Street.—“I now find that L[or]d M[oir]a’s letter to the D[uke] of Kent was a long recapitulation of all that had passed, and a statement also of the concessions which the P[rin]ce was inclined to make; requiring for the P[rin]ce that the child should not be taken from him to be put under the care of the Princess; and reserving an approbation from the P[rin]ce of the persons to be named by the King; this ended, as I before told you, by desiring to receive the King’s commands. The Duke of Kent read the letter; it was heard with great agitation; and the answer dictated by the K[ing] was that none of the unpleasant parts of this business were imputable to L[or]d Moira, but that the King had no commands to give him.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 5. Charles Street.—“I have this moment been *confidentially* informed from the *best* authority, that Pitt has found it impossible that L[or]d Wellesley can go on in his warfare with the Directors, and that L[or]d W[ellesley] is believed to be now actually at sea on his return; I therefore take for granted that Pitt will reserve some Cabinet arrangement for his landing. My friend at Russell Farm surprised me a good deal by telling me that L[or]d Cornwallis has actually consented to return to India for two or three years, and is going out quite immediately. L[or]d C[ornwallis] it seems, offer’d his services when Pitt came in, and upon this being proposed to him, he accepted immediately, and sails immediately; a bold undertaking at sixty six, and as I hear, he takes out nobody with him, as he finds a military secretary among the officers now in India.

“I am also told, *but in confidence*, that Osborne Markham

is to-day dismissed by a letter from being a Commissioner of Navy Board on account of indiscretion; but with an intimation that, in consideration of his services, he shall have some other office. I understand his indiscretion to have been that of thwarting Sir A. Hammond. I have heard no new details of the P[rince]ss Charlotte, but still suppose all will end peaceably, tho[ugh] L[or]d B[uckingham]'s accounts to me from Stowe, are those of new jealousy on this subject, new uneasiness about health, and of the most general and indiscreet language to everybody about the *praise of Addington* and *about Pitt*.

"I know of no details, but I am told that the Prince has seen the Chancellor again, and that all will end peaceably as to the family discussions—so much the better. L[or]d Moira is also said to have been again sent for, and to have arrived.

"I expect L[or]d Melville is to be foreign Secretary, in order partly to save Canning; Addington to be L[or]d Reading and L[or]d President."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 7. [Charles Street].—"Lord St. Helen's quotes the King and L[or]d Glastonbury quotes Pitt for saying the day before yesterday that Addington certainly will be a peer, and the publick believes that he will be L[or]d President. L[or]d Mulgrave, with Ward for his Under-Secretary, has the foreign seals, which he is supposed to hold *ad interim* till L[or]d Wellesley arrives, who is expected in June. It was said yesterday that the King had demurred to Lord Mulgrave and Ward, thinking their appointment too hostile to Addington; but I do not find this report confirmed, though certainly Mulgrave's speeches and Ward's pamphlet do not make them very conciliatory partners in office with the new Lord President. Some people fancy that Canning is to go to Ireland, to soften to him the asperity of these domestick arrangements; but he is out of town, and declines writing to his friends as to his own intentions, before he sees them in town.

"Two days before the reconciliation, Fawkenor told me from Dyson that while he Dyson was riding with Addington, Pitt passed, and coldly touched his hat, upon which Addington observed to Dyson that even that cold greeting was new to him; Pitt made the overture by a letter to L[or]d Hawkesbury written to be shewn to Addington.

"Lyll the messenger is arrived from Lisbon, which he left on the 11th Dec[ember]. It appears that Frere, while all the world was waiting upon his motions, has been amusing himself by a jaunt of pleasure with Lord and Lady Holland. You who know him will perhaps not be surprised to hear that

while the letters of marque, and privateers, and declaration of war here were hourly watching his return to justify our intercepting the Spanish trade, he, Frere, was going a sort of tour of pleasure, having left Madrid the 14th Nov[embe]r, and not having reached Lisbon till the 10th of Dec[embe]r, though there was no hindrance or impediment whatever. He is making love to Lady Holland, and is now staying at Lisbon for a month or two with them for his recreation; this is almost incredible, but I know it to be true."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 8. [Charles Street.]—"Hatsell, with whom I conversed to-day, told me that he believed the D[uke] of Portland's answer was not yet received; and upon my saying that I knew the peerage at least was settled, he said 'then they have overcome Mr. Addington, for I know his letter to Pitt of Saturday was to urge Mr. P[itt] to leave him in the H[ouse] of Commons without office, though in the Cabinet, in order by being in the Cabinet to shew his entire concurrence.' And why, said I, did Mr. Pitt press him so vehemently to be a peer against his wish; to which he answered 'because he wanted his help in the House of Lords, *for I suppose I must not be allowed to say that he wanted him out of the House of Commons.*' This language in a person so confidential to Addington cannot be mistaken, and I find every day new proofs of the haughty and unconciliatory language of Addington's friends, and hear of some of Pitt's best friends who think that he would have done better to have resigned than to have connected himself in this new shape. T. Villiers held this language quite distinctly to me, and though I know he will vote as he ought to do with Pitt, he quite distinctly told me he should have advised Pitt rather to resign, than to have taken Addington, in order to keep his office. Hatsell sighed out to me several wishes for peace, and there is industriously circulated by Addington's friends an opinion that he will bring about peace.

"In confirmation of this I receive by this post a letter from G. Berkeley from Ramsgate, telling me that on Sunday evening a fishing boat brought on board of our admiral a Frenchman with a pass-port from Talleyrand, purporting that he was a lieutenant de marine charged with dispatches of great importance from Talleyrand to L[or]d Harrowby; and he was immediately forwarded to London with great dispatch and a great mystery.

"Elliot dines with me on Saturday, and I will ask Windham also to meet you and the little woman, as I expect you both to dinner in Charles street on Saturday, and I will send the carriage for you at six."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 9. Charles Street.—“I have received a letter to-day from Fox in which he tells me that he comes to-morrow to town to stay, and wishes to have some conversations upon the approaching business. I have told him that you and Windham and Elliot are out of town now, but will dine with me on Saturday, and I have desired him to be of the party. He is of opinion that not a moment should be lost in moving about the Defence Bill; although the objectionable mode in which the Spanish war has been commenced must necessarily first force itself into discussion. It seems to me, however, to be very easy, upon the address in answer to the King’s speech on the Spanish war, to give notice on that first day of some motion to ascertain what the success of the Defence Bill has been; in order to ascertain the best mode of carrying on the war in which we are engaged. This indeed would be so regular that it might actually be moved to be inserted as an amendment, if we had not seemed to have agreed in general upon having none, and if I had not consequently told Watkin and Charles that they would not be much wanted before Monday the 21st.

“If L[or]d Fitzwilliam or Grey come to town by Saturday I will ask them to dine here. Tell the little woman she need not be afraid of us, because she may go up to coffee whenever she is bored with the politicians.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 22. [Charles Street.]—“I am very sorry indeed to hear of the painful seizure under which you are suffering; the chest is a bad seat for the rheumatism, and sometimes a pain in the chest and left side which seems rheumatick, in fact is the beginning of an incipient pleurisy. I hope therefore that at all events you will not let the day go by without seeing Dr. Ferris, who will probably be able at least to determine whether you are certainly right in conceiving your complaint to be rheumatism.

“L[or]d Hawkesbury yesterday told L[or]d Carlisle and L[or]d Spencer that the papers would probably be printed upon the table on *Wednesday*, and that he should move for the debate on them for *Tuesday* next; if therefore by Friday you are not well enough to think you can attend on Tuesday, L[or]d Spencer or L[or]d Carlisle should be instructed by you to move on that day for deferring it to Thursday or Friday.

“Our day for the Spanish papers is fixed for Monday next, but as we shall not have them before Wednesday or Thursday, I think our debate will perhaps be postponed; Windham’s Defence Bill will stand for next Monday se’nnight.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, January 24. Charles Street.—“I hope, by your describing continued though slow amendment, that your complaint is not more than rheumatism, which, God knows, is bad enough; but as you have no prior authority for supposing yourself rheumatic, I still trust you will hear what the learned call it in London, if it pursues you hither.

“The debate on the Spanish papers being adjourned in our House till Thursday next, I take for granted the Lords keep time to the same tune; the papers that Windham moved for yesterday are such as we know will take no time in preparing, and therefore that debate still stands for Monday se’nnight.

“I do not hear who is Archbishop to-day, although it was to be settled yesterday; but Sutton is still the favourite, and the harder Pitt fights for Prettyman, the more marked will be the disappointment.

“Ponsonby writes word that the Catholic petition will be adopted for immediate presentation on the 3rd February; and Newport, who is arrived, confirms that account.

“I have been much surprised lately in hearing that Pitt was forced to this last junction with Addington by your unreasonably continuing to deny yourself to any of the overtures and communications made to you by Pitt, and this is the explanation of what I told you was called the violence of your opposition. This is too abominable a lie, and I have contradicted it, and mean to do so whenever I hear it, without reserve.

“Grey is come; my brother is to dine in town to-day.

“I find their army is fortunately more numerous than I had imagined, though certainly not by Pitt’s Bill; they have thirty thousand infantry for general service in England, and twenty thousand in Ireland, exclusive of guards and artillery.”

Private. LORD THURLOW to LORD AUCKLAND.

1805, March 22.—“Being without books I cannot give more than crude ideas on a motion which you have considered so maturely. It is difficult to deny the general competence of the House to address, but I lean every hour more and more to Lord Grenville’s line, that where crimes are alleged they should be left to the appropriate course of trial. In disposing of a criminal charge, sound discretion is the essence of justice. Would it be just, after a motion in the House, to leave a judge exposed to a severer process with a previous declaration of his guilt? or would it be wise to risk his subsequent acquittal? Whatever we may think of ourselves, the world will justly give superior credit to the ordinary and more formal

tribunals. I write without reference to the statutes and journals which I have not here. I would not mention the statutes in the motion, you know that the judges have them all *in scrinio pectoris*. Nor would I mention the 'address'; the judges would say that they are not competent to pronounce what the course of Parliament should be. The great point is that they should state, whether the charge in question is a legal and sufficient ground whereupon to found the jurisdiction of the House to take judicial cognisance.

"It may be material in some part of the debate to ascertain whether the Lords cannot by judgment or impeachment deprive the culprit of an office which appears to be abused. I have a confused recollection of such judgment and of incapacities." *Extract.*

Endorsed by Lord Auckland in lead pencil: "I have made some alterations pursuant to Lord Thurlow's suggestions and submit the motions so altered to any corrections your lordship may think proper to make.

"At the same time I strongly incline to think (and Mr. Cowper agrees with me) that the preliminary motion ought to be 'that the entry in the journal of the last session and in the minutes of this session concerning a complaint made by a peer, *be vacated*.' Either the Chancellor will negative that motion and then the ground of the two enclosed motions will be strengthened, or (which I have some reason to believe) he will reluctantly give way, and then the object will be gained."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, March 31. Palace Yard.—"The Chancellor has intimated to me (with civil expressions of regret) that his objections to the motion, to which you gave so distinguished a support on Monday last, are insurmountable. He thinks that 'the motion as at present worded, would carry the subject to the consideration of the judges, in terms that would give to the whole proceeding a character not belonging to it. He can shew (he says) by our journals that every step taken in the business is connected with the purpose of *deliberating whether we should address or not*. The statute (he adds) gives to the House a right to address upon the grounds alleged if true, and implies a right in the House to institute its own proceedings in order to determine its own judgment. He infers that our right, so described, is too clear to make it fit to put any question to the judges respecting it.'

"In the result he inclines to recommend to the House either that a motion to address should *now* be made, or to wait till the 6th of May, and then to move an address and an immediate proceeding at the Bar, on the event of which he would ground an address, taking proper means to dispose

of what has hitherto been done (he does not think illegally but perhaps not prudently) in the Committee.

"I have stated these details, not because they carry any conviction or satisfaction to my mind, but because I think it material that they should come under your better consideration. I really cannot comprehend how the difficulty is lessened by the use of the word 'address.' An address cannot be moved without a previous exhibition of grounds for it, and if the enquiry for the purpose of shewing grounds should be extended to matters of crime and misdemeanour, our proceeding then ceases to be consonant to justice, to the usage of Parliament, and to positive law.

"Still it is so evidently the wish of some who are engaged in this business to maintain the punctilio of not confessing an error, that a negative is likely to be given to any motion, however altered or modified, for a reference to the judges.

"Thus circumstanced, and after taking Mr. Cowper's private opinion, I submit to your lordship, whether it may not be expedient, after enforcing the motion of reference to the judges, and after receiving a negative to it, to move 'that the proceedings of the 5th July, 1804, containing certain matters of crime and misdemeanour alledged against Luke Foxe, Esq., and communicated to him that he might answer to them, were not conformable to law' (or 'irregular' or 'illegal.') Some such measure well weighed and well worded seems to be right. We call for precedents on the question of legality; they are refused. We then call for a reference to the judges on the same point of legality, and that reference is refused. The next step may reasonably be to require the House to declare that the proceeding is conformable to law. The affirmative will not be easy."

SIR J. C. HIPPESELEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, April.] Grosvenor Street.—"Should your lordship wish to have an interview with Dr. Milner, he will wait on your lordship at any time your lordship may be disposed to receive him. He dines with me to-day. He had a very detailed conversation with Mr. Fox on Monday last.

"Connected with the little *brochure* I now send your lordship my apologies are also due for the reference I have made to a note of your lordship, in *page* 342. The editor applied to me about two years since to supply him with notes connected with the King's bounty to the Cardinal of York, and such other transactions in which I had been engaged. The Duke of Portland, Lord Minto, Sir W. Hamilton and some others with whom I had been in correspondence permitted me to make use of their correspondence as far as it was connected with public transactions, and I did not scruple to avail myself of the extract of your lordship's letter, as I considered it in some degree official.

"Lord Glastonbury has encouraged me to think I was right in introducing the notes in the baronetage, and as far as precedent goes, I perceive that others have done the same, partially Lord Macartney in Debrett's peerage.

"I will beg to refer your lordship to the concluding or summary note, which the editor has *suppressed* in the *published* edition for the reasons assigned *page* 360.

"In the years 1799 and 1800 I had much correspondence with Lord Castlereagh, who approved my suggestions and acted upon them; but as the correspondence was of a confidential nature, I did not think myself authorized to refer to it."

Postscript.—"I shall be very happy to shew your lordship Lord Castlereagh's letters, when I can have a quarter of an hour's interview.

"I will much thank your lordship for Bishop Coppinger's letters this evening or to-morrow morning."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, April 1-7.] Charles Street.—"By what I hear of Whitbread's resolutions they are not of a very hostile personal description, but as the course of the debate may take a more personal turn than can easily be controlled, I have thought it more consistent with your wishes to stay away altogether, and I have spoken to L[or]d Temple, Ch[arles] Wynn and L[ord] Althorp, who will do the same. The hostile array of the Addingtons on the last question, the anxiety of L[or]d Sidmouth on that day, and something that I have heard of their private language, convince me that they can no longer go on with Pitt, and probably he too has found that they cannot go on together. Under these circumstances I am very glad to find that my friend in Arlington Street, who considers some reference to you or to him as of great probability, thinks exactly as you would wish him to do on the subject. In a very long conversation that I had with him yesterday, he professed explicitly that in his opinion nothing could save us all, but a general union of all without any exclusion whatever. He still adheres to the opinion that he has expressed to you, that it will *now* be impossible to consider of an arrangement in which P[itt] shall be left acknowledged prime minister; and I see that he is earnest that you should keep this in mind; but as for the rest, if I can judge from his language, he very sincerely wishes a general union, including P[itt] and L[or]d S[idmouth], and I am convinced he would do all that could be done by him to facilitate that measure, if there should be question of it.

"I know your hurry of to-day too well to write you a longer letter, but I thought it important that you should know this as soon as may be. I hope you will come up on Monday if

possible, as in the present circumstances, it seems very desirable that you should be in town as soon as you can with convenience.

"An answer is at last sent to Petersburg, but I know not what."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 4. Palace Yard.—"I am clearly convinced by what you say that it will be best to move simply to vacate the proceedings of last session, as manifestly contrary to law. In truth this was my original opinion, and I adopted the more complicated proposition partly from deference to Mr. Cowper. I will try to satisfy him, and to-morrow or Monday I will give the notice accordingly for the 3rd May. I must also speak to Lord Spencer, who feels strongly that we ought further and fully to discuss the legality of the proceeding; perhaps if you see him you will have the goodness to satisfy him that the mode now proposed is the best."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 7. [London.]—"I send you a proxy by desire of the Prince of Wales, who is very eager to have a strong division, as to numbers, to-morrow in the House of Lords on the third reading of the Militia Bill. His Royal Highness has taken some pains to get an attendance, and I thought it impossible to decline obeying his commands in sending you this proxy to sign, which will be entered in Lord Fitzwilliam's name, if I get it in time to send to the House to-morrow.

"The news of the day is that Government are to prepare to refer the matter of the tenth Report to a Select Committee, having found that they could not command numbers sufficient to risk a more direct resistance to Mr. Whitbread's motion."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 13. Charles Street.—"The uncertainty of my steps, and the daily project of my coming down to Dropmore has made me every day save myself the trouble of writing, in the confident hope of seeing you; but much as those resolutions have hitherto failed, I do now trust that if the weather continues as fine, I shall certainly be with you towards Tuesday next.

"So many people have quitted town that there is scarce wherewithal to furnish as much conversation as the interest of the moment would naturally afford. The two persons the most named to-day as likely to succeed L[or]d Melville

are L[or]d Hood and Sir Charles Middleton ; but these reports are so vague, that it is evident nothing is yet decided. It is something in Pitt's favour that he has ten days to look about him before Parliament meets ; but he has so much to look for, and has so little hope of finding anything that can suffice to all his present necessities and distresses, that his prospect even to his own sanguine mind must be gloomy in the extreme. The first idea of his friends seems to have been that he must go out ; but the difficulty of taking that step without its implicating him in all the disgraces of L[or]d Melville's resignation, seems at present to make that step impossible ; and what indeed must be the extent of his embarrassments, when all immediate retreat is cut off from him, so much that he cannot even insist upon naming his own Lord of the Admiralty, because both Addington and the K[ing] know that he dares not threaten them with resignation. I think his friends will grow so sensible of his danger as to rally in force around him when we meet again ; and yet even as late as on Wednesday last it was evident that Banks and Wilberforce and all the saints are still to the greatest degree eager to push on the consideration of the other parts of the tenth and of the eleventh Report ; and this spirit of enquiry spreads so much, and (as I hear) among all ranks of people with so much eagerness, that it will be in vain for Pitt to hope to parry it by delay or by management. His only possible chance will be to endeavour to divert the public attention a little to the Catholic question, and to strengthen himself in the Closet by all the means which that topic will afford him there. In the meantime I hear they are uneasy at the expectation of the next news from the W[est] Indies, as it is to be feared that the *next* account from thence cannot probably supply anything favourable, whatever may be the ultimate result."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 15. Charles Street.—“The east wind and the dust of yesterday and of this morning would alone have made me pause upon an excursion from London ; but, in addition to this, L[or]d Carysfort's report of the hole in the wall, and of the evening walk is of much too airy a description for me, under my present tendencies to catch cold. Towards the middle of June, I will dine with you at three, to lounge about in the evening, but for the 15th of April it sets me a sneezing to think of it.

“I have no rose-coloured suggestions to enliven the gloom of your political picture ; nor do I see any way by which Pitt can extricate himself from his present difficulties, or can afford to the country by any step that he shall take, the chance of such a government as it ought to have, and as it might have had. All that I hear of the language of his friends sounds as if they were persuaded that the thing cannot go on as it is,

but that it is Pitt's business to hold office a little longer in order to separate his own case from that of Dundas, to defend the King upon the Catholic question, and to take the chance of a Protestant clamour prevailing against his adversaries. In the meantime I do not hear of anything fixed for the Admiralty; but whether it be old Hood or young Castlereagh, or Hobart or L[or]d Camden or Yorke, or whether old Hood will hold it for two months by which time L[or]d Royston will be of age to succeed Yorke for Cambridgeshire, these various alternatives may be interesting to the parties but cannot be so to the public, who are likely to have little preference for any one of these gentlemen to any other. The K[ing] has written a letter to Dundas to say that 'he is sorry to find that some incautious acts done by him in the office of Treasurer of Navy makes it necessary for him to quit the Admiralty; that he is satisfied with his good services in that department; and whatever may be the clamour of the day, he believes posterity will do justice to the vigour and ability which he has shewn in the Admiralty.'

"What that vigour and ability is, the people in the city who are trembling to open their next letters from the W[est] Indies, are at a loss to understand; they are furious against Lord Castlereagh who has been so incautious as to say he is glad they are gone to the W[est] Indies."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 18. Eden Farm.—"It requires an effort of mind to advert to printed debates and journals amidst the scenes and subjects of a pleasanter description which my shrubberies, fields and gardens furnish at this season, and which probably exist in equal beauty on a larger scale at Dropmore. Still I should be sorry to abandon our point of parliamentary law, as I am satisfied that our construction of it is right, though not consonant to the professional and ministerial authorities of the House.

"I am indeed well convinced not only that our positions are well founded, but that they are of a first-rate importance in the theory of the constitution. And if any proceeding should take place in virtue of the opposite doctrines, I shall feel it a duty to enter an explanatory and solemn protest; and I believe that Lord Spencer will do the same. In the meantime, the chancellor inclines to supersede the proposed motion of the 3rd of May by an offer to put an end to the committee, and to bring the whole consideration *de novo* before the House. It is probable that such a measure would be, in its effect, a dereliction of the whole enquiry, which can hardly go forwards at so late a period of the session, and under an accumulating pressure of public embarrassments, which seem likely to produce events and fermentations of a very superior interest. Your lordship will best judge how far we ought to rest satisfied with this negative sort of victory, if it should present itself.

"I write at present chiefly to mention (what has been pointed out to me) that on the 13th February, 1673, 'a Bill for settling the fees and powers in the Patents of Judges' was read a second time in the House of Commons. It contained a clause of *quamdiu se bene gesserint*, and a long debate took place, and is stated in *Grey's Debates*, Vol. II, pp. 415 to 420. The speeches are given in some detail, but in a style of abridgment not very intelligible. It appears however that the notion of original enquiry into crimes and misdemeanours for the purpose of grounding a parliamentary address to remove, never occurred either to the promoters or opposers of the Bill. I have not yet looked into the contemporary histories for any further accounts of that debate. In truth my reading has not gone beyond *Les Mémoires de Marmontel*, which is a long chapter of *commérage*, in four volumes, but not the less agreeable on that account.

"We are obliged to remove to Westminster on the 23rd, in order to go to Cooper's Hill on the 24th, and to Frogmore the 25th."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1804 [1805], April 20. Charles Street.—"Elliot, who is gone to Beaconsfield, will tell you the news of London, though it is so poor in matter that it is scarce worth telling. The prevailing report still is that L[or]d Hawkesbury is to have the Admiralty, and Yorke the seals when L[or]d Royston is of age; but in answer to this report I find that L[or]d R[oyston] is already of age, and both Windham and Elliot think they know (from pretty good authority) that L[or]d H[awkesbury] has refused it. You will find Elliot a good deal impressed with the idea that (barring the Catholick question) the K[ing] himself has entertained the notion of looking to Opposition for a Government, and he, Elliot, is very solicitous that much management should be had at least in the debating of the question.

"L[or]d Harrowby is come up quite furious, as I hear, about this unjust attack upon L[or]d Melville, and several of Pitt's friends are doing all they can, and saying all they can, to rally round Pitt for the defence of him and of his government. Among other things they say in the *M[orning] Post* that L[or]d Lowther has promised unqualified support to Pitt, which I know is not true. It is true that he has said to one of Pitt's friends that, much as he disapproved of Pitt's conduct, he would not press upon him now in any question that was personal to him, but he likes less than ever the present state because, as he says, it shews Pitt in a state of dependence quite disgraceful to him. It is however new to me to hear that Rose and some others of Pitt's confidential friends, *when talking together*, do not spare L[or]d Melville, whom they describe (and probably truly) as having put the seal

to the ruin of Pitt by the scrape he has got into. It is curious, but I know of a certainty, that L[or]d Melville, four days ago, said to a common friend of his and of Pitt's, 'do you not think that Pitt should go out upon *this*'; you must not repeat this, but I know the fact.

"In the meantime on the one hand, the spirit of enquiry certainly spreads, as it naturally would among the better class of middling men as well as among the lower orders; while the Court politicians are moving heaven and earth to resist what they call a common danger to all governments. Your own notions, I see by your letters, are not cheerful or sanguine, and I do not perhaps see much more sanguinely than you do; and yet I must say the present state of a more successful opposition is that to which we were all naturally looking, and to which we were all contributing; so that I know not what new difficulty should press more upon us now than for the whole of the last year.

"The B[isho]p of Oxford called on me to-day. He spoke with very real feeling of his obligations to you for supporting him the other day in his Bill, and with much regret that he had no chance of you on the 25th. I have advised him to put off his Bill till you come, but he doubts if it is right. I have still more unwellness about me than belongs to the activity of excursion, though I wish to see and talk with you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 22. [Charles Street.]—"Yesterday everybody thought it settled that L[or]d Hawkesbury and Yorke divided between them Admiralty and Home Seals; but Sir H. Mildmay, whom I have just seen, assures me that he positively knows that both this arrangement, and the projected exchange between L[or]d Camden and L[or]d Sidmouth, went off again yesterday, and that up to the present hour nothing of any kind is settled. I learn from the same quarter that all Pitt's friends consider the game as completely up, and look upon Pitt as only waiting to discuss the charge against him (I suppose that of the eleventh Report) previous to his resignation, a measure which, I am told, many of his friends are even now urging him to in the present moment. This news was told me with great invectives against the present Parliament for their desertion of Pitt in the vote against L[or]d Melville; and by the same authority I learn that Pitt does not resist the motion for prosecution by the Attorney General, nor that for a Committee, though possibly the mode of naming it may create debate and division. The Frogmore ball stands much in the way of Thursday's H[ouse] of Commons, but as the House does not meet before Thursday, I do not see that any arrangement can be had for putting off the debate.

"Calcraft hears that L[or]d Mulgrave dislikes his situation as Foreign Minister, and if the Government can stand, would insist upon taking some other in exchange.

"This is all the news of the day. The violent abuse of the Parliament by P[itt]'s friends, would in other times announce a dissolution, but under the present circumstances, I think it cannot be ventured.

"L[or]d Buckingham excuses himself from the installation for fear of illness, and so does L[or]d Carlisle."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, [April 23]. Charles Street.—"They have sent a messenger to Sir Charles Middleton to offer him the Admiralty, which they think he will accept; they have likewise sent a messenger to Whitbread to desire him to put off his motions till Monday. I know not what his answer will be, but as the Windsor ball ends on Thursday, I see no pretext for the business being put off beyond Friday, if it be put off at all. Ministers are pressing vehemently for attendance in order to make such a Committee as they may like; L[or]d Melville's friends still continues to press Pitt to go out now. The Russian news is said not to be over-good, but as Austria is decided not to act, what can be done by Russia alone? I hear from good authority that ministers boast that they have a measure on foot that must divide Opposition on foreign politicks. This sounds like the whole subsidy to Russia, because they will naturally suppose that Fox will not think it right to give that enormous sum mentioned for Russia alone; but who is there that will think that anything worth doing can be done by Russia without Austria or Prussia?"

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 25. Charles Street.—"I have no doubt but that your speculation as to Pitt's present and future intentions is as near the truth as the general uncertainty of the present circumstances will allow any speculation to be. All that I heard in the last two days announced his intention of his making a struggle to sustain himself for the present. His notices for a military enquiry by Commissioners, and for renewing the naval Commission were dexterously contrived to take these two subjects out of the hands of Opposition in the House yesterday. They had taken little or no measures for attendance while Government had been indefatigable in procuring it; so that, although we carried out in our division almost all the *doubtful votes* of the former night, we had between fifty and sixty absentees, who might just as well have been present as not.

"In addition to this mistake, Whitbread (I know not why) abandoned his regular motion for prosecution by the Attorney-General, a measure which both Grey and I had thought was the true course to pursue, and which in the House we expressed our preference for, and our desire still to pursue. These

blunders and neglects, and the falling off in the numbers of the first division, made it easy for Pitt to carry his subsequent motion of ballotting for the Committee, which will, of course, throw it into his own hands ; and I see no reason now why he should not struggle on through the session without being in a minority, though such a government as his is now become cannot certainly offer any prospect of real or permanent advantage to the country. That this weak and unfortunate state of things should continue, is for the country a great calamity ; but I own I have no hope that the resource which your letter alludes to, as arising out of your conversations at Dropmore, can take place after all the circumstances attending the disappointment of it last year. The eager and irritating course of all the present debates shews the utter impossibility of that *general* union taking place ; and a *partial* one continues subject to all the former objections, with many additional which are daily arising. That nothing can be worse therefore than the present state of things, I readily admit ; but still it appears to me that there is nothing new in any of the circumstances attending it, and nothing therefore that would naturally lead to any new conduct on our part. Under this impression I am a good deal surprized to read in your letter of yesterday that you propose to come up for the Catholick question *only*, and then to remain in the country. In the situation in which you stand as to political connections, it is impossible you should not see that such an absence from Parliament will of necessity cut short the chain of those connections, without any reasonable expectation of the means of renewing them if it should become desirable to you. Such a determination, therefore, as it appears to me, should naturally require a good deal of previous reflection and consideration, which I have no doubt that you will give to it. It was Fox's intention the day before yesterday to write to press very earnestly to see you by the end of this week ; but I have not been able to have any conversation with him alone as yet, and therefore I know not upon what subject he is so intent to see you, though I suppose it is upon the question of Russian subsidy. Certainly I agree with you in thinking that a possible case might arise where it would be well worth while to give even the enormous sum of five million of subsidy ; but, I own I do not think it is easy to conceive that, under the present circumstances of Europe as far as they are known, the *single* co-operation of Russia could be stated to be worth the purchasing at such a price, or when purchased could be expected to produce effectual or extensive results.

“Of this however and of all other matters we shall be able to talk shortly. L[or]d Spencer is impatient to see you, and so are many of our friends. The enclosed note came to me to-day from B[isho]p of Oxford, and I told him I would send it on to you at Dropmore.”

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, April 26. London.—“In this strange state of politics you will not be surprised at my being very anxious to have some conversation with you ; which, indeed, independently of the matters now agitating in Parliament, I should very much desire on account of the Catholic question which is fast approaching, and upon the details of which I am far from feeling sufficiently clear to enable me to form a satisfactory judgment for myself without the benefit of some previous discussion of it with you. If I had not been apprized of your excursion to Oxford, I believe I should have made an attack on you from Windsor on Wednesday ; but now I hope you will come to town, as there are really a good many points that require your immediate attention.

“The Bishop of Oxford’s Bill about livings is postponed till Monday next, and I trust that on that day at latest we shall see you here.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, April 25-30. London.]—“I despaired of finding your *Don Whiskerandos*, for he called at your door and left no card. But Proby has found him this morning, and dines him at L[or]d Carysfort’s to-day, and to-morrow with me. This evening they shew him the King at the ancient musick, and to-morrow young Roscius, so that his hours will be filled till you see him.

“The Catholicicks saw Pitt yesterday and proposed to him :—

1. To present the petition purely and simply.
2. To state them as contented with a declaratory vote of the justice of their application.
3. To state them as contented that nothing should be done in this session.

“Mr. Pitt declared himself unchanged in his opinions on the justice of their pretensions, but alleged that there were reasons that rendered it impossible for him to support their petition or to *intermeddle in it* ; and further, that in justice he must inform them of his intention to oppose it with all his exertions ; and lastly he suggested that it might be adviseable for them not to urge this matter which might indispose and pledge against them many who would otherwise wish to support them *at a fit opportunity*.

“This is the result of the meeting which has rendered them outrageous ; and they have at their meeting this day agreed to put the whole matter into the hands of L[or]d Grenville and of Mr. Fox, and have appointed L[or]d Fingall and L[or]d Kenmare to request you both to appoint a day for meeting the deputation. They know that you are to be in town on Friday, so they will leave their note for you at Camelford House to-morrow.

"I think it probable that the proposal to you both will be the presentation of the petition purely and simply, without anything of what is stated in the second or third proposal made to Mr. Pitt; and I think that this will be the cleanest and neatest way of putting it into your hands. But, if you wish to have the same discretion (which I think you ought not to wish for), you may have it. At all events pray let me see you on Friday as soon as you arrive, for I have much more to tell you on this subject.

"Pitt is savage on his horse-tax defeat; and much sensation has been created by it. He has shewn disposition to give way on the Militia question, and I fancy that others who are wiser have frightened him."

SIR J. C. HIPPIESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, May 1.]—"I received this morning the enclosed from the Roman Catholic Bishop Coppinger.

"Your lordship may possibly not have at hand the *Observations* to which Dr. Coppinger's former letter replied. I therefore enclose them, and will much thank your lordship to favour me with the former enclosures in the course of to-morrow."

Enclosure.

BISHOP W. COPPINGER to SIR J. C. HIPPIESLEY.

1805, April 27. Middleton.—"The kind interest you were pleased to take in the malevolent introduction of my name into the '*Observations upon the late and present state of Ireland*,' induces me to hope that, as it carried you patiently through my long and tedious letters while I endeavoured to unfold such calumnies as bore upon me in that furious production, so it will ensure me your attention to a few particulars which remain to be cleared up in a weightier volume of congenial cast and disposition; Sir Richard Musgrave's *History of the Rebellions in Ireland*. The author of the *Observations* will doubtless consider himself flattered at hearing that his pamphlet is ascribed by some of our best judges to the very flippant pen of that renowned baronet; the matter, the manner and the style bespeak identity. We behold every where in both the same cogency of assertion; the same extensive indiscriminating censures; the same confident hardihood in circumstantiating his facts; and the same satisfactory authorities; namely *I have heard!*—*it was commonly said at that time!*—*it was well known!*—*or I have been assured by a gentleman!*—*or by a lady!*—The kindred of these two exquisite performances is yet further evinced by the multitudinous assemblage of their topics, which must ever secure them both against detailed refutation or detection. Having already exposed to you the falsehoods which touched me in the one; I beg leave to trespass on you a few moments

longer, while I hold up the like falsehoods regarding me in the other ; at least such of them as I noticed in a very rapid flight through it. In page 42 of his *quarto* appendix, he gravely introduces some home-bred cub, who has received, he says, a good classic education, and who laboured with great effect among the Roman Catholic clergy in proselyting them to the Jacobin treason of 1798. The clergy of this county are these he intends particularly to asperse ; they all in general, according to Sir Richard, received the itinerant incendiary very well. There were but three exceptions ; the Right Reverend Doctor Moylan of Cork, the Reverend James Barry of Charleville, and the Reverend Thomas Barry of Mallow. About one hundred Roman Catholic priests are here stigmatized with a single dash, and the credulous reader in England will have logic enough to infer that the Irish Roman Catholic priesthood should not be suffered to exist. Now for my own part I can declare upon oath, I never saw, nor heard of this emissary, until Sir Richard introduced him to me in page 42 of his appendix ; nor have my best enquiries among the clergy subject to me been able to discover any such person as Sir Richard describes, addressing, or received by any of them ; and I could not but have heard of him had he a being elsewhere than in the baronet's creative fancy. Doctor Moylan has most peremptorily disavowed, and even under his hand, any knowledge whatsoever of this incendiary. The Rev. James Barry of Charleville in like manner has disclaimed under his hand, as he will upon his oath, any knowledge of the same ; and the Rev. Thomas Barry has not only given it under his hand that no man of this description ever spoke to him, but further spiritedly adds, that no man had dared to hold such language to him. It is very probable, notwithstanding, that Sir Richard, by this triple exception at our *general* expense, intended a compliment to Doctor Moylan and to my two clergymen ; but it was a bear's hug, and I believe the Doctor would have given him his thoughts upon it had not cooler reflection left it beneath his notice. It was reserved for Sir Richard to panegyryze Doctor Moylan by exhibiting him as a man that would suffer himself to be tampered with, upon the sacred obligation of his allegiance, by an upstart puppy, just let loose from school, whom he did not even stop in his career of treason. As to myself, I would think it a slighter injury that Sir Richard had spit his most tainted venom full into my face, than to beslaver me with an Iscariot kiss of that sort. It is his unenvied fate that his compliments like his dedication should be spurned alike by the objects of them. In the very last page of this same appendix I am set down as an unfeeling illiberal bigot who, in return for the kindness which actuated different Protestant commanders in either sending or permitting their regimental bands to play on Sundays in the Roman Catholic chapel at Youghal, withheld my assent from a Roman Catholic bandsman playing for divine

service in a Protestant church. No *gentleman* could have told Sir Richard that a regimental band was either sent, or permitted to play, at any time or on any occasion whatsoever, in the Roman Catholic chapel at Youghal, because in such assertion there is no truth. It must have been deposited in the baronet's tablets by one of the many trading story tellers who, if his neighbours are to be believed, were hospitably received where they could bring materials for the bulky volume ; and in return for their wares, carried away his meat and his drink ; nay, at times, his money. A regimental band consists, I believe, in general of from sixteen to twenty persons ; of these, at certain times, three, but oftener two boys, and occasionally one, would run off to the Roman Catholic chapel after playing the regiment, as their phrase is, to the gate of the Protestant church ; and here, for their private devotion, would play at some parts of the Mass. If these can be called the band, it must be upon the principle so happily adduced by Mr. Sheridan, *ipse agmen*—I am the band—a favourite trope in the baronet's eloquence. As to the charge of bigotry or illiberality I rejoice that it has been made, because it affords me now an opportunity of declaring my religious sentiments. I firmly believe that I am bound to love God above all things, and my neighbour as myself. I believe that every human being is that very neighbour whom I am bound to love ; let his religion, his prejudices, or his opinions be what they may. Were my last moment to overtake me with enmity in my heart, against any man, or any description of men, I would not expect salvation, though the injuries done to me, or intended against me by them, were ever so atrocious ; moreover though I firmly believe that there is but one true religion, as there is but one Eternal Truth, who can not possibly reveal contradictions ; and though I am fully convinced that the religion of my preference is that only true one, yet I am also persuaded that vast multitudes are comprised within its pale, in the sight of God, who do not adhere to it by bonds of communion visible to me. I am not warranted to judge my brother. I am to work my own salvation with fear and trembling, while I pray for all and desire eternal happiness to all. I will not however join in the exterior rites of worship with those of other religions because that, though they themselves may, and I sincerely hope, do according to their several means, honour God and forward their salvation in this way, I, believing as I believe, cannot so honour Him. If for this creed I be denominated an intolerant bigot, I bow to the charge ; and I glory in the denomination. In wishing well to all I certainly do not exclude Sir Richard ; I wish from my soul that God may incline him to make one good general confession to some worthy priest, who might convince him of what is indispensibly due to the characters he has injured. Arthur O'Leary I know, had he been consulted in his day, would have most forcibly inculcated

the necessity of reparation ; he would have reminded his penitent that no time was to be lost ; that in every page of the bulky volume a great number of formidable items were staring at him ; that to leave so long an account to be settled in the next world was perilous in the extreme ; for that the certain consequence of neglect in this point would be sentence to a region widely different from Purgatory, where he must go farther and fare worse.

“ We have heard of different publications heretofore censured most severely by the Legislature, and condemned to be burned by the common hangman. If the complexion, the injustice, the effect, and the mischievous tendency of the baronet’s work were duly considered by the great inquest of the empire, it would very probably be immortalized by a similar fate. And should the author, emulous of Fénélon’s fame, be the first to light up the funeral pile, he would thereby attain a character which his writings can never procure for him. Depurated in this manner from all its misrepresentations and untruths it would, in the sublime language of our Henry Flood, arise like a Phoenix from its own ashes, and with the flames of its cradle illuminate our isle.”

R. CHURTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 1. Middleton, near Banbury.—“ As you have honoured the Roman Catholic petition by introducing it into the House of Lords, I have no doubt you would wish it to have a full and fair consideration ; and will therefore, I trust, receive with favourable allowance every well-intended hint or suggestion on the subject. And this emboldens me to lay before your lordship the enclosed paper, which nothing but the most imperious sense of duty has extorted from me, and which I have or mean to submit to the indulgence of some others, as well Lords of Parliament as members of the House of Commons.

“ A notion some time ago seemed to be gaining ground that a tacit reformation had taken place among the Roman Catholics, and that they had relinquished many of their more absurd and dangerous tenets. I was myself a most unwilling, but by degrees a complete convert from this opinion. Their authorized manuals are as grossly superstitious and idolatrous as ever ; their public rituals unaltered. Their own writers, the Plowdens, Dr. Troy, and others, reject with disdain the intended compliment of amelioration, and insist that their faith is the same it ever was. The creed of Pope Pius is still their creed, and that recognises the traditions and decrees of the canons and councils, especially of the Council of Trent ; which authorize the persecution of heretics. A full toleration they already enjoy, and no one wishes to hurt a hair of their head ; but they now demand power, which whenever they have possessed they have always abused ; nor while they

hold the known principles of their Church can they, as a body, ever be trusted, and scarcely individuals in times of danger. In the late unhappy rebellion in Ireland some of Bishop Euseby Cleaver's most approved domestics and retainers, to whom before the troubles he would have trusted his life, were at the head of those who plundered his property and drank confusion to his lordship.

"But my apology, if I go on, will itself want an apology. I have beheld your lordship's talents with constant admiration since your early days at Oxford."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805, May 1-5. Charles Street].—"I waited till one, and then went to Arlington Street. I found there Fitzgerald, two Ponsonbys, Grattan, Grey, Windham, Sir J. Newport, L[or]d Temple, Fitzpatrick. We all agreed that to put it off for a short time was out of the question, but Grey, Windham, Fitzgerald, L[or]d Temple and myself were the discussers of putting it off without fixing a precise period. What I hear of the indisposition of our whole party to it, as well as its general unpopularity, incline me to this; but this is much increased by the eagerness and irritation of the Prince, who called in Windham and myself in Pall Mall after the meeting, and shewed me in his conversation the extreme to which he pushes this matter. He entertains the idea of calling a general meeting and asking each individual their opinion, when he will be sure to have a majority. Windham suggested the mooting with Fox the question of deferring the business till next session, leaving to the Catholics a positive promise to bring it on then, if *they then* require it. The P[rince] directed us to urge Fox to this, and we shall do so when we see him, though I know not with what success. My conviction is that in persisting you will make the future possessor of the Crown as adverse to it as the present."

THE EARL OF FINGALL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 10. Thayer Street.—"Not having had the honour of seeing your lordship when I had that of calling yesterday on your lordship, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of the resolution entered into at the last meeting of Catholics held in Dublin. It is merely in case anything should be urged against the measure being brought forward at this moment, I trouble your lordship with this communication."

PETER TRANT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1805], May 12. Bath.—"I am induced to trouble your lordship with this letter in consequence of having read in the *Courier* of Saturday the report of Lord Redesdale's speech on the subject of the Catholic petition brought forward in the House of Lords with so much patriotism and ability by

your lordship. I arrived very lately from Ireland and have resided chiefly in the county of Kerry; and of the state of the Roman Catholic clergy of this remote county I can speak with the utmost certainty, not only by means of the general information I have for several years past had an opportunity of obtaining, but also by means of my personal acquaintance with Doctor Sugrue the Roman Catholic bishop of the diocese.

"I lament much that in his statement of the immoderate power possessed and exerted by the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, Lord Redesdale's zeal should have urged him to transgress the bounds of truth, and appear the champion of religious bigotry and intolerance. But his lordship has been deceived; he never called upon the moderate, well-informed, disinterested Protestant country gentleman of Ireland for information relative to the character and situation of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and clergy of his county; his lordship only drew his information from men who have notoriously ever distinguished themselves by their rancour to the Catholics and their dislike of religious liberty. However I think myself bound as an Irishman and a Protestant to declare that Lord Redesdale's observations on the general state of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, clergy, and laity, are devoid of sufficient information, and should not make an unfavourable impression on the minds of noble peers; besides, I feel myself obliged as a country gentleman of Ireland to declare, and I call upon the Knight of Kerry and Mr. T. Crosbie the representatives of the county of Kerry to confirm my assertion, that the character given by the Chancellor of Ireland of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and clergy does not apply to Doctor Sugrue or to the clergy of his diocese. The influence of the Roman Catholic clergy has most sensibly declined these fifteen years past in every part of Ireland, and proportionably as much in the county of Kerry as elsewhere. I have heard the worthy prelate above mentioned say that the disgraceful scenes which are too frequently exhibited on the Sabbath day at the parish chapels, producing riot and disorder within them, not respecting the altar or the priest whilst celebrating Mass, prove strongly that religion has no longer any hold on the minds of the common people, and that their clergy no longer possess the power of enforcing obedience to their exhortations or observance of religious duties. I entreat you to be assured that the Chancellor has viewed the power and situation of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, clergy, and laity with a disordered imagination; and that the power and influence of the clergy instead of being reduced should be strengthened, and their character be made respectable; the distinction of religion should no longer be made the pretext for depriving three millions of people of the rights of citizenship, to the disgrace of the most civilized empire in the world, and during its most enlightened period.

"I forgot to mention to your lordship that the Chancellor of Ireland is not unacquainted with Doctor Sugrue, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kerry. I remember he dined last summer at Killarney with Lord Redesdale. If these observations can be of any use to your lordship in your reply, I shall think myself very fortunate to have made them; if not, I beg your lordship to excuse this letter."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 16. Palace Yard.—"I enclose a copy of the resolutions which I prepared, and moved yesterday in concurrence with the Chancellor, and which I hope you will approve. Lord Mulgrave thought proper to oppose our putting a previous question on the last resolution, which he contended ought to have a direct negative; and some others were inclined to support him in that idea, but at last they gave way.

"In effect therefore the proceedings will commence as *de novo* on Tuesday next, and there seems to be little probability that can tend to anything either useful or creditable; that opinion gains ground, and if we help it forwards a little, some means may be found to close the enquiry. If the judge deserved a little punishment he will have had more than enough by the inconvenience, loss, and expense to which he has been subjected.

"I also send the printed copy of the resolutions and message respecting Lord Melville's proposed attendance.

"It seems to be believed that on the 22nd April* the combined Toulon and Spanish fleets were certainly in one of the harbours near to Cadiz. A lieutenant of the King's navy who reconnoitred them towards sunset has written a detailed account of the flags, the number of ships, and other particulars. If he should not have been deceived, I think it likely that the first report of sailing westward on the 10th April was unfounded."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 21. London.—"I am come to town this morning (meaning to return at night) and shall go down to the House to see what they do about the proceedings on Judge Fox. I called on Cowper to learn at what time they were to begin, and I find from him that there is a difficulty in point of form *in limine*, namely, where the judge is to be placed; a question which though merely a matter of form, has some difficulty in it, and will probably occupy, at least for a few days, the undecided minds of the Chancellor and Lord Hawkesbury before they can settle what to do about it.

"Nothing more transpires, as far as I have yet heard, about the Russian Treaty; and the time is getting so late that it is very easy to foresee that nothing of active co-operation for

* I am not quite sure that this is the date.

this year can possibly arise out of it ; and, under those circumstances, I confess I think it will be rather difficult to justify any very considerable pecuniary sacrifices if such should be proposed to us ; though I perfectly agree with you on the importance of re-connecting ourselves with the Continent.

“The Brest fleet was only making a demonstration, and I fear produced the effect they wished by doing so, as it has occasioned a further delay in the detachment of Admiral Collingwood to the West Indies, whither, it now appears most probable, that the Toulon and Cadiz combined squadron is gone ; the reports which have been circulated of their return to Cadiz being now looked upon at the Admiralty as perfectly unfounded.”

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, May 22. Fort William.—“It is difficult to adjust the account of correspondence between us. I am in debt to you on account of a letter which I never received, but which I have read and admired in common with all the world. Yet it is not easy to answer what you have not avowed. You have received (I think) a letter from me respecting the war in India which, I suppose, you have not acknowledged either from an expectation of my early return home, or of my answer to your letter which never reached me. Whatever may be the balance of our account of correspondence, I feel and confess myself to be deeply in your debt on account of your invariable kindness and affectionate attachment towards me and my family. My obligations to you in this respect are indeed boundless and inestimable.

“You may well conceive the delight with which I have viewed my dearest Richard’s progress, and how much that joy has been enhanced by the consideration that my favourite son has met all my hopes under the guidance and care of my most respected, affectionate and first friend. Lady Wellesley and Richard will assure you of the sincerity and warmth of my gratitude for this most acceptable proof of your unabated friendship.

“Having sent you a variety of documents respecting the state of affairs in India, I shall not enter into any further details upon that subject in this letter than to apprise you that tranquility is now sufficiently restored to admit of my departure, under the expectation either of the arrival of a successor to me from England, or of the confirmation of Sir George Barlow’s appointment. The Court of Directors is incensed against me, because three packets have been taken by the enemy ; because the public business in India has been dispatched in the most expeditious form in a crisis of war ; and because they suppose me to be a friend to the free trade of India, and to the extension of the general executive power

of the realm over these possessions. In their suspicions, they happen to be erroneous, as I believe you know ; for I think we have always concurred in the necessity of maintaining the Company's charter, and the authority of the Direction, as the best securities for the maintenance of the British empire in India and for the purity of the constitution of our country at home. With these established principles, however, I trust that it is neither heresy nor treason to entertain a hope that the Indian branch of our government with every other, may be susceptible of improvement, without any injury to the foundations of the present system. Progressive improvement, derived from the ancient sources of the constitution, and conducted through channels which tend to purify the original fountain without perverting its course, or excluding the accession of other streams, has been the happy policy of Parliament in the best times. And I confess that I cannot forget all my old principles, and embrace the Hindu faith so exclusively, as to reject every idea of the possibility of gradual improvement in our established Eastern system. On the other hand, I am not so entirely *désorienté* as to desire or attempt any change of the great foundations of our power in the East. The truth, however, is that (whatever may be the suspicions of the India House) I entertain no notion of making any exertion whatever on the subjects of the alarms of the Directors ; and that I am much more inclined to seek repose for a time, and, when recovered from the present fatigues of my health and spirits, to turn my mind to other objects, than to continue in the state of a nabob for the remainder of my life.

“ Under these impressions I hope to meet you in the course of the next winter in England, with all the cordiality and freedom of our long established friendship. My health has suffered considerably during the last year, but I trust it may be improved by the voyage. I shall probably leave India in August, and I may arrive in January. The season for embarkation is not favourable in August, and I may possibly be delayed, in which case I cannot hope to reach England before the spring of 1806.

“ I think Richard should be sent to Oxford at least as early as January next ; if it be deemed an object that he should wait for my arrival, before he leaves Eton, he might be detained at Eton until the Christmas holidays, but he should (I imagine) be sent to Oxford at the first term after Christmas.

“ Upon the state of politics in England and Europe I say nothing at present ; it is really difficult to form a correct judgment at this distance on a state of things so complicated and extraordinary. My first object will be to maintain all my old friendships, which have constituted so large a portion of the happiness of my early life, and of which I cannot afford the loss at the close of my career. At all events I trust that

I shall preserve your regard and esteem, without which the prospect of a return to my country would be gloomy and cheerless."

Private. LORD AUCKLAND to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1805, May 31 Palace Yard.—"Lord Spencer will (I hope) have drawn your attention to Lord Melville's public notice, through his son, that on Thursday next he will attend at the House of Commons to answer Mr. Whitbread's motion for a further proceeding in a business respecting which several accusations and criminating resolutions have already passed, and have been carried to the throne by an address. This is not therefore a case within any of the precedents, nor is there any instance of such a previous notice. The words in the first resolution communicated in our late conference are 'that a lord may be permitted to go down to the House of Commons to defend himself on any points, on which that House has not previously passed any accusatory or criminating resolution against him.'

"I feel every due consideration, and every right delicacy concerning the party in question, but I find it difficult to satisfy my mind that such a breach, not merely of our standing orders but of the essential principles of our independence on the other House of Parliament ought to be permitted. At the same time (though all those to whom I have mentioned the subject see it in a similar point of view) I much doubt either the prudence or propriety of stirring the question without your concurrence and assistance.

"The prosecution of Mr. Justice Foxe is to 'commence' to-day at four o'clock."

Private. LORD AUCKLAND to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1805, June 4. Palace Yard.—"The point of view in which you see Lord Melville's notice to the House of Commons is such as to leave no doubt on my mind that, if that notice should be carried into effect without remark or resistance, the privileges of the Lords will be violated not merely in a consideration of punctilio, but in a question involving their independence, character, fortunes, and personal safety. In saying this, I assume (what I believe) that Lord Melville does not intend to ask any permission.

"He misconceives himself to be authorised by the two cases of the Duke of Leeds (*House of Commons' Journals*, Vol. 11, p. 326) and of Lord Somers (Vol. 13, p. 489). The first of those cases is a strange specimen of Parliamentary irregularity. The charge had been framed on an enquiry before a joint committee of the two Houses, and the impeachment had been voted, and ordered to be carried up before the Duke of Leeds appeared at the Bar. In the other case, nothing criminatory was voted, till after Lord Somers had been heard. Neither of those cases (even if admissible) can justify Lord Melville's

'ten days previous public notice of his intention'; besides, the votes of accusation already passed against him are grounded indeed on evidence and facts distinguishable in their details from the new charges to be found in the report of the Committee; but still they are all *ejusdem generis*, and so interwoven and connected that it is impossible to enter into any separated reasonings of defence. The consequence will be that he must either claim an acquittal under an implied trial in the House of Commons, or, if he should fail in that object, that he will lay open his means of defence prior to the trial by impeachment, and will have established a precedent most injurious hereafter to every peer who may be either justly or unjustly accused.

"Seeing the business in this grave light, I really lament your absence, for the subject is certainly more important than the duties (however important and respectable) of preparatory field days. I see that there are circular and pressing notes for a full attendance at the House to-morrow (I do not know with what view) and I should not hesitate either to bring forward the discussion or to support it; and as the House must be cleared below the bar, all delicacies respecting Lord Melville may be observed, even if it should be thought proper to have it understood by him that he must either apply for permission, or subject himself to an eventual animadversion for the breach of privilege. If he should apply for permission, it would be difficult to frame it in terms which would leave no future doubts.

"I have been obliged to trouble you with this long note, as I am prevented by mourning from going to the Courts of the morning or evening, when I might perhaps have found you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 5. Charles Street.—"Calcraft has sent an express to stop Fox from coming to town to-day, as the Athol business is put off. I have therefore just written to him to tell him that, if he had come, my business was to have told him from you that you had seen Windham who, upon re-consideration, had entirely agreed to the motion as it was *last* discussed in Arlington Street; that therefore you saw no necessity for any previous meeting, unless Fox much wished it, in which case you would come for an hour next Monday. I have further desired Fox to write me a line by return of post, to fix whether Lord Carysfort shall give notice of the motion on Friday for Tuesday se'nnight; and I have desired Fox, in case he has any question to put, to send a letter to Dropmore to which he may have an answer time enough to write to me by Thursday's post, as L[or]d Carysfort goes to Worthing on Saturday for a few days. In like manner, I must beg of you to write me a line by Thursday's post, to say whether L[or]d Carysfort shall give notice on Friday or not.

"No naval news. If you think further communication with Fox necessary, perhaps your servant, with a letter to St. Anne's, might bring you an answer in time for your writing to me by Thursday's post."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 7. [Charles Stre]jet.—"Fox came to town yesterday, and has settled with Grey that Grey should give notice to-day in the Commons, and L[or]d Carysfort in the Lords for Wednesday se'nnight.

"It is now generally understood that the session cannot end sooner than in five or six weeks, and it has been settled that Lord C[arysfort] should first ask if ministers had any communication to make on foreign affairs, and upon their answer, that he should then give notice in *general* terms, in order to keep within his own hands the precise terms of his motion.

"L[or]d Minto is said to have made a very impressive speech yesterday, and was supported by L[or]d Ellenborough against the Chancellor, who daily adds to his disgraces on the subject of Judge Fox.

"L[or]d Auckland moved to restrict L[or]d Melville from defending himself, and L[or]d Hawkesbury, after reading a long letter from L[or]d Melville, said he should support L[or]d M[elville] in his desire of defending himself, restricting him only from the matter contained in the criminatory resolution.

"Strong rumours prevail of increased ill humour between Pitt and L[or]d Sidmouth; Pitt's friends now abuse him without any reserve, and L[or]d Sidmouth's resignation was again bruited about yesterday. All that I know for certain is that L[or]d Sidmouth yesterday followed L[or]d St. V[incen]t from house to house till he obtained an interview with him; the same interview, as you may remember, took place in his last resignation.

"L[or]d Dartmouth has written by the K[ing]'s order to Birmingham to fix the day for the ceremony of H[is] M[ajesty]'s laying the first stone of a new church there; and I am told that at the City review yesterday, the K[ing] ordered himself to be stopped in going down the line when he came to Birch the pastry cook, who is a volunteer officer, and H[is] M[ajesty] then thanked him for his laudable endeavours to support the true Church to which the K[ing] said he had shewn himself a true friend. Perhaps you recollect that Birch moved in the city against the Catholick petition.

"I have spoke to L[or]d B[uckingham] about your standards, and he says he will give the proper orders for them.

"Pitt's St. Anthony's fire prevented his going to the House yesterday, and I know not if he can go to-day; if he does not appear, Grey will put off his notice till he does."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 8. Buckingham House.—“The news of yesterday was all hostility of Pitt and Addington on the subject of L[or]d Melville ; but still I believe, *though I do not know*, that no explanation has taken place. *Tierney* is now *confident* that Addington will join in the impeachment. But the scene of the two last days in the H[ouse] of Lords shews disunion of the most marked kind ; in which every minister has danced round every point of the compass on the questions respecting Judge Fox, and have shewn uncommon pains to avoid even the semblance of co-operation. On Wednesday they all refused through the L[or]d Ch[ancello]r your motion for reviving the committee ; on Thursday L[or]d Hawkesbury objected to Adam’s even referring to the evidence given by a witness in the committee ; L[or]d Ch[ancello]r supported L[or]d Hawkesbury ; L[or]d Minto spoke most ably, L[or]d Eldon grew convinced, L[or]d Sidmouth joined him, L[or]d Mulgrave spoke for L[or]d Ch[ancello]r’s opinions. The debate was resumed yesterday when L[or]d Minto again pressed it. L[or]d Hawkesbury gave way immediately, but urged as a *sine qua non* that the evidence should not be communicated to Fox, but that it should be printed for the use of the Lords, by which means it would ‘*properly and regularly find its way to the parties.*’ L[or]d Ch[ancello]r called him to order, made a most angry speech on the law and the order of this proceeding, declared he would dissent but not divide, and threw out a challenge on both points to L[or]d Ellenborough ; who argued very warmly on the law, and quoted the communication *every day* of Hastings’ trial to him (as counsel) of the printed papers and evidence by order of the House ; was flatly contradicted on this fact by L[or]d Ch[ancello]r, and again rose to re-assert with much warmth the story as he had first stated it. The motion was then carried, and L[or]d Ch[ancello]r gave notice that when the papers were printed he would move a resolution which should prevent the Lords from communicating to any person whatsoever those papers which were to be printed *solely for their use!* And in this temper the House broke up, after L[or]d Auckland had commented on the state of *all* the parties at the bar, who by this proceeding could not hope that the question could be even pursued in its present slow course sooner than the 19th or 20th of June ; and consequently, that it was utterly impossible that the evidence on one side should close this year. The report is that the K[ing] has expressed himself strongly against this proceeding. L[or]d Sidmouth did not attend yesterday.

“The next wonder of wonders is the speech of the K[ing] on Thursday at the review of the eight London reg[imen]ts to Lieutenant Colonel Mr. Deputy Birch, the Great Pastry Cook. H[is] M[ajesty] enquired for him, and on going down the line stopped when he came to him ; the music ceased, and the

monarch made a speech of thanks to the Lieut[enant] Col[onel] for having as a common council man proposed the petition to Parl[iamen]t against the Catholics!!!

"This is the farce of the more solemn scene of the same sort in the speech to the bishops at the birthday, where he called upon them to resist '*this daring attempt*' to overthrow the Church.

"And on the day before, Monday, he had ordered L[or]d Dartmouth (the Lord Chamberlain, not the Sec[reta]ry of State) to write to the Bailiff of Birmingham to announce H[is] M[ajesty's] intentions to lay the first stone of a new church.

"So much for the state of his mind!

"The account of the captured Spanish packet is true, and there is no reason to doubt the originality of them. They were addressed to Vera Cruz and announce a great armament destined for the Havannah.

"We have given L[or]d Melville leave to attend, but not to defend himself."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 12. Palace Yard.—"The inclosed protest might have been stated with more precision if it could have had the benefit of your corrections. Still I am satisfied both on full reflection, and from a due confidence in those who signed with me, that the several reasons are good. And the consideration is become so important that I think it material you should be apprized of it.

"I apprehend that Lord Melville's speech in the House of Commons by virtue of the permission protested against will not have been advantageous to him. Indeed it seems doubtful whether the sense of a majority may not be decided to-night for the impeachment; more especially if Mr. Bond's amendment can be disposed either 'by previous question' or by his agreeing not to urge it in a form which might eventually prove a negative to every mode of prosecution whether by impeachment or by the Attorney General."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 13. [Buckingham House.]—

Impeachment	{	For 195	} Maj[ority] 77
	{	Against 272	

Prosecution by	{	For 238	} Maj[ority] 9.
Att[orne]y G[enera]l	{	Against 229	

"The debate and division will shew you that my information was good respecting the pistol put to Mr. Pitt's head by L[or]d Sidmouth, and nothing could exceed the anxiety or exertions of the latter all yesterday to secure the prosecution by the Att[orne]y Gen[era]l. It was obvious that we should fail

in the impeachment, not only because ten or eleven of our numbers had left us and gone over to Pitt, but, because several absented, and all the (few) Addingtons voted against us. But it is a fact within *my knowledge* that Pitt was quite confident to a late hour last night of resisting Bond's motion by a majority of forty, nor have I yet seen any one who accounts satisfactorily for our majority. They divided at half past six, and you will see that, including the Speaker and tellers, 472 members were then present, and I understand that above forty had paired off, so that it seems impossible for Pitt to recover this blow. The violence of Pitt's friends against Addington cannot be described, and they are equally loud against L[or]d Melville for the extreme indiscretion of the greatest part of his speech, which is universally described as being made in a tone that could only be justified on the supposition of being borne out by an eager and triumphant majority. He threw everything upon Trotter, and certainly when he left the House he thought he had done wonders! Pitt was unwell, quite beat down with anxiety and fatigue, but confident of success to the last moment. It is however matter of astonishment that he did not speak either night, and no one clearly understands it.

"The most important feature of the last two hours is the universal conviction that L[or]d Sidmouth was to have been removed by Pitt if the question of prosecution had been successfully resisted; and it is now said that he, Pitt, means immediately to resign, of which I do not believe one word. Canning went out of his way to make the breach with Bond and Bragge more marked and more completely irreparable."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1805, June 24. Dropmore.—"I wrote you three lines just before I left town to-day, and in truth I have not much to add to them. Lord Camden sent me a note in the morning to say he would call upon me. When he came he said that his only object was to renew the conversation we had a few weeks ago, but that he came to me *perfectly unauthorized*; that he thought the present circumstances were still more favourable than those which then existed for the formation of a Government on the most extended plan; and that he wished to know my ideas on the subject, especially as all the personal questions affecting Pitt seemed now at an end, and had, he said, been terminated in a manner in the highest degree liberal and honourable on the part of Opposition. In the course of this conversation he spoke in strong terms of resentment respecting the conduct of the Addingtons, and said that Pitt now felt on that subject as he (Lord C[amden]) wished.

"My answer was that I thought the business was now come to its point. That I was (as I had long been) fully convinced that nothing could save the country but a full and complete union of all the men of talents and weight. That if Pitt was

of that opinion, it was for him to act upon it. That no *unauthorized* communication could lead to any satisfactory explanation on such a subject ; a *direct* communication was the only thing that could do any good ; and if that was made, or wished to be made, *to me*, I could receive it only with the view of imparting it to Fox, and of our making our answer in common. But the King's journey would very soon put all these ideas out of the question. If therefore Pitt meant anything, he must have an immediate explanation with the King, and make his communication in consequence.

"L[or]d C[amden] then shewed a great desire to know how far Fox's declaration in the H[ouse] of C[ommons] might be considered as a ground to be proceeded on. I told him that the declaration he alluded to was made without any communication with anybody. That I was no party to it, and for my own part, though I thought the declaration highly honourable to Fox, yet I couldn't see how either of the two objects in view, that of a Government comprizing all the talents of the country or supported by a union of the great parties in Parliament, was likely to be promoted by any such ideas. That all this however was matter into which I could not enter individually, being engaged in a party, separately from which neither any of my immediate connections nor myself would listen to any suggestions on the subject. If therefore any disposition towards such discussions existed in Pitt's mind, he had no time to lose in trying his ground with the King, and then making a direct communication of whatever he had to say on the subject.

"This is nearly the substance of what passed, beyond mutual expressions of kindness, and a strong declaration of L[or]d C[amden]'s as to *his own* wish to see an arrangement formed on the largest scale ; and to contribute to it by any means in his power. He told me incidentally that Pitt had not seen the King *for a month*."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 25. Charles Street.—"It is now four, and I have twice called on Fox, who is not yet come, but who has sent word that he will certainly be in town before the House.

"I will make a point of shewing him your letter of to-day as soon as I see him. Nothing can be more correctly satisfactory than the account which you have given of the conversation on your part ; on the other side it is moving upon a very little scale to send out these unauthorized skirmishers, instead of looking the whole business manfully in the face. The account which was given to you on Sunday night seems to me probably to have accelerated the tardy and reluctant steps upon which P[itt] is still pausing, and hesitating, instead of acting. The eager desire for making the dis-interested declaration alluded to the ground-work of discussion, was very properly rejected by you, and should never have been proposed

by the other. The total want of the *last month's* communication, which your last line describes, shews that none of the previous difficulties have been likely to have been discussed or removed in the quarter where they are most to be feared ; but, on the other hand, it shews too that, on the part of P[itt], there can be no claim on him for any special marks of attachment where so little confidential intercourse has been allowed to him. I learn to-day from sure knowledge that, not very long ago, your friend who conversed with you professed himself to be weary of office, and anxious to devote himself entirely to domestic enjoyments ; and from a good quarter too I know and see that L[or]d H[awkesbury] is now considered as devoted to P[itt], and as the favourite with the K[ing], so that I am pretty confident you will find, if it comes to question, that P[itt] will insist on L[or]d H[awkesbury] and on L[or]d Castlereagh, and that L[or]d C[amden] will offer to make room.

“ I am now going to make another effort in Arlington Street. I know not what is to happen in the House, but so many of our friends are gone, that the Ministers may beat us, if they have the face to interpose for the protection of L[or]d M[elville] which will naturally make us all very savage.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 26. [Charles Stree]t.—“ I communicated your letter to Fox yesterday, and as he seemed to wish it, I ventured likewise to read it to Grey, desiring them to mention the contents of it to nobody else, and to recollect that it related merely to private unauthorised conversation. They both spoke in high terms of approbation of every word of the letter, which they seemed to think was most perfectly and entirely what they could have wished ; but they are both as much at a loss as I am to foresee what is the next step which will be taken by Pitt. That which is the most obviously pointed to by your conversation seems to be of little promise, as a practicable measure, because where there has been no communication for a month together, there seems little hope of any point being gained by discussions of mutual confidence. I hear to-day that notions circulate much of the K[ing's] being less well, and I am told that Phipps the oculist was sent down yesterday with many mysterious precautions to prevent it's being known. I hope by Saturday or Sunday to pass a few days at Dropmore.

“ I hear no news. Canning joined me and walked a great way with me to-day, but as he did not open any interesting subject, I let him alone to ordinary conversation, and we parted without a word on any business.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 26. House of Lords.—“ L[or]d Hawkesbury brought in his Bill yesterday, and gave notice for the second

reading to-morrow. The precedents are the Bills in the case of Sir T. Rumbold, which we talked over, and the Bill in 1786 for continuing the proceedings against Mr. Hastings, before any impeachment was resolved or even announced ; and I own that this last Bill appears more nearly in point than any other. At all events, however, the House appears so entirely forsaken, that I see no chance of collecting three persons to form an Opposition.

"You will have observed that after I had noticed yesterday some language of the D[uke] of Montrose leaning upon the Lieut[enant] Governor of Jamaica, L[or]d Camden and L[or]d Hawkesbury took very particular pains to assure the House and me that nothing could have been more correct than General Nugent's conduct.

"The reports which I mentioned to you on Sunday night are very much in circulation ; and I understand, from the same authority, that on Monday, the complaint of the eyes was encreased, and that the despondency had encreased in proportion with very great apprehension of a *gutta serena*. Mr. Pitt was called out of the House of Commons on Monday at half past four by L[or]d Camden and L[or]d Harrowby, who took him to the com[mittee] room of the H[ouse] of Lords for a long time ; and upon his return to the H[ouse] of C[ommons] he took Mr. Canning and Mr. Long up into the Speaker's room for near half an hour. This story is commented upon as connected with the K[ing]'s situation.

"You will have seen the result of last night's debate, which has given much room for speculation. Nothing could be more adverse than the two parties of Pitt and Addington, or seemingly more happy than Pitt in his victory. Everyone round me is waiting (with near forty peers in the House) with impatience for Whitbread and his impeachment, but no one seems to have an idea that it can be heard this session.

"Whitbread has just appeared and has done his part very well ; he was very well attended. The message has been read and nothing said upon it."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 27. [Buckingham House.]—"My son came to me this evening to tell me, that Mr. Bourne Sturges had come over to him this day in the H[ouse] of C[ommons] and settling down next to him, began immediately : 'how happened it that Mr. Fox's speech of Tuesday was so much more hostile to us, than that which we considered so very conciliatory ?' The answer was 'Mr. Fox probably has many friends, whose feelings he must consult, and that may account for slight variations of tone, and of phrase, though possibly there is no variation in the essential.' *St[urges]* 'Do you think then that Mr. Fox is as disposed to discuss the formation of a new ministry, as he was ?' Lord T[emple], 'I do

not know what he may discuss, but I conceive him quite as open to discuss a *new ministry*, as he was before that second speech.' *St[urges]*, 'I am glad you think so; for if there are difficulties in such a discussion, they will come from your friends rather than from us.' The conversation then went very much at length into the question of the present ministry which *St[urges]* said was *at an end*, for that Pitt never could go on with Addington, of whom *St[urges]* spoke with great violence. He said that he was not very sanguine in his expectation of a junction 'for you will make propositions that Mr. Pitt never will accede to.' *L[or]d T[emple]*, 'What are they? I hope you do not expect *L[or]d Grenville* and Mr. Fox to consider themselves as coming in to serve under Mr. Pitt?' *St[urges]*, 'No, that is out of the question; the whole must be considered as white paper; there must be equality of pretension; but Mr. Pitt never can serve in office under Mr. Fox.' *L[or]d T[emple]*, 'Certainly not, but if it is admitted that he is to quit his present situation, what is the difficulty to which you advert?' *St[urges]*, 'It is that, probably, his friends who may think he degrades himself by quitting his situation may advise him to resign absolutely, and to take no office. AND THEN YOU WILL HAVE THE DOCTOR.' *Lord T[emple]*, 'I think that possible, though not probable; but what is to happen if that should be the case?' *St[urges]*, 'Why in plain English, there are four parties in the country; and if your two parties expect to govern without a third, you will fail.' *Lord T[emple]*, 'That may be, and I should regret the experiment, as I sincerely wish for an extended administration.' *St[urges]*, 'So DOES MR. PITT, and the difficulties will not arise FROM HIM, or from HIS PRESENT SITUATION; but from difficulties on your part, and from the reluctance of his friends to see him in an inferior office, and therefore I AM PERSUADED THIS WILL ALL END IN HIS RESIGNATION.'

"This is the general tenor, and the parts underscored the exact words of a very long conversation, intermixed by frequent abuse of Addington, wishes for coalition, approbation of Fox's foreign politicks, and lamentation that the broad administration of last year had failed. The DIFFICULTIES in question though never exactly defined, appeared always to be the minor arrangements; for Sturges originally stated that he was persuaded Pitt was ready to sacrifice HIS SITUATION, but expressed his doubt whether he would not resign altogether rather than take one inferior. But it must be observed that, during the whole of this conversation, my son remarked, that ten different times (at least) Sturges spoke of the Ministry as *at an end*, and of the question being not the retaining the Treasury, but the question of an inferior office, or of entire resignation; but with a *caveat*, often repeated, against serving under Mr. Fox, which would only point at the exclusion of Fox from the Treasury. The result of this talk of a full half hour, evidently courted by Sturges, was the persuasion of

Lord T[emple] that Pitt will resign, so soon as he has made his proposition of quitting the Treasury in favour of some one, whom he has in view, but whom Sturges (if he knows him) has carefully kept out of sight.

"Sturges said carelessly that Pitt was to see the K[ing] on this day ; and that he hoped he would open himself to the K[ing], for that the country could not go in on its present state. Soon after this, it was known in the H[ouse] of C[ommons] that Mr. Pitt had seen the K[ing] after council, and had been with him (as reported) near an hour. He came to the House, and Lord T[emple] spoke to him on indifferent points, and found him cheerful, but could gather nothing from his manner.

"As it is possible that you may hear to-morrow from him, I have thought it right that you may know this interesting conversation, which L[or]d T[emple] reports to have been too long for a perfect detail of it ; but to be correct in the general view of it, and in the particular words underscored.

"The King's eyes now occupy everybody's conversation. I have seen my authority this day, and *nothing can be worse* than this whole chapter ; it is however more than probable that the disorder is completely and indisputably cataract ; which has wholly seized one eye, and partially the other. His head is said not to be affected, but his dispendency and irritation are *stated to me* to be very great indeed. Phipps (the partner of Wathen) has been called in on Monday last, and is said (but this is not clear) to have proposed the operation of couching ; but my authority doubts whether the K[ing] is informed of the extent of the disorder, and is of opinion that the K[ing]'s head will give way when he knows the full mischief. The whole is indeed most lamentable !

"I forgot to say that Sturges said that Pitt hoped to get all his Bills out of the H[ouse] of C[ommons] by Tuesday or Wednesday next ; and *if so*, that Parl[iamen]t might be prorogued about the 12th or 13th ; and Canning seems to have been equally confident on this, last night to my brother. How can we reconcile this with the K[ing]'s situation, which is incontestable.

"Under all these circumstances, it seems clear that you will have another message, and possibly as early as this letter ; but I should think that the real push will be to place L[or]d Hawkesbury at the Treasury, and that on failure of this device, Pitt will wholly retire ; and Addington will be employed to propose a new ministry ; to which attempt he will be encouraged by Fox's speech of Tuesday, which was addressed to the wise country gentlemen who support the Doctor."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 28. Buckingham House.—"I have nothing to add to my letter of last night save that I now know from the very best authority, as well as from my usual channel, that nothing

can be worse than the King's situation. Phipps saw him on Monday and did not tell him all he thought of his case, but told *the very best authority* that there was no *gutta serena* but a decided cataract on one eye, and one forming on the other. He added that there would be no danger in removing them by operation. All this may be true, but it is equally so that the absolute quiet of mind and body to which the King must submit when he is couched, will, according to the opinion of my usual channel, utterly and rapidly destroy the little remains of sanity that at present exist. Old Lady Bath passed this week at Windsor and says that the King, putting the hand on one eye, said, now I do not see you or any object whatsoever, but a very dim haze of light; and then moving the hand to the other eye said, now I see that something is between me and the light, but I cannot distinguish your figure or features, 'and what is extraordinary my spectacles do not help me.'

"It is now said—this morning—that the Weymouth journey is stopped, and indeed it is not possible that it should go on if all this is as correct as I believe it. Lord Chatham [said] last night to a *person*, 'the journey is stopped for a reason you know'; and Lady Chatham said 'I wish that the eyes was the only reason.'

"The universal language is that the change must take place immediately, and I am told that the impression is that Mr. Pitt will resign as soon as the Bills are out of the House of Commons, which is now fixed for Thursday next; but of this I do not profess to be a believer.

"In consequence of your note I have determined to remain in town, very much against my inclinations, but thinking it right so to do.

"The articles against Lord Melville are three—as I hear—namely for the three sums, and they will be ready on Monday. The universal idea is that Pitt was more actuated by the desire of over-throwing Addington's measure than by the wish of saving Lord Melville in the last division in the House of Commons; and this opinion is held by the *doctor's* friends.

"Nothing is yet known of Mr. Pitt's audience of yesterday, which common report says was to produce immediate consequences. The King was to go this day to see Cashiobury, and was very peevish yesterday with some of his family who tried to dissuade him."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 28. Charles Street.—"I have no news to tell you except that Lord Stafford met Pitt in the park the day before yesterday, and Pitt told him he expected the Parliament to be up on the 10th of July. I still hear a bad report of the King's eyes, and I am assured that, two days ago, he spoke of his being sure that he had lost the sight of one. I have

a letter from the bishop at Brasenose, in the moment that he is packing up to set out for Bangor. He writes me word that they are told at Oxford that Sir W. Scott is immediately to be a peer. That will open a vacancy for Windham whose friends begin to stir, but the bishop is convinced that it will be quite hopeless for any who have given a decided vote for the Catholic question; and he thinks it will be either Dickenson or Heber. As he very kindly writes this in enquiry as to my views or wishes, I mean to write him word that I retain no personal views, taking for granted that my vote for the Catholic question is a complete bar to my pretensions; that I conclude him in that case to be interested for Heber's success, which—if Windham does not stand—I shall be glad to hear of as a circumstance gratifying to the Principal of Brasenose. My intention of coming to you on Saturday must be put off till Wednesday, as I must stay till then to see Tatham on Monday about the house, and to sign on Tuesday or Wednesday the agreement with Lord Stafford.

“Lord Buckingham goes to Stowe to-morrow to meet his wife; he will come up if anything arises.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, June 29. Buckingham House.—“The same conversation was resumed yesterday between the same persons, and no variation in the opinions expressed that the thing was at an end; but the difficulties appeared to have increased in S[turges's] mind, though the resentment against Addington was more strongly stated. Upon the whole it appeared that he was less sanguine in hope, though equally strong in the expressions of the state of things and of his wishes. All this appeared difficult to account for, as my informant thought he was sure that there was no real variation in his friend's opinions, and did not see where the hitch had been from anything he could collect; but in a few minutes after Fox took him aside and told him that he had just got information from a quarter on which he could absolutely and entirely depend, that Mr. Pitt had gone into the King on Thursday with the intention of preparing his mind for discussions on the state of his Government, but that, after trying a few general observations, he had found his mind so much depressed by the state of his eyes, and by the heavy complaint which at times affects his bladder, that he had found it impossible to proceed, and turned the conversation to other matters. Fox had no doubt on this fact, and judges from it that Pitt has made up his mind to endeavour to rub on with Addington as well as he can. This seems perfectly of a piece with the tone held by S[turges], so that it is possible that Pitt may see in the King's state new motives of various sorts for endeavouring to go on with what all his friends—some of them even this morning—say is hopeless and disgraceful.

"My accounts yesterday to you of the King's health are confirmed to me this morning. He is very low at times, but does not even yet know the extent of the mischief. On the contrary, he said yesterday that he should be 'confined for four days by physic for his eyes, which are so much inflamed that he could not see out of them.' I cannot imagine how they will propose the couching to him.

"I open my letter to say that a very intimate friend of Addington's told me this day that Addington said to him yesterday that the Government was at an end, and that he should be sacrificed."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 1. Buckingham House.—"The cataracts are beyond all doubt, one complete the other in progress. Phipps was at Windsor yesterday and was to open the idea of couching, for as yet the King imagines the complaint to be inflammation and removable by physic. It is doubtful how far he can bear this communication, and therefore, I doubt if it will be made. The operation however cannot yet take place, for they must prepare him by medicine, and the left eye is not yet ripe. The confinement *in darkness* cannot be less—as I hear—than a month; and, if so, I much doubt whether his mind or body will bear it. His family are very low on the subject. He has been bound up ever since Wednesday, and was at Cashiobury in that state, sometimes speaking gloomily but in general cheerful. Phipps is confident that he can remove the cataracts, but I find that the operation on old subjects is thought hazardous. This state of things evidently increases the ideas of change, but the Post Office is welcome to my opinion that it will give Pitt and Addington the means of sacrificing their resentments *sur l'autel de la patrie*. We shall however judge better of this matter when it is known whether Foster resigns or not. His Bills for taking all revenue patronage from the Lord Lieutenant, after lying upon our table for three weeks, were thrown out upon the motion of Lord Hawkesbury on Friday; and on Saturday *Foster resigned* and told it right hand and left. Yesterday he was to see Pitt, and as I know that an Irishman takes a great deal of time to resign, I wait for his ulterior resignation of which as yet I know nothing.

"News is just arrived of the French fleet by the *Triton* merchant ship, arrived at Liverpool the 29th with despatches from General Prevost, announcing that the French fleet arrived at Martinique May 15, consisting of 16 sail (the whole number that sailed being 12 French and 4 Spaniards) and a crowd of smaller ships. They sent two sail to attack Diamond Rock on the same day, who were beat off, and Captain Maurice sent a boat to St. Lucia to apprise the governor of Antigua, whom he imagined most threatened; but the idea was that they

were bound for St. Domingo, not for Jamaica. Admiral Dacres at Jamaica had detained six of Cochrane's ships, which he added to his own three ; and Cochrane, though Commander in Chief of the Leeward Islands, has given himself leave and is coming home angry. Lord Nelson sailed, as you remember, from Cadiz Bay on the 14th of May with ten ships, namely 1 of 100, 3 of 84, and 6 of 74 guns. Upon the whole I am glad to find this fleet in the West Indies, and not going further, where they might be much more troublesome. I have letters from Ushant of June 26. All well and no news but that nothing is moving in Brest, and that Sir C. Cotton, the second in command, has written in the strongest terms to complain of Nugent's appointment, who is senior to him."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 5. Buckingham House.—"The report of both Houses last night was, that Addington had resigned to the King as a measure of hostility to Mr. Pitt, and though I thought I saw signs of various sorts that inclined me to think that it was so, yet I did not give credit to it till six o'clock. The person—Lord Temple—whom I quoted to you, as having had the very interesting conversations in the House of Commons with the man in office, Sturges, who crossed the House to sit by him; told me that not that man in office, Sturges, but another, Ward, equally confidential, had told him, 'all is over with us; the Doctor has resigned this morning and Pitt must now make up his mind to resign, or to form the broad-bottomed government.' He added that Addington had attended the King's council *pro forma*, but that he and Lord Buckinghamshire did not attend the Cabinet which was held afterwards at Lord Mulgrave's office. This was soon afterwards confirmed to me by Charles Williams, to whom the same man in office, Ward, told the same thing. The absence of Lord Sidmouth and Lord Buckinghamshire from the House gave me a pretence to ask one of the Cabinet—Lord Westmoreland—whether they were in town; and afterwards to challenge him with this rumour; which he did not controvert; though he spoke much of his wishes for a broad government; and from his tone and manner, as well as from that of all his colleagues, I have no doubt but that the fact is true. I likewise know that one of the King's sons—Duke of Sussex—likely to be the best informed, said yesterday that it was known at Windsor that Addington had resigned to the King, and that 'great changes would immediately take place.'

"I wrote this early this morning, and I now find that this is all over London as a fact of which there is no doubt. I shall of course keep this letter open.

12 o'clock. "Lord Buckinghamshire has been with me this moment, and has shown me his official resignation, telling

me that Addington and he notified this step yesterday to the King. Addington had informed Pitt of his intention, and had desired him to let him know what day would be most convenient for this communication, and he requested him to inform the King of the intention that it might not agitate him too much. Pitt sent to him on Monday, and fixed yesterday. Addington said the King's manner was firm and temperate, but very kind to him. All which Lord Buckinghamshire says was assumed, for that he is very hostile to them. Vansittart has resigned; and they are trying to patch up with Foster, but hitherto have failed. *He* clearly thinks that Pitt will patch up the government without applying to us, and thinks the whole of his mind is directed by Lord Harrowby, who is—as he thinks—to be Chancellor of the Duchy, and Lord Camden President; Mr. Yorke Secretary for War. His opinion is, that the King is so weak in mind, and so obstinate, that he will support Pitt in any mad attempt to go on, but he conceives this to be impracticable. The Prince of Wales has sent for me; I must therefore break off and shall send this by my groom, keeping it open for news.

6 o'clock. "I have seen the Prince, who,—as usual without any distinct object—has desired me to write to you to come up to town on Monday to meet Fox, evidently with the intention of mixing himself in any discussions that might take place. I told him that I had every reason to think that Pitt would endeavour to patch up these vacancies with Lord Harrowby and perhaps Mr. Yorke, as a peace offering to Lord Hardwicke on the dispute with Mr. Foster; and that, as I thought so highly of the very wise and dignified line which he had taken in not appearing to obtrude himself on the King in his present infirm state, I would submit to his better judgment, whether it might not be wiser that those who were known to be so much devoted to his service as Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, should communicate with each other in the country, and should remain there, unless any communication was made to them by Government; in which case they would of course take the earliest moment of receiving His Royal Highness's commands. He then proposed that he would go down and take a bed at Dropmore and appoint Fox there. This brought me with a bow to the ground to acknowledge the high honour intended to you; but to submit whether if it were true—as I firmly believe it was—that Pitt would try to patch his government, such a meeting, which could not be secret, might not interfere with the line he had taken, particularly when there could be no distinct question on our line of conduct, or upon any specific proposition. And therefore I again suggested, and promised for you, that my brother Tom and you should drive over to-morrow to St. Anne's Hill, and should converse with Fox on the present state of things, with a view of informing him whether any good purpose was to be answered by your coming to town on Monday; which I promised for you and

for Mr. Fox that you would both do, if you saw any such good purpose. Be so good therefore as to redeem my pledge by seeing Fox, and writing to me an ostensible letter, when you return from St. Anne's.

"The Prince told me that Addington has desired Sheridan last night to tell him of his resignation; and took great pains to vindicate Sheridan and himself from having spoke to him for the three last months. He spoke with great acrimony on Addington's conduct in having deferred to this period of the King's situation, 'this mortal and diabolical stab to Mr. Pitt, in revenge for the blows which he had received.'

"Sheridan's account of Lord Sidmouth's exposition to him agrees with Lord Buckinghamshire's to me, namely that three points were made by him when he joined Pitt.

1. Free liberty to vote against the Spanish war, if he should so please!!!

2. Free liberty in the case of Lord Melville.

3. Protection and favour to the Board for naval enquiry.

"On number 1 Lord Sidmouth did more than he engaged for; and on numbers 2 and 3 Mr. Pitt has broken faith; but the great and specific grievance as stated both to Sheridan and to me is the breach of faith respecting offices for Addington's friends. The explanation was forced forward by Pitt on Saturday; and on that day Addington notified to Pitt his intention to resign; but desired Pitt to open it to the King, least it should agitate his mind, and to name to him the day on which he might see the King for the purpose of resigning. Pitt saw the King on Sunday, and on Monday desired Addington to attend council on Thursday and to resign after council. It is therefore clear that Pitt must already have made up his mind to his arrangements; for—as Lord Buckinghamshire observed—he might have protracted this for a few days, if he had pleased.

"I have understood from others as well as from the Prince that the King's eyes are in a more precarious state than are imagined. Phipps told my informant—and he told the Prince the same—that all operation was out of the question till late in the autumn, and that he had great doubts when that time [came] whether it would be advisable. His habits are entirely broken in upon, and his daughters think very ill of him.

"I have just seen my son, who says that the language of Ward, whom he has just seen, is, 'that a proposition will be made, but that he feared our terms would be too high, and that Pitt would then stand his own ground'; but his language and that of Sturges was great triumph that they had got rid of Addington. This you see agrees with my idea that Pitt will patch the business. And yet, after all, how is it possible that he should go on under such circumstances.

"I saw Lord Carlisle in the House of Lords, and told him of the Prince's wish, that Fox and you should come up; and

of my ideas on that point in all which he cordially joins, and authorises me to state that opinion to you. But you must remember to send me a proper confidential letter for his Royal Highness's perusal.

"You will see that I had intended to send you this letter by the post, and therefore concealed the names in the beginning of Lord Temple, and of his friend Mr. Ward, and I have been so broken in upon that I have written very disjointedly, and fear that you can hardly make out all that I have collected. The idea in the streets is that the whole machine has fallen to pieces, and that the game is in our hands, which I do not believe."

J. T. TROY, R.C. Archbishop of Dublin, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 5. Dublin.—"Permit me to assure you of the singular satisfaction indeed which I enjoy in having been charged by my brethren with the very honourable commission of forwarding their enclosed letter to your lordship.

"However disproportioned their language is to an adequate expression of their grateful feelings, your lordship may rest satisfied it is sincere, untinctured with adulation.

"I shall therefore only add their wish that the sentiments and statements it conveys may be rendered as public as the subject and circumstances seem to demand, in such manner as your lordship shall judge expedient. They have likewise addressed a letter to Mr. Fox, which I forward to him by this mail.

"My satisfaction in executing this commission is increased by the opportunity it presents to me of declaring my high esteem and great respect."

[*Enclosure.*]

1805, July 5. Dublin.—"We, the undersigned Archbishops and Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church of Ireland, beg leave to convey to your lordship our testimony of sincere and respectful gratitude for the powerful support which the recent discussion in Parliament of the Catholic petition has derived from your lordship's name and distinguished abilities. We acknowledge and shall ever hold in memory the generous promptitude with which you undertook the cause of the petitioners; and the force of argument with which you maintained that great national measure. Though we are sensible that justice, expediency, and policy were on this occasion the paramount objects of your lordship, we trust nevertheless, that you will kindly receive this particular acknowledgment from persons whose principles and conduct you have so zealously vindicated. To the noble Lords who have co-operated with your lordship is also due the tribute of our most fervent gratitude. We are deeply impressed with a sense of the liberality which actuated so many of the noble

and some of the right reverend speakers, in their late splendid efforts to promote our interests. The principles contained in the Catholic petition we avow as our principles, agreeably to those reiterated and solemn oaths whereby we have bound ourselves to our sovereign and our country. But if, notwithstanding such pledges, we be still charged with tenets immoral or anti-social in consequence of canons and decretals misunderstood, or of divines and schoolmen delivering their own particular opinions, our answer is, that we have long since abjured all such tenets, maxims, and sentiments.

"However we may wish for the speedy accomplishment of the measure petitioned for, yet we never did, nor do intend to disturb the security of the established Church. We ambition not its preeminence, nor repine at our own situation, neither do we seek to exalt our Church by means of wealth or power. The titles, precedence, and privileges of the established clergy, conferred by the laws of the land, we freely acknowledge in our daily intercourse with them, nor have we ever refused to them their rights and distinctions. The jurisdiction we exercise over our respective congregations is merely spiritual, and this, in its extent and nature, we conceive to be in perfect analogy with that necessarily exercised in every other religious society, when any member is segregated for his disorderly life or obstinate criminality, but we do not assume or pretend to enforce such sentence of removal otherwise than by spiritual coercion.

"The principles of our holy religion as taught and practised by us are not only compatible with the most faithful allegiance to our gracious sovereign, but are also among the most powerful incentives to the conscientious discharge of that sacred duty. It will, moreover, be found that the best instructed Catholics are the most loyal of subjects, and the most virtuous in the community. These, our principles and practice, have long been submitted to the severest scrutiny.

"We earnestly solicit a full enquiry into our past conduct, in order to an exculpation from the charges which are said to have been lately preferred against us; charges heretofore unheard of in Ireland, and of which we are confident our country will acquit us, for *we know* them to be groundless.

"And surely now we may presume to express our confident hope, founded upon the known wisdom of the legislature, that no imputations contrary to these our solemn disavowals will be admitted against the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, the spiritual teachers and comforters of so large a portion of his Majesty's European subjects, without full investigation and substantial proofs.

"We may doubtless be permitted to hope that such imputations so unsupported, so contrary to fact, will not be allowed to prejudice us, or the laity of our communion; or to postpone the long-wished-for enjoyment of the entire benefit of the British laws and constitution."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 8. Buckingham House.—“No news except that all Pitt’s friends hold the same language that his immediate dependants held a few days since, and it is the general opinion that he will make propositions on Wednesday or Thursday, but there does not appear any general confidence that they will succeed. The King stays at Windsor till Monday—as it is said—at Mr. Pitt’s desire. He is very tranquil, and his immediate dependants have not been able to form their guess whether he disapproves the *Doctor’s* conduct. In fact, no one—and I quote one of his Majesty’s first confidential favourites—has heard him open his lips on that subject. At times he is very low and desponds, and you may be sure that his remaining eye gets worse every hour. It is now clear that Mr. Pitt was apprized of Addington’s intention more than ten days before it took place, and is not yet prepared to announce the successors to the offices. The conclusion is obvious and is in everybody’s mouth.

“The letter you sent me was perfectly satisfactory, and the person to whom I sent it, meaning to return the original, gave me the copy of it by a mistake, of which I took no notice.

“I have now to state to you that I saw the Prince of Wales on Sunday, His Royal Highness having sent to me to fix his day for Stowe, and he has fixed ‘soon after his birthday,’ having proposed to me to defer it to the first week in September. I have, however, prevailed upon him to throw it back as far as he can for your sake as well as my own, and he will fix it about the 16th. He has ordered me to invite all my own family to meet him, as he means to bring no one but the Duke of Clarence. Personally, I am sorry that this will break in upon your Cornish journey, but I should hope that we might go down together as soon as this visitation was over, which will last three days, during which Lady Grenville and you will see the repetition of your illuminations.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 9. Buckingham House.—“I have now before me a letter from Lord Nelson dated Antigua, June 12th. He arrived at Barbados, June 3rd, and by false information from St. Lucia was lead to embark 2,000 troops for Tobago and Trinidad, during which time the French fleet slipped out of Port Royal, and he has missed them. A French corvette dogged him for two days off Madeira, and gave them notice of his arrival. They left Martinique on the 6th, were off Guadelupe on the 8th, and passed to leeward of Antigua on the same day, standing to the westward. They are, therefore—as he imagines—pushing for Europe, and he is returning as soon as he is sure of their course to the streights’ mouth. Admiral Gravina commands them.

"All this is most unlucky, but he has saved the islands, and above 250 sail of loaded ships. I hear no other news and am full of my Isle of Man. Lord Harrowby quoted you and your House of Commons speech approving this compensation, and drew from me a declaration that all you was pledged to was to an enquiry upon the case then alleged; but that, so far from approving this new Bill, you had never seen it; and that you most certainly never ought to be stated as approving the Bill or admitting that the Duke of Athol had established the case which he put forward. And after taking notice that this quotation of your speech was personally addressed to me, and stated by his lordship to be 'the opinion of one equally near to Mr. G[renville] with myself,' it became necessary for me to observe that 'it ill became anyone to infer opinions of one perfectly able to state his own ideas if he had thought fit to have been present, and that such a quotation, considering the person to whom it was addressed, and on what subject, *would have been much better spared.*' He came to me afterwards to apologise, but I was very much out of humour.

"No news of Lord Sidmouth's successor, but the same language is held."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 11. Buckingham House.—"I went into the House yesterday, half dead with fatigue of Tuesday night's debate, which fell wholly upon me, and lasted till four o'clock, and too late to write to you the detail of the new arrangements, namely, Lord Camden, President, Lord Harrowby, Lancaster, Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State and Board of Control. The comment by Pitt's friends on all this is that it is a preliminary for negotiation, inasmuch as he must show that he is capable of going on without the Opposition if they are unreasonable in their treatment of the offer which is to be made, and that the retreat of the Board of Control for Lord Castlereagh marks this disposition. But all this is to my conviction nonsense; for I am satisfied that nothing of that sort is really meant, though I doubt not but that some offer will be made as matter of form. You will observe that all the Ministers and papers announce that Lord Grenville had an audience of his Majesty for an hour and a half before Lord Camden was named; and you will observe what they do not state, namely, that Lord Sidmouth saw the King for an hour and a half at Windsor on Sunday, which you will believe, for it is most true; and it is equally true that the King was most extremely hurried and agitated in mind yesterday evening after seeing Mr. Pitt. This last fact I know.

"I finish this from the House of Lords, where I learn that Talleyrand is certainly dead, and that Starembergh expects an immediate attack from Bonaparte on Vienna.

“The Prince of Wales has ordered me to attend him to-morrow at two; he is gone to Windsor. When I return from him I will write you. I am very unwell and quite exhausted.

“The language of the Ministerialists is that an offer will be made to-morrow or next day to you and Mr. Fox. I do not believe it.”

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 12. Buckingham House.—“I have for your accommodation prevailed on the Prince to fix his visit finally and decisively to the 15th of August, so that I hope this will not altogether be as inconvenient to your Cornish arrangements as it might have been. I will write to Lord Spencer, and have already spoken to Windham and Elliott, and will think of others.

“You have received my letter announcing the *nova progenies*, and you know likewise by the same letter that you are bound to consider this step as a preliminary to a negotiation with Fox and you. At least this is the text on which every one connected with Government talk to everybody who will hear them. Charles Williams came to me last night to tell me that my son’s informant had come to him to say that ‘he hoped Opposition understood this arrangement in its true light, namely, as a measure necessary to enable Mr. Pitt to treat with Lord Grenville and Fox, which could not be until he had filled the vacancies made by Addington’s resignation.’ The answer was obvious and only expressed a wish that the difficulties might not be rendered more difficult. And the reply was ‘Good God! how can that be when every one must see that these arrangements cannot be permanent, and are only intended to keep these and all other arrangements of office open for discussion.’ This led to a great deal more of the same, when the same expressions which were so distinctly used to my son were again repeated. Elliott and Windham have just left me, having heard, as I had, from various quarters that propositions are immediately to be made to you for Fox and yourself, and they believe it. But believe with me that it is all hollow, and that the whole will be a trial of carte and tierce for public opinion.

“The King most certainly on Sunday used every exertion with Addington to make him stay, and Monday and Tuesday passed in negotiation between Pitt and him, through the Duke of Cumberland—as is said—at the King’s request. The Duke breakfasted with Addington on Tuesday, then went to Pitt, returned with Lord Camden to the Doctor, and again returned to Pitt; but on Wednesday I was told, and by the surest authority, that the quarrel had been finally stated by Addington to Pitt as ‘irreconcilable and for life’; and this phrase he again used to various persons yesterday.

"Pitt saw the King on Wednesday, and his Majesty was very much agitated, even to strong symptoms of disturbed mind on that evening; which clearly proves that Pitt on that day opened ideas unpleasant to him; and it is not impossible to guess them.

"The tone in the Speech to-day is hostile, and I understand that immediate hostilities are expected from Bonaparte against Vienna. Russia has negatived the Duke of York, who has been proposed to command an allied army of English, Russians and Swedes; and has admitted that the King of Sweden shall command in person when present; on this fact you may depend."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 15. Stowe.—"Your letter, which ought to have reached me on Friday in London, appears not to have had the Beaconsfield postmark till that day, and consequently reached London after I had left it on Saturday. And as if it was doomed that I should rest in ignorance of all the progress made by that letter and your answer, it was missent to *Stone*, and reached me this morning. I shall strictly obey your commands, and as you certainly have no present demand for your copies, I detain them that no other post may be wiser. I agree with you as fully on the awkwardness as you probably do with me on your estimate of the result of this step.

"The person whom I saw on Friday is, of course, most anxious to mix himself in all that is to be said or sung; and repeatedly bid me tell you how ready he was to come to you, or to St. Anne's Hill at a moment's notice, so soon as any real move was made; all which I promised and vowed in your name would be done *in limine*. I found that he—like everybody else—has some exclusion to suggest; all which I took care to combat as departing from the general principle, though I admitted his reasons. In truth—as you know—my opinions on some of his exclusions agree with his, if I did not see the necessity of adhering to one principle on this subject.

"I have very little idea that your Cornish journey will be finally deferred, though I have some doubt whether your science in *carte* and *tierce* will enable you to say when this trial of skill shall end, if does not end *in limine*, which I think not impossible. I know that the King does not state all his objections latterly as strongly as he did, which makes me think that he does not absolutely put the whole aside. It is remarked that he does not speak hostilely of Addington since his last interview."

LORD GRENVILLE to ARCHBISHOP J. T. TROY.

1805, July 16. Dropmore.—"I have had the honour to receive your letter, with one from the respectable persons who exercise episcopal functions among the Roman Catholics of

Ireland, expressing to me in very flattering terms their acknowledgments for the part which I took in the late discussion of the Catholic Petition. My sentiments on the subject have been long known. I thought it one of the greatest advantages of the Union that it would, without the smallest danger to the Establishment, afford the means of relieving a large class of the community from disqualifications still attaching upon them. Entertaining these opinions, I was gratified by an unexceptionable opportunity of declaring them in public. And although the endeavours of those with whom I had the satisfaction of concurring on this subject have not, for the present, been successful, yet the manner in which the question was for the most part discussed could not but be satisfactory, even to those who most regret the result. Much advantage was, I hope, derived from the opportunity of bringing before the public facts and circumstances very little known in this country; and few things can be more conducive to ultimate success than the avowal on the part of yourself and your brethren, of those sentiments of loyalty and attachment to the established government and laws of your country, which you have expressed in the letter now before me, and which, I am confident, you will always be desirous to manifest in every part of your conduct." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 18. Worthing.—“I have been so constantly in motion since I last saw you that till my arrival here last night I have not had a moment to command. I now enclose to you your letter from Lord Camden, which, together with your answer, I communicated to Fox on Sunday. I found him still more strongly impressed than I had expected with the belief that Pitt had not any intention of moving with real effect towards the attempt at forming an extensive administration; and I found that this belief arose very principally from his having been informed by the illustrious Wednesday visitor of St. Anne's, that it was a positive fact known to him that Pitt had already for several days past, obtained from the highest quarter sufficient authority to endeavour to form an extended administration, without any exclusion. The mode in which this information was obtained was not, as I am told, specifically described to Fox, but Fox said that it had all the appearance of authenticity. He also added that this account tallied exactly with another description which had been given to him to the same effect, in a more subordinate but very well informed channel of intelligence. According to this latter account, the King had agreed to receive into the Cabinet, Fox, Grey, Lord Moira, Lord Spencer, Windham and yourself, but this was accompanied by a suggestion that Fox—taking me for his partner—might go to a general congress to settle the affairs of this country with the Continent; and, though no precise offices were named, he understood it to be

in contemplation that P[itt] was to retain the Treasury, with Lord Castlereagh and Lord Harrowby for the two Secretaries of State. Having found him much impressed with these reports, as I confess I do not believe them, I endeavoured to show him, without naming distinct names or authorities, how uniformly all P[itt's] friends, high and low, had concurred in representing this last step of filling up the offices as a mere temporary measure, which would not be allowed to create any new difficulty ; and I asked him what advantage Lord Camden could mean to gain by referring to the King's journey to Weymouth, unless there was really an intention to pursue the object there. And I told him how very improbable it seemed to me that Pitt would have incurred all the risk and difficulties of obtaining sufficient authority, without the desire or intention of acting under it. After a good deal of such conversation, I think he admitted that it was probable that he had been misinformed, but he said it was impossible not to see that all these delays and circuitous steps did much increase the indisposition of several of his friends, though he would do all that could be done by him to smooth that road. He added, however, that he never could think of any negotiation for strengthening P[itt's] government, and knew not how to believe that P[itt] would ever negotiate upon the principle of his government being at an end. In this perhaps I do not much differ with him, but still it is right to keep everything in as practicable a state as possible; and therefore if Lord B[uckingham] is permitted to enable you to make direct communication to Fox of what was said to you, I hope you will send a letter to that effect to St. Anne's.

"Lord Moira had written to thank Fox for his account of what had passed. His letter, which I saw, rested entirely upon the necessity of forming a new Government, and not patching up an old one."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1803, July 23. Worthing.—"Lord Buckingham has just sent me 50*l.* for Mr. Kidd, and I have authorised Nares to draw on my account at Coutts's for the same sum, as a joint contribution from you and me, which I understood you to approve of, so that Mr. Nares will receive from the *Adelphi* 100*l.* for his Greek friend. If this meets with your approbation be so good as to direct Coutts' to place 25*l.* from your account to mine, and the whole thing is done.

"My brother speaks with some disappointment of Lord Spencer's having declined the visit to meet the Prince, at which, however, I am myself not very much surprised. He says he has written to Fox and the Duke of Bedford, and that if his beds hold out, he will write to Lord Stafford also ; and he speaks in high spirits of his satisfaction with his preparations. Watkin is young enough to have determined to go to Brighton and Lewes Races, which I fear will more than counteract the

good effects of the regularities of Worthing, but at 32 years of age he must decide for himself, instead of letting his wary uncle decide for him. I am sorry for it, as I feel confident that with care he would be as well as ever, and that without it, all will be precarious.

"It is probable that I shall go to town for two days in five or six days time, and then shall go to Stowe, but whether by Dropmore or not will depend partly upon the room in your house, and partly upon what I hear of your own intentions.

"A line from Lord Carlisle tells me that P[itt] goes to Weymouth the first week of August, and that P[itt's] friends continue to speak confidently of the result."

EARL TEMPLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 28. Avington.—"I have reason to think that *the enemy* is active both in the county and borough, and we *must* be on the alert. Could you help us by looking about, between this and the time when we shall meet at Stowe, for any persons in your neighbourhood who would buy freehold votes in Aylesbury to serve us. There are two ways of doing this which will suit different pockets. The first is the obvious the most expensive way of authorising us to lay out from 30*l.* to 100*l.* in the purchase of a cottage in Aylesbury; the other, which will answer better for *tenants* or *farmers* or tradespeople, is to authorise Chaplin to purchase forty *shillings per annum* of *land tax*, arising out of freehold property. This can be done to any extent, and quite secretly, for about 50*l.*, to be paid in four instalments within the year. Pray see whether you cannot bring from your neighbourhood a list of names for these purposes, as the fatal negligence which lost Aylesbury last time makes immediate though discreet activity necessary to insure our future object there and elsewhere. We have the means of managing both the above-mentioned methods to any extent if we had names, and the present state of uncertainty of *every sort* makes the existence of Parliament, of course, more doubtful, and therefore no time must be lost. P. Grenfell has bought votes for himself and two brothers."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, July 31. Charles Street.—"A letter from Calder to Cornwallis is just arrived at the Admiralty. It is dated the 23rd, and Calder says that on the preceding day he had with fifteen line of battle brought to action the combined fleet of twenty line of battle besides frigates, and that he had captured the *St. Raphael* 84, and the *Firm* 74, both Spanish, which he has sent to Plymouth with the *Windsor Castle* that had been crippled in the action. It took place in lat. 43, 30, long. 11, 17, which is near Ferrol, and Calder adds that he hopes to be able to force a renewal of the engagement. We have lost only 41 killed and 158 wounded. No news of Lord Nelson.

"Your foreign intelligence has nothing good in it, because I fear that Austria will be swallowed up in the first outset; and then I know not what hope remains upon the continent, and what I hear of domestic news is not promising of any practicable result. I hear from some good authority that P[itt] distinctly says that *rather than find a middle-man for the Treasury like the Duke of Portland he should think it better to resign*; and farther that he means to make a point in any negotiation of keeping Lord Castlereagh, War Secretary of State. These two opinions, which I can trace to very authentic sources, show such a very mistaken notion of the first principles on which a large comprehensive Government should and might be formed, that I am less sanguine than ever as to the result of a negotiation, though I think that some proposition will be made.

"I was in hopes to find you in town, as you talked of two days in this week for London; pray let them be soon, as you will find the Carysfort's, Williams's, and me for this week here. I am in great rage to be told by Hoppner to-day that the picture has not arrived, though I thought I left it on its road.

Postscript.—"I wish you could find it convenient to send the picture soon, as Hoppner goes out of town in ten days or a fortnight; and if he does not first give directions about it, I shall not be able to keep my promise to Malone."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, August 2. Charles Street.—"I do not find that there is any account arrived this morning from the fleet, and in truth I do not expect any further good news, as the conversation of all office people shows that no such expectations are entertained by them. There is something a little obscure in the account of the engagement, and, as far as I can collect, they are not well satisfied with what has passed, though I do not trace the exact ground of question about it. Cook tells Elliot that the greatest part of the Antigua convoy was taken by the combined fleet and burned by them. Fawkener, whom I saw yesterday, told me that Sir C. Cotterell was to go *about the 14th* to Weymouth, to hold a council for the further prorogation of Parliament, but he did not mention any of an earlier date. The first opinion which I quoted to you, I learned from Morpeth, who had it from Canning, so that its authenticity cannot be doubted. I am, therefore, now disposed to think that Pitt will probably obtain permission from the K[ing] to offer to *receive into the Cabinet* the persons whom I had before named to you, and that Pitt will rest entirely upon his having overcome the difficulty of the exclusion of Fox, and will trust that in having so done he will have done all that is necessary to satisfy the public mind on his part, and to put our friends in the wrong in the case of the failure of the negotiation, after such a concession made by the King, and by

himself. Perhaps such a confidence might be well grounded, for, if the public be as anxious as I believe them to be for a large Government, they will be disposed enough to blame those who, upon the general view of the subject, seem foremost to make the greatest objections and difficulties to such a union. War being so decidedly the order of the day, will, however, still more increase Fox's reluctance at this particular moment, or will at least increase that of his friends. Elliot thinks Lord Castlereagh pretty sure of his election.

"My brother was so vexed at Lord Spencer's absence, that I have set to work, and have prevailed upon him and upon Lord Althorp to join our celebrity.

"I enclose you a Windsor buck, and will not leave town before Monday, so that I shall depend upon seeing you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, August 30. Stowe.—"I am just stepping into my carriage to join Lord Carysfort in our progress to Wynnstay, which has hitherto been delayed by the military cares of the Northamptonshire major of yeomanry. Whether from Wynnstay I shall have courage enough to undertake the Cornish journey as late in the year as the 20th of September, and whether you yourself will make any long stay there while the Dropmore walls are still building, are two questions of doubt, the latter of which you will probably now be able to resolve.

"My brother is well, and is now left entirely alone. We have heard nothing of Kings, Princes or Ministers since you left us, and I suppose by your silence that your visits upon your road have not supplied you with anything worthy of communication; reports have been whispered of more malady than mere rheumatism at Weymouth, but we know nothing here beyond the London report in the streets upon the subject.

"Our naval accounts in the channel are pretty much what you would expect. Cornwallis, in answer to Douglas's offer of coming aboard of him to receive his orders when he joined the fleet, sent him word that he had never asked for him, did not know how he came there, and had nothing to say to him.

"Nugent is in disgrace with Cornwallis, and is either sent or to be sent home again. This is all very lamentable. I know no other news, except that Lord Melville and Trotter are just arrived at Edinburgh in the same post-chaise; and that William Dundas is announced as manager of Scotland, where the elections, in case of dissolution, are stated to me to be less promising to Government."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, September 14. Wynnstay.—"I received yesterday your letter from Boconnoc, together with the copy of your answer to Lord M[into], which I will return to you when we meet.

The opinion which you expressed in it was certainly the safest, because in such cases the decision is, nine times out of ten, already taken in the affirmative before any advice is desired upon it; and it is agreed that the only prudent answer to a doubt stated about taking a wife is to wish the man joy of his marriage. Under this impression therefore, and with the natural delicacy which you must have felt of interposing a negative in which you might seem to have a political interest of your own, I do not wonder that you did not choose to put yourself upon this occasion between the cup and the lip; but I will fairly own that your statement of the arguments *pro* and *con*, would have left me, upon your own showing, no doubt as to the necessity of adopting that negative, which, I am glad to see, had in this instance fairly and honourably been given, in anticipation of your answer. I will not certainly undertake to say that there is no possible case in which such a service might not be required to supersede the objections arising from the difference of political parties and opinions; but I must fairly confess that, in the present instance, there did not appear to me to be the shadow of a pretence for making that claim on the one side, or for acquiescing in it on the other. The suggestion of such a service being professional, and therefore independent of political opinions, I consider only as a shabby apology provided by those who made the offer for anybody who could be found to be shabby enough to adopt and to act under it. But say you, here is a great national concern pending at Petersburg, and the ministers have nobody belonging to them that is fit to be sent there. Granted; and that this weak ministry is so constituted, is of the very essence of the opposition which you and I, and Lord M[into] with us, have therefore made both to the formation and to the existence of such a ministry. And the solidity of this objection of ours is almost acknowledged by the Ministers themselves, as well as by their followers, and by the public, in the general wish that has been expressed for a union of all parties; but instead of openly and honestly pursuing this great object, it is plain that the ministers are now only endeavouring to detach and to separate their opponents, without any idea of looking after a more manly and comprehensive system. And can it be endured that, for this paltry purpose, their own insufficiency should give them a claim to try to bolster themselves up with the assistance of the separate talents of any of those whose general weight and authority they are apparently labouring to exclude from the public service. They have nobody fit to send to Petersburg, and therefore Lord M[into], say they, should go to do that public service. They have nobody fit, that I know of, to hold the foreign seals in this moment when so much depends upon our negotiation with the different powers of Europe, but does it follow from their insufficiency (which ought at this moment to be fatal to their administration) that you or Fox are bound to

answer any claims from them for your separate and individual assistance? Or would Lord Spencer, upon a similar plea, be held to the call of the old gentleman at the Admiralty? The littleness of all these petty shabby devices is really quite of a piece with the persons by whom, both in body and mind, Pitt is at present surrounded; and though it seems to make the general picture of our affairs more frightful, it serves likewise to show beyond a doubt that a determination is taken to persevere to the last in a continuance of the present wretched system. I had a short line from Fox two days ago to ask for some Scotch assistance to make the P[rin]ce's chaplain Moncrieff, Procurator of the Church of Scotland; and he tells me that the last communication from Austria hither is to promote a renewal of negotiation, and that we have sent, or that we are to send, a favourable answer; but he has not heard what is likely to be the answer to a similar application to Petersburg and Berlin. All this looks to me like a greater desire at Vienna to avoid hostilities than our English newspapers would admit; and inclines one to suspect that Austria is less confident in her own strength and preparations than she ought to be when she begins a war which is to decide perhaps upon the existence of her empire. Our coffee-house politicians will rejoice to see the Boulogne army menacing Vienna instead of London, but, if the activity of the French should give them soon another treaty of Leoben, I do not know that London or Europe will have much profited by the event."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, September 20. Wynnstay.—"I take my chance of this letter finding you either at Boconnoc or in your road from thence, to tell you that, by what I hear this morning from Fox, I see he is persuaded that Pitt's journey to Weymouth on Sunday last is to produce some proposition or other. Of what nature it will be he has no knowledge, but he expects it to be such as will appear to everybody to be of a nature entirely inadmissible upon the face of it; and even if it be such as to require discussion, he appears more impressed than I have yet seen him with the belief that the preliminary difficulties, as well as those of the arrangement of Pitt's personal situation, will be found insuperable; and he talks of putting upon paper some of his opinions upon this interesting subject, which he will communicate to you if he finds in himself activity enough to put pen to paper. Perhaps I am not less sensible than my correspondent is to the difficulties of giving any real good effect *now* to a proposition such as, in the most favourable sense, can *now* be expected; and all the circumstances which have necessarily attended the delay and reluctance that Pitt has shown towards the making any proposition, have obviously so much increased the original difficulties, that I had persuaded myself that Pitt had entirely abandoned

any ideas which he might have entertained of pursuing the great object of general union. Still, however, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the justice of the reproaches to which Pitt has subjected himself by having hitherto disappointed the country of what was perhaps the only practicable mode and moment for a general union, we and our friends are, and must be, somewhat differently placed from the old Opposition for the discussion of that question, under whatever circumstances it shall come to be discussed ; and though our conclusion should be found to be the same with theirs, we should probably not have to arrive at it through the same course of arguments and opinions. Difficulties enough there always were, even at the most favourable moment, but, what alone would be a difficulty insuperable, is the additional disinclination and distrust which Pitt's conduct has created in the old Opposition since the question of union has been before the public. And if he has so conducted himself as to destroy all confidence in his sincerity, it will be hopeless to look for such a union as could be maintained upon no other grounds than those of mutual and unreserved confidence. I still, therefore, am inclined to believe that Pitt may mean to make a proposition of union, grounded on the present state of foreign politics, in the hope that a preliminary discussion of that question, though it may not unite the three parties, may tend to divide the two parties of which the present Opposition is composed. If this be his object he certainly has not my good wishes for his success in it ; but if he is *bona fide* endeavouring even now to bring about a real good understanding, founded upon the public dangers and necessities of the times, I must fairly say that, though I think he has taken the most unfavourable time and means to obtain it, and though I doubt whether it can now be productive of all the good that might have been supplied by it, still I should not be discouraged from manifesting the best and fairest endeavours to assist and promote it ; and this is one of the instances in which the opinions of some of our friends will naturally differ from those of the old Opposition, as I suspect that few, if any, of that party retain the inclination which they have had to the accomplishment of this object. It is probable that if any proposition is, as Fox believes it, the motive of Pitt's journey to Weymouth, you will soon be to hear of it ; and my chief purpose in writing now is to prepare you for the receipt of some overture or other which my correspondent is persuaded will be made either to you or to himself. Of foreign news he adds nothing, except that, according to his information, Bonaparte will instantly attack Austria ; and he thinks there has been much indiscretion on the part of our ministers in their having announced the intention of Austrian confederacy by their speeches and their newspapers, before the Austrians were ready to strike their blow. In the meantime I know not what course our British expeditions are to take. I am told by very good authority that there is at this moment

no precise object whatever in view ; and that the extensive orders for foreign service are merely given in proof to our allies of our general intentions of military co-operation, but that there is no expedition actually in view. It is possible that this may be said to deceive, but I am sure that this has very recently been confidentially said by those who must know what is intended, and who describe this general bustle of regiments, generals, orders for victualling and ordnance, as being only calculated to keep up the spirits of this country, and to raise the expectations of our allies and the alarms of our enemies upon the Continent. If this be so, it is most miserable work indeed. Long is Irish Secretary, Foster is to remain, and if Long cannot make peace between him and Lord Hardwick, the Lord-Lieutenant is to go to the wall."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, September 26. Llangedwin.—"I have this moment received your letter of the 19th, and, as I wrote to you from Wynnstay two days ago, I should not in the common course of things have pursued you with so quick a succession, but the times are interesting enough to give more than usual importance to the intelligence of the day. I know from more than one channel of good intelligence, that two or three days before Pitt went to Weymouth, one of his most confidential friends said and wrote that Pitt was extremely anxious to give effect to the great end that he had in view, that the alarm of invasion had hitherto prevented him from going to Weymouth to obtain leave to make some overture ; that things were, however, now *just drawing to a crisis* in which this country must take a decided line, and that *after* that line had been taken, he should be better enabled to judge what proposal he could best make. It seems to me, by a comparison of dates, that this language was studiously held by his friends at the moment at which Fox conceived that he knew Pitt went to Weymouth to arrange his proposal ; and my correspondent, in giving me the information which I now quote to you, considers it as mere artificial language, which is not likely to be followed by any real effects ; so that, if I did not rest entirely upon Fox's letter, I should be taught to think that there would not be more of a proposal after the Weymouth journey, than there was before it. And when I find from you so much reason to believe the notion of dissolution, I am more than half-inclined to think that this strange measure may be after all the only real object of the Weymouth journey. The one way which is left to reconcile the different account given me by Fox and by my other correspondent, is to suppose that there is question of dissolution, which is the first object of the Weymouth journey ; and that some overture to Opposition is to accompany that measure. But then every part of that combined scheme would become so

incomprehensible, that it is desperate to pursue such a speculation, and I must be content to let time unravel a clue which I do not know how to follow. In the meantime I have answered Fox's letter by telling him that I agree with him in thinking it probable that the proposal which he expects may be so made as to appear to be inadmissible in the first instance, and therefore incapable of further discussion; but I have said that if Pitt should make a proposition which, fairly speaking, ought to lead to farther discussions, my opinion is that, in that case, Pitt will be found ready to make greater concessions in order to overcome the obvious preliminary difficulties, including, too, that of his own situation; and that, upon the whole, much more will be done by Pitt to forward the general object—if he once makes a proposal that it is possible to discuss—than Fox appears to believe or to expect. And this is certainly the opinion which I have formed, and which I have thought it useful to state; although I do not deny that I incline to think the proposal which is to be made will be a mere inadmissible offer of accepting an accession to the present Government, instead of an offer to agree in the composition of a new one.

"I am rather sorry that you have encouraged Proby to make any offer of his military-diplomatic services. If Lord Mulgrave should have invited him to any such mission, and should have stated it to be a mere professional service, perhaps the case of an officer who is merely to arrange the military details of a military engagement already taken, might be fairly enough deemed so far professional as not to interfere with his own political character or connections; but an application to be so employed is and must be looked upon as having in it more of solicitation than either Lord Carysfort or Lord Proby can mean to acknowledge or to pursue. And so I think it must strike you, if you ask yourself how you, in Lord Mulgrave's situation, should have interpreted such an offer from General Phipps, or from any younger branch of that family, in the military line. Perhaps, however, I am more rigid than I should be upon these matters, but I say to you naturally what occurs to me upon them. It is in the same spirit, too, that I should a little hesitate to adopt your creed about supporting what is done, without previously satisfying one's-self that what is done was right to do. What has been done wrong may render the correction difficult, but in proportion as it does so, its original character of wrong would increase one's indisposition to be controlled by its effects."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 1. Stowe.—"Arthur Wellesley has passed two days with me, and has made me very happy by a most confidential and unreserved statement of his view and opinions of his brother's line of political conduct. I cannot, of course, say more by letter on that subject, but I cannot avoid giving

you this intimation of what he conceives will hardly be paused upon for many minutes. In short, I am made very happy, chiefly because I know how essentially all this will contribute to your public and private comfort.

"I conclude that my prayers have been heard by the Jupiter of our political heaven, and that no proposition will be made, which, on every account, now seems the one thing best for us. Addington is still in a very critical state of health. His medical men think very ill of him, and his son's *insanity* presses severely on his mind, but still I understand that his anger will induce him to every the most unqualified exertions against Government.

"The King is certainly lowered in mind, body, and eyes. I do not mean by this that he is in a state of imbecillity, but he is very inactive, not easily roused to exertion, and his eyes quite hopeless to any purpose save that of distinguishing light, but he never will be able to read a line.

"The Duke of York attends very much to him, and stated this attendance very lately as a necessary bar to any possibility of his assuming any Continental command. But, in truth, this was unnecessary, for, after sending away the Scotch brigade of three regiments, embarking now for Malta, and two more for the West Indies, who go with Coote from Ireland, I do not see how they can spare more. Baird is now avowedly going—as I expected—to the Cape.

"The continental war waits, as I hear from good authority, for the arrival of the second Russian army on the 12th September, but I confess I shall not believe it till I see Bonaparte strike. The French accounts speak of domestic agitation and *arrestations*."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 4. Trentham.—"I found on my arrival here last night your two letters of the 29th September and 1st October. You will already have perceived that nothing short of the authority which Fox seemed to write from would have induced me to expect any proposition for union after the many instances which had appeared to show on the part of Pitt so much reluctance towards the discussion of that measure. Your enclosure, however, has set at rest all farther speculations of this sort, and we must—however reluctantly—confess to ourselves that there is no longer any chance of obtaining for the country the one object which would have made it the most strong to meet the tremendous crisis which is now at hand. I acknowledge that I give up the pursuit of this object with reluctance and regret; and although I certainly never have been blind to the infinite difficulties which hung upon all the discussions connected with it, I have never ceased to hope that, if it once was fairly and honestly put in train on both sides, the general benefit

and advantage of the measure would have carried it through, and would have forced down the multitude of objections which grew all round it. That Pitt himself should have closed, in the manner which he now has closed it, the communication which had been so recently made by him of his own disposition and wishes for its success, and that the dry expression which is quoted in Bathurst's letter should appear to him to be the fit and proper conclusion of all that had been previously said to you by him and from him, is a topic upon which it can now neither be useful nor pleasant to dwell. It may be a matter of political curiosity to try to account in an intelligible manner for a course of conduct which no obvious reasoning can explain ; but it is enough for us and for our own measures to know the result, and to see that a union of the two great hostile political parties in this country is no longer a measure to be pursued, and is, to all appearance, no longer now desired or wished for by either. Released as we are by the knowledge of Pitt's decision upon this subject, I see however that you naturally feel scrupulous of betraying prematurely your knowledge of it. I am therefore glad to relieve you from this embarrassment in part, by telling you that the first thing which passed on my arrival here was that Lord Stafford put into my hand a letter from Long apologising for not calling here in his way to Ireland, and concluding with expressions of regret that they were not now to meet in politics as he had hoped they would. You see therefore that the abandonment of union is talked of without reserve, and described generally as such by a general reference to the language now held by Pitt's friends, without the breach of any confidential communication whatever.

"I return your enclosure as you had desired, and shall be very glad to talk at large with you upon all that remains to be talked of. I see your reluctance to engage in the course of the Opposition, and my own opinions are not such as would lead me to press upon yours ; but there are considerations affecting the possibility of future advantage from keeping our own friends together which are important enough to demand very serious reflection. I am here for a few days, and then shall come to you by way of Stowe, and of Althorp, if they are there."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 7. Trentham.—"Since I last wrote to you to return your enclosure, I have heard that Lord Spencer is not at Althorp ; I shall therefore go from here direct to Stowe on Saturday or Sunday next, and after two or three days there, shall hope to be with you at Dropmore.

"Lord Spencer writes me word that Edmund Phipps being asked two days ago what news there was, answered 'Oh, the best in the world, for we have now got the King our fast

friend again, and we may now defy *them* all.' Silly as this is, it tells much when one recollects that it comes from one of the most familiar and most indiscreet inmates of Downing Street.

"Prettyman has been writing to the Bishop of Carlisle to say that government will go on upon its own ground, although it is to receive some great additional strength. No explanation is given of this obscure promise, which my friends here suppose to allude to Addington; and yet the shocking disaster of his son's insanity, and attempt upon his own life at Worthing, is too recent to suppose it possible that there can just now have been any discussions going on with him.

"Villiers is quoted to me for having said that when he went *this last winter* to announce his political opinions to Pitt, P[itt] asked him if he knew what he would have or what he could advise; that V[illiers] said his advice was for P[itt] to desire the King to enable him to negotiate with Fox, and with Lord Grenville; and that Pitt's first answer was, with respect to F[ox], 'Villiers are you gone quite mad;' and again, 'since when is it that you are so fond of the Grenvilles, you who knew when Lord G[renville] was with me before, the trouble I had to make him give up any opinion he had conceived. What do you think that I could do with him now?' Of these expressions I am so far assured that I am quite confident that Villiers repeated them; and I quote them now only to show how utterly impossible it has been ever to carry into effect what, upon public grounds alone, was so strongly the wish of you and of myself.

"Lord Harrowby drove over here yesterday. I collect by what he said that the ministers think Bonaparte is taken unawares by the activity of Austria. He seems to expect the Russians in Bavaria by the 20th instant, and mentions two different armies of them of 50,000 each. I just hinted my suspicion that the Elector of Bavaria might only be making a show of co-operation with Austria, till France could be ready to defend him against Austria; and I saw that he entertained the same suspicion, which he strengthened by observing that the Elector had promised to put all his troops under an Austrian general, which, however, he had hitherto evaded doing."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 8. Pall Mall.—"At the moment at which I write, being just about to get into my chaise, I can say nothing about public affairs, if indeed I had anything particular to say. For domestic politics I think it is pretty clear now that we shall have for the present neither overture nor dissolution. Overture I think will not come at all, at least without some great change. But dissolution is still thought by many likely to happen, if any favourable event calculated to make much impression should take place.

"What chance there is of any event of that sort I hardly allow myself to conjecture. My fears outweigh my hopes. In the meanwhile, I cannot by any means reconcile my mind to that part of the Austrian declaration which disclaims all interference in the internal concerns of France, though I am afraid it is the part which will be the most popular. I can understand perfectly why they should have said nothing upon the subject. I might, myself, easily have been persuaded that such was the best course. But why they should cast away the hope of such means of interference, even in their own minds, and still less why they should publicly renounce such hope, I cannot at all see. In the meanwhile, I think I see great prejudice that may attend their so doing.

"Some have thought that this Declaration will not at all fetter their conduct should any favourable opportunities present themselves; but, if it does not, it will, I think, injure their reputation, in spite of any interpretation which would confine the meaning of it to their mere views in commencing the war, as distinguished from what they might do in the course of it."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, October 27. Stowe.—"Two things have occurred to prevent my answering your letter which I received on Wednesday, namely my having been unwell at Wotton for two days, and my determination, which I must now break, of setting out for Dropmore to-morrow. Upon my return hither last night I found some company which I shall not be able to get rid of till towards the end of the week, when I certainly shall be with you, being naturally very anxious to converse with you on all the various points arising out of the domestic and foreign politics of this country. I have no objection to the Post Office knowing that—with respect to the first—I am very happy that no proposition has been made to us, and that we have been saved the odium of refusing assistance where no real confidence could have existed, even if we had been ready for sacrifices such as would, I fear, have been fatal to our characters. As to all the rest I say nothing; and, in truth, I see too little of the real state of things to risk an opinion of what may be the state of the foreign politics of this country on the 28th November. Perhaps my expectations are not very sanguine, and every gazette necessarily lowers them.

"The defeat of the Austrians—such as we have heard it—will not tempt our Ministers to claim much share in their military councils, and as nothing has occurred to make me think Lord Castlereagh more able to conduct the war, Lord Barham to conduct the navy, Lord Mulgrave to conduct the negotiations, or the Ministry in general to conduct the country, I feel these specimens of incapacity and imbecillity a *summum malum*, and—coupled with the king's present situation—such as will bring on rapidly the consideration of our very existence.

"A few days will satisfy us whether the Austrians and Russians will not have received the law of the victor; and in all events, the promising bud of Prussian enterprise will, I fear, have been nipped before Lord Harrowby's instructions will have been signed.

"As to our expedition, I have no doubt but that it goes to the Elbe because the little energy of the King's mind looks to Hanover, and to the means of recovering it by direct attack rather than by arrangements arising out of a more useful employ of the 20,000 disposable men which the two islands can now furnish. I find that three additional regiments are to embark since the news of the Austrian reverses.

"God grant that all this may not have staked our last means on a desperate game?"

W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 3. Sunning, near Reading.—"I had thought of driving over to you to-morrow to dinner, on the chance of your being at Dropmore, and of returning the next morning; but I believe it will be better to beg you to let me have a line merely to say whether I may be pretty sure of finding you during the course of the present week, and at the beginning of the next, as, in that case, I shall shape my course from here so as to enable me to spend a day with you.

"In great calamities and dangers men flock together, even where the distress is such as to leave no hopes of relief from any combination of counsels or exertions, and where the only effect of the meeting will be to express to each other their sense of the common danger. Disastrous as events have certainly been, there will be a hope that all is not yet lost, nay that much may possibly be to be gained, if the remains of Mack's army have not actually surrendered, and he himself become a prisoner. It is that last incident of the piece, that finishing stroke, of the general himself being captured—'Romeo banished'—that seems to extinguish all chance of recovery; not, probably, on account of the value of the general himself, but by the evidence which it contains of the state to which things must have been reduced. There seems still to be a ray of hope that this may not be true, and then not only something but perhaps a great deal may be hoped. On this however it is in vain to enlarge. I send this off in a hurry in the hope that you may be able to favour me with a line by return of post. Soon as I may hope to see you, many things, bad at least if not good, may be expected to happen between."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 4. Stowe.—"From various quarters I am informed that Parliament certainly does not meet on the 27th, but is postponed to the 3rd or 10th of January. The

ostensible reason is that the money holds out, which is not true. The real, I take it, is the hope of bringing to a favourable issue a negotiation for strengthening themselves by Erskine, Tierney and York, of all of whom it is said that they have hopes. I have reason to know that their despondency is very great indeed, both on the Spanish question, and on the other more material which we discussed so much at Dropmore. All this is fully confirmed by a conversation held by Lord Chatham to Lord Temple on Thursday last, so that I think there can be no doubt of it. Lord Chatham said that the King meant to be in town on Monday—tomorrow—to attend the council for the further prorogation, but he spoke doubtfully upon it ; and as the Queen has put off the crowded drawing-room, expected on Thursday the 8th, until after Christmas, I shall anxiously watch the points connected with this drawing-room, namely the proposed *fête* to the young princess, which is not announced, though talked over at Weymouth as for the third week in November. The King was not to have been at the drawing-room, so that this further adjournment of it is not accidental. I likewise know that the troops ordered for embarkation at Cork are above 9,000 men, exclusive of what may be to assemble at Portsmouth. From the victualling it is clear that they are not meant for the West Indies ; and the report is that they are to be ready *about the 14th December*. The Defence Bill—or rather the 20*l.* Bill, as it is better termed—does not meet a single friend. Duke of York and brother Ministers all abuse it. The idea now is to draught the militia by volunteers, which, after the pledge so solemnly given by Mr. Pitt, is a bold undertaking.

“Sir J. Orde is certainly gone to Cadiz with his six ships, for he has taken on board a very large medical establishment bound for Gibraltar.”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1805, November 5. Dropmore.—“I shall certainly be here all the time you mention, and I need not say that I shall, on every account, be happy to see you when it best suits you to come. I wish it had been this morning as you had proposed, because you would have found both brothers here, and I am very sure your coming would have induced them to prolong their stay. They left me only an hour ago, and I have but just now received your letter.

“You will have seen that, contrary to what is usually the case, the calamity very much exceeds the first report of it. One’s mind is lost in astonishment and apprehension when one looks at what has happened, and what is still to be expected. An army of 100,000 men, reckoned the best troops in Europe, totally destroyed in three weeks, without (as far as yet appears) sustaining any one considerable action ; and 36,000 of them capitulating on a bare statement of the position occupied by their enemy, are events that really confound one’s imagination.

And yet, even this is, I am afraid, only the beginning of misfortunes. The situation of the Arch-duke's army in particular seems quite desperate, unless he has had the means of retreating in time ; which the account of the affairs of Verona, if true, puts out of the question.

"The only remaining hope seems to rest on Prussia. Knowing nothing of the grounds or motives of the unexpected vigour lately shewn at Berlin, I cannot reason much on what is now to be looked to from that quarter, but, after all I remember, I cannot look with much confidence for effectual assistance there. Yet such a confidence must, I apprehend, exist in other quarters, and be much relied on there, since the plan of sending a British force to Hanover is persisted in ; and that too at a season when our escape by sea from such an immense superiority of force as an Austrian peace might pour back upon us, would be cut off by the frost, and no other resource be left to us but the protection of Prussia.

"As to our internal situation, we must now fairly say to the country that they must rely on themselves alone.

"Even the last resource to which I had looked with more sanguine hopes than many entertained, that of rallying the exertions of the country round one common centre of union, seems, to say the least, as far as ever it was ; and we are plunging into a sea of hitherto unthought of difficulties, with little hope that our internal divisions will leave us the fair use even of that measure of activity and vigour, whatever it be, that the country still possesses.

"These croakings may be allowed to the first impressions of such a calamity. Time and reflection may suggest topics of confidence which I have hitherto looked for in vain. I wish you may see the whole in a less unfavourable point of view, but, at all events, it will be a great satisfaction to me to talk the subject over with you, both as it relates to our situation and our conduct." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 6. Charles Street.—"You will probably before this have heard of Nelson's most glorious victory and death.

"19 sail of line of battle taken or destroyed, chiefly French. Nelson had detached Admiral Lewis with 7 towards Carthagera, which left himself only 27, and this tempted the combined fleet to come out of Cadiz on the 19th, with 33. On the 21st he fought them, took and destroyed 19, and made Villeneuve prisoner, but was himself killed by a musket shot from the tops of the *Santa Trinidad*. He lived two hours, long enough to know his victory, and to thank his friends, and to die the most glorious death that a British heart like his could wish for. The regrets for his loss are almost greater than the exultation for his victory.

“ Bourne Sturges is quoted for saying that the Prussians have taken possession of Hanover.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 11. Charles Street.—“ The gazette which is already printed, and which will be in the evening papers, will give you Strachan’s account of his having fallen in with and taken three 74 and one 80 French ship on the 4th November from Cadiz. These ships either did not know or did not speak of Nelson’s victory, as the officer who brought the news from Strachan knew nothing of Nelson’s battle till he landed here.

“ There is a strong report current in the last two hours of Stirling having taken 3 of the Rochefort squadron, but I cannot yet find on what authority this report rests. Count Munster has received accounts of the Prussians having re-established the electoral government in Hanover. This seems to commit irrevocably the Cabinet of Berlin ; and being committed, they have nothing to do in common sense but to press as fast and as close as they can upon Bonaparte. If they give him time to beat Prince Charles first, and the Russians next, their own turn will come next, and the Elector of Hanover will not then be able to save them, even though the great commanders whom we have heard of should be sent to their assistance.

“ I am impatient to hear more of Collingwood ; all that I hear of Pitt is that he is *tout rayonnant de gloire*.

“ I agree with you in thinking that the state of things is so critical as to undergo some change every day ; and therefore it is useless to concert measures at a time when that which is right for to-day may become unwise or impracticable to-morrow.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 12. Charles Street.—“ There was no truth whatever in yesterday’s report respecting Stirling, nor is there as yet any further account from Collingwood. The language of Ministers is more sanguine than ever respecting Prussia, although I cannot find that there are any new grounds known upon which to form any new hopes. The armed camp which they are reported to be forming in Westphalia sounds too like a defensive position to promise any good to the Austrians, or even to the Prussians themselves. If they are in a state of war they are undone if they do not attack rapidly enough to give a chance to the armies of Prince Charles and Prince Ferdinand, if they are yet within the possible chance of escaping entire defeat.

“ I had not heard of the demand for titles for Lord Spencer and for you. Whatever tardiness and reluctance Pitt’s silence has shown on his own part, is more than compensated by the

activity of his followers who certainly have succeeded in creating a general impression, nobody knows how, that the union has failed by the fault of the Opposition only. This is a paltry and wretched artifice which would make me more angry if I did not feel that greater matters are at issue than the dirty little tricks of the politicians of the second table.

"What could Lord Camden mean by telling me the Swedes and Russians are gone to the Ems? are they really attacking Holland, or does the Lord President know the Ems from the Elbe."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 15. Charles Street.—"Henry writes on 2nd November from Dresden, that from authentic information they know that the Austrian loss has not been much exaggerated by the French accounts. But he says it is likewise indisputably true that the French had lost not less than 25,000 killed and wounded in all the different actions that preceded the capitulation of Ulm. He says it is still a mystery at Dresden what course the King of Prussia will pursue!!!

"No naval news, nor any confirmation of the arrival of any of Collingwood's prizes. Lord Macartney has just seen a friend of Wellesley's just arrived from India, who says he was to embark on the 8th August. His report of the close of the war is not pleasant. He considers the treaty with Holkar as only patched up to save our credit for the moment; but he describes Holkar and Scindia as combined in determined hostility, and as confirmed by the experience of this war that their Mahratta course of destroying the country, and moving rapidly away, will wear out our army, and prevent our arriving at any final success. He describes the East India paper at a discount of 15 or 16 *per cent*; and I see that, upon the whole, Lord Macartney does not think well of the present state of things there."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 19.—"You see that the Italian news is composed of a new surrender of 5,000 men on the 2nd November, and a new effort on the part of Prince Charles towards retreat; while upon the Danube, the combined armies are at Molz, not 20 leagues in the high road from Vienna, and followed by the French who are already at Wels. In this state, when nothing but the most rapid march of the Prussian army is worth looking for, we are desired by the ministers in London to rejoice at the news of Haugwiz and Lombard having set forth to begin a negotiation with Bonaparte in the style and character of armed mediation. If this be their good news, it is sadly thrown away upon me. Lukin from the War Office tells Windham that the *expedition*, meaning Don and his

troops, are to be made up 60,000 ; and Elliot has seen upon paper a muster-roll of 58,000, which I suppose they will call 60,000.

"Lord Nelson's will leaves 1,000*l.* *per annum* to Lady Nelson ; and gives the house at Merton, with £500 *per annum*, to Lady Hamilton. Government are to give Lady Nelson 2,000*l.* *per annum* for her life, and are to attach 5,000*l.* *per annum* to the earldom.

"Thelusson's Irish peerage is finally fixed ; his father was a Swiss and a banker's clerk, and he himself is what you see him.

"Lord Harrington's friends are all much out of humour at his going to Ireland under Lord Powis ; but, nevertheless, both appointments will take place, and Lord Harrington told me that he should sail next week."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 22. [Charles Street.]—"I have just seen General Phipps, who tells me there is no news of any sort at any of the Offices. Sir W. Scott said that yesterday when he asked Pitt if Sir Sydney had yet burned the Boulogne flotilla, Pitt's answer was '*no, nor has he any orders from us to do so.*' This sounds like the last Catamaran project, which though protected by the King's ships and the King's officers, was maintained by Lord St. Vincent to have been a private expedition, not ordered by the Admiralty.

"There are rumours that the frequent expressions of public dissatisfaction and apprehension have stopped the Duke of York's command ; I believe there is some ground for this. Lord Powis desires not to go to Ireland till February ; his appointment makes it clear that Ministers mean to support the two Indian governors.

"They are still exulting in their Prussian hopes ; what can they hope from mediation and negotiation at such a moment ? "

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 23. Charles Street.—"Lord Camden, whom I have just seen, tells me that there is no news of any sort.

"I dined yesterday at Holland House, and found Tierney there, who took an opportunity to say that Pitt had called upon Addington to show the interest that he took in his family distresses ; but that Addington assured him, Tierney, that nothing else had passed, and that he was sorry Pitt had done more than send to him, for fear his visit should give rise to political reports and speculations. T[ierney] added that he thinks the young man will die, as there is great increase of debility from week to week.

"I was sorry to find from Lord Holland that Campbell the poet, whom he has seen, is in great distress ; as he has nothing but a guinea or two a week by writing for the booksellers. He told Lord H[olland] that having now a wife and

two children, he would gladly take the office even of a sweeper in the India House, for any certain provision, was it ever so small. Is it possible that you can assist by any of the subordinate stations in the Auditor's Office ? or shall we endeavour by means of Dardis to overcome his reluctance to take money, and make a brotherly purse for him as we did for our Greek scholar. The poor fellow has consented to have a guinea subscription opened for printing his works, but that, I fear, will not do much. Do let us somehow contrive to help him. He has got somebody to mention his name to Lord Hawkesbury who says that there are prior claims upon him, but that when they are satisfied, he will see what he can do. In the meantime poor Campbell has four mouths to fill, and nothing to give them but verses ; though I hear he has still a laudable pride which stands in the way of pecuniary assistance. But that may be overcome in some way I am sure."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 25. Charles Street.—"Instead of news I give you the Duke of Montrose's authority for saying that there is none by land or sea. Collingwood has no frigates to send, so that the only immediate chance of hearing from him is via Lisbon ; but although we receive nothing new from Germany, we are going to furnish them with news there, for it is just determined to send Lord Cathcart *immediately to Vienna* ; and as I hear Lord Granville is not expected till the spring, I presume Lord Cathcart stays till that time with the Austrians, to give them the benefit of his military science.

"Woronow talks largely of the Russian force now in motion, which he puts at 200,000 men ; namely in Germany a first body of 50,000, a second of 50,000, and a third on their march from Galicia of 60,000 ; to which he adds 20,000 with his son adjutant-general at Lawenburgh, and 20,000 at Corfu. All this, he protests, to be a real effective force ; but of the last I fear there is much question, for Drummond told Lord Stair a few days ago that he had the means of knowing the exact force at Corfu, and that Ministers here were outrageous with him for asserting the truth that their 20,000 at Corfu did not exceed 8,000 at the utmost. If the other numbers are equally exaggerated, the exertions of Russia are less than they might be.

"I did not find the Duke of Montrose as sanguine in his expectations of Prussia as I had expected ; and the apology which he furnishes for their present inactivity, namely, that of being unprepared to move, would be too foolish if it were true, and not being so, is subject to an imputation of a different sort. I am afraid, and Elliot confirms my fears, I am afraid that Ministers almost avow that they think the immediate possession of Holland an object of more pressing importance than the relief of the Austrian and Russian army. And yet I am at a total loss to conceive how it is possible for them to

flatter themselves that the possession of Holland is worth a fortnight's purchase in case the army of Prince Charles or Prince Frederick should have met with the same fate which has attended the army of Mack.

"Can the mind of our Minister descend so low at such a crisis as to like to vapour about the conquest of Holland at the beginning of the session, when he sees at the same time that there is ten to one against maintaining that conquest, if the campaign should continue in its course to be as favourable to Bonaparte as it has been in the outset.

"I ventured to ask the Duke of Montrose if Parliament was likely to meet on the 7th, and he said he thought very likely they would not, if money would hold out.

"Charles was at Judge Johnson's trial. He thinks the Judge innocent, and is in great indignation at Lord Ellenborough."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 28. Stowe.—"Your distinction of voting the volunteers capable of acting *without* troops of the line, because they may be fit to act *with* them, had not escaped me, and most certainly does not add to the pain with which I see the last stake of England and perhaps of Europe committed to the Dukes of York, Cumberland, Cambridge, and Lord Chatham! I know the difficulties of a thousand sorts that would occur to any Parliamentary discussion of such an arrangement; but I am so satisfied that it is of such transcendent importance to check this arrangement which is now certain, and, as I believe, finally submitted to by Mr. Pitt, and so sure of the universal panic which it has struck on the minds of *all descriptions*, that I am anxious to find some mode of stopping this measure *almost at any risk*. Pray think this over.

"I cannot understand why Collingwood is not instantly ordered with Admiral Louis's ships, and the five who sailed to join him on the 15th to the Mediterranean to attack Genoa or Toulon with Craigs troops, now 7,800 men, at Malta. This would surely assist the Austrians as a diversion in their favour.

"I have no letter from Fremantle who is blockading Cadiz. He has done most superiorly in the action, having dismasted the *Bucentaur* and the *San Ildephonso* in forty minutes, by placing himself on their stern and quarter, whilst they could hardly fight a gun against him.

"I have no additional news, except confirmation of that which my son sent you."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 29. [Charles Street].—"I have only just time to tell you that there is a new paper called *The Morning Star*, the editor of which has been to Windham to profess

himself a friend, and to desire the assistance of hints and communications. His name is Hunt, and Wi[ndham] knows his connections to be respectable. I have written to Stowe to suggest enquiries for our friend there. In the meantime pray take the *Morning Star*, and the more so as this is the only morning paper which contains the substance of the 18th and 19th Bulletins, which I cut out to send you.

"Pitt, till now, has been in conversation sanguine beyond imagination; though with reproaches and reflection on the Austrians. It now seems all over as I have long feared; and Bonaparte will force Austria to a separate peace first, and Russia next, and we shall be the third and last to treat, if that be a distinction valuable either in honour or interest.

"I still believe in further adjournment if they can get money to go on.

"Tell me as soon as you know anything for Campbell. It will be fortunate indeed if you can help him in the Office in any practicable shape. Your picture is taken back from Hoppner's to Oxford Street; you shall have some proofs when you come to town.

"J. King (as I hear it whispered) will succeed Long in Ireland.

"Elliot says Lord Cathcart will command on the Continent instead of [the] D[uke] of York; and Lord Harrington go as military minister to Vienna and Petersburg."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 29. Stowe.—"I conclude you have no doubt but that the French are in Vienna, though they could not be there on the 10th. I have as little doubt but that the Prussian negotiation will end in a continental peace, which will nearly balance the transcendent advantages that might have been derived from Nelson's victory. The order for embarking not only all the German cavalry, but the 11th Dragoons and the Greys, was issued on Saturday last, and the 11th embark this day. What madness is this if the Ministers are not sure of Prussian co-operation. The army is loud in blame, as *I was told this morning*; and my alarms respecting the three Royal Dukes and Lord Chatham are, I find, very general. There is much talk of proroguing for ten days, and I see no objection to that idea, for, if they can weather the payments of January 5, they may go on for ten days longer, and they will hardly have given time for Lord Harrowby's mission."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, November 30. [Charles Street].—"I have written a line to my brother to tell him that we are still disgusted in London by hearing from all the government runners *what a trap* Bonaparte has fallen into by being drawn away to the capture of Vienna.

"Lord Castlereagh said at dinner yesterday 'that he did not think *so ill* of the capture of Vienna ; but what he *really* thought *bad news* was that a *feu de joye* had been heard at Boulogne, which might very probably be for having forced the *Emperor to make a separate peace.*' You will probably conclude as I do from this judicious remark that they know this event either has happened or is taking place. In the meantime Lord Harrington is actually gone to Windsor to-day to take leave, being instantly departing for Vienna instead of Lord Cathcart ; and I still suspect *Lord Cathcart* to be destined to the Continental command, of which expedition there is more talk than ever, now that there is less than ever any probability of it's being undertaken with any prospect of success.

"I am so much pressed by my friends at Althorp and Stowe that I believe I must commit my cold carcase to all the horrors of a winter journey ; for which, as soon as I can muster resolution enough, I will if possible set forth by way of Dropmore ; but you shall hear of me before you see me.

"Elliot is gone to Park Place in his way to Dropmore, and Beaconsfield."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 2. Charles Street.—"You will have seen that I was but too just an interpreter of Lord Castlereagh's cyphered conversation. I do not yet find that any regular confirmation of the Austrian peace is received, but no doubt remains in London ; and the sensation made appears to me to be more strong, more general and more hostile to Government, than I could have expected it to be, who have seen no other result before my eyes since my leaving Dropmore at the time of the capitulation of Ulm. But, in truth, if any thing could add to the impression of such disastrous news, it would be found in the childish affectation of sanguine confidence which the Ministers so universally displayed, that nobody who trusted them at all could be prepared to receive the tremendous reverse which has now happened.

"The ill opinion that I have entertained of the time and manner in which this business has been so misconducted has so impressed my mind with impressions of blame and reproach to the principal actors in it, that I must fairly own myself to be but a bad counsellor for the disguise or restraint of those sentiments. I can however, at the worst, be a patient hearer ; and certainly can answer for being a silent one ; as it is of much more importance to me to hear the opinions that are to be discussed rather than to express any of my own. I will therefore obey your summons, and will be with you to dinner on Friday, and go on to Stowe, and Althorp, on Sunday.

"Before I received your letter Elliot had stopped at my door to say that he was on his road to Beaconsfield, and he begged

me to mention that it was his intention to come to Dropmore on Thursday. If the possibility of Fox's sleeping at Dropmore (as you should perhaps press him by letter to do) should make Elliot's arrangement inconvenient to you, a line from you will find him at Beaconsfield.

"Farquhar thinks Pitt wants Bath, but does not describe him as being materially ill. He went on Saturday to *Lord Camden's*, and is to return to town to-day with all the advantage that he may have obtained from his discussions with the sage of the Wilderness!!! The second embarkation has, I believe, actually sailed. The Ministers here will probably forget that it has done so, and will leave them, till the Elbe has fast frozen them, for Bonaparte's Christmas dinner. Courtier as Lord Macartney is, he said yesterday he was convinced the country would not longer bear such men as Pitt has now got round him. Where he is to get others I know not."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 3. Charles Street.—"The recent mails which appear in the morning papers, seem to warrant the belief that there is no truth in so much of the Dutch communication as relates to the Austrian peace, and to the death of Prince Charles. When I heard that Stahremberg had set the Twickenham bells a-ringing at a late hour last night, I was in hopes that he had received some authentic accounts; but I find that at 2 o'clock to-day nothing had been received by Ministers, foreign or domestic, beyond what you see of the Dutch and French gazettes in the morning papers. I cannot help, however, upon the whole flattering myself that, if the Imperial Court have so long since abandoned Vienna, they will not be found to have made this disastrous peace upon the loss of it. The campaign seems, it is true, almost irrecoverable; but yet the difference between a disastrous campaign, and such a disgraceful and precipitate peace is so great, that I consider the escape from it almost as a victory. I see in all the foreign papers that the Austrians had asked an armistice, which Bonaparte refused unless they would give for it the Tyrol and Venice; and I will hope that the Dutch report is no other than a confused account of what passed upon this proposal for armistice.

"Windham talked to me to-day of going down with me to Dropmore; I therefore thought it best to tell him who would be there on Saturday, in order not to have the appearance of any mystery where none is meant; but his goings and comings are too uncertain for me to rest upon.

"I shall certainly be with you on Friday, and go to Stowe on Sunday."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 4. Charles Street.—"The produce of the last mails, which you see in the morning paper, is a full

conviction of the falsehood of the Dutch news, and seems still to leave a possibility of Prince Charles's army retreating into Hungary ; while, at the same time, the Austrian manifesto leads one to hope that they will continue stout long enough at least for Prussia to take part with them, if this extremity of danger can induce them ever to take their part like men and soldiers.

"While this contest is alive, while there is yet left any faint hope of continuing the struggle against France, you yourself cannot be more averse than I should be to the utterance of one word in Parliament that should tend to lessen the confidence either of our allies in us, or of our own people in our allies.

"The Ministers themselves cannot have a more eager wish for their success in this tremendous contest than what I myself entertain ; and whatever I may think of the means, motives, and persons employed in it, I would give to it as much assistance as if I most approved of every one of those circumstances.

"Windham talks of going to Beaconsfield to-morrow, and very justly observes that he can easily return from Dropmore on Saturday to Beaconsfield, if there is not room for him.

"Lord Harrowby's dispatches are certainly come, but I can hear nothing of them.

"I think it a very good symptom of hope, that the French are so industriously fortifying the Lech, and Donawert, and Augsburg."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 15. Althorp.—"After passing two days with my brother at Stowe, he came over with me to Althorp on Wednesday, and returned home yesterday.

"We found the opinions of the master of the house here coincide with those of Dropmore and Stowe upon the general topics which had been matter of discussion between yourself and Windham and Fox. The first impression made upon his mind by the account of those discussions was to attribute to the natural consequences of them more extensive and permanent mischief than will, I trust, be found in the event ; but the more we talk the subject over he becomes, I think, more inclined to agree that *political* difficulties of *our* present situation are rather likely to be lessened than to be increased in these eventful times before the actual moment of the meeting of the Parliament. In truth the *difference* in question cannot but be materially affected either by any great reverse to the successes of the French, or by such a confirmation of them as should close the contest upon the Continent by negotiations for peace. I wish I could see any reason to indulge a hope of the first of these events taking place ; but, whatever my wishes may be, certainly my opinion is that our news will very soon be that of armistice or peace. The mission of Guilay

as described by the Emperor of Germany, together with the French statements of proposals from the Russians and from Hungary (which I know not how altogether to disbelieve) would alone be sufficient to lead me to strong expectations of armistice or peace. But when, in addition to this, we find Prussian negotiation in the hands of Haugwiz, under the immediate impression of the daily progress of Bonaparte and the daily retreat of the confederates, I know not how to entertain a doubt that such negotiations will arise as will leave Prussia in a state of peace rather than induce their ministers to challenge that war with France in the present impaired state of the Austrian army, which Prussia did not feel bold enough to challenge when the fresh and untouched army of Austria was so much better able to second the efforts of Prussia. Still however in my mind, even this event of peace made in any common concert is so much lesser an evil than that which Kirkhert reported, and which we *are told* we shall still live to desire and to regret, that, at least in this comparison, I shall think we have escaped an irreparable evil ; and, however, perilous and unsatisfactory the terms may be of any general peace, I shall think them almost a triumph when compared to that peace of Kirkhert's, which some of our friends are disposed to consider as a boon well worthy of our acceptance. I shall stay here a week longer, and then go for a few days to Stowe.

"I have subscribed 10 guineas at Coutts's to Campbell, and am pressed to obtain your name there. If you approve, write to Coutts who receives the subscriptions."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1805, December 18. Althorp.—"I have this moment received from Stowe the account which you had sent there of the last news from Germany, of which the evening papers had given but a very confused and perplexed account. I certainly agree with you however in thinking that even a drawn battle is rather a favourable circumstance, more particularly as one may hope that so general an action, of which the two Emperor's personally partook, will discountenance the habit of capitulation and surrender which has so much disgraced the beginning of the campaign. It is something too to see by the position of Wischau that, prior to that battle, the French had begun to retreat ; and the combined armies had advanced from the neighbourhood of Olmutz. If, in addition to this, one could really give credit to the report of the commencement of Prussian hostilities, much indeed might be done, and I am very glad to see that both my brother and you seem to speak with confidence of this important article of intelligence. At the same time I cannot help feeling some distrust of the truth of *this* news when I observe that the papers describe the arrival of letters of the 8th from Berlin,

without furnishing any such authentic notification of this important fact as they might and would naturally afford, if the fact was true. It appears to me to be highly probable that, in consequence of Bonaparte's refusing to accede to the proposals made by Haugwiz, the Prussian troops may have approached nearer towards Bohemia and Franconia; but no march of the Prussian troops is decisive of hostilities till they have either declared war or begun it. To be sure, if the battle of the 2nd or any subsequent event should afford to Prussia a fair prospect of being able at one blow to decide the fate of the French army, it may be hoped that they will be tempted to avail themselves of it; but I am so strongly impressed with the notion of their pluming themselves upon their system of neutrality that, even if they begin to engage in the war, I suspect they would very probably, upon the first fair offer made to them by Bonaparte, fly back to their *cordon*, their line of demarcation, and their magnificent protection of the north of Germany. I have thought it right to give some account of our Dropmore conference, in confidence to Lord Stafford and Lord Carlisle, and I see by their answers that they are both of them very anxious that all appearance of difference should be kept back; and both of them are disposed to think that may be done without any great difficulty. Hitherto I have likewise been of that opinion, because I have hitherto been persuaded that the interference of Prussia, added to the bad success of the combined armies, would quickly produce negotiation and peace on the Continent; in which case our respective opinions as to Continental confederacies would not be 'the order of the day.' If, however, the hopes of the Confederates revive, as I hope in God they will, by the retreat or defeat of the French, we must then look to another solution, and trust that Fox will not take the moment of the success of the Confederates to make a Parliamentary war upon the system of confederacy. To both my correspondents I have talked of the probability of our having a perfect agreement in our questioning the insufficient state of the British army, and the tardy and inadequate support which it has as yet afforded in co-operation with our allies upon the Continent. Lord C[arlisle] writes me word that he hears a great deal latterly of the dejection of the K[ing], which he is told is owing to the expectation of the departure of the D[uke] of Cambridge. Is it true that Pitt has been in great danger from gout in the stomach?

"Lord B[uckingham] writes me word that Haugwiz proposed a joint peace embracing *all* the powers at war, with a reserve as to England *if Bonaparte should demand her exclusion*. This might be made a fair ground of Parliamentary or political attack; but, in truth, if the powers on the Continent make a joint peace upon a real and well-understood concert, I should not think the nominal exclusion of England would, for our separate interests, be the worst that could happen."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 1. Eden Farm.—“I wish to trouble you with a few lines respecting the old story of Mr. Justice Foxe, though it is become almost a ludicrous consideration amidst the gigantic businesses which seem likely to occupy the ensuing session. I am going on Friday next with a family party to Dr. Heath’s at Windsor; on Saturday to Blenheim; and on the Thursday following for a couple of days to Park Place; after which I incline to resettle here till about the 10th February, with the exception perhaps of the first day of the session. But if it were thought material to resist any farther that silly and irregular proceeding against a judge for a few intemperate phrases used above three years ago, I certainly would attend to have at least a day’s debate against the renewal of the order for witnesses; which order will otherwise pass as a matter of course.

“The continental catastrophe is most afflicting in many points of view, and equally disgraceful (and almost equally dangerous) to all the old established governments in Europe. But from the date of the incomprehensible capitulation of Mack’s army, I have considered, and have professed to consider the whole enterprise as desperate. It was then evident, that the war had been forced forwards without any comprehensive plan, and consequently without resources to compensate for any material disaster; and that, in the whole line of territories from Malta to Lapland (Naples, Berlin and Hanover included) there was a want of communication, preparation, promptitude, decision, and concert. The prospect is now most gloomy, and our good countrymen do not appreciate perils which as yet are at a certain distance; but, unless there shall be some special interposition of Providence, their feelings will be well awakened before midsummer. In the meantime I am tempted to enclose an extract which is just sent to me as copied from an Irish paper. It is certainly not written in the spirit of wise conciliation, nor with due political foresight; I hope and trust therefore that it is not penned by my old friend the new Chief Secretary.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 6. Blenheim.—“We really should have been most happy to have availed ourselves of your premission to us to pay our respects to Lady Grenville, and to see Dropmore in our way homewards, even if we had not been able to call for more than an hour or two. And I conceive that would have been a digression only of 4 or 5 miles from our direct line, which is by Windsor through Kingston. But we think that the Malmsbury’s may have had enough of us from Thursday to Saturday; and also our troop left at Eden Farm would mutiny if we should prolong our absence beyond Saturday evening. We are therefore under the necessity of leaving Park Place early in that day.

"I will ask leave to wait on you in town some morning before the opening of the session, for I am solicitous to know your sentiments respecting the best means of resisting the farther prosecution of the Irish judge.

"I am fearful of adverting to other subjects which are become momentous and menacing beyond the powers of my mind, and seem to me to be swallowing up all secondary interests ; and to involve, at this hour not only the well-being but the very existence of the British empire. The danger is of a different description, but not less alarming than that which existed in 1792.

"In admiring the varied and magnificent scenes of this place, I am induced every hour by the buildings, monuments, pictures and historical tapestries to wish for the revival of a John, Duke of Marlborough, with all his energies and successes ; or at least for a recurrence of those times when we were able to maintain the independence and balance of the continental powers."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 6. Stowe.—"Stunned indeed are we all by this continental news. I have no faith in the re-embarkation of our troops, for it is too tempting to Bonaparte that to attack them appears to me certain, and equally sure that we shall buy their retreat by another Helder convention which will cede the Trafalgar prisoners in exchange for them. Surely the blow of Ulm was a sufficient lesson to our Ministers to have played better what remained of their immediate game, I mean the movements of the Anglo-Russian army in Westphalia ; but the mind is sickened by this horrible picture of imbecility from which I see no salvation. Much as I felt on the subject of misconduct before, I must say that I could not conceive that so much could have occurred since Trafalgar of omission and commission, in all which I think our Government so deeply guilty.

"I heard of Mr. Pitt yesterday that he is still very lame, and is much beaten down by this news ; and of the King I heard this day that he is well, but gloomy to a degree that has seriously alarmed all his family. He believed this bad news to its fullest extent quite from the first report of it, and resisted all the lies of which every one heard so much for ten days."

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 10. Portsmouth.—"I seize the first moment of recovery from the fatigues of my voyage and of landing, to thank you cordially for your very kind letter written upon the first intelligence of my arrival.

"I hope to be in town to-morrow night or sometime on Sunday, and on my arrival I will immediately inform you,

and shall most eagerly expect the happiness of taking you again by the hand either in London or at Dropmore according to your convenience.

"My obligations to you are innumerable, but the first is your attention to Richard, who surpasses even my very sanguine expectations."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 15. Eden Farm.—"It would be quite convenient to me to wait upon you at any early hour either on Monday or Tuesday (or even on Saturday if you preferred it) respecting the renewal of the enquiry into Judge Foxe's conduct, which, though of trivial import amidst the actual and increasing pressures, may deserve a few minutes consideration.

"I have not yet heard what sums have been remitted to the (late) foreign powers; I believe not much above one million. But I understand that the naval expenditure has necessarily and considerably exceeded the amount voted, and must be immediately provided for (having been defrayed from other branches of service). I enclose a rough minute of the state of the consolidated fund, though perhaps you have a more detailed account from the Exchequer."

Enclosure.

In the grants for the year 1804 (ending 5 April, 1805) the surplus was taken at 5,000,000*l*. It produced about two millions. The deficiency was voted as supply, and the fund left clear from the 6th April, 1805.

"In the grants for the year 1805 the surplus of the consolidated fund was taken at four millions.

For the quarter ending 5th July last the surplus was	206,907
10th October	2,287,077
Surplus	2,493,977
For the quarter ending the 5th last there was a deficiency	410,117
	<hr/> 2,083,860
Income	8,861,941 9
Charge	9,272,059 4

Deficiency..... 410,117 15

and therefore the deficiency is 1,916,140*l*. which sum will be diminished or increased according to the produce of the quarter ending 5th April next."

CHARLES JAMES FOX to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 18. Arlington Street.—"I send you enclosed two sketches for an amendment, one by Lord Henry Petty,

the other nearly the substance of that I left with you yesterday. I understand that you sent last night was only made with a view to the case of the House feeling the propriety of adjourning certain discussions on account of Mr. Pitt's absence. This is a case which I own I think very unlikely ; but, if it were to happen, and one felt oneself obliged to sacrifice principle and decency to delicacy, we ought at least to wait till we feel the necessity, by which means too we should have the advantage of some speeches at least before we give way.

"With regard to the particular point on which there is unfortunately a difference, there is nothing in either of the drafts I send which in any way touches upon it. I confess I thought the same with respect to my original sketch in which I had purposely omitted my favourite words *ill-timed*, *ill-concerted*, *ill-supported* ; and if the word *councils*, being liable to be misunderstood for *counsels*, was objectionable I was willing to substitute *conduct* as it now stands. If any other plan is suggested I shall be happy to see and discuss it, but I fairly own that I can hardly feel myself justified in supporting any that does not in some way convey strong feelings of indignation at the situation to which we are reduced."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 18. Putney Heath.—"I am very happy, to be able to inform you that all the physicians have pronounced Mr. Pitt to be rather better this morning, and there are symptoms which seem to indicate that his stomach is in a less relaxed and irritable state ; he has taken chicken broth with something like appetite, and his countenance is improved. I do not, however, mean to represent his amendment as great, but in my judgment it is the first day that there has been any amendment at all since he returned from Bath. He seems to have no positive complaint, and the physicians have repeatedly assured me that no essential organ is injured. His cough, which arose entirely from irritability, has been much less in the last twenty hours, but still a great degree of weakness remains. Be assured that I shall always find leisure to answer any inquiries I may receive from you."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 19. Putney Heath.—"I am very happy to make a second favourable report of Mr. Pitt. Though he had not a very good night, he thinks himself better to-day, and the physicians expressed themselves decidedly of that opinion ; they said that they now saw light. Doctor Reynolds and Doctor Baillie assured me that they considered him better this morning than any day since they first saw him, which was last Sunday, the day after he returned from Bath."

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1806, January 20.] Park Lane.—“I send you the enclosed with real grief of heart. Pray return it, and do not copy, nor communicate it.

“Once more let me entreat you to consider again your intended conduct for to-morrow. I am persuaded that any measure tending to create a division in either House or manifesting any degree of warmth, will be deeply injurious to the common cause.

“A shock might be given to the feelings of many, of which advantage might be taken to the prejudice of every great object of the public interests.

“If you could substitute in place of your intended motion, a notice for a motion at the distance even of a week, you would obtain every object which you stated to me this morning, and you would avoid all the mischief which I apprehend.”

Enclosure.

SIR WALTER FARQUHAR to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 20. Putney Heath.—“Sir Walter Farquhar intended to have had the honour of waiting upon the Marquis Wellesley this morning, but he has been detained with Mr. Pitt. It would afford Sir Walter great and heartfelt satisfaction to send a good report. He is sorry he cannot. The symptoms are unpleasant, and the situation hazardous. If there should be a favourable change towards night, the Marquis Wellesley shall have a report again.”

EARL FITZWILLIAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 20. Milton.—“Being unable to attend on more accounts than one; the severe illness of Milton, who, thank God, is now safe, but still in bed, and my own crazy frame, not quite (even if the former obstacle did not exist) equal to a long sitting in the House, I trouble you with my proxy, to apologize in the best way I can for my absence.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 20. Palace Yard.—“The following account which is direct from Putney may be depended on and I am grieved to see it. ‘The situation of the day is certainly discouraging, the pulse 130, other symptoms unpleasant; on the whole, the view is unpromising and hazardous.’

“Permit me under these circumstances to repeat with great submission to your superior judgment, but with some knowledge of general impressions out of doors, whether it would be desirable to push any amendment at the moment. I think it liable to invidious remark; and also that many (of whom I cannot scruple to say I am one) will be precluded from the immediate concurrence which they would wish to give. I have indeed (*confidentially*, and say it) reason to believe that this

would be the impression of a considerable set, to whom we alluded to-day. I conceive that it would be right in both Houses to open the amendment, to give the pledge and impression to the country, but to take a further day for it, or to be induced to withdraw it. Excuse this suggestion."

CHARLES JAMES FOX to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Arlington Street.—"I should be much inclined to your suggestion if I did not feel two difficulties ; 1st, the old one of so many people being come to whom it will be difficult to explain our reasons, 2ndly, upon what ground I or any of my friends can state Pitt's being so ill, we having no particular means of information on that head. This objection would be obviated by the proposition for delay coming from the other side. I will mention the thing as early as I can to-morrow morning to a few persons, and if Pitt is really considered to be in such danger as you suppose, I shall be for putting the business off. I will let you know the result as soon as I can, unless you could call here and assist at a very small *conciliabulum*."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Palace Yard.—"It is quite a load off my mind to learn what you mention. I am satisfied (and not merely from reflection but from knowing the sentiments of several) that it makes an essential difference respecting the future goodwill of the country (which is now more than ever essential) to proceed with extreme delicacy, and better to be pressed for, than to seem to press.

"The commission with the Speech will open at three.

"I have a confidential note from a medical friend best informed as to Mr. Pitt, and it most fully confirms the melancholy account which I sent yesterday, though he is said to be not worse to-day than he was yesterday. The only hope remaining is that it may not be a failure of vital powers, but a twenty-one days fever."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Putney Heath, 9 o'clock a.m.—"Mr. Pitt shewed great marks of weakness on Sunday night, and yesterday morning the symptoms were very unpleasant ; he improved in the course of yesterday, and took full as much nourishment as usual without incommoding the stomach ; at ten last night the physicians pronounced all the symptoms to be more favourable ; he rested tolerably well, but Sir Walter Farquhar is not yet able to pronounce anything respecting the situation of his patient this morning comparatively with last night. The consulting physicians are to come at half-past five this evening, and I will trouble you with a note by

the messenger whom I shall send to town probably about nine. The physicians are to dine here, and I shall not be able to write any letters till they leave Putney."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 21. Putney Heath.—"The symptoms are all aggravated, and Mr. Pitt is materially worse to-night."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22. Putney Heath.—"Sir Walter is engaged with Mr. Pitt, he has passed rather a better night than was expected, and his pulse are rather better this morning. But still there is not, I fear, a ray of hope. I was in his room just now, and he knew me, and I hope he will presently be able to receive some comfort from me. You shall hear again when the physicians have been here at ten."

Postscript. "Mr. Pitt has declined to see me just at present for the purpose of my praying with him.

"Sir Walter begs me to make his excuses."

SIR WALTER FARQUHAR TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22. Putney Heath.—"Sir Walter Farquhar was so occupied by his attendance upon Mr Pitt this morning that the Bishop of Lincoln was kind enough to answer his Lordship's enquiries for him.

"Sir Walter has since that been in town for an hour by appointment of the Prince of Wales, and, on his return, certainly is of opinion that *no ground has been lost* since morning. Would to God he could say any were gained."

SIR WALTER FARQUHAR TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22, 10 o'clock, p.m. Putney Heath.—"He is sorry he cannot add one word of comfort to the morning's report. Mr. Pitt is worse—not a ray of hope left." *Copy.*

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 22. Putney Heath, $\frac{3}{4}$ past 11 [p.m.].—"The physicians have pronounced that Mr. Pitt's pulse are more feeble and more frequent; that his general strength is less, and that the disease is making progress, though there are no symptoms of immediate dissolution.

"I am confident that I may mention to you that I talked with Mr. Pitt for some time upon religious subjects and found his mind in a state very much to my satisfaction; he expressed great humility and trust in the mercy of God, and said that he should die in perfect charity and peace with all mankind. He attempted afterwards to write but could not; he desired me to write down some particulars which he mentioned; he

signed them after hearing them read by me, and indeed he also read them himself, in the presence of Sir W. Farquhar and three servants."

THE BISHOP OF LINCOLN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Putney Heath, 7 o'clock a.m.—"The last sad scene closed at half-past four this morning. Delirium and shortness of breath increased for the last three hours, but I trust there was no particular suffering."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Eden Farm.—"You will have learnt this morning the last afflicting account from Putney Heath.

"I deeply lament the death of one for whom I retained both respect and undiminished affection, although a misunderstanding (arising perhaps in the mutual infirmities of the human mind) had interrupted our intercourse on public subjects. It is also a painful reflection that such a man should quit the world in the middle period of life, and in a disastrous conjuncture so adverse to fair ambition and noble pride, which had animated all his pursuits and existence.

"God only knows what difficulties and perils are in store for the age on which we are thrown; but I at least know too well that if a most strong government cannot now be formed; and if when formed it shall not manage both the defensive system and the financial means with an unexampled energy and wisdom, this empire will soon be in an agony.

"The proposed address for Monday next will, I hope, be superseded and suspended for a short time by new circumstances. At any rate I submit to you that, both from tenderness to the memory of an individual, and from the justice and expediency of the case, it may be very desirable to vary the apparent aim and direction of the measure, and to direct it specifically against the war department and the foreign department.

"After you left the House on Tuesday I was told that the one million of prize money had not actually been applied, but was only offered as now applicable; that distinction makes an essential difference if it be founded in truth.

"It is a small matter to mention, but Lord Abercorn's speech seemed to imply that he was tired of the proceeding and would not renew it unless called upon.

"I go from this place on Saturday afternoon to Roehampton (Lord Buckinghamshire's) till Monday, when I will go for the day to town.

"Is it not a great subject deserving of private enquiry whether a large proportion of the volunteers (as they are now called) might not in their improved state be brought into some system approaching to an efficient militia?"

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Park Lane.—“In the present state of public affairs, I think it necessary to apprize you at the earliest moment of my determination to co-operate with you in the great work of endeavouring to surmount the difficulties and dangers which surround the country.

“It will be sufficient to explain that, in my judgment, no administration can prove equal to the present exigency, which shall exclude any description of persons distinguished by public talents or virtues from His Majesty’s councils; and that I will not lend my aid to any administration formed upon such a principle of exclusion.

“Understanding that some persons now acting with you have manifested a disposition to investigate the state of that branch of the empire which was lately entrusted to my charge, I assure you that I shall never object to any examination of the affairs of Asia which may be deemed advantageous to the national interests or honour; on the other hand, it is proper to apprize you of my resolution to maintain and assert in every situation the principles which directed my conduct in the government of India.”

LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 23. Dropmore.—“I found myself last night so entirely overcome by the melancholy event which was then hourly expected, and which has since taken place, and so utterly unequal to the discussions in which I might have been engaged this day, had I remained in town, that I took the resolution of coming down here this morning (if the account from Putney was such as I feared, and as it turned out to be) and endeavouring by one or two day’s quiet to recover myself a little, and to prepare my mind for any discussions to which this great public and private misfortune may give rise.

“It is quite superfluous for me to express to you the satisfaction I must always feel from your concurrence and co-operation in those views which I entertain of the public interest. I am utterly ignorant what steps the King may be advised to take towards the formation of a government calculated to meet the difficulties of the present crisis. It is perhaps little likely that my advice or opinion on this subject should be asked. If it should, it will certainly be given with sincerity and freedom, and will be in substance that there is no other prospect of safety to the country than the formation of a government upon the most extended basis that the circumstances and situation of affairs shall be found to render practicable.

“The possibility of realizing such a plan must of course depend on the views and dispositions of the different parties, and leading individuals in the country, on the sentiments they may be found to entertain towards each other, on the pretensions they may form for themselves, and on the extent

to which they may, on mutual communication, be found to concur in the course to be now pursued for the safety of the country.

"On all these points I can speak only for myself, till some circumstances shall arise to justify the calling for explanation from others. My own sentiments upon them you already know. There is no sacrifice, consistent with duty and honour, that I have not long ago professed myself ready to make for giving them effect; and be assured that of such sacrifices the greatest of all would be that of my own peaceful, studious, and domestic life.

"What you say on the subject of India is no more than I had anticipated, and had always said for you. The limited knowledge which I have from time to time acquired of the subject has always confirmed, what my full knowledge of your character had uniformly impressed upon my mind, that the more the principles and conduct of your government are understood, the greater your claims will be found to be on the applause and gratitude of your country." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1806, January [23]. Dropmore.—"I very much incline to think that the state of the nation is the properest question to move after such a pause as the present circumstances require, and which I trust there will be no eagerness shown on our part to shorten. This change of plan will relieve me from a difficulty which I should have found insuperable, that of coming down for the first time after this great loss to urge a censure upon his measures and character; and I am fully persuaded that, now we have lost him, the impression of that loss will be such as to give to his colleagues the greatest possible advantage in sheltering themselves under his name, should there be the least appearance of pressing upon his memory.

"The public opinion is likely, with proper management, to be entirely adverse to the notion of leaving all that is most important to us in such hands as the Hawkesburys, Castlereaghs and other ministers. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we should do nothing that can create unfavourable impressions against us, and that if we err, we should err rather on the side of moderation and forbearance, than on that of impatience and violence. I know and see and lament every day, how adverse this course of opinion is to the temper and habits of some of Fox's friends, but the point is too important both to our own characters and to the success of any plan by which the public dangers can be averted, to make it possible that I should for an instant lose sight of it. It has been, more than once Fox's misfortune to let himself be hurried on in this way against his own better judgment, and to throw away, by yielding to the intemperance of others, those advantages which he never afterwards could regain. I trust that

he himself has no disposition to follow the same course again ; but I am sure that for myself at least, and in the situation in which I stand, all chance of my being useful depends on the moderation and temper of our present conduct, and that, instead of outrunning the public sentiment, the true line for us now is to let the public press us forward, and not we them.

"If all this were merely a speculation how to overturn one government, and to put in its place another, which should include our own friends, you know how little appetite I feel for such pursuits at any time, and can easily believe that I am less than ever inclined to them just now. But I do see, and cannot doubt that this is now the last chance of saving ourselves from such evils and dangers as this country has never yet experienced ; and I am very anxious that this chance should not be thrown away for the gratification of party violence, or the pleasure of a triumphant debate in Parliament.

"And so ends my sermon, which I do hope will make more impression than sermons often do.

"I think there can be no doubt that you should be at the Speaker's dinner and in mourning.

"Wellesley, not seeing me yesterday as he was to have done, has written to repeat to me more distinctly what he had indeed already said, that his mind was decidedly made up to have nothing to do with any government except one formed upon the broad basis which I have recommended.

"I think from something I have heard, that your report of Lord Sidmouth's language is likely to be true. I wish he may have steadiness to adhere to his resolution. Should the King apply himself earnestly to shake it, I should fear the result.

"If I hear anything that seems to call for my being in town, I shall be ready to come at a moments notice any time after to-morrow morning. But if nothing particular should arise, as seems now most likely, and if both Houses should be adjourned till towards the middle or end of next week, I should then wish to stay here a day or two longer, supposing that I am not *really* wanted. Do not think this is mere idleness. I assure you that the quiet of these two days was become absolutely necessary to me, and that I shall be much better able in consequence of it to do whatever can now be fairly required of me.

"In the meantime let me conjure you to apply yourself singly to the object of moderating and restraining. Indeed, indeed, it is the bridle and not the spur that is wanted just now." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 23. Charles Street.—"I have seen Fox and Grey who both seem persuaded that, either by the desire of government, or by their own proposition, the business must be put off from Monday next to give the King time to make

his arrangements ; and Fox supposes that Ministers, if hard pressed for money, may lay the navy estimates on the table to-morrow, and then adjourn over for a few days, so as to vote the navy estimates on the first day after adjournment. We are to meet 5 or 6 in Arlington Street tomorrow to settle this, and to talk over the future question. Fox thinks the best motion to make—after the proper pause—will be the state of the nation, and Grey and Windham and myself feel inclined to the same opinion ; and, as far as we hear of the Addingtons, they are likely to be for the state of the nation, though they are adverse to Lord Henry Petty's motion to the effect of the proposed amendment. Speculations are still divided between Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Sidmouth ; but Lord Sidmouth is reported to have said this day that he had no enmity with the great person that is no more, but that nothing shall ever persuade him to act with the dirty fellows that had betrayed him, and these are interpreted to be the Chancellor, Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Castlereagh. The King passed all his time this morning previous to the Cambridge address, with the Duke of York and Lord Hawkesbury. He looked well in the *levée* room, was very collected, but so blind that, having passed close to Lord Spencer, he asked Lord Dartmouth what star he had passed. He seemed to know nobody but the Archbishop and Duke of Rutland, who were the only persons to whom he spoke. Lord Hawkesbury read the King's answer, with all the air of a new-appointed Minister, but nothing of any sort is yet known."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1806, January 24. Dropmore.—"I enclose you a letter which I have this moment received from Wellesley, and a copy of that which I write by his messenger to Lord Chatham. I know that you will feel at once, more than volumes could express it, the earnest and anxious desire which I feel to be enabled to render this last melancholy service to a friend whose memory will ever be most dear to me.

"I hope I do not flatter myself in thinking that the object of this request may not be difficult to accomplish. I know the generosity and liberality of Mr. Fox's mind, and have often admired it when I had not the good fortune of agreeing with him as now in political opinions and conduct. And I cannot but persuade myself that it will appear to him a line becoming his character to express his acquiescence (perhaps even his approbation) of this public testimony to the memory of a man distinguished by so many virtues and talents, and doing so much honour to the country by his general character ; although in his estimate of some of Mr. Pitt's public services, Mr. Fox may still feel himself obliged to differ from the proposers of this motion.

"If to these considerations any weight whatever can be added by any personal request of mine, I have no difficulty in

saying that it is very little likely he or any other person should ever again have the opportunity of conferring upon me an obligation which I should so highly prize, as by his compliance with this request ; and should it be necessary to add to what you will say in support of it as a personal application from me, I will only beg you to send me an express without loss of time, and I will not delay an instant coming to town for that purpose.

“At all events I feel so much interested in the result of this business, that I will beg you, as soon as you have seen Mr. Fox, to send my groom down with one of my horses, which he may leave at Cranford Bridge, and come on with a post-horse.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 24. Dropmore.—“I do not lose an instant in sending back your messenger with a letter to Lord Chatham, to assure him of my earnest endeavours to contribute every thing in my power to the object you mention, and with another to my brother Mr. Grenville requesting him to see Fox in my name and to say everything to him from me that may best conduce to its success ; and if, contrary to my wishes and hopes, there should arise any difficulty on the subject, I have desired him to send me an express which will bring me to town in less than three hours after I receive it. As this is Friday, I presume the notice could not be for an earlier day than Monday, and therefore that, by coming to town to-morrow in the course of the morning, I shall have full time for every exertion ; and certainly I will spare none, if any should be necessary.

“I hope none will. Have the goodness to send my two letters to Lord Chatham and my brother as soon as you get this.” *Copy.*

MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. Park Lane.—“I received your letter last night with great satisfaction, and forwarded the inclosures immediately.

“I am extremely anxious to see you, and I would have gone to Dropmore, if I had not expected you in town. An event has happened which renders it very desirable that I should see you early to-morrow morning, and, if you could come to town, I should be much obliged to you, and ready to receive you at any hour you will appoint. I do not wish to go out of town at present, as I am rather afraid of changing my bed.

“My anxious desire to see you arises from this circumstance. A man of the name of Paul (whose character you probably know) rose yesterday in the House of Commons, and gave notice of a motion for Monday, when he says he proposes to move for papers with a view of founding charges against

Lord Wellesley. It is said that he is supported by Francis, even by Wyndham, and that the Prince of Wales has also ordered all his friends to attend for the purpose of countenancing the miserable attack of this obscure and low man. Certainly this is not the mode in which I expected to be treated. If any person honestly wishes to examine the affairs of India, let him first receive from me all the information I can afford, and if that should not satisfy him, or should convince him that I have been wrong, and that a change of system is requisite, let him then proceed in Parliament. But to aid the vindictive designs of such a person as Mr. Paul is not worthy of any character with whom I can ever attempt to act. I am informed that the main object of the design is to cast a shade over my reputation in this critical moment for the express purpose of excluding me from public affairs. On this occasion I trust that you will come to a full explanation with Mr. Fox and his friends; you must see the necessity of doing this very early, for if the plan to be pursued be not fully arranged before Monday, the shaft may be shot, and I may be separated from you by absolute necessity. You must see the impossibility of my acting with Mr. Fox and his friends, while they are employed in co-operating with such a man as Paul to disturb the repose which I am entitled to enjoy, after such arduous and successful labour in the public service.

"On the other hand, I am totally ignorant of the designs of Ministry, with whom I have had no intercourse whatever on this subject. My intention is without delay to require Lord Castlereagh to take some direct line with relation to this attack, and in the course of to-morrow I shall ascertain his views.

"But I must rely on you to obtain for me a distinct view of the intentions of your friends, and I therefore earnestly entreat you to come to town for that purpose, as well as for the purpose of advising me with regard to the conduct which I ought to pursue on this occasion."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. Buckingham House.—"I know that you will be delighted to hear that the Prince of Wales has this moment left me, having called here to command me to tell you, that as soon as he saw by the papers that Mr. Paul had given notice of an attack on Lord Wellesley, he sent immediately for Mr. Francis, and through him to Mr. Paul; and the result has been, that Mr. Francis has assured his Royal Highness that he has no idea of bringing forward or joining in any measure of attack at present, and that he had little doubt of being able to induce Mr. Paul to desist. And his Royal Highness particularly desires this may be stated to you, as a very anxious proof of his attachment to you, and of his partiality to Lord Wellesley. You may be assured

that I acknowledged it in your name, with proper expressions of gratitude and respect.

"The exact state of politics at this hour is very curious. Every exertion was yesterday made by the King to induce Lord Hawkesbury to accept the Treasury; and, upon the arrival of a messenger yesterday evening at Windsor, his Majesty appeared overjoyed, and ordered his carriage for this morning, announcing that he should return to Windsor, and therefore forbid the Queen or his family coming to town. He arrived at noon, and saw Lord Hawkesbury, who was with him for an hour; and afterwards he saw Lord Castlereagh and the Lord Chancellor; and he received from them the unanimous opinion of a Cabinet held late last night that they could not undertake his government in the shape proposed by his Majesty. The King then saw Lord Ellenborough, and it is understood that he gave him the Exchequer seal. He then ordered his bed to be prepared at the Queen's House, and announced his intention of sleeping in town; and at the moment I now write,—*having been trusted by his Royal Highness with the channel of his information*—I can state to you beyond a doubt that the whole is at sea, in consequence of the opinion of Cabinet being so clearly expressed against the possibility of patching this administration; which, for several hours, everybody had concluded to have been finally arranged, and which, I will fairly own, I should have been glad to have seen so settled. As to what is to come next I cannot guess, for the King has declared he will not send for Addington; and even if he did, there seems little doubt but that he would decline any share in a government composed of his friends, and those remnants.

"It is supposed that he will not send to you; though I know he has enquired very much in the last four days into the history of our connexion with Fox; and that he has declared that he will not 'suffer the latter to sit in any cabinet that is to advise him.'

"He was very much agitated this morning after he saw Lord H[awkesbury] and certainly came to town under the idea that he was sure of forming the ministry out of the old remnants.

"I have seen your letter to Tom. You may be assured of every compliance on my part, and that of Lord Temple, with your wishes; and nothing can be more conciliatory than Fox; but the matter is become delicate and difficult for Fox from the manner in which it has been conducted. My son threw out to Mr. Fox an idea of a sort of compromise which I thought Mr. Pitt's friends might even prefer to a funeral; namely a monument, and payment of his debts. To this Lascelles readily jumped, and Mr. Fox said it was less objectionable, but Grey and Windham are stated to be impracticable. I will however try further, and have great pleasure in letting you see my son's eager pursuit of your wishes on this subject.

"Lord Castlereagh has just announced to the House, upon being challenged, on a motion for the Committee of Supply, that it could not proceed without filling the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, that 'he was commanded by his Majesty to inform the House that he would forthwith take steps for forming a new administration.'

"The words are accurately taken down.

"The King is very much agitated indeed.

"I open my letter again to say that I have now reason to know from a note I have just seen, that the Chancellor has been ordered to sound whether Lord Sidmouth would accept any share, and he has refused."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. Charles Street.—"I will not delay your groom by writing at any length upon the post-letter which I receive from you, but will satisfy myself in assuring you that the general course of my opinions corresponds with those expressed by you, as to avoiding all unnecessary precipitation, and as to endeavouring to moderate the eagerness of those who from excess of zeal may move faster than is either prudent or decorous. The event however which I have just heard from very good authority, removes all plea of delay for the purpose of forming a government.

"A Cabinet was held yesterday and, the result of it being carried to the King yesterday night, he announced his intention of going to town this day. He arrived an hour ago, and from a person of undoubted authority I just learn that *Lord Hawkesbury is First Minister*. I do not hear of any accession as yet, but I am told that Lord Sidmouth has nothing to do with this, but that the present ministry will continue, with no new person except a new Chancellor of the Exchequer who is not yet named. If Lord Hawkesbury is gazetted to-night, I presume business will come on immediately; and you will probably think it necessary to come up to settle what is to be done.

"It is from a near connection of the Duke of York that I learn this news."

LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

1806, January 25. Dropmore.—"I this moment receive your letter, and had, only five minutes before, seen in the papers some account of what was said on Friday by Mr. Paul. You refer to him as to a person whose character and situation I probably know, but I am ignorant of both. I should think what you mention respecting the Prince of Wales to be of all unlikely things the most unlikely, but I have lived too long in this world to answer for anybody but myself. Francis's disposition I was well aware of, and mentioned it to you from

the beginning. I shall not fail to be in town early to-morrow, and will immediately call upon you to concert with you what it is best to do in this state of things.

"I inclose a letter I have just received from my brother, by which you will see that the business on which you wrote to me yesterday has been, like many others, spoiled by precipitation and inconsiderate zeal. What is now to be done I know not, for certainly every man of feeling must agree in the opinion you expressed to me that such a question, if it is to be opposed and merely carried by a majority, had much better never have been stirred at all.

"Can it really be true, as the letters I now receive positively affirm, that Lord Hawkesbury has accepted the office of First Minister of this country at this time, and with no other accession of strength to the government than he can derive from some solitary individual whom he may tempt to come forward as *his* Chancellor of the Exchequer?

"If you should happen to see Bathurst before I call upon you to-morrow, which however is not likely, I would wish you to show him my brother's letter. I trust I need hardly say that if there be any course in Parliament by which my opinion on that subject can be manifested, I will most gladly embrace it." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF CHATHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25. St. James's Square.—"The letter you were so good to write to me, in consequence of a communication from Lord Wellesley, reached me last night. On a subject so near my heart, I feel most sensibly all the kindness of it. It had not however been my intention to have made any direct suggestion on this melancholy occasion, either to you, or to any one else, from motives which you will at once enter into. But, feeling that all the value of any such object as that in question depends wholly on a pretty general, if not unanimous concurrence, and being perfectly convinced of those sentiments on your part, the result of a long and intimate friendship, and conceiving, at the same time, that you would be most likely to know the dispositions of a numerous description of persons, I certainly concurred entirely in the opinion expressed by Lord Bathurst, when I saw him, that it would be very material, before any friend of my brother's stirred in it, to ascertain, and through Lord Wellesley, what your opinion was on the subject. As it is, I have now only to express my thoughts most truly for the very kind manner in which you received this communication, and to assure you, that the warm and affectionate interest you have taken on the occasion of this last tribute of respect and veneration to the memory of one so near and dear to me, cannot but make the most lasting impression on my mind."

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 25 [26?]. Park Lane.—“Upon thinking over what passed between us to-day, I think it is very desirable that I should be in your Cabinet at all events, whether with or without office. The last office I should wish is the Board of Control. You will understand however that the whole of this statement is subject to the same reservations which I have already mentioned, namely that I shall aid you with the utmost zeal in every way, whatever may be my situation.”

(Private.) LORD GRENVILLE to EARL FITZWILLIAM.

1806, January 26. Camelford House.—“I lose no time in apprising you that I have received thro’ Lord Dartmouth his Majesty’s commands to attend him to-morrow at two o’clock. Of course there can be no doubt that in the present circumstances the object of this step must relate to the formation of a new government, and I have reason to believe that the present ministers themselves have expressed to his Majesty their opinion that the measure of a change is now of indispensable necessity.

“In this state of things there is nothing I so much wish for as the opportunity of communicating fully and confidentially with you on every part of this momentous and difficult concern. The only thing I can say to-morrow will be to express my decided opinion that nothing can be done, unless with the fullest concurrence of Mr. Fox, and with the abandonment of all idea of exclusion. If this point be conceded the rest will then be to be considered,—and I feel extremely anxious for your presence here, and earnestly hope that the state of your health will not prevent your coming up as soon as you can.”
(Holograph draft.)

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 26. Buckingham House.—“I send you the enclosed as it is most necessary that you should know accurately the state of the King’s mind as far as it can be collected from this close observer. I received it last night, but of course did not trouble you with it at that hour. Jemmy, whom I have just seen, tells me that Lord Cardigan told him this morning that the Queen comes up with the King, and that it was hoped his Majesty would remain in town till this change of government was settled.

“You will judge of Fremantle’s request. In some points of view the appointment might be very useful to you. At all events I am bound to bear every testimony to his fidelity, zeal, discretion and abilities, and to recommend him as every way qualified to serve you ; at the same time that his declarations in this letter, which you will keep, clearly releases you

at all times from claim upon you if you should employ him. Beyond this I feel I ought not to say one word.

"The conversation of last night shows me but too clearly the difficulties on the Irish question; and, after consulting my pillow, I hasten to request you will forget all that passed on that matter between us, for I feel that such a sacrifice for a public purpose so ungracious would be too heavy.

"I have said nothing respecting the Cabinet; but if any one is called to it not holding official situation connected with it, you will, I am sure, discuss it with me, before you finally decide upon it.

"I mean to remain at home, and will not wish to detain you a moment; but as I cannot go to ask the result of your interview from Mr. Fox, and as it is probable that the Prince of Wales will be at my door immediately after he knows it, I think it highly desirable that you would give me a minute on your return from Carleton House.

"The letter I enclose shows strongly the necessity of resisting immediately the inordinate influence to which Fremantle refers, so far as it affects the control over the King, and the entire independence claimed and exercised of the army administration. The more I consider this, the more strongly I am convinced that the ideas discussed last night must be asserted at an early period, though perhaps not at the earliest."

Enclosure.

W. H. FREMANTLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1806, January 25.—"Of course your Lordship knows by this time that the King has made his determination, and is to see Lord Grenville to-morrow morning. He goes to town for that purpose. I trust everything will end to your perfect satisfaction. The King returns to Windsor in the evening, and the royal family do not go to town until about the middle of the week, at least this was the determination last night. You may easily imagine that this decision operates in different ways upon the royal family. I am persuaded the Queen is delighted with it, but not so the party of the Duke of York. There has been intrigue beyond exception, and now the great exertion is to prevent the King sleeping in town which would, if once done, break the tie, and induce him to repeat it, and not so wholly to detach himself from his ministers and the public. He seemed in good spirits last night, and I am sure is glad at the determination he has made.

"If your lordship don't take office, I should really be obliged to you, if you would name me to Lord Grenville to be employed under him. I know how he must miss Fisher, and I should feel truly grateful and happy if I could supply his place. I flatter myself my attachment and affection to your family makes it unnecessary for me to say anything on this head; and for upwards of twenty years, that I have

served your lordship I trust you will give me credit, for stability, truth and correctness. I know how necessary it is for a Minister to have a private confidential friend ; such a friend Lord Grenville should find me, without private objects or political ambition, and most steadily devoted to his interest."

MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 26. Buckingham House.—"I have seen Tom, and am happy to find from his accounts that you appear relieved by your Dropmore air. By coming away so early, I understand that you missed a long letter, which I wrote to give you the account of the pains which the Prince of Wales had taken on the subject of Lord Wellesley, and of the exertions that my son had made on another point very near to your feelings. I fear however that great difficulties will occur in the way of any attempt to moderate those who have made the real objections in this matter. As I find that you have settled to see Fox this evening upon the subject of the communication to be made to you to-morrow, I will call upon you before my brother and he can get away from the Speaker's dinner, that I may discuss with you your wishes on the subject of Lascelles's motion, in which I need not add that your wishes, whatever they are, shall implicitly guide me ; and therefore, even if you cannot avoid the whole of the unpleasantness which this matter has created, you have at least the satisfaction of seeing all that is dearest to you rallying round your personal feelings."

EARL FITZWILLIAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 27. Milton.—"I am truly sensible of the confidence reposed in me by your early communication of the King's orders, and by your wishes for my presence in town.

"Under any other circumstances than those in which I now find myself, I should not hesitate to obey the summons and set out immediately. My health is equal to the task, I could bear the journey ; it is not therefore on that account, that I must excuse myself for not obeying. Milton, though declared by the physicians free from fever, and out of all immediate danger, is left in a state of extreme debility, usual in such cases, but still requiring unceasing attention ; and though perhaps he is so far recovered, as to put a relapse out of question, he still remains liable to consequences that are not unfrequently entailed upon the patient by illnesses of this description, and of so long duration ; consequences to be provided against by unremitting care and attention. To leave Lady Fitzwilliam there alone to watch and take care of him, to leave upon her the sole responsibility of doing so (for so she would consider it) would, I am sure, be so distressing to her, that hardly any occasion could justify me to myself, for placing her in a situation of so much anxiety. On the present, I should have less

to satisfy my own conscience, from the full conviction, that my presence can be of no importance, scarcely of any possible utility. The King has taken his line ; he has sent his orders, and is to communicate with you directly, not by any intermediate means. The confidence that I have seen with such heart-felt satisfaction take root mutually between you and Fox, founded upon the ingenuous mode of proceeding, and the upright ways of thinking of each party, promises on this occasion the formation of a wise, and respectable administration, founded on principles truly congenial with the spirit of the constitution ; and I shall be happy to hear in the country that this desirable event has taken place. I assure you it has been the object of my anxious wishes very, very long."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 27. Palace Yard.—"I write and forward this on arriving in town for the day. From the reports of last night at Roehampton, I hope and trust that the results of a royal conference this morning will give full powers to you to form a government on a very comprehensive and solid ground, adequate to a conjuncture of some peril and great difficulties both at home and abroad. You will have to counteract the manœuvres of some who are reluctantly quitting the scene of action, and to reconcile the jarring claims of others whom you will wish to bring forwards ; but I am not aware of any essential obstacles to whatever arrangements you may think best. I have only therefore to repeat *explicitly*, that if in any respect or at any time I can be of use, either in stating privately what I know relative to the views and pretensions of individuals ; or in private discussions of finance, and of new and necessary taxation ; or in saving time and trouble to you by adverting to the progress and details of parliamentary businesses, you may rely on my acting with the strictest care and discretion, and with an honourable zeal to promote your measures for the public service.

"I state these sentiments without hesitation, because I really am not aware that I have any view or object of a beneficial nature, although I should be glad both from personal considerations, and for the purpose of being more useful, to have at least some ostensible link of connection with your government. My income is straitened, but I am content that it should remain so. I never even in more auspicious times, and when I was ten or fifteen years younger, had a wish for a Cabinet office ; and now I am aware that such an object would be utterly unattainable, and to me the reverse of desirable. A return to the office which I quitted two years ago, and which had been given to me as a permanent retreat from long and laborious services, would be of no benefit to me ; for I could only accept it on the condition of suspending pensions of a larger amount. The Presidentship of the Board of Trade would be, as an

employment, perhaps not ill suited to me ; but I have always considered it as an office of thankless trouble, and not well constituted to answer the good purposes to which it points.

"I think it, however, not unreasonable or unnatural to mention that I have a son of a most promising character, and of talents greatly above par, as all who know him will allow. It would be an object to me to see him in a secretaryship of a higher form than that which he filled three years under Lord Buckinghamshire, and I hope very soon to see him in Parliament. He has a promise of the same seat which I held, most unconditionally, during twenty years, and through the same old and respected friend (whose interests I shall now wish to conciliate to your government).

"I have thought that you would permit me to mention these small particulars. At any rate, and from a kind recollection of all that passed during the momentous period when I served with you, and under you, from 1786 to 1794, I feel that in giving a most earnest support to your government, I am gratifying my personal feelings, and at the same time promoting the best interests of the empire."

Postscript.—"May it not be worth consideration whether in commencing a new system of war, under circumstances of unexampled novelty, it may not be useful to issue a declaration explaining the circumstances and principles of the war, and the general grounds of a safe and honourable pacification."

Private. LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1806, January 27. Camelford House.—"I have only a moment to acknowledge your kind letter. I am certainly very desirous of availing myself of the assistance and friendship you offer in so obliging a manner ; and I shall be anxious to converse with you as soon as the hurry of these days is over. I am ordered to lay before the King a plan of a government, his Majesty putting no exclusion upon anybody, but reserving to himself to judge of the whole. What all this will end in is perhaps still very doubtful, but we must do our best."
—*Copy by Lord Grenville.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 28. Pall Mall.—"I need not say how much pain it has given me to be obliged to resist what I knew to be so anxiously your wishes, and that for a purpose sufficiently disagreeable to myself. But you know as well as anybody what it is to adhere to principle in opposition to every other consideration, and, though differing in the application, will readily see that if I thought Mr. Pitt's political life, with all his talents and all his virtues, had not been beneficial to the country, it was impossible for me to concur in a vote decreeing to him the highest national honours. I am vexed not a little

that, among many things forgot or ill-said, I omitted what I had fully intended to do, that is to anticipate what is meant to [be] proposed respecting the debts, and to concur in what I understand is already done respecting Lady Hester and her brothers. I had stated my opinions, however, upon those points to various people. Anything personal to Mr. Pitt, anything not involving a judgment on the general effect of his political life, I could concur in with the greatest pleasure."

W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 28, night. Pall Mall.—"In mentioning to you Lord Kensington and Lord Folkestone, I did not, I think, sufficiently point out the situation in which I stand to both of them, but particularly with respect to Lord Folkestone. They were both in our division of twenty in 1802; they have both acted with us more steadily since; and both are in circumstances, I fear, to render some situation desirable.

"Lord Folkestone has great industry, and by no means inconsiderable talents for business; and seems to be so marked out for the situation which I suggested, that I hardly know how I could be thought to satisfy the fair claims which he has upon me personally, as well as upon all of us conjointly, [if] I were to be seen going into a great office without obtaining for him the offer of the situation above alluded to, or of some one equivalent to it.

"Lord Kensington, though more pressed in his circumstances, may be put by, perhaps, for the present, under an assurance of being considered on the first opportunity.

"Elliot stands so high in all our wishes and opinions and has so many qualifications to render him useful and valuable, that it is idle to say anything about him, except to urge the keeping something in reserve if possible, now that the Secretaryship of War is otherwise disposed of, on the possible failure of the situation in Ireland.

"Lord Minto feels, I know, and on grounds which cannot be disputed, that he is entitled to look to the Cabinet, and I fear is decidedly adverse to a foreign mission. On the former of these points you may probably know his opinion as well as I. He certainly is peculiarly fitted for the situation of the Board of Control. Smaller matters it is needless now to talk about."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 28. Palace Yard.—"We are setting off for Eden Farm till Monday next, when we settle in town; in the meantime, however, I shall always be ready to attend to your summons. I write now to acknowledge your kind and right construction of my yesterday's letter.

"I am aware of some of the circumstances which may raise a doubt as to the final results of the plan of government which

you are preparing ; and I can see a cherub who sees other circumstances, which are not yet brought into our view. But I foresee no difficulties of a texture or magnitude to resist a decided firmness on your part.

"I have been told that there is a question as to the compatibility of your auditorship with the other office, which it is material (I might say essential) that you should hold. If there be anything in that question, nothing can be more easy (or decorous) than to give the auditorship avowedly to some friend to hold for you and for yours, whilst you remain at the head of the Treasury ; and, in truth, that mode would give to you an interest for a certain period of two-lives in the office.

"I forgot to mention yesterday that, though the competition for situations will not allow you to sink the Irish Chancellor of Exchequer, it is most material to keep in view the importance of consolidating the two Exchequers, and the whole system of the finance of the two countries.

"And in the paragraph where I alluded to the Board of Trade, I meant to have added that, in the supposition of a permanent ministry being formed, we should find it of incalculable importance so to apply the powers and communications and facilities of that Board, as to rally the mercantile body round government, far beyond what has yet been done."

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 29. Park Lane.—"I send you the enclosed note ; I believe the account is certainly true.

"The subject will require instant attention. My advice to you is to appoint Sir G. Barlow acting Governor-General ; to order Lord Lake to resume the chief command of the army ; not to appoint Lord William Bentinck Governor-General yet ; he is not yet qualified for it ; to send a proper person fully instructed in the course of a few months ; to give Lord W[ellesley] Lord C[ornwallis's] Garter.

"I have received other accounts which leave no doubt of the fact. The *Medusa* is arrived with Lord Cornwallis's private secretary."

Enclosure.

W. B. DAVIS to LORD MACARTNEY.

"I take the liberty of informing your lordship, that I have this instant seen a letter from Captain Robinson stating that he is just arrived at Plymouth and that the Marquis Cornwallis is dead."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 29. London.—"I trouble you thus early to mention a point to you which I have much at heart

respecting our present interior arrangements, but which the multiplicity and difficulty of the matters we have hitherto been employed upon prevented me from doing sooner.

"It has always been my wish, as soon as I had a fair opportunity for it, to introduce my son into something of public business. If I had been at the Admiralty, I should have certainly wished most to place him there, as it would have been the most natural appointment; but, as it is, I need hardly say how much satisfaction I should derive from his being at the Treasury whilst you are at the head of it. The situation would also, I know, be much more agreeable to him than any other, on account of his intimate friendship with Lord H. Petty. I am aware of the numerous claims there must be on this head; but I trust to your kind indulgence which I have so often experienced on other occasions, and on none more than the late one, when you consented to relieve my mind from a weight under which I believe it must have sunk."

MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 30. Park Lane.—"You will be glad to learn that, after my departure from India, the settlement of Madras voted me a very flattering address, and the settlement of Bombay voted me a statue to be erected at that town. It is necessary that these compliments to a *delinquent* should be known.

"I find by my letters from India that Lord C[ornwallis] had commenced a systematic demolition of all my plans of policy, and had thrown many of our affairs into confusion. This subject requires immediate attention; not an hour should be lost in giving full powers to those on the spot. Barlow is now without such powers; Lord Lake is not *full* commander in chief; and such dissensions have arisen, as I never witnessed during the whole period of my government.

"I wish what I stated to you yesterday on the subject of Lord C[ornwallis's] Garter to be understood as the expression, of my just claim founded upon public services to that honour, and I wish the grounds of that claim to be distinctly stated, and fairly and fully considered. After all that has passed, I think it would be an act of positive injustice to my fair pretensions not to submit them in a clear and plain manner for determination.

"The Duke of York has just now written to me to inform that the King (without a suggestion that I am aware of from any quarter) has given the 33rd regiment, vacant by Lord Cornwallis's death, to Sir Arthur Wellesley. This is an act of real justice, and will highly gratify the army in India. Arthur has been Lieutenant Colonel of that regiment ever since the year 1793, and has constantly served with it since that time

in Europe and India. In every view this favour will be very acceptable to him. He had also been Major of that regiment for some time."

CHARLES JAMES FOX to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 30. Arlington Street.—"T. Grenville will have told you my clear opinion on your own business. I have not sent to Lord Spencer partly because I deferred it owing to that forgetfulness which hurry occasions, and partly because I find that Windham and Lord Spencer did understand that, after Mansfield's compliance or refusal, the matter was again to be discussed. I am sent for in a great hurry to Carlton House, and therefore I fear shall not be able to see you, till we meet at Spencer House."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1806, January 30. Camelford House.—"We have brought our arrangements into a shape which will admit of their being laid before the King to-morrow.

"The Treasury is to be placed in my hands, with Lord H. Petty as Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Spencer, Fox, and Windham are to be the three Secretaries of State. Grey, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord FitzWilliam and Lord Sidmouth, President and Privy Seal. The seals were offered to Sir Joseph Mansfield, and Lord Ellenborough, but both declined them, and Erskine will therefore be Chancellor.

"I have taken the liberty to put down your name for the President of the Committee of Trade, which I hope will not be disagreeable to you, and which is a situation in which I am confident the public will derive essential advantage from your abilities and knowledge; and in which, from its necessary connection with the Treasury business, it was of extreme importance to me to have the assistance of a person with whom I hope to live in habits of mutual confidence. Lord Temple is desirous, if this arrangement takes place, of profiting by your instructions and knowledge of business, and acting in the House of Commons as Vice President of the Committee. Lord Minto will be at the Board of Control if he does not object to that situation when he arrives. Lord Buckinghamshire will have the Post Office, and Lord Ellenborough be called to the Cabinet, which (with his single exception) will consist exclusively of persons whose situations absolutely require their being called to it.

"I do not expect the King to give me an answer to-morrow, but merely to take the paper for consideration; but as the thing will probably be now brought to its final issue in the course of a day or two more, I should be very glad to know that you approve of this arrangement, and that you are coming to town."

Copy.

LORD GRENVILLE to VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH.

1806, January 31. Camelford House.—“I had my audience of his Majesty to-day, and delivered the paper containing the plan of the proposed arrangements, which his Majesty took for consideration, informing me that he would send for me again when he was able to communicate to me his determination upon it.”

Postscript.—“I mentioned the subject of Mr. Vansittart’s situation; and I think there is reason to hope that, if other matters are satisfactorily settled, no objection will be made on that point. I look with much satisfaction to the prospect of having so able and useful an assistant.” *Copy.*

Confidential. LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1806, January 31. Eden Farm.—“I feel as I ought to do the whole value and interest of the communication which you have had the goodness to make to me. I accept most readily the office of President of the Board of Trade, because it will be gratifying to me to discharge its duties under your immediate inspection, and with your concurrence and confidence; and also because it presents to me an ostensible and creditable pretension for taking a zealous part in the details of your parliamentary measures; and, indeed, I am not without hopes that, by your assistance, I may be able to give an utility and efficiency to that Board beyond what it has yet had. I am most unaffectedly glad to have Lord Temple for my associate, for I know him just sufficiently to wish to know him much more, and I have not the smallest doubt that we shall work together with mutual satisfaction and cordiality, and I entreat the favour of you to say this to him.

“Lord Minto’s intended appointment is precisely that which I had marked out for him. I have not a doubt that he will be gratified by it.

“Lord Buckinghamshire in many respects will like the Post Office much, and will be liked in it. I conceive that he wished to be of the Cabinet; but I shall be able to contribute to convince him (if he retains any doubt) that the ground taken of including in the Cabinet only those whose offices make it necessary, is the right and wise ground in every respect; and he knows that this is not with me a new opinion.

“Your note does not happen to mention who is the other Postmaster-General. I hope Lord Charles Spencer, and yet I am sensible that the pressure of circumstances may have made it difficult. I shall hardly venture to write to Blenheim till I know how that matter rests.

“As to the other arrangements, one circumstance (which could not be otherwise) excepted, they appear to me to be the best possible, and such as must, upon the whole view, be soothing and encouraging to the royal mind, for which however

I always feel some uneasiness. There are in your back ground some gigantic considerations respecting military influence and administration, the duration of the parliament, which must, I am sure, have given to you a good deal of thought in this whole arduous transaction.

"I am tempted, *quite in confidence*, to enclose to you an arrangement which I made last Tuesday night, at my library table, for the amusement of Lady Auckland and my son. You will see where it tallies, and in what slight respects it differs.

"I am ready to go to town at an hour's notice, but as I am going for four full months (with the exception of the Easter recess) and am packing up, I want a day or two. I conceive that my intended situation will require a kissing of hands; if that ought to be before Monday or Tuesday next, perhaps you will have the goodness to order a line to be written to me by this night's post, and I shall have it at eight o'clock to-morrow; and indeed I would have asked leave to wait on you to-morrow at twelve o'clock if I had not supposed that as yet you may be too much occupied; or I can attend you at any hour on Sunday. But if I hear nothing, I shall infer that you will permit me to see you at Camelford House at eleven o'clock on Monday morning, and that you prefer that hour; still observing that either to-morrow or Sunday would be nearly equally convenient to me.

"The variation from the Cabinet rule in respect to Lord Ellenborough is certainly an excellent idea."

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL FITZWILLIAM.

1806, January 31. Camelford House.—

Lord Chancellor	..	Mr. Erskine.
Lord President	..	Earl FitzWilliam.
Lord Privy Seal	..	Viscount Sidmouth.

Secretaries of State—

Foreign	..	Mr. Fox.
Home	..	Earl Spencer.
War	..	Mr. Windham.
Admiralty	..	Mr. Grey.
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland		Earl of Moira.
Chancellor of the Exchequer		Lord Henry Petty.
First Lord of the Treasury		Lord Grenville.
Chief Justice	..	Lord Ellenborough.

"The above plan of Cabinet was this day submitted to the King, with a minute reserving for future discussion the military arrangements and administration.

"His Majesty took the whole for consideration, and told me he would send for me again when he was ready with his answer, which would probably be in a day or two.

"I trust that Lord Milton goes on as favourably as you can wish." *Copy.*

APPENDIX.

1804-5.

CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE III. AND HIS SON, THE PRINCE OF WALES, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EDUCATION OF PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES.

THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, July 17.—“The Prince of Wales has just honoured me with a commission to your lordship, which I fulfil with infinite satisfaction. From various quarters it has come round to his Royal Highness that his Majesty had expressed a wish to have the Princess Charlotte under his immediate care. The Prince of Wales apprehends that the gracious delicacy which so peculiarly marks the King, may have prevented his Majesty signifying his desire upon this subject. Therefore his Royal Highness commands me to request that your lordship will tender his humble duty to the King, with the profession that, if such be his Majesty’s inclination, nothing could be more highly gratifying to his Royal Highness than to see the Princess under his Majesty’s special direction. The Prince of Wales only hopes this explanation may, in indulgence to a father’s anxiety, be permitted; that he would solicit to commit the Princess Charlotte to the sole and exclusive care of the King.”

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, 23 November.—“The King incloses to the Lord Chancellor his instructions as to the language he is, if the Prince of Wales is in town, to hold to him on the subject of his Majesty’s granddaughter, or if absent, which the Lord Chancellor is to write in the King’s name to the Prince of Wales. His Majesty trusts he has stated the whole in so clear and concise a manner that further explanation from him cannot be necessary.” *Copy.*

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, November 23.—“The Lord Chancellor, offering his very humble duty to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, begs leave to inform his Royal Highness that his Majesty has been pleased to command him to lay before his Royal Highness the inclosed paper, containing an outline of the plan which his Majesty proposes respecting the care and education of her Royal Highness the Princess Charlotte, previous to any decision being made what persons may be proper to be named to the important situations mentioned in the paper.”

Enclosure.

"The Prince having, through the Earl of Moira, expressed his wish that the education and care of the person of his daughter shall be placed under the immediate inspection of the King, his Majesty is willing to take that charge on himself, and has prepared an house at Windsor for the reception of the Princess Charlotte. The sum now issued, in each quarter, out of his Majesty's Civil List for the maintenance and education of the young Princess, should in future be paid into the hands of the person who shall be named by the King to defray those expenses; and such additional charges as may arise from the change of establishment, will be defrayed by the King. His Majesty proposes to name a bishop to superintend Princess Charlotte's education, as it cannot be alone that of a female, but she, being the presumptive heir of the Crown, must have one of a more extended nature. His Majesty also thinks it desirable that the bishop should fix on a proper clergyman to instruct the young Princess in religion and Latin and daily to read prayers; that there should be another instructor for history, geography, *belles lettres*, and French, and masters for writing, music, and dancing. That the care of the person and behaviour of the Princess should be intrusted to a governess; and (as she must be both day and night under the eyes of responsible persons) that a sub-governess and assistant sub-governess should also be named.

"These seem the necessary outlines to form such a plan as may make so promising a child turn out as it is the common interest of the King, all his family, and indeed the whole nation, eagerly to wish.

"It may not be improper to add that the conduct of the Dowager Countess of Elgin has been so exemplary that, though her age and weak state of health must make her retiring necessary, the King will give her a pension equal to her present salary." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, November 24. Carlton House.—"The Prince of Wales has received a letter from the Chancellor, inclosing a paper, which he understands to come from the King, containing the outlines of a plan for the future care of the person and education of his daughter the Princess Charlotte. It is with no inconsiderable degree of surprise that the Prince observes, in the very commencement of the paper transmitted by the Lord Chancellor, a reference to a communication through the Earl of Moira, which can only relate to the letter which his lordship wrote the Chancellor (his Majesty never having yet been pleased to utter one word upon the subject to the Prince), the contents of which letter the Prince had, not without reason, flattered himself had been sufficiently explained to the Lord Chancellor by the Prince himself in the interview he had with

his lordship at Carlton House, the day but one previous to his Majesty's leaving Windsor for Weymouth; and by the Earl of Moira, immediately before the last time his lordship left London to resume his command in Scotland, as well as very lately indeed (only a few days ago) in the very short interview he had with the Chancellor; in which interview the Earl of Moira assured the Prince that he had put the Chancellor most fully in possession of the Prince's feelings and intentions.

"The Prince likewise knows from the Earl of Moira that he has completely informed Mr. Pitt of the Prince's dispositions and resolutions upon the subject. The Prince therefore returns the inclosed paper to the Chancellor, and desires that both he and Mr. Pitt will most respectfully, but most thoroughly, at the same time, explain to his Majesty what the Earl of Moira has been so fully authorised to communicate to them upon this head; and, in order to prevent in future any misunderstanding or misinterpretation, the Prince further desires that all communications with him upon this subject may pass through the Earl of Moira." *Copy.*

THE LORD CHANCELLOR TO H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, November 27.—"The Lord Chancellor, with every sentiment of respect and duty, acknowledges the receipt of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales' letter of the 24th instant. With the same sentiments he expresses his hope that his Royal Highness will allow him to mention, as his Royal Highness's letter leads him to doubt whether he is sufficiently aware of the fact, that the paper, which he had the honour of transmitting, was delivered by his Majesty himself to the Chancellor, with his express commands that the Chancellor should communicate it to his Royal Highness. Having stated this circumstance he very humbly solicits that his Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to inform him whether he is to acquaint his Majesty that his Royal Highness has returned the paper to the Lord Chancellor, signifying his desire that all communications upon this subject with his Royal Highness should pass through the Earl of Moira, who is, as the Chancellor understands, at present in Scotland. The Lord Chancellor further humbly informs his Royal Highness that he has communicated the letter he has received to Mr. Pitt, expressing his Royal Highness's pleasure that Mr. Pitt and the Lord Chancellor should explain to his Majesty what the Earl of Moira had been authorized to state to them upon the subject. The Lord Chancellor can only, most respectfully, and dutifully, assure his Royal Highness that, according to his understanding of what the Earl of Moira has been pleased to communicate, he has nothing to add to what he has already stated to his Majesty; and that, according to that understanding, he is not aware that any part of what his Majesty stated in the paper transmitted to his Royal

Highness, as proposed by his Majesty, is inconsistent with what the Lord Chancellor had learnt from the Earl of Moira." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, November 30. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales has received the note of the Chancellor, in which his lordship appears to decline to lay before his Majesty the answer which the Lord Chancellor received from the Prince to the communication made to him through the Lord Chancellor, by command of his Majesty. The Lord Chancellor has only to refer to that answer to observe that the Prince never doubted his lordship’s assertion that the communication in question was made by the command of his Majesty. The presumed error therefore of the Prince in this respect can afford no ground for the Chancellor’s continuing to decline or defer communicating the Prince’s answer. At the same time the Prince desires it to be most distinctly understood that, in returning the paper transmitted by the Lord Chancellor, nothing is so distant from the Prince’s feeling and intention as to be guilty of the least disrespect to his Majesty, or to depart, in the slightest degree, from that dutiful and grateful attention with which the Prince must ever entertain any communication coming from his Majesty, when he shall have reason to think that his Majesty has been duly informed of the grounds upon which such a communication professes to proceed. But the Prince feels himself bound explicitly to declare that he cannot entertain any proposition which has for its preliminary the idea that the Prince is to relinquish the care, custody, and education of his daughter, however solicitous he may be, as he ever has been, to meet his Majesty’s wishes, and to have the benefit of his Majesty’s gracious advice and counsel upon this most important and interesting subject.

“The Prince is compelled to add that after the very full explanations which have passed upon these points between the Earl of Moira on the part of the Prince, and the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt, he did not expect that his Majesty would have remained so uninformed of the Prince’s sentiments as to have commanded the Lord Chancellor to transmit to the Prince a paper, wholly grounded on the statement of a wish on the Prince’s part, which, if ever expressed to the extent assumed (the Prince having no copy of Lord Moira’s letter), subsequent explanations, and even those accompanying that letter, must have clearly shown to warrant a very different conclusion from that which has been drawn from it; and it is only for the purpose of securing that a distinct statement of those explanations shall now be made, that the Prince has thought it necessary to take this course.

“With regard to what has occurred in the interviews of

Lord Moira with the Chancellor or Mr. Pitt, the Prince places the most implicit reliance on the representations, verbal and written, made to him of what passed in those interviews, by Lord Moira, to whom the Prince will immediately communicate the letters of the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt, and by whom alone misunderstandings, if any such in fact exist, can be cleared up.

“The Prince has only further to observe that his Majesty has never been pleased to speak to the Prince upon this important subject ; nor to the Earl of Moira in the audience with which he deigned to honour him ; that, if the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt decline to return to his Majesty such reply as the Prince humbly conceives himself bound to make to the propositions conveyed through them, the lamented appearance of disrespect towards the King can, in no degree, be imputed to the Prince. The Prince desires the Lord Chancellor to communicate this note to Mr. Pitt.” *Copy.*

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1804, December 1.—“The Lord Chancellor has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales’s letter of yesterday’s date, and according to his Royal Highness’s commands, will immediately communicate it to Mr. Pitt.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, December 21.—“The Prince of Wales arrived last night from Brighton, and has honoured me with his commands to attend him at one o’clock this day. I shall then be apprised of what his Royal Highness considers as essential deviations from the principles on which he allowed me to proceed in my former communications.”

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, December 23. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales has, this afternoon, been informed by the Earl of Moira that the Lord Chancellor represents the King as waiting for an answer to a paper delivered on the 23rd of November last. The Prince of Wales never could have been guilty of such disrespect to his Majesty, as to have left any communication from his Majesty so long unanswered. And he did imagine that he had fully testified his duty to the King by the note dated the very next day, the 24th of November, which he transmitted to the Lord Chancellor. The note explained there was a misapprehension in the preamble, upon which the propositions on the part of the King were grounded, such as could only arise from his Majesty’s not having been in possession of all the circumstances relating to the subject in question. As the effect of such misapprehension would pervade every

arrangement built upon it, and alter the quality of measures in which the Prince might otherwise most cheerfully concur, there was a necessity that the mistake should be remedied in the first instance. The Prince of Wales therefore endeavoured to recall the Lord Chancellor's advertance to a special condition which the earl of Moira was originally commissioned to insert; and on the apparent disregard of which he was subsequently directed to comment. Although that condition was only, through motives of peculiar delicacy, indicated by the word 'exclusively,' the full report of it was detailed by the Earl of Moira, in the trust that his Majesty would be made acquainted with its bearing, an attention which the Prince of Wales could not but suppose from the paper of the 23rd November, had been omitted. Till this is cleared, the Prince can only repeat the unfeigned professions of his humble and affectionate duty to the King, and the assurances of his anxious desire to gratify his Majesty's wishes in every particular that may not injuriously affect his own honour; a reservation which the Prince of Wales would not express, did he not know that the King would be, beyond any other man living, solicitous to guard him against such a consequence. The Prince of Wales persuades himself that this explanation cannot but satisfactorily remove all supposition of the existence of any inattention so inconsistent with his heart-felt reverence towards his father and sovereign." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1804, December 31.—“The King, with many good wishes to the Lord Chancellor on the approaching new year, transmits the paper to be either delivered or sent to the Prince of Wales by the Lord Chancellor; who is authorised, at the same time, to forward a copy to the Earl of Moira at Donington, as that Earl, being early apprised of the contents of the paper, may enable him to expedite this tedious business, and at length bring it to a fair conclusion.” *Copy.*

Enclosure.

“His Majesty in the paper which the Lord Chancellor communicated by the King's command on the 23 November to the Prince, referred in the preamble to the Prince's wish, expressed through the Earl of Moira. That wish was expressed in the Earl's letter of 17 July last, in which the Lord Chancellor was requested to tender the Prince's humble duty to his Majesty with the profession that, if such was his Majesty's inclination, nothing could be more gratifying to the Prince than to see the Princess Charlotte taken under his Majesty's special direction. His Majesty, therefore, in the preamble of the paper, referred to the wish which had been so communicated on the part of the Prince, and he accordingly considered the communication through the Earl of Moira as representing

that the Prince wished to see the Princess Charlotte taken under the King's special direction, in consequence of the Prince's understanding that such was his Majesty's wish and desire. The King repeats what he has before stated to the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Pitt, which he has been informed they represented to Earl Moira, that his Majesty regards the communication from the Prince, founded upon his desire to gratify what he understood to be the King's wishes, as a step very acceptable to his Majesty, and conformable to the sense of duty which the Prince has expressed. His Majesty has uniformly stated that, in the taking upon himself the care and management of the Princess Charlotte, he must be understood to do so in a sense consistent with all the attention due to each of the parents of the Princess. His meaning was to form the best plan he could for the education and governance of the Princess, and so to refer it to the consideration of the Prince, and to make such communications respecting it to the Princess of Wales, as the nature of their respective relations to the Princess Charlotte seemed to require. It will be his Majesty's earnest desire to act according to this principle. His Majesty has great satisfaction in believing that there is reason to think that the Prince is likely to concur in the measures proposed by his Majesty, if the misapprehensions, which have been unhappily entertained, are removed; and he trusts that the explanations which have taken place may effectually remove them.

"If this should happily be the case, his Majesty would proceed to state, for the consideration of the Prince, the names of the persons who may appear proper to fill the very important situations mentioned in his Majesty's paper; and, as this measure originated, and has been carried on, in consequence of the Prince's having expressed a wish to meet his Majesty's inclination, it will be most satisfactory to the King that the arrangement should be completed upon the same footing, and that his Majesty's choice should be made with the Prince's entire concurrence." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 3. Carlton House.—"The Prince of Wales requests that the Lord Chancellor will express to the King how sensible the Prince is to his Majesty's condescension in the explanations now transmitted. From the moment in which he first allowed Lord Moira to write to the Lord Chancellor on the subject, the Prince of Wales has never varied in his readiness to meet the King's wishes on any terms consistent with his honour and parental duty to his daughter; a duty the fulfilment of which he could, with cheerful conscientiousness, share with the King, but with no other individual whatsoever; well knowing the implicit confidence which might be placed in the King's honour, he never would

have an apprehension of deviation from the true spirit of the condition, supposing it once distinctly understood. But circumstances led the Prince to surmise that there had not been a clear communication upon this point, and he thence had to fear that the Princess Charlotte might imperceptibly have fallen under other guidance, than that to which he was willing to commit her. Now that the Prince of Wales is satisfied that the King has a correct view of what is to be the good faith of the engagement, he hastens to profess his happiness in concurring with His Majesty's pleasure as far as it is yet indicated; construing, of course, the allusion to the respective relations of the parents by that universally recognised moral feeling which has, in all countries, and in all times, made a marked distinction between the rights of a father and a mother, and has uniformly assigned to the judgment of the former the direction of the offspring. Assenting perfectly to the outline which his Majesty has deigned to trace, the Prince of Wales anticipates with pleasure the hope of finding himself enabled to concur with the King in the details which his Majesty has been pleased to say shall be presented for the Prince's concurrence." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 5.—“The King authorises the Lord Chancellor to inform the Prince of Wales that he has received with satisfaction the answer to the paper which the Lord Chancellor sent to the Prince of Wales from his Majesty, and will in consequence proceed with as little delay as the due consideration of so serious a concern requires, to state to the Prince, through the same channel, for the Prince's consideration the names of the persons that shall occur to his Majesty as most likely to suit the situations necessary for the care and instruction of his grand-daughter, the Princess Charlotte, who has every gift from nature to render her capable of profiting by that care and attention which may render her in future an honour to her family, and a blessing to those, if it pleases the Almighty to preserve her life, who must on a future day acknowledge her as their sovereign.” *Copy.*

THE LORD CHANCELLOR to H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1805, January 17.—“The Lord Chancellor offers his most humble duty to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and, by the King's commands, transmits for his Royal Highness's consideration the inclosed paper. The Lord Chancellor has been authorised by His Majesty, and has thought it his duty to his Royal Highness to transmit a copy to Earl Moira.” *Copy.*

Enclosure.

“The King having given the utmost attention to the magnitude of the object he has at heart, the fixing on proper

persons to superintend the care and education of his dear grand-daughter the Princess Charlotte, is convinced that, on the bench of bishops, no man is so well calculated to plan the mode of education as the Bishop of Exeter who, in addition to his exemplary conduct, erudition, and having with great assiduity and attention attended the Duke of Kent, has the peculiar advantage of being of a very mild disposition, and possessing a most engaging manner, likely to gain the esteem of any young person he is required to converse with. To him must be left the choice of the instructor in religion, Latin, English history, and the duty of reading prayers. In examining those who, from their rank and unimpeached characters might be thought eligible to the employment of governess, immediately the names of the Marchioness of Townsend, and the Countess of Cardigan and Aylesbury occurred ; but from their particular situations, it appears evident that any application to them could not succeed. His Majesty therefore thinks that, considering the excellent education and character, as well as the exemplary attention which she has given to the education of her children, Baroness Howe is the person best qualified for this great trust ; and the real attachment which the Howe family have ever manifested towards every branch of the Royal Family ensures that, should she undertake the task, she will fulfil it with real diligence and the utmost propriety.

“The King has with great attention viewed the behaviour, the last summer at Weymouth, and enquired into the character of Mrs. Campbell, the widow of a colonel in the army, who died governor of the Island of Bermudas. She is by birth Irish, her name was Kelly, she lived as a friend with Lady Strangeways last summer, and would not have been invited by the Countess of Ilchester had she not in every light been able to stand the severest scrutiny ; and his Majesty thinks she might with great propriety be intrusted with the important situation of sub-governess. It seems only necessary to mention the idea of an assistant sub-governess. The nomination ought, his Majesty thinks, to be left to the governess, as the person most interested to find an assistant sub-governess every way fit to attend the young Princess in the absence of the sub-governess. His Majesty thinks that on this plan the Princess will be surrounded with persons who will cultivate her mind, furnish it with excellent principles, and render her an honour and comfort to her relations, and a blessing to the dominions over which she may hereafter preside.” *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 18. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales desires to acknowledge the receipt of a paper, which the Lord Chancellor transmitted yesterday from his Majesty. Truly sensible how much his Majesty wishes that the arrangements

should give the completest satisfaction to all parties, the Prince would think that he did not do justice to the King's gracious intentions, if he did not suggest any alteration which occurred to him on so important a subject. In this sentiment the Prince ventures to express his earnest hope that the King may deign to reconsider an article of the plan, upon grounds relative to which the Earl of Moira is authorised to confer with the Lord Chancellor." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 20-25.—“His Majesty, next to doing his duty, has nothing more at heart than that the arrangement for the due care of the person and education of his granddaughter the Princess Charlotte should be settled to the satisfaction of all parties; of which he will give the fullest proof; as he finds the Prince of Wales doubts the idea of the fitness of Baroness Howe, whom the King would undoubtedly have named as governess, if the appointment had respected one of his own daughters. His Majesty however waives the idea on the present occasion, and, after the severe loss which she has sustained within these few days, a doubt might reasonably be entertained whether she would accept the situation, if the appointment had met with the approbation of all parties. The King, having reason to believe that the Baroness de Clifford would be acceptable to the Prince of Wales, and being convinced of her excellent sense and correct conduct, is willing to cast his eyes upon her for the important situation of governess to the Princess Charlotte, trusting, that, this being agreed to, no further difficulties will be made respecting the subjects in the paper, transmitted through the Lord Chancellor.” *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, January 28. Carlton House.—“The Prince of Wales requests the Lord Chancellor to lay before the King the dutiful and most respectful acknowledgments of the Prince for his Majesty's condescension in reconsidering an article in the proposed arrangement. The footing, on which the matter is now placed, the Prince most earnestly hopes will remove any further difficulty. The Prince of Wales has nothing to add but his renewed assurances of his devotion to the King, and of the happiness he must ever feel when he has the good fortune to have it in his power to do anything that is pleasing to his Majesty.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, February 18.—“The King authorises the Lord Chancellor to acquaint the Prince of Wales that his Majesty has, this morning, received notice of Mrs. Campbell's acceptance of her nomination as sub-governess of his dearly beloved

daughter the Princess Charlotte. This completing the most necessary attendants upon the young Princess, the King approves of the Baroness de Clifford taking the charge of the Princess whenever it shall be most agreeable to the Prince of Wales. She will then be a better judge of the requisites necessary in the lady she may recommend as assistant sub-governess, who must be of sufficient birth to appear with the young Princess in the absence of Mrs. Campbell. The Earl of Dartmouth has very handsomely consented to regulate the expenses of the young Princess's establishment." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, February 19.—“ The Prince has to acknowledge the Lord Chancellor's note of this day containing a communication from his Majesty. The Prince of Wales will take as early an opportunity as possible of introducing Lady de Clifford to the Princess Charlotte. At the same time the Prince must add that he has some observations to offer, which he will delay making till the arrival in town of the Earl of Moira whom he expects on either Thursday or Friday next.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, February 20.—“ The King has just received the Lord Chancellor's note forwarding a copy of the one from the Prince of Wales on the receipt of the King's message. The transaction is now happily concluded, though his Majesty cannot conceive what further observations are to be made.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 1.—“ The preparations for establishing the Princess Charlotte at Windsor being now in such forwardness that the King can authorise the Lord Chancellor to acquaint the Prince of Wales that her apartment will be ready for her reception in two weeks, and that then he shall give notice to Lady de Clifford for her removal to that place. From what he has seen of his dear grand-daughter during the few days she has been there, he doubts not but, with the proper attention of those now placed to superintend her education, and the upright conduct, in all situations, of the governess, who is to have the care of her, she will prove a blessing to her relatives, and an honour to her native country.” *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 1.—“ The Prince of Wales has to acknowledge the receipt of the Lord Chancellor's note of this morning enclosing a communication from the King. The Prince of Wales will, in consequence, prepare a paper with as little delay as possible to be laid before his Majesty.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 2.—“ Could I be of any further utility I should not go out of town ; but I do not see of what further service my longer stay here can be in either result of the step which will now be taken by the Prince of Wales. Anxious in the extreme to avoid anything which can be dissatisfactory to the King, his Royal Highness will adopt a course for submitting to his Majesty’s own judgment certain points of convenience in such manner as he hopes may preclude every appearance of altercation. Until the issue of this endeavour, the most truly respectful he can devise, shall be known, the Prince will delay any formal paper. I ardently hope this measure may yet succeed in removing all difficulties.” *Copy.*

THE BISHOP OF EXETER to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 8.—“ The Bishop of Exeter is commanded by the King and authorised by his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to deliver to the Lord Chancellor a sealed paper, which the Bishop has received from the Prince to be presented to the King.” *Copy.*

Enclosure.

MEMORANDUM of H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

1805, March 4.—“ Lady de Clifford and the Bishop of Exeter having now entered upon the important functions committed to them, the Prince is desirous that they should, from time to time, lay before his Majesty such ideas as occur to him, as to the details necessary for carrying into execution the general principles adopted respecting the education of Princess Charlotte. This memorandum is therefore intended to apprise them of the general state of the business, and to serve as a guide for them in such conversations as his Majesty may honour them with upon this subject. In consequence of some previous intimation which the Prince had received of his Majesty’s wishes, the Prince has expressed that, without meaning to discharge himself in any degree of that duty of superintendence and control which nature imposes on a father in all that relates to the education of his child, he was, at the same time desirous of receiving the benefit of his Majesty’s gracious advice and assistance in a matter so interesting to his feelings, and of giving to Princess Charlotte the full advantage of that affectionate interest which his Majesty is graciously pleased to take in her welfare. But reasons, which it is not necessary here to particularize, compelled the Prince to require that the persons, through whom this communication was made, should respectfully, but distinctly, explain to his Majesty that the Prince could on no account agree to the interference of any other person whatever, except his Majesty, in the dispositions to be made on the subject, and that this point must at

all times be considered as the indispensable condition of the Prince's consent to any arrangement present or future. What has hitherto been done on the subject has, as the Prince conceives, been intended to be regulated by this principle. The next point to be adjusted for giving effect to it is that which relates to the residence of the Princess Charlotte. On which subject the Prince desires that Lady de Clifford and the Bishop will submit to his Majesty, for his gracious consideration, the following ideas. The Prince thinks that, during the period of the year in which he is usually resident in London, his daughter can nowhere be so properly placed as under her father's roof, where her education may be carried on without interruption, and where he himself will have the constant opportunity of observing its course and progress. His Majesty's habits of doing business in London several days in each week will afford to the Princess Charlotte ample opportunity of paying her duty there to the King and Queen, as often as they may be pleased to require it. And it is by no means the Prince's idea that this arrangement should exclude such short visits to Windsor, during the seasons of holidays, or on other temporary occasions, as may be found not to break in too much upon the course of her education. During those months when the Prince is usually not resident in London, he would have great satisfaction in his daughter being allowed to reside at Windsor, at Weymouth, or elsewhere, reserving to himself in the same manner as is above stated, the pleasure of seeing her sometimes, if he should wish it, on short and occasional visits. The communications already made to Lady de Clifford seem to give every reason to hope that these ideas are very little, if at all, different from those entertained by his Majesty on the subject; and, at all events, the Prince is confident that they cannot fail to be considered as fresh proofs of his respectful desire to meet his Majesty's wishes in every way consistent with his honour, and with the feelings of paternal affection and duty towards his daughter." *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, March 18.—“The King having signed the commission for passing the Bills now ready for the royal assent, returns it to the Lord Chancellor. His Majesty is well satisfied with the Chancellor's report that the business of the future care of the education and person of his dearly beloved granddaughter has been stated to his confidential Ministers for their opinion, as he has no view but fulfilling his duty on this occasion. He is desirous the opinion should be well weighed before given; and consequently, clearness in giving it, more than despatch, is required.” *Copy.*

GEORGE III. to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, November.—“The King has not thought it necessary previous to his return to Windsor to take any further steps

for fixing the residence of his grand-daughter, as the apartment is not yet entirely prepared for her reception. It has been his Majesty's earnest wish, from the beginning, in superintending and directing her education to act in entire concurrence with the wishes of her father, and it was, in full conformity to this principle, that he directed a proper place to be prepared at Windsor for her residence, except at such times as she might occasionally visit either of her parents. Having since learnt that the Prince is desirous that she should remain under his roof during the time of his usual residence in town, and that she should remain with his Majesty in the summer, except during the time of occasional visits, his Majesty is disposed to concur in that proposal; and is desirous to fix the period of her residence at Windsor from June to January, and is willing that she should reside at Carlton House the remaining months of the year. And his Majesty would not be desirous of making any alteration in this arrangement, which admits the absence of the Princess for so long a period of the year from his own roof, unless it should appear to him to become detrimental to the execution of the plan prepared for the education of the Princess, in which his Majesty can never cease to take the strongest interest, both from personal affection, and from what he feels to be due to the future welfare of his subjects." *Copy.*

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, December 12. Brighton.—“The Prince of Wales acknowledges the Chancellor's letter, which he has this moment received, inclosing a paper from his Majesty relative to the Princess Charlotte. The Prince must observe that, as all communications throughout this business have passed, on the part of the Prince, through the Earl of Moira, as they have, on the part of his Majesty, through the Chancellor, it will be impossible for the Prince, at any rate, to send as immediate an answer as he could wish to do to the King's paper. The peculiar delicate situation of the Earl of Moira's family would preclude the Prince from sending for his lordship, even if the power of so doing rested in the Prince; but, from the military command which the Earl of Moira still holds, it must require an order from his Majesty for him to leave his post. In addition to this consideration, it is proper to observe that, since the last communication on this subject took place several months ago between his Majesty and the Prince, various circumstances have occurred, of many of which the Chancellor cannot fail to be in possession, and which make it absolutely necessary that nothing should be left now open to the possibility of further or future misunderstandings. There are also, in his Majesty's present note, some passages which render it impossible for the Prince to proceed without a clear explanation of the extent and meaning in which they are

understood by His Majesty, as the Prince has always wished to have everything that concerns this transaction settled upon the most distinct, the fairest, and the most honourable grounds. In this situation it is scarcely necessary that the Prince should again observe to the Chancellor that all further discussion or proceedings on the subject of his Majesty's papers, must consequently be suspended until whatever period the Earl of Moira may arrive in London." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF MOIRA to the LORD CHANCELLOR.

1805, December 30. London.—“Allow me to offer with the greatest truth my deep condolence on the grievous loss you have suffered. In such circumstances I should deem it unpardonable to intrude upon you anything of business beyond a simple intimation for which I conceive your lordship may be even at present solicitous. Having had leave to come hither for a few days on my private concerns, I was on my arrival made acquainted with a message, recently transmitted through your lordship, by the King to the Prince of Wales, together with an answer, in which the Prince has honoured me so far as to refer to my absence, his Royal Highness not being then aware that I was coming to town. Of course I have taken the earliest opportunity of waiting upon the Prince of Wales, and I am just returned from Brighton. I have humbly conceived that his Majesty did not mean to state a reservation which would annul the terms of the proposal he had deigned to make, as well as all former points mutually understood on the subject. If I do not err in that construction, I am sure there cannot (when I have the honour of meeting your lordship) be any difficulty in settling everything consonantly to the King's wishes. Nothing is lost by the delay, as the arrangement looks to no consequence till late in the spring. A just reverence for your lordship's sorrows, added to the pressure of public affairs after the painful news just received from the Continent, would prevent advertence to this topic for a longer period than the probable absence which I am now to make from London. When the matter shall be resumed, I have the happiness of thinking his Majesty will find cause to give credit to the Prince of Wales for being actuated solely by the fear that the reservation (if unexplained) might be a source of misapprehension hereafter; a possibility which his affection and veneration towards the King led his Royal Highness most anxiously to avoid. His Majesty will then be further satisfied that the Prince of Wales has felt with full sensibility the King's gracious expression of his desire that the arrangement should be on such a footing as would be completely agreeable to his Royal Highness. I earnestly entreat your lordship not to take the trouble of acknowledging this letter.” *Copy.*

APOLOGY FOR THE LOSS OF MALTA.

“PRÉCIS DE LA RÉVOLUTION DE MALTE,” by BARON DE HOM-PESCH, GRAND MASTER OF THE ORDER OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM.

“ Pour faire une rélation exacte de la révolution de Malte et de l’envahissement par les Français qui la suivit, il faudroit attendre du tems et de la communication des différents membres fugitifs de l’Ordre bien des circonstances encore ensévelies sous le voile du mistère L’espèce de conjuration étoit si préméditée et si noire, qu’elle ne permet pas de juger des faits d’après un premier coup d’oeil. On les rapportera tous ici, comme on les a vu se succeder les uns aux autres ; mais on n’entrera pas dans tous les détails des causes qui peuvent les avoir fait naître. Ce sera dans le suite, lorsqu’on aura éclairés bien des doutes, qu’on communiquera une historie détaillée à tous ceux qui doivent prendre intérêt à un Ordre qui, dans l’intention de se faire honneur, fut le sacrifice de la plus noire des trahisons.

“ Le 6. juin, 1798.—On decouvrit vers midi cette grande flotte Francaise dont l’armement excitoit l’attention de toute l’Europe. Quelques heures après, deux batiments marchands Grecs qui avoient devancés de beaucoup l’escadre pour faire un détour et paraitre venir du levant, entrèrent dans le port ; ils dirent être chargés de grains, venir de l’Archipel, et furent mis, selon l’usage, en quarantaine.

“ Le 7. juin.—La première division de la flotte avoit déjà déployé devant le port. Son commandant nommé Eidoux, s’appercevant qu’on avoit renforcé quelques batteries sur le rivage, écrivit à Monsieur Caruson, consul de France, né Maltais, le charger de témoigner au gouvernement son étonnement de ce qu’on supposoit à l’escadre des vues qui démentiroient la bonne intelligence qui n’avoit cessé de regner entre la France et l’Ordre.

“ Le Gouvernement de Malte ne se refusa pas à laisser entrer dans le port plusieurs petits batiments endommagés. Ils saluerent le port et firent une foule de declarations d’amitié°. On leur facilita les radoub, et on leur donna les rafraichissements nécessaires.

“ Ce même Eidoux, ainsi que d’autres officiers, firent une quantité de demonstrations qui tendoient à prouver l’ amitié constante de la République francaise pour l’ordre de Malte, en ne cessant de louer la neutralité que le Gouvernement avoit gardé jusqu’ici. Ces declarations engagerent une partie de la population à croire que les Francois n’avoient pas des vues hostiles sur Malte. Malgré cette opinion, malgré la conduite qu’avoit tenu la flotte Francaise le mois de Mars passé lorsque, revenant de l’isle de Corfu, elle s’étoit arretée à

Malte pour passer à Toulon, le Grand Maître a jugé nécessaire d'ordonner les dispositions suffisantes à repousser une attaque du dehors, mais malheureusement trop faibles à prévenir une trame intérieure ; les ordres nécessaires furent donnés au Maréchal de l'Ordre Commandant les forces, le Bailli de Loras. On fit rassembler les milices et marcher les réserves dans les différens forts ; en même tems l'on envoya plusieurs barques pour chercher le vaisseau et la frigate de l'Ordre qui étoient encore en croisière, et venoient de prendre un chebec de Tunis. Les vaisseaux furent trouvés ; ils revinrent deux jours après, passant au milieu de l'escadre Française qui, pour faire croire à ses bonnes intentions, ne leur fit aucun empêchement. Le retour des vaisseaux rendit à la ville un grand nombre de canoniers qui manquoient, et cela acheva de garnir les forts autant que la petite garnison le permettoit.

“ Lorsque l'on vit que la première division de l'escadre Française ne faisoit que croiser sur le port et revirer toujours, on s'aperçut que, non-obstant les déclarations d'amitié des Français, on devoit être sur ses gardes contre toute surprise. Le Gouvernement fut enchanté de voir qu'il regnoit une satisfaction générale dans tous les esprits, et que tant le corps des chevaliers que le peuple étoit bien disposé à la défense, et l'on jugea superflue et inutile toute proclamation là, où un concert général faisoit entrevoir l'heureux ensemble de l'opinion.

“ Les nobles, les gens de justice, et les riches bourgeois de le ville, n'étant point employés dans les dispositions de défense, eurent d'autant plus occasion de tenir leurs desseins cachés. C'est ainsi que se passerent les deux premiers jours. Les préparatifs se firent avec autant d'ordre et de tranquillité que l'on pouvoit attendre d'une troupe renforcée de milices peu exercées.

“ Le 9. juin.—Le troisième jour le consul de France, Caruson, se présenta auprès de son altesse Eminentissime, et lui demanda de la part du général en chef Bonaparte, l'entrée du port pour toute l'escadre et le convoi, ainsi que l'assurance d'obtenir tout ce qui feroit l'objet de ses recours. La réponse à cette demande hostile et insidieuse fut : qu'on refusoit l'entrée de l'escadre d'après les loix ; qu'on ne recevroit que quatre batimens à la fois d'après les loix ; que d'ailleurs, on donneroit les secours qu'il conviendrait ; enfin que l'on souhaitoit avoir cette demande par écrit. Le Consul Caruson partit avec cette réponse et ne revint plus.

“ Le 10. juin.—Le lendemain à la pointe du jour les Français armerent leurs canots, les chargerent de troupes, et les dirigerent vers le lieu du débarquement. Ils envoyèrent en même tems au port un officier chargé d'une lettre du dit consul à son Altesse Eminentissime.

“ Elle étoit conçue en ces termes,

Eminence.

‘Ayant été appelé pour aller à bord du vaisseau amiral pour porter la réponse que votre Eminence avoit fait á ma proposition de permettre à l’escadre de faire de l’eau, le général-en-chef Bonaparte a été indigné de ce qu’elle ne vouloit accorder la permission de faire de l’eau qu’ à quatre batiments à la fois, et en effet quel tems ne faudroit-il pas á cinq ou six cent voiles pour se procurer de cette manière l’eau et d’autres choses dont ils ont un besoin pressant ! Le refus a d’autant plus surpris le général Bonaparte qu’il n’ignore pas la préférence accordée aux Anglais, et la proclamation faite par le prédécesseur de votre Eminence. Le Général Bonaparte est résolu à se procurer de force ce qu’on auroit du lui accorder suivant les principes d’hospitalité, qui est la base de votre Ordre. J’ai vu les forces considérables qui sont aux ordres de Bonaparte, et je prévois l’impossibilité où se trouve l’Ordre de resister. Il eut été à souhaiter que dans une circonstance si majeure, votre Eminence par amour pour son Ordre, ses chevaliers, et toute la population de Malte, eut pu proposer quelque moyen d’accomodement. Le général n’a point voulu que je retournasse dans une ville qu’il se croit désormais obligé de traiter en ennemie, et qui n’a plus d’espoir que dans la loÿauté du Général Bonaparte. Il a donné les ordres les plus précis pour que la religion, les moeurs, et les propriétés des Maltais soient scrupuleusement respectés.’

“ Les François étoient arrivés a terre. Une petite tour de garde qui est dans ces environs, dont on attendoit d’ailleurs peu de défense, fut abandonnée des huit soldats qui y étoient, après qu’ils eurent tiré une couple de coups de canons. Les bataillons Français se repandirent bientôt dans l’ysle ; quelques troupes de milices qui gardoient les villages se defendirent, d’autres prirent la fuite en vraies milices.

“ Les Français avouerent pourtant d’avoir perdu dans les campagnes plus de monde qu’ils n’auroient cru ; ils s’en vengerent en pillant impitoyablement les villages. Comme on ne s’étoit jamais attendu à voir la campagne defendue, et que, faute de troupes réglées, on n’en avoit pas même fait le projet, on resolut sur le champ de se borner à une vigoureuse defense de la place. Malheureusement ces paysans fuyards des villages, accompagnés de femmes et enfants, se précipiterent dans la ville, et par leur multitude et leur stupidité naturelle, conservent dans la suite tant de confusion et de malheurs. En se bornant à la défense de la forteresse, on n’espéroit pas de soutenir pour tous les tems une place qui seroit imprenable avec les troupes et les moyens nécessaires ; mais on étoit dans la persuasion de pouvoir se défendre au moins quatre ou cinq mois : c’est à dire jusqu’à ce que l’automue eut amené un coup de vent qui auroit chassé l’escadre. Voilà quelle eut été l’issue de cette affaire si la ville n’y avoit pas mis tant d’entraves,

“Cependant on fit aussi du côté du port tout ce que les circonstances permettoient. Une galère, deux galiotes garde-côtes, et une couple de corsaires à rames sortirent et canonèrent vivement les chaloupes de débarquement. On ne put en faire sortir davantage, parceque les canoniers et les matelots avoient été distribués dans les différents forts. Cette sortie du port, secondée du feu vif des forts St. Elme et Tigny, ne vint pas à tems pour empêcher le débarquement, mais ne laissa pas de faire du mal aux bâtimens Français qui s'étoient le plus approchés de terre ; il y eut même une chaloupe coulée bas par le feu d'un petit corsaire Maltais.”

Le 10, juin.—“C'est dans la même matinée que le conseil de guerre donna l'ordre de faire une sortie avec la garnison réglée de 900 hommes sur les troupes Françaises qui approchoient ; mais lorsque ce corps, en sortant de la ville, vit que les milices revenoient en déroute, et qu'ainsi il n'avoit aucun soutien à attendre, il montra mauvaise contenance.

“Comme en effet on ne pouvoit attendre aucun fruit de ce petit nombre, on le fit rentrer et on le distribua dans les forts.

“Les Français commençoient à cingler la ville hors de la portée du canon ; il y eut de leurs bataillons qui, du côté du port, approchèrent jusque sous les forts, voulant s'assurer si on étoit en état de défense, et essayer de faire un coup de main. Mais les forts Emanuel et Tigny repoussèrent vivement ces épreuves, surtout pendant la nuit du dix au onze, dans laquelle les Français firent plusieurs tentatives.

“Les ennemis voyant que les coups de main ne réussiroient point, et qu' on étoit disposé à se défendre vigoureusement, se retirèrent tout à fait hors de la portée du canon, et attendirent tranquillement les effets d'autres épreuves qu'ils avoient préparés.”

Le 10, juin.—“Ce fut après midi que l'on s'aperçut que les vivres qu'on envoïoit aux forts et aux batteries de la ville étoient détournés par de mal-intentionnés de différents états qui, sous prétexte de rendre service dans le département des vivres, fomentoient de la confusion. Ces traitres, satellites des conjurés qui n'étoient pas encore démasqués, avoient soin de diriger ces secours vers les côtés les plus forts pour laisser manquer de tout le Floriane, forteresse de terre, qui fut reconnue dans la suite être le lieu destiné par les Français à une attaque. Mais le gouvernement se hâtant de faire amener de nouvelles provisions, y mit ordre pour le moment. En même tems il fit exhorter les employés à la tranquillité et au devoir, et en fit relever quelques-uns.

“Alors les conjurés, encore toujours masqués, commencèrent à insinuer dans la Floriane aux milices et aux troupes qui la gardoient, que leurs chefs, pour se faire un mérite auprès de leurs compatriotes ennemis, les avoient déjà vendu. Ce peuple cruel se saisit avec acharnement de plusieurs de ces chefs et les traina, avec les traitements les plus cruels, comme en triomphe par la ville. Plusieurs y furent blessés à mort.

Le Chevalier du Chatel, officier du premier mérite, fut le plus indignement traité, et resta à l'hôpital avec ses compagnons de malheur.

“ Ces troubles inattendus persuaderent au chef de l'Ordre de ne pas changer de place, afin que ceux qui avoient à donner des rapports, ou à recevoir des renseignements, ne fussent pas obligés de le chercher en vain. D'ailleurs dans ce genre de conjuration son apparition en publique auroit, peut-être, haté le terme qui en étoit l'objet, sans aucune probabilité de pouvoir être utile. Il n'auroit certainement pas été difficile aux conjurés décidés de consommer leur œuvre d'iniquité à planter dans les têtes déjà échauffées d'un peuple imbecile la même opinion sur leur prince, qu'ils avoient réussi à mettre sur les chevaliers, leurs chefs et commandants ; et c'est cette même raison qui a induit le conseil à faire des remontrances au grand-maitre, décidé de paroître au milieu de son peuple, dont la plus grande partie étoit induite en erreur par des scélérats qui avoient vendu leur foi et leur honneur à l'ennemi.

“ Le Gouvernement voyant les horreurs qui se commettoient dans la ville, envoya de patrouilles pour essayer d'y mettre ordre ; mais, malheureusement, il diminua par là le nombre des gardes du Palais. On fit aussi relever en hate beaucoup de chefs de portes. Surtout les Français qui, quoiqu'ils fussent les officiers les plus expérimentés et fidèles (à l'exception d'un petit nombre) ne pouvoient plus être utiles, depuis qu'on avoit inspiré au peuple de la méfiance contre eux. Pendant que le gouvernement faisait l'impossible pour mettre de l'ordre dans les dispositions, les conjurés étoient occupés à faire atrouper le peuple de la campagne, encore armé en différentes hordes, et à le faire agir, toujours trompé, selon leur dessein d'augmenter la confusion. Ces troubles se fomentoient dans la ville dans un moment où l'on devoit fournir aux forts les secours de munitions dont ils avoient besoin, en aiant déjà beaucoup consumé ; mais les porteurs furent interceptés et pillés par ces hordes que les conjurés faisoient agir à leur volonté. Ces interceptions se firent d'autant plus facilement que le chef de l'artillerie, commandeur Bardouanché, étoit, comme on l'apprit dans la suite, gagné par les conjurés.

“ Le servant d'armes Foussard, étoit depuis longtems chef du génie. Il eut l'adresse de ne se demasquer dans la suite que lorsque la révolution étoit faite ; il contribuoit insensiblement à faire naître des mesentendus, et à détourner tout le fruit qu'on auroit pu attendre de la bonne disposition de la chevalerie et du peuple. Il étoit certainement un des chefs de la conspiration, aussi suivit-il l'escadre Française comme officier ingénieur du premier rang.”

Le 11, juin.—“ Cependant les atroupements du peuple, qui n'avoient cessé pendant la nuit, augmentèrent le matin ; les uns demandoient du pain, les autres exigeoient la punition des

traîtres, et designoient en même tems les meilleurs et les plus fidels chefs ; d'autres étoient envoyés par les forts et se plaignoient de n' avoir pas reçu des vivres qu' on avoit pourtant envoyé la veille ; et chaque troupe, en se plaignant, reçut d'autant plus facilement les impressions qui leur furent communiquées, chemin faisant, par les émissaires des conjurés, toujours occupés à persuader le peuple que l'état d'oubli dans le quel on le laissoit, venoit de la trahison de ses chefs.

“ Les deux batiments grecs dont on a parlé plus haut, qui étoient mouillés dans le fort depuis le jour qu' on avoit apperçu les Français, voyant ces attroupements, crurent que c'étoit déjà le moment de la revolte ; ils débarquerent des soldats Grecs armés, qui avoient été cachés dans ces batiments, et ils firent une attaque sur le peuple. Mais une patrouille qui passoit dans ce moment fondit sur eux, secondé par le peuple, en tua une vingtaine, en blessa un grand nombre, et on eut beaucoup de peine à arracher le reste, au nombre de cent, à la fureur du peuple. Tons ceux qui y échaperent furent jettés dans les prisons. Voilà un des moiens dont les Français vouloient se servir pour seconder la revolte ; ils avoient donc projeté de la faire par le sang. On trouva dans la suite dans ces batiments toutes les espèces d'armes et de munitions, qui auroient suffis pour armer une grande troupe. Le Gouvernement voyant qu' on cherchoit à lui susciter une guerre intestine, essaya d' y remédier par différentes précautions ; on avoit déjà mis en prison le Commandeur Ransijat pour avoir tenu quelques mauvais propos. On promit encore au peuple armé dix écus par tête pour tous ceux qui voudroient être d'une sortie qu' on comptoit faire sur les Français. On espéroit par là occuper ce peuple dont l'erreur et l'oisiveté servoient à seconder toutes les entreprises des conjurés. Mais ces sorties n'eurent aucun fruit, puisque le peuple en général se méfioit de la chevalerie, et ne lui obéissoit plus ; il revint donc en ville après s'être légèrement escarmouché. Ce retour de la foule échauffée occasionna de nouveaux tumultes. Les patrouilles qu' on envoya de tout coté heurterent non seulement contre les milices, mais s'escarmoucherent même entre elles, croyant toujours rencontrer des ennemis de l'état.

“ Une troupe de bourgeois de la ville de différentes classes profita de ce moment d'alarme générale pour faire une deputation à son altesse Eminentissime : ils demanderent simplement, et sans s'expliquer plus clairement, sureté de vie et de propriété. Le Grand-Maitre leur repondit qu'il sauroit ce qu'il auroit à faire, et qu'il en consulteroit avec le conseil, en leur declarant qu' on devoit penser à se defendre jusqu' à la dernière extremité. Au reste, qui ne voit dans cette deputation d'un petit nombre des bourgeois, peu instruits de ce qui pouvoit arriver dans une attaque réglée d'une place comme Malte, le soin luisant de ne pas laisser reduire en décombres leurs maisons ? ”

Du 11, au 12, juin.—“La nuit suivante les conjurés, profitant de l’obscurité, n’épargnerent ni peine ni argent pour achever de gagner le peuple dont ils avoient déjà égaré l’esprit. Des hordes armées courroient par la ville, sans qu’on pût jamais bien savoir qui les avoit envoyé, et qui les commandoit. Des coups de fusil qu’on tiroit de tout coté, la plupart en l’air, faisoient naître des allarmes à tout moment, et en attirant de monde, augmentoient la confusion. Plus le gouvernement envoïoit de patrouilles, plus elles souleverent contre elles les hordes du peuple, et plus elles furent seduites et égarées elles-mêmes. Ce fut dans une de ces occasions que le Bailli de Neveu, Chef des chasseurs de la langue d’Allemagne, qui avoit été depuis trente ans l’idole du peuple, fut blessé par une balle de fusil au cou, qui vint d’une patrouille du corps dont il étoit le chef. Lui-même étoit occupé à y mettre ordre.

“C’est vers la fin de cette cruelle nuit, dont les scènes sanglantes sont encore peu connues même aux membres de l’Ordre, qu’il parut une seconde deputation nombreuse, à la tête de la quelle étoient les chefs de la conjuration ; le reste étoit des nobles du paÿs, les avocats, bourgeois, marchands, et une quantité de gens de justice. Ils declarerent avec les expressions les plus menaçantes que, ne voulant pas faire depeudre leur sûreté des resolutions de l’Ordre, ils y avoient déjà pourvu, en signant de leurs noms chez le consul d’Hollande, le désir des habitans de se rendre aux Français par un traité préparé, et qu’ils avoient chargé ce consul de la transmettre incessamment au général Bonaparte, avec ou sans l’aveu de l’Ordre.

“Ces Deputés avoient pris la precaution de venir en grand nombre, et de se présenter dans un moment ou les gardes du Palais, à l’exception des sentinelles, étoient occupées à patrouiller ; ils étoient d’ailleurs maitres de la force armée, en dirigeant depuis deux jours les hordes du peuple repandu dans la ville. Le Grand-Maitre, des mains du quel la force coactive étoit déjà échapée, espéroit toujours encore de pouvoir ramener les égarés ; les nouveaux efforts que fit son altesse éminentissime pour tacher de mettre ordre dans la ville, furent infructueux, par les cruelles scènes que ces traitres venoient de préparer pour appuyer leur demande.

“Ils avoient entièrement réussi à persuader le peuple que leurs chefs les avoient déjà vendu, et alloient traiter pour les livrer aux ennemis. C’est tout de suite après cette deputation que l’on vit, l’un après l’autre, sept chevaliers massacrés par ce peuple furieux. Les chevaliers Doremi, D’Andelar l’ainé, et Vallin étoient parmi eux des chefs du premier mérite.

“Les serviteurs de l’Ordre les plus fidèles entre les habitans du paÿs, vinrent à chaque moment donner avis au gouvernement que ces massa[c]res ne faisoient que commencer, et qu’on travailloit à les faire continuer sur tous les membres de l’Ordre qu’on pourroit rencontrer.

“Le Gouvernement sachant que la force armée étoit généralement égarée et gagnée par les conjurés, se vit obligé, pour faire finir au moins pour le moment les massacres, de permettre à cette députation rebelle, dont il falloit se débarrasser, de traiter avec les Français, en leur imposant cependant de demander une trêve. On eseroit par là gagner du tems, et trouver peut-être encore quelque remède à la révolution qui avoit éclaté. On fut obligé de consentir à faire relâcher de sa prison le Commandeur Ransyat, qui alla avec la députation. En revanche, le gouvernement jugea à propos de la faire accompagné par le bailli de Frisary, pour essayer de temporiser. On demanda, en même tems, l’intermédiation du Ministre d’Espagne, qui suivit aussi.

“Pendant que cette députation devoit demander un armistice, le gouvernement essaya encore de remettre quelque ordre dans les dispositions ; mais il vit avec désespoir que, quoique pour le moment on eût mis trêve aux massacres, les vivres et munitions étoient à tel point interceptés par la force armée, qu’on ne pouvoit plus y mettre ordre. Quelques corps de troupes revenoient de leur poste, manquant de munitions, et mettoient le comble au désordre en augmentant la foule. Les troupes en ville refusoient généralement d’obéir aux chevaliers, dont elles croyoient avoir été trahis. On reçut tout à coup le rapport que la Floriane, forteresse qui rase la porte de terre de la ville, étoit en pleine insurrection, de façon à ne plus résister à un assaut que les Français pouvoient donner d’un moment à l’autre. Une foule de crieurs démocrates de toutes les classes, sachant qu’ils étoient maîtres de la force armée, avoient envahis le Palais, et crioient à la reddition de la place. Ils avoient constamment entretenu les dissensions dans le peuple, qui n’attendoit qu’un signal pour recommencer les massacres. Enfin on vit qu’il n’y avoit plus de remède. La seule chose qui restoit à faire, fut de se servir des voyes de douceur pour empêcher le peuple d’éclater.

“Pendant qu’on y travailloit, la députation à Bonaparte, dans la quelle les conjurés, qui étoient les plus nombreux, avoient pris le dessus, accorda la reddition de la place qui étoit déjà prise par les conjurés. Les Français offrirent une infinité d’articles de capitulation qu’ils dictèrent selon leur caprice, et qui furent imprimées dans la suite en différentes variantes. Mais le fait est qu’ils donnerent d’autant plus la loi que, dans le fond, la ville se rendoit à discrétion, et qu’on ne put rien repliquer à tout ce qu’ils dictoient.”

Le 12, juin.—“C’est le lendemain que les Français commencèrent à entrer dans la ville, et dans ces forts que le manque de vivres avoient fait abandonner par leurs garnisons. Il faut remarquer que les Français étoient déjà vingt-quatre heures dans la ville, que quelques forts éloignés, comme celui de Marsasciroc, ignorant la révolution de la ville, canonoient encore, et se defendoient vigoureusement. Il y eut même une couple de forts du côté du port, qui étoient encore bien

fourni de munitions, et où les émissaires séducteurs n'étoient pas parvenus, qui refuserent de se rendre, ne sachant pas jusqu' où étoit allé révolution dans la ville.

“ L'isle du Goze, où il n'y avoit qu'un commandeur de l'Ordre, qui étoit le Commandant d'un peuple qui ne fut point séduit, parce qu'il n'y avoit ni nobles, ni riches, ni gens de justice, réussit même à repousser deux fois le débarquement des Français ; cette isle peu fortifiée, ne se rendit que lorsque Malte étoit entre les mains des Français.

“ Ceux-ci n'eurent d'autre mérite dans toute cette affaire que d'avoir soutenu par une armée au dehors la revolte qui se fit dans l'intérieur, mais ils agirent, cependant, en vainqueurs altiers et vindicatives.

“ Il faut observer encore que bien des pièces ont été imprimées en différents pays, où il est question de la rentrée des Français dans leur pays, de grand dédommagement d'argent, de pension, et d'une infinité d'autres articles. On verra clairement par cette relation, que ces différens imprimés sont ou dictés par les Français pendant la révolution, ou bien inventés par des mal-intentionnés.

“ Aussitôt après l'entrée des Français, il y eut un grand nombre de boutiques qui furent pillées ; la dépouille de la riche église de St. Jean et du trésor de l'Ordre suivit. On arracha toutes les armoiries de l'Ordre, et les différentes puissances dont les sujets avoient des hotels. Les vaisseaux, les galères et tout l'équipement des arséniaux furent enlevés.

“ C'est quatre jours après que partit son Altesse Eminentiissime. Elle demanda à emporter quelques reliques de l'Ordre, qui lui furent remises, dépouillées de leurs riches ornements. Elle fut accompagné de plusieurs anciens de l'Ordre, qui formerent son conseil.

“ Ce qui se passa après l'entrée des Français, leur manière d'agir vis-à-vis des différentes nations, et vis à vis de la population de Malte, ne manquera pas d'être fort intéressant, lorsqu'on aura été à même de rassembler les faits. Le séjour des premiers fugitifs de l'Ordre a été trop court pour s'assurer de la vérité de ces circonstances ; à peine a-t-on pu apprendre le détail des scènes sanglantes qui caractérisent cette révolution. La suite des tems prouvera qu'on ne les a que faiblement mentionnés. Elle prouvera que le Grand-Maitre de l'Ordre, dans les circonstances épineuses dans lesquelles il s'est trouvé, loin d'avoir perdu l'espérance de conserver l'isle, loin de craindre les menaces des traîtres et de l'ennemi peu généreux au quel ils l'avoient livrés, n'oubliait ni son rang, ni les sentimens d'humanité, n'a pas voulu user de sévérité où elle ne pouvoit être utile ; et n'a pas composé lui-même avec un ennemi injuste dans ses vues, dans ses mesures, et dans son procédé, et dont les faux lauriers ne sont dus ni à la vertu ni au courage, mais à une vile, et infame trahison.

“ Les chefs de la conspiration étoient, parmi la chevalerie,

le Commandeur Ransyat, Secrétaire du Trésor ; le Chevalier De Fay, Commissaire des Fontaines, le Commandeur Foussard, ingénieur, servant d'armes ; le Commandeur Bardouanche, chef de l'artillerie ; le Chevalier de St. Simon. Le Chevalier de Picot avoit quitté Malte depuis peu de tems ; embarqué avec Bonaparte, il dirigea le débarquement. Doublet, sous-secrétaire de son Altesse Eminentissime, avec quelques-uns de ses subalternes ; le consul de France Caruson, né Maltais, avec toute sa société ; les prêtres conventuels Beaufort, Sandiblan, Feÿdon, et Frein. Il y eut quelques Espagnols du premier ordre qui se montrèrent fort suspects.

" Parmi les Maltais, les familles de Poussielque et de Seyonds ; Schembri avocat ; Bouano, conseiller du magistrat ; Guido Greffier ; Gavino Bonavita notaire ; Casavana, secrétaire de l'éveque ; Planes, bourgeois ; Sacchel, constructeur ; une foule d'avocats à la tête des quels étoit Muscat ; presque tous les nobles Maltais, parmi les quels Dorel, Baron, jouoit le premier rôle.

" Les Chevaliers qu'on a vu massacrés par les intrigues de ces traitres sont : Vallin, Dandelar, Dormi, Montazet, Rigaud, Moudion, Dechoux, Du Chatel, Du Quesnoi ; les trois derniers n'étoient pas encore morts au départ de Son Altesse Eminentissime. Une infinité d'autres furent blessés par les mauvais traitements qu'ils reçurent. Bien des chevaliers, dont on n'a plus eu de nouvelles, font craindre que la révolution ait immolé plus de victimes que celles qu'on a vu périr. Une relation plus détaillée, historiquement travaillée et communiquée à tous ceux qui prennent intérêt à L'Ordre, satisfera dans la suite la juste curiosité d'un chacun."

A RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA.

JOHN MALCOHM to LORD ELGIN.

1801, March 23, near Baghdad.—" I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's late letters, the last of which reached me on the march to Baghdad, and I hope your Lordship will pardon my delaying to answer them till I arrived at that city.

" A rupture with Russia would from your Lordship's letters appear inevitable, and as every intelligence relative to the possible attempts of that power to affect the English possessions in India will, in such event occurring, have an importance, I am encouraged by your Lordship's condescension to offer my sentiments upon that subject, which, though incorrect, may perhaps add in a trifling degree to the information already in your Lordship's possession.

" Any successful attempt of Russia to affect the British interests in India through the means of intermediate powers appears to me attended with so many difficulties that I should doubt the possibility of its immediate execution, even should that

powerful nation make the utmost exertions for its accomplishment ; by immediate, I mean, a period of three, four, or five years. For that that vast empire, if it continues united, and is governed by a succession of able monarchs, will extend its influence and power over this part of Asia, I have not a doubt ; but such must from its nature be a work of time, and any hasty stride imprudently taken to affect an immediate purpose will be more likely to retard than facilitate its ultimate execution.

“ Any influence Russia could establish with an Eastern power, unless she afforded such the means of attacking the English territories by furnishing ample supply of men and artillery would, I consider, be of little consequence. All Asiatic monarchs are sufficiently disposed to extend their dominions, and when they remain at peace, their conduct almost invariably proceeds from a want of courage or ability to attack their neighbours.

“ Russia can distantly threaten the British possessions in India in many quarters. Establishing a settlement on the banks of the Tygris, or northern shores of the Persian Gulf, would be perhaps the most likely mode of doing this with a probability of success. The difficulty of accomplishing these objects may be conjectured when it is considered that to effect them, the whole Eastern part of Turkey or the western provinces of Persia must be subdued, and settled ; and, even after such a conquest, what a period it would require to form a force in the gulph equal to any enterprize against British India.

“ There are only two routes by which it is possible for Russia, either by herself, or in co-operation with any other power, to make an immediate attack on the British possession in India. The one from an eastern port in the Caspian to the banks of the Indus ; or through Tartary from the port of Orenburg to Bockhara, from whence they might either proceed against the province of Oude by the Punjaub, or through that of Moultan, or along the banks of the Indus against Bombay.

“ For Russia to attempt either of these projects by herself is out of the question. Such would require the conquest and settlement of the intermediate [nations], a task that would from its nature, supposing it possible, occupy a period much beyond the probable duration of any war. It is then to consider how far any co-operation of intermediate nations is to be expected, and how likely such would be to meet with success.

“ The Persian, Afghaun, and Usbeg Governments are the only ones that could act with Russia against India ; it remains to show how far any of these have either the inclination or ability to aid in the execution of such a scheme.

“ The Persian Government has a direct and easy communication with Russia, and all supplies required could be

sent by the latter to Inzellce, a port in the Caspian, and from thence transported in a few days to Teheraun, the capital of the Persian empire; and, under present circumstances, if the King of Persia could overcome his fear and prejudices, and take full advantage of the skill and courage of a body of Russian auxiliaries, he would not only soon subdue that part of the province of Khorassaun governed by independent chiefs, but the Afghaun empire, and he might then threaten India with a serious invasion.

“The following existing causes seem however to preclude every idea of a connection so dangerous taking place.

1st.—“The jealousy that the Persians entertain of the progress of the Russians, which has been of late so much heightened by the circumstance of the Empress Catherine sending an army into that kingdom in the year 1796.

2ndly.—“The conduct of the present Emperor Paul to the King of Persia, to whom he wrote proposing to send an ambassador for the purpose of cementing the friendship between the two states on the condition of the Persian monarch’s consenting to give up all claims on the province of Georgia; to which an answer was returned by the King of Persia that he would never part with his inheritance, and that, if circumstances prevented his reducing to subjection a province of the Persian empire at the present moment, he trusted at some future to do it.

3rdly.—“The intimate alliance into which the King of Persia has entered with the English Government, all the benefits of which he must at once forego, should he dream of connecting himself with the Russian state for any purpose hostile to that nation; and both inclination and interest are likely to ensure his keeping his engagements with the English, who have been the means of raising his reputation, and can, he must be sensible, do him either (as policy dictates) the most serious service or injury.

“I confess the above considerations have so much weight with me, that I do not think any intimate alliance between the present government of Persia, and that of Russia is likely to be effected. On the contrary, I think a rupture between these two states is a much more probable event.

“The present King of the Afghauns, Shauh Zumaun, I consider as an enemy of the English power in India, and one whose enmity no influence from a foreign quarter can increase. He will invade Hindoostan if ever he has the means. His intentions have been hitherto defeated by a variety of events, and it appears to me they cannot be renewed for a period of one or two years, nor indeed for a much longer, if the present government of Persia is enabled to perform its recent engagements with the English nation.

“Though pride, jealousy, and prejudice is more likely to prevent the Afghaun Government than any other Asiatic power whatsoever co-operating with a body of Russians, or

any other European nation in an invasion of India, and though, if it consented to do so, the difference of manners and habits would destroy every hope of cordiality, and defeat the purpose of such an unnatural union, yet I shall for a moment conceive the contrary, that I may examine how likely such alliance would be to answer the end intended.

“There are three routes by which a force of men, or a supply of stores from Russia could reach the Afghaun territories. One from the port of Asterabad on the Caspian to Mushid, and from that to Heraut. The second from a more northern port in the Caspian to Oorgunge, and from that to Kandahar by the cities of Khaurizim, and Bokhara; and the third from the port of Ovenburg to Kandahar, by the way of Bokhara. The two first of these roads are well known, being constantly travelled by caravans; the latter is little frequented, as tribes of Tartars who are esteemed by *even* the Usbeks as savages, possess the intermediate country.

“The shortest of these roads is a distance of upwards of 400 English miles. The nature of the intervening country would render the march by any of these impracticable for a small body of men; and I shall proceed to state the causes that would combine to impede the progress of a larger force. If they took the first mentioned route, Asterabad, which is the native city of the present family on the throne of Persia, and the place where they deposit most of their wealth, must be reduced, as well as the adjoining country, as it never can be imagined the King of Persia would give his consent to an auxiliary force marching through his dominions to assist his rival and enemy; and after this was effected, which it only could be by defeating all the force of Persia, the Russians would also have to conciliate or combat all the tribes of Turkomans, and the various independent chiefs of Khorassan, through whose territories they must pass; which they could only hope successfully to accomplish by the advance of an Afghaun army to near Asterabad; after their junction with which, when they marched eastward, all communication with the Russian dominion would be entirely cut off, unless the provinces of Mazinderaum and Khorassaum were previously subdued and settled, or, in other words, the Persian Government overthrown.

“By the route of Origunje, Kharonzin, and Bokhara, still more difficulties would obtrude. The hordes of Turkomans, and the independent chiefs of the western parts of the province of Kharvism, jealous of their independence and alarmed at any event that has a tendency to increase the power of their neighbours, would at least oppose in some degree the advance of such a force; while the King of the Usbeks, Shaah Murad, would, though in close alliance with Shaah Zumaun, be little inclined to admit a body of auxiliaries to pass through his capital and territories that would add so much to the strength of the Afghaun nation, of which he already stands in much

dread. A Russian force advancing by this route implies nothing short of the conquest and settlement of the intermediate countries, and if that was not thoroughly effected, all communication with the port in the Caspian at which they had disembarked would be soon cut off.

“With the country through which a Russian force must pass that takes the last mentioned route from the port of Ovenburg, I am little acquainted, but this attempt I conceive of all others the most difficult. The distance exceeds 600 miles, and through a country that is little cultivated, and badly supplied with water. By this route, the territories of the King of the Usbegs must also be passed, and the same opposition from the independent chiefs to the northward of Bokhara, and from Shaah Murad is to be expected, as they would be actuated by the motives I have before stated to oppose the progress of any European force.

“It appears from what has been said, that if the Afghaan monarch was disposed to accept the aid of the Russians (which is a very improbable case) that effecting a junction of any force they might send, and keeping open their communication with their own territories would, in all likelihood, lead into a series of operations quite foreign to the original intent of the alliance.

“The Russian Government forming a connection for the purpose of invading India with Shaah Murad, or Begg Laun, (as he is more generally termed) is still more unlikely than with the Persians or Afghauns. The Usbegs are both a more ignorant, and more prejudiced race than either, and their present ruler (who has confined his sovereign the descendant of Ghenghiz) preserves his authority entirely by wearing the mask of a devotee. He assumes both the manner and garb of a dervish, and has so imposed upon his weak subjects that they view him with an enthusiasm bordering upon adoration.

“It is evident that a ruler whose conduct is regulated upon such principles would be little inclined to risk the loss of the power he has obtained by acting in direct opposition to his professions, and connecting himself with a nation whom religious duty (for he is the priest as well as the sovereign of his people) obliges him every day to denounce as infidels.

“Supposing however the desire of increasing his power led him to waive his scruples, let us examine what difficulties remain to be encountered. The only routes to Bokharra are those before-mentioned from the Caspian Sea by Vorgunje [or Origunje] and Khaurvim [or Kharvism], and from the port of Ovenburg. The difficulties that would oppose the progress of a force on either of these roads, has been already stated. It remains to add, that after all these had been overcome, the Afghauns must either be brought over to the league or subdued; and means must be taken to keep the powerful

Khauns that border on the Usbeks' territories in order, while the force of Shauh Muraud was employed in the distant conquest of India.

"Though the present king of the Usbeks and Shauh Zumaun are friends, and of the same sect in religion, their both uniting with a Russian force for the purpose of making a conquest of India, is an event that I may almost pronounce impossible; and if they did, the different habits and interests of the parties would to a certainty defeat any project that they might originally propose by their combined efforts to accomplish.

"From what I have said the difficulty of any attempt made by Russia to affect either by her influence or power British India may be conjectured. I shall only add my conviction of the fallacy of an opinion that has been often entertained that a hatred and jealousy of the power of the English in India would incline any neighbouring nation to co-operate for the purpose of attacking them. The fact is, most Asiatic nations, but particularly those that I have alluded to, have but a very confused idea of the different powers of Europe. They blend them all under the name of Feringuy, a term signifying European, and are equally alarmed at giving any of them a footing in their dominions, as they dread their art and courage; and the great strides which the English have made in India has made this alarm rise to a height, that will, or I am mistaken, prevent any of these nations ever admitting into their territories a European force of any consequence."

Private. MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

¹1804, January 1. Barrackpore.—"By this conveyance I have sent you a printed copy of notes (officially recorded at Fort William) which will offer a sufficient excuse for my silence since Henry's departure, as well as for the hasty and short letter which I must now be content to write to you. I trust you will be of opinion that I have omitted no exertion within my power to extinguish whatever portion of French influence has been situated within my reach. I refer you for more particular details to Henry, who will be amply supplied with materials to enable you to form a judgment of the difficulties and dangers by which I have been surrounded, and of the glorious (I must say magnificent and noble) result of the military operations, of which it became my duty to form the plan. In the execution of this great work I have been served with the most unexampled and unrivalled zeal, ability, perseverance and courage. It is impossible to give vent to all the sentiments of my heart respecting General Lake. The British military service has not produced a more

¹ This letter was inadvertently omitted from its proper place in the text of the volume.

consummate officer. His ardent valour has been long distinguished ; but his judgment and skill are equal to his spirit in the field ; and his cordial and honourable support of all my plans and arrangements for the campaign has been a main source of our brilliant success in Hindostan. I hope you will bear public testimony to the merits of General Lake, in the capacity (which I know you will never decline) of my personal friend. I owe every acknowledgment to General Lake, and he deserves every honour which has ever been conferred on the most exalted military achievement. You will exult in the eminent glory which has been obtained by your old friend Arthur ; he has conducted the army in the Deccan, under even greater difficulties than General Lake experienced in Hindostan, through a succession of triumphs never surpassed by the British arms in any quarter of the globe ; and his merits in various negotiations and political arrangements are of the highest character. We are now approaching rapidly to peace upon terms which, I trust, will bar the portals of the East against all the fraud and force of the Consuls of France.

“ You will perceive that these unexpected and important events have also barred the portals of the East against my return to Europe. Every motive of public duty and personal honour have concurred to induce me to remain in India until the result of this war can be determined, and until the finishing hand can be put by myself to my own plans. It is not possible, at present, to determine the precise moment of my release ; but I think it cannot be sooner than the month of December, 1804. I cannot sail from Bengal after the month of March with tolerable safety, and I cannot expect even to conclude peace much before that month. A considerable period of time must be occupied in the settlement of various treaties and arrangements connected with the peace ; and I therefore entertain no expectation of being able to embark before December, which is the earliest favourable season after March for the passage from Bengal.

“ I have received your kind letters down to the month of May, 1803. My communications by Henry will have apprized you of the state of my situation here, as well as of my opinions respecting the political state of England and of Europe. I refer you to Henry for further details on both those points, and I am satisfied that you will concur with me in opinion, that while my judgment and conscience indicate to me the necessity of my retaining my present station until the operations and plans commenced under my orders can be completed, I am bound in honour to serve the executive power at home with fidelity and zeal. In my judgment I could not abdicate my present station during the existing crisis, without involving the trust committed to my hands in certain and inevitable ruin. What my ultimate judgment may be upon the questions which appear to have scattered

all my friends in England to different positions in the field of contest, I cannot even calculate with the limited means of information which I possess at this distance. On some points, as far as my information extends, I confess myself to entertain different sentiments from those which you have stated in public and in your letters to me. It appears to me that the peace with France was inevitable, in the temper of the nation, of Parliament, and of the Crown, at the period of time when the peace was made : and although the terms were nothing less than secure, I think they could not have been amended, otherwise than by a renewal of war which, at that time, I believe to have been impracticable. The renewal of war in the spring of 1803 seems to me to have been inevitable ; and I think it is a general duty to support the prosecution of the war with cordiality and firmness, in the hands which, I apprehend, must conduct it. For I see no prospect of forming any administration, which would improve the security of the nation. I perceive no symptoms of harmony or union in any quarter, excepting the Cabinet. Pitt's conduct is to me utterly unintelligible ; and he has not written a line to me since his resignation (excepting a short letter of introduction by a young writer) although, upon the first intelligence of his resignation, I wrote to him in the most affectionate and earnest terms, urging an explanation of his wishes and views. In this state of my sentiments events have occurred within the limits of my own station which have demanded my most strenuous exertion for the preservation of that branch of the empire entrusted to my charge : the result of those events has required my continuance in my station for a considerable period of time. While that exigency shall last, I must hope that I shall not give offence to any of my friends by contributing my aid against the common enemy. You will think me well employed in securing these possessions against France ; I trust Pitt will be of the same opinion, although he does not appear to me to agree with you in all points. Upon my return to England, I hope we shall all unite against the common enemy. With you I never can hold a public difference of political sentiment ; and I repeat it, if we should differ essentially, I shall renounce all attendance upon Parliament, and retire from the world. At the same time it is just and candid to declare that Addington has acted towards me with honour and public spirit ; and that I have not yet seen any reason to warrant an abatement of my respect and esteem for him, either with reference to myself, or to his public conduct.

“ I never experienced such astonishment as I felt in reading a passage in your last letter, which states that the public in England had received an unfavourable impression of my conduct respecting the settlement of the Carnatic. Henry will have informed you of the sense which I entertain of the merits of that arrangement ; and Lord Clive will also be able

to afford you full information upon the subject ; or to refer you to persons now in England (especially Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick, Mr. Cowper, and Mr. Cockburne) who can illustrate every branch of the question. You must be satisfied of the utter impossibility of my finding time to address the public in England on such a question. The documents on which my judgment was founded are all deposited at the India House, together with my arguments upon the whole settlement. I must therefore leave the public, as it has often been left, to find the road to truth by means of its own common sense. I entertain no kind of anxiety upon the issue of any discussion, otherwise than as it may affect the interests of the nation in India : my judgment has been passed to the best of my ability and knowledge : the information on which I acted is public ; my duty is therefore discharged ; the rest is for the decision of higher authorities."

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